DOCSLIB.ORG

Counterintelligence

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Counterintelligence MCWP 2-14 (Coordinating Draft -- 7 Oct 98) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE U.S. Marine Corps PCN ??? ?????? ?? MCWP 2-14, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, DC 20380-1775 __ ___ 1998 FOREWORD Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 2, Intelligence, and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 2-1, Intelligence Operations, provide the doctrine and higher order tactics, techniques, and procedures for intelligence operations. MCWP 2-14, Counterintelligence, complements and expands upon this information by detailing doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for the conduct of counterintelligence operations in support of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The primary target audience of this publication is intelligence personnel responsible for the planning and execution of counterintelligence operations. Personnel who provide support to counterintelligence or who use the results from these operations should also read this publication. MCWP 2-14 describes aspects of counterintelligence operations including doctrinal fundamentals, equipment, command and control, communications and information systems support, planning, execution, security, and training. MCWP 2-14 provides the information needed by Marines to understand, plan, and execute counterintelligence operations in support of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force across the spectrum of conflict. MCWP 2-14 supersedes FMFM 3-25, Counterintelligence, dated 22 September 1992. Reviewed and approved this date. BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS JOHN E. RHODES Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps Commanding General Marine Corps Combat Development Command DISTRIBUTION: ??? ?????? ?? MCWP 2-14, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 1 MCWP 2-14, Counterintelligence 2 Table of Contents 3 Page 4 Chapter 1. Doctrinal Fundamentals 5 1001 Introduction 1-1 6 1002 Objective 7 1003 Basis for CI Activities 8 1004 Concepts of CI and Force Protection 9 1005 MAGTF Counterintelligence Operations—Overview 10 1006 Counterintelligence Measures 11 1007 Counterintelligence Support to Operations 12 Chapter 2. Counterintelligence Functions and Services 13 2001 Counterintelligence Functions 2-1 14 2002 Counterintelligence Services 15 2003 Counterintelligence Support to Strategic, Operational and 16 Tactical Levels of War 17 2004 Garrison Support 18 Chapter 3. Organization and Responsibilities 19 3001 General 3-1 20 3002 Commander 21 3003 Intelligence Officer 22 3004 Operations Officer 23 3005 Individual Marines 24 3006 Marine Corps Counterintelligence Organization 25 3007 Naval Component Organization 26 3008 Joint Counterintelligence Organization 27 3009 National Level Counterintelligence Support 28 Chapter 4. Counterintelligence Employment 29 4001 Operational Environment 4-1 30 4002 Employment of Counterintelligence Elements 31 4003 Friendly Prisoners of War and Persons Missing (Non-Hostile) 32 and Missing in Action 33 4004 Counterintelligence Support during Military Operations Other TOC-1 MCWP 2-14, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 1 Than War 2 Chapter 5. Communications and Information Systems Support to 3 Counterintelligence Operations 4 5001 General 5-1 5 5002 Basic Counterintelligence CIS Requirements 6 5003 Command and Control 7 5004 Communications and Information Systems Support to MAGTF 8 Counterintelligence Operations 9 5005 Counterintelligence CIS Planning Considerations 10 Chapter 6. Counterintelligence Planning 11 6001 Marine Corps Planning Process and Joint Planning Process 6-1 12 Overview 13 6002 Counterintelligence Planning 14 6003 Counterintelligence Planning and the Intelligence Cycle 15 6004 Counterintelligence Planning Requirements and Considerations 16 6005 Counterintelligence Plans and Orders 17 Chapter 7. Execution of Counterintelligence Activities 18 7001 MAGTF Counterintelligence Operations 7-1 19 7002 Counterintelligence Screening Operations 20 7003 Cordon and Search Operations 21 7004 Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations 22 7005 Tactical Counterintelligence Interrogation 23 7006 Counterintelligence Investigations 24 7007 Captured Material Exploitation 25 7008 Counterintelligence Technical Collection and Investigative 26 Techniques 27 7009 Counterintelligence Surveys/Vulnerability Assessments, 28 Evaluations, and Inspections 29 7010 Counterintelligence Support to the Crisis Action Team 30 Intelligence Cell 31 7011 Counterintelligence Mission Profiles 32 Chapter 8. Counterintelligence Training 33 8001 General 8-1 34 8002 Basic Counterintelligence and Security Training for All TOC-2 MCWP 2-14, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 1 Personnel 2 8003 Training for Officers and Staff Noncommissioned Officers 3 8004 Mission-Oriented Training 4 8005 Training of Intelligence Section Personnel 5 8006 Peacetime Counterintelligence Training 6 8007 Counterintelligence Training Programs 7 Chapter 9. Counterintelligence Administration 8 9001 General 9-1 9 9002 Files 10 9003 Reports 11 9004 Personnel 12 9005 Emergency and Extraordinary Expense Funds 13 Chapter 10. Garrison Counterintelligence Support 14 10001 Mission 10-1 15 10002 Counterintelligence Survey/Vulnerability Assessment 16 10003 Counterintelligence Penetration Inspection 17 10004 Counterintelligence Evaluation 18 10005 Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Support 19 Appendices 20 A Glossary A-1 21 B Counterintelligence Principal and Supporting Equipment B-1 22 C Counterintelligence Operations Appendix C-1 23 D Counterintelligence Analysis and Production D-1 24 E Counterintelligence Plans, Reports and Other Formats E-1 25 F Counterintelligence Training Courses F-1 26 G MAGTF Counterintelligence Planning Checklist G-1 27 H References H-1 28 Figures 29 1-1 The Counterintelligence Process 30 2-1 Objectives of Counterintelligence Functions 31 2-2 Levels of Counterintelligence Support 32 3-1 CI/HUMINT Company, I and II MEF 33 3-2 CI/HUMINT Company, III MEF 34 3-3 MAGTF G/S-2 Combat Intelligence Center and Subordinate 35 Elements TOC-3 MCWP 2-14, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 1 5-1 Counterintelligence Architecture 2 5-2 Counterintelligence Elements Within the MAGTF Command 3 Element Combat Intelligence Center 4 6-1 The Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) 5 6-2 The MCPP and the Joint Deliberate Planning Process 6 6-3 The MCPP and the Joint Crisis Action Planning Process 7 6-4 Functions of the Planning and Direction Phase 8 6-5 Application of the Intelligence Cycle 9 6-6 Counter-HUMINT Operations 10 6-7 Counter-SIGINT Operations 11 6-8 Counterintelligence Threat Assessment 12 7-1 Example of a Checkpoint 13 7-2 Example of a Community Cordon and Search Operation 14 7-3 Example of a Community Collection Screening Station 15 7-4 Captive/Document/Equipment Tag 16 B-1 CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set (CHATS) 17 D-1 Time Event Chart 18 D-2 Association Matrix 19 D-3 Activities Matrix 20 D-4 Link Diagram 21 D-5 Systems Component Quick Reference Matrix 22 D-6 C-SIGINT Threat Assessment Process 23 D-7 MAGTF Vulnerability Assessment Process 24 D-8 Friendly Unit Communications-Electronics Profile 25 D-9 Example of a Unit EEFI Statement 26 D-10 Vulnerability Matrix Format TOC-4 MCWP 2-14, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 1 CHAPTER 1 2 3 DOCTRINAL FUNDAMENTALS 4 5 1001. Introduction. Intelligence strives to accomplish two objectives. First, it provides 6 accurate, timely, and relevant knowledge about the enemy (or potential enemy) and the 7 surrounding environment. In other words, the primary objective of intelligence is to support 8 decision making by reducing uncertainty about the hostile situation to a reasonable 9 level—recognizing, of course, that the fog of war renders anything close to absolute certainty 10 impossible. The second intelligence objective is that it assists in protecting friendly forces 11 through counterintelligence. Counterintelligence includes both active and passive measures 12 intended to deny the enemy valuable information about the friendly situation. Counterintelligence 13 also includes activities related to countering hostile espionage, subversion, and terrorism. 14 Counterintelligence directly supports force protection operations by helping the commander deny 15 intelligence to the enemy and plan appropriate security measures. The two intelligence objectives 16 demonstrate that intelligence possesses either positive—or exploitative—and protective 17 elements. It uncovers conditions that can be exploited and simultaneously provides warning of 18 enemy actions. Intelligence thus provides the basis for our own actions, both offensive and 19 defensive. Identifying, planning, and implementing MAGTF counterintelligence operations and 20 measures are the main focus of this publication. 21 22 1002. Objective. Counterintelligence (CI) is the intelligence function that is concerned with identifying 23 and counteracting the threat posed by hostile intelligence capabilities and by organizations or individuals 24 engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorism. 25 Counterintelligence -- Information The objective of CI is to enhance command security by 26 gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other denying an adversary information that might be used to 27 intelligence activities, sabotage, or conduct effective operations against friendly forces and to 28 assassinations conducted by or on protect the command by identifying and neutralizing 29 behalf of foreign governments or espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorism efforts. CI 30 elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or provides critical intelligence support to command force 31 international terrorist activities.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • What Is Counterintelligence? and How Lessons on Counterintelligence Might Enrich Their Courses
    Association of Former Intelligence Officers From AFIO's The Intelligencer 7700 Leesburg Pike, Suite 324 Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Falls Church, Virginia 22043 Web: www.afio.com , E-mail: [email protected] Volume 20 • Number 2 • $15 single copy price Fall/Winter 2013 ©2013, AFIO measure what an adversary knows about us? How do we determine whether or not we are successful in keeping our secrets and projecting the image we wish Guide to the Study of Intelligence to project? How do we know what and whom to trust?3 This article is a short cut to some basic concepts about counterintelligence: what it is and is not. Educa- tors in history, government, political science, ethics, law and cognitive psychology should consider whether What is Counterintelligence? and how lessons on counterintelligence might enrich their courses. Recommended additional readings are suggested in the footnotes. A Guide to Thinking A general introductory course on U.S. counter- and Teaching about CI intelligence should have five key learning objectives: Understanding the meaning of counterintelli- gence, its place within intelligence studies, and by Michelle K. Van Cleave its role in international relations as an instrument of statecraft.4 Understanding the difference between tactical WHY STUDY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE? and strategic CI,5 the difference between CI and security,6 and the range of foreign intelligence he study of “counterintelligence” is rare in aca- 3. Consider for example the deception paradox: “Alertness to demia. While modern courses on international deception presumably prompts a more careful and systematic relations often include intelligence, they usually review of the evidence.
    [Show full text]
  • Countering FIE Threats: Best Practices
    i Countering FIE Threats: Best Practices Effective programs to counter foreign intelligence entity (FIE) threats are focused on three overarching outcomes: Promote CI and Identify and 1. Identification of foreign intelligence threats security training assess risks to and sharing of threat information and awareness sensitive assets 2. Safeguarding of sensitive information, assets, and activities Establish Share threat programs Develop and 3. Prevention and detection of insider threats information countering implement and warnings FIE threats mitigation internally and strategies The best practices detailed in this Guide, from identifying externally and assessing risks to promoting training and awareness, are complementary program components that, when employed together, can effectively shield your organization Integrate counter-FIE efforts across the from FIE threats. organization The National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) is charged with leading and supporting the counterintelligence (CI) and security activities of the U.S. government, the U.S. Intelligence Community, and U.S. private sector entities that are at risk of intelligence collection, penetration, or attack by foreign adversaries and malicious insiders. The capabilities and activities described in this Guide are exemplars of program components delineated as requirements in numerous strategies, policies, and guidelines. This Guide is a living document and will be updated to reflect improved and innovative ways to achieve the above outcomes. In addition, organization-specific capabilities and activities may be defined and implemented to ensure unique needs are met. Finally, nothing in this document shall be construed as authorization for any organization to conduct activities not otherwise authorized under statute, executive order, or other applicable law, policy, or regulation, nor does this document obviate an organization’s responsibility to conduct activities that are otherwise mandated, directed, or recommended for execution under the same.
    [Show full text]
  • Cyber Counterintelligence - Deception, Distortion, Dishonesty
    #RSAC SESSION ID: CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - DECEPTION, DISTORTION, DISHONESTY Jeff Bardin Dr. Khatuna Mshvidobadze Chief Intelligence Officer Principal Treadstone 71 Cyberlight Global Associates @Treadstone71LLC [email protected] 5 2 Agenda Taxonomy Types of Denial Deception Dimensions of D&D Tactics Deception Chain (see your handout) and Deception Planning D&D Russian Historical Information Criminals & Kids Notable Events Georgia US Election Background Warfare Dis-information / France – Information Complexity of Formation of cyber Troll Factories Major Players TV5Monde Warfare on Social Outsourcing troops Media Forming public Interagency Socio-Cultural Conclusions - opinion Rivalries Differences Recommendations 3 Denial and Deception - Lifecycle Types of Denial and Deception Resource Diversion Uncertainty Intelligence Proactivity Depletion • Direct an • Waste an • Cause the • Monitor and • Use adversary’s adversary’s adversary to analyze deception attention time and doubt the adversary techniques to from real energy on veracity of a behavior detect assets toward obtaining and discovered during previously bogus ones. analyzing vulnerability intrusion unknown false or stolen attempts to attacks that information. information. inform future other defense defensive efforts. tools may miss. 4 Deception Planning Consideration of all critical components of the operation. Deny, deceive, create propaganda RSA Conference - Bardin and Mshvidobadze Western Dogs Dogs Lie Like Dotards - We will hack their sites and bring them down 5 Dimensions
    [Show full text]
  • The Spectacle of the False-Flag
    The Spectacle of the False-Flag THE SPECTACLE OF THE FALSE-FLAG: PARAPOLITICS FROM JFK TO WATERGATE Eric Wilson THE SPECTACLE OF THE FALSE-FLAG: PARAPOLITICS from JFK to WATERGATE Eric Wilson, Monash University 2015 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This work is Open Access, which means that you are free to copy, distribute, display, and perform the work as long as you clearly attribute the work to the author, that you do not use this work for commercial gain in any form whatsoever, and that you in no way, alter, transform, or build upon the work outside of its normal use in academic scholarship without express permission of the author and the publisher of this volume. For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to others the license terms of this work. First published in 2015 by Thought | Crimes an imprint of punctumbooks.com ISBN-13: 978-0988234055 ISBN-10: 098823405X and the full book is available for download via our Open Monograph Press website (a Public Knowledge Project) at: www.thoughtcrimespress.org a project of the Critical Criminology Working Group, publishers of the Open Access Journal: Radical Criminology: journal.radicalcriminology.org Contact: Jeff Shantz (Editor), Dept. of Criminology, KPU 12666 72 Ave. Surrey, BC V3W 2M8 [ + design & open format publishing: pj lilley ] I dedicate this book to my Mother, who watched over me as I slept through the spectacle in Dallas on November 22, 1963 and who was there to celebrate my birthday with me during the spectacle at the Watergate Hotel on June 17, 1972 Contents Editor©s Preface ................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • MCWP 2-14 Counterintelligence CI Support to the Combat Service Support Element and Rear Area Operations
    MCWP 2-14 Counterintelligence U.S. Marine Corps 5 September 2000 PCN 143 000084 00 To Our Readers Changes: Readers of this publication are encouraged to submit suggestions and changes that will improve it. Recommendations may be sent directly to Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Doctrine Division (C 42), 3300 Russell Road, Suite 318A, Quantico, VA 22134-5021 or by fax to 703-784-2917 (DSN 278-2917) or by E-mail to [email protected]. Recommendations should include the following information: l Location of change Publication number and title Current page number Paragraph number (if applicable) Line number Figure or table number (if applicable) l Nature of change Add, delete Proposed new text, preferably double-spaced and typewritten l Justification and/or source of change Additional copies: A printed copy of this publication may be obtained from Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA 31704-5001, by following the instructions in MCBul 5600, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications Status. An electronic copy may be obtained from the Doctrine Division, MCCDC, world wide web home page which is found at the following uni- versal reference locator: http://www.doctrine.usmc.mil. Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and women are included. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, D.C. 20380-1775 5 September 2000 FOREWORD Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 2, Intelligence, and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 2-1, Intelligence Operations, provide the doctrine and higher order tactics, techniques, and procedures for intelligence operations. MCWP 2-14, Counterintelligence, complements and expands on this information by detailing doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for the conduct of counterintelligence (CI) operations in support of the Marine air- ground task force (MAGTF).
    [Show full text]
  • Counterintelligence for the 21St Century
    Counterintelligence for the 21st Century Counterintelligence for the 21st Century The Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA) is pleased to present this paper on counterintelligence (CI) to help frame the debate on an issue of high priority to US national security. The paper was prepared with input from a broad range of INSA members, many of whom had government careers in intelligence and law enforcement and now work for industries that support the US national security mission. Several INSA members made contributions to this paper, but their individual inputs do not necessarily connote agreement with all the judgments or recommendations in the document. The paper results from a lively debate that helped both to establish agreement on some core issues—including the urgency of CI reform, the imperative to enhance offensive CI, and the need to clarify the role of CI in the era of globalization—but also to recognize dissent on others issues, especially with regard to the pace and scope of change needed to address the cyber and other technical challenges. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) today faces continuing traditional national and transnational threats while confronted, at the same time, by unprecedented technical challenges in the era of globalization. Getting ahead of these problems will require fundamental, long-term reforms to CI governance, culture, and training across the Intelligence Community (IC). It will also demand a far greater willingness among IC leaders to partner with outside sources of expertise—which
    [Show full text]
  • And Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations
    ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS I. SCOPE (U) A. These guidelines are established by the Attorney General to govern all foreign intelligence, foreign counterintelligence, foreign intelligence support activities, and intelligence investigations of international terrorism conducted by the FBI pursuant to Executive Order 12333. They also govern all FBI investigations of violations of the espionage statutes and certain FBI investigations requested, or FBI assistance to investigations conducted, by foreign governments. (U) B. All significant new legal questions as 'to the coverage and interpretation of these guidelines will be resolved by the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review. (U) II. DEFINITIONS (U) A. NATIONAL-.SECURITY THREAT LIST: 1. Country Threats: foreign governments and entities whose intelligence activities are so hostile, or of such concern, to the national security of the United States that counterintelligence or monitoring activities directed against such countries are warranted. 2. Issue Threats: categories of activity that pose a significant threat, or are of such concern, to the national security of the United States when engaged in by any foreign power or entity that counterintelligcrrce or .monitoring actions directed against such activities are warranted. -2 - Country threats and issue threats shall be identified by FBI Headquarters and the Department of Justice in cooperation with the Department of State and shall be reviewed annually. (U) FOIA EXEMPTION b1 (C) C. EMPLOYEE OR ASSET: any pereon employed by, assigned to, or acting for or at the direction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.(U) D. FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage and other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by, for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document or communications security programs.
    [Show full text]
  • Counterintelligence
    COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE October 2011 Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................ i Scope Note ........................................................................................................................................... iii US Technologies and Trade Secrets at Risk in Cyberspace .....................................................................1 The Appeal of Collecting in Cyberspace................................................................................. .....1 Security and attribution .......................................................................................................1 Faster and cheaper ..............................................................................................................2 Extra-territoriality ................................................................................................................2 Large but Uncertain Costs...........................................................................................................3 Pervasive Threat from Intelligence Adversaries and Partners ...............................................................4 China: Persistent Collector ..........................................................................................................5 Russia: Extensive, Sophisticated Operations ..............................................................................5
    [Show full text]
  • Counterintelligence Strategic Partnership Programs Let Us Know
    Who might steal IP? Department of Justice • Domestic and foreign commercial rivals. Let us know how Federal Bureau of Investigation • Domestic and foreign research facilities. we can help you! • Foreign intelligence officers (Spies). • Disgruntled employees (Insider threat). » Selling IP for profit. Contact your local FBI Office and ask Counterintelligence » Using IP to create new start up. to speak with the SPC so you can • Organized criminals. safeguard your hard work and keep Strategic your people safe. Partnership Indicators of IP Theft • Employees/Insiders: Programs » Seeks/Obtains IP not related to their work “America’s entrepreneurial spirit and integrity are duties. embodied by the creativity and resourcefulness of our workforce. New inventions, innovations, works » Working odd hours to facilitate theft of art, and discoveries create jobs and industries The Challenge: of technology, schematics and/or and add to our country’s heritage. Innovation prototypes. To protect United States corporate and drives commerce and enables the United States academic Intellectual Property (IP), sensitive Unexplained affluence; buying things that » to compete in the global marketplace. Intellectual information, and technologies from foreign he/she cannot afford on their household property rights and the ability to protect those economic espionage activities. income. rights encourage American companies to continue the tradition of American innovation by developing products, ideas and merchandise.” ICE Asst Deputy Director Erik Barnett testimony before US Senate Judiciary Committee, 22 June 2011 Contact Information: • IT/Remote Access: » Maliciously or unwittingly downloading and installing Malware. » Blatant theft of data via Universal Serial Bus (USB), electronic mail (email), or Cloud sharing. » Unauthorized access to official laptops/ smartphones (unsecured/lost/stolen).
    [Show full text]
  • FM 34-52 Intelligence Interrogation, May 1987
    Field Manual *FM 34-52 NO 34-52 HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Washington. DC. 8 May 1987 INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION Table of Contents Page Preface ................................................................................iii Chapter 1 Interrogation and the Interrogator .......................................... 1-0 Principles of Interrogation ................................................. 1-0 Sources of Information ......................................................1-1 Personal Qualities ......................................................... 1-2 Specialized Skills and Knowledge .......................................... 1-4 Chapter 2 Role of the Interrogator ..................................................... 2-0 Commander's Mission Under Air-Land Battle .............................. 2-0 Military Intelligence and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield ............................................. 2-0 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations ............................. 2-2 Counterintelligence ........................................................ 2-4 Electronic Warfare ......................................................... 2-6 Capabilities and Limitations of Interrogators ............................... 2-6 Chapter 3 Interrogation Process ...................................................... 3-0 Screening Sources ..........................................................3-0 Interrogating Procedures ...................................................3-3 Chapter 4 Processing Captured Enemy Documents
    [Show full text]
  • Ethics of Human Intelligence Operati'ons: ~F MICE and Men Donald A
    Ethics of Human Intelligence Operati'ons: ~f MICE and Men Donald A. Petkus . Recent debates on the ethics of espionage seem to center on questions of technical data collection and privacy rights, interrogation, covert intervention in foreign affairs (e.g., regime change), renditions, and conflicts of interest, but seldom .on the recruitment and management of agents. One issue that arises from the current espionage and ter­ rorism environment concerns standards for ethical decision making. For compelling reasons, members of the intelligence community must address the ethical issues Specific to human intelligence (HUMINT) . operatIOns. For those outside the intelligence community, the term "espionage ethics" may seem oxymoronic. With few exceptions, intelligence col­ lection overseas violates the target country's laws. Being expected to break a foreign country's laws and manipulate its citizens is part of the job for an intelligence officer, yet she or he is expected to scru­ pulously adhere to her or his own country's laws and professional standards. To some, the idea of espionage is itself distasteful. Prior to World War I, some of Great Britain's military attaches took the view that actual spying on the host country was ungentlemanly conduct for a "guest." For others, operational work with agents seemed to grate against their sensibilities, as in the case of an officer assigned to Ber­ lin just prior to World War I: With war now inevitable, Sir William Everett, the British military at­ tache in Berlin was asked by the Intelligence Branch to continue in secret service after leaving Germany. He declined, saying: "You will not have forgotten when we talked this matter over some months ago, that I mentioned how distasteful it would be to me when it no longer formed a necessary part of my duties.
    [Show full text]
  • National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States 2020-2022
    National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America 2020-2022 NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER NOTE: This National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America 2020-2022, fulfills the requirement of the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002. This Strategy was approved by the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center in August 2019, and sent to the President for signature. It was approved by the President on December 25, 2019 and signed on January 7, 2020. January 7, 2020 Protecting our Nation’s security and continuing to enhance the prosperity of our citizens are my top priorities. Ensuring that the United States is protected against espionage and other damaging intelligence activities conducted by our foreign adversaries is essential to meeting those goals. The Nation faces an expanding array of foreign intelligence threats by adversaries who are using increasingly sophisticated methods to harm the United States. Russia remains a significant intelligence threat to United States interests - employing aggressive acts to instigate and exacerbate tensions and instability in the United States, including interfering with the security of our elections. A more powerful and emboldened China is increasingly asserting itself by stealing our technology and intellectual property in an effort to erode United States economic and military superiority. Regional adversaries and ideologically motivated entities, such as hackers and public disclosure organizations, pose a growing
    [Show full text]