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ENG-CMJ Vol 5-No. 1 MILITARY HISTORY MILITARY DND photo PL12610 Squadron Leader N.E. Small, the officer responsible for 113 Squadron’s remarkable success during the 1942 U-boat campaign in Canadian waters. SQUADRON LEADER N.E. SMALL: A STUDY OF LEADERSHIP IN THE RCAF’S EASTERN AIR COMMAND, 1942 by Richard Goette It is not aeroplanes or ships or tanks that win battles; it also under his leadership that 113 Bomber Reconnaissance is the men in them and the men who command (i.e., Maritime Patrol) Squadron achieved the best record them. The most important factors in any battle of successful attacks on U-boats of any squadron in Eastern are the human factors of leadership, morale, Air Command in 1942. courage and skill, which cannot be reduced to any mathematical formula. It was these that won the S/L Small’s innovative and independent actions as a Battle of the Atlantic....1 squadron commander provided ample evidence of his own superb leadership skills and, at the same time, of the serious Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, shortcomings of the senior leadership of Eastern Air Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Command. In evaluating the leadership attributes of both Coastal Command S/L Small and Eastern Air Command senior officers, this article will draw on a study by Dr. Allan English, a historical uring 1942, the Royal Canadian Air Force’s research fellow at the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute. Eastern Air Command had a difficult time coping with German U-boats (submarines) English argues that an effective squadron leader that entered North American coastal waters must demonstrate both heroic and technical leadership. to attack Allied shipping. The German Heroic leadership is the “conspicuous sharing of risk Dassessment that anti-submarine defences in the area with subordinates,” while technical leadership is “the were weak proved to be well-founded, for few pilots ability to influence others to achieve a goal based on in Eastern Air Command had the skills or initiative needed the specialized knowledge or skill of the leader.”3 Since to counter U-boat attacks on merchant shipping. One technology and the technical ability of both crews and exception, however, was Squadron Leader (S/L) N.E. their leaders are essential for ensuring survivability Small, an airman described by historian W.A.B. Douglas and the ability to fight, English stresses that technical as Eastern Air Command’s “outstanding pilot and its most conscientious student of maritime airpower.”2 Indeed, Small’s skill and initiative resulted in Eastern Richard Goette is a doctoral candidate at Queen’s University Air Command’s first U-boat kill on 31 July 1942. It was in Kingston. Spring 2004 ● Canadian Military Journal 43 leadership is thus “exer- SMALL’S EARLY CAREER “The placing of cised by leaders who the depth charges must be able to ... actually orn in 1908, Norville Everitt “Molly” Small joined 4 was ideal, as they do the same job as their Bthe RCAF in 1928 and trained as a pilot. After receiving subordinates (e.g., pilots).” his wings in June 1931, he served on the west coast as a bracketed the Therefore, English con- sergeant pilot, where he logged 2,000 hours on seaplanes submarine forward cludes, before a squadron and flying boats, and a further 1,000 hours on twin-engine of the conning tower commander could be aircraft. Senior officers appreciated Small’s dedication an effective leader, he to duty, and in his yearly “Record of Character and and exploded as had to first demonstrate Trade Proficiency,” Small was consistently ranked as the vessel submerged. his operational flying being good or very good. Small’s superiors described him ... S/L Small had ability (technical leader- as a “good worker, who takes his duties seriously”, as an ship), and then share individual with remarkable “keenness and ability to sunk U-754, the first the risks with his subor- absorb instruction”. submarine kill by an dinates by going on Eastern Air Command difficult operations (heroic Small’s service on the west coast lasted until 1937, leadership) with them. when, like several of the RCAF’s pre-war pilots, he aircraft.” S/L Small fulfilled both resigned to fly commercial aircraft. While flying for civil requirements. airlines, Small further enhanced his reputation as a fine pilot and a hard worker. For example, when Small English also notes that the higher up the chain decided to leave Canadian Airways in the of summer 1939 of command one goes, the less one has to demonstrate for a better position at Imperial Airways, his former technical or heroic leadership. At the formation level, employer noted: (i.e., Wing Commander and Group Captain), there was a decline in the amount of technical leadership necessary, We should like to take this opportunity to express although “occasional heroic leadership was still necessary our confidence in Mr. Small, not only as a pilot to inspire confidence in the aircrews.” Finally, at the of outstanding ability and sound judgement, but highest level of air force command (i.e., Air Commodore also as an executive whose interest in his chosen to Air Marshal), leaders were not expected to demonstrate work extends far beyond the limits of the ordinary flying skills or physical risk. What subordinates did “day’s work.”5 expect of them was that they risk their careers for the welfare of their crews. This included not only securing Shortly after the outbreak of war in September 1939, resources like new equipment and sufficient personnel, Small re-enlisted in the RCAF as a pilot officer. He was but also ensuring that the latest doctrinal innovations soon posted to Eastern Air Command’s No. 10 Bomber and tactics reached the squadrons. It was in these Reconnaissance Squadron, where he served as an advanced areas, in fact, where the senior Eastern Air Command flying instructor on the Douglas Digby aircraft that Canada leadership failed. had recently acquired from the United States. While with 10 Squadron, Small quickly became a ‘jack-of-all-trades’; besides his instructor duties, he also carried out reconnaissance patrols searching for airfield sites in Newfoundland, and for potential remote anchorages that enemy submarines might try to use as bases for their attacks on Allied shipping. In the spring of 1941, Small was assigned to the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) Ferry Command, where pilots with airline experience were in high demand for transatlantic ferry flights. Among the aircraft that Small flew while with Ferry Command was the long-range Consolidated Catalina. Therefore, when the RCAF’s newly-formed 116 Bomber Reconnaissance Squadron began to take delivery of Cansos (the Canadian amphibian version of the Catalina) in July 1941, Air Force Headquarters (AFHQ) posted Small to that unit in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia. DND photo PMR77-192 It did not take long for Small to secure Crewman loading a depth charge into the bomb-bay of a Hudson. a good grasp of maritime air power in his new assignment. Senior leaders described 44 Canadian Military Journal ● Spring 2004 him as a “master pilot” and “excellent tactician” who frequency radio transmissions. But the Allies was possessed of a “burning desire to get on with the intercepted these messages and, by means of High job.”6 In March 1942, AFHQ recognized Flight Frequency Direction-Finding (HF/DF), were able Lieutenant Small’s service by giving him command to plot the submarine’s probable position. The of the newly-created 10 Squadron Detachment problem in Canada, though, was that it took in Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, and by awarding far too long for the HF/DF information him an Air Force Cross (AFC).7 Small did to get from the Operational Intelligence not disappoint. On 28 April 1942, he was on Centre (OIC) in Ottawa to Eastern Air Command an operational patrol off Yarmouth in a Canso Headquarters in Halifax for it to have any when he sighted a U-boat on the surface. Diving operational value.12 from 500 feet, Small attempted to release his four 450-lb depth charges around the U-boat, To counter this problem, S/L Small set but, fortunately for the German submarine, only up an ad hoc system of communications (bypassing two of the depth charges came away from the aircraft, both the Naval and RCAF Operations Centres in Ottawa so there was minimal damage. As luck would have it, and Halifax) with the Director of Maritime Patrol HISTORY MILITARY soon after Small’s return to base, he received a letter that Operations at AFHQ, Wing Commander Clare Annis, outlined the solution to the depth-charge release problem and with the OIC in Ottawa. As soon as the OIC received he had just experienced.8 This was not to be the last time a ‘hot’ U-boat fix, it phoned the bearings to Annis, who that important tactical information was late in arriving in turn telephoned the information by hot-line to Small in at the squadron level. Yarmouth.13 The key to the system was that Small had emergency standby crews at full readiness at Yarmouth. On 19 May 1942, 10 Squadron’s detachment in These crews were on a 24-hour tour of duty, sleeping Yarmouth, having received more aircraft, was re-formed in the hangar and leaving only to take their meals. They as 162 Bomber Reconnaissance Squadron, with the were therefore able to act at a moment’s notice once recently promoted Squadron Leader N.E. Small in a U-boat fix arrived from Ottawa, much like the command. However, this assignment lasted only one scrambling of fighter pilots during the Battle of Britain. month, and on 28 June Small took command of 113 Bomber Small was thus able to have an aircraft in the air a scant Reconnaissance Squadron at Yarmouth.
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