IV SOCIOLOGYAN DPUBLI CPOLICY-MAKIN G ANESSA YO NTH ELIMITE DROL EO F SOCIOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE INSHAPIN GPUBLI CPOLICIE S B.E.J.C.Lekann edi tDepre z Essaysi nRura lSociolog y inHonou ro fR.A.J ,va nLie r Departmento fRura lSociolog yo fth eTropic san dsubtropic s AgriculturalUniversity ,Wageningen ,th eNetherlands ,198 1 126 CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION 127 2 HUMAN BEINGS AS DECISION-MAKERS 129 3 INTERLUDE 135 4 SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE NOTION OF POLICY 136 4.1 What is public policy making? 136 4.2 Knowledge and policy: the primacy of politics 141 5 DISCUSSION 147 REFERENCES 149 127- 1 INTRODUCTION Eversinc eth ecreatio no fth esocia l sciencesa sa distinc torientatio n within the scientific community, the relationbetwee n these sciences -particularl y sociology -an dsocia lchang eha sbee nsubjec tt ocontin ­ uous debate.An d itseem sa sthoug hth ediscussio nabou tth eus eo fso ­ ciologicalknowledg et ohel pchang eth eworl dha sincrease d inscop ean d intensity. Itha sbecom ealmos timpossibl e tokee pu pwit hth einsatiabl e flow of articles and books on thepolicy-relevanc y ofsociolog ydurin g thelas tte nyears .Th ereason sar enumerous . The general underlying attitude seems tob etha tsociolog y isno tonl y applicable to the analysis ofpubli c policy-making,bu tshoul d alsob e applied todecision-makin g inpubli caffairs . At the same time,however , there is a growing awareness that applied studies seldom result inpolicy-recommendations , or inrecommendation s that are simply not used by the public policy-making bodies, thus leadingt oa natmospher e ofreproach ,disappointmen t andestrangement . Most discussions about thisstat eo faffair sdea lwit hth e shortcomings of sociology and public policy-making relations, instead of coming to gripswit h the fundamental issuesa tstake .On eo fth emai nproblem si s the degree of governability of societal processesa sVa nLie r (1980:9) recently put it.Suc h a study could be called thesociolog y ofinter ­ vention and should havea wide rscop etha ni susua li npolic ysciences . Itshoul d look atproblem sconcernin gth elimit so fsteermanshi p ofth e social sciences,especiall y in aperio d ofwidely-fel t recognition of the trouble thatgovernment s run into. It is this problem thatraise s thequestio no fth eques tfo rcontro l (VanGunsteren , 1976). However,mos t discussions about the role ofsociolog y inpolicy-makin g centrearoun dtopic ssuc has : thecondition sunde rwhic hpolicy-maker snormall yoperat e the type of researchmetho do rth eselectio no ftheoretica lorien ­ tation by the social researcher (for instance, the debate about knowledge forunderstandin gversu sknowledg e foraction ) the difference in culture,languag ean dfram eo freferenc ebetwee n socialresearcher s andpolicy-maker s deficiencies in the state of art insociolog y (toth eeffec ttha t policy-makers do not attachmuc hprestig e andauthorit yt osocio ­ logicalknowledge ,i ncontras tt oeconomi c analyses forinstance ) thelac ko fa nadequat eorganizationa l structure asa meetin gplac e ofsocia lscience san dpolicy . - 128- It is tob e hoped that apart from general reflections more emperical researchi nthes e fieldswil lb econducted . The object of this essay, however, is to inquire intoth epositio na s such of sociological knowledge, in the decision-making process that policy-making essentially is.M ysuggestio ni stha tth ewidel yaccepte d misconception about theproces s of transformation of applied research into policy-action is largely toblam e forth edisappointin g recordo f the utilization of social sciences inpolicy-making . Ihop et ob eabl e to demonstrate that, in general, sociologists tendt ooverestimat eth e impact of scientific knowledge in shaping public policy and tounder ­ estimate the role ofconsciou so runconsciou s ignorance ando fpolitic s inth ever ysam etransformatio nproces so fknowledg e intoaction . My analysis will focuso nth eprimordia lquestio no fdelineatin grecep - tiveness ofpubli c policy for social sciences,i.e . sociologicalknow ­ ledge.Thes ereflection swil lb erestricte d toth eimmediat e interaction betweenbot h units,an dwil l leave aside themor e general anddiffus e utilization of sociological research findings that in amor e indirect way influence strategic decision-makers. Ina nopen ,pluralisti c society, these indirect lines of communication between thesource so fne wknow ­ ledgean dth ecentre so fpolicy-makin g arehighl ysignificant . Decision-making ismainl y studied at the levelo fth eindividua lacto r or small group.Therefore ,t o get somebasi c idea,m yanalysi sbegin s with individual decision-making. This isno t to suggest that therei s a similarity between individual and societal actors (Etzioni, 1968), but ismean t to open the eyest oth eintricacie s ofth eapplicatio no f knowledge and non-knowledge in the decision-making process.Afte rre ­ viewing some of the basic approaches inth e literature ondecision ­ makingstrategie s inpubli cpolicies ,w epresen tou rmai nargumen tabou t the primacy ofpolitic s in the transformation process of sociological knowledge intoaction . 129 2 HUMANBEING SA SDECISION-MAKER S Humanbeing s asdecision-maker s areinformation-utilizers .A basi cques ­ tion one must askis :Ho wdoe sa nindividua lus eth einformatio n athi s disposal in order to arrive at "adequate" decisions, especially deci­ sions that entail seriousconsequences ?Ar ether ecertai nway so farri ­ ving atth ebes tsolutions ? Probably, most of the work done by social scientists in this field consists of developing normative,prescriptiv e models that startwit h the assumption of the rationality of a person's decisions and then developing procedures according to which researchers think rational persons should make theirdecisions .A ver y fineexampl eo fsuc ha nap ­ proach is to be found in Janis and Mann (1977:11)wh o mention seven "ideal" procedural criteria for attaining the decision maker's ob­ jectives: The decision maker, to the best ofhi sabilit yan dwithi nhi sin ­ formation-processing capabilities 1. thoroughly canvasses awid e range of alternative courses of action; 2. surveys the full range of objectives tob e fulfilled andth e valuesimplicate db yth echoice ; 3. carefully weighs whatever he knows about thecost san drisk s ofnegativ econsequences ,a swel la sth epositiv econsequences , thatcoul d flow fromeac halternative ; 4. intensively searches for new information relevant tofurthe r evaluationo fth ealternatives ; 5. correctly assimilates andtake s accounto fan yne w information or expert judgment to which he isexposed ,eve nwhe nth ein ­ formationo rjudgmen tdoe sno tsuppor tth ecours eo factio nh e initiallyprefers ; 6. re-examines the positive and negative consequences of all known alternatives, including those originally regarded as unacceptable,befor emakin g afina lchoice ; 7. makes detailed provisions for implementing or executing the chosencours eo faction ,wit hspecia l attentiont ocontingenc y plans that mightb e required ifvarou s known riskswer e to materialize. Janisan dMann' sworkin g assumptioni s "thatfailur et omee tan yo fthes e sevencriteri awhe na perso ni smakin ga fundamenta l decisionconstitute s adefec ti nth edecision-makin gprocess " (p.11) .Deviation so fthi smod ­ elo f "vigilantinformatio nprocesses "ar ecalle dmiscalculation s orde ­ fective decision-making, although the authors state that they seema n not as a cold fishbu ta sa warm-bloode dmammal ,no ta sa rationa lcal ­ culator always wanting towor kou tth ebes tsolutio nbu ta sa reluctan t decision-maker. Thenex tparagraph s drawheavil y -an d Ihav et oadmi trathe r freely onWagenaa r (1977). - 130- More andmor e the conviction has gained ground that thisrationa lap ­ proach to human decision-making isbase d on anormativ e intellectual modeltha ti sno twithou theuristi cvalue ,bu ttha tha sscarcel yany ­ thing to say about the real process of decision-making. Anincreasin g flow of empirical research inquiring whatpeopl eactuall yd owhe nthe y make decisions rather thanusin gth eyardstic ko frationalty ,hav ecom e to the conclusion that individuals basically havet oac twithi na con ­ texto flimitations . To beginwith , humanbeing s are onlyabl et oabsor b limitedamount so f information simultaneously. The rational decision-maker also has an impossible task to copewit hinformatio noverload .Bu tapar tfro mthes e sheer limitations of a physical and psychological nature,ther e are other limitations that are atth e core of decision andinformatio na s such.T omentio nonl ytw oaspect so fit : The limited time horizon in decision-making. Theconsequence s ofa de ­ cision and the corresponding activities are incalculable,particularl y on a long-term basis.Th e interconnections betweenth einfinit enumbe r ofvariable s areto ocomplicate d tob e adequately interpretedbeforehand . That is to say, any decision is,t o a considerable extent,a sho ti n thedark . Thenther e isth ecognitiv e complexity involved inan yessentia ldecision . The many aspects of a decision are so intricate interm so fcost san d benefits, of long-term andshort-ter m effects,i nmeasurabl e andimmea ­ surable consequences, in adequacy andinadequac y ofinformatio ntha ti s essentiallyimpossibl et ogathe ral lth evariou s facetsunde ron edenom ­ inator. The selection of alternatives is essentially hampered by the lack of objective standards for appraising differentcourse so factio n ona comparativ ebasis . These are some reasonswh yrationalit y islimite db yth ever ynatur eo f decision-making. For the same reason somepeopl e say that themakin