Field Manual *FM 34-52 NO 34-52 HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Washington. DC. 8 May 1987 INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION

Table of Contents Page Preface ...... iii Chapter 1 Interrogation and the Interrogator ...... 1-0 Principles of Interrogation ...... 1-0 Sources of Information ...... 1-1 Personal Qualities ...... 1-2 Specialized Skills and Knowledge ...... 1-4 Chapter 2 Role of the Interrogator ...... 2-0 Commander's Mission Under Air-Land Battle ...... 2-0 Military Intelligence and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield ...... 2-0 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations ...... 2-2 Counterintelligence ...... 2-4 Electronic Warfare ...... 2-6 Capabilities and Limitations of Interrogators ...... 2-6 Chapter 3 Interrogation Process ...... 3-0 Screening Sources ...... 3-0 Interrogating Procedures ...... 3-3 Chapter 4 Processing Captured Enemy Documents ...... 4-0 Document Handling ...... 4-0 Document Exploitation ...... 4-4 Evacuation Procedures ...... 4-8 Documents Captured with a Source ...... 4-11 Chapter 5 Direct and Supervise Interrogation Operations ...... 5-0 Advice and Assistance ...... 5-0 Prepare and Move to the Deployment Site ...... 5-0 Establish a Site for Interrogation Operations ...... 5-1 Supervise the Interrogation Process ...... 5-1 Supervise the CED Processing Cycle ...... 5-2 Supervise Administrative Tasks ...... 5-2 / Approved for public release; distribi tion is unlimited . "This publication supersedes d30.15. 29 September 1978. Chapter 6 Operational Environment ...... 6-0' Command Relationships ...... 6-0 Tasking Relationships ...... 6-3 Support Relationships ...... 6-4 Interrogator Training ...... 6-7 /Chapter 7 Strategic Debriefing ...... 7-0 Duties and Responsibilities ...... 7-0 Notification ...... 7-0 Planning and Preparation ...... 7-0 Contact and Interview ...... 7-0 Components of Strategic Intelligence ...... 7-1 Intelligence Cycle ...... 7-3 Chapter 8 Joint Interrogation Facilities ...... 8-0 Formation ...... 8-0 Use ...... 8-1 Chapter 9 Low-Intensity Conflict ...... 9-1 Terminology ...... 9-1 Operational Concept for Low-Intensity Conflict ...... 9-1 Interrogation Support to Low-Intensity Conflict ...... 9-3 The Source ...... 9-6 Interrogation Operations ...... 9-9 Appendix A STANAG Extracts ...... A-1 Appendix B Sample Detainee Personnel Record ...... B-0 Appendix C Sample Enemy Prisoner of War Identity Card ...... C-0 Appendix D Sample Enemy Prisoner of War Captive Tag ...... D-1 Appendix E Sample JINTACCS Salute Report Format and Report ...... E-0 Appendix F Sample Screening Report Format and Report ...... F-0 Appendix G Sample Tactical Interrogation Report Format and Report ...... G-0 Appendix H Approaches ...... H-0. Appendix I Interrogation Guides ...... 1-0 Appendix J 1949 Geneva Conventions ...... J-0 Glossary ...... Glossary-0 References ...... References-1 Preface

This manual sets forth the basic principles of interrogation doctrine and establishes proce- dures and techniques applicable to Army intelligence interrogations, applies to the doctrine contained in FM 34-1, and follows operational procedures outlined in FM 100-5. It provides general guidance for commanders, staff officers, and other personnel in the use of interroga- tion elements of Army intelligence units. It outlines procedures for the handling of the sources of interrogations, the exploitation and processing of documents, and the reporting of intelligence gained through interrogation. It covers directing and supervising interrogation operations, conflict scenarios and their impact on interrogation operations, and peacetime interrogation operations. These principles, procedures, and techniques apply to operations in low-, mid-, and high-intensity conflicts; to the use of electronic warfare (EW) or nuclear, biological, or chemi- cal (NBC) weapons; to the CI operations contained in FMs 34-60 and 60A (S/NOFORN); and to the psychological operations (PSYOP) contained in FM 33-1. The provisions of this publication are the subject of international agreements 1059 (National Distinguishing Letters for Use by NATO Forces), 2033 (Interrogation of Prisoners of War), 2044 (Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War), and 2084 (Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and Documents). These principles and techniques of interrogation are to be used within the constraints established by FM 27-10, the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and the Uniform Code of Mili- tary Justice (UCMJ). Sources for tactical interrogations may be civilian internees, insurgents, enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), defectors, refugees, displaced persons, and agents or suspected agents. Sources in strategic debriefings are emigres, refugees, resettlers, and selected US sources. Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and women are included. The proponent of this publication is HQ TRADOC. Submit changes for improving this pub- lication on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) and forward it to Commander, United States Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: ATSI-TD-PAL, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7000. CHAPTER 1 Interrogation and the Interrogator

Interrogation is the art of questioning the interrogation. He should not concen- and examining- a source to obtain the maxi- trate on the objective to the extent that he mum amount of usable information. The overlooks or fails to recognize and exploit goal of any interrogation is to obtain usable other valuable information extracted from and reliable information, in a lawful the source. For example, during an interro- manner and in the least amount of time, gation, he learns of an unknown, highly which meets intelligence requirements of destructive weapon. Although this informa- any echelon of command. Sources may be tion may not be in line with his specific civilian internees, insurgents, EPWs, defec- objective, he develops this lead to obtain all tors, refugees, displaced persons, and possible information concerning this weap- agents or suspected agents. A successful on. It is then obvious that the objective of interrogation produces needed information an interrogation can be changed as neces- which is timely, complete, clear, and accu- sary or desired. rate. An interrogation involves the interac- tion of two personalities: the source and the interrogator. Each contact between these INITIATIVE two difrers to some degree because of their individual characteristics and capabilities, Achieving and maintaining the initiative and because the circumstances of each con- is essential to a successful interrogation tact and the physical environment vary. just as the offense is the key to success in combat operations. The interrogator must remain in charge throughout the interroga- PRINCIPLES OF tion. He has certain advantages at the INTERROGATION beginning of an interrogation, such as the psychological shock the source receives Intelligence interrogations are of many when becoming a prisoner of war, which types, such as the interview, debriefing, and enable him to grasp the initiative and assist elicitation. However, the principles of objec- him in maintaining it. An interrogator may tive, initiative, accuracy, prohibitions lose control during the interrogation by against the use of force, and security apply allowing the source to take control of the to all types. interrogation. If this occurs, he must post- pone the interrogation and reassess the situation. To resume the interrogation, a OBJECTIVE different interrogator should conduct the The objective of any interrogation is to interrogation. In addition, the interrogator obtain the maximun amount of usable must identify and exploit leads developed information possible in the least amount of during the interrogation. time. Each interrogation has a definite purpose-to obtain information to satisfy ACCURACY the assigned requirement which contributes to the successful accomplishment of the The interrogator makes every effort to supported unit's mission. The interrogator obtain accurate information from the must keep this purpose firmly in mind as he source. He assesses the source correctly by obtains the information. The objective may repeating questions at varying intervals. be specific, establishing the exact location The interrogator, however, is not the final of a minefield, or it may be general, seeking analyst and should not reject or degrade order of battle (OB)information about a information because it conflicts with pre- specific echelon of the enemy forces. In viously obtained information. The interro- either case, the interrogator uses the objec- gator's primary mission is the collection of tive as a basis for planning and conducting information, not evaluation. Conversely, the interrogator should not accept all information as the truth; he views all violence, and deprivation useless as inter- information obtained with a degree of rogation techniques. doubt. If possible, and when time permits, he should attempt to confirm information SECURITY received and annotate less credible or unproven information. It is of great impor- The interrogator, by virtue of his position, tance to report accurate information to the possesses a great deal of classified informa- using elements. The interrogator checks his tion. He is aware constantly that his job is notes against the finished report to ensure to obtain information, not impart it to the that the report contains and identifies the source. He safeguards military information information as heard, seen, or assumed by at all times as well as the source of informa- the source. tion. This becomes very clear when one considers that among those persons with whom the interrogator has contact, there PROHIBITION AGAINST USE are those attempting to collect information OF FORCE for the enemy. The interrogator is alert to detect any attempt made by the source to The use of force, mental torture, threats, elicit information. insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohi- bited by law and is neither authorized nor SOURCES OF INFORMATION condoned by the US Government. Experi- ence indicates that the use of force is not The interrogator is concerned primarily necessary to gain the cooperation of sources with two sources of information in his intel- for interrogation. Therefore, the use of force ligence collection effort: human sources and is a poor technique, as it yields unreliable material sources (mainly captured enemy results, may damage subsequent collection documents (CEDs)). The senior interroga- efforts, and can induce the source to say tor, depending on the supported command- whatever he thinks the interrogator wants er's priority intelligence requirements (PIR) to hear. However, the use of force is not to and information requirements (IR), decides be confused with psychological ploys, ver- which of these sources will be more effective bal trickery, or other nonviolent and non- in the intelligence collection effort. coercive ruses used by the interrogator in questioning hesitant or uncooperative HUMAN SOURCES sources. The psychological techniques and princi- The interrogator encounters many ples outlined should neither be confused sources who vary greatly in personality, with, nor construed to be synonymous with, social class, civilian occupation, military unauthorized techniques such as brain- specialty, and political and religious beliefs. washing, mental torture, or any other form Their physical conditions may range from of mental coercion to include drugs. These near death to perfect health, their intelli- techniques and principles are intended to gence levels may range from well below serve as guides in obtaining the willing average to well above average, and their cooperation of a source. The absence of security consciousness may range from the threats in interrogation is intentional, as lowest to the highest. Sources may be ci- their enforcement and use normally consti- vilian internees, insurgents, EPWs, defec- tute violations of international law and tors, refugees, displaced persons, and may result in prosecution under the UCMJ. agents or suspected agents. Because of these variations, the interrogator makes a Additionally, the inability to carry out a careful study of every source to evaluate his threat of violence or force renders an inter- mental, emotional, and physical state and rogator ineffective should the source chal- uses it as a basis for interrogation. He deals lenge the threat. Consequently, from both mainly with three categories of sources: legal and moral viewpoints, the restrictions cooperative and friendly, neutral and non- established by international law, agree- partisan, and hostile and antagonistic. ments, and customs render threats of force, Cooperative and Friendly CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS A cooperative and friendly source offers CEDs include any piece of recorded little resistance to the interrogation and information which has been in the posses- normally speaks freely on almost any topic sion of a foreign nation and comes into US introduced, other than that which will tend possession. This includes US documents to incriminate or degrade him personally. which the foreign nation may have pos- To obtain the maximum amount of informa- sessed. There are numerous ways to acquire tion from cooperative and friendly sources, a document, some of the most common the interrogator takes care to establish and ways are: found in the possession of human to preserve a friendly and cooperative sources, on enemy dead, or on the battle- atmosphere by not inquiring into those pri- field. There are two types of documents: (1) vate affairs which are beyond the scope of official (government or military) documents the interrogation. At the same time, he such as overlays, field orders, maps, and must avoid becoming overly friendly and codes; (2) personal (private or commercial) losing control of the interrogation. documents such as letters, diaries, news- papers, and books. Neutral and Nonpartisan A neutral and non~artisansource is PERSONAL QUALITIES cooperative to a limited degree. He normally An interrogator should possess an inter- takes the position of answering questions est in human nature and have a personality asked directly, but seldom volunteers which will enable him to gain the coopera- information. In some cases, he may be tion of a source. Ideally, these and other afraid to answer for fear of reprisals by the personal qualities would be inherent in an enemy. This often is the case in low- interrogator; however, in most cases, an intensity conflict (LIC) where the people interrogator can correct some deficiencies in may be fearful of insurgent reprisals. With these qualities if he has the desire and is the neutral and nonpartisan source, the willing to devote time to study and practice. interrogator may have to ask many specific Some desirable personal qualities in an questions to obtain the information interrogator are motivation, alertness, required. patience and tact, credibility, objectivity, self-control, adaptability, perseverence, and personal appearance and demeanor. Hostile and Antagonistic A hostile and antagonistic source is most difficult to interrogate. In many cases, he MOTIVATION refuses to talk at all and offers a real chal- An interrogator may be motivated by lenge to the interrogator. An interrogator several factors, for example, an interest in must have self-control, patience, and tact human relations, a desire to react to the when dealing with him. As a rule, at lower challenge of personal interplay, an enthusi- echelons, it is considered unprofitable to asm for the collection of information, or just expend excessive time and effort in interro- a profound interest in foreign languages gating hostile and antagonistic sources. and cultures. Whatever the motivation, it is When time is available and the source the most significant factor used by an inter- appears to be an excellent target for exploi- rogator to achieve success. Without motiva- tation, he should be isolated and repeatedly tion, other qualities lose their significance. interrogated to obtain his cooperation. A The stronger the motivation, the more suc- more concentrated interrogation effort can cessful the interrogator. be accomplished at higher levels, such as corps or echelons above corps (EAC), where ALERTNESS more time is available to exploit hostile and antagonistic sources. The interrogator must be constantly aware of the shifting attitudes which nor- mally characterize a source's reaction to interrogation. He notes the source's every ing the interrogation. Without this required gesture, word, and voice inflection. He objectivity, he may unconsciously distort determines why the source is in a certain the information acquired. He may also be mood or why his mood suddenly changed. It unable to vary his interrogation techniques is from the source's mood and actions that effectively. the interrogator determines how to best proceed with the interrogation. He watches for any indication that the source is with- SELF-CONTROL holding information. He must watch for a The interrogator must have an excep- tendency to resist further questioning, for tional degree of self-control to avoid dis- diminishing resistance, for contradictions, plays of genuine anger, irritation, sym- or other tendencies, to include pathy, or weariness which may cause him susceptibility. to lose the initiative during the interroga- tion. Self-control is especially important PATIENCE AND TACT when employing interrogation techniques which require the display of simulated emo- The interrogator must have patience and tions or attitudes. tact in creating and maintaining rapport between himself and the source, thereby, ADAPTABILITY enhancing the success of the interrogati~n. Additionally, the validity of the source's An interrogator must adapt himself to the statements and the motives behind these many and varied personalities which he statements may be obtainable only through will encounter. He should try to imagine the exercise of tact and patience. Display- himself in the source's position. By being ing impatience encourages the difficult able to adapt, he can smoothly shift his source to think that if he remains unres- techniques and approaches during interro- ponsive for a little longer, the interrogator gations. He must also adapt himself to the will stop his questioning. The display of operational environment. In many cases, he impatience may cause the source to lose has to conduct interrogations under a va- - respect for the interrogator, thereby, reduc- riety of unfavorable physical conditions. ing his effectiveness. An interrogator, with patience and tact, is able to terminate an interrogation and later continue further PERSEVERANCE interrogation without arousing apprehen- A tenacity of purpose, in many cases, will sion or resentment. make the difference between an interroga- tor who is merely good and one who is superior. An interrogator who becomes eas- CREDIBILITY ily discouraged by opposition, noncoopera- The interrogator must maintain credi- tion, or other difficulties will neither bility with the source and friendly forces. aggressively pursue the objective to a suc- Failure to produce material rewards when cessful conclusion nor seek leads to other promised may adversely affect future inter- valuable information. rogations. The importance of accurate reporting cannot be overstressed, since interrogation reports are often the basis for PERSONAL APPEARANCE AND tactical decisions and operations. DEMEANOR The interrogator's personal appearance may greatly influence the conduct of the OBJECTIVITY interrogation and the attitude of the source The interrogator must maintain an objec- toward the interrogator. Usually a neat, tive and a dispassionate attitude, regardless organized, and professional appearance will of the emotional reactions he may actually favorably influence the source. A firm, experience, or which he may simulate dur- deliberate, and businesslike manner of speech and attitude may create a proper and enhancement training for interrogator environment for a successful interrogation. linguists. If the interrogator's personal manner reflects fairness, strength, and efficiency, the source may prove cooperative and more KNOWLEDGE OF THE US ARMY'S receptive to questioning. However, depend- MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND ing on the approach techniques, the inter- OPERATIONS rogator can decide to portray a different (for Interrogation operations contribute to the example, casual, sloven) appearance and accomplishment of the supported com- demeanor to obtain the willing cooperation mander's mission. The interrogator must of the source. have a working knowledge of the US Army's missions, organizations, weapons SPECIALIZED SKILLS AND and equipment, and methods of operation. This knowledge enables him to judge the KNOWLEDGE relative significance of the information he The interrogator must be knowledgeable extracts from the source. and qualified to efficiently and effectively exploit human and material sources which KNOWLEDGE OF THE are of potential intelligence interest. He is ' TARGET COUNTRY trained in the techniques and proficiency necessary to exploit human and material Every interrogator should be knowledge- sources. His initial training is in foreign able about his unit's target country, such as language, and his entry-level training is in armed forces uniforms and insignia, OB the exploitation of documents and human information, and country familiarity. sources. The interrogator must possess, or acquire through training and experience, special skills and knowledge. Armed Forces Uniforms and Insignia Through his knowledge of uniforms, in- WRITING AND SPEAKING SKILLS signia, decorations, and other distinctive devices, the interrogator may be able to The most essential part of the interroga- determine the rank, branch of service, type tor's intelligence collection effort is report- of unit, and military experience of a mili- ing the information obtained. Hence, he tary or paramilitary source. During the must prepare and present both written and planning and preparation and the approach oral reports in a clear, complete, concise, phases, later discussed in this manual, the and accurate manner. He must possess a identification of uniforms and insignia is good voice and speak English and a foreign very helpful to the interrogator. language idiomatically and without objec- tionable accent or impediment. Order of Battle Information Knowledge of a foreign language is nec- essary since interrogators work primarily OB is defined as the identification, with non-English speaking people. Lan- strength, command structure, and disposi- guage ability should include a knowledge of tion of personnel, units, and equipment of military terms, foreign idioms, abbrevia- any military force. OB elements are separ- tions, colloquial and slang usages, and local ate categories by which detailed informa- dialects. Although a trained interrogator tion is maintained. They are composition, who lacks a foreign language skill can disposition, strength, training, combat interrogate successfully through an inter- effectiveness, tactics, logistics, electronic preter, the results obtained by the linguisti- technical data, and miscellaneous data. cally proficient interrogator will be more During the questioning phase, OB elements timely and comprehensive. Language labs, assist the interrogator in verifying the tapes, or instructors should be made avail- accuracy of the information obtained and able wherever possible to provide refresher can be used as an effective tool to gain new information. Aids which may be used to Enemy Material and Equipment identify units are names of units, names of The interrogator should be familiar with commanders, home station identifications, the capabilities, limitations, and employ- code designations and numbers, uniforms, ment of standard weapons and equipment insignia, guidons, documents, military pos- so that he may recognize and identify tal system data, and equipment and vehicle changes, revisions, and innovations. Some markings. of the more common subjects of interest to the interrogator include small arms, infan- Country Familiarity try support weapons, artillery, aircraft, ve- hicles, communications equipment, and The interrogator should be familiar with NBC defense. FM 100-2-3provides informa- the social, political, and economic institu- tion on enemy material and equipment. tions; geography; history; and culture of the target country. Since many sources will readily discuss nonmilitary topics, the Specialized Training interrogator may induce reluctant prisoners The interrogator requires specialized to talk by discussing the geography, eco- training in international regulations, secu- nomics, or politics of the target country. He rity, and neurolinguistics. may, then, gradually introduce significant topics into the discussion to gain important insight concerning the conditions and atti- International Agreements tudes in the target country. He should keep abreast of major events as they occur in the The interrogator should know interna- target country. By knowing the current tional regulations on the treatment of pris- events affecting the target country, the oners of war and the general principles of interrogator will better understand the gen- the Law of Land Warfare and The Hague eral situation in the target country, as well and Geneva Conventions. as the causes and repercussions. Security KNOWLEDGE OF COMMON Interrogators must know how to identify, SOLDIER SKILLS mark, handle, and control sensitive mate- Interrogators must be proficient in all rial according to AR 380-5. He should have common soldier skills. However, map read- received special training on Subversion and ing and enemy material and equipment are Espionage Directed Against the Army keys to the performance of interrogator (SAEDA). duties. Neurolinguistics Neurolinguistics is a behavioral commu- Map Reading nications model and a set of procedures that Interrogators must read maps well improve communication skills. The interro- enough to map track using source informa- gator should read and react to nonverbal tion obtained about locations of enemy communications. An interrogator can best activities. Through the use of his map adapt himself to the source's personality tracking skills, the interrogator can obtain and control his own reactions when he has information on the locations of enemy an understanding of basic psychological activities from sources who can read a map. factors, traits, attitudes, drives, motiva- Furthermore, his map reading skills are tions, and inhibitions. essential to translate information into map terminology from sources who cannot read a map. Map reading procedures are outlined in FM 21-26. CHAPTER 2 Role of the Interrogator

An interrogation element does not operate doctrine concentrates on deep, close, and on its own. It conducts operations in re- rear operations. Air-land battle doctrine sponse to an assigned collection mission requires all commanders to have a mental and reports the information it collects back and emotional commitment to the offensive. into the system to help support combat They must set primary and secondary ob- commanders in fighting the air-land battle. jectives in terms of enemy formations, not The intelligence preparation of the battle- terrain features. They must attack units field (IPB)process is the framework in and areas critical to coherent enemy opera- which intelligence and electronic warfare tions, not just the enemy's lead formations. (IEW) operations take place. Interrogation Commanders must possess the spirit of of- assets operate within that framework to fensive determination. They must direct support the commander. powerful initial blows against the enemy, placing him at an immediate disadvantage. These initial blows must be rapidly followed COMMANDER'S MISSION by additional strikes to keep the enemy off UNDER AIR-LAND BATTLE balance. To successfully implement the air-land battle doctrine, commanders All combat commanders have the same must- basic responsibility. They must destroy the enemy's capability to conduct further oper- Hold the initiative. ations within their assigned areas of opera- Operate across the entire width and tion. To accomplish this mission, com- depth of the battlefield. manders must locate, identify, engage, and React rapidly to changes in the ene- defeat enemy units. A commander can only engage the enemy after that enemy has my's intentions. entered the commander's area of opera- Synchronize the operations of their tions. The depth of this area is determined subordinates. by the maximum range of the weapon sys- The air-land battle doctrine places an tems controlled by the commander. High extremely heavy burden on all command- technology battlefields of the future will be ers. However, these burdens must be borne, characterized by high mobility, devastating if commanders expect to win against heavy firepower, and tactics which take maximum odds on the battlefield of the future. advantage of both. On such battlefields, a commander whose sole interest is his area of operations is a commander who has lost the initiative. Losing the initiative on a bat- MILITARY INTELLIGENCE tlefield means losing the battle. Air-land AND INTELLIGENCE battle doctrine projects a way for com- PREPARATION OF THE manders to preserve the initiative. It BATTLEFIELD requires commanders to expand their out- look on the battlefield to another area, the Like all other intelligence assets, interro- area of interest. This area contains those gators serve the commander. Interrogation enemy elements which may be close enough operations are of no value unless they con- to effect the outcome of combat operations tribute to the accomplishment of the sup- in the immediate future. If commanders can ported commander's mission. To under- locate, identify, and accurately predict the stand the interrogator%role in mission intentions of enemy units while they are in accomplishment, the overall contribution the area of interest, it may be possible to made by military intelligence must be inhibit or destroy their ability to conduct understood. Military intelligence is respon- future combat operations. In combat opera- sible for providing commanders with an tions against the enemy, air-land battle accurate and timely estimate of the enemy's capabilities and probable courses of action. that satisfies their assigned collection mis- This estimate must consider the terrain fea- sions. As collection assets gather informa- tures in the area of operations, the number tion, they report it. The reported informa- and type of enemy units in this area, and tion is consolidated and analyzed to the prevailing weather conditions. Intelli- determine its reliabilitv and validitv. Valid gence assets collect and analyze informa- information is collated and used to produce tion to develop this estimate, then, give the intelligence, which is then provided to the estimate to commanders in sufficient time commanders, and simultaneously to collec- for use in their decision making.- tion assets to provide immediate feedback Commanders request the information to assist in coilection operations. This pro- they need. These information requests are cess is continuous, since commanders must translated into collection requirements. The react to a constantly changing battlefield. collection requirements are consolidated The following illustration shows the overall into collection missions and assigned to process followed by intelligence personnel specific collection assets. Collection assets in producing this estimate. cbnduct operations to obtain information 1 I THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS s THE COMMANDER ,q s:::E:::kk:-

PIR/IR CREATED AND/OR STAFF ELEMENTS PLAN REVISED TO COVER ALL FUTURE OPERATIONS BASED THE IDENTIFIED NEEDS. ON INTEL PREDICTIONS. u v COLLECTION MISSIONS I INTEL USED TO PREDICT I FORMULATED TO COVER PROBABLE ENEMY FUTURE ALL PIR/IR. I ACTIVITY. I v

MISSIONS ASSIGNED TO INFORMATION PROCESSED SPECIFIC, CAPABLE TO PRODUCE INTEL. I COLLECTION ASSETS. I I

ASSETS RESPOND TO COLLECTED INFORMATION ASSIGNED MISSIONS BY IS REPORTED BACK THRU COLLECTING INFORMATION. INTEL CHANNELS. Analysis is the heart or center of the rent weather affect the enemy's men intelligence process. The collection effort is and equipment? How will these effects driven by an analysis of the commander's change his operational timetables? mission and the information needs this What tactics will the enemy employ to analysis identifies. The information col- achieve his objectives? What equip- lected is analyzed to determine how well it ment will he employ? How will he fills the commander's needs. IPB is the organize his forces? initial step in performing this analysis. IPB integrates enemy doctrine with the weather Where will the enemy fight? What are and terrain as they relate to a specific bat- his current unit locations? What are tlefield environment. This integration the strengths and weaknesses of those allows enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, dispositions? and probable courses of action to be deter- What are the enemy's intentions? mined and evaluated. On the battlefield, Where will he move next? What will he IPB is dynamic. It produces graphic esti- do when he gets there? Will he attack, mates that portray the enemy probable defend, or withdraw? Where, When, courses of action in the immediate situa- How? tion. Commanders and their staff elements use IPB products to help them determine Who, exactly, is the enemy? What are how to achieve decisive results with limited the capabilities, limitations, and opera- resources. tional patterns of specific enemy units and their commanders? Where is the enemy vulnerable? What INTELLIGENCE AND are his technical, operational, and ELECTRONIC WARFARE human weaknesses? OPERATIONS TARGETDEVELOPMENT IEW operations are conducted to satisfy Target development requires the collec- the aggregate intelligence, counterintelli- tion of combat information, targeting data, gence (CI), and EW requirements of the and correlated targeting information. Its commander. IEW operations include both objective is to accurately predict where and situation and target development activities. when the enemy will establish dispositions They are collectively oriented on the collec- that will yield the most decisive results tion, processing, analysis, and reporting of when struck by a minimum of firepower. all information regarding the enemy, The following questions exemplify the types weather, and terrain. IEW operations gen- of information required. erate combat information, direct targeting data, all-source intelligence, and correlated Where, exactly, are the high value targeting information. CI supports OPSEC, targets? Where are the locations of deception, rear operations, and EW. CI sup- enemy weapons systems, units, and port to OPSEC and deception protects activities that may impact on combat friendly,command, control, and communi- operations? cations (C3) programs. These are integral to What, exactly, is at these locations? IEW operations performed in support of the How much equipment? How many per- commander's combat objectives. sonnel? To what units do they belong? SITUATION DEVELOPMENT How long will these locations be targets? When did the units, equip- Situation development requires the collec- ment, and personnel arrive? Where will tion of information that accurately de- they locate? scribes the enemy, weather, and terrain within the supported commander's area of interest. The following questions exemplify Specific Information Requirements the types of information required. Tactical intelligence operations begin How will the terrain features and cur- with the commander. He conveys his information needs to the intelligence staff Possibility of special weapons. who converts them into PIR and IR for the commander's approval or modification. The Probability of enemy use of NBC intelligence officer translates PIR and IR weapons. into specific collection missions for subor- dinate, attached, and supporting units and requests information from the next higher Brigade Specific Information echelon. He receives and evaluates informa- Requirements tion from all sources, develops and nomi- Brigade commanders need and use speci- nates high-payoff targets (HPTs),and fic information to plan, direct, coordinate, reports intelligence results to higher, lower, and support the operations of the division and adjacent units. against enemy first-echelon regiments, their battalions, companies, and combat support Battalion Specific Information units-the sustainers. They also need accu- Requirements rate intelligence about enemy second- echelon regiments within first-echelon divi- Battalion commanders need specific sions and any follow-on forces which can information and accurate intelligence from close on their area of operation before the the brigade and higher headquarters to current engagement can be decisively plan their operations. They need timely concluded. combat information and targeting data from subordinate, adjacent, and supporting Brigades strive to attack enemy first- units to refine their plan and to win their echelon forces while they are on the move offensive and defensive battles. Their spe- and before they can deploy into combat cific information requirements (SIR) for formations. The brigade commander needs attacking and defending are consolidated, specific information about- due to the speed with which they must react Composition, equipment, strengths, on the extremely dynamic and volatile and weaknesses of advancing enemy air-land battlefield. They must know- forces. Location, direction, and speed of pla- Location, direction, and speed of toon and company-sized elements enemy first-echelon battalions and within the enemy's first-echelon their subordinate companies. battalions. Locations and activities of enemy Location, direction, and speed of second and follow-on echelons capable enemy second-echelon battalions of reinforcing their first-echelon forces which indicate the first-echelon regi- in the operations area. ment's main effort. Location of enemy indirect fire weapon Disposition and strength of enemy de- systems and units. fensive positions and fortifications. -0 Locations of gaps, assailable flanks, Location of antitank positions, and other tactical weaknesses in the crew-served weapons, individual vehi- enemy's OB and operations security cle positions, and dismounted infantry. (OPSEC) posture. Locations of barriers, obstacles, mine- Air threat. fields, and bypass routes. Enemy use of NBC. Effects of terrain and prevailing weather conditions throughout the Effects of weather and terrain on cur- course of combat operations. rent and projected operations. Anticipated timetable or event sched- Capability of enemy to employ air ule associated with the enemy's most assets. likely courses of action. Availability and probability of use of enemy radio electronic combat (REC) assets to disrupt friendly C:'. Should the enemy succeed in establishing The suppression, neutralization, and des- his defensive positions, then, brigade com- truction of enemy C3 systems and facilities manders' SIR increase. They must then are critical to the success of close opera- know the specific types, locations, and tions. Brigade commanders, in concert with organization of enemy first- and second- supporting division and corps IEW, and echelon defensive positions and fortifica- maneuver and fire support units use all tions. These include- available means to identify, locate, disrupt, Barriers, obstacles, fire sacks, and and destroy these extremely HPTs. Their antitank strong points. objective is to neutralize the enemy com- manders' capability to command troops and Locations of antiaircraft and missile control weapon and combat support sys- artillery units. tems. Thus, to degrade or deny the ability of Locations of surface-to-air missile the enemy commander to conduct his attack units. as planned, this is done by systematically attacking key nodes and information links Location of REC units. in the enemy commanders' command and control (C2) system, which supports their Location of reserve maneuver forces. decision-makingprocess. This form of C2 Enemy ability to conduct deep attack warfare is founded upon the basic tenets of into friendly rear area. command, control, and communications countermeasures (C3CM)strategy and is Brigade commanders given defensive defined as- missions, or forced to defend given sectors, require specific information about assault- The integrated use of OPSEC, ing enemy companies, battalions, regi- military deception, jamming, ments, and divisions-generally, their and physical destruction, sup- strength, composition, and direction of ported by INTELLIGENCE, to attack. The same information is required deny information, influence, about enemy follow-on units that can affect degrade, or destroy enemy C3 brigade combat operations. Of specific con- capabilities and toprotect cern are the locations, size, activities, direc- friendly C3. tion, and speed of enemy air-assault, heli- The protection of friendly C3-protect borne, and tactical air units capable of C3-is the number one priority under C3CM dealing lethal and decisive blows to brigade strategy. Intelligence supports the protec- units and which could potentially be used to tion of friendly C3 primarily through CI thwart any counterattack. support to OPSEC and deception. Specific information about enemy first- and second-echelon regimental C3facilities is of paramount concern to the brigade commander, whether on the offense or COUNTERINTELLIGENCE defense. He must know the specific loca- The mission of CI is to detect, evaluate, tions of enemy- counteract, or prevent hostile intelligence Division forward and main command collection, subversion, sabotage, and inter- posts (CPs). national terrorism conducted by or on behalf of any foreign power, organization, Regimental and battalion CPs. or person operating to the detriment of the Fire direction control centers. US Army. CI personnel identify the hostile intelligence collection threat. They, together Command observation posts. with operations personnel, develop friendly Radio and radar reconnaissance sites. force profiles, identify vulnerabilities, and make recommendations to reduce those REC sites. vulnerabilities. CI operations support Target acquisition sites. OPSEC, deception, and rear operations. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE enemy agents, saboteurs, terrorists, sympa- SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS thizers, and special purpose forces. Brigade SECURITY and battalion commanders, their staffs, and all subordinate personnel must be trained CI support to OPSEC is the principal role and prepared to identify and report enemy of CI at echelons division and below. It units or activities which may pose a threat includes- to brigade trains, DISCOM, and COSCOM The identification and analysis of operations. The potential impact on close enemy reconnaissance, surveillance, operations from the rear cannot be and target acquisition (RSTA)capabili- overlooked. ties, personnel, units, and activities. Black, gray, and white lists identify per- The identification and analysis of sonnel of CI interest. CI teams conduct enemy REC units, locations, and operations that provide data used to com- activities. pile these lists. Black lists contain the names of persons who are hostile to US Assisting in the development of interests and whose capture or nullification friendly force profiles. of their effectiveness are of prime impor- Determining friendly vulnerabilities to tance. Gray lists contain names of persons enemy RSTA and REC activities. whose inclinations or attitudes toward US interests are certain. White lists contain Recommending and evaluating names of persons who are favorably appropriate OPSEC and deception inclined toward US interests and need to be measures. protected from enemy targeting. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO DECEPTION INTERROGATION SUPPORT TO CI Military deception operations are Interrogation and CI personnel must planned, controlled, directed, and conducted interact to defeat the enemy's collection by commanders at echelons above division. effort and the threat posed to our rear areas. They are designed to mislead enemy senior The interrogator must work in close coordi- military and political leaders regarding our nation with CI personnel to keep abreast of true military objectives, our combat capabili- CI targets in the event he encounters a ties and limitations, and the composition source that possesses information of CI and disposition of our combat forces. Bat- interest. The following questions exemplify tlefield deception is deliberate action to the types of information required by CI: achieve surprise on the air-land battlefield. What specific intelligence collection Its purpose is to mislead enemy ground operations are being conducted by the force commanders as to our true combat enemy? objectives; tactical OB; major axis of advance; and the disposition of our reserve What aspects of the enemy's plans and combat support units, defensive posi- have been successfully concealed from tions, fortifications, and C3facilities. our collection efforts? What aspects of friendly plans have been discovered by the enemy, and COUNTERINTELLIGENCE how were they discovered? SUPPORT TO REAR OPERATIONS Does the enemy plan to conduct sabot- age operations? CI support to rear operations includes identifying and analyzing the enemy threat Does the enemy plan to conduct sub- to brigade trains and both division support versive operations? command (DISCOM) and corps support How effective are our OPSEC command (COSCOM) operations. CI per- measures? sonnel recommend steps to neutralize How effective are our attempts at mil- obtained to the PIR and IR contained in the itary deception? interrogation element's collection mission. Interrogators collect information on politi- cal, economic, and a wide range of military ELECTRONIC WARFARE topics. In doing this, they organize their col- EW is an essential element of combat lection effort according to the OB elements power. It can provide commanders both a used by the intelligence analyst. However, passive and an active means to protect their at the tactical level, commanders and intel- C3 systems and a passive and an active ligence staff will generate requests for spe- means to attack the enemy commanders' C3 cific intelligence and combat information systems as well. Protecting C3is the PIR and IR that will allow them to better number one priority for EW in accordance conduct the war. Therefore, the collection with C3CMstrategy. Action taken to deny, effort should be limited to obtaining infor- influence, and degrade or destroy enemy C3 mation that responds to the PIR and IR: capabilities and counter-C3is equally Missions. Information that describes important. EW, like other elements of com- the present, future, or past missions of bat power on the air-land battlefield, is specific enemy units. Each unit for waged by employing a combination of both which mission information was offensive and defensive operations, tactics, obtained is identified. and procedures. Air-land battle doctrine and the spirit of the offense are the overrid- Compositions. Information that identi- ing considerations in planning and con- fies specific enemy units. This identifi- ducting EW operations (see FM 34-1). cation should include the type of unit (artillery, transportation, armor, and The following questions exemplify types so forth) and a description of the unit's of information that the interrogator pro- organizational chain of command. vides to EW operations: Strength. Information that describes Will the enemy employ jammers? the size of enemy units in terms of per- Will the enemy augment heavy elec- sonnel, weapons, and equipment. A tronic equipment? unit identification must accompany each description. What specific means of C3'arebeing used by the enemy? Dispositions. Information that estab- What problem has the enemy expe- lishes locations occupied by the enemy rienced when using each of these units or activities. The information means? will identify the military significance of the disposition, other enemy units What has been the effect of our there, and any security measures. attempts to influence, degrade, or de- stroy these means of C3? Tactics. Information that describes the tactics in use, or planned for use, by specific enemy units. The doctrine CAPABILITIES AND governing the employment of these LIMITATIONS OF tactics will be included in the description. INTERROGATORS Training. Information that identifies Interrogators are trained as linguists to and describes the types of individual question sources and to exploit CEDs. They and collective training being con- collect and report information that pertains ducted by the enemy. The description to the IEW tasks. Reportable information is will include all information on the determined by comparing the information thoroughness, degree, and quality of the training. Combat effectiveness. Information that describes the ability and fighting quality of specific enemy units. The sonalities, passwords, unit histories, description will provide unit identifica- radio call signs, radio frequencies, unit tion and information about personnel or vehicle identification numbers, and and equipment losses and replace- PSYOP. ments, reinforcements, morale, and The degree of success achieved by inter- combat experiences of its members. rogation operations is limited by the envi- Logistics. Information that describes ronment in which the operations are per- the means by which the enemy moves formed. Interrogators depend on the IEW and sustains his forces. This includes process to give direction to their collection any information on the types and efforts. They rely on the conduct of combat amounts of supply required, procured, operations to provide them with collection stored, and distributed by enemy units targets: sources and CED. in support of current and future Interrogation operations are also limited operations. by the very nature of human intelligence Electronic technical data. Information (HUMINT) collection. The source or CED that describes the operational parame- must actually have the desired information ters of specific enemy electronic before the interrogators can collect it. With equipment. This includes both com- respect to sources, there is always the pos- munications and noncommunications sibility that knowledgeable individuals may systems. refuse to cooperate. The Geneva and Hague Conventions and the UCMJ set definite Miscellaneous data. Information that limits on the measures which can be used to supports the development of any of the gain the willing cooperation of prisoners of other OB elements. Examples are per- war. CHAPTER 3 Interrogation Process

The interrogation process involves the that he is willing to talk should be noted by screening and selection of sources for inter- the screeners. During the observation, the rogation and the use of interrogation tech- screener should look for signs (such as the niques and procedures. Both screening and source's branch insignia or other identifi- interrogation involve complex interpersonal able features) to indicate that the source skills, and many aspects of their perfor- could have knowledge of information mance are extremely subjective. Each related to the supported commander's PIR screening and interrogation is unique and IR. because of the interaction of the interroga- tor with the source. There are five interro- Question Guards gation phases: planning and preparation, Screeners should question guards about approach, questioning, termination, and the source. Since the guards are in constant reporting. contact with the source, they can provide the information on the source's behavior. The guards can provide information on how SCREENING SOURCES the source has responded to orders, what Screening is the selection of sources for requests have been made by the source, interrogation. It must be conducted at every what behavior has been demonstrated by echelon to determine the cooperativeness the source, and so forth. In addition, the and the knowledgeability of sources and to guards can help screeners with specific determine which sources can best satisfy items of interest to identify sources who the commander's PIR and IR in a timely might answer the supported commander's manner. PIR and IR.

CONDUCT PRESCREENING Examine Documents Observe the Source Screeners should examine the documents captured with the source and any docu- Screeners should personally observe the ments pertaining to the source. Documents source. During this observation, the captured with the source (identification screener should first examine the EPW cap- card, letters, map sections, and so forth) can tive tag (Appendix D). The EPW captive tag provide information that identifies the will provide the screener information source, his organization, his mission, and regarding the source's circumstances of other personal background (family, knowl- capture (when, where, how, by whom, and edge, experience, and so forth). Available so forth). This information can assist the documents pertaining to the source (screen- interrogator in the conduct of the screening ing reports, interrogation reports, and and most importantly can show imme- administrative documents, such as detainee diately if the source has the potential of personnel record (see Appendix B)) prepared possessing information which could answer by the military police, can help the screener the supported commander's PIR and IR. by providing information on the source's The screeners should pay particular atten- physical and emotional status, knowledge, tion to rank insignia, condition of uniforms experience, and other background informa- and equipment, and behavior demonstrated tion. This information can be used to verify by the source. Screeners should look for information from documents captured with things like attempts to talk to the guards, the source and further assess his willing- intentionally joining placement in the ness to cooperate. When examining docu- wrong segregation group, or any signs of ments, screeners should look for items that nervousness, anxiety, or fear. Any source will indicate whether the source is coopera- whose appearance or behavior indicates tive or willing to cooperate based on any specific personal interest. In addition, the sources are identified through the screeners' screener should examine the documents to review of documents, questioning of the determine if the source has information guards, and their own personal observa- which answers the supported commander's tions. Based on their notes, the screeners PIR and IR. establish the order in which these sources If the source has information pertaining will be screened. The guards are then told to to new foreign material, contact the techni- bring these sources, in a specified sequence, cal intelligence element, and if the source to the screening site one at a time. has information of target exploitation Screeners ask each source about the cir- interest, contact the target exploitation cumstances of his capture, his personal element. background, his military job, and his unit of assignment. The goal is to get the source to talk. Once the source is talking, the COORDINATION WITH screeners try to identify any strong emo- CI ELEMENT tions and the reasons for them. This will Before initiating the interrogation and indicate how susceptible the source may be screening process, the interrogator estab- to interrogation and may identify the lishes close liaison with the supporting CI approach techniques which have the great- agents. The CI element provides PIR of CI est chance of success. Screeners also inject interest. During the interrogation and questions designed to identify those topical screening process, interrogators identify areas in which the source possesses perti- sources of CI interest. After these sources nent information. have been interrogated for any information of immediate tactical value, (as needed) RECORD INFORMATION they are turned over to CI personnel as quickly as possible. For example, CI is A screener must record information as it interested in sources that the following is obtained from the source on a screening conditions apply: report form. An example of this form is Have no identification documents. shown in Appendix F. All of the informa- tion shown is rarely obtained from any one Have excessive identification source. The blocks are there to save the documents. screeners as much additional writing as Have modified identification possible. If size, activity, location, unit, time documents. and equipment (SALUTE)reportable information is obtained during the screen- Possess unusually large amounts of ing, it must be exploited fully and reported cash or valuables. as soon as possible. Possess knowledge of critical interest ASSIGN CATEGORY (for example, nuclear power plant operations, chemical plant operations, The screening of a source ends when the weapons test and development, and so screener is sure that he can make an accu- forth). rate assessment of the source's potential cooperation and pertinent knowledge. At Are illegal border crossers. this time, the source is returned to the con- Attempt to avoid checkpoints. trol of the guards, and the screener records his assessment on the screening report Are on the black, gray, or white list. form. The assessment is recorded by means Request to see CI or US Army of a screening code. The screening code is a intelligence. number-letter designation which reflects the Have family in the denied area. level of cooperation to be expected from the source and the level of knowledgeability the source may possess. The number "1" repre- Screeners should always consider coopera- sents a source who responds to direct ques- tive, knowledgeable sources first. These tions. The number "2" represents a source who responds hesitantly to questioning. those assigned to categories 2A, lC, 2B, 3A, The number "3" represents a source who 2C, and 3B. Category 3C sources are nor- does not respond to questioning. The letter mally interrogated last. This order of priori- "A" represents a source who is very likely to ties ensures the highest probability of possess information pertinent to the sup- obtaining the greatest amount of pertinent ported commander's PIR. The letter "B" information within the time available for represents a source who might have infor- interrogations. Screening codes may mation pertinent to the supported com- change with the echelon. The higher the mander's IR. The letter "C" represents a echelon, the more time is available to con- source who does not appear to have perti- duct an approach. The following illustra- nent information. tion depicts the order in which sources will Those sources who have been assigned to be interrogated. the same category may be interrogated in NOTE: The term "screening category" any order deemed appropriate by the senior should not be confused with EPW- or interrogator. Category 1A sources should source-assigned category that is assigned normally be the first to be interrogated. according to their intelligence value (see Category 1B sources are next, followed by Appendix A).

INTERROGATION PRIORITIES BY SCREENING CATEGORY

AMOUNT OF PERTINENT KNOWLEDGE MOST LEAST

LEAST INTERROGATING The interrogator himself. What abili- ties does he have that can be brought PROCEDURES into play? What weaknesses does he PLANNING AND PREPARATION have that may interfere with the inter- rogation of the source? Can his per- Once the senior interrogator has assigned sonality adapt to the personality of the specific sources to his subordinates, the source? interrogators develop a plan for their inter- rogations. These plans reflect the current situation and the supported commanders' Questioning Guards PIR and IR. If they do not, the subsequent interrogations will not help the element to Interrogators should question guards as satisfy its assigned collection mission, and part of their preparations. The guards are information needed by the supported unit in constant contact with the sources and will be missed. Each interrogator, where may be able to provide the following types feasible, begins his preparation by examin- of information: ing the situation map (SITMAP), the OB Physical condition. data base, and pertinent information con- tained in the interrogation element's files. Demonstrated attitude and behavior. Contact made with other guards or sources. Interrelation of Planning and Preparation and Approach How the source has been handled since his capture. The planning and preparation phase and the approach phase are interrelated. In the Hearsay information from others who planning and preparation phase, the inter- have handled the source. rogator gathers information on the source's Confirmation of capture data, espe- circumstances of capture, comments from cially the circumstances under which others who have been with the source, the source was captured. information on the source's observed behav- ior, and information on some of the source's Each interrogator will unobtrusively personal traits and peculiarities from the observe the source to personally confirm his screening sheet. This information helps the identity and to check his personal appear- interrogator develop a picture of the source ance and behavior. ' and enables him to select approaches most likely to work. There are four primary fac- Analyze Information tors that must be taken into consideration in selecting tentative approaches: After the interrogator has collected all information available about his assigned The source's mental and physical source, he analyzes it. He looks for indica- state. Is the source injured, angry, cry- tors of any psychological or physical weak- ing, arrogant, cocky, or frightened? If ness that might make the source susceptible so, how can this state be best exploited to one or more approach techniques. The in the interrogation effort. interrogator formulates a strategy to con- The source's background. What is the duct his analysis. He also uses the inxorma- source's age and level of military or tion he collected to identify the type and civilian experience. level of knowledge possessed by the source that is pertinent to the element's collection The objective of the interrogation. How mission. much time is available for the interro- gation? Is the commander interested only in specific areas (PIR and IR)? Is Modify Sequences of Questioning this source knowledgeable enough to The interrogator uses his estimate of the require a full OB interrogation? type and extent of knowledge possessed by the source to modify the basic topical sequence of questioning. He selects only the source to the interrogation site. The those topics in which he believes the source interrogator collects all available interroga- has pertinent knowledge. In this way, the tion aids needed (maps, charts, writing interrogator refines his element's overall tools, reference materials, and so forth) and objective into a set of specific topics for his proceeds to the interrogation site. interrogation. The major topics that can be covered in an interrogation are shown APPROACH below in their normal sequence. The inter- The approach phase actually begins rogator is, however, free to modify this when the interrogator first comes in contact sequence as he deems necessary. with the source and continues until the pris- Mission. oner begins answering questions pertinent Organization. to the objective of the interrogation effort. Interrogators do not "run" an approach by Personnel strength. following a set pattern or routine. Each Weapons and equipment strength. interrogation is different, but all ap- proaches in interrogations have the follow- Dispositions. ing purposes in common: Tactics. Establish and maintain control over Training. the source and the interrogation. Combat effectiveness. Establish and maintain rapport between the interrogator and the Logistics. source. Electronic technical data. Manipulate the source's emotions and Miscellaneous. weaknesses to gain his willing cooperation. The successful application of approach Finalize Interrogation Plan techniques eventually induces the source to As a result of the planning and prepara- willingly provide accurate intelligence tion phase, the interrogator develops a plan information to the interrogator. The term for conducting his assigned interrogation. "willingly" refers to the source answering He must review this plan with the senior the interrogator's questions, not necessarily interrogator when possible. Whether writ- his cooperation. The source may or may not ten or oral, the interrogation plan must con- be aware that he is actually providing the tain at least the following items of interrogator with information about enemy information: forces. Some approaches may be complete when the source begins to answer ques- Identity of the source. tions. Others may have to be constantly Interrogation serial number. maintained or reinforced throughout the interrogation. The techniques used in an Topics, in sequence, that will be approach can best be defined as a series of covered. events, not just verbal conversation Reasons why the interrogator selected between the interrogator and the source. only specific topics from the basic The exploitation of the source's emotion can questioning sequence. be either harsh or gentle in application (hand and body movements, actual physi- Approach strategy selected. cal contact such as a hand on the shoulder Means selected for recording the for reassurance, or even silence are all use- information obtained. ful techniques that the interrogator may have to bring into play). The senior interrogator reviews each plan and makes any changes that he feels neces- Basic Concepts of Approaches sary based on the commander's PIR and IR. After the plan is approved, the holding The manipulative techniques within each compound is notified to have a guard bring approach are different, but there are some factors common to all-approacheswhich in asking about the source's back- affect the success or failure of the approach ground is to develop rapport, but non- itself. The interrogator should establish and pertinent questions may open new maintain control, establish and develop avenues for the approach and help rapport, assess the source, make smooth determine whether or not the tentative transitions, appear sincere, be convincing, approaches chosen in the planning and recognize the breaking point. and preparation phase will be effec- Establish and Maintain Control. The tive. If nonpertinent questions show interrogator should appear to be the one that the tentative approaches chosen who controls all aspects of the interrogation will not be effective, a flexible interro- to include the lighting, heating, and configu- gator can easily shift the direction of ration of the interrogation room, as well as his approach without the source being- the food, shelter, and clothing given to the aware of the change. source. The interrogator must always be in Depending on the situation, circum- control, he must act quickly and firmly. stances, and any requests the source may However, everything that he says and does have made, the following can also be used must be within the limits of the Geneva and to develop rapport: Hague Conventions, as well as the stan- Offering realistic incentives: such as dards of conduct outlined in the UCMJ. immediate (coffee, cigarettes, and so Establish and Develop Rapport. Rap- forth), short-term (a meal, shower, send port between the interrogator and the a letter home, and so forth), and source is really nothing more than a long-term (repatriation, political asy- two-way flow of communication. It can lum, and so forth). involve showing kindness and humanity in Feigning experience similar to those of an otherwise harsh situation, or it can the source. mean badgering the source. Rapport is established when the source reacts to the Showing concern for the prisoner interrogator's statement. Rapport must be through the use of voice vitality and maintained throughout the interrogation, body language. not only just in the approach phase. If the interrogator has established good rapport Helping the source to rationalize his initially and then abandons the effort, the guilt. source would rightfully assume that the Showing kindness and understanding interrogator cares less and less about him toward the source's predicament. as the information is being obtained. If this occurs, rapport is lost and the source may Exonerating the source from guilt. cease answering questions. Rapport may be Flattering the source. developed by- Assess the Source. After having estab- lished control of the source and having Asking about the circumstances of established rapport, the interrogator con- capture. By asking about the source's tinually assesses the prisoner to see if the circumstances of capture, the interro- approaches, and later the questioning tech- gator can gain insight into the prison- niques, chosen in the planning and prepa- er's actual state of mind and more ration phase will indeed work. Remember importantly, he can ascertain his pos- that the approaches chosen in planning sible breaking points. and preparation are only tentative and are based on the sometimes scanty information Asking background questions. After available from documents, the guards, and asking about the source's circumstan- personal observation. This may lead the ces of capture, the interrogator can interrogator to select approaches which further gain rapport by asking ques- may be totally incorrect for obtaining this tions about his background. Apparent source's willing cooperation. A careful interest can be built by asking about assessment of the source is absolutely his family, civilian life, friends, likes, necessary to avoid wasting valuable time in dislikes, and so forth. The main point the approach phase. Make assessment by training. A good assessment of the source is asking background and nonpertinent ques- the basis for the approach and is vital to tions which will indicate whether or not the the success of the interrogation effort. approaches chosen will be effective. The questions can be mixed or they can be Recognize the Breaking Point. Every separate. If, for example, the interrogator source has a breaking point, but an interro- had chosen a love of comrades approach, he gator never knows what it is until it has should ask the source questions like "How been reached. There are, however, some did you get along with your fellow squad good indicators that the source is near his members?" If the source answers that they breaking point or has already reached it. were all very close and worked well as a For example, if during the approach, the team, then the interrogator can go right source leans forward with his facial expres- into his love of comrades approach and be sion indicating an interest in the proposal reasonably sure of its success. However, if or is more hesitant in his argument, he is the source answers, "They all hated my probably nearing the breaking point. The guts and I couldn't stand any of them!," interrogator must be alert and observant to then the interrogator should abandon that recognize these signs in the approach approach and ask some quick nonpertinent phase. Once the interrogator determines questions to give himself some time to work that the source is breaking, he should inter- out a new approach. ject a question pertinent to the objective of the interrogation. If the source answers it, Make Smooth Transitions. The interro- the interrogator can move into the question- gator must guide the conversation smoothly ing phase. If the source does not answer or and logically, especially if he needs to move balks at answering it, the interrogator must from one approach technique to another. realize that the source was not as close to "Poking and hoping" in the approach may the breaking point as was thought. In this alert the prisoner of ploys and will make the case, the interrogator must continue with job more difficult. Tie-ins to another his approach or switch to an alternate approach can be made logically and approach or questioning technique and con- smoothly by using transitional phrases. tinue to work until he again feels that the Logical tie-ins can be made by the inclusion source is near breaking. The interrogator of simple sentences which connect the can tell if the source has broken only by previously used approach with the basis for interjecting pertinent questions. This pro- the next one. Transitions can also be cess must be followed until the prisoner be- smoothly covered by leaving the unsuccess- gins to answer pertinent questions. It is ful approach and going back to nonperti- entirely possible that the prisoner may nent questions. By using nonpertinent con- cooperate for a while and then balk at an- versation, the interrogator can more easily swering further questions. If this occurs, the move the conversation in the desired direc- interrogator can either reinforce the tion, and as previously stated, sometimes approaches that initially gained the obtain leads and hints as to source's source's cooperation or move into a differ- stresses or weaknesses or other approach ent approach before returning to the ques- strategies that may be more successful. tioning phase of the interrogation. At this point, it is important to note that the Be Sincere and Convincing. All profes- amount of time that is spent with a particu- sional interrogators must be convincing lar source is dependent on several factors, and appear sincere in working their that is, the battlefield situation, the expe- approaches. If an interrogator is using diency with which the supported command- argument and reason to get the source to er's PIR and IR requirements need to be cooperate, he must be convincing and answered, and so forth. appear sincere. All inferences of promises, situations, and arguments, or other Approach Techniques invented material must be believable. What a source may or may not believe depends on Interrogation approach techniques are his level of knowledge, experience, and usually performed by one interrogator working alone. However, sometimes inter- himself to approaches that he now believes rogators work together. He must also will work in gaining the source's remember that the tactical situation is very cooperation. fluid and that the commander needs infor- mation in the shortest period of time. This means that the tactical interrogator has lit- QUESTIONING tle time to waste, especially during the Although there is no fixed point at which approach phase. Obviously, the more com- the approach phase ends and the question- plicated an approach technique is, the more ing phase begins, generally the questioning preparation time is required for it and its phase commences when the source begins successful use. For this reason, the to answer questions pertinent to the specific approach techniques discussed are those objectives of the interrogation. Questions that take the least amount of time to pro- should be comprehensive enough to ensure duce the most usable information possible. that the topic of interest is thoroughly The number of approaches used is limited explored. Answers should establish the only by the interrogator's imagination and who, what, when, where, how, and when skill. Almost any ruse or deception is usable possible why. Questions should be pre- as long as the provisions of the Geneva sented in a logical sequence to be certain Conventions are not violated. The Geneva that significant topics are not neglected. A Conventions do not permit an interrogator series of questions following a chronologi- to pass himself off as a medic, chaplain, or cal sequence of events is frequently as a member of the Red Cross (Red Crescent employed, but this is by no means the only or Red Lion). To every approach technique, logical method of asking questions. Adher- there are literally hundreds of possible ence to a sequence should not deter the variations, each of which can be developed interrogator from exploiting informational for a specific situation or source. The varia- leads as they are obtained. The interrogator tions are limited only by the interrogator's must consider the probable response of the personality, experience, ingenuity, and source to a particular question or line of imagination. questioning and should not, if at all possi- With the exception of the direct approach, ble, ask direct questions likely to evoke a no other approach is effective by itself. refusal to answer or to antagonize the Interrogators use different approach tech- source. Experience has shown that in most niques or combine them into a cohesive, logi- tactical interrogations, the source is coop- cal technique. Smooth transitions, logic, erative. In such instances, the interrogator sincerity, and conviction can almost always should proceed with direct questions. make a strategy work. The lack of will undoubtedly dooms it to failure. Some Questioning Techniques examples of combinations are- Use good questioning techniques throughout the questioning phase. An interrogator must know when to use the dif- Direct/futility/love of comrades. ferent types of questions. With good ques- tioning techniques, the interrogator can extract the most information in the shortest The actual number of combinations is amount of time. There are many types of limited only by the interrogator's imagina- questioning techniques. tion and skill. Great care must be exercised In tactical interrogations, the direct ques- by the interrogator in choosing the tioning technique is used due to critical time approach strategy in the planning and factors. The direct questioning-technique- preparation phase of interrogation and in listening carefully to what the source is say- Uses only properly formed, direct ing (verbally or nonverbally) for leads that questions. the strategy chosen will not work. When Properly uses follow-up questions for this occurs, the interrogator must adapt complete information. 17 Properly uses repeated, controlled, pre- They may also be used as a means of pared, and nonpertinent questions to returning to a topical area for further control interrogation and assess questioning. source. Control questions are developed from 17 Avoids confusing, ambiguous, and information which the interrogator believes time-consuming questions. to be true. Control questions are based on 17 information which has been recently con- Uses a proper, logical sequence of top- firmed and which is not likely to have ics or questions. changed. They are used to check the truth- Characteristics of direct questions are- fulness of the source's responses and should 17 Basic interrogatives (who, what, when, be mixed in with other questions through- where, and how, plus qualifier). out the interrogation. Brief, concise, simply-worded, and Prepared questions are developed in address the looked-for information. advance of an interrogation to gain precise 17 Asks for a narrative response (cannot wording or the most desirable questioning be answered by just yes or no). sequence. They are used primarily for inter- rogations which are technical in nature, 17 Produces the maximum amount of require legal precision, or cover a number of usable information and gives a greater specific topics. Interrogators must not allow number of leads to new avenues of the use of prepared questions to restrict the questioning. scope and flexibility of their interrogations. Follow-up questions are used to exploit a Leading questions may prompt the source topic of interest. Questions usually flow to answer with the response he believes the one-from-anotherbased on the answer to interrogator wishes to hear. As a result, the previous questions. Interrogators ask a response may be inaccurate or incomplete. basic question and then based on the Leading questions are generally avoided answer from the source, use follow-up ques- during interrogations, but they can be used tions to completely exploit all available by experienced interrogators to verify information about the topic. Follow-up information. This is especially true during questions are also used to fully exploit a map tracking. lead given by the source in his response. Avoid vague questions as they do not Nonpertinent questions are used to con- have enough information for the source to ceal the interrogation's objectives or to understand exactly what is being asked by strengthen rapport with the source. They the interrogator. They may be incomplete, may also be used to break the source's con- "blanket" or otherwise nonspecific, and centration, particularly, if the interrogator create doubt in the source's mind. Vague suspects that the source is lying. It is hard questions tend to confuse the source, waste for a source to be a convincing liar if his time, are easily evaded, and result in concentration is frequently interrupted. answers that may confuse or mislead the Repeated questions ask the source for the interrogator. same information obtained in response to The interrogator must use the different earlier questions. They may be exact repeti- types of questions effectively. Active listen- tions of the previous question, or the pre- ing and maximum eye-to-eyecontact with vious question may be rephrased or other- the source will provide excellent indicators wise disguised. Repeated questions may be for when to use follow-up, repeated, control, used to check the consistency of the source's and nonpertinent questions. The interroga- previous responses. They may also be used tor uses direct and follow-up questions to to ensure the accuracy of important details fully exploit subjects pertinent to his inter- such as place names, dates, and component rogation objectives. He periodically includes parts of technical equipment. The use of control, repeated, and nonpertinent ques- repeated questions may develop a topic that tions to check the sincerity and consistency the source had refused to talk about earlier. of the source's responses and to strengthen rapport. A response which is inconsistent then consult the senior interrogator for a with earlier responses or the interrogator's final determination of the information's available data is not necessarily a lie. When value. such a response is obtained, the interroga- tor reveals the inconsistency to the source Hot and Cold Leads and asks for an explanation. The source's Leads are signs which tell an interrogator truthfulness should, then, be evaluated that the source has additional pertinent based on the plausibility of his explanation. information that can be obtained through There are two types of questions that an further questioning. Leads are provided by interrogator should not use. These are com- a source's response to the interrogator's pound and negative questions. Compound questions. There are two types of leads that questions are questions which ask for at concern interrogators-hot and cold. A hot least two different pieces of information. lead, when exploited, may obtain informa- They are, in effect, two or more questions tion that is SALUTE reportable. A cold combined as one. They require the source to lead, when exploited, may obtain informa- supply a separate answer to each portion of tion that is not SALUTE reportable but is the question. Compound questions should still of intelligence value. The use of not be used during interrogations because follow-up questions to fully exploit hot and they allow the source to evade a part of the cold leads may require an interrogator to question or to give an incomplete answer. cover topics that he did not list in his inter- They may confuse the source or cause the rogation plan. An interrogator must exploit interrogator to misunderstand the response. hot leads as soon as he identifies them. Negative questions are questions which are Once the interrogator is sure that he has constructed with words like "no," "none," or obtained and recorded all the details known "not." They should be avoided because they to the source, he issues a SALUTE report. may confuse the source and produce mis- The interrogator then resumes his question- leading or false information. They usually ing of the source at the same point where require additional questions to clarify the the hot lead was obtained. An interrogator source's responses. should note cold leads as they are obtained and exploit them fully during his question- ing on the topics to which the cold leads SALUTE Reportable Information apply. Cold leads may expand the scope of the interrogation because they may indicate SALUTE reportable information is any that the source possesses pertinent informa- information that is critical to the successful tion in areas not previously selected for accomplishment of friendly courses of questioning. If the interrogator does not action. SALUTE reportable information is fully exploit all of the cold leads he obtains, reported by the interrogator in a SALUTE he must include information on all the leads report format, written or oral (see Appendix he did not exploit in his interrogation E for an example). Information may be report. SALUTE reportable even when an interro- gator cannot determine its immediate intel- Hearsay Information ligence value. SALUTE reportable informa- tion is always time sensitive and answers Hearsay information must include the the supported, higher, or adjacent unit's most precise information possible of its PIR and IR. SALUTE reportable informa- source. This will include the name, duty tion is identified by its potential value. If position, full unit designation of the person the information indicates a change in the who provided the information, and the date enemy's capabilities or intentions, it is time group of when the source obtained the SALUTE reportable. If an interrogator information. cannot decide whether or not a piece of information is SALUTE reportable, he Questioning Sequence should act as though it is. This means that he should exploit it fully and record all per- An interrogator begins his questioning tinent information. The interrogator should phase with the first topic in the sequence he tentatively established as part of his inter- through the use of map tracking. Map rogation plan. He obtains all of the source's tracking is performed in the order in which pertinent knowledge in this topical area they are described. By following the before moving on to the next topic in his sequence below, an interrogator ensures sequence. He maintains his established that all required details are obtained for sequence of questioning to ensure that no each disposition known to the source: topics are missed. The only exception is to exploit a hot lead immediately. Even then, Establish an initial common point of however, he must resume his questioning at reference (ICPR). The first location the the same point in the same area at which interrogator should try to establish as the hot lead was first identified. the ICPR is the source's point of cap- ture (POC), because it is the most - recent in his memory. Map Tracking Establish a destination common point The interrogator obtains information of reference (DCPR).The DCPR can be concerning the location of enemy activities the reference point furthest back in time, distance, or higher echelon. This could be forward or to the rear of the ICPR. In any case, you must establish a route using the procedures, in the sequence shown, in the following illustration.

ESTABLISHING THE ROUTE

Obtain the direction in which the source would travel when leaving the ICPR. Obtain a description of the surface on which the source would be traveling. Obtain the distance the source would travel in this direction. Obtain a description of the prominent terrain features the source would remember while traveling in this direction. Repeat the questions and plot the responses until the entire route between the ICPR and the DCPR has been plotted. The interrogator can follow the same sequence when establishing the route actually traveled by the source by beginning with the DCPR. Each sequence establishes a CPR. Exploit the DCPR. Upon determining route of travel, what of military signifi- the DCPR, the interrogator must cance do you know or have seen or obtain the exact location and decrip- heard?" The interrogator will continue tion of each enemy disposition the from segment to segment, fully exploit- source knew about at the DCPR. ing each, until he has exploited the Methods of obtaining this information entire route traveled. are shown in the following illustration. Exploit dispositions not on route. If the Until he obtains all dispositions interrogator obtains a disposition known by the source in the vicinity of which is not located on the established the DCPR, the interrogator must route, he must establish the route the repeat these questions and plot or source would have taken to that dispo- record the information as it is provided sition. The interrogator then treats this by the source. new route the same way he does any Segment and exploit the route seg- other route segment,-exploiting it fully ments. The interrogator begins exploit- before moving on to the next segment ing the source's route with the segment of the original route. closest to either the ICPR or the DCPR. The sequence, above, organizes map The preferred segment is the segment tracking so that information obtained from closest to the DCPR, but either can be the source can be plotted and recorded accu- used. The interrogator will exploit each rately. Correct performance of this task segment of the route by asking the results in the map used by the interrogator. question "From (description of com- The description of each disposition must be mon point of reference (CPR))to (de- recorded preferably near the site of the dis- scription of next CPR) back along your position on the map.

EXPLOITATION OF DISPOSITIONS

Identify and describe items of military significance belonging to his forces which are located at each disposition. Provide the full unit designation of the enemy units to which these items belong. Describe the security measures deployed at each identified disposition. Identify the source of his information. Provide the date and time when he obtained his information. Provide the name, rank, duty position and full unit designation of each person who provided hearsay information to the source. Recording Information must use his past experiences to decide which items of information should be There are several reasons for recording recorded. He should organize his materials information obtained during interrogations. to avoid having to flip back and forth The most important of these is to ensure between references. that all information can be reported com- pletely and accurately. Recorded informa- The only information that should be tion may also be used to- recorded during the approach phase is that required by part 1of the interrogation Refresh the interrogator's memory on report (format is shown in Appendix G). All a topic covered earlier, such as when other information should not be recorded returning to a topic after exploiting a until after the source's cooperation has been hot lead. obtained. Check responses to repeated questions. All notes must be complete, accurate, and Point out inconsistencies to the source. legible. Notes should be organized by topi- cal areas. A separate piece of paper should Gain the cooperation of other sources. be used to record cold leads. The interroga- Compare with information received tor should make maximum use of author- from other sources. ized military abbreviations and brevity There are several methods of recording codes. Notes should be in recognizable for- information that can be used during inter- mat and complete enough for any other rogations. Two are listed below and their interrogator to use. Situations may arise advantages and disadvantages are de- that require one interrogator to finish scribed. These methods may be used sepa- another interrogator's interrogation. rately or in combination with each other: Using a Sound Recorder. The use of a Taking Notes. The interrogator's own sound recorder allows the interrogator to notes are the primary method of recording continually observe the source. When com- information. When the interrogator takes pared with note taking, this method allows his own notes, he has a ready reference to more information to be obtained in less verify responses to repeated questions or to time. However, more time is required for refresh his memory. They also provide him report writing because the entire tape must with the means to record cold leads for later be replayed to transfer information to the exploitation. report. Place names, numbers, and other pertinent, detailed information may be Using his own notes expedites the inter- unclear on the recording. Sound recorders rogator's accurate transferral of informa- cannot provide a ready reference that can tion into a report format. When taking his be used to compare answers to a repeated own notes, however, he cannot observe the question, and the equipment may source continually. This may cause him to malfunction. miss leads or fail to detect losses in rapport or control that are detectable only through clues provided by the source's behavior. TERMINATION It is possible to lose control and the Although the termination phase is only source's willing cooperation by devoting too the fourth phase of the five phases, it is the much of his concentration to note taking. last phase in which the interrogator will The interrogator must avoid distracting the actually deal with the source. The interro- source while taking notes. Notes should be gator must leave the source ready to con- taken in such a way that the maximum tinue answering questions in the future if amount of eye-to-eye contact with the source necessary. The termination of the interro- is maintained. gation must be conducted properly. If the The interrogator will not have enough interrogator mishandles the termination time to record every word that the source phase and he later finds that the source has says. He must be able to condense or sum- lied or he needs to question the source marize information into a few words. He further, he must start again from scratch. Need to Terminate identity card issued by his government, the source will be issued a completed DA Form A number of circumstances can cause an 2662-R (see Appendix C) by the military interrogation to be terminated. An interro- police. The identity card will be in the pos- gator must be able to identify such circum- session of the source at all times. Some cap- stances as soon as they occur. Some cir- tured documents will contain information cumstances that require an interrogation to that must be exploited at higher echelons. be terminated are- Any such documents may be impounded by C1 The source remains uncooperative the interrogator and evacuated through throughout the approach phase. intelligence channels. The interrogator must issue a receipt to the source for any Either the source or the interrogator personal documents he decides to impound. becomes physically or mentally unable He must comply with the accounting proce- to continue. dures established for captured documents All pertinent information has been by the military police, according to AR obtained from the source. 190-8.The accounting procedures required for impounding documents captured with a The source possesses too much perti- source are time-consuming but necessary. nent information for all of it to be The interrogator can save time by prepar- exploited during the interrogation ing receipts and document tags during the session. planning and preparation phase. He com- Information possessed by the source is pletes the termination phase by instructing of such value that his immediate evacu- the escort guard to return the source to the ation to the next echelon is required. holding compound and to keep him away from any sources who have not yet been The interrogator's presence is required interrogated. elsewhere. The interrogator loses control of the interrogation and cannot recover it. REPORTING Reports are submitted on all information of intelligence value that is obtained. Initial Termination Procedures reports are submitted electronically when- ever possible to ensure that the information Whatever the reason for terminating the reaches the intelligence analysts in the interrogation, the interrogator must least amount of time. Written reports are remember that there is a possibility that prepared to document electronic reports. someone may want to question the source at They are used as the initial means of report- a later date. For that reason, he should ter- ing only when electronic reporting is minate the interrogation without any loss impossible. Any information of intelligence of rapport whenever possible. The interro- value that will diminish with the passage of gator reinforces his successful approach time must be SALUTE reported. Electronic techniques to facilitate future interroga- SALUTE reports are formatted and submit- tions. He tells the source that he may be ted according to the procedures established talked to again. When appropriate, he tells during the senior interrogator's initial coor- the source that the information he provided dination. Written SALUTE reports are pre- will be checked for truthfulness and accu- pared according to the format in Appendix racy. He offers the opportunity for the E. Information that is not SALUTE report- source to change or add to any information able is electronically reported with a lower he has given. priority. The aim of any interrogation is to obtain information which will help satisfy a During termination, the interrogator commander's intelligence requirements. must make proper disposition of any docu- Since these requirements will differ in scope ments captured with the source. A source's at each level, when conducting PIR or IR military identity document must be interrogations, nonapplicable paragraphs returned to him. If a source does not hold an may be deleted. Part 1must always be included and distribution made according Neither the interrogator nor the inter- to STANAG 2033 (see Appendix A). preter tends to get confused when - using the simultaneous method of interpretation. INTERROGATION WITH AN INTERPRETER If any of the criteria listed above cannot be met, the interrogator must use the alter- Interrogating through an interpreter is nate method. The alternate method should more time consuming because the interpre- also be used whenever a high degree of pre- ter must repeat everything said by both the cision is required. interrogator and the source, and the inter- preter must be briefed by the interrogator before the interrogation can begin. An Interpreter Briefing interrogation with an interpreter will go through all five phases of the interrogation Once the interrogator has chosen a process. After the interrogation is over, the method of interpretation, he must brief his interrogator will evaluate the interpreter. interpreter. This briefing must cover the- Current tactical situation. Methods of Interpretation Background information obtained on the source. During the planning and preparation phase, the interrogator selects a method of Specific interrogation objectives. interpretation. There are two methods: the Method of interpretation to be used. simultaneous and the alternate. The inter- rogator obtains information about his Conduct of the interrogation in that interpreter from the senior interrogator. He statements made by the interpreter analyzes this information and talks to the and the source should be interpreted in interpreter before deciding which method to the first person, using the same con- use. With the simultaneous method, the tent, tone of voice, inflection, and interpreter listens and translates at the intent. The interpreter must not inject same time as the person for whom he is any of his own personality, ideas, or interpreting, usually just a phrase or a few questions into the interrogation. words behind. With the alternate method, Selected approach techniques and how the interpreter listens to an entire phrase, they are to be applied. sentence, or paragraph. He then translates it during natural pauses in the interroga- Conduct of interrogation in that the tion. The simultaneous method should only interpreter should inform the interro- be selected if all of the following criteria are gator if there are any inconsistencies met: in the language used by the source. The interrogator will use this informa- The sentence structure of the target tion in his assessment of the source. language is parallel to English. One example is a source who claims to The interpreter can understand and be an officer but who uses excessive speak both English and the target lan- slang and profanity. guage with ease. Physical arrangements of the interro- The interpreter has any required spe- gation site. The best layout is to have cial vocabulary skills for the topics to the interrogator and the source facing be covered. each other with the interpreter behind the source. This enhances the interro- The interpreter can easily imitate the gator's control by allowing him to interrogator's tone of voice and atti- simultaneously observe the source and tude for the approaches selected. the interpreter. Need for the interpreter to assist with report preparation. Throughout the briefing, the interrogator During the termination phase, the inter- must answer all questions that the interpre- preter's ability to closely imitate the inter- ter may have as fully and clearly as possi- rogator and the source is again very impor- ble. This helps ensure that the interpreter tant. The approaches used are reinforced completely understands his role in the here, and the necessary sincerity and con- interrogation. viction must be conveyed to the source. The interpreter assists the interrogator in preparing reports. He may be able to fill in Conduct the Interrogation gaps and unclear areas in the interrogator's During the interrogation, the interrogator notes. He may also assist in transliterating, corrects the interpreter if he violates any of translating, and explaining foreign terms. the standards on which he was briefed. For Following the submission of all reports, example, if the interpreter injects his own the interrogator evaluates the performance ideas into the interrogation, he must be cor- of his interpreter. The evaluation must rected. Corrections should be made in a cover the same points of information that low-key manner. At no time should the the interrogator received from the senior interrogator rebuke his interpreter sternly interrogator. The interrogator submits the or loudly while they are with the source. results of his evaluation to the senior inter- The interrogator should never argue with rogator. The senior interrogator uses this the interpreter in the presence of the source. evaluation to update the information he has If a major correction must be made, and about the interpreter. This evaluation may only when it is necessary, the interrogator also be used in developing training pro- and interpreter should leave the interroga- grams for interpreters. tion site temporarily. When initial contact is made with the source, the interpreter must instruct him to maintain eye contact with the interrogator. Since both rapport and control must be established, the interpreter's ability to closely imitate the attitude, behavior, and tone of voice used by both the interrogator and the source is especially important. The questioning phase is conducted in the same way that it would be if no interpreter was used. CHAPTER 4 Processing Captured Enemy Documents

The information contained in CEDs can documents are of a private or nongovern- prove to be of intelligence value to com- ment origin. Examples of personal docu- manders at all levels. CEDs are important ments are letters, personal diaries, news- because they can provide information papers, photographs, books, magazines, directly from the enemy. Only on rare occa- union dues payment books, and political sions will a single document or group of party dues payment books. documents provide vitally important infor- Interrogators are, from time-to-time,re- mation. Usually, each document provides a quired to handle and translate a wide vari- small bit of a larger body of information. ety of nonmission-related documents. Some Each CED, much like a single piece of a include identity and other documents asso- puzzle, contributes to the whole. In addition ciated with working and residing in a for- to their tactical intelligence value, technical eign country. data and political indicators can be extractedfrom CEDs that are important to strategic and national-level agencies. CEDs DOCUMENT HANDLING can also be helpful in exploiting sources. The accountability phase begins at the STANAG 2084 defines a document as any , piece of recorded information, regardless of time the document is captured. Documents form, obtained from the enemy and that must be clearly tagged. The capturing unit subsequently comes into the hands of a attaches a captured document tag to each friendly force. CEDs can be US or allied document. The capture data is always writ- documents that were once in the hands of ten on a captured document tag (see the fol- the enemy. Types of CEDs are typed, lowing illustration of a captured document handwritten, printed, painted, engraved or tag). When a captured tag is not available, drawn materials; sound or voice recordings; the same information recorded on any piece imagery such as videotapes, movies, or pho- of paper is acceptable. Nothing is to be writ- tographs; computer storage media includ- ten directly on the CED. The captured docu- ing, but not limited to floppy disks; and ment tag should be assigned a sequential reproductions of any of the items listed number at the first formal exploitation above. point, showing the nationality of the cap- turing force by national letters prescribed in CEDs are mainly acquired two ways. STANAG 1059. Furthermore, the capturing Some are taken from sources. Most docu- unit will report the following information: ments, however, are captured on the battle- field from former enemy locations and from enemy dead. Time the document was captured, recorded as a date-time group (DTG). Generally, CEDs are of two types: official Place the document was captured, and personal. Official documents are of including the six-or eight-digit coordi- government or military origin. Examples of nate and a description of the location official documents are, but are not limited of capture. to, overlays, field orders, maps, codes, field Identity of the source from whom the manuals, identification cards, reports, document was taken, if applicable. sketches, photographs, log books, mainte- nance records, shipping and packing slips, Summary of the circumstances under war and field diaries, and written commu- which the document was found. nications between commands. Personal Identity of the capturing unit. CAPTURED DOCUMENT TAG

CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT TAG

1. DATEITIME CAPTURED:

2. PLACE CAPTURED:

3. CAPTURING UNIT:

4. IDENTITY OF SOURCE (IF APPLICABLE):

5. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:

ACCOUNTABILITY (see the illustration on page 4-10). When a batch is received without a transmittal, the At each echelon, starting with the captur- interrogation element contacts the forward- ing unit, steps are taken to ensure that CED ing unit and obtains a list of document accountability is maintained during docu- serial numbers. The interrogation element ment evacuation. To establish account- records all trace actions in its journal. ability, the responsible element inventories Accountability includes inventorying the all incoming CEDs. Thorough account- CEDs as they arrive, initiating any neces- ability procedures at each echelon ensure sary trace actions, and maintaining the that CEDs are not lost. To record each pro- captured document log. Whenever intelli- cessing step as it occurs helps correct mis- gence derived from a CED is included in a takes in CED processing. Accountability is unit or information intelligence reports, the accomplished by anyone who captures, identification letters and number of the evacuates, processes, or handles CEDs. All document concerned are quoted to avoid CEDs should have captured document tags, false confirmation. All CEDs are shipped and all captured document tags should be with any associated documents. completely filled out. An incoming batch of documents includes a transmittal document Inventory An inventory of incoming CEDs is con- The captured document log is a record of ducted initially by comparing the CED to what an element knows about a CED (see the captured document tag and to accom- the following illustration of a captured docu- panying transmittal documents. This com- ment log). After trace actions are initiated, parison identifies any- the CEDs are entered in the captured docu- Transmittals that list missing CEDs. ment log. The captured document log, in general, must contain the entries listed 17 Document tags not attached to CEDs. below: CEDs not attached to document tags. File number (a sequential number to 17 CEDs not Iisted on the accompanying identify the order of entry). transmittal documents. DTG the CED was received at this element. Trace Actions 17 Document serial number of the cap- tured document tag. When necessary, the receiving unit initiates a CED trace action. Trace actions Identification number of the transmit- are initiated on all missing CEDs, captured tal document accompanying the CED. document tags, and on all information Full designation of the unit that for- missing from the captured document tag. warded the CED. Trace actions are initiated by first contact- ing the element from which the documents Name and rank of individual that were received. This corrective action can be received the CED. completed swiftly if that unit's captured 17 DTG and place of capture (as listed on document log was filled out completely. If the captured document tag). necessary the trace action continues to other elements that have handled the docu- Identity of the capturing units (as ment. If a captured document tag is listed on the captured document tag). unavailable from elements that have pre- Document category (after screening). viously handled the CED, the document Description of the CED (at a minimum examiner fills out a captured document tag the description includes the original for the document using whatever informa- language; number of pages; type of tion is available. Attempts to obtain miss- document such as map, letter, photo- ing CEDs are critical because of the infor- graph, and so forth; and the enemy's mation those CEDs might contain. identification number for the CED, if available). 13 Destination and identification number of the outgoing transmittal. Remarks (other information that can assist the unit in identifying the CED to include processing codes. These are set up by local SOP to denote all actions taken with the document while at the element, including SALUTE reports, translations, reproductions, or return of the CED to the source from whom it was taken). Accountability for the CED should be established at each echelon once the actions described above have been accomplished. UNIT:

FILE RECEIVED DOCUMENT INCOMING FORWARDING RECEIVED BY TIME AND PLACE OF NUMBER DTG SERIAL TRANSMIS- UNIT CAPTURE (DTG) NUMBER SlON NUMBER

C) B w -I aC um u 0 C)

mE Z -I r 0 G) CAPTURING UNIT SCREENING DESCRIPTION OF OUTGOING REMARKS CATEGORY DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL

- DOCUMENTS REQUIRING SPECIAL possess qualified personnel to provide the HANDLING translation support required. Intelligence units ensure that there is no delay in the Technical Documents exploitation of CEDs. Qualified personnel A technical document (TECHDOC)is a or document copying facilities should be document that pertains to equipment of any available to handle CEDs, and personnel type. A captured TECHDOC should be should be available to exploit the volume or evacuated with the equipment with which it type of documents concerned. If not, the was captured. If this is not possible, a cover documents are forwarded immediately to sheet should be attached, with the word the next higher echelon. Copying avail- "TECHDOC" written in large letters across ability is determined by the echelon in ques- the top. The capture data is listed the same tion, as well as mission and mobility as other CEDs, and the TECHDOC cover considerations. sheet should contain a detailed description of the equipment captured with the docu- ment. If possible, photographs of the CED SCREENING equipment should be taken, including a Document exploitation begins when per- ieasurement guide, and evacuated with the sonnel are available for document exploita- TECHDOC. tion operations. CEDs are screened for information of immediate intelligence inter- est; and as each document is screened, it is Communications and assigned one of the four following category Cryptographic designations. The category assigned deter- Documents mines the document's priority for exploita- CEDs containing communications or tion and evacuation. cryptographic information are handled as secret material and are evacuated through Document Categories secure channels to the technical control and Category A. Category A documents con- ' analysis element (TCAE). tain SALUTE-reportableinformation, are time sensitive, contain significant intelli- DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION gence information, and may be critical to the successful accomplishment of friendly As incoming CEDs are accounted for, the courses of action. Significant intelligence exploitation phase for intelligence informa- topics include the enemy's OB, new weap- tion begins. Exploitation includes- ons or equipment on the battlefield, and CED screening to determine potential may contain information that indicates a intelligence value. significant change in the enemy's capabili- ties or intentions. When a document is iden- Extracting pertinent information from tified as category A, the document examiner the CED. immediately ceases screening operations Reporting the extracted information. and submits a SALUTE report of the criti- cal information from the document. The examiner then resumes screening CEDs are processed and exploited as soon as possible within the constraints of the operations. unit's mission. The main mission of some Category B. Category B documents con- units is the exploitation of human sources tain information pertaining to enemy cryp- rather than the translation of CEDs; there- tographic or communications systems. fore, manpower constraints may limit the Once a document is identified as category time that can be devoted to translation. B, it is considered to be classified secret. However, the translation of CEDs is neces- This is done to limit the number of people sary at any echelon where interrogators having knowledge of either the capture or and translators are assigned. It is impor- its contents. A category B document may tant, therefore, that interrogation elements contain SALUTE-reportableinformation, thereby requiring immediate exploitation. In every case, category B documents will be Navy-Related Documents. Documents transferred through secure channels to the taken from ships (code books, call signs, TCAE as soon as possible. frequency tables, identification symbols, Category C. Category C documents con- and so forth) are forwarded without delay to tain no SALUTE-reportableor time- the nearest Navy headquarters. sensitive information but do contain infor- mation that is of general intelligence value Recording Document Category that does not indicate significant changes in the enemy's capabilities or intentions. A The category assigned to each CED is category C document may be of interest or recorded as part of the captured document of value to other agencies. When identified log entry for that CED. The entry includes a as category C, it requires exploitation, brief description of the CED. This regardless of the content. description- Category D. Category D documents Identifies the CED by type (sound appear to contain only information that is recording, written material, painting, of no intelligence value. Documents are not engraving, imagery, and so forth). identified as category D until after a Identifies the language used in the thorough examination by document trans- CED. lation specialists at the highest command interested. This is accomplished at EAC. Specifies the physical construction of Category D documents are to be disposed of the CED (typed, printed, handwritten, as directed by the appropriate authority. tape cassette, photographs, film, and so forth). Gives some indication of the size Special Document Handling (number of pages, rolls of film, Technical Documents. TECHDOCs, con- cassette, and so forth). taining information associated with specific items of enemy equipment, are given special Screening at Higher Echelons handling to expedite their exploitation and evacuation. TECHDOCs are handled as CEDs can be recategorized during screen- category A CEDs until screened by techni- ing conducted at higher echelons. The cal intelligence personnel. Generally, information may have become outdated, or TECHDOCs accompany the captured the echelon currently exploiting the docu- equipment until the intelligence exploita- ment may have different intelligence tion is completed. TECHDOCs include requirements. maintenance handbooks, operational manu- als, and drawings. TRANSLATING Air Force-Related Documents. Docu- Once a CED has been screened, the docu- ments of any category that are captured ment must be exploited. The translator from crashed enemy aircraft, particularly if must be able to translate the document. For they are related to enemy antiaircraft anyone else to gain benefit from the docu- defense or enemy air control and reporting ment translation, it must be clearly and systems, are transmitted to the nearest Air accurately written (typed or handwritten). Force headquarters without delay. Also, as part of interrogation duties, the interrogator may have previously trans- Maps and Charts ofEnemy Forces. lated a document by sight to help gain a Captured maps and charts, containing any source's cooperation. operational graphics, are evacuated imme- diately to the supporting all-source analysis Types of Translations center. Captured maps and charts without graphics may be transmitted to the topo- Full Translation.A full translation is one graphical intelligence section attached to in which the entire document is translated. corps. It is very manpower- and time-intensive, especially for lengthy or technical docu- the need for complete exploitation of the ments. It is unlikely that many full transla- document against the time available in tions will be performed at corps or below. combat operations. A summary translation Even when dealing with category A docu- may also be used by translators working in ments, it may not be necessary to translate languages in which they have not been the entire document to gain the information formally trained. For instance, a Russian it contains. linguist may not be able to accurately deliver a full translation of a Bulgarian Extract Translation. An extract transla- language document. However, he can proba- tion is one in which only a portion of the bly render a usable summary of the infor- document is translated. For instance, a technical intelligence analyst may decide mation it contains. that a few paragraphs in the middle of a Translation Reports 600-page helicopter maintenance manual merit translation and a full translation of Except for SALUTE reports, all informa- the manual is not necessary. Therefore, he tion resulting from document exploitation would request an extract translation of the activities will be reported in a translation portion of the text in which he has an report (see the following illustration for a interest. sample translation report). After all required SALUTE reports have been sub- Summary Translation. A translator be- mitted, the translator will prepare any gins a summary translation by reading the required translation reports. CEDs that entire document. The translator then sum- contain information of intelligence value marizes the main points of information that was not SALUTE reported are the sub- instead of rendering a full translation or an ject of translation reports. Translation extract translation. This type of translation reports are prepared on all category C requires that a translator have more analy- CEDs and include portions of category A, tical abilities. The translator must balance TECHDOCs, and category B CEDs not SALUTE reported. SAMPLE TRANSLATION REPORT

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE: 231500ZAug85 TO: G2, V Corps

FROM: Team 1, IPW Section, REPORT NUMBER: 08-0356 241st MI Bn, 23d Div (Armd), V Corps

PART I: CONTROL DATA

1. DOCUMENT NUMBER: US-WAIBVO-03093 2. DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: Personal letter, 1 page, handwritten, mentions a tank factory disguised as a sugar processing plant, and school teachers and elderly people working in factories 3. DOCUMENT'S ORIGINAL LANGUAGE: Russian 4. DATE AND TIME RECEIVED: 240847ZAug85 5. DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE: 230923ZAug85 6. PLACE OF CAPTURE: NB640320 7. CAPTURING UNIT: All-50513182 ABN DIV 8. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE: Found in an abandoned enemy CP. 9. TRANSLATOR: SSG Schnurbart 10. TYPE OF TRANSLATION: Full

PART 11: TEXT OF TRANSLATION

My dear Serezhen'ka: It has been a long time since Ireceived a letter from you. How are and where are you? The last time you wrote that fighting was going on around you all the time, and this worries me alot. Take care of yourself. There have been many changes at home. Your mother, des- pite her age, had to go to work in the factory. They make tanks there, but the sign over the entrance says this is a sugar plant. I don't know why they do this. At the school where I work, we were also told to go and work at the same plant. They are going to close the school. Everyone has either to go to the front or work in the war industry. This is necessary in order to speed up the victory over the enemy of our country. Iwould be more at ease if I knew that you are alive and well. Please write as soon as you can. Your KATHY.

UNCLASSIFIED Priorities. The priority for the preparation Reports Dissemination and Records. of translation reports is- At least two copies are prepared for each SALUTE and translation report. One copy Category A. is placed in the interrogation element's TECHDOCs. files. The other accompanies the CED when Category B. it is evacuated. When the CED cannot be fully exploited, a copy of the CED should be Category C. made and retained. The original CED is forwarded through evacuation channels. Format. A translation report should con- Even when copies of an unexploited CED tain the following information: cannot be made, the original CED is still Destination. The element to which the forwarded through evacuation channels report will be forwarded. without delay. Originator. The element which pre- pared the report. EVACUATION PROCEDURES Date of preparation. For friendly forces to benefit from a docu- Report number as designated by local ment to the greatest extent possible, send SOP. CEDs to the element most qualified to exploit them as quickly as possible. Infor- Document number taken from the cap- mation gained from a CED is frequently tured document tag. time sensitive. If a document is not sent to Document description including the element most capable of exploiting it, number of pages, type of document, time will be lost. Any time lost in exploiting and enemy identification number. the document may reduce or even negate Original language of the CED. the value of the information. The CED evacuation procedures in use at any ele- DTG document was received at the ment must ensure that documents are element preparing the report. shipped to their proper destinations in a DTG document was captured. timely manner. Place document was captured. NORMAL EVACUATION Circumstances under which the docu- ment was captured. CEDs are normally evacuated from echelon to echelon through the intelligence Identity of capturing unit. organizational chain. The capturing unit Rank and full name of the translator. evacuates the CEDs to the first intelligence Remarks for clarification or explana- section, usually the battalion S2. The bat- tion, including the identification of the talion evacuates them to brigade, brigade to portions of the document translated in division, division to corps, and then, to an extract translation. EAC. Depending on the type of documents they may, then, be evacuated to the Classification and downgrading National Center for Document Exploitation. instructions, according to AR 380-5. Take care to protect the document from weather, soil, and wear. Interrogators and translators can exploit CEDs at every Dissemination and Records echelon and will make an attempt to exploit Recording in Captured Document Log. CEDs within their expertise and technical The translator records each exploitation support constraints. step taken in the captured document log. Transmission of SALUTE and translation DIRECT EVACUATION reports is entered in the element's journal. Some CEDs are evacuated to different elements based upon the information con- tained and the type of document concerned. Direct evacuation to an element outside the TRANSMITTAL DOCUMENTS chain of command takes place at the lowest practical echelon. The previous guidelines, When CEDs are evacuated from any eche- discussed in evacuation procedures, are fol- lon, a document transmittal is used (see the lowed when dealing with documents requir- following illustration for a sample CED ing special handling. transmittal). A separate document trans- mittal is prepared for each group of CEDs to be evacuated. When second copies of EVACUATION PRIORITIES category B CEDs are being sent to a techni- cal intelligence element, a separate docu- When transportation assets are limited, ment transmittal is required. The transmit- CEDs are evacuated according to priority. tal identification number is recorded in the The priority is the category assigned to the captured document log as part of the entry CED. All category A CEDs will be evacu- for each CED. The exact format for a docu- ated first, TECHDOCs will be considered ment transmittal is a matter of local SOP, category A CEDs until examined by the but it should contain the information listed captured material exploitation center below: (CMEC), followed in order by categories B, C, and D. The identity of the element to which the CEDs are to be evacuated. Category B documents are evacuated to the TCAE, which maintains a signals intel- The identity of the unit forwarding the ligence (SIGINT) and EW data base. Cate- CEDs. gory B documents, pertaining to communi- Whether or not the CEDs in the pack- cations equipment, are duplicated if age have been screened and the screen- possible, and the duplicate documents are ing category. (If not screened, NA is sent to the CMEC. circled.) CEDs that are not evacuated are held The identification number of the docu- until the next transportation arrives. These ment transmittal. remaining CEDs are combined with any A list of the document serial numbers other CEDs of the same category that have of the CEDs in the package. arrived and have been processed in the meantime. When determining evacuation priorities, interrogators consider all CEDs that are ready for evacuation. Lower pri- ority CEDs, no matter how old, are never evacuated ahead of those with higher pri- ority. A package of documents contains documents of only one category. All unscreened CEDs are handled as category C documents, but they are not packaged with screened category C documents. CEDs in a single package must have the same destination. SAMPLE CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL

CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL

TO: DATEITIME:

FROM: TRANSMITTAL NO:

SCREENED: YES NO CATEGORY: A B C D NIA

DOCUMENT SERIAL NUMBERS: COVER SHEETS AND ATTACHED tion process and can contain reportable DOCUMENTS information the same as with a CED obtained on the battlefield. During source All CEDs being evacuated must be screening operations, for instance, docu- accompanied with the appropriate- ments can indicate that a specific source 0 TECHDOC cover sheet. may have information pertaining to the commander's intelligence requirements. O SECRET cover sheet on category B The interrogator uses various pieces of documents. information in forming his interrogation o Translation reports and hard-copy plan. Documents captured with the source SALUTE reports accompanying trans- may provide the key to the approach neces- lated documents. sary to gain the source's cooperation. O Captured document tags. Guidelines for the disposition of the source's documents and valuables are set by ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS international agreement and discussed in The preparations for further CED evacua- more detail in AR 190-8and FM 19-40. tion begin with verifying the document Additionally, one way the source's trust and serial numbers by comparing the entry in continued cooperation can be gained is the captured document log with the entry through fair and equitable handling of his on the captured document tag attached to personal possessions. In some instances, each CED. Once all CEDs are present, such treatment can make it more likely that copies of all reports derived from the CEDs the source will cooperate during interroga- are assembled. A copy of all SALUTE and tion questioning. Furthermore, fair treat- translation reports is placed with the CEDs ment by the interrogator and the holding that were the sources of those reports. When- area personnel can ease tensions in the con- ever possible, all category B CEDs and their finement facility. captured document tags should be copied. DISPOSAL OF DOCUMENTS GROUP DOCUMENTS The disposition of documents captured CEDs are first grouped according to their with a source is normally a function of the assigned screening code. Personnel must be military police and other holding area per- careful when sorting the CEDs to ensure sonnel. Because of their language capabili- that no CED is separated from its asso- ties, the interrogators at the compound will ciated documents. These large groupings probably be required to provide assistance can then be broken down into smaller and guidance. The military police sign for groups. Each of these smaller groupings all documents taken from sources; and to consists of CEDs that were- ensure proper handling and most expedi- tious disposition of these documents, the Captured by the same unit. interrogation element should sign for any Captured in the same place. documents captured with a source. When the interrogation element assumes control Captured on the same day at the same of documents, they process them according time. to established procedures. Received at the interrogation element When documents are captured with a at the same time. source, the immediate reaction is to take

DOCUMENTS CAPTURED WITH A SOURCE The documents captured with a source play a very important role in the interroga- them away from him so that he cannot de- Impounded stroy them. In general, this is good, but Impounded CEDs are taken away with there is one major exception. Under no cir- the intention of returning them at a later cumstances is a source's identification card time. When a document is impounded, the to be taken from him. source must be given a receipt. The receipt must contain a list of the items impounded When documents are taken from a source, and the legible name, rank, and unit of the it is necessary to ensure the source from person issuing the receipt. All personal whom they were taken can be identified. effects, including monies and other valu- The easiest way to accomplish this is with ables, will be safeguarded. An inventory of the source's captive tag (see standardized personal effects that have been impounded captive tag in Appendix D). The bottom will be entered on DA Form 4237-R (Appen- portion of the tag is designed to be used for dix B). Also, DA Form 1132 will be com- marking equipment or documents. Three pleted and signed by the officer in charge or possible actions may be taken with docu- authorized representative. A copy will be ments captured with a source. The docu- provided the source. Further procedures for ments may be confiscated, impounded, or the handling of personal effects are pro- returned to the source. vided in AR 190-8.

Confiscation Returned Documents confiscated from a source are Returned CEDs are usually personal in taken away with no intention of returning nature, taken only for inspection and them. Official documents, except identifica- information of interest, and immediately tion documents, are confiscated and appro- given back to the source. Personal docu- priately evacuated. The intelligence value of ments belonging to a source will be returned the document should be weighed against to the source after examination in accor- the document's support in the interrogation dance with the Geneva Convention. Copies of the source. Category A documents require of such papers may be made and forwarded exploitation and should be copied. One copy if considered appropriate. An identification should be translated and exploited sepa- document must be returned to the source. rately, and the other copy should be evacu- ated with the source. If copying facilities are not available, a decision should be made RECOGNITION AND EVACUATION on whether to evacuate the document with OF DOCUMENTS the source or evacuate it separately. Cate- In a fast-moving tactical situation, it is gory B CEDs should be evacuated to the possible that documents captured with, TCAE for appropriate exploitation. Cate- sources will not be handled expediously. gory C official documents can best be used Final disposition of these documents may in the interrogation of the source. Therefore, not be made until the source is evacuated at these CEDs and category D official docu- least as far as the corps holding area. Some ments should be evacuated with the source. documents captured with a source will aid in the interrogation of the source. Others, particularly category A documents, should be copied and evacuated separately. One copy can then remain with the source to aid in the interrogation, and the other can be translated and exploited separately. This makes it particularly important for the cap- turing unit to correctly identify the docu- ments captured with the source. This is more easily done when the interrogation element rather than the military police ele- Documents captured with a source are ment signs for the documents captured with subject to the same screening and exploita- sources. tion procedures as those found on the bat- tlefield. These documents are categorized as category A, B, C, or D. Category A docu- EVACUATION OF SIGNIFICANT ments have SALUTE reportable informa- DOCUMENTS tion extracted and are copied, if possible. A For more efficient exploitation of CEDs copy can then be used to aid in the exploita- and sources, documents captured with a tion of the source, and the other copy is sent source are normally evacuated with the forward for prompt exploitation and trans- source. A document of great significance lation. Category B documents should be may be evacuated ahead of the source, but a treated as secret and evacuated to the reproduction should be made and kept with TCAE. Category C documents are exploited. the source. If reproduction is not possible, A category C document may also require the captured document tags should be copying and evacuation. Official documents annotated as to where the document was should be evacuated through document sent. Significant documents such as cate- evacuation channels. If they would aid in gory A documents and TECHDOCs, Cate- the interrogation of a source, personal gory B documents, maps, charts, and Air documents may require similar copying. Force- and Navy-related documents are evacuated directly.

ACCOUNTABILITY OF DOCUMENTS The evacuation of documents captured with a source follows the same account- ability procedures as with documents found on the battlefield. The capturing unit pre- pares a captive tag listing details pertain- ing to the source and the place and circum- stances of capture. The bottom portion is used to list documents captured with the source. CHAPTER 5 Direct and Supervise Interrogation Operations

The direction and supervision of interro- important information which may become gation operations are critical to the success- available between liaison visits. ful performance of the interrogation ele- ment's mission. Direction and supervision are the responsibility of the senior interro- gator. These responsibilities fall into three PREPARE AND MOVE TO THE categories: Advising, coordinating, and DEPLOYMENT SITE directing actual interrogation operations. The intelligence annex of the supported FM 34-80 provides guidance for brigade and unit's OPORD indicates the exact location battalion IEW operations, and FM 34-25 of the holding area. Once this is known, the provides guidance for corps IEW opera- senior interrogator ensures the interroga- tions. The supervisory duties discussed in tion team moves to that location. Interroga- this chapter are- tion elements deploy with little more than Advice and assistance. their personal weapons and equipment. Prepare and move to deployment site. Assigned vehicles and radios may not be sufficient to move the entire element; espe- Establish a site for interrogation cially, when the element is deploying to operations. more than one site. The senior interrogator Supervise the interrogation process. makes arrangements for transportation and determines when it will be provided. Inter- Supervise the CED exploitation cycle. rogation elements are not equipped for Supervise administrative tasks. small unit movements. Unaccompanied deployment is a dangerous procedure and should be avoided. When this cannot be ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE done, the following steps must be con- sidered to minimize danger during The senior interrogator coordinates and movement: provides input to both the parent MI unit's S2 and S3 and the supported echelon's intel- Confirm the element's exact ligence staff. This includes reviewing source destination. evacuation plans and estimates, as well as Obtain a safe route from the supported advising on the capabilities and limitations command, if this is not possible, then, of the interrogation element. He must be select the route offering the best pro- able to discuss and provide advice on the tective terrain. interrogation element's deployment in order Identify checkpoint locations along the to most effectively support the intelligence route. If checkpoints are not available, collection effort. To accomplish this, the radio contact on a periodic basis senior interrogator must be familiar with should be established with the parent the intelligence annex to the supported MI unit. echelon's operations order (OPORD). In addition, the senior interrogator must con- Obtain current call signs, frequencies, stantly coordinate with the division or and passwords for unit areas that will corps G2, the interrogation teams, and the be crossed during the movement. intelligence staffs of supported echelons. This is done preferably through liaison vis- Coordinate with all affected units. The its to these elements. This coordination is safest method for deploying the inter- critical to ensure that information and rogation element is to have them information updates are passed to the inter- accompany one or more of the sup- rogation teams and, in turn, are passed to ported echelon's subordinate units as OB personnel in an orderly, accurate, and they deploy. This method should be timely manner. This ensures access to used whenever possible. When it is used, the senior interrogator must portation of the source from the hold- determine exactly when the element ing area to the interrogation opera- must arrive at the assembly area, the tions area. element's position within the march Evacuation. Evacuation procedures order, and what call signs, frequencies, should have been previously estab- and passwords will be used during the lished. These procedures should be dis- movement. cussed so that all concerned are famili- ar with time constraints and ESTABLISH A SITE FOR procedures of exactly when and who INTERROGATION should be evacuated. Communications. Arrangements for OPERATIONS receiving and transmitting message Once the interrogation element has traffic must be made with the C-E arrived at the designated holding area, the officer. These arrangements must pro- senior interrogator establishes a site for vide for primary and alternate electri- interrogation operations. The senior inter- cal and courier channels. rogator coordinates with the military police to ensure that the site is set up to enable Site preparation. An interrogation operations between the interrogation opera- element must contain as a minimum, tions and the holding area. He also contacts an operations and administrative area the commander responsible for the opera- as well as specific areas to conduct tional area. This commander authorizes a interrogations. If the element will be specific location close to the holding area exploiting CEDs, an area must also be and within its secure perimeter as the site designated for this activity. for interrogation operations. The interroga- The area, for the conduct of individual tion element's mission does not include per- interrogations, is established in such a way forming its own perimeter security. The as to ensure that interrogations taking senior interrogator also contacts the officer place in one area cannot be heard by per- in charge of the holding area and coordi- sonnel in another area. At a minimum, the nates the following: interrogations area, whether a tent or a building, must have enough space to Screening site. A specific site for accommodate the interrogator, source, screening sources must be selected and guard, and an interpreter, if needed. Each agreed upon. The site must enable the area should have a table and at least three screener to observe the sources while chairs. A light is required for night opera- they are inprocessed and segregated., tions. Field expedient replacements for this The site, however, must be shielded equipment are used as necessary. from the direct view of, and far enough away from the sources so they cannot see, hear, or overhear screening SUPERVISE THE conversations. INTERROGATION Medical support. Procedures must be PROCESS established to verify that any sick or wounded personnel have been treated The senior interrogator ensures that the and released by authorized medical interrogation process is started immediately personnel for interrogation. upon receipt of the source. This process is continuous and can become confused if the Guards. Arrangements must be made senior interrogator does not closely super- for guards to escort each source vise the timely and orderly conduct of each selected for interrogation. The guard step in the process. The three steps in the should accompany the source through- process are screening, interrogation, and out the interrogation process. reporting. Movement. Routes and procedures for 'movement must be arranged for trans- SCREENING REPORTING Screening determines who will be interro- The senior interrogator ensures that all gated on a priority basis and in many cases reports are prepared and submitted in an how many times a source will be interro- accurate and timely manner. SALUTE gated. For this reason, the successful reports must be generated immediately accomplishment of the intelligence collec- upon identification of information which tion effort depends on qualified screeners. satisfies an intelligence requirement. Other The senior interrogator designates his most reports which are generated by an interro- qualified interrogators as screeners. He gation must be correctly and accurately should not assign himself to screening prepared and submitted upon completion of operations. This cannot always be avoided, the interrogation. however, but must be kept to a minimum. The senior interrogator ensures that all He is required to supervise all steps of the reports generated in the interrogation pro- interrogation process. cess are transmitted within established time frames. Transmission procedures and INTERROGATION time frames should have already been dis- The senior interrogator ensures that cussed and verified with the site communi- sources are assigned for interrogation cations officer upon arrival to the holding according to the screening results. This area. method of assigning assures that the high- est probability of obtaining the maximum amount of pertinent information within the SUPERVISE THE CED time available is chosen. PROCESSING CYCLE The senior interrogator, then, assigns his The senior interrogator ensures that the subordinates to interrogate screened three steps of CED processing: account- sources. He does this by comparing infor- ability, exploitation, and evacuation are mation gained during the screening process correctly and rapidly conducted (see Chap- to the abilities (linguistic skills, technical ter 4). expertise, and special knowledge) of his subordinate interrogators. He then selects the interrogator best suited to conduct the SUPERVISE interrogation of a particular source. ADMINISTRATIVE At times, a situation will occur in which TASKS none of the available interrogators speaks the target language well enough to conduct The senior interrogator ensures that three an interrogation. When this occurs the major functions are accurate and kept senior interrogator coordinates with Sl/Gl updated. These are maintaining the for procurement of native interpreters. The SITMAP, updating the collection mission, senior interrogator maintains a list of and maintaining the Army files. available interpreters. He compares this list with the qualifications of his subordinate interrogators and the information listed on SITUATION MAP the screening report. Based on this compari- He ensures that the SITMAP is kept son, the senior interrogator can then assign updated by posting all known enemy units the best qualified interpreter and interroga- and activities within the supported unit's tor. Interrogators must monitor interpreters area of operations, according to the intelli- periodically to ensure their performance is gence summary (INTSUM), intelligence according to the standards established by report (INTREP),periodic intelligence the senior interrogator. report (PERINTREP), and other intelli- gence reports. In addition, he ensures any dispositions obtained through interroga- tions are posted to the SITMAP as accu- rately as the information will allow. COLLECTION MISSION rials, and blank forms that the interroga- UPDATE tion element has in its possession. The same files must be generated for any docu- Through previously discussed liaison vis- ments, reference materials, and blank forms its and established communications, he that may be acquired or generated during ensures that all subordinate interrogators day-to-day interrogation operations. He are kept abreast of any changes to the col- ensures that these files are established, lection mission. maintained, and disposed of according to AR 25-400-2. MODERN ARMY BOOKKEEPING SYSTEM He ensures that files have been estab- lished for any documents, reference mate- CHAPTER 6 Operational Environment

Interrogation operations are conducted timely reporting. Experience indicates that within the context of the supported unit's a division involved in a high intensity con- day-to-day combat operations; This chapter flict may have to process between 525 and will describe the interaction of interrogation 5,300 sources per week. While these figures elements with the echelons they support. are estimates, they demonstrate the inabili- ty of a division's own interrogators to simultaneously exploit both sources and COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS CEDs. Divisions may receive additional interrogation assets from corps, depending Interrogation assets are not organic to on their mission. Prior planning must be echelons below division except armored conducted to establish the availability of cavalry regiments (ACRs) and separate bri- these assets, and their deployment within gades. At every echelon, division and the division. higher, interrogators are assigned to the MI unit supporting that echelon. MI unit com- The density of interrogation assets and manders are responsible for these assets command emphasis on the collection effort and should become personally involved in determines mission requirements. The feasi- two key decisions affecting interrogators: bility of a dual collection mission may also be the result of initial IPB by the com- Which collection target, sources, or mander's intelligence staff. If an echelon CEDs will be given command priority. cannot conduct a dual collection effort, Where interrogators will be deployed interrogation of sources has traditionally within the area of operations. received the priority for two important reasons: The greater intelligence potential of a COLLECTION PRIORITY source. As previously noted, interrogators are The rate at which people forget trained to exploit sources and CEDs. This detailed information. allows the all-source collection manager three exploitation options for the interroga- An individual's value system is easier to tion assets. They may exploit sources alone, bypass immediately after undergoing a sig- CED alone, or attempt to exploit both nificant traumatic experience. Capture, and simultaneously. In the past it was assumed the circumstances surrounding it, is signifi- that interrogators could accomplish the cantly traumatic for most sources. Many dual collection mission no matter what type former Vietnam prisoners of war indicated of combat operations were being supported. that a ~eriodof extreme disorientation This may no longer be true. Unit manning, occurred immediately after capture. Capture coupled with the amount of CEDs and thrust them into a totally foreign environ- sources, may prevent exploitation of both ment over which they had no control. The sources and CEDs simultaneously. standards of behavior and conduct which they had previously accepted and lived by Combat since World War I1 indicates that were of no use to them during this period. the volume of CEDs alone will overwhelm Most of them survived this initial period by an interrogation element the size of that clinging to very basic values (love of family being projected for a heavy division. A flow and loyalty to friends or comrades). Human of CEDs similar to that encountered in beings are very adaptable, however, and Grenada will supply enough targets to keep this initial vulnerability passes rather a light division's interrogators busy quickly. An individual's established values around-the-clock just screening and cate- begin to assert themselves again within a gorizing the CEDs. Any attempt to conduct day or two. When this happens, much of an deeper exploitation would result in a tre- individual's susceptibility to interrogation mendous evacuation delay and the end of is gone. Memory stores information in two areas: even greater between 24 and 72 hours. The The five senses constantly transmit infor- percentage of information available from mation to the brain's short-term sources drops sharply during the first 24 memory. This data is stored there tempo- hours after capture. This represents the rarily and then shifted to the brain's rapid loss of what sources would consider to long-term memory. The time at which be insignificant details. A slower drop in this transfer takes place varies widely, but the percentage begins at 48 hours to repre- research shows that a great amount of sent the resurgence of established value detail is lost during that transfer. Studies systems. This resurgence makes it harder conducted on classroom learning indicate for interrogators to obtain what informa- that even though students know informa- tion the source still remembers. tion stressed in class is important, by the next day most of the information is forgot- The supported echelon's intelligence ten. The percentage of information lost officer determines the guidelines for priority beyond recall varies from study to study, of exploitation. The commander's intelli- but a 70-percent figure is a conservative gence needs and the G2's or S2's estimate of estimate. Much of the information of value the enemy's intentions dictate the extent to to the interrogator is information that the which these guidelines can be applied. source is not even aware he has. Although Exploitation priorities are reviewed and no research data is available in this area, it changed when needed. is reasonable to assume that this type of information will be lost even faster than classroom learning. CEDs, while not affected by memory loss, are often time sensitive and are screened for possible exploitation as quickly as possible. Interrogators were given the CED exploita- tion mission because of their linguistic ability. This makes printed and typed mate- rial readily exploitable, but many handwrit- ten documents are illegible. Information contained in undeveloped imagery and recordings is inaccessible to most interroga- tion elements. The intelligence value of painted, drawn, or engraved material can- not be exploited by many elements unless it is accomplished by explanatory informa- tion in writing. An example of this would be an overlay prepared without map data, reg- istration points, orjdentifying terrain fea- tures. In spite of these limitations, an esti- mated 90 percent of all the information contained in CEDs can be exploited. The following illustration shows a comparison along a time line of the amounts of infor- mation available to the interrogator from the two collection targets. The comparison assumes that the CEDs and the sources initially had the same amount of informa- tion, and that it was of equal intelligence value. Bear in mind that the figures used are conservative estimates, and that the time between the two target types might be ACCESSIBLE INFORMATION OVERTIME.

100 -

90 -

80 -

70 -

Z 0- ka 60 - I a 0 L -z 50 - LL 0 I- Z W 0 40 - a aW 30 -

20 -

EPWS OR SOURCES 10 -

I I I I I I I

0 8 16 24 32 40 48 56 64 72

TIME SINCE CAPTURE IN HOURS DEPLOYMENT SITES slower, exploiting fewer sources over a given period of time. Interrogation assets are not mobile enough to be quickly shifted in response to The last important factor that should be new developments. The initial deployment considered in making deployment decisions of these assets are guided by the exploita- is the area in which operations are to be tion priority established by the commander. conducted. This area must be capable of Operations are conducted at an echelon providing the support required by the inter- that will allow interrogators the best oppor- rogation element. This support includes- tunity to satisfy their assigned collection Priority access to reliable means of mission. When making the deployment secure communications. decision, the following should also be considered: Adequate shelter and security. Number of interrogators available. A flow of CEDs and sources to exploit. Type and intensity of anticipated com- bat operations. TASKING RELATIONSHIPS Support available at subordinate units. The MI unit commander retains overall The number of interrogators available responsibility for the interrogators assigned limit the number of deployment sites that to his unit. The manner in which these can be used. MI commanders at corps con- interrogators are tasked depends on how sider how many interrogators will be avail- the MI unit is task organized for combat. If able for interrogation operations after aug- interrogators are deployed in general sup- mentation has been provided to subordinate port (GS) of the division, the MI battalion divisions. The number of interrogators also commander tasks them through his S3 and plays a key role in deciding the level of the battalion tactical operations center intense or sustained collection operations (TOC). If interrogators are deployed in they can conduct. direct support (DS) of a division's subordi- nate units, they are tasked by the com- Intense collection employs all available mander of that unit through his S2. If at- interrogators with little or no provision for tached to an IEW company, team tasking is them to rest. The major disadvantage of directed through the team commander. The intense collection is that these interrogators officers responsible for tasking interroga- become exhausted quickly. Interrogations tion elements ensure that the following amount to prolonged conversations under steps are accomplished: extreme stress. Once the available interro- gators are exhausted, collection stops until Collection missions that reflect the they recover or additional assets arrive. A capabilities and limitations of interro- severe decrease in interrogation effective- gators are assigned. ness can be expected to begin between 12 Interrogation reports are integrated and 18 hours after the onset of intense col- with information provided by other lection. Eighteen hours should be consid- collectors during the IPB process. ered the maximum period possible for intense collection. This kind of all-out effort Copies of the INTSUM, INTREP, can be justified when critical information PERINTREP, daily intelligence sum- must be obtained or confirmed quickly to mary (DISUM), and supplementary forestall a major disaster. Similar problems intelligence report (SUPINTREP) are can be expected during intense CED exploi- disseminated to the interrogation ele- tation. Sustained operations can be main- ment as they are published. tained for indefinite periods of time. They Close contact is maintained with the also allow the commander some rested interrogation element. interrogators to use on a contingency basis in a different location. The disadvantage of sustained collection is that operations are COLLECTION MISSIONS obtained from sources often identify general locations that imagery intelligence (IMINT) Once the IPB process has produced initial or SIGINT collectors can further exploit to results, all identified intelligence gaps are produce targeting data. addressed by detailed collection require- ments. Any PIR and IR requesting informa- tion that interrogators can collect are iden- INTELLIGENCE DISSEMINATION tified. The PIR and IR are then con- solidated into a collection mission and Intelligence is used by interrogators as a assigned to the interrogation element. The source of prepared and control questions assigned collection mission is tailored (see Chapter 3). The CM&D section or BICC according to the capabilities and limita- ensures that current copies of the INTSUM, tions of interrogators (see,Chapter2). INTREP, PERINTREP, SUPINTREP, Tailoring collection missions ensures that DISUM, and any other intelligence reports all intelligence gaps are covered and avoids are provided to the interrogation element. unnecessary duplication. Intelligence is also used to revise and refine the objectives of interrogation operations, to Collection missions are tailored and update the element's OB data base, and to assigned by the collection management and keep the element's threat SITMAP current. dissemination (CM&D)section subordinate to the G2 at corps and division. The same functions are performed at brigade and bat- CONTACT talion by the battlefield information control The CM&D section (through the MI bat- center (BICC). These elements ensure that talion TOC) or the BICC maintains close the assigned collection mission is passed by contact with the interrogation element. This secure means, through established chan- contact allows a two-way flow of communi- nels, to the interrogation element. In addi- cation. The CM&D section or BICC needs tion to PIR and IR, the assigned collection the contact to accomplish the collection mission includes- mission, IPB interrogation, and intelligence Specific events about which informa- dissemination. They also use the contact to tion is required. revise the interrogation element's collection mission as required. The interrogation ele- Time frames during which the events ment requires the contact to ensure that it must have occurred to be of value. receives current guidance, direction, and The date on which the information will assistance in solving collection problems. no longer be of value. Channels to be used to report the SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS information collected. Successful interrogation operations Higher, lower, and adjacent units require support from a number of elements authorized to receive copies of reported within their echelon of assignment, includ- information. ing all of the major staff organizations. These elements are collectively responsible for the planning that creates the overall INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION environment for interrogators. The intelli- OF THE BATTLEFIELD gence staff's (G2 or S2) direct contribution INTEGRATION to interrogation operations has already The CM&D section or the BICC must been discussed. Its general responsibilities ensure that information reported by the are outlined below, along with those of interrogation element is integrated with other staff andsupport elements. information collected by other intelligence disciplines during the IPB process. One major value of interrogation operations is PERSONNEL (GI AND S1) that information obtained can cue other col- The G1 and S1 are responsible for: super- lection systems. Mission statements vising the medical support furnished to sources, maintaining a list (by language the employment of additional personnel as and proficiency) of qualified linguists guards. It is also responsible for- within their command, and coordinating Training of military police and guard with the G5 for procurement and payment personnel. of other interpreters and translators needed to perform both intelligence and nonintelli- Providing G2 and S2 with details of gence duties. The G1 and S1 ensure that the planned operations. echelon's operations plan contains complete provisions for source handling and evacua- Planning and supervising all PSYOP tion. This plan must satisfy the interests of activities in support of tactical all other staff officers, as well as STANAG operations. 2044 (see Appendix A for an extract). Its Evaluating, in coordination with the provisions must cover the following G2 and the G5, enemy PYSOP efforts principles: and the effectiveness of friendly PSYOP on target groups. Humane treatment of all sources. Prompt evacuation from the combat zone. SUPPLY (G4 AND S4) Opportunities to interrogate sources. The G4 and S4 are responsible for the storage and maintenance of supplies and Integration of procedures for the equipment needed by subordinate units to evacuation, control, and administra- conduct source handling operations. They tion of sources with other combat sup- are responsible for delivering supplies and port and combat service support (CSS) equipment to subordinate units as they are operations (through the provost needed. They also supervise- marshal). Acquisition of real estate and the con- Training for all troops on the provi- struction of source holding area facili- sions of international agreements and ties in the communications zone regulations relating to sources. (COMMZ). Collection and distribution of captured INTELLIGENCE (G2 AND S2) enemy supplies. This is coordinated with the intelligence and operations The G2 and S2 are responsible for super- staffs. vising appropriate censorship activities relating to sources. They are also respon- Procurement and distribution of sible for- rations to source holding areas. Cap- tured enemy rations will be used to the Projecting source capture flows. greatest extent possible. Determining the number of interpre- Determination of requirements for use ters and translators needed to perform of source labor for the logistical sup- intelligence duties. port needed in source handling Controlling the procedures used to pro- operations. cess and grant clearances to the inter- Provide logistical support to interpre- preters and translators who need them. ter personnel.

OPERATIONS (G3 AND S3) The G3 and S3 are responsible for opera- tions, plans, organization, and training. Where military police assets are not avail- able, or not sufficient, they are responsible for obtaining, organizing, and supervising CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS ADDITIONAL SUPPORT (G5 AND S5) Besides the major staff elements, an The G5 and,S5 are responsible for civil interrogation element requires support from affairs (CA). They are also responsible for- several other elements in order to conduct Advising, assisting, and making operations. These elements include- recommendations that relate to Communications. Secure, reliable civil-military operations (CMO) and communications must be available at CA aspects of current or proposed or near the interrogation element's operations. deployment site. Priority access to Preparing estimates and conducting these communications must be studies and analyses for CMO arranged to support contact with col- activities. lection management. Preparing the portions of operations, Staff judge advocate. This element can administrative, and logistics plans and provide legal support and advice on orders concerning CMO activities. the interpretation and application of international regulations and agree- Determining the requirements for ments concerning handling of sources. resources to accomplish the CMO It is also a channel for reporting activities of the command, including known or suspected war crimes. CA units and personnel. Maintaining a list of native linguists Health service support. This element must clear all sick and wounded for interpreter support. sources before they can be interro- Coordinating with local US Govern- gated. Seriously sick and wounded ment representatives and host-nation sources are evacuated through medical armed forces for the procurement of channels. If adequate facilities are not native linguists for interpreter support. available in EPW hospitals, EPWs are Recommending command policy con- admitted to military or civilian medi- cerning obligations between civil and cal facilities where the required treat- military authorities and policy con- ment can be obtained. Medical inspec- cerning the population of the area of tions are made and the weight of each operations and its works and activities EPW is recorded at least once a month. arising from treaties, agreements, Provisions are made for the isolation international law, and US policy. of communicable cases, for disinfec- tion, and for inoculations. Retained Providing civil support for tactical and medical personnel and EPWs with CSS operations and for preventing medical training are used to the fullest civilian interference with these extent in caring for their own sick and operations. wounded. FM 8-2 and FM 8-10provide Coordinating military support of popu- guidance for health service support. lace and resource control programs. NBC protection. All EPWs will be pro- vided NBC protection. EPWs should be Providing technical advice and assis- allowed to use their own NBC protec- tance in the reorientation of sources tion equipment or if not feasible, the and enemy defectors. detaining forces will exchange the Coordinating the MI aspects of CMO EPWs' equipment for proper NBC activities with the G2 or S2. gear. If EPWs do not have their own NBC protection equipment, the detain- ing forces must provide them with proper NBC gear. Chaplain support. The unit ministry Area studies of the target countries team, chaplain, and chaplain assistant that emphasize the inhabitants and provide for religious support. Coordi- the economic, social, religious, and po- nation is made with the S5 and G5 for litical systems which shape the behav- religious support for refugees, dis- ior of those inhabitants. placed persons, and indigenous civil- ians. The unit ministry team provides Principles of human behavior that for services for EPWs or assists by emphasize the social and cultural supporting detained clergy of enemy characteristics of behavior considered forces, supporting other detained acceptable in the target countries. As clergy and providing for burial rites often as possible, training in these (combatants are granted, where possi- areas should be integrated with indi- ble, the right to be buried according to vidual and collective training. This the rites of their religion). Religious gives the unit the best return for the preference of EPWs will be obtained training time expended and gives the from their detainee personnel record individual interrogator the most realis- form (see Appendix B). tic training possible. Inspector general. This element is a Innovative training methods are devised channel for reporting known or sus- and implemented in garrison as part of the pected war crimes. scheduled training cycle. This training is based on the results of periodic evaluations of individual and collective performance. INTERROGATOR TRAINING Army Training and Evaluating Programs are being developed which set the stan- Commanders and supervisors must take a dards for collective performance by interro- deep interest in the quality and quantity of gation elements of various sizes. training given to the interrogators assigned to their units. Commanders cannot wait for the start of hostilities to begin a compre- hensive training program. Interrogators require a high degree of proficiency in sev- eral complex skills that are difficult to mas- ter. These skills fade rapidly if not prac- ticed. The value and versatility of a commander's interrogation assets can be continually enhanced by a training pro- gram within his unit. An individual inter- rogator's contributions to the unit's overall collection effort are directly dependent on the degree of exposure he has had to- Language training that emphasizes continuous improvement in military and technical vocabulary, dialects spoken in the target countries, and slang or idiomatic expressions. CHAPTER 7

I Strategic Debriefing.--

Strategic debriefing is the art of inter- PLANNING AND viewing an individual in a strategic envi- PREPARATION ronment, that is, voluntary sources of information to obtain usable information in Planning and preparation for the stra- response to command and national-level tegic debriefer are similar to that process intelligence needs. Strategic intelligence already described in Chapter 3 with the fol- provides support to national-level planners lowing considerations peculiar to the stra- and operational commanders across the tegic environment: entire spectrum of conflict and is especially useful for long-range planning purposes. Prior intelligence reports pertaining to Strategic intelligence is collected in peace- a particular source may not be readily time as well as wartime and often fills intel- available and the source's area of ligence gaps on extremely sensitive topics knowledgeability, personality traits, or from sensitive areas. and potential intelligence value should be determined by the debriefer. The objective of the strategic debriefing process is to obtain information of the Pertinent intelligence requirements highest degree of credibility to satisfy out- should be reviewed in an attempt to standing intelligence requirements. This assess the source's potential to answer avoids surprises of strategic nature and them. consequences. Strategic debriefing opera- Necessary maps, technical reference tions will be discussed further in FM 34-5 manuals, city plans, photographs, /''(s). The types of sources encountered in handbooks, and so forth should be strategic debriefing are emigres, refugees, assembled and organized in the antici- resettlers, and selected US sources. While pated sequence of the interview. there are other types, these represent the An appropriate debriefing site may I vast majority. Doctrine for strategic debrief- need to be selected with considerations ing is provided in DIAM 58-13. given to legal agreements with host countries or particular directives DUTIES AND within unit SOPs. RESPONSIBILITIES CONTACT AND INTERVIEW Due to the diverse nature of the various operations using debriefers, both outside APPROACH AND INITIAL CONTACT the continental United States (OCONUS) In the approach and initial contact, basi- and within the continental United States cally the same process is used as described (CONUS), specific duties and responsibili- before except that the sources for strategic ties peculiar to a particular operation will debriefing are in a different legal status be detailed in unit SOPs. However, there are than EPWs. certain duties and responsibilities to debriefers regardless of assignment. QUESTIONING NOTIFICATION The debriefer uses good questioning tech- niques and rapport and effective follow-up Proper response to notification of the leads to ensure the answering of specific availability of a source will depend upon requirements. unit operations. The debriefer may have to respond spontaneously as in the case of RECORDING AND REPORTING walk-in sources. He may have the luxury of advance notice as in the case of an invita- Comprehensive and logical note taking is tional interview. translated into comprehensible, logical, and objective reporting within the of nents. An easy way to remember these the intelligence report procedures outlined, components is through the use of the acro- in DIAM 58-13. nym BEST MAPS: B-biographic intelligence. TERMINATION E-economic intelligence. An interview is terminated in a manner S-sociological intelligence. which enables any debriefer to recontact a source at a later date 2nd resume the T-transportation and telecommunica- debriefing process. The debriefer ensures tions intelligence. that the source receives all promised incen- M-military geographical intelligence. tives. It is often necessary to provide trans- portation and lodging for sources. Such A-armed forces intelligence. considerations demand that the debriefer be P-political intelligence. familiar with the procedures for use of Intel- ligence Contingency Fund monies. S-scientific and technical intelligence.

OPERATIONAL SECURITY Each of these components can further be There is an obvious need for OPSEC divided into a number of subcomponents. before, during, and after any debriefing. These components and subcomponents are Source confidentiality and the handling of not all-encompassing nor mutually exclu- classified materials demand constant and sive. This approach is merely a means to special attention. enhance familiarization with the types of information included in strategic LANGUAGE ABILITY intelligence. Maintaining a language proficiency is a basic requirement, and improvement of dia- BIOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE lects, slang, and technical terminology is a Biographic intelligence is the study of must. individuals of actual or potential impor- tance through knowledge of their personali- LIAISON ties and backgrounds. This component can A debriefer may have the added responsi- be divided into a number of subcomponents: bility of maintaining local liaison with Educational and occupational host-government agencies while OCONUS. history-including civilian and mili- Unit SOPSusually dictate the necessary tary backgrounds of individuals. and proper procedures. Individual accomplishment-notable accomplishments of an individual in SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL professional or private life. ENHANCEMENT Idiosyncrasies and habits-including The debriefer keeps up with new scientific mannerisms and unusual life styles. and technical development of target coun- Position, influence, and potential- tries. Intelligence agencies publish numer- present and future positions of power ous reports and summaries which are readi- or influence. ly available to the strategic debriefer. El Attitudes and hobbies-significant interests that may affect an individu- COMPONENTS OF STRATEGIC al's accessibility. INTELLIGENCE Such biographic information is reported by preparing a message intelligence report Information gathered as strategic intelli- in accordance with the format in DIAM gence may be categorized into eight compo- 58-13. ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE al) which may impact on military opera- tions. Physical geography is concerned with Economic intelligence studies the eco- natural or man-made geophysical features. nomic strengths and weaknesses of a coun- Cultural geography provides demographi- try. Its subcomponents are- cal information. Economic warfare-information on the diplomatic or financial steps a country ARMED FORCES INTELLIGENCE may take to induce neutral countries to cease trading with its enemies. Armed forces intelligence is the inte- grated study of the ground, sea, and air Economic vulnerabilities-the degree forces of a country-often referred to as OB. to which a country's military would be It is concerned with- hampered by the loss of materials or facilities. Strategy-military alternati'ves in terms of position, terrain, economics, Manufacturing-information on politics, and so forth. manufacturing processes, facilities, logistics, and so forth. Tactics-military deployments and operations doctrine. Source of economic capability-any means a country has to sustain its OB-location, organization, weapons, economy. strengths. Equipment-analysis of all military SOCIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE materiel. Sociological intelligence deals with peo- Logistics-procurement, storage, and ple, customs, behaviors, and institutions. distribution. The subcomponents are- Training-as carried out at all eche- Population-rates of increase, lons to support doctrine. decrease, or migrations. Organization-detailed analysis of Social characteristics-customs, command structures. mores, and values. Manpower-available resources and Manpower-divisions and distribution their conditioning. within the workforce. Health, education, and welfare. POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE Public information-information ser- Political intelligence studies all political vices within the country. aspects which may affect military opera- tions. Its subcomponents are- TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS Government structure-organization INTELLIGENCE of departments and ministries. Transportation and telecommunications National policies-government actions intelligence studies the role of transporta- and decisions. tion and telecommunications systems dur- ing military emergencies and during peace- Political dynamics-government views time. The subcomponents of this topic are and reactions to events. too varied and numerous to cover. Propaganda-information and disin- formation programs. MILITARY GEOGRAPHIC Policy and intelligence services- INTELLIGENCE organization and functions. Military geographic intelligence studies Subversion-subversive acts sponsored all geographic factors (physical and cultur- by the government. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE CYCLE INTELLIGENCE , Equally important to the components of Scientific and technical intelligence stud- strategic intelligence is an awareness of the ies the country's potential and capability to strategic intelligence cycle and the debrief- support objectives through development of er's role within that cycle. The first step is new processes, equipment, weapons sys- the identification of intelligence gaps. Ana- tems, and so forth. The subcomponents lysts translate these gaps into intelligence are- requirements-the second step. In the third Weapons and weapon systems. step, the strategic debriefer fulfills those requirements. The fourth step involves Missile and space program. preparation of an intelligence report. The 0 Nuclear energy and weapons fifth and last step is the preparation of an technology. intelligence report evaluation by the origi- nator of the requirement. These evaluations NBC developments. measure the quality of the information as Basic applied science. well as the quality of the report writing. Research and development systems. CHAPTER 8 Joint Interrogation Facilities

A conceptual void exists concerning the provides this support through the interroga- formation and use of a joint interrogation tion of category A sources and exploitation facility (JIF). This chapter provides general of CEDs based on theater and national- guidance to an EAC interrogation and level intelligence requirements. exploitation (I&E)battalion commander on how to form a JIF (information on the organization of an EAC I&E battalion can ORGANIZATION be found in FC 34-124).STANAG 2033 pro- The intelligence collection facility is com- vides the authority for the use of a JIF. prised of interrogators, CI personnel, and Many contingencies exist worldwide analysts from the US Army, Air Force, under which the use of US forces could Navy, Marine Corps, and from various become necessary. These procedures are in other US national agencies as required. general terms and allow the I&E battalion They are established under one commander commander the latitude necessary to form a to operate as a JIF in the exploitation of JIF under those contingencies. documents and personnel. The JIF is a field activity of the joint command organized to meet theater requirements during crises or FORMATION contingency deployments. The JIF is not a TOE organization, but it The organization of a JIF is tailored to is formed to meet specific requirements. It is meet the specific requirements of crises, task organized using I&E battalion assets. contingency deployments, or military assis- The personnel provided by other services tance operations to host nations. The Army and agencies will depend upon theater component commander is designated as the requirements. executive agent for the establishment, organization, and functioning of the JIF. Combined interrogation centers (CICs) The EAC MI brigade commander, asso- are interrogation facilities which are ciated with the theater in question, will manned by more than one nation and are exercise command and control of the JIF. not addressed. CICs, in the European theater, are established according to STANAG 2033. The operation of a CIC is RESPONSIBILITIES determined by international agreement. The JIF, in meeting the specific require- ments of crises, contingency deployment, or REQUIREMENT military assistance operations to host nations, is responsible for the following In the constantly changing environment functions: of today's world, our military forces could be called upon to enter into armed conflict in any level of intensity, anywhere on the Develop guidance and operational globe. Unified and specified commands are procedures for the conduct and man- totally prepared and react as necessary to agement of all JIF functions. multilevel threats of combat involvement. Coordinate with participating agencies An intelligence collection facility is required and units to develop personnel selec- to provide support to these joint commands. tion criteria and assignment proce- dures necessary for partial or complete MISSION activation of the JIF. The JIF provides support to joint com- Organize, direct, manage, and control mands for collection, analysis, and report- resources assigned to or included ing of intelligence information. The JIF within the JIF. Supervise and direct full or partial rogate category A sources to satisfy theater activation of the JIF for the conduct of collection requirements and support service screenings and interrogation of component interrogation operations. MIT sources, translation and exploitation of interrogation reports are forwarded to the CEDs, and debriefing of captured or JIF, theater 52, and service components. In detained US personnel released or response to these interrogation reports, the escaped from enemy control. theater 52 prioritizes and forwards addi- Coordinate through the Army compo- tional collection requirements for specific nent with the theater 52 to ensure sources to the JIF. The JIF directs the MIT compatibility of other service compo- to conduct further interrogations or coordi- nents' plans and actions pertinent to nate evacuation of the source to the JIF for the establishment and operation of the further interrogation. JIF. Vital information derived by MIT Coordinate through the Army compo- through interrogation of sources or exploi- nent with the theater 52 the selection tation of CEDs is reported via secure com- of suitable JIF operational sites. munications to JIF and theater 52. Coordinate with the provost marshal Based on collection requirements and for all site operations. MIT screening reports and interrogations, the JIF identifies EPWs for priority evacua- Coordinate and satisfy the intelligence tion to the theater camp for JIF exploita- collection requirements of theater and tion. The JIF prepares and dissseminates service components from available source knowledgeability briefs (KB) to sources. theater and national-level agencies. The Perform liaison to theater, service JIF continually reviews. the requirement to components, and other agencies and exploit these selected sources. organizations as deemed appropriate. MIT assist lower echelon interrogators As directed, provide personnel as and intelligence specialists in the examina- replacement, backup, or augmentation tion and categorization of CEDs for evacua- for service component interrogation tion to the JIF. organizations destroyed or depleted. Reports are submitted on all information Develop contingency plans for the of intelligence value. Initial reports are evacuation of the JIF and the destruc- submitted electronically whenever possible tion of classified material. Selected to ensure that the information reaches the sources, documents, and equipment analysts in the least amount of time. Writ- will be evacuated with US forces. ten reports are prepared according to the format contained in Appendix G. Copies of SALUTE and interrogation reports pertain- USE ing to specific category A sources accom- pany them when they are evacuated to the During crisis, contingency deployments, JIF. In situations where time-critical data is or military assistance to host nations, com- involved, secure voice SALUTE reports to ponents will forward collection require- the theater 52 may be used to supplement ments to the theater command 52. The 52 procedures. serves as the requirements control authority and is responsible for the registration, vali- Initial MIT reporting includes the inter- dation, and establishment of priorities for rogator's assessment of the category A JIF collection requirements. The 52 exer- source intelligence value. This assessment cises staff cognizance over JIF operations. addresses the category A source's intelli- gence, experience, cooperation, and reli- ability. Any areas of special knowledge OPERATION possessed by the category A source is also identified. The JIF deploys mobile interrogation teams (MIT) to identify, screen, and inter- COORDINATION Component security and military police units are responsible for the evacuation, Effective coordination between the JIF safeguarding, and control of sources. JIF and numerous component, theater, and MIT at lower echelons coordinate with national and host-government assets is these units for access to a source and the necessary to ensure the success of JIF source's subsequent evacuation to the JIF operations. JIF coordination and interface with Theater 52 and service components' intel- theater and service component CI elements ligence staffs require interface and coordi- are necessary at all times. CI teams located nation with the JIF to ensure collection at the JIF and with the MIT facilitate this requirements are satisfied accurately and in interface and coordination. The JIF and a timely manner. The success of JIF opera- MIT assist CI elements in the identification tions depends in part upon the screening, and exploitation of all sources of CI interrogation, and debriefing operations of interest. division and corps interrogation and CI JIF coordination and interface with elements. The JIF establishes and main- PSYOP and CA units are facilitated by tains working relationships with service direct access to members of these units con- component HUMINT collection managers ducting operations in support of military and interrogation and document exploita- police EPW camps. PSYOP analysis con- tion units at all echelons. Service compo- cerning motivational and cultural factors of nent members attached to the JIF facilitate sources is of direct benefit to JIF this interface. operations. Interface and coordination with compo- JIF coordination and interface with legal, nent security and military police elements medical, and chaplain activities and are required to ensure the timely evacuation authorities supporting EPW camps are and proper safeguarding and exploitation required to ensure compliance with the of sources. Geneva Convention concerning the treat- The JIF is located in the immediate vi- ment and care of sources. cinity of the theater EPW camp. The loca- National agency access and participation tion of the EPW camp is the responsibility in debriefings and interrogations conducted of the military police EPW camp com- by the JIF are coordinated in advance mander. Army component G2s and provost through the theater 52. National agencies marshal staffs coordinate all EPW plan- may establish liaison officers at the JIF. ning about location. Access to or knowledge of JIF operations Security arrangements for the EPW camp and activities by host governments is coor- and planning for the segregation and safe- dinated through the theater 52. guarding of JIF sources are the responsi- bility of the EPW camp commander. Sources are identified, classified, and segre- COMMUNICATIONS gated according to their status, sex, nation- ality, languages, and intelligence category. To effect required interface and coordina- JIF sources are segregated and safeguarded tion, the JIF requires secure communica- from other sources. Security of the JIF and tions with the theater 52, service compo- control over the sources within the JIF are nents, and the MIT. Secure record and voice under the direction of the JIF commander. communications circuits and telephone switchboard trunks are used. Interface and compatibility with service component inter- rogation and CI team communications are required. CHAPTER 9 Low-Intensity Conflict

This chapter provides concepts and doc- OPERATIONAL CONCEPT trine concerning interrogation assets in LIC FOR LOW-INTENSITY operations. Before discussing the use of CONFLICT interrogation assets in a LIC, we must understand the terminology and the US LIC involves the actual or contemplated Army operational concept for LIC. use of military capabilities up to, but not including, sustained combat between regu- lar forces. TERMINOLOGY The factors which lead to LIC are com- LIC is a limited politico-military struggle plex and, in many cases, cannot be resolved to achieve political, social, economic, mili- by short-term actions. Success in this envi- tary, or psychological objectives. It is often ronment is dependent upon the effective protracted and ranges from diplomatic, application of all elements of national economic, and psycho-social pressures power and clearly defined goals and objec- through terrorism and insurgency. LIC is tives. Political objectives establish the lim- generally confined to a geographic area and its and constraints for military operations, is often characterized by constraints on the as well as other social, political, and eco- weaponry, tactics, and level of violence. nomic programs. The difference between The definitions of mid- and high-intensity military operations in LIC and the war, as conflict limit their use to war between found in mid- or high-intensity levels, lies in nations. These terms, defined here, will not the measure of military success. In the lat- be further discussed. ter, military success is measured in terms of winning campaigns and battles. In LIC, Mid-intensity conflict-war between however, success will consist of achieving two or more nations and their respec- US national objectives without the pro- tive allies, if any, in which the bellig- tracted commitment of US forces in a com- erents employ the most modern bat role. It must be noted that, should mili- technology and all resources in intelli- tary intervention be necessary, a premature gence; mobility; firepower (excluding commitment of US soldiers to combat in a nuclear, chemical, and biological weap- low-intensity situation may result in the ons); command, control, and communi- loss of strategic initiative. Political, eco- cations; and service support for limited nomic, social, and psychological initiatives objectives under definitive policy limi- are necessary to achieve lasting success in tations as to the extent of destructive the LIC arena. power that can be employed or the extent of geographic area that might The US Army's mission in LIC can be be involved. divided into four general categories: peace- keeping operations, foreign internal defense High-intensity conflict-war between (FID), peacetime contingency operations, two or more nations and their respec- and terrorism counteraction. tive allies, if any, in which the bel- ligerents employ the most modern technology and all resources in intelli- gence; mobility; firepower (including nuclear, chemical, and biological weap- ons); command, control and commu- nications; and service support. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS communications. The terms of the cease fire agreement may call for the peacekeeping Increasing world tension, continuing con- force to supervise the withdrawals and dis- flicts, scarce resources, and general distrust engagements of the belligerents, supervise have created environments in which a mili- the exchange of prisoners of war, or moni- tary force may be employed to achieve, re- tor demobilization. store, or maintain peace. A peacekeeping mission may present situations that are often ambiguous and may require forces to Law and Order Maintenance deal with extreme tension and violence in the form of terrorism, sabotage, and minor Peacekeeping operations also include res- military conflicts from known and toration or maintenance of law and order. unknown belligerents. Traditional civilian law enforcement func- tions are generally not performed by US Given the worldwide nature of US military personnel. However, situations national interests, it is vital to US security may arise which require limited support to to maintain not only the capability to duly authorized law enforcement authori- employ force, but also the ability to assist in ties of a receiving state. the peaceful resolution of conflicts. US Army participation in peacekeeping opera- tions may be multinational in nature or FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE may be conducted unilaterally. FID encompasses those actions taken by Multinational peacekeeping operations civilian and military agencies of one are military operations conducted for the government in any program taken by purpose of restoring or maintaining peace. another government to preclude or defeat They may be undertaken in response to a insurgency. Insurgencies cannot be over- request for assistance made to either a mul- come by military measures alone but by tinational organization or to the US di- military support to national programs. rectly. Historically, the United Nations has been the most frequent sponsor of multina- tional peacekeeping operations, though re- US Army forces operate in concert with gional organizations have acted in a simi- other services, both US and host nation and lar fashion to prevent, halt, or contain with other US Government agencies. Opera- conflict in their respective regions. tions are conducted in support of plans Although unilateral peacekeeping opera- developed by the host nation and the US tions are possible, they are inherently sensi- Government. tive and require tacit international appro- US forces involved in FID must have an val. Unilateral peacekeeping operations appreciation of the culture into which they conducted by the US require clear humani- are employed and should be selected, edu- tarian justifications. cated, and prepared to ensure that US involvement and goals are understood and The two common missions in peacekeep- complied with. Language capabilities are ing operations are cease fire supervision important and must be developed to the and law and order maintenance. maximum extent possible. Units should be prepared for the FID mission prior to deployment and arrive in the host country Cease Fire Supervision established as an effective, cohesive group, Peacekeeping forces can be deployed to prepared to begin operations immediately. observe and report on compliance with US Army forces can assume various rela- diplomatically arranged cease fires. The tionships with the host nation's military force will require the capability for rapid forces in FID operations. They can serve as deployment to perform its peacekeeping advisors or instructors at all levels. Special function and must be initially self- forces units are specifically trained for this sufficient, have self-defense capability, and mission. Combat support of CSS units may possess effective internal and external augment the host nation's efforts and serve to prepare the battlefield for US combat TERRORISM COUNTERACTION forces, if required. US forces must assume an unobtrusive support role to maintain Terrorism, employed worldwide, may be credibility of the host government. sponsored by political or other terrorist groups within a nation, sponsored by an The manner in which US combat forces external source, or employed as a tactic of are employed will vary with the situation. insurgents. It is clearly a dimension of war- Because of their familiarity with local fare which pays high dividends with mini- communities and population, it is generally mum risk. Population areas, public trans- better to use indigenous military assets in port conveyances, industrial facilities, and more populated areas and to employ US individuals are high-probability targets for combat assets in remote areas. terrorist activities. Terrorist groups increas- When US Army combat troops are ingly threaten US interests throughout the required for FID operations, planning for world. their withdrawal begins at the time of Terrorism counteraction consists of those deployment. The withdrawal of Army units actions taken to counter the terrorist threat. depends on the capability of the host nation Antiterrorism refers to defensive measures forces to regain and maintain control. taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist attack. Counterterrorism refers to offensive measures taken against terrorists. Specially PEACETIME CONTINGENCY trained US Army forces are the main ele- OPERATIONS ment used in counterterrorism operations. In certain environments, peacetime con- Intelligence is essential to implementing tingency operations become necessary effective antiterrorism and counterterrorism when diplomatic initiatives have been, or measures. Its purpose in terrorism counter- are expected to be, ineffective in achieving action is to identify and quantify the threat extremely time-sensitive, high-value objec- and provide timely threat intelligence. This tives. Failure to influence a belligerent includes the evaluation of terrorist capabili- nation or activity through diplomatic ties, tactics, targets, and the dissemination means may necessitate the use of military of this information. forces to protect US national interests, Terrorism counteraction varies according rescue US citizens, or defend US assets. to the type of terrorist organization Intelligence is a particularly critical part involved. Autonomous terrorist groups, for of all peacetime contingency operations. example, are vulnerable to intelligence and The rapid and tightly controlled introduc- police-type operations. In a different arena, tion of US combat forces is a part of contin- the actions of state-supported and state- gency operations which requires precision directed groups would certainly be sensitive planning. Accurate, detailed, and timely to measures taken against the supporting intelligence determines the success or fail- states. ure of these operations. Time for planning and execution is typically short, and intelli- gence assets must be able to anticipate INTERROGATION SUPPORT requirements and provide comprehensive products on extremely short notice. City TO LOW-INTENSITY plans with complete detail of utilities, per- CONFLICT sonality profiles of local officials, and details of specific ports, airports, roads, and The principles and techniques of interro- bridges are examples of information which gation discussed elsewhere in this manual must be made readily available. Intelli- apply with equal validity to interrogations gence gathering missions into sensitive areas are also conducted as required. conducted in LIC operations. Specific appli- INTERROGATOR SKILLS cations of the general principles and tech- AND ABILITIES niques must be varied to meet local pecu- liarities. However, because of these LIC operations intelligence requirements peculiarities of LIC operations, this chapter demand detailed familiarity with the mili- provides additional guidelines for the con- tary, political, and front organizations of duct of interrogations in support of such the insurgent enemy and the environment operations. Intelligence interrogations play in which he operates. a significant role in ascertaining the devel- opment of an insurgency in the latent or The interrogator's familiarity with the initial stage; the intentions, attitudes, areas of operations must include an under- capabilities, and limitations of the insur- standing and appreciation of the insur- gents: their underground organizations: gency, its objectives, history, successes, and and their support systems. In addition to failures. This understanding and apprecia- the traditional military concepts of intelli- tion is required not only on a general coun- gence concerning the enemy, terrain, and trywide basis, but also on an expanded weather, LIC operations have added a new basis within the interrogator's particular dimension-the population. The major aim area of operation. Therefore, it is essential of both the threatened government and the that the intelligence interrogator fully insurgents is to influence the population grasps the importance that the insurgent favorably and win its support. organization places on the accomplishment of political objectives as opposed to military successes. LIMITATIONS TO UNITED One measure of the interrogator's effec- STATES ASSISTANCE tiveness is his ability to apply the appro- priate interrogation techniques to the per- US military or civilian participation in sonality of the source. Interrogations intelligence interrogations during LIC associated with LIC operations dictate the operations is generally limited to that per- need for skill in the full range of interroga- mitted by the host government concerned. tion techniques so that the interrogator can This limitation places certain restrictions conduct the many types of interrogations on US military and civilian personnel demanded. engaged in such operations. The degree of participation will, therefore, be determined by combined US and host-country policies. ADVISOR AND INTERROGATOR Normally, the interrogator is asked to RELATIONSHIPS advise, assist, and train host-country per- sonnel who are members of the armed In some instances, US Army interroga- tors are assigned to a host country to assist forces, paramilitary forces, police, and other in developing interrogation capabilities of ~ecurityagencies (FM 100-20). The interro- gator may also provide intelligence interro- host-country forces. FM 100-20 contains detailed information on advisor duties, gation support to committed US or allied techniques, and procedures. However, the forces during LIC operations. This will operations and relationship of the advisor require effective, close coordination of the to host-country interrogators require special combined effort with host-country agencies. mention and are discussed below. In this respect, coordination problems can be avoided by conducting a combined inter- Advisor Qualifications rogation effort with interrogators of the host country. Further advantages of such a The advisor must be a qualified, experi- measure are the language capability and enced interrogator with an extensive intel- the intimate knowledge of the area- ligence background. He requires area orien- personalities, customs, ethnic differences tation and must have language ability, and and geography-possessed by the host a personality favorable for working with country's interrogation personnel. indigenous peoples. The following are nor- mal functions of an interrogation advisor: Establish a working relationship with would be contrary to the orders of the coun- his counterparts through development terpart. In reality, advice is totally accepted of mutual respect and confidence. only when the counterpart is convinced that Provide advice for effective collection the advice is sound and appropriate of the through interrogation. situation. Assist in establishing combined inter- In cases where the advisor may observe rogation centers. brutal methods in handling and interrogat- ing captives and other detainees, he must Provide on-the-jobtraining for indi- not participate in these acts and, further, genous interrogators. should remove himself and any other US Assist in the establishment of neces- personnel for whom he is responsible from sary file systems to support interroga- the scene. Local theater policies and direc- tion operations. tives normally assign other specified actions for the advisor in a situation of this Conduct appropriate liaison with all sort. Such policies and directives may units participating in the combined include advising the counterpart of the interrogation center. undesirability of such action and the report- Keep the senior Army intelligence ing of the incident through US channels. advisor informed on operations and The advisor must comply with any such activities within his area. theater (or other command) policies and directives. Provide the financial support, as autho- rized, for interrogation operations to his counterpart. Advisor Operations Conduct appropriate coordination with The advisor must emphasize that devel- other US intelligence advisors. opment of a combined interrogation effort is of the utmost importance to successful operations. This combined capability is Counterpart Relationship achieved by uniting the interrogation The advisor's accomplishments depend resources of all intelligence forces (except upon the relationship established with his tactical) within a specific geographic area counterpart. This relationship is influenced of responsibility (that is, national, province, by the personalities of each. Ideally, this district). Most likely, the advisor will find relationship should develop as the counter- that in many host countries, interrogation part's knowledge of the area combines with responsibilities will be assigned as follows: the professional knowledge of the advisor. Civilian police-suspects and insur- Before he provides advice to his counter- gent political cadre. part, the advisor should observe the opera- tion of the unit and become familiar with Military interrogators-captured the area and the local situation. For con- military insurgents and those military venience, his office should be adjacent to insurgents who have rallied to the that of his counterpart. However, the advi- legally constituted government. sor should not interfere with the routine Indigenous military administrative duties that must be accom- counterintelligence-insurgent infiltra- plished by his counterpart. tors and deserters from host-country Above all, the advisor must remember forces. that his is an advisory role and not that of The advisor must stress the integration of a supervisor or commander. He advises the all interrogator resources to achieve econo- counterpart rather than individuals within my of force and unity of effort. Often this the unit. This is important, for advising task will be complicated by personalities of individuals could result in advice which the host country, military, and civilian offi- POPULATION cials. But if harmonious working relation- ships are established with the key person- LIC operations place the population in alities involved, the advisor can succeed in the position of a prime target. Therefore, the integrating all available resources. population becomes a principal source of intelligence. The population with which the The interrogator (advisor) should estab- interrogator will have to deal may be com- lish liaison with US advisors working with posed of friendly, hostile, or completely host-country tactical forces operating indifferent elements. In dealing with these within his area. From these advisors he can population elements, as well as with the be constantly informed of insurgents cap- insurgents, the desires of the host country tured by these tactical forces. The interro- must be considered. There is a need to gain gator (advisor) and tactical unit advisor, the support of the population to deprive the working together with their respective insurgents of their primary sources of sup- counterparts, can ensure effective interro- port. Such a need places a burden upon the gation of these captured insurgents. Fur- interrogator to learn more about the ther, the advisors can assist in achieving people-their customs and taboos (by ethnic the required coordination between host- groups, if appropriate), distrust and fear of country tactical units and area forces to foreigners, fear of insurgent reprisal, philo- improve handling and exploiting interroga- sophy or outlook on life, and other facets of tion sources. their political, economic, and social institu- tions. Since CI elements are tasked with the THE SOURCE mission of countersubversion, the primary responsibility of identifying insurgent The status of insurgents in LIC opera- operations within the population is placed tions differs from that of recognized bellig- upop CI personnel. Therefore, it is essential erents; the field of interrogation will that the intelligence interrogator maintain encompass a wider variety of sources close and continuous coordination with CI involved in operations. personnel to ensure complete exploitation of the population. LEGAL STATUS OF INSURGENTS EPW interrogations are conducted in support of wartime military operations and INSURGENT VULNERABILITY are governed by the guidelines and limita- TO INTERROGATION tions provided by the Geneva Conventions and FM 27-10. However, insurgent subver- The individual insurgent may lack many sive underground elements who are seeking of the conventional psychological supports to overthrow an established government in which are helpful in resisting interrogation. an insurgency do not hold legal status as Often he is in conflict with his own people, belligerents (see DA Pam 27-161-1). Since perhaps of the same ethnic group, religion, these subversive activities are clandestine environment, or even, in some cases, his or covert in nature, individuals operating in family. Further, the insurgent has no legal this context seek to avoid open involvement status as an EPW and, therefore, realizes he with host-government police and military may be considered a common criminal. The security forces. Hence, any insurgent taken insurgent often expects to receive harsh and into custody by host-government security brutal treatment after capture. If he does forces may not be protected by the Geneva not receive this harsh treatment, the psy- Conventions beyond the basic protections chological effect may make him amenable in Article 3. The insurgent will be subject to to the interrogator. In addition, the shock the internal security laws of the country effect normally induced by capture will concerning subversion and lawlessness. further increase his susceptibility to inter- Action of US forces, however, will be gov- rogation. Therefore, the individual insur- erned by existing agreements with the host gent may rationalize cooperation with the country and by the provisions of Article 3 of interrogator as the best course of action for the 1949 Geneva Conventions. his survival. Although the insurgent often lacks con- what he has been led to believe, this mis- ventional psychological support, as pre- treatment is not forthcoming, he is apt to viously discussed, the interrogator should become psychologically softened for inter- realize that other support may have been rogation. Furthermore, brutality by either furnished him through intensive political capturing troops or friendly interrogators and psychological indoctrination and train- will reduce defections and serve as grist for ing to resist interrogation. Indoctrination the insurgent's propaganda mill. sessions using such techniques as self and Special care must be taken in handling group criticism can give insurgents a strong insurgent suspects, for their degree of sym- group identification and fanatical belief in pathy with the insurgency usually is not the insurgent cause. readily apparent. Improper handling of The entire range of insurgent activity is such persons may foster sympathies for the vulnerable to mass interrogation of the insurgency or induce them to remain pas- populace. Since the insurgent's operations sive at a time when the host country are often contingent on the support of the requires active support from its citizens. populace, members of the populace inevita- bly learn the identities and activities of the insurgent. With large numbers of people INSURGENT METHODS OF knowing him, the insurgent is vulnerable to RESISTANCE mass screening and interrogation pro- Recognizing vulnerability to interroga- grams. Success of such programs may be tion, the insurgent counters by taking any enhanced by the insurgent's previously of the following actions: committed acts of terror, tax collection, and forced recruitment, which will have alien- Keeps his forces ignorant of future ated some members of the population. operations, unit designations, and true names of leaders. Assigns multiple designations to units, HANDLING OF INSURGENT frequently changes them, and uses CAPTIVES AND SUSPECTS aliases for names of leaders. Insurgency is identified as a condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection Hires informants to watch and report against a constituted government which on the people and commits reprisals falls short of civil war. It is not usually a against those who provide information conflict of international character, and it is to the government. not a recognized belligerency. Therefore, Instructs his forces to remain silent insurgent captives are not guaranteed full upon capture for a given period of time. protection under the articles of the Geneva This lapse in time tends to decrease the Conventions relative to the handling of value of the information which is ulti- EPWs. However, Article 3 of the Conven- mately revealed to hostile tions requires that insurgent captives be interrogators. humanely treated and forbids violence to life and person-in particular murder, muti- Provides plausible cover stories to hide lation, cruel treatment, and torture. It true information. furtheriforbids commitment of outrages Indoctrinates his forces with ideologi- upon personal dignity, taking of hostages, cal training. passing of sentences, and execution without Publicizes cases where captives have prior judgment by a regularly constituted been killed or mistreated by capturing court. forces. Humane treatment of insurgent captives should extend far beyond compliance with Screens his recruits carefully. Article 3, if for no other reason than to Uses cellular structure to restrict render them more suceptible to interroga- knowledge of personnel and tion. The insurgent is trained to expect bru- ,operations. tal treatment upon capture. If, contrary to COMMON CHARACTERISTICS AND Militia KNOWLEDGEABILITY OF SOURCES Compared to the main and local force The characteristics and knowledge of insurgent, the local village militia member interrogation sources vary widely, based is often poorly trained, disciplined, and upon the position, status, and mission of equipped. While he is not likely to be a prof- the insurgent within his organization. The itable source of information on regular force interrogator's appraisal of these factors, units, his native familiarity with the area in coupled with his own knowledge of the which he operates makes him a most valu- source and the organization to which he able source on local terrain, insurgent belongs, will assist in quickly evaluating infrastructure, food and weapons caches, the informational potential of each source. lines of communications and logistics, intel- Interrogation sources vary and include the ligence operations, and OB information on combatant, terrorist, propagandist, courier, his own militia unit. When cooperative, he, political cadre, and intelligence agent. They likewise, can be used to identify local insur- may be young or old, male or female, edu- gent sympathizers within his area. cated or illiterate. General characteristics and knowledgeability of the more common Political Cadre types are discussed below. This individual is a profitable interroga- Main and Local Forces tion source for obtaining information on the composition and operation of the insur- The main force combatant is the best gent's political structure. At the lowest level indoctrinated, trained, led, disciplined, and (hamlet and village) he normally wears equipped of all insurgent forces. He will "two hats," one as the political leader, the know more, but may be inclined to reveal other as the commander of the militia. At less than a local force insurgent or a higher levels the individual is more political member of the village militia. When prop- in orientation and can provide information erly interrogated, however, he can be on cell members, front organizations, sym- expected to be a fruitful source of informa- pathizers, and nets. He is also knowledge- tion on his unit and its personnel; current able on the military units within his area, and past military operations; supply and their lines and methods of communications, base areas; status of training and morale; and future plans and operations of both the some information of higher, lower, and political and military organizations. adjacent units; routes of infiltration and exfiltration; tactics and general information on his area of operations. In short, he may Sympathizer be likened to the more conventional pris- This individual may be a sympathizer in oner of war and will be knowledgeable on fact or one of circumstance-that is, topics akin to that type of individual. He through blackmail, terror, or relatives being will differ, however, in that his knowledge held hostage. In either event, if skillfully of units other than his own will be far less interrogated, the sympathizer can become than that of the conventional prisoner of the most fruitful source of information on war. Generally speaking, the local force one of the greatest and most perplexing insurgent soldier (the second component of questions of insurgency-"How do you tell the insurgent regular armed forces) will be the difference between friend and foe?" The almost as valuable as a main force soldier sympathizer coerced into assisting the for interrogation purposes. His knowledge insurgent is, of course, the most useful type will depend primarily upon the methods of of individual, but care must be taken to pro- operation used by the insurgent movement tect him after he has revealed useful in the employment of its regular armed information. forces. Defectors These individuals are perhaps the best source of information available during LIC. They are usually cooperative and easily overt capacity, he will always require pro- susceptible to direct approach interrogation tection later. The mere fact that a man is a techniques. The most important feature of constituted local leader should never be interrogating defectors is the capability to viewed as prima facie evidence of loyalty to exploit physically the individual who the host-country government. A leader may voluntarily agrees to accompany friendly be secretly or tacitly supporting the insur- personnel into tactical operations areas. gency or may, for personal political rea- The primary methods of exploiting defec- sons, discredit political rivals with false tors are to use them as tactical guides and accusations. advisors, as informants, as aides in interro- gation and document analysis, and as advi- sors on enemy agent net modus operandi. It Insurgent Captive should be noted, however, that some of The insurgent captive can be used as a these techniques involve personal danger "finger man" in a police-type line-up, an for the defector, and for that reason, he excellent means of mass screening. As the should be provided appropriate protective entire population of a community files past, equipment. Coercion cannot be used to the captive points out those individuals induce his cooperation. However, when loyal to the insurgency. A police "mug file" defectors are employed to accomplish objec- is a useful variant of this technique. Here tives, as discussed in FM 34-60,they will be the captive reviews photographs taken from controlled only by qualified CI personnel. family registries.

INTERROGATION Agent or Friendly OPERATIONS Civilian SCREENING TECHNIQUES The line-up or the "mug file," described above, is most productive when friendly The screening of insurgent captives and agents and civilians are used as screening suspects is the key to productive interroga- assistants. However, care should be taken tion by CI personnel. Screening is a twofold to hide the identity of these individuals by operation conducted to identify insurgents placing them behind a barrier or covering or their sympathizers in the population and, their faces. An excellent source for employ- of these, to find the most knowledgeable ment of this technique is the individual who individuals for interrogation. Techniques has close relatives within the government for accomplishing these functions are var- or its military forces. ied and depend mainly upon the imagina- tion and ingenuity of screener personnel. For this reason, only the most resourceful Area Cordon interrogators should be selected as screen- ers. Examples of successful screening aids and techniques are discussed below. A good method to screen a community is to cordon off the area and restrict the inhabitants to their homes. All movement Local Leader thereafter must be strictly controlled and The local leader, whether a government regulated. With this accomplishment, each official, religious personage, teacher or vil- member of the community is questioned lage elder, is a useful screening assistant. regarding the identities of party members This individual knows the people, their hab- and sympathizers for the same length of its and activities. He knows the legitimate time and with the same questions. If the resident from the stranger and can often desired information is not obtained after point out insurgents and their sympathizers completion of all questioning, the process in his area. However, since the local leader should begin again and continue until peo- is vulnerable to insurgent terror or repri- ple start to talk. Once information is sals, his overt use in screening may be sometimes limited. When employed in an obtained, the members of the local insur- "how many" is often difficult. The interro- gent infrastructure are apprehended simul- gator must agree on common terminology taneously and removed from the commu- with his source so that he can communicate nity for intensive, detailed interrogation. and obtain the informa.tion he desires. He can use a system of holding up fingers on his hands, marking on a piece of paper, or Informant Technique using matchsticks, pieces of wo-od, or other This technique involves placement of a materials to determine numerical facts. In friendly individual among a group of sus- determining types of weapons, the interro- pects or captives. The individual acts out gator can show actual weapons, photo- the role of an insurgent sympathizer to gain graphs, or drawings of weapons from which the confidence of the group and to learn the the source can make a comparison with identity of the true insurgents and their what he actually saw. Description of colors leaders. can be made from pieces of materials or color charts. Direction of movement may be found out by location of the sun, stars, or INTERROGATION OF ILLITERATES landmarks familiar to the source. Time can be determined by the position of the sun, The interrogation of illiterate sources locating a traveled route and then comput- requires special questioning techniques. ing how rapidly the source walked, or find- The interrogator is after facts, and eliciting ing out how often he stopped and how such simple data from illiterates as "size" or many meals he ate. The methods discussed are examples of common terminology or reference points which an interrogator employs. Additionally, knowledge of the specific habits of the populace and of the area allows the interrogator to select a defi- nite term of reference. APPENDIX A STANAG Extracts

Extracts from STANAGs 1059,2033, copied as they appear in the STANAGs and 2044, and 2084 pertaining to intelligence are not reformatted. Copies of STANAGs interrogations and document exploitation can be obtained from Naval Publications are being provided in this Appendix for and Forms Center, 5801 Tabor Avenue, your information. The extracts have been Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19120.

EXTRACT FROM STANAG 1059

NATIONAL DISTINGUISHING LETTERS FOR USE BY NATO FORCES

2. The following national distinguishing letters shall be used whenever it is

necessary to use abbreviations in staff work and communications, including

publications, documents, communications, orders or other media, to identify a

NATO nation or any part of NATO Forces. The distinguishing letters are to be

used to denote the countries concerned in all documents or papers, ir-

respective of whether they are in the English or French language. Whenever the

NATO nations are listed in any paper or document, they are to be listed in the , order shown in both English and French versions. Belgium BE Canada CA (see Note 1) Denmark DA France FR Federal Republic of Germany GE Greece GR Iceland IC Italy IT Luxembourg LU Netherlands N L Norway NO Portugal P0 Spain SP Turkey TU United Kingdom UK (see Note 2) United States u S

Notes: 1. The national distinguishing letters for Canada are not to be used to

identify Canadian Army format ions which have the word "can-

adian/Canadiennel' in their official designation. 2. The letters "UK" denote the United Kingdom, or a force or part of a

force provided solely from the United Kingdom. The letters "BR" may,

however, be used in special cases to denote a force comprising units

or elements of more than one country of the British Commonwealth.

3. When used to identify a National Force or component of a National Force the distinguishing letters are to be bracketed immediately following the Force, formation or unit number.

Examples: 12(~~)Army Group ~(FR)Armoured Division 6 (NL) Infantry Brigade 5(1T) Infantry Regiment

National distinguishing letters for components of Army Forces smaller than a division are to be used only when it is necessary to avoid confusion.

EXTRACT FROM STANAG 2033

EXTRACT FROM STANAG 2033

INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

21. Interrogation Serial Number. In order to avoid errors in cross-checking

the information obtained from interrogating PW, the origin of infbrmation

repeated in intelligence reports will be indicated in brackets. To this end,

every PW interrogated is to be given an interrogation serial number as a

source of information (not to be confused with the internment serial number

discussed in STANAG 2044 which is given to PW for administrative reasons).

This number is to be allocated by the first interrogation unit to interrogate him officially. It is to be noted on the Tactical Interrogation Report. Only one interrogation serial number is to be allocated to each prisoner; it will

not be changed or re-allocated subsequently. The system of allocating the

interrogation serial number is given in Annex B.

ANNEX B TO STANAG 2033 (~ditionNo. 4) SYSTEM FOR ALLOCATING AN INTERROGATION SERIAL NUMBER

TO A PRISONER OF WAR

1. Every PW selected for interrogation shall receive an interrogation serial

number as a source of information, (not to be confused with an internment

serial number discussed in STANAG 2044, which is given to all PW for

administrative reasons). his interrogation serial number will be allocated

to the PW by the first team of interrogators officially interrogating him and

responsible for his selection. This number will be constituted as follows:

a. Two letters, in accordance with STANAG 1059, indicating the

nationality of the unit which captured the prisoner (e.g. BE, CA, GE, etc.).

b. Two letters indicating the service or enemy forces to which the

prisoner belongs :

Army...... AR Marines...... YR

Navy...... NV Airborne...... AB

Naval Air Arm.. ..NA Police...... PL Air Force...... AF Irregular...... IR

c. Four or five figures as required, to designate the team which carried out the first .official interrogation.

d. A number to identify the prisoner himself. Every prisoner selected for interrogation will receive a personal number, allocated in numerical order and given by the first team to interrogate him officially.. This number, preceded by a dash will be added to the code number constituted as described above. 2. Table showing how numbers are allocated to teams of interrogators:

a. NATO Forces:

SACEUR : 1.000 - 4.999 -SACLANT : 5.000 - 6.999

CINCNORTH : 1.000 - 1.999 -CINCHAN : 7.000 - 7.999

CINCENT : 2.000 - 2.999

CINCSOUTH : 3.000 - 3.999

a. National Forces:

BELGIUM : 10.000 - 10.999 -ITALY : 16.000 - 16.999

CANADA : 11.000 - 11.999 -LUXENBOURG : 17.000 - 17.999

DENNARK : 12.000 - 12.999 -NETHERLANDS : 18.000 - 18.999

FRANCE : 13.000 - 13.999 -NORWAY : 19.000 - 19.999

-PORTUGAL : 20.000 - 20.999

-SPAIN : 24.000 - 24.999

Federal Republic of Germany: 14.000 - 14.999 -TURKEY : 21 .OOO - 21.999

GREECE : 15.000 - 15.999 -UNITED KINGDOM : 22.000 - 22.999

-UNITED STATES : 23.000 - 23.999

3. Example of an interrogation serial number:

"BE-AR-2207-137"

BE : Belgian capturing unit.

AR : Prisoner is a member of enemy army forces.

2207 : The team of interrogators which allocated the number is part of a

force attached to CINCENT.

137 : He is the 137th prisoner interrogated and numbered as such by this team.

9. Categories of PW According to Intelligence Value. According to their value of intelligence, PW may be divided for convenience into the following broad categories which are not listed in any agreed order or priority. a. Categories A. High level PW whose broad or specific knowledge of the enemy war effort makes it necessary for them to be interrogated without delay by specially qualified interrogators and at the highest level. This category will normally include all:

(1) General officers or equivalent, who have knowledge of sufficient value to NATO to warrant detailed interrogation.

(2) Chiefs of Staff of formations down to and including divisions or the equivalent.

(3) Heads of staff sections down to army group/army level or the equivalent.

(4) Scientific personnel.

(5) Technical personnel with up-to-date knowledge of radiological, biological, and chemical weapons or any other type of equipment.

(6) Psychological personnel.

(7) Political officers.

(8) Other officials, war correspondents, supply contractors, etc., who have a wide knowledge of enemy logistics capabilities or political and economic factors.

(9) Personnel with a knowledge of enemy communications and especially cyphers or cryptographic equipment.

(10) Officers serving intelligence appointments or organizations.

(11) Personnel who are intimately associated with or have a working knowledge of items of major intelligence importance.

(12) Flying personnel whose mission, subordination, training and knowledge of enemy locations and movements is thought likely to be of considerable intelligence interest.

(13) Officers, warrant officers and senior Non commissioned Officers

(NCO) of special purpose forces. b. Category B. PW who have enough information on any subject of

intelligence interest to warrant a second interrogation.

c. Category C. PW who have only information of immediate tactical value

and do not therefore warrant a second interrogation.

d. Category D. pW who are of no interest to intelligence.

EXTRACT FROM STANAG 2044

PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH PRISONERS OF WAR

7. PW Processing-Stage 1-The Capture. As far as practicable, the responsibilities of the capturing unit are:

a. To disarm the PW without delay and to remove all their military documents and equipment, except for clothing and protective equipment (~rticle

18 of the Convention). Tagging should then be carried out as described in

Annex C.

b. To segregate, Eor the purpose of interrogation, PW according to rank, grade and service, sex, nationality, deserters, civilians and political indoctrination personnel. Such segregation is not to violate the requirements of Article 16 of the Convention.

c. To treat PW with correctness but to permit no talking or fraternization that may prejudice future interrogation.

d. To arrange for naval and air force PW to be interrogated by naval or air force interrogators as appropriate. To place adequate guards around crashed enemy aircraft.

e. To segregate, as soon as possible, from PW and other captured enemy personnel, enemy nationals who identify themselves as defectors. These personnel will be screened to ascertain whether they possess information of ground, naval or air interest. Upon determination of primacy of interest, the defector will be interrogated by that service. Subsequently, to send a report along staff channels, as may be prescribed by the commander concerned, giving

details of the alleged defector and asking for disposal instructions.

I f. To segregate from other personnel, captured personnel claiming to be

special agents of an allied service and send a report on such personnel to the

appropriate staff.

g. TO inform PW of their rights under Section V of the Convention.

elations of Prisoner of War with the Exterior.)

h. To escort PW to the nearest collection point or PW Holding Area as

quickly as possible.

8. EProcessing-Stage 2-Evacuation and Holding. If the situation has

prevented the capturing unit from fulfilling the responsibilities listed in

para. 7 above, the unit administering the collection points should do so

without delay. If PW bypass the collection points these responsibilities will

be fulfilled by the unit administering the Corps of Army PW Holding Area.

Then if possible the following should be carried out:

Completion of Detainee Personnel Record. The Detainee Personnel Record

(Appendix B) is to be used as the basic Prisoner of War Personnel Record. The I

form is to be printed in the national language of the capturing unit and in

one of the NATO languages. It remains a national responsibility to provide

translation keys in the language of the prisoner concerned.

9. PW Processing-Stage 3-PW Camp. If any of the responsibilities or duties

listed in paras 7 and 8 above or arising from the Convention have not been

fulfilled they must be so fulfilled by the PW Camp authorities. In addition

prisoners will be allotted internment Serial Numbers which are to be

consecutive and composed of prefix code letters identifying the capturing

nation in accordance with STANAG 1059.

10. Handling of Personal Property. The procedures set forth in Annex B are

to govern the handling of personal property, including money. -

11, Financial Accountability. Financial accounts, pay and work records, and

receipts for property and money are to be in accordance with the terms of the

Convent ion.

ANNEX B TO STANAG 2044 (edition no. 4)

PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE HANDLING OF PROPERTY AND MONEY

OF PRISONERS OF WAR

1. No attempt has been made to standardize a list of those effects of

personal use, sums of money and articles of value to be impounded, confiscated

or to remain in the possession of the prisoners. Policies in these matters

are to be individually determined by the nations. ~ikewise,nations are

independently to determine policies with regard to the conversion of foreign

currencies into their own currency. When laying down these policies, nations

are to ensure that the appropriate articles of the Geneva Convention of 1949

are complied with.

2. In addition to issuing receipts to the prisoners for articles and sums of

money which are impounded for reasons of security, such impounded articles and

money are to be listed in the appropriate space on the Prisoner of War

Personnel Record. Sums of money are not be taken away from PW except on order

of an officer. That record must be maintained up to date by the addition of

items taken from the prisoners subsequent to the initial entry and by the

deletion of items returned to the prisoners.

3. In the event of an international transfer of prisoners, their impounded

articles and money which has been converted into the currency of the detaining

nation are to accompany them and must be clearly accounted for on the Prisoner

of War Personnel Records which also accompany the prisoners. The appropriate

representative of the receiving nation is to verify and sign for the articles

and money received. Money taken from the prisoners in the currency of the 4

detaining nation and that which has been converted into the currency of the

detaining nation at the request of the prisoners is not to be the subject of transfer. Such money is accounted for in the certificate required to be

issued to the prisoners at the time of the transfer by the tranferring nation,

showing the amounts standing to the credit of their accounts, and need not to

be the subject of concern to the nation receiving the prisoners. It should be

clearly indicated on the Prisoner of War Personnel Record that such money,

although initially listed on the form as impounded money, is not included in

the articles and money delivered to the receiving nation.

4. Impounded articles and money, except money initially in the currency of

the Detaining Power or subsequently converted to same and credited to the

prisoner's account, which for any reason do not accompany the prisoner at the

time of an international transfer, must be sent to the Prisoner of War

Information Bureau of the nation receiving the

ANNEX C TO STANAG 2044 (edition no. 4)

STANDARDIZE CAPTIVE AND EQUIPMENT/DOCUMENTTAG

GENERAL

1. A standardization tag is considered necessary for temporary use in

identifying captured personnel and equipment or documents captured with

personnel, be fore formal documentat ion can be completed. This tag should

contain on one side the minimum necessary information in a standard format. The reverse side may be used for national handling instructions. The tag is

not to be used for labelling captured equipment or documents not associated

with captured personnel. The procedure for dealing with such equipment is

covered by STANAG 2084.

2. The tag which is in 3 parts will be used as follows (Note 1):

a. Top part (marked "A") To serve as identification of captured personnel before completion of the Prisoner of War Record; and to serve as a substitute identifying card when required.

b. Middle part (marked "B")

For administrative purposes according to national requirements.

c. Bottom part (marked "c")

To mark document and/or equipment.

3. The form is to be printed in the national language of the capturing unit and in one of the NATO official languages.

4. A specimen tag and description is at Appendix 1 to this annex.

PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS

5. Each captive is to be tagged by the capturing unit as soon as possible.

6. If a captive possesses equipment or documents, the capturing unit is to complete the bottom part of the tag (C) and affix it to the equipment or documents as soon as possible.

7. The tag number is to be preceded by the printed national code (see STANAG

1059) -e.g. BE, CA, FR, etc...

NOTE 1: Those nations which do not wish to use 3 part tags many have only a 2 part tag consisting of the top and bottom parts (marked A and c). A EXTRACT FROM STANAG 2084

HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS

3. Document. For the purpose of this agreement, "document" is defined as any recorded information regardless of its physical form or characteristics including, but not limited to, all: a. Written material, whether handwritten, printed or typed. I b. Painted, drawn or engraved material. I c. Sound or voice recordings. d. Imagery. I e. Punched cards, punched paper tape, printed output and associated

material.

f. Reproductions of the foregoing, by whatever process.

PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING OF CAPTURED ENEEN DOCUMENTS (CED).

Ceneral.

17. CED are valuable sources of information and should be exploited for

intelligence purposes with minimum of delay.

18. CED associated with CEE (i.e. ATD marked TECHDOC)will be handled as

described in part I. All other types of CED will be handled as described in

this part. Such documents are to be divided into categories as follows:

a. Category A. Documents containiq infonnation concerning subjects pf

[sic] priority intelligence imterest [sic].

b. Category B. Cryptographic documents, encrypted items and all other

documents relating to enemy co~nmunicationssystems.

C. Category C. Documents considered of less intelligence value.

d. Category D. Documents containing no infor~wtionof intelligence value.

19. In principle CED belong to the nation of the capturing unit, but in

order to ensure that information of tactical intelligence interest is ef-

ficiently utilized, such documents should be handled through command channels

in the initial phases of the exploitation process. Final, thorough investiga-

1 tion will be the responsibility of the capturing nation.

20. CED associated with a PW, or copies thereof, should follow the PW dur-

ing the PW interrogation process. Otherwise, the exploitation of CED should be

carried out in accordance with the principles laid down for CEE in Part I,

paras. 6 - 10. EXPLOITATION PROCESS

21. CED will be exploited through the following process but, whenever

feasible, in order to expedite the handling, the processing stages may be

combined.

a. Preliminary screening and reporting of information of immediate tacti-

cal value by capturing unit.

b. Complementary examination, translation, categorization (see para 181,

reporting, reproduction and dissemination by or for intelligence

staffs.

c. Detailed exploitation and further reporting, reproduction and dis-

semination by CDU or other special elements.

MARKING OF CED

22. The capturing unit will tag or otherwise mark the CED as follows:

National identifying letters as prescribed in STANAG 1059.

Designation of capturing unit including service.

Serial number of the CED. This will consist of a number allocated

sequentially by the capturing unit.

Date-time of captur-

Place of capture (UTM co-ordinates).

Summary of circumstances~underwhich the CED was obtained.

Interrogation serial number of any associated PW, if appropriate or

known.

25. ~eproductionand dissemination of CED and translation as necessary will be carried out at the earliest ~ossiblestage of the exploitation process. Copies of CED considered of interest or translations thereof and

lists of exploited documents, whether disseminated or not, will be submitted to appropriat-e NATO and national staffs. HANDLING OF CATEGORY "8" DOCUMENTS

26. Category B documents require special, restricted handling. National

and NATO 110 should he kept informed of the seizure and disposition of such

docnmcnts ss soon as possible. They are to be handed over to the most relevent

[sic] Service without delay. Here they should be handled in close coordination

with the co~n~nunicationsstaff.

HANDLING: OF SPECIAL DOCUMENTS

27. Unmarked maps, charts, air imagery and other types of cartographic

material and information should be forwarded to the nearest geographic staff,

survey unit or topographical section for exploitation. Copies may be retained

to meet operational needs.

28. Marked maps, charts, and air imagery will be handled as ordinary types

of CED, but relevant geographic staffs, survey units and topographical

sections are to be infonned of their existance, with scale, series, edition

and other identification data.

29. Personal papers belonging to a PW will be returned to the PW after examination in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Copies oi s~chpapers may be made and forwarded if considered appropriate. APPENDIX B Sample Detainee Personnel Record

DETAINEE PERSONNEL RECORD

wywlm of Mtdl~l

31. REMARKS 37. PnOTO

PHOTO PHOTO (Ront V1.u) IRUht R0lD.l

3m. PREPARED BV llndividvol and unit1 30. SIGNATURE

40. DATE PREPARED 41. PLACE

DA FORM 4237-R, Aug 85 EDITION OF MAV 81 18OMOLLTL

.- PART II- TO BE MAINTAINED BY UNIT HAVINO CUSTODY 428. LAST NAME b. FIRST NAMES I

44. MEDICAL RECORD a. IMMUNIZATION (Vocclnallon# and lnnoculatioru wllh Date,)

b. MAJOR ILLNESSES AND PHYSICAL DEFECTS (Wlth Dole#) c. BLOOD GROUP

46. INTERNMENT EMPLOYMENT OUALIFICATIONS

4(1. SERIOUS OFFENSES. PUNISHMENTS. AN0 ESCAPES (Wilh Dater)

- - 47. TRANSFERS \v/ FROM fLoeetion) I TO (Locotion) DATE 1

I

48. REMARKS

4s. RNATIONAL TRANSFER a. CERTIFICATE OF CREDIT BALANCE ISSUE0 TO EPW (Amount in word,) b. AMT IN FIGURES I C. LOCATION d. DATE 1 W. NTERNATIONAL TRANSFER a. CERTIFICATE OF CREDIT b. AMT IN FIGURES

I c. LOCATION Id. DATE- I 61. REPATRIATION a. REASON

b. MODE c. DATE

62. FINANCIAL STATUS AT TIME OF REPATRIATION a. CERTIFICATE OF CREDIT BALANCE ISSUED TO EPW (Amount in words) b. AM1 IN FIGURES

C. LOCATION

REVERSE OF DA FORM 4237.R. AUG 86 APPENDIX C Sample Enemy Prisoner of War Identity Card

..""I". "" .,...-- f Sktei Army. Thu cud mwt bs curied at dl timer by the EPW x to whom it u iuucd. APPENDIX D Sample Enemy Prisoner of War Captive Tag

0 0 A DATE OF CAPTURE P ( I Search Thoroughly NAME ( I ( ) SERIAL NUMBER I I RANK ( I Tag Correctly DATE OF BIRTH ( J ( 1 UNIT ( I Report lmmed~ately LOCATION OF CAPTURE ( I ( 1 CAPTURING UNIT I J Evacuate Raptdly SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE ) I ) Segregate by Category ( 1 Safeguard from DangertEscape WEAWNSIDOCUMENTS I I ( 1 PW I ------b FORWARD TO UNlT ( I B DATE OF CAPTURE I 1 NAME 1 1 SERIAL NUMBER ( I RANK l 1- DATE OF BIRTH I I UNIT ( I LOCATION OF CAPTURE ( I

CAPTURING UNIT ( 1 SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE I I

WEAPONSJDOCUMENTS ( I --- ATTACH TO ITEM I J C DATE OF CAPTURE ( I NAME ( J SERIAL NUMBER I RANK ( I DATE QF BIRTH I I, UNIT 1 1 LOCATION OF CAPTURE I

DESCRIPTION OF WEAPONSIDOCUMENTS

I VUMENTAND, 0 FRONT APPENDIX E Sample JINTACCS SALUTE Report Format and Report

SALUTE REPORT FORMAT

TO: DTG:

FROM: REPORT NO:

1. SIZE/WHO:

2. ACTIVITY/WHAT:

3. LOCATION/WHERE :

4. UNIT/WHO:

5. TIMEINHEN:

6. EQUIPMENT/HOW :

7. REMARKS

a. SOURCE:

b. MAP DATA: SAMPLE JINTACCS SALUTE REPORT

I

(UNCLASSIFIED)

SALUTE REPOT

TO: G2, V Corps DATE: 2309502 Aug 85

FM: Team 1, IPW Section REPORT NUMBER 08-0175 241st MI Bn, 23d Div (ARMD)

1. (u) SIZE/WHO: Company-size tank unit.

2. (u) ACTIVITY~WHAT: Reconnoiter and secure river crossing sites (number

unknown).

3. (U) LOCATION/WHERE: West bank of FULDA River, southwest of BEBRA (NB

5547). Exact location unknown to source.

4. (u) UNIT/WHO: Amph Tank CoIRecon ~11156thMRD.

5. (u) ~IME~WHEN: ~issionto be completed no later than 2323002 Aug 85.

6. (u) EQUIPMENT/HOW: Using assigned weapons and equipment.

7. (u) REMARKS:

a. (U) SOURCE: EPW assigned interrogation serial number US-AR-2235-1.

b . (u) MAP DATA: GERMANY, .1:50,000, EISENACH-HUNFELD, USACGSC 50-242.

(UNCLASSIFIED)

< APPENDIX F Sample Screening Report Format and Report

REPORT FORMAT

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SCREENING REPORT

Report Number: ~ate/~ime:

PART I. INFORMATION CONCERNING CAPTIVE

A. PREVIOUS SCPEENING/INTERROGATION REPORTS (unit/Report No.)

B. CAPTURE DATA

1. Captive Tag Number:

2. Capturing Unit:

3. ~ate/~imeof Capture:

4. Place of Capture:

5. Documents Captured (~is~osition):

6. Equipment Captured/ Disposition:

7. Circumstances of Capture:

C. BIOGRAPHIC ' INFORMATION

1. Full Name / Rank / Service Number:

2. Date / Place of Birth:

3. Sex / Marital Status / Religion:

4. Full Unit Designation / Unit Code:

5. Duty Position: 6. Military Education / Experience:

7. Civilian Education / Experience :

8. Languages Spoken (proficiency) :

D. OBSERVATIONS

1. Physical Condition of Captive:

2. Uniform / Insignia (type and condition):

3. Assessment of Attitude / Behavior:

4. Assessment of Knowledgeability:

PART II. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SCREENER'S RECOMMENDATIONS :

1. Screener's / Interpreter's ~ame(s):

2. Place of Screening:

3. Screening Code:

4. Remarks:

B. SENIOR INTERROGATOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Senior Inter,rogatorts Name:

2. Interrogate (Y/N):

3. Remarks: SAMPLE SCREENING REPORT

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 1st Brigade IPW Team, 123rd CEWI APO New York 09166

SCREENING REPORT

Report Number: 001 Da te/~ime: 150345ZAUG 89

PART I. INFORMATION CONCERNING CAPTIVE

A. PREVIOUS SCREENING/INTERROGATION REPORTS (~nitf~eportNO.)

B CAPTURE DATA

1. Captive Tag Number: P1A

2. Capturing Unit: C ~rp/lst ~qdrn/8ACR

3. ~ate/~.imeof Capture: 150330ZAUG 89

4. Place of Capture: x645162

5. Documents Captured ispo position): lxID Card (retained by EPW), lxSOl (evac W/EPW)

6. Equipment Captured/ Disposition: None

7. Circumstances of Capture: pulled out of stream near SETZELBACH (~~6416)

C. BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

1. Full Name / Rank / Service Number: Kiril Dimitrievich GRECHKO / JrSGT / 4911623

2. Data / Place of Birth: 11 NOV 67 / KIEV, UkSSR, USSR

3. Sex / Marital Status / Religion: Male / Single / None

4. Full Unit Designation / Unit Code: WNA / CNB-677

5. Duty Position: WNA

6. Military Education / Experience: WNA 7. Civilian Education / Experience: 10 yrs compulsory

8. Languages Spoken (~roficienc~): Ukrainian (N), Russian (FL)

D. OBSERVATIOE

1. Physical Condition of Captive: Tired and wet.

2. Uniform / Insignia (type and condition):

3. Assessment of Attitude / ~ehavior: A little shaken but cooperative

4. Assessment of Knowledgeability: Probably will answer PIR /I5

PART I I. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SCREENER'S RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. ~creener's/ lnterrreterls ~arne(s): SGT PFREZ

2. Place of Screening:

3. Screening Code: 2B

4. Remarks: Source may respond to futility approach

B. SENIOR INTERROGATOR'SRECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Senior Interrogator's Name: SSG RIVERA

2. Interrogate (Y/N): Yes

3. Remarks Assigned SSG Gonzalez

L APPENDIX G Sample Tactical Interrogation Report Format and Report

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT FORMAT

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

TACT IC AL

INTERROGATION REPORT

NAME OF PRISONER: INTERROGATOR:

CATEGORY: A B C D UNIT/FORMATION TO WHICH INTERROGATOR ATTACHED:

INTG SERIAL NO:. MAPS USED

DTG OF INTG: LANGUAGE USED:

INTG REPORT NO: INTERPRETER:

PART I - INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL OF ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR

A. PERSONAL PARTICULARS:

1. Rank, full name, service number, and position:

2. Date and place of birth:

3. Nationality: Ethnic: Religion:

4. Knowledge of languages and proficiency:

5. Unit formation or organization:

6. Date, time, place (grid references), capturing unit, and circumstances

of capture:

B. CAREER:

1. Premilitary:

2. Military:

C. ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE VALUE:

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE) (CLASS IFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

1. Intelligence, experience, cooperation, reliability:

2. Specialist knowledge:

3. Discussion of approach technique:

D. DOCUMENTS CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE:

1. List of documents:

2. Details of money and valuables:

E. EQUIPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE:

1. Personal equipment:

2. Weapons:

NOTE: The aim of any interrogation is to obtain information whichwill con- tribute to the satisfaction of a canmander's intelligence requirements. Since these requirements will differ in scope at each level of command, when conducting PIR and IR interrogations nonapplicable paragraphs may be deleted. Part 1 must always be included according to STANAG 2033

PART I1 - INFORMATION OBTAINED

A. DO1 is unless otherwise indicated in the body of this report.

.B. TEXT:

1. MISSIONS:

a. EPW: (and full unit designation)

(1) Time of capture:

(2) Future:

(3) Past:

b. Unit: (full unit designation)

(1) Present:

(2) Future:

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE) (CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

(3) Past:

c. hit: (full unit designation):

(1) Present:

(2) Future:

(3) Past:

2. COMPOSI'rTON (Level of knowledgeability) and (unidentified, full unit designation unknown if applicable):

a. (tie-in to level of knowledgeability) had (~2,directly subordinate Attached--full unit designation, detached--full unit designation):

b. (tie-in to level of knowledgeability) had (c2, directly subordinate Attached--full unit designation, detached--full unit designation) :

3. STRENGTH: (level of knowledgeahility):

a. Personnel: (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(1) (Tie-in to level of knowledgeahility) had. ..(number x total personnel, number X officers/enlisted, duty positions, as appropriate, full unit designation of attachedldetached personnel :

(2) (Tie-in to level of knowledgeability) had...(numher x total personnel, nurnher X off icerslenlisted , duty positions, as appropriate, full unit designation of attachedldetached personnel:

(NOTE: Duty Positions: Only obtained for headquarters elemnts, squads, sections, teams, and record duty positions of officers/senior enlisted member for platoons if there is no platoon headquarters).

h. Weapons and eqriipment (level of knowledgeahili ty) :

(1) Individual weapons (tie-in to level of knowledgeahili ty):

(a) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution):

(h) Number x f'ull military nomenclature, distribution):

(2) Crew-served weapons (tie-in to level of knowledgeahilitv):

(a) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution): (CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE) (b) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution):

(3) Other weapons (tie-in to level of knowledgcability):

(a) Number x full military nomenclature., distribution) :

(b) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution).

(4) Armored vehicles (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(a) Number x full military nomenclature, armament, distribution of armored vehicles:

(b) Number x full military nomenclature, armament, distribution of armored vehicle

(5) Other Vehicles: (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(a) number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(b) number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(6) Canmunications Equipment: (tie-in to level of knowledge- ability):

(a) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(b) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(7) NBC equipment (tie-in to level of kn~wled~eability):

(a) Individual:

((1)) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

((2)) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(b) Vehicular:

((1)) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

((2)) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(8) Specialized equipment: (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(a) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(b) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE) (CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

4. DISPOSITIONS:

a. Activity, full unit designation, located vicinity, 6-digit grid coordinate--physical description, security measures, date of informat'ion. (HIS):

b. Activity, full unit designation, located vicinity, collocated activities, 6-digit grid coordinate - physical description, security measures, DOI. (HIS):

5. TACTICS (level of knowledgeability) :

a. Offensive:

b. Defensive:

c. Special operations:

6. TRAINING (level of knowledgeability) :

a. Individual:

b. Unit:

c. Special:

7. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS (level of knowledgeabili ty) :

a. Losses (tie-in to level of knowledgeability) :

(1) Personnel:

(2) Equipment:

b. Replacements and Reinforcements (tie-in to level of knowledgeability) :

(1) Personnel:

(2) Equipment:

c. Combat experience ( tie-in to level of knowledgeability) :

d. Morale ( tie-in to level of knowledgeability) :

8. LOGISTICS (level of kn~wled~eability):

a. Weapons and ammunition (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(1) Weapons:

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE) (CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

(2) Ammunition:

b. Vehicles and POL (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(1) Vehicles:

(2) POL:

c. Food and water: (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(1) Food:

(2) Water:

d. Cmmunications equipment (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

e. Medical (tie-in to level of knowledgeability) :

(1) Individual equipment:

(2) Vehicular equipment:

(3) Personnel:

(4) Facilities:

(5) Evacuation procedures:

f. NBC equipment (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(1) Individual:

g. Specialized equipment (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

9. ELECTRONIC TECHNICAL DATA (level of knowledgeability):

10. MISCELLANEOUS (level of knowledgeability):

a. Personalities (tie-in to level of knowledgeability) :

LAST NAME FIRST NAME MN/I RANK POS FUD

(tie-in to tie-in)

( tie-in to tie-in)

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE) (CLASSIFLCATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

b. Code names/numbers ( tie-in to level of knowledgeabili ty) :

(1) Code name:

(2) Code number:

c. Radio frequencies/call signs (tie-in to level of knowledgeability).

(1) Radio frequency:

(2) Call sign:

d. Passwords (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

e. Obstacles (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(1) Enemy:

(2) NATO;

f. PSYOP (tie-in to level of knowledgeability).

(1) Enemy:

(2) NATO:

(CLASS IFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

- SAMPLE TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

( NAME OF PRISONER: SCHULTZ ( INTERROGATOR: SFC JONES ( ) CATEGORY: A (B) C D ( ) UNIT/FORMATIONTO WHICH INTERROGATOR ATTACHED: Team 1, Interrogation Sect ion, 241s t MI Bn, 23d Div (ARMD) ( INTG SERIAL NO: US-AR 2235-1 ( ) MAPS USED: Germany, 1 :50,000, EISENACH-HUNFELD, USACGSC 50-242 ( DTG OF INTG: 230930ZAug 85 ( ) LANGUAGE USED: Russian ( INTG REPORT NO: ( INTERPRETER: None

PART I - INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL OF ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR (EPW)

A. ( ) PERSONAL PARTICULARS:

1. ( ) Rank, full name, service number, and position: JrSgt Georg SCHULTZ, 1634921, Squad Leader.

2. ( ) Date and place of birth: 12 Jun 62, KIEV, UkSSR, USSR.

3. ( ) Nationality: Soviet Ethnic: Germari Religion: none.

4. ( ') Knowledge of languages and proficiency: Russian (N), German (FL).

5. ( ) Unit formation or organization: 1 MR Sqd (MRS), 2 MR Plt (MRP), 3 MR Co (MRC) 3 MR Bn (MRB),44 MR Regt (MRR), 32 MR Div (MRD), (1~~~/2/3/3/44/32~~~).

6. ( Date, time, place (grid references), capturing unit, and circumstances of capture: 221800ZAug 85, NB655498, 1st ~lt/~/2/1/23Div (ARMD), captured during a counterattack across the main road northwest of BAUHAUS (~~662495).

B ( CAREER:

1 ( ) Premi1ita.r~: 10 years civilian education, c ivil~anoccupation: coal miner.

2. ( ) Military: 5 years military service, attended NCO school in July 1982.

(DOWN GRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS) C. ( ASSESSMENT 01- INTELLIGENCE VALUE:

1. ( ) Intelligence, experience, cooperation, reliability: Source was of average intelligence; experience is rated good; source was cooperative, answering all questions; reliability is rated good as no discrepancies were noted by use of repeat and control questions.

2. ( ) Special knowledge: None

3. ( ) Discussion of approach technique: Source cooperated on the direct approach.

D. ( DOCUMENTS CARRILD AT TIME OF CAPTURE:

1. ( ) List of documents: 1 x Enemy ID card (1634921) (returned to source).

2. ( ) Details of money and valuables: None

E. ( ) EQUIPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE.

1. ( ) Personal equipment: 1 x ShM protective mask (returned to source).

2. ( ) Weapons: 1 x 7.62mm AKM, 3 x empty magazines (evacuated through supply channels)

PART I1 - INFORMATION OBTAINED

A. ( ) DO1 is 221800ZAug 85 unless otherwise indicated in the body of this report.

B. ( ) TEXT:

1. ( ) MISSIONS:

a. ( EPW:

(1) ( ) Time of capture: Taking part in the defense of Hill 456.

(2) ( ) Future: Continue to defend Hill 456.

(3) ( Past: Participate in the assault against NATO forces on Hill 456.

b. ( ) Unit: (2~~~/3/,3/44/32MRD). (1) ( ) Present: Defend ill 456 w/antitank ~lt/3/44/32MRD in support.

(2) ( ) Future: cbntinue to defend Hill 456 until ordered to rejoin 3 MRc/3/44/32MR~.

(3) ( ) Past: Assault and secure ill 456; set up perimeter defense.

c. ( ) Unit: (Arnph Tank Co, Recon Bn, 32 MILD).

(1) ( ) Present: Reconnoiter and secure river crossing sites (no. unk) on the west side of the Fulda River, SW of BEBRA (~~5547)NLT 232300ZAug 85. (HIS U/I Sqd Ldr, Amph Tank Co. DOI: 220900ZAug 85.)

(2) ( Future: Unk.

(3) ( ) Past: Unk.

2. ( ) COMPOSITION: (32 MRD and u/I MRL unit).

a. ( ) 32 EW) had 44 MRR and 1 x Recon Bn.

h. ( ) 4 ~~~132MRD had 3 x MRD, dsg 1, 2, and 3.

c. ( ) 3 MRR/44/32 MRD had 3 x MRC, dsg 1, 2, 3 and 1 x AT Plt.

d. ( ) 3 ~~C/3/44/32PtRD had a Co tQ and 3 x MRP, dsg 1, 2, and 3.

e. ( ) Ea ~~~/3/3/44/32MRL) had 3 x EIRS, dsg 1, 2, and 3.

f. ( ) Recon Bn/32 PW had 1 x Amph Tank Co.

g. ( ) U/I MRL unit.

3. ( ) STKENGTH: (3 ~iRC/3/44/32 MRD).

a. ( ) Personnel: (3 HRC)

(1) ( ) 3 MRC had 103 x pers. (6 x OFF, 102 x EM) (HISPlt Sgc, 2 MR11/3 ERC, DOI: 201800ZAug 85).

(2) ( ) Co HQ/3 MRC had 9 x pers. (3 x Of f--CO, PO, TO 6 x EM-- lSG, BPW driver, BblP gunner, 1 x PKM gunner, and 2 x riflemen).

(3) ( 2 MKP/~bIRC had 33 x pers. (1 x Off--Plt Ldr, 32 x EM--Plt Sgt and 31 x Plt mbrs).

(4) ( ) 1 ~lRS/2/3/ MRC had 10 x pers. (Sqd Ldr, sniper, WG-7 gunner, 2 x PKM gunners, BlIP driver, BMP gunner, and 3 x riflemen). b* ( Weapons and equipment: (3bEC).

(1) ( ) Individual weapons: (1 MRS/2/3 MRC).

(a) ( ) 1 x 9mm PM, carried by BMP driver.

(b) ( ) 1 x 7.b2mrn AKM, 1 x ea EM except BMP driver, sniper, and PKM gunners.

(c) ( ) 1 x 7.62mm SVD, carried by sniper.

(2) ( ) Crew-served weapons: ( IEIRS/~/~MRC) .

(a) ( ) 2 x 7.62mm PKM, 1 x ea PKM gunner.

(b) ( ) 1 x 85mm RPG-7 ATGL, carried by RPG-7 gunner.

(3) (.) Other weapons: (lMRs/2/3 MRC) Approx 50 x F-1 hand grenades, 5 x ea member, 1 MRS.

(4) ( ) Armored vehicles: (2~~~13MRC) 3 x BMP, ea armed with 1 x 73mm smoothbore gun, 1 x 7.62mm PKT, and 1 x AT-3 launcher, 1 x ea MRS/~MRP.

(5) ( ) Other vehicles: ~MKP/~MRC)Notie.

(6) ( ) Ccmmunications equipment: (~MRP/~MRC)3 x R-123 transceivers, 1 x ea BMP/~MRP.

(7) ( ) NBC equipment: (3MRC).

(a) ( ) Individual: Ea mbr had 1 x ShM protective mask, 1 x set U/I protective clothi.ng, and 1 individual decon kit.

(b) ( ) Vehicular: Ea vehicle had 1 x air filtration sys tem.

(8) ( Specialized equipment: Unk.

4. ( ) DISPOSITIONS:

a. ( ) CP, 3 MRc/3/44/32M~~location vicinity NB660495, in the last house on light sllrface road at SW edge of BAUHAUS (~~6649).security measures and collocated units: UNK. (HIS Plt Sgt, 2~1~~/3/3/44/32MRD DOI: 220800ZAug 85.)

b. ( ) U/I deployment of 6 x 122mm howitzers from NB651491 approx 500 meters N along a light surface road to 14B654494. Guns were pointing west. Security measures and collocated units: UNK. DOI: 220930ZAug85.

c. ,( ) U/I convoy of 10 x T-72 Tanks from NB659495 to NB654496, traveling W along secondary road. Security measures and collocated units: UNK. DOI: 221600ZAu~85. 5. ( ) TACTICS: (2~1~~/3/3/4432hlR~)Defensive tactics used by the 21iRP at Hill 456 were based on the use of boiling oil and catapulting large stones over the perimeter.

6. ( ) TRAINING: (3M~C/3/44/32MRll) Political training by the PO, 3MRC had since 1 Aug 85 involved increased emphasis on perfidy of the NATO Alliance and especially the FRG in planning an invasion of the GDR.

7. ( ) COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: (3M.~C/3/44/32MRD).

a. ( ) Losses: (2bRS/2/3MRC).

(1) ( ) Personnel: 1 x KIA on 21 Aug 85, when the 2 MRS BMP was destroyed by an U/I US missile.

(2) ( Equipment: The 2 MRS BMP was completely destroyed by the same U/I US missile on 21 Aug 85.

(1) ( ) Personnel: 1 x EM arrived as replacements for 2 MRS/2/3 MRC at 221430ZAug 85. The replacements arrived already formed in a MRS and appeared to be well-trained troops.

(2) ( ) Equipment: A new BlIP arrived at 221430ZAug 85.

c. ( ) Combat experience: None prior to current offensive.

d. ( ) Morale: (3MRC) Morale in the 3 1.IItC was excellent, due to successes in the early stages of the offensive.

e. ( ) Additional information: None.

8. ( LOGISTICS: (~MRC/~/~~/~ZMRD).

a. ( ) Weapons and ammunition: (2MRP/3MRC).

(1) ( ) Weapons: All weapons are in good condition. Spare parts for all weapons were scored in the BFLP. No shortages of weapons.

(2) ( ) Ammunition: All ammunition in the 2 MRP was in good condition and in adequate supply.

b. ( ) Vehicles and POL: (3MKC).

(1) ( ) Vehicles: All BMPs were in good condition. Each BMP carries its own spare parts and tool kit.

(2) ( ) POL: POL resupply to the 3 MRC is delivered by truck of an U/I unit each evening at about 2000 hours. No shortages of POL. I c. ( Food and water (3MRC). (1) ( ) Food: Since 17 Aug 85 all personnel have been eating canned rations. There were no shortages of food. Last resupply of food was at 2120uOZAug 85.

(2) ( ) Water: Water was available from water trucks of an U/I unit which arrived at the CP, 3MRC each evening at 2030 hours. No shortages of water.

d. ( ) Cmrnunicatioils equipment. (~MRP/~MRC)All transceivers wdre in good working order.

e. ( ) Other: (3MRC).

(1) ( ) Medical: Each mbr had 1 x individual first aid kit.

(2) ( ) NBC: All individual and vehicular NBC gear was in excellent condition, since it had been inspected in early Aug 85.

9. ( ) ELECTRONIC TECHNICAL DATA: None.

10. ( ) NISCELLANEOUS: (3~~~/3/44/32M~~).

a. ( Personalities: (3MRC).

LAST NAME FIRST NAME MN/I RANK POSN F E

HOFBAUEK FN U MN U CP t t CO 3MRC

KAEMPERT PN U MNU SrSgt 1SG 3MRC

BECK Co slno s MNU JrLt PltLdr ~MRP/~MRL

GUCIiENKO Franz MNU SrS,t PltLdr ~MRP/~MRC

b. ( i Code narne./code number: Unk.

c. ( ) Radio frequencies/call signs: ( MRC).

(1) ( ) Radio frequencies for 22 Aug 85 were as follows: Primary, 16.90 MHz; Alternate, 18.75 MHz. Frequencies are changed daily at 2400 hours by unit SOI.

(2) ( ) Call signs: (~MRP/~MRC)Call signs for 22 Aug 85 were as follows: ~MRs/~MRP,AFCS 25; ZMRS/PMRP, AFCS 22, ~MRs/ZMRP, AFCS 19. Call signs are changed at 2400 ho~rsdaily by unit SOI. d. ( ) Passwords: Challenge for 22 Aug 85 is DZIEN; countersign is DOBRY. Both are changed daily at 2400 hours by unit SOP.

e. ( Obstacles: Unk.

f. ( ) PSYOP: Unk. APPENDIX H Approaches DIRECT APPROACH rogator had to talk with the source again, the source would not have any trust and The direct approach is the questioning of would most probably not cooperate. Instead a source without having to use any type of of promising unequivocably that a source approach. The direct approach is often will receive a certain thing, such as political called no approach at all, but it is the most asylum, an interrogator will offer to do effective of all the approaches. Statistics tell what he can to help achieve the source's us that in World War 11, it was 85 percent to desired goal; as long as the source 95 percent effective. In Vietnam, it was 90 cooperates. percent to 95 percent effective. The direct The incentive approach can be broken approach works best on lower enlisted per- down into the incentive short term (recej sonnel as they have little or no resistance immediately) and incentive long term training and have had minimal security (received within a period of time). The training. Due to its effectiveness, the direct determination rests on when the source approach is always to be tried first. The expects to receive the incentive offered. direct approach usually achieves the maxi- mum cooperation in the minimum amount of time and enables the interrogator to EMOTIONAL APPROACH quickly and completely exploit the source for the information he possesses. The The emotional approach overrides the advantages of this technique are its sim- source's rationale for resisting by using and plicity and the fact that it takes little time. manipulating his emotions against him. For this reason, it is frequently used at the The main emotions of any source at the tactical echelons where time is limited. time of capture might be either love or fear. Love or fear for one person may be ex- ploited or turned into hate for someone else. INCENTIVE APPROACH For example, the person who caused the source to be in the position in which he now The incentive approach is a method of finds himself. The source's fear can be built rewarding the source for his cooperation, upon, or increased so as to override his but it must reinforce ~ositivebehavior. This rational side. If the situation demands it is done by satisfying the source's needs. and the source's fear is so great that he Granting incentives to an uncooperative cannot communicate with the interrogator, source leads him to believe that rewards the interrogator may find that he has to can be gained whether he cooperates or not. decrease the source's fear in order to effec- Interrogators may not withhold a source's tively collect information from him. There rights under the Geneva Conventions, but are two variations of the emotional they can withhold a source's privileges. The approaches: Emotional love, emotional granting of incentives must not infringe on hate. the Geneva Conventions, but they can be things to which the source is already EMOTIONAL LOVE APPROACH entitled to. This can be effective onlv" if the For the emotional love approach to be source is unaware of his rights or privileges. successful, the interrogator must focus on Incentives must seem to be logical and the anxiety felt by the source about the cir- possible. An interrogator must not promise cumstances in which he finds himself. The anything that cannot be delivered. Interro- interrogator must direct the love the source gators do not make promises, but usually feels toward the appropriate object: family, infer them while still sidestepping guaran- homeland, comrades, and so forth. If the tees. If an interrogator made a promise that interrogator can show the source what the he could not keep and he or another inter- source himself can do to alter or improve his situation, the approach has a chance of success. This approach usually involves assessment indicates that the source feels a some incentive; such as communication negative emotion toward it. The emotional with the source's family, a quicker end to hate approach can be much more effectively the war to save his comrades' lives, and so used by drawing out the source's negative forth. A good interrogator will usually emotions with questions that elicit a orchestrate some futility with an emotional thought-provoking response. For example, love approach to hasten the source's reach- "Why do you think they allowed you to be ing the breaking point. Sincerity and con- captured?" or "Why do you think they left viction are extremely important in a suc- you to die?" Do not berate the source's cessful attempt at an emotional love forces or homeland unless you are certain of approach as the interrogator must show his negative emotions. Many sources may genuine concern for the source and for the have great love for their country, but still object to which the interrogator is directing may hate the regime in control. The emo- the source's emotion. If the interrogator tional hate approach is most effective with ascertains that the source has great love for the immature or timid source who may have his unit and fellow soldiers, he can effec- no opportunity up to this point for revenge, tively exploit the situations by explaining or never had the courage to voice his to the source that his providing information feelings. may shorten the war or battle in progress, thus saving many of his comrades' lives. But, his. refusal to talk may cause their INCREASED FEAR UP deaths. This places a burden on the source APPROACH and may motivate him to seek relief through cooperation with the interrogator. The increased fear up approach is most effective on the younger and more inexperi- EMOTIONAL HATE APPROACH enced source or on a source who appears nervous or frightened. It is also effective on The emotional hate approach focuses on a source who appears to be the silent, confi- any genuine hate, or possibly a desire for dent type. Sources with something to hide, revenge, the source may feel. The interroga- such as the commission of a war crime, or tor must correctly pick up on exactly what it having surrendered while still having is that the source may hate so that the emo- ammunition in his weapon, or breaking his tion can be exploited to override the source's military oath are particularly easy to break rational side. The source may have negative with this technique. There are two distinct feelings about his country's regime, his variations of this approach: the fear up immediate superiors, officers in general, or (harsh) and the fear up (mild). his fellow soldiers. This approach is usually most effective on a member of racial or reli- FEAR UP (HARSH) gious minorities who has suffered discrimi- nation in both service and civilian life. If a In the fear up (harsh) approach, the inter- source feels that he has been treated rogator behaves in a heavy, overpowering unfairly in his unit, the interrogator can manner with a loud and threatening voice. point out that if the source cooperates and The interrogator may even feel the need to divulges the location of that unit, the unit throw objects across the room to heighten can be destroyed, thus affording the source the source's implanted feelings of fear. an opportunity for revenge. By using a con- Great care must be taken when doing this spiratorial tone of voice, the interrogator so that any actions taken would not violate can enhance the value of this technique. the Geneva Conventions. This technique is Phrases, such as "You owe them no loyalty to convince the source that he does indeed for the way they have treated you," when have something to fear and that he has no used appropriately, can expedite the success option but to cooperate. A good interrogator will implant in the source's mind that the of this techn:q1 ue. interrogator himself is not the object to be One word of caution, do not immediately feared, but is a possible way out of the trap. begin to berate a certain facet of the source's background or life until your The fear can be directed toward reprisals by nothing more than calming the source and international tribunals, the government of convincing him that he will be properly and the host country, or the source's own forces. humanely treated, or that for him the war is Shouting can be very effective in this varia- mercifully over and he need not go into tion of the fear up approach. combat again. When used with a soothing, calm tone of voice, this often creates rap- FEAR UP (MILD) port and usually nothing else is needed to get the source to cooperate. While calming The fear up (mild) approach is better the source, it is a good idea to stay initially suited to the strong, confident type of inter- with nonpertinent conversation and to care- rogator as there is generally no need to fully avoid the subject which has caused the raise the voice or resort to heavy-handed, source's fear. This works quickly in develop- table banging violence. It is a more correct ing rapport and communication as the form of blackmail when the circumstances source will readily respond to kindness. indicate that the source does indeed have something to fear. It may be a result of When using this approach, it is important coincidence; the soldier was ca.ught on the that the interrogator meets the source at the wrong side of the border before hostilities source's perspective level and not expect the actually commenced (he was armed, he source to come up to the interrogator's per- could be a terrorist), or a result of his spective level. If a prisoner is so frightened actions (he surrendered contrary to his mili- that he has withdrawn into a shell or tary oath and is now a traitor to his coun- regressed back to a less threatening state of try, and his own forces will take care of the mind, the interrogator must break through disciplinary action). The fear up (mild) to him. This may be effected by the interro- approach must be a credible distortion of gator putting himself on the same physical the truth. A distortion that the source will level as the source and may require some believe. It usually involves some incentive; physical contact. As the source relaxes the interrogator can intimate that he might somewhat and begins to respond to the be willing to alter the circumstances of the interrogator's kindness, the interrogator source's capture, as long as the source coop- can then begin asking pertinent questions. erates and answers the questions. This approach technique may backfire if In most cases, shouting is not necessary. allowed to go too far. After convincing the The actual fear is increased by helping the source that he has nothing to fear, he may source to realize the unpleasant conse- cease to be afraid and may feel secure quences that the facts may cause and then enough to resist the interrogator's pertinent presenting an alternative, which of course questions. If this occurs, reverting to a can be effected by answering some simple harsher approach technique usually will questions. The fear up approach is dead- rapidly bring the desired result to the end, and a wise interrogator may want to interrogator. keep it in reserve as a trump card. After working to increase the source's fear, it would be difficult to convince him that everything will be all right if the approach PRIDE AND EGO APPROACH is not successful. The pride and ego approach concentrates on tricking the source into revealing perti- DECREASED FEAR DOWN nent information by using flattery or abuse. APPROACH It is effective with a source who has dis- played weaknesses or feelings of inferiority The decreased fear down approach is used which can be effectively exploited by the primarily on a source who is already in a interrogator. There are two techniques in state of fear due to the horrible circum- this approach: the pride and ego up stances of his capture, or on a source who is approach and the pride and ego down in fear for his life. This technique is really approach. A problem with the pride and ego Effective targets for a successful pride approach techniques is that since both and ego up approach are usually the variations rely on trickery, the source will socially accepted reasons for flattery: eventually realize that he has been tricked appearance, good military bearing, and so and may refuse to cooperate further. If this forth. The interrogator should closely watch occurs, the interrogator can easily move the source's demeanor for indications that into a fear up approach and convince the the approach is getting through to him. source that the questions he has already Such indications include, but are not answered have committed him, and it limited to, a raising of the head, a look of would be useless to resist further. The inter- pride in the eyes, a swelling of the chest, or rogator can mention that it will be reported a stiffening of the back. to the source's forces that he has cooperated fully with the enemy, and he or his family may suffer possible retribution when this PRIDE AND EGO DOWN becomes known, and the source has much APPROACH to fear if he is returned to his forces. This The pride and ego down approach is may even offer the interrogator the option based on the interrogator attacking the to go into a love-of-family approach in that source's sense of personal worth. Any the source must protect his family by pre- source who shows any real or imagined venting his forces from learning of his inferiority or weakness about himself, his duplicity or collaboration. Telling the loyalty to his organization, or his capture in source that you will not report the fact that embarrassing circumstances can be easily the prisoner talked or that he was a severe broken with this approach technique. The discipline problem is an incentive that may objective is for the interrogator to pounce on enhance the effectiveness of the approach. the source's sense of pride by attacking his loyalty, intelligence, abilities, leadership qualities, slovenly appearance, or any other PRIDE AND EGO UP APPROACH perceived weakness. This will usually goad The pride and ego up approach is most the source into becoming defensive, and he effective on sources with little or no intelli- will try to convince the interrogator that he gence or on those who have been looked is wrong. In his attempt to redeem his pride, down upon for a long time. It is very effec- the source will usually involuntarily tive on low ranking enlisted personnel and provide pertinent information in attempting junior grade officers as it allows the source to vindicate himself. The source who is to finally show someone that he does indeed susceptible to this approach is also prone to have some "brains." The source is con- make excuses and give reasons why he did stantly flattered into providing certain or did not do a certain thing, often shifting information in order to gain credit. The the blame to others. Possible targets for the interrogator must take care to use a flatter- pride and ego down approach are the ing somewhat-in-awetone of voice and to source's loyalty, technical competence, speak highly of the source throughout the leadership abilities, soldierly qualities, or duration of this approach. This quickly appearance. If the interrogator uses a engenders positive feelings on the source's sarcastic, caustic tone of voice with appro- part as he has probably been looking for priate expressions of distaste or disgust, the this type of fecognition all his life. The source will readily believe him. interrogator may blow things out of propor- tion using items from the source's back- One word of caution, the pride and ego ground and making them seen noteworthy down approach is also a dead end in that, if or important. As everyone is eager to hear it is unsuccessful, it is very difficult for the themselves praised, the source will eventu- interrogator to recover and move to another ally "rise to the occasion" and in an attempt approach and reestablish a different type of to solicit more laundatory comments from rapport without losing all credibility. the interrogator, reveal pertinent information. on cooperating, it may aid the interrogation FUTILITY TECHNIQUE effort if he is told that all the other source's APPROACH have already cooperated. A source who may want to help save his comrades' lives may The futility approach is used to make the need to be convinced that the situation on source believe that it is useless to resist and the battlefield is hopeless, and that they all to persuade him to cooperate with the will die without his assistance. The futility interrogator. The futility approach is most approach is used to paint a black picture for effective when the interrogator can play on the prisoner, but it is not effective in and of doubts that already exist in the source's itself in gaining the source's cooperation. mind. There are really many different The futility approach must be orchestrated variations of the futility approach. There is with other approach techniques. the futility of the personal situation "you are not finished here until you answer the questions," futility in that "everyone talks "WE KNOW ALL" APPROACH sooner or later," futility of the battlefield The "we know all" approach convinces situation, and futility in the sense that if the source that we already know every- the source does not mind talking about thing. It is a very successful approach for history, why should he mind talking about sources who are naive, in a state of shock, his missions, they are also history. or in a state of fear. The interrogator must If the source's unit had run out of supplies organize all available data on the source (ammunition, food, fuel, and so forth), it including background information, knowl- would be relatively easy to convince him edge about the source's immediate tactical that all of his forces are having the same situation, and all available OB information logistical problems. A soldier who has been on the source's unit. Upon initial contact ambushed may have doubts as to how he with the source, the interrogator asks ques- was attacked so suddenly and the tions, pertinent and nonpertinent, from his interrogator should be able to easily talk specially prepared list. When the source him into believing that the NATO forces hesitates, refuses to answer, provides an knew where he was all the time. incomplete response, or an incorrect response, the interrogator himself supplies The interrogator might describe the the detailed answer. Through the careful source's frightening recollections of seeing use of the limited number of known details, death on the battlefield as an everyday the interrogator must convince the source occurrence for his forces all up and down that all information is already known; the lines. Factual or seemingly factual therefore, his answers are of no conse- information must be presented by the quence. It is by repeating this procedure interrogator in a persuasive, logical manner that the interrogator convinces the source and in a matter-of-fact tone of voice. that resistance is useless as everything is Making the situation appear hopeless already known. When the source begins to allows the source to rationalize his actions, give accurate and complete information to especially if that action is cooperating with the questions to which the interrogator has the interrogator. When employing this the answers, the interrogator begins inter- technique, the interrogator must not only be jecting questions for which he does not fortified with factual information, but he have the answers. After gaining the should also be aware of, and be able to source's cooperation, the interrogator still exploit, the source's psychological, moral, tests the extent of that cooperation by peri- , and sociological weaknesses. odically using questions for which he has Another way of using the futility the answers. This is very necessary; if the approach is to blow things out of propor- interrogator does not challenge the source tion. If the source's unit was low on, or had when he is lying, the source will then know exhausted, all food supplies, he can be that everything is not known, and that he easily led to believe that all of his forces has been tricked. He may then provide had run out of food. If the source is hinging incorrect answers to the interrogator's questions. There are some inherent problems with method of questioning. The repetition the use of the "we know all" approach. The technique must be used carefully, as it will interrogator is required to prepare generally not work when employed against everything in detail which is very time introverted sources or those having great consuming. He must commit much of the self-control. In fact, it may provide an information to memory as working from opportunity for a source to regain his notes may show the limits of the composure and delay the interrogation. In information actually known. employing this technique, the use of more than one interrogator or a tape recorder has proven to be effective. "ESTABLISH YOUR IDENTITY" APPROACH FILE AND DOSSIER The "establish your identity" approach APPROACH was very effective in Viet Nam with the Viet Cong, and it can be used at tactical The file and dossier approach is when the echelons. The interrogator must be aware, interrogator prepares a dossier containing however, that if used in conjunction with all available information obtained from the file and dossier approach, it may exceed records and documents concerning the the tactical interrogator's preparation source or his organization. Careful ar- resources. In this technique, the inter- rangement of the material within the file rogator insists that the source has been may give the illusion that it contains more identified as an infamous criminal wanted data than what is actually there. The file by higher authorities on very serious may be padded with extra paper, if neces- charges, and he has finally been caught sary. Index tabs with titles such as educa- posing as someone else. In order to clear tion, employment, criminal record, military himself of these allegations, the source will service, and others are particularly effec- usually have to supply detailed information tive. The interrogator confronts the source on his unit to establish or substantiate his with the dossiers at the beginning of the true identity. The interrogator should interrogation and explains to him that initially refuse to believe the source and intelligence has provided a complete record insist that he is the criminal wanted by the of every significant happening in the ambiguous "higher authorities." This will source's life; therefore, it would be useless to force the source to give even more detailed resist interrogation. The interrogator may information about his unit in order to read a few selected bits of known data to convince the interrogator that he is indeed further impress the source. If the technique who he says he is. This approach works is successful, the source will be impressed well when combined with the futility or "we with the voluminous file, conclude that know all" approach. everything is known, and resign himself to complete cooperation during the interro- gation. The success of this technique is REPETITION APPROACH largely dependent on the naivete of the source, the volume of data on the subject, Repetition is used to induce cooperation and the skill of the interrogator in from a hostile source. In one variation of convincing the source. this technique the interrogator listens carefully to a source's answer to a question, and then repeats both the question and answer several times. He does this with each succeeding question until the source becomes so thoroughly bored with the procedure that he answers questions fully and candidly to satisfy the interrogator and to gain relief from the monotony of his "MUTTAND JEFF" ("FRIEND RAPID FIRE APPROACH AND FOE") APPROACH The rapid fire approach involves a The "Mutt and Jeff" ("friend and foe") psychological ploy based upon the approach involves a psychological ploy principles that everyone likes to be heard which takes advantage of the natural when he speaks, and it is confusing to be uncertainty and guilt which a source has as interrupted in midsentence with an un- a result of being detained and questioned. related question. This technique may be Use of this technique necessitates the used by an individual interrogator or employment of two experienced simultaneously by two or more interro- interrogators who are convincing actors. gators in questioning the same source. In Basically, the two interrogators will display employing this technique the interrogator opposing personalities and attitudes toward asks a series of questions in such a manner the source. For example, the first that the source does not have time to interrogator is very formal and displays an answer a question completely before the unsympathetic attitude toward the source. next question is asked. This tends to He might be strict and order the source to confuse the source, and he is apt to follow all military courtesies during contradict himself, as he has little time to questioning. The goal of the technique is to prepare his answers. The interrogator then make the source feel cut off from his confronts the source with the inconsis- friends. tencies, causing further contradictions. In many instances, the source will begin to At the time the source acts hopeless and talk freely in an attempt to explain himself alone, the second interrogator appears and deny the inconsistencies pointed out by (having received his cue by a hidden signal the interrogator. In attempting to explain or by listening and observing out of view of his answers, the source is likely to reveal the source), scolds the first interrogator for more than he intends, thus creating his harsh behavior, and orders him from additional leads for further interrogation. the room. He then apologizes to soothe the source, perhaps offering him coffee and a The interrogator must have all his ques- cigarette. He explains that the actions of tions prepared before approaching the the first interrogator were largely the result source, because long pauses between ques- of an inferior intellect and lack of human tions allow the source to complete his sensitivity. The inference is created that the answers and render this approach ineffec- second interrogator and the source have, in tive. Besides extensive preparation, this common, a high degree of intelligence and technique requires an experienced, compe- an awareness of human sensitivity above tent interrogator, who has comprehensive and beyond that of the first interrogator. knowledge of ,his case, and fluency in the language of the source. This technique is The source is normally inclined to have a most effective immediately after capture, feeling of gratitude toward the second because of the confused state of the source. interrogator, who continues to show a sympathetic attitude toward the source in an effort to increase the rapport and control SILENCE APPROACH the questioning which will follow. Should the source's cooperation begin to fade, the The silence approach may be successful second interrogator can hint that since he is when employed against either the nervous of high rank, having many other duties, he or the confident-type source. When employ- cannot afford to waste time on an ing this technique, the interrogator says uncooperative source. He may broadly infer nothing to the source, but looks him that the first interrogator might return to squarely in the eye, preferably with a slight continue his questioning. When used smile on his face. It is important not to look against the proper source, this trick will away from the source, but force him to normally gain the source's complete break eye contact first. The source will cooperation. become nervous, begin to shift around in his chair, cross and recross his legs, and look away. He may ask questions, but the interrogator should not answer until he is ready to break the silence. The source may blurt out questions such as, "Come on now, what do you want with me?" When the interrogator is ready to break the silence, he may do so with some nonchalant question such as, "You planned this operation a long time, didn't you? Was it your idea?" The interrogator must be patient when employ- ing this technique. It may appear for a while that the technique is not succeeding, but it usually will when given a reasonable chance. APPENDIX I Interrogation Guides EXAMPLE 1, Morale of troops. QUESTION GUIDE FOR El Casualties. SUPPORT OF TACTICAL Defensive and protective items of NBC INTERROGATION equipment, status of NBC training and defensive NBC instructions, and RIFLEMEN offensive capability of NBC Some of the specific topics on which a operations. captured enemy rifleman may be ques- El Status of immunizations; new shots, tioned are- booster shots more frequently than El Identification of source's squad, pla- normal. toon, company, battalion, regiment, Stress on care and maintenance of and division. NBC protective equipment. Organization, strength, weapons, and Issuance of new or different NBC pro- disposition of squad, platoon, and tective equipment. company. Morale and esprit de corps of civilians. Number of newly assigned personnel in unit within last 30 days. Civilian supply. El Location and strength of men and El Health of civilians and availability of weapons at strongholds, outposts, and medicine. observation posts in the source's El Night maneuvers, rehearsals, unit size, immediate area. night vision devices, and special Mission of the source immediately equipment. before capture as well as mission of source's squad, platoon, company, and MESSENGERS higher- echelons. Location and description of defensive Messengers are frequently chosen on the installations, such as missile sites, basis of above average intelligence and the antitank ditches and emplacements, ability to observe well and remember oral minefields, roadblocks, and barbed messages and instructions. Messengers, wire entanglements in source's area who have an opportunity to travel about before capture. Description of weapons within the immediate combat zone, gener- with which these locations are covered. ally, will have a good picture of the current situation and are excellent prospects for Names and personality information of tactical interrogation. The following topics small unit commanders known to the should be included when questioning a source. messenger source: Possible identifications of support mortar, artillery, and armored units. Nature and exact contents of messages he has been carrying over a reasonable El Status of food, ammunition, and other period of time, as well as the names of supplies. persons who originated these mes- sages, and the names of persons to whom messages were directed. Des- cription of duty positions of such personalities. Information as to the extent to which Disposition of companies, regiments, messengers are used in the applicable and reserves of each. enemy unit, routes of messengers, and location of relay posts. Identifications and general organiza- tion of supporting units such as Location of message centers and com- artillery, armor, and engineer units. munication lines. Location, strength, and mission of Condition of roads, bridges, and alter- heavy weapons units. nate routes. Offensive and defensive tactics of Location of CPs and the names of small units. commanders and staff officers. Quality and morale of subordinate Location of artillery, mortars, and troops. armor seen during messenger's move- ment through the combat area. Doctrine for employment of NBC weapons. Location of minefields and other de- fensive installation~. Doctrine for defense against NBC weapons. Location of supply and ammunition dumps. Status of NBC defense SOP and cur- rent NBC training. Description of terrain features behind the enemy's front lines. Communications procedures and communications equipment. NBC weapons, installations, and units. Issuance of NBC detection equipment and detector paints or paper. Morale and esprit de corps of civilians. Morale of civilians. Relocation or movement of civilians. Relocation or movement of civilians. Civilian supply. Civilian supply. Health of civilians and availability of medicine. Health of civilians and availability of medicine. Use of radio equipment in applicable enemy units. Instructions on handling and evacua- tion of US and allied prisoners. Night maneuvers, rehearsals, unit size, SQUAD AND PLATOON night vision devices, and special LEADERS AND COMPANY equipment. COMMANDERS Squad and platoon leaders, as well as RADIO AND TELEPHONE company commanders, generally will pos- OPERATORS sess information on a broader level than that discussed up to this point. In addition Radio and telephone operators, like mes- to the information possessed by the rifle- sengers, are frequently familiar with the men, they may be able to furnish informa- plans and instructions of theircommand- tion on the following subjects: ers. In general, they can be expected to know the current military situation even more thoroughly because of the greater Plans and mission of their respective volume of information which they normally units. transmit. Topics to be covered when ques- Organization of their units as well as tioning communications personnel are- their regiment and battalion. Nature and exact contents of messages Number of newly assigned personnel sent and received during a given tacti- in unit within last 30 days. cal situation. Code names or numbers of specific Attitudes of commanders and staff enemy units, such as those appearing officers toward each other, civilians, in enemy telephone directories, and in units under their command, and the other SO1 such as unit identification general military situation. panel codes. 13 Routes of communications and their 13 Major enemy units to your front and condition. their code names. tl Tactical doctrines of commanders. Units and individuals in radio nets, their call signs, call words, and operat- Command and staff organization. ing frequencies. Supply routes and road conditions. Names and code names of command- 13 Location of supply points and types of ers and their staff officers. military and civilian supplies. Types, numbers, and basic characteris- Sufficiency or lack of both civilian and tics of radios and telephone equipment military supplies. used at company, regiment, and divi- Types, numbers, and condition of mili- sion level. tary and civilian supply-carrying 13 Identification and location of units vehicles. occupying front line positions. Location of artillery and mortar 13 Location of artillery and mortar positions. positions. 13 Troop movements and troop assembly 13 Information on enemy codes and areas. ciphers. Location of truck parks and motor Code names given to operations or to pools. specially designated supply points Organization of antitank and air such as supply points for special defense artillery units, weapons, and weapons. strength. 13 Names and signals designating vari- Location of antitank and air defense ous types of alerts. artillery positions. 13 Names of commanders of antitank and DRIVERS air defense artillery units. Questions directed by the tactical interro- Mission of antitank and air defense gator to captured drivers should concern the artillery. aspects of the enemy situation which the tl Types and status of ammunition. prisoner would know because of his driving 13 Voluntary or forced evacuation or assignments. In dealing with EPW drivers movement of civilians. of command and staff vehicles, supply vehi- cles, and vehicles drawing weapons, the fol- Morale and health of civilians. lowing topics should be examined: CI Identification and location of com- PATROL LEADERS AND mand posts of higher, lower, and sup- PATROL MEMBERS porting units. The degree of patrol activity on the part Names and personal character traits of of the enemy is often a good indication of commanders and staff officers. enemy plans. Topics for questioning patrol leaders and members of enemy patrols upon Plans, instructions, orders, and con- their capture include- versations of commanders and staff officers. 13 Specific mission of the patrol. Exact routes used and time of depar- MEMBERS OF MACHINE GUN ture and return of patrol. AND MORTAR UNITS Location of enemy forward edge of the Members of machine gun and mortar battle area, general outpost, combat units can be expected to know, on the basis outpost, and outposts. of their experience or observation, the Location of platoon, company, regi- following: ment, or division headquarters. Location of their own, as well as other, Routes of approach and enemy machine gun and mortar positions and positions. ~rojectedalternate positions. Enemy strongholds and fields of fire. Organization, strength, casualties, and weapons of the source's unit. Machine gun and mortar positions of the enemy. Targets for machine guns and mortars. Observation posts and listening posts. Names of small unit leaders. Condition of bridges and location of Status of weapons crew training. fords. Disposition of small rifle units, squads, Description of key terrain features. and platoons. Location and description of defensive Supply of ammunition to include type positions such as antitank weapons, of ammunition in the basic load or on roadblocks, mines, barbed wire entan- hand, for example, chemical and bio- glements, gaps in wire and safe lines, logical ammunition. trip flares, booby traps, tank traps, 0 Location of forward ammunition and ambushes. points. Other reconnaissailce objectives, agen- Characteristics of weapons used. cies, and patrols. Food and other supplies. Organization and equipment of tacti- Morale. cal reconnaissance agencies in regi- ments and divisions. Effect of our own firepower upon their positions. Passwords and counter signs of patrols and line units. Availability of nuclear capability. Patrol communication system and Number of newly assigned personnel range or radios. in unit within last 30 days. Names of commanders, staff officers, and particularly of intelligence officers LIAISON OFFICERS of enemy unit. The liaison officer is the commander's Coordination of patrol activities with agent for accomplishing coordination other units such as rifle companies, among the headquarters of lower, adjacent, mortar units, and artillery units. and higher units. The liaison officer also Morale and esprit de corps of civilians. may be called upon to effect coordination between infantry units and supporting or Relocation or movement of civilians. supported armor and artillery, engineer, Civilian supply. and reconnaissance units. Topics to be Health of civilians and availability of covered when questioning a captured liai- medicine. son officer are as follows: Contents of field orders, such as com- Methods of mortar, artillery, and tank position of attacking forces; location coordination. and direction of attack; missions of individual units; objectives; plans for Location of tank repair depots and attack, defense, or withdrawals; and POL dumps (to include resupply and plans for communication and coordi- refueling techniques). nation among units. Effect of weather on tank operations. Location of lower, adjacent, higher, Armored reconnaissance missions. and supporting unit CPs as well as Number of newly assigned personnel location of supply and communica- in unit within last 30 days. tions installations. Morale and esprit de corps of civilians. Locations of observation posts and Relocation or movement of civilians. outposts. Civilian supply. Assembly areas for troops and supplies. Health of civilians and availability of Disposition of regiments, battalions, medicine. and companies of a division. Status of ammunition and POL Identification and disposition of resupply. reserves. Location of ammunition supply points. Status of supplies of all types. Ammunition supply to include type in Civilian social and economic the basic load or on hand, for example, chemical ammunition. conditions. Measures for defense against NBC and Evacuation or movement of civilians. radiological attack to include type of NBC defensive equipment installed in ARMORED TROOPS the tank. Night maneuvers, rehearsals, unit size, Topics to be covered when questioning captured armored troops are as follows: night vision devices, and special equipment. Unit identifications. Designation and strength of support- ARTILLERYMEN ing or supported infantry units. Types and characteristics of tanks Topics to be covered when questioning employed. captured artillerymen are as follows. Mechanical and tactical weaknesses of these tanks. Forward Observers Means of communications between Topics for interrogation of forward tanks and between tanks and infantry. observers include- Missions and objectives. Location, organization, and number of Routes of approach. guns of the battery or battalion whose Armored units in reserve. fire the source was observing and directing. Location of tank parks and assembly areas. Location of front lines, outposts, and observation posts. Location of impassable terrain features. Location of alternate observation posts. Location and probable time of occupa- Effect of our artillery upon the enemy tion of present or alternate gun units. positions. Location and numbering of defensive Deployment of artillery concentrations. Characteristics of guns, including Location of ammunition supply points. caliber and range. Radio channels used for fire control Targets for the various types of fire nets. during different phases of combat. Identification and location of support- Nature of the infantry-artillery com- ing battalions. munications net. Availability of nuclear fire support. Type and location of artillery fire Morale and esprit de corps of civilians. requested by infantry units. Relocation or movement of civilians. Identification of corps or other sup- porting artillery units. Civilian supply. Plan of attack, defense, or withdrawal Health of civilians and availability of of enemy units. medicine. Methods of coordinating artillery fire with infantry maneuver. Artillery Firing Battery Mission and objectives of source's unit Personnel as well as of supported units. Interrogation of a source from a firing Routes of approach and their condi- battery should cover the following topics: tion. Characteristics of terrain features. Measures of defense against friendly Methods of observing and directing artillery fire. artillery fire, including information Counterbattery protection for artillery such as types of aircraft employed. installations. Methods of counterbattery fire and Effect of friendly counterbattery fire. methods of protecting enemy positions from counterbattery fire. Location of battery ammunition points. Use and location of dummy artillery positions. Disposition of local security weapons. Types of artillery ammunition used for Direction and elevation of fire. various targets, new types of ammuni- Instructions concerning the use of tion, and conservation of fires and rea- ammunition. sons for conservation. Names of battery and other Location of artillery and infantry unit commanders. command posts. Detailed description of artillery weap- Trafficability of routes appropriate for ons used. movement of heavy artillery. Status of weapons crew training. Names of commanders, staff officers, and their attitudes toward each other Information on food supplies and and toward infantry commanders. morale of military and civilians. Number of newly assigned personnel Measures for defense against NBC in unit within last 30 days. attack. Types and amount of ammunition, to Conditions of health and sanitation in include chemical and nuclear ammuni- enemy units. tion, in the basic load or on hand. Ratio of dead to wounded. Location of chemical and biological Commander's tactics in relation to the ammunitions. number of casualties. Location of targets marked for chemi- Adequacy and efficiency of casualty cal and biological fires. evacuation. Weapons most feared by the enemy Air Defense Artillerymen Location and staffing of aid stations Interrogation of a source from an air and hospitals. defense unit should cover the following: Organization of division, regiment, Location and number of air defense and battalion medical units. weapons. Status and types of medical supplies. Detailed description and characteris- tics of air defense guns and missiles Use and characteristics of newly devel- used. oped medicine or drugs. Data on your wounded, sick, or dead in Shape, size, and location of ground the hands of the enemy. radars. Skill of enemy medical personnel. Organization of air defense units. Information on mass sickness or epi- Types of areas defended. demics in the enemy forces. Nuclear capability. Types of treatment and medication for Methods of attack against friendly air- NBC casualties. craft, by type of aircraft. Supply and availability of materials Avenues of approach and altitudes used in the treatment of NBC most and least advantageous to enemy casualties. air defense. Special training or treatment of NBC Methods of identifying unknown casualties. aircraft. New or recent immunizations. Morale and esprit de corps of civilians. MEDICAL CORPSMEN Relocation or movement of civilians. Although medical personnel are entitled Civilian supply. to special protective measures under the provisions of international agreements, Health of civilians and availability of they can be, and are, interrogated without medicine. infringement of any existing laws or rules Location and present condition of ci- of warfare. Topics to be covered when inter- vilian hospitals, factories producing rogating enemy medical personnel are as medical supplies, and warehouses and follows: stores containing medical supplies. Number of casualties over a given phase of combat operations. ENGINEER TROOPS Weapons accounting for most casualties. Topics for questioning of captured engi- neer troops are as follows: Key personnel who have been casualties. Mission of supported unit. Exact location and pattern of existing RECONNAISSANCE TROOPS minefields, location of bridges, build- ings, airfields, and other installations Topics for questioning captured recon- prepared for demolition, and types of naissance troops are as follows: mines or explosives used. The reconnaissance plan, march order, Doctrine pertaining to the use of mines time schedule, and specific missions of and booby traps to include types of all elements, means of coordination mines, characteristics of firing devices, and communication between elements, and minefield patterns. and the unit headquarters and higher headquarters. Location of roadblocks and tank traps and how constructed. Nature of orders received from higher headquarters. Condition of mads, bridges, and streams or rivers for trafficability of Identification, organization, composi- personnel, vehicles, and armor. tion, strength, means of transporta- Weight-carrying capacity of bridges tion, and weapons of the unit. and location and description of fords. Routes of approach used by the unit. Location of engineer materials and Identification, composition, organiza- equipment such as road material, tion, strength, and disposition of the bridge timber, lumber, steel, explo- main body of troops and reinforce- sives, quarries, rock crushers, saw- ments. Routes to be used. mills, and machine shops. General quality of troops of the recon- Location of dummy vehicles and tank naissance unit and of the main body. and gun positions. Radio communication equipment and Location of camouflaged positions and frequencies used. installations. Night maneuvers, rehearsals, unit size, Water supply and locations of water night vision devices, and special points. equipment. Organization, strength, and weapons of engineer units. LOCAL CIVILIANS Presence of other than organic engi- Civilians who have recently left neer units at the front and mission of enemy-held areas normally have important such units. information and often give this information readily. This information is usually of par- Number of organic trucks, tractors, ticular importance to the CA and PSYOP and other engineer vehicles. personnel of the unit. The following topics Location of new or repaired bridges. should be included when questioning local civilians: Use of demolitions. Location of enemy front lines and Morale and esprit de corps of civilians. major defensive positions. Relocation or movement of civilians. Location of artillery positions. Civilian supply. Location and nature of minefields in Health of civilians and availability of enemy rear area. medicine. Location and present condition of ci- vilian power plants, water works, and sewage disposal plants. Night maneuvers, rehearsals, unit size, night vision devices, and special equipment. Description of key terrain. Area of activities. Condition of roads, bridges, and major Nature of activities. buildings. Strength. Enemy policy and attitude toward Equipment. local civilians. Motivation. Human and material resources of the area. Leadership. Morale and esprit de corps of local Reliability. civilians. Contacts Data on important civilian personali- External direction or support. ties remaining in enemy areas. Health and medical status of local populace. EXAMPLE 2, Effect of friendly operations on ci- QUESTION GUIDE FOR vilian populace. NUCLEAR BIOLOGICAL AND Instructions to prepare for defensive CHEMICAL OPERATIONS measures against NBC attack. Some specific questions for information Recent immunizations. on NBC operations are as follows: What items of NBC protective equip- POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA ment have been issued to enemy PERSONNEL troops? Is there any differentiation in Personnel recently acquired through issue of items for particular areas? If combat operations and who are identified so, what items for what areas? as being involved with political and PSYOP Are there any new or recent immuniza- should be questioned. As a minimum, the tions indicated by sources during following topics should be included: interrogations? Policy, plans, and objectives. What immunizations have enemy Organization and training. troop units received, as indicated in captured immunization records? Current and past activities, to include themes of any propaganda programs. Are enemy troops equipped with pro- tective masks? Is the individual Enemy analysis of our weaknesses and required to carry the mask on his per- strengths. son? Are there any sectors where the Target audiences for propaganda, mask is not required equipment for the including priorities. individual? What accessory equipment is issued with the mask? Effects of friendly PSYOP. Is protective clothing issued to enemy Analysis of enemy weaknesses and troops? If so, what type of clothing or strengths. articles? If special clothing is used, is it Enemy counterpropaganda activities. for any particular geographic area? Have enemy troop units constructed NBC protective shelters? If so, what GUERRILLA PERSONNEL type? Topics for interrogation of captured guer- Are enemy fortifications, individual rilla personnel are as follows: and collective, provided with overhead cover? Are enemy troops issued any protective CI Do enemy units have decontamination footwear or other means to provide materials on hand? If so, what type protection against penetration by liq- and in what quantity? uid agents? Have sources observed decontamina- tion stations or installations estab- Are enemy tanks or armored vehicles lished in enemy areas? If so, what is provided with specially installed pro- their location and composition? tective equipment to protect the crew in case of chemical attack? Are enemy troop units issued biologi- cal sampling kits or devices? If so, Are enemy troops issued any type of what is their type and composition? individual protective items, including antidotes or protective ointment, for Have sources observed any cylinders first aid? or containers which might contain bulk chemical agents? Are there any areas for which addi- tional or unusual NBC safety precau- Have sources observed any tactical tions have been established? aircraft equipped with accessory tanks which indicate a spray capability? What is the size and composition of enemy NBC specialist troop units? Are sources aware of location of dumps Where are they located? Why? of chemical-filled ammunition, bombs, clusters, and bulk chemical agents? Have enemy troops been issued any special precautionary instructions con- Do enemy artillery, mortar, or rocket cerning consumption of food and water units have chemical ammunition on or handling of livestock in areas that hand? may be overrun by enemy forces? At what radiological exposure or dose What training, if any, have enemy are troops required to relocate? troops received in the use of Are there any problem areas or short- incapacitating-type agents and their comings in NBC material? dissemination? What items of chemical detection The following PIR and IR are applicable equipment have been issued to enemy for internal defense operations in appro- troops? Are the items operated con- priate theaters of operations? stantly, irregularly, or not at all? Is What types of tunnels and caves and there any differentiation made regard- modification are used in defense ing their use in certain areas? against riot control agents and explo- What type of radiation-measuring sive gases? instruments are issued to enemy troop What defensive material and instruc- units and what is their range or limit? tions are issued for defense against riot How are they distributed? control agents? How many hours of training with What defensive measures are taken radiation measuring instruments have against defoliation and anticrop enemy monitoring and survey person- agents? nel received? How many hours of NBC training have enemy troops received? How many hours training are devoted indi- vidually to chemical, biological, and radiological operations? Have enemy troops received any special or acceler- ated training as opposed to what is considered routine? APPENDIX J 1949 Geneva Conventions

1. The United States is a party to the following Geneva Conventions of 1949:

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12August 1949,cited herein as GWS.

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949, cited herein as GWS Sea.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, cited herein as GPW.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12August 1949,cited herein as GC.

2. These treaties will be strictly observed and enforced by United States forces without regard to whether they are legally binding upon this country and its specific relations with any other specified country. Military commanders will be instructed which, if any, of these treaties, or component parts thereof, are not legally binding in a given situation. On 10 August 1965, the US Secretary of State notified the International Committee of the Red Cross that the Geneva Conventions as a whole would apply to the Vietnam conflict. Future armed conflict involving the United States will most likely be subjected to the same laws on a unilateral basis.

3. Those articles of the above-referenced treaties directly applicable to this manual are quoted below. (See FM 27-10 for full explanation of these treaties.)

(GWS, GWS Sea, GPW, GC, Art. 2) SITUATIONS TO WHICH LAW OF WAR ARE APPLICABLE EXPLOITATION PROCESS

21. CED will be exploited through the following process but, whenever feasible, in order to expedite the handling, the processing stages may be combined.

a. Preliminary screening and reporting of information of immediate tacti-

cal value by capturing unit.

b. Complementary examination, translation, categorization (see para 181,

reporting, reproduction and dissemination by or for intelligence

staffs.

c. Detailed exploitation and further reporting, reproduction and dis-

semination by CDU or other special elements.

MARKING OF CED

22. The capturing unit will tag or otherwise mark the CED as follows:

National identifying letters as prescribed in STANAG 1059.

Designation of capturing unit including service.

Serial number of the CED. This will consist of a number allocated

sequentially by the capturing unit.

Date-time of captur-

Place of capture (UTM co-ordinates).

Summary of circumstances~underwhich the CED was obtained.

Interrogation serial number of any associated PW, if appropriate or

known.

25. Reproduction and dissemination of CED and translation as necessary will be carried out at the earliest possible stage of the exploitation process. Copies of CED considered of interest or translations thereof and lists of exploited documents, whether disseminated or not, will be submitted to appropriat-e NATO and national staffs. APPENDIX B Sample Detainee Personnel Record

DETAINEE PERSONNEL RECORD

wywlm of Mtdl~l

31. REMARKS 37. PnOTO

PHOTO PHOTO (Ront V1.u) IRUht R0lD.l

3m. PREPARED BV llndividvol and unit1 30. SIGNATURE

40. DATE PREPARED 41. PLACE

DA FORM 4237-R, Aug 85 EDITION OF MAV 81 18OMOLLTL

.- APPENDIX C Sample Enemy Prisoner of War Identity Card I DATE ISSUE0 I EPW IDENTITY CARD I I For uaa of th~aform. u AR 190-8; thm proponant aoancv la OCSPER. 1 LAST NAME

FIRST NAME IGRAOE I SERVICE NUMBER 'POWER SERTEO I 1 PLACE OF BIRTH

SIGNATURE OF BEARER APPENDIX E Sample JINTACCS SALUTE Report Format and Report

SALUTE REPORT FORMAT

TO: DTG:

FROM: REPORT NO:

1. SIZE/WHO:

2. ACTIVITY/WHAT:

3. LOCATION/WHERE :

4. UNIT/WHO:

5. TIMEINHEN:

6. EQUIPMENT/HOW :

7. REMARKS

a. SOURCE:

b. MAP DATA: APPENDIX F Sample Screening Report Format and Report

REPORT FORMAT

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SCREENING REPORT

Report Number: ~ate/~ime:

PART I. INFORMATION CONCERNING CAPTIVE

A. PREVIOUS SCPEENING/INTERROGATION REPORTS (~nit/ReportNo.)

B. CAPTURE DATA

1. Captive Tag Number:

2. Capturing Unit:

3. ~ate/~imeof Capture:

4. Place of Capture:

5. Documents Captured isp position):

6. Equipment Captured/ Disposition: I

I 7. Circumstances of Capture:

C. BIOGRAPHIC' INFORMATION I 1 1. Full Name / Rank / Service Number:

I I 2. Date / Place of Birth: ~ 3. Sex / Marital Status / Religion: ~ 4. Full Unit Designation / Unit Code: 1 5. Duty Position: SAMPLE SCREENING REPORT

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 1st Brigade IPW Team, 123rd CEWI APO New York 09166

SCREENING REPORT

Report Number: 001 Da te/~ime: 150345ZAUG 89

PART I. INFORMATION CONCERNING CAPTIVE

A. PREVIOUS SCREENING/INTERROGATION REPORTS (~nitf~eportNO.)

B CAPTURE DATA

1. Captive Tag Number: P1A

2. Capturing Unit: C ~rp/lst ~qdrn/8ACR

3. ~ate/~.imeof Capture: 150330ZAUG 89

4. Place of Capture: x645162

5. Documents Captured ispo position): lxID Card (retained by EPW), lxSOl (evac W/EPW)

6. Equipment Captured/ Disposition: None

7. Circumstances of Capture: pulled out of stream near SETZELBACH (~~6416)

C. BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

1. Full Name / Rank / Service Number: Kiril Dimitrievich GRECHKO / JrSGT / 4911623

2. Data / Place of Birth: 11 NOV 67 / KIEV, UkSSR, USSR

3. Sex / Marital Status / Religion: Male / Single / None

4. Full Unit Designation / Unit Code: WNA / CNB-677

5. Duty Position: WNA

6. Military Education / Experience: WNA APPENDIX G Sample Tactical Interrogation Report Format and Report

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT FORMAT

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

TACT IC AL

INTERROGATION REPORT

NAME OF PRISONER: INTERROGATOR:

CATEGORY: A B C D UNIT/FORMATION TO WHICH INTERROGATOR ATTACHED:

INTG SERIAL NO:. MAPS USED

DTG OF INTG: LANGUAGE USED:

INTG REPORT NO: INTERPRETER:

PART I - INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL OF ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR

A. PERSONAL PARTICULARS:

1. Rank, full name, service number, and position:

2. Date and place of birth:

3. Nationality: Ethnic: Religion:

4. Knowledge of languages and proficiency:

5. Unit formation or organization:

6. Date, time, place (grid references), capturing unit, and circumstances

of capture:

B. CAREER:

1. Premilitary:

2. Military:

C. ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE VALUE:

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE) (CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

(3) Past:

c. hit: (full unit designation):

(1) Present:

(2) Future:

(3) Past:

2. COMPOSI'rTON (Level of knowledgeability) and (unidentified, full unit designation unknown if applicable):

a. (tie-in to level of knowledgeability) had (~2,directly subordinate Attached--full unit designation, detached--full unit designation):

b. (tie-in to level of knowledgeability) had (c2, directly subordinate Attached--full unit designation, detached--full unit designation) :

3. STRENGTH: (level of knowledgeahility):

a. Personnel: (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(1) (Tie-in to level of knowledgeahility) had. ..(number x total personnel, number X officers/enlisted, duty positions, as appropriate, full unit designation of attachedldetached personnel :

(2) (Tie-in to level of knowledgeability) had...(numher x total personnel, nurnher X off icerslenlisted , duty positions, as appropriate, full unit designation of attachedldetached personnel:

(NOTE: Duty Positions: Only obtained for headquarters elemnts, squads, sections, teams, and record duty positions of officers/senior enlisted member for platoons if there is no platoon headquarters).

h. Weapons and eqriipment (level of knowledgeahili ty) :

(1) Individual weapons (tie-in to level of knowledgeahili ty):

(a) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution):

(h) Number x f'ull military nomenclature, distribution):

(2) Crew-served weapons (tie-in to level of knowledgeahilitv):

(a) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution): (CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

4. DISPOSITIONS:

a. Activity, full unit designation, located vicinity, 6-digit grid coordinate--physical description, security measures, date of informat'ion. (HIS):

b. Activity, full unit designation, located vicinity, collocated activities, 6-digit grid coordinate - physical description, security measures, DOI. (HIS):

5. TACTICS (level of knowledgeability) :

a. Offensive:

b. Defensive:

c. Special operations:

6. TRAINING (level of knowledgeability) :

a. Individual:

b. Unit:

c. Special:

7. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS (level of knowledgeabili ty) :

a. Losses (tie-in to level of knowledgeability) :

(1) Personnel:

(2) Equipment:

b. Replacements and Reinforcements (tie-in to level of knowledgeability) :

(1) Personnel:

(2) Equipment:

c. Combat experience ( tie-in to level of knowledgeability) :

d. Morale ( tie-in to level of knowledgeability) :

8. LOGISTICS (level of kn~wled~eability):

a. Weapons and ammunition (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(1) Weapons:

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE) (CLASSIFLCATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

b. Code names/numbers ( tie-in to level of knowledgeabili ty) :

(1) Code name:

(2) Code number:

c. Radio frequencies/call signs (tie-in to level of knowledgeability).

(1) Radio frequency:

(2) Call sign:

d. Passwords (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

e. Obstacles (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(1) Enemy:

(2) NATO;

f. PSYOP (tie-in to level of knowledgeability).

(1) Enemy:

(2) NATO:

(CLASS IFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

- C. ( ASSESSMENT 01- INTELLIGENCE VALUE:

1. ( ) Intelligence, experience, cooperation, reliability: Source was of average intelligence; experience is rated good; source was cooperative, answering all questions; reliability is rated good as no discrepancies were noted by use of repeat and control questions.

2. ( ) Special knowledge: None

3. ( ) Discussion of approach technique: Source cooperated on the direct approach.

D. ( DOCUMENTS CARRILD AT TIME OF CAPTURE:

1. ( ) List of documents: 1 x Enemy ID card (1634921) (returned to source).

2. ( ) Details of money and valuables: None

E. ( ) EQUIPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE.

1. ( ) Personal equipment: 1 x ShM protective mask (returned to source).

2. ( ) Weapons: 1 x 7.62mm AKM, 3 x empty magazines (evacuated through supply channels)

PART I1 - INFORMATION OBTAINED

A. ( ) DO1 is 221800ZAug 85 unless otherwise indicated in the body of this report.

B. ( ) TEXT:

1. ( ) MISSIONS:

a. ( EPW:

(1) ( ) Time of capture: Taking part in the defense of Hill 456.

(2) ( ) Future: Continue to defend Hill 456.

(3) ( Past: Participate in the assault against NATO forces on Hill 456.

b. ( ) Unit: (2~~~/3/,3/44/32MRD). b* ( Weapons and equipment: (3bEC).

(1) ( ) Individual weapons: (1 MRS/2/3 MRC).

(a) ( ) 1 x 9mm PM, carried by BMP driver.

(b) ( ) 1 x 7.b2mrn AKM, 1 x ea EM except BMP driver, sniper, and PKM gunners.

(c) ( ) 1 x 7.62mm SVD, carried by sniper.

(2) ( ) Crew-served weapons: ( IEIRS/~/~MRC) .

(a) ( ) 2 x 7.62mm PKM, 1 x ea PKM gunner.

(b) ( ) 1 x 85mm RPG-7 ATGL, carried by RPG-7 gunner.

(3) (.) Other weapons: (lMRs/2/3 MRC) Approx 50 x F-1 hand grenades, 5 x ea member, 1 MRS.

(4) ( ) Armored vehicles: (2~~~13MRC) 3 x BMP, ea armed with 1 x 73mm smoothbore gun, 1 x 7.62mm PKT, and 1 x AT-3 launcher, 1 x ea MRS/~MRP.

(5) ( ) Other vehicles: ~MKP/~MRC)Notie.

(6) ( ) Ccmmunications equipment: (~MRP/~MRC)3 x R-123 transceivers, 1 x ea BMP/~MRP.

(7) ( ) NBC equipment: (3MRC).

(a) ( ) Individual: Ea mbr had 1 x ShM protective mask, 1 x set U/I protective clothi.ng, and 1 individual decon kit.

(b) ( ) Vehicular: Ea vehicle had 1 x air filtration sys tem.

(8) ( Specialized equipment: Unk.

4. ( ) DISPOSITIONS:

a. ( ) CP, 3 MRc/3/44/32M~~location vicinity NB660495, in the last house on light sllrface road at SW edge of BAUHAUS (~~6649).security measures and collocated units: UNK. (HIS Plt Sgt, 2~1~~/3/3/44/32MRD DOI: 220800ZAug 85.)

b. ( ) U/I deployment of 6 x 122mm howitzers from NB651491 approx 500 meters N along a light surface road to 14B654494. Guns were pointing west. Security measures and collocated units: UNK. DOI: 220930ZAug85.

c. ,( ) U/I convoy of 10 x T-72 Tanks from NB659495 to NB654496, traveling W along secondary road. Security measures and collocated units: UNK. DOI: 221600ZAu~85. c. ( Food and water (3MRC).

(1) ( ) Food: Since 17 Aug 85 all personnel have been eating canned rations. There were no shortages of food. Last resupply of food was at 2120~0ZAug85.

(2) ( ) Water: Water was available from water trucks of an U/I unit which arrived at the CP, 3MRC each evening at 2030 hours. No shortages of water.

d. ( ) Cunrnunicatioils equipment. (~MRP/~MRC)All transceivers wdre in good working order.

e. ( Other: (~MRC).

(1) ( ) Medical: Each mbr had 1 x individual first aid kit.

(2) ( NBC: All individual and vehicular NBC gear was in excellent condition, since it had been inspected in early Aug 85.

9. ( ) ELECTRONIC TECHNICAL DATA: None.

10. ( ) NISCELLANEOUS: (3~~~/3/44/32~1~~).

a. ( Personalities: (~MRC).

LAST NAME FIRST NAME HN/I RANK POSN F K

HOFBAUEK FN U MN U C~ t t CO 3MRC

KAEMPERT PN U MNU SrSgt 1SG 3MRC

BECK Co slno s MNU JrLt PltLdr ~MRP/~MRL

GUCIiENKO Franz MNU SrS,t PltMr ~MRP/~MRC

b. ( 1 Code narne./code number: Unk.

c. ( ) Radio Erequencies/call signs: ( MRC).

(1) ( ) Radio frequencies for 22 Aug 85 were as follows: Primary, 16.90 MHz; Alternate, 18.75 MHz. Frequencies are changed daily at 2400 hours by unit SOI.

(2) ( ) Call signs: (~MRP/~MRC)Call signs for 22 Aug 85 were as follows: ~MRS/~MRP,AFCS'~~; ~MRS/~MRP, AFCS 22, ~MRS/~MW,AFCS 19. Call signs are changed at 2400 ho~rsdaily by unit SOI. APPENDIX H Approaches DIRECT APPROACH rogator had to talk with the source again, the source would not have any trust and The direct approach is the questioning of would most probably not cooperate. Instead a source without having to use any type of of promising unequivocably that a source approach. The direct approach is often will receive a certain thing, such as political called no approach at all, but it is the most asylum, an interrogator will offer to do effective of all the approaches. Statistics tell what he can to help achieve the source's us that in World War 11, it was 85 percent to desired goal; as long as the source 95 percent effective. In Vietnam, it was 90 cooperates. percent to 95 percent effective. The direct The incentive approach can be broken approach works best on lower enlisted per- down into the incentive short term (recej sonnel as they have little or no resistance immediately) and incentive long term training and have had minimal security (received within a period of time). The training. Due to its effectiveness, the direct determination rests on when the source approach is always to be tried first. The expects to receive the incentive offered. direct approach usually achieves the maxi- mum cooperation in the minimum amount of time and enables the interrogator to EMOTIONAL APPROACH quickly and completely exploit the source for the information he possesses. The The emotional approach overrides the advantages of this technique are its sim- source's rationale for resisting by using and plicity and the fact that it takes little time. manipulating his emotions against him. For this reason, it is frequently used at the The main emotions of any source at the tactical echelons where time is limited. time of capture might be either love or fear. Love or fear for one person may be ex- ploited or turned into hate for someone else. INCENTIVE APPROACH For example, the person who caused the source to be in the position in which he now The incentive approach is a method of finds himself. The source's fear can be built rewarding the source for his cooperation, upon, or increased so as to override his but it must reinforce ~ositivebehavior. This rational side. If the situation demands it is done by satisfying the source's needs. and the source's fear is so great that he Granting incentives to an uncooperative cannot communicate with the interrogator, source leads him to believe that rewards the interrogator may find that he has to can be gained whether he cooperates or not. decrease the source's fear in order to effec- Interrogators may not withhold a source's tively collect information from him. There rights under the Geneva Conventions, but are two variations of the emotional they can withhold a source's privileges. The approaches: Emotional love, emotional granting of incentives must not infringe on hate. the Geneva Conventions, but they can be things to which the source is already EMOTIONAL LOVE APPROACH entitled to. This can be effective onlv" if the For the emotional love approach to be source is unaware of his rights or privileges. successful, the interrogator must focus on Incentives must seem to be logical and the anxiety felt by the source about the cir- possible. An interrogator must not promise cumstances in which he finds himself. The anything that cannot be delivered. Interro- interrogator must direct the love the source gators do not make promises, but usually feels toward the appropriate object: family, infer them while still sidestepping guaran- homeland, comrades, and so forth. If the tees. If an interrogator made a promise that interrogator can show the source what the he could not keep and he or another inter- source himself can do to alter or improve his situation, the approach has a chance of The fear can be directed toward reprisals by nothing more than calming the source and international tribunals, the government of convincing him that he will be properly and the host country, or the source's own forces. humanely treated, or that for him the war is Shouting can be very effective in this varia- mercifully over and he need not go into tion of the fear up approach. combat again. When used with a soothing, calm tone of voice, this often creates rap- FEAR UP (MILD) port and usually nothing else is needed to get the source to cooperate. While calming The fear up (mild) approach is better the source, it is a good idea to stay initially suited to the strong, confident type of inter- with nonpertinent conversation and to care- rogator as there is generally no need to fully avoid the subject which has caused the raise the voice or resort to heavy-handed, source's fear. This works quickly in develop- table banging violence. It is a more correct ing rapport and communication as the form of blackmail when the circumstances source will readily respond to kindness. indicate that the source does indeed have something to fear. It may be a result of When using this approach, it is important coincidence; the soldier was ca.ught on the that the interrogator meets the source at the wrong side of the border before hostilities source's perspective level and not expect the actually commenced (he was armed, he source to come up to the interrogator's per- could be a terrorist), or a result of his spective level. If a prisoner is so frightened actions (he surrendered contrary to his mili- that he has withdrawn into a shell or tary oath and is now a traitor to his coun- regressed back to a less threatening state of try, and his own forces will take care of the mind, the interrogator must break through disciplinary action). The fear up (mild) to him. This may be effected by the interro- approach must be a credible distortion of gator putting himself on the same physical the truth. A distortion that the source will level as the source and may require some believe. It usually involves some incentive; physical contact. As the source relaxes the interrogator can intimate that he might somewhat and begins to respond to the be willing to alter the circumstances of the interrogator's kindness, the interrogator source's capture, as long as the source coop- can then begin asking pertinent questions. erates and answers the questions. This approach technique may backfire if In most cases, shouting is not necessary. allowed to go too far. After convincing the The actual fear is increased by helping the source that he has nothing to fear, he may source to realize the unpleasant conse- cease to be afraid and may feel secure quences that the facts may cause and then enough to resist the interrogator's pertinent presenting an alternative, which of course questions. If this occurs, reverting to a can be effected by answering some simple harsher approach technique usually will questions. The fear up approach is dead- rapidly bring the desired result to the end, and a wise interrogator may want to interrogator. keep it in reserve as a trump card. After working to increase the source's fear, it would be difficult to convince him that everything will be all right if the approach PRIDE AND EGO APPROACH is not successful. The pride and ego approach concentrates on tricking the source into revealing perti- DECREASED FEAR DOWN nent information by using flattery or abuse. APPROACH It is effective with a source who has dis- played weaknesses or feelings of inferiority The decreased fear down approach is used which can be effectively exploited by the primarily on a source who is already in a interrogator. There are two techniques in state of fear due to the horrible circum- this approach: the pride and ego up stances of his capture, or on a source who is approach and the pride and ego down in fear for his life. This technique is really approach. on cooperating, it may aid the interrogation FUTILITY TECHNIQUE effort if he is told that all the other source's APPROACH have already cooperated. A source who may want to help save his comrades' lives may The futility approach is used to make the need to be convinced that the situation on source believe that it is useless to resist and the battlefield is hopeless, and that they all to persuade him to cooperate with the will die without his assistance. The futility interrogator. The futility approach is most approach is used to paint a black picture for effective when the interrogator can play on the prisoner, but it is not effective in and of doubts that already exist in the source's itself in gaining the source's cooperation. mind. There are really many different The futility approach must be orchestrated variations of the futility approach. There is with other approach techniques. the futility of the personal situation "you are not finished here until you answer the questions," futility in that "everyone talks "WE KNOW ALL" APPROACH sooner or later," futility of the battlefield The "we know all" approach convinces situation, and futility in the sense that if the source that we already know every- the source does not mind talking about thing. It is a very successful approach for history, why should he mind talking about sources who are naive, in a state of shock, his missions, they are also history. or in a state of fear. The interrogator must If the source's unit had run out of supplies organize all available data on the source (ammunition, food, fuel, and so forth), it including background information, knowl- would be relatively easy to convince him edge about the source's immediate tactical that all of his forces are having the same situation, and all available OB information logistical problems. A soldier who has been on the source's unit. Upon initial contact ambushed may have doubts as to how he with the source, the interrogator asks ques- was attacked so suddenly and the tions, pertinent and nonpertinent, from his interrogator should be able to easily talk specially prepared list. When the source him into believing that the NATO forces hesitates, refuses to answer, provides an knew where he was all the time. incomplete response, or an incorrect response, the interrogator himself supplies The interrogator might describe the the detailed answer. Through the careful source's frightening recollections of seeing use of the limited number of known details, death on the battlefield as an everyday the interrogator must convince the source occurrence for his forces all up and down that all information is already known; the lines. Factual or seemingly factual therefore, his answers are of no conse- information must be presented by the quence. It is by repeating this procedure interrogator in a persuasive, logical manner that the interrogator convinces the source and in a matter-of-fact tone of voice. that resistance is useless as everything is Making the situation appear hopeless already known. When the source begins to allows the source to rationalize his actions, give accurate and complete information to especially if that action is cooperating with the questions to which the interrogator has the interrogator. When employing this the answers, the interrogator begins inter- technique, the interrogator must not only be jecting questions for which he does not fortified with factual information, but he have the answers. After gaining the should also be aware of, and be able to source's cooperation, the interrogator still exploit, the source's psychological, moral, tests the extent of that cooperation by peri- , and sociological weaknesses. odically using questions for which he has Another way of using the futility the answers. This is very necessary; if the approach is to blow things out of propor- interrogator does not challenge the source tion. If the source's unit was low on, or had when he is lying, the source will then know exhausted, all food supplies, he can be that everything is not known, and that he easily led to believe that all of his forces has been tricked. He may then provide had run out of food. If the source is hinging incorrect answers to the interrogator's questions. "MUTTAND JEFF" ("FRIEND RAPID FIRE APPROACH AND FOE") APPROACH The rapid fire approach involves a The "Mutt and Jeff" ("friend and foe") psychological ploy based upon the approach involves a psychological ploy principles that everyone likes to be heard which takes advantage of the natural when he speaks, and it is confusing to be uncertainty and guilt which a source has as interrupted in midsentence with an un- a result of being detained and questioned. related question. This technique may be Use of this technique necessitates the used by an individual interrogator or employment of two experienced simultaneously by two or more interro- interrogators who are convincing actors. gators in questioning the same source. In Basically, the two interrogators will display employing this technique the interrogator opposing personalities and attitudes toward asks a series of questions in such a manner the source. For example, the first that the source does not have time to interrogator is very formal and displays an answer a question completely before the unsympathetic attitude toward the source. next question is asked. This tends to He might be strict and order the source to confuse the source, and he is apt to follow all military courtesies during contradict himself, as he has little time to questioning. The goal of the technique is to prepare his answers. The interrogator then make the source feel cut off from his confronts the source with the inconsis- friends. tencies, causing further contradictions. In many instances, the source will begin to At the time the source acts hopeless and talk freely in an attempt to explain himself alone, the second interrogator appears and deny the inconsistencies pointed out by (having received his cue by a hidden signal the interrogator. In attempting to explain or by listening and observing out of view of his answers, the source is likely to reveal the source), scolds the first interrogator for more than he intends, thus creating his harsh behavior, and orders him from additional leads for further interrogation. the room. He then apologizes to soothe the source, perhaps offering him coffee and a The interrogator must have all his ques- cigarette. He explains that the actions of tions prepared before approaching the the first interrogator were largely the result source, because long pauses between ques- of an inferior intellect and lack of human tions allow the source to complete his sensitivity. The inference is created that the answers and render this approach ineffec- second interrogator and the source have, in tive. Besides extensive preparation, this common, a high degree of intelligence and technique requires an experienced, compe- an awareness of human sensitivity above tent interrogator, who has comprehensive and beyond that of the first interrogator. knowledge of ,his case, and fluency in the language of the source. This technique is The source is normally inclined to have a most effective immediately after capture, feeling of gratitude toward the second because of the confused state of the source. interrogator, who continues to show a sympathetic attitude toward the source in an effort to increase the rapport and control SILENCE APPROACH the questioning which will follow. Should the source's cooperation begin to fade, the The silence approach may be successful second interrogator can hint that since he is when employed against either the nervous of high rank, having many other duties, he or the confident-type source. When employ- cannot afford to waste time on an ing this technique, the interrogator says uncooperative source. He may broadly infer nothing to the source, but looks him that the first interrogator might return to squarely in the eye, preferably with a slight continue his questioning. When used smile on his face. It is important not to look against the proper source, this trick will away from the source, but force him to normally gain the source's complete break eye contact first. The source will cooperation. become nervous, begin to shift around in his chair, cross and recross his legs, and APPENDIX I Interrogation Guides EXAMPLE 1, Morale of troops. QUESTION GUIDE FOR El Casualties. SUPPORT OF TACTICAL Defensive and protective items of NBC INTERROGATION equipment, status of NBC training and defensive NBC instructions, and RIFLEMEN offensive capability of NBC Some of the specific topics on which a operations. captured enemy rifleman may be ques- El Status of immunizations; new shots, tioned are- booster shots more frequently than El Identification of source's squad, pla- normal. toon, company, battalion, regiment, Stress on care and maintenance of and division. NBC protective equipment. Organization, strength, weapons, and Issuance of new or different NBC pro- disposition of squad, platoon, and tective equipment. company. Morale and esprit de corps of civilians. Number of newly assigned personnel in unit within last 30 days. Civilian supply. El Location and strength of men and El Health of civilians and availability of weapons at strongholds, outposts, and medicine. observation posts in the source's El Night maneuvers, rehearsals, unit size, immediate area. night vision devices, and special Mission of the source immediately equipment. before capture as well as mission of source's squad, platoon, company, and MESSENGERS higher- echelons. Location and description of defensive Messengers are frequently chosen on the installations, such as missile sites, basis of above average intelligence and the antitank ditches and emplacements, ability to observe well and remember oral minefields, roadblocks, and barbed messages and instructions. Messengers, wire entanglements in source's area who have an opportunity to travel about before capture. Description of weapons within the immediate combat zone, gener- with which these locations are covered. ally, will have a good picture of the current situation and are excellent prospects for Names and personality information of tactical interrogation. The following topics small unit commanders known to the should be included when questioning a source. messenger source: Possible identifications of support mortar, artillery, and armored units. Nature and exact contents of messages he has been carrying over a reasonable El Status of food, ammunition, and other period of time, as well as the names of supplies. persons who originated these mes- sages, and the names of persons to whom messages were directed. Des- cription of duty positions of such personalities. Code names or numbers of specific Attitudes of commanders and staff enemy units, such as those appearing officers toward each other, civilians, in enemy telephone directories, and in units under their command, and the other SO1 such as unit identification general military situation. panel codes. Routes of communications and their Major enemy units to your front and condition. their code names. Tactical doctrines of commanders. El Units and individuals in radio nets, their call signs, call words, and operat- Command and staff organization. ing frequencies. Supply routes and road conditions. Names and code names of command- Location of supply points and types of ers and their staff officers. military and civilian supplies. Types, numbers, and basic characteris- El Sufficiency or lack of both civilian and tics of radios and telephone equipment military supplies. used at company, regiment, and divi- El Types, numbers, and condition of mili- sion level. tary and civilian supply-carrying Identification and location of units vehicles. occupying front line positions. Location of artillery and mortar Location of artillery and mortar positions. positions. Troop movements and troop assembly Information on enemy codes and areas. ciphers. Location of truck parks and motor Code names given to operations or to pools. specially designated supply points Organization of antitank and air such as supply points for special defense artillery units, weapons, and weapons. strength. Names and signals designating vari- Location of antitank and air defense ous types of alerts. artillery positions. Names of commanders of antitank and DRIVERS air defense artillery units. Questions directed by the tactical interro- Mission of antitank and air defense gator to captured drivers should concern the artillery. aspects of the enemy situation which the Types and status of ammunition. prisoner would know because of his driving Voluntary or forced evacuation or assignments. In dealing with EPW drivers movement of civilians. of command and staff vehicles, supply vehi- cles, and vehicles drawing weapons, the fol- Morale and health of civilians. lowing topics should be examined: Identification and location of com- PATROL LEADERS AND mand posts of higher, lower, and sup- PATROL MEMBERS porting units. The degree of patrol activity on the part Names and personal character traits of of the enemy is often a good indication of commanders and staff officers. enemy plans. Topics for questioning patrol leaders and members of enemy patrols upon Plans, instructions, orders, and con- their capture include- versations of commanders and staff officers. Specific mission of the patrol. Contents of field orders, such as com- Methods of mortar, artillery, and tank position of attacking forces; location coordination. and direction of attack; missions of individual units; objectives; plans for Location of tank repair depots and attack, defense, or withdrawals; and POL dumps (to include resupply and plans for communication and coordi- refueling techniques). nation among units. Effect of weather on tank operations. Location of lower, adjacent, higher, Armored reconnaissance missions. and supporting unit CPs as well as Number of newly assigned personnel location of supply and communica- in unit within last 30 days. tions installations. Morale and esprit de corps of civilians. Locations of observation posts and Relocation or movement of civilians. outposts. Civilian supply. Assembly areas for troops and supplies. Health of civilians and availability of Disposition of regiments, battalions, medicine. and companies of a division. Status of ammunition and POL Identification and disposition of resupply. reserves. Location of ammunition supply points. Status of supplies of all types. Ammunition supply to include type in Civilian social and economic the basic load or on hand, for example, chemical ammunition. conditions. Measures for defense against NBC and Evacuation or movement of civilians. radiological attack to include type of NBC defensive equipment installed in ARMORED TROOPS the tank. Night maneuvers, rehearsals, unit size, Topics to be covered when questioning captured armored troops are as follows: night vision devices, and special equipment. Unit identifications. Designation and strength of support- ARTILLERYMEN ing or supported infantry units. Types and characteristics of tanks Topics to be covered when questioning employed. captured artillerymen are as follows. Mechanical and tactical weaknesses of these tanks. Forward Observers Means of communications between Topics for interrogation of forward tanks and between tanks and infantry. observers include- Missions and objectives. Location, organization, and number of Routes of approach. guns of the battery or battalion whose Armored units in reserve. fire the source was observing and directing. Location of tank parks and assembly areas. Location of front lines, outposts, and observation posts. Location of impassable terrain features. Location of alternate observation posts. Types and amount of ammunition, to Conditions of health and sanitation in include chemical and nuclear ammuni- enemy units. tion, in the basic load or on hand. Ratio of dead to wounded. Location of chemical and biological Commander's tactics in relation to the ammunitions. number of casualties. Location of targets marked for chemi- Adequacy and efficiency of casualty cal and biological fires. evacuation. Weapons most feared by the enemy. Air Defense Artillerymen Location and staffing of aid stations Interrogation of a source from an air and hospitals. defense unit should cover the following: Organization of division, regiment, Location and number of air defense and battalion medical units. weapons. Status and types of medical supplies. Detailed description and characteris- tics of air defense guns and missiles Use and characteristics of newly devel- used. oped medicine or drugs. Data on your wounded, sick, or dead in Shape, size, and location of ground the hands of the enemy. radars. Skill of enemy medical personnel. Organization of air defense units. Information on mass sickness or epi- Types of areas defended. demics in the enemy forces. Nuclear capability. Types of treatment and medication for Methods of attack against friendly air- NBC casualties. craft, by type of aircraft. Supply and availability of materials Avenues of approach and altitudes used in the treatment of NBC most and least advantageous to enemy casualties. air defense. Special training or treatment of NBC Methods of identifying unknown casualties. aircraft. New or recent immunizations. Morale and esprit de corps of civilians. MEDICAL CORPSMEN Relocation or movement of civilians. Although medical personnel are entitled Civilian supply. to special protective measures under the provisions of international agreements, Health of civilians and availability of they can be, and are, interrogated without medicine. infringement of any existing laws or rules Location and present condition of ci- of warfare. Topics to be covered when inter- vilian hospitals, factories producing rogating enemy medical personnel are as medical supplies, and warehouses and follows: stores containing medical supplies. Number of casualties over a given phase of combat operations. ENGINEER TROOPS Weapons accounting for most casualties. Topics for questioning of captured engi- neer troops are as follows: Key personnel who have been casualties. Mission of supported unit. Description of key terrain. Area of activities. Condition of roads, bridges, and major Nature of activities. buildings. Strength. Enemy policy and attitude toward Equipment. local civilians. Motivation. Human and material resources of the area. Leadership. Morale and esprit de corps of local Reliability. civilians. Contacts Data on important civilian personali- External direction or support. ties remaining in enemy areas. Health and medical status of local populace. EXAMPLE 2, Effect of friendly operations on ci- QUESTION GUIDE FOR vilian populace. NUCLEAR BIOLOGICAL AND Instructions to prepare for defensive CHEMICAL OPERATIONS measures against NBC attack. Some specific questions for information Recent immunizations. on NBC operations are as follows: What items of NBC protective equip- POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA ment have been issued to enemy PERSONNEL troops? Is there any differentiation in Personnel recently acquired through issue of items for particular areas? If combat operations and who are identified so, what items for what areas? as being involved with political and PSYOP Are there any new or recent immuniza- should be questioned. As a minimum, the tions indicated by sources during following topics should be included: interrogations? Policy, plans, and objectives. What immunizations have enemy Organization and training. troop units received, as indicated in captured immunization records? Current and past activities, to include themes of any propaganda programs. Are enemy troops equipped with pro- tective masks? Is the individual Enemy analysis of our weaknesses and required to carry the mask on his per- strengths. son? Are there any sectors where the Target audiences for propaganda, mask is not required equipment for the including priorities. individual? What accessory equipment is issued with the mask? Effects of friendly PSYOP. Is protective clothing issued to enemy Analysis of enemy weaknesses and troops? If so, what type of clothing or strengths. articles? If special clothing is used, is it Enemy counterpropaganda activities. for any particular geographic area? Have enemy troop units constructed NBC protective shelters? If so, what GUERRILLA PERSONNEL type? Topics for interrogation of captured guer- Are enemy fortifications, individual rilla personnel are as follows: and collective, provided with overhead cover? APPENDIX J 1949 Geneva Conventions

1. The United States is a party to the following Geneva Conventions of 1949:

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12August 1949,cited herein as GWS.

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949, cited herein as GWS Sea.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949,cited herein as GPW.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12August 1949,cited herein as GC.

2. These treaties will be strictly observed and enforced by United States forces without regard to whether they are legally binding upon this country and its specific relations with any other specified country. Military commanders will be instructed which, if any, of these treaties, or component parts thereof, are not legally binding in a given situation. On 10 August 1965, the US Secretary of State notified the International Committee of the Red Cross that the Geneva Conventions as a whole would apply to the Vietnam conflict. Future armed conflict involving the United States will most likely be subjected to the same laws on a unilateral basis.

3. Those articles of the above-referenced treaties directly applicable to this manual are quoted below. (See FM 27-10 for full explanation of these treaties.)

(GWS, GWS Sea, GPW, GC, Art. 2) SITUATIONS TO WHICH LAW OF WAR ARE APPLICABLE In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the State of War is not recognized by one of them.

The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the ter- ritory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain. bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.

(GWS, GPW, GWS Sea, GC, Art. 3) INSURGENCY

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

violence to life and person, in particular, murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

taking of hostages;

outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;

the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civili.zedpeoples. 1 The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanita- rian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.

The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions 0.fthe present Convention.

The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.

(GPW, Art. 4) PRISONERS OF WAR DEFINED

A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:

1 Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.

1 Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:

that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;

that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;

that of carrying arms openly;

that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

1 Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power. Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model.

H Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favorable treatment under any other provisions of international law.

H Inhabitants of a nonoccupied territory, who on the agproach of the enemy spon- taneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the'laws and customs of war.

B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention:

Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied coun- try, if the occupying Power considers is necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even though it has originally liberated them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it occupies, in particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat, or where they fail to comply with a summons made to them with a view to internment.

H The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been received by neutral or nonbelligerent Powers on their territory and whom these Powers are required to intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favourable treatment which these Powers may choose to give and with the exceptions of Article 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral or nonbelligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom these per- sons depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these Parties normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties.

C. This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and chaplains as provided for in Article 33 of the present Convention. (GPW, Art. 13) HUMANE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS

H Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. An unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention. In particular, no prisoner of war may be subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the prisoner concerned and carried out in his interest.

H Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.

Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.

(GPW, Art. 17)QUESTIONING OF PRISONERS

H Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information.

H If he willfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a restriction of the privileges accorded to his rank or status.

Each Party to a conflict is required to furnish the persons under its jurisdiction who are liable to become prisoners of war, with an identity card showing the owner's surname, first names, rank, army, regimental, personal or serial number or equiva- lent information, and date of birth. The identity card may, furthermore, bear the signature or the fingerprints, or both, of the owner, and may bear, as well, any other information the Party to the conflict may wish to add concerning persons belonging to its armed forces. As far as possible the card shall measure 6.5 x 10cm. and shall be issued in duplicate. The identity card shall be shown by the prisoner of war upon demand, but may in no case be taken away from him.

H No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to'answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind. H Prisoners of war who, owing to their physical or mental condition, are unable to state their identity, shall be handed over to the medical service. The identity of such prisoners shall be established by all possible means, subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph.

H The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language which they understand.

(GC, Art. 31)PROHIBITION OF COERCION

H No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain inforrrstion from them or from third parties. GLOSSARY abn airborne ACR armored cavalry regiment AF Air Force AG Adjutant General AKM designation of a type of Soviet rifle amph amphibious amt amount AOE Army of Excellence approx approximately armd armored at antitank ATGL antitank grenade launcher Aug August

BEST MAPS B - biographic intelligence E - economic intelligence S - sociological intelligence T - transportation and telecommunications intelligence M - military geographic intelligence A - armed forces intelligence P - political intelligence S - scientific and technical intelligence BICC battlefield information control center BMP designation of a type of Soviet armored personnel carrier bn battalion

C command and control C3 command, control, and communications C3CM command, control, communications countermeasures CA civil affairs C-E Communication-Electronics CED captured enemy document CEE captured enemy equipment CEWI combat electronic warfare and intelligence CINCAFMED Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces, Mediterranean CI counterintelligence CIC combined interrogation center CINCENT Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe CINCHAN Allied Commander in Chief Channel CINCNORTH Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Northern Europe CINCSOUTH Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe CM&D collection management and dissemination CMEC captured material exploitation center CMO civil-military operations co company COMMZ communications zone CONUS continental United States COSCOM corps support command CP command post CPR common point of reference CSS combat service support

Glossary-0 DCPR destination common ~ointof reference decon decontamination det detachment DIAM Defense Intelligence Agency Manual DISCOM division support command DISUM daily intelligence summary div division DO1 date of information DS direct support dsg designated DTG date-time group

E east ea each EAC echelons above corps EM enlisted man EPW enemy prisoner of war evac evacuation EW electronic warfare

FID foreign internal defense fl fluent FM field manual FNU first name unknown FRG Federal Republic of Germany FUD full unit designation

G1 Assistant Chief of Staff, GI, Personnel G2 Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence G3 Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, Operations G4 Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, Logistics G5 Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, Civil Affairs GDR German Democratic Republic GS general support

H/S hearsay HPT high-payoff target HQ headquarters HUMINT human intelligence

IAW in accordance with ID identification ICPR initial common point of reference i.e. that is I&E interrogation and exploitation IEW intelligence and electronic warfare IMINT imagery intelligence intel intelligence intg interrogation INTREP intelligence report INTSUM intelligence summary IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield IPW prisoner of war interrogation IR information requirements

52 Intelligence Directorate JIF joint interrogation facilities JrLt junior lieutenant JrSgt junior sergeant

KB knowledgeability briefs KIA killed in action ldr leader LIC low-intensity conflict

MARSTA martial status mbr member MHz megahertz MI military intelligence MIT mobile interrogation teams MN/I middle name/initial MOSC military occupational specialty code MR motorized rifle MRB motorized rifle battalion MRC motorized rifle company MRD motorized rifle division MRP motorized rifle platoon MRR motorized rifle regiment MRS motorized rifle squad

N north/no NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NBC nuclear, biological, chemical no number

OB order of battle OCONUS outside continental United States off officer OPORD operation order OPSEC operations security

PERINTREP periodic intelligence report pers personnel PIR priority intelligence requirements PKM designation of a type of Soviet weapon PKT designation of a type of Soviet weapon ~lt platoon PO political officer POC point of capture POL petroleum, oil, and lubricants POS position PSYOP psychological operations

REC radio electronic combat recon reconnaissance regt regiment RPG-7 designation of a type of Soviet antitank grenade launcher RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition

S south S1 Adjutant (US Army) S2 Intelligence Officer (US Army) S3 Operations and Training Officer (US Army) S4 Supply Officer (US Army) S5 Civil Affairs Officer (US Army) SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic SAEDA Subversion and Espionage Directed Against US Army and Deliberate Security Violations SALUTE size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment SFC sergeant first class SIGINT signals intelligence SIR specific information requirements SITMAP situation map SO1 signal operating instructions SOP standing operating procedure ssd squad sqdrn squadron SrSgt senior sergeant STANAG standardization agreement SUPINTREP supplemental intelligence report svc service SVD designation of a type of Soviet rifle SW southwest

TCAE technical control and analysis element TECHDOC technical document TOC tactical operations center TOE table of organization and equipment

UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice UIC unit identification code UkSSR Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic U/I unidentified unk unknown us United States USA United States Army USACGSC United States Army Command and General Staff College USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republic UTM Universal Transverse Mercator (grid)

W west WNA would not answer REFERENCES REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS Required publications are sources that users must read in order to understand or to comply with this publication.

Army Regulations (ARs)

The Modern Army Recordkeeping System Army Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons Department of the Army Information Security Program

Field Manuals (FMs)

Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons Map Reading The Law of Land Warfare Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations Counterintelligence Counterintelligence Operations (U) The Soviet Army Troops Organization and Equipment Operations Low Intensity Conflict

Department of Army Pamphlets (DA Pams) 27-161-1 International Law Vol 1

Defense Intelligence Agency Manuals (DIAMs)

58-13 (S) ' Defense Human Resources Intelligence Collection Procedures (U)

Miscellaneous Publications

The Hague and Geneva Conventions Uniform Code of Military Justice

Department of Army Forms (DA Forms)

1132 Prisoners Personal Property List-Personal Deposit Funds COMMAND Command publications cannot be obtained through Armywide resupply channels. Deter- mine availability by contacting the address shown. Field circulars expire three years from the date of publication unless sooner rescinded.

Field Circulars (FCs)

Medical Intelligence in the Airland Battle, 31 Mar 86. Academy of Health Sciences, US Army, Fort Houston, Texas 78234-1600 MI Bn/Co Interrogation and Exploitation (EAC), Oct 85 United States Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: ATSI-TD-PAL, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7000

PROJECTED PUBLICATIONS Projected publications are sources of additional information that are scheduled for printing but are not yet available. Upon print, they will be distributed automatically via pinpoint dis- tribution. They may not be obtained from the USA AG Publications Center until indexed in DA Pamphlet 310-1.

Field Manuals (FMs)

34-5 (S) Human Intelligence Operations (U) 34-25 Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations

RELATED PUBLICATIONS Related publications are sources of additional information. They are not required in order to understand this publication.

Field Manuals (FMs)

Health Service Support in Theater of Operations Psychological Operations Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations INDEX air-land battle, 2-0, 2-5, 2-6 battlefield information control center, area of interest, 2-0 6-4 area of operations, 2-0 contact, 6-4 initiative, 2-0 DISUM, 6-4 doctrine, 2-0 intelligence dissemination, 6-4 analysis, 2-2 INTREP, 6-4 INTSUM, 6-4 approach, 3-0, 3-3, 7-0 PERINTREP, 6-4 approaches, 3-4, 3-7, H-0 SUPINTREP, 6-4 decreased fear down, H-2 captured enemy documents, 1-1, 1-2, 4-0, direct, H-0 4-1, 4-4, 4-6, 4-9, A-11 emotional, H-0 emotional hate, H-0 accountability, 4-1, 4-13 emotional love, H-0 Air Force-related documents, 4-5 "establish your identity", H-5 captured material exploitation center, 4-9 fear up (mild), H-2 captured with a source, 4-11 fear up (harsh), H-1 categories, 4-4 file and dossier, H-5 category A, 4-4 futility technique, H-4 category B, 4-4 incentive, H-0 category C, 4-5 increased fear up, H-1 category D, 4-5 "Mutt and Jeff" ("friend and foe"), H-6 communications and cryptographic pride and ego, H-2 documents, 4-4 pride and ego down, H-3 confiscation, 4-12 pride and ego up, H-3 date-time group, 4-0 rapid fire, H-6 detainee personnel record repetition, H-5 disposal, 4-11 silence, H-6 electronic warfare, 4-9 "we know all", H-4 evacuation, 4-1, 4-12 assess the source, 3-5 exploitation, 4-4, 8-0 breaking point, 3-6 handling, 4-0 commander's information requirements, impounded, 4-12 3-6 inventory, 4-2 commander's priority intelligence log, 4-2, 4-3 requirements, 3-6 maps and charts of enemy forces, 4-5 contact, 7-0 Navy-related documents, 4-5 establish and develop rapport, 3-5 recognition, 4-12 establish and maintain control, 3-4, 3-5 recording documents category, 4-5 establish and maintain rapport, 3-4 returned, 4-12 Geneva and Hague Conventions, 3-5 SALUTE report, 4-4, 4-8 initial contact, 7-0 screening, 4-4 interview, 7-0 SIGINT, 4-9 STANAG 1059,4-0 manipulate the source's emotions and STANAG 2084,4-0 weaknesses, 3-4 tag, 4-1 phase, 3-4 technical control and analysis element, planning and preparation, 3-3 4-4, 4-9 selecting, 3-3 technical documents, 4-4, 4-5, 4-9 sincere and convincing, 3-6 trace actions, 4-2 smooth transitions, 3-6 translation reports, 4-6, 4-8 techniques, 3-4, 3-6 translating, 4-5 UCMJ, 3-5 transmittal documents, 4-9, 4-10 categories command, control, and communications, document, 3-2, 4-4, A-11 2-6 source, 3-1, 3-2, 8-0, A-4, A-5, A-6 compositions, 2-6 combined interrogation center, 8-0 counterintelligence, 2-2 dispositions, 2-6 STANAG 2033,8-0 electronic technical data, 2-7 collection management and IR, 2-6 dissemination, 6-4 logistics, 2-7 contact, 6-4 miscellaneous data, 2-7 DISUM, 6-4 PSYOP, 2-7 intelligence dissemination, 6-4 missions, 2-6 INTREP, 6-4 OB elements, 2-7 INTSUM, 6-4 PIR, 2-6 PERINTREP, 6-4 strength, 2-6 SUPINTREP, 6-4 tactics, 2-6 training, 2-6 command, control, and high-intensity conflict, P, 9-1 communications, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-6 human intelligence, 2-7 countermeasures, 2-4 programs cooperative and friendly, 1-2 hostile and antagonistic, 1-2 counterintelligence, 2-2, 2-4 human sources, 1-1 agents, 3-1 neutral and nonpartisan, 1-2 agent or friendly civilian, 9-9 information air-land battle, 2-5 black list, 2-5 all-source intelligence, 2-2 command, control, and communications analyze information, 2-3 programs, 2-2, 3-4 area of operations, 2-1 deception, 2-2, 2-4, 2-5 collection assets, 2-1 element, 3-1 collection missions, 2-1 enemy agents, 2-5 collection requirements, 2-1 gray list, 2-5 combat, 2-2, 2-3 informant technique, 9-10 components of strategic debriefing, 7-1 insurgent captive, 9-9 armed forces intelligence, 7-1, 7-2 interrogation operations, 9-9 biographic intelligence, 7-1 local leader, 9-9 economic intelligence, 7-1, 7-2 operations security, 2-2, 2-4 military geographical intelligence, 7-1, priority intelligence requirements of 7-2 counterintelligence interest, 3-1 political intelligence, 7-1, 7-2 radio electronic combat, 2-5 scientific and technical intelligence, 7-1, rear operations, 2-2, 2-4, 2-5 7-3 reconnaissance, surveillance, and target sociological intelligence, 7-1, 7-2 acquisition, 2-5 transportation and telecommunications saboteurs, 2-5 intelligence, 7-1, 7-2 screening techniques, 9-9 direct targeting data, 2-2 sympathizers, 2-5 electronic technical data, 2-7 special purpose forces, 2-5 imagery intelligence, 6-4 terrorists, 2-5 interrogation operations, 2-0 white list, 2-5 military intelligence, 2-0, 2-4 echelons above corps, 1-2, 4-5 miscellaneous data, 2-7 PSYOP, 2-7 electronic warfare, 2-2, 2-6 OB elements, 2-7 capabilities and limitations, 2-6 OB data base, 3-3 combat effectiveness, 2-6 signals intelligence, 6-4 situation map, 3-3 approach, 3-0 strategic debriefing, 7-0 area cordon. 9-9 duties and responsibilities, 7-0 battlefield information control center, 6-4

notification, 7-0 CEDS., 4-0- planning and preparation, 7-0 collection management and targeting data, 2-3 dissemination, 6-4 terrain features, 2-1 collection mission, 6-4 weather conditions, 2-1 collection priority, 6-0 command relations, 6-0 information requirements, 2-3, 2-6, 3-0, contacts, 6-4, 7-0 3-1, 3-4, 3-6, 3-8 counterintelligence, 2-2, 2-4 intelligence and electronic warfare, defectors, 9-8 2-0, 2-2, 2-4, 2-7, 3-3 deployment site, 6-3 detainee personnel record, 3-0 all-source intelligence, 2-2 EPW captive tag, 3-0 CED, 2-7 examine documents, 3-0 collection, 2-2 foreign internal defense, 9-1 combat information, 2-2 illiterates, 9-10 command, control, and communications information requirements, 3-0, 3-1, 6-4 programs, 2-2 informant technique, 9-10 counterintelligence, 2-2 initiative, 1-0 deception, 2-2 prisoner of war, 1-0 direct targeting data, 2-2 insurgent captive, 9-9 electronic warfare, 2-2 insurgent vulnerability to interrogation, operations security, 2-2 9-6 processing, 2-2 rear operations, 2-2 intelligence, 1-0 intelligence and electronic warfare, 2-0, reporting, 2-2 I sources, 2-7 2-2 situation development, 2-2 intelligence preparation of the battlefield, target development, 2-2 2-0 joint interrogation facilities, 8-0 intelligence annex, 5-0 legal status of insurgents, 9-6 deployment site, 5-0 local leader, 9-9 low-intensity conflict, 9-1, 9-3 intelligence preparation of the main and local forces, 9-8 battlefield, 2-0, 2-2 military police, 3-0 battlefield information control center, 6-4 militia, 9-8 collection management and mission, 8-0 dissemination, 6-4 national agency, 8-2 collection missions, 6-4 objective, 1-0 intelligence process, 2-1, 2-2 order of battle, 1-0, 2-3 military intelligence, 2-0 interrogation, 1-0 weather and terrain, 2-2, 2-3 interrogator, 1-0 OB elements, 2-7 interpreter, 3-14, 3-15 observe the source, 3-0 interrogation, 3-14 operational environment methods, 3-14 operations, 2-0, 9-1, 9-9 preparation, 3-14 peacekeeping operations reports, 3-15 peacetime contingency operations, 9-1 plan, 3-4 interrogation, 1-0, 3-0, 3-3, 6-0, 8-0 planning and preparation, 3-0,3-4 accuracy, 1-0 political cadre, 9-8 advisor operations, 9-5 population, 9-6 agent or friendly civilian, 9-9 prescreening, 3-0 and the interrogator, 1-0 priority intelligence requirements, 3-0, 3-1, 6-4 principles of, 1-0 intelligence and electronic warfare process, 3-0 operations, 2-2 question guards, 3-0 international agreements, 1-5, 1-6 questioning, 3-7 knowledgeability of sources, 9-8 reports, 3-15 law of land warfare, 1-5 screeners, 3-0, 3-1 logistics, 2-7 screening, 3-0, 9-9 1o.ng-termmemory, 6-1 security, 1-1 site, 3-14, 6-3 map reading, 1-5 situation map, 3-3 map tracking, 1-5, 3-10 source, 3-0 miscellaneous data, 2-7 support relationships, 6-4 missions, 2-6 additional, 6-6 motivation, 1-2 chaplain, 6-7 neurolinguistics, 1-5 communications, 6-6 objectivity, 1-3 order of battle, 1-4 health service, 6-6 OB data base, 3-3 inspector general, 6-7 patience and tact, 1-3 NBC protection, 6-6 perseverence, 1-3 staff judge advocate, 6-6 personal appearance and demeanor, 1-3 civil-military operations (G5 and S5), personal qualities, 1-2 6-6 population, 9-6 intelligence (G2 and S2), 6-5 priority intelligence requirements, 2-6 operations (G3 and S3), 6-5 role, 2-0 personnel (GI and Sl), 6-4 security, 1-5 supply (G4 and S4), 6-5 self-control, 1-3 sympathizer, 9-8 short-term memory, 6-1 termination, 3-12 situation map, 5-3 terrorism counteraction, 9-1 SALUTE, 3-9 with an interpreter, 3-14 specialized skills and knowledge, 1-4 strength, 2-6 tactics, 2-6 interrogator, 1-0, 3-14 target country, 1-4 accessible information overtime, 6-2 tasking relationships, 6-3 adaptability, 1-3 The Hague and Geneva Conventions, 1-5 advisor operations, 9-5 training, 2-6 advisor qualifications, 9-4 writing and speaking skills, 1-4 advisor relationships, 9-4 joint interrogation facility (JIF),8-0, 8-2 alertness, 1-2 and the interrogation, 1-0 CA units, 8-2 approach techniques, 1-4 category A sources, 8-0 capabilities and limitations, 2-6 communications, 8-2 combat effectiveness, 2-6 coordination, 8-2 common characteristics of sources, 9-8 debriefing, 8-2 compositions, 2-6 division and corps interrogation and CI counterintelligence, 2-4 elements, 8-2 counterpart relationship, 9-5 EPW camp, 8-2 credibility, 1-3 exploitation of documents, 8-0 dispositions, 2-6 formation, 8-0 enemy material and equipment, 1-5 Geneva Conventions, 8-2 entry-level training, 1-4 HUMINT collection, 8-2 electronic technical data, 2-6 interrogation, 8-2 foreign language, 1-4 division and corps interrogation and CI hot and cold leads, 3-9 elements, 8-2 information requirements, 2-6 interrogation reports, 8-1 intelligence assets, 2-0 knowledgeability briefs, 8-1 mission, 8-0 modern Army recordkeeping system, mobile interrogation teams, 8-1 5-3 national agency, 8-2 operations security, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 7-1 operation, 8-1 organization, 8-0 reconnaissance, surveillance, and target PSYOP, 8-2 acquisition, 2-5 requirement, 8-0 order of battle, 1-0, 1-4,2-3,2-7 responsibilities, 8-0 SALdUTE, 8-1 data base, 3-2 screening, 8-2 elements, 2-7 division and corps interrogation and CI planning and preparation, 3-0, 3-3, 3-4 elements, 8-2 use, 8-1 documents captured with a source, 4-11 EPW captive tag, 3-0 low-intensity conflict, P, 1-6, 9-1 evaluation of documents, 4-12 advisor and interrogator relationships, examine documents, 3-0 9-4 guards, 5-1 advisor operations, 9-5 interpreter preparation phase, 3-14 advisor qualifications, 9-4 interrogation, 3-14 area cordon, 9-9 observe the source, 3-0 cease fire supervision, 9-2 preparation, 3-14 common characteristics of sources, 9-8 questioning guards, 3-0, 3-3, 3-4 counterpart relationship, 9-5 SALUTE, 3-9, 4-4, 4-8, E-0 defectors, 9-8 priority intelligence requirements, 2-3, foreign internal defense, 9-1, 9-2 2-6,3-0, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-8, 3-13 Geneva Conventions, 9-7 handling of insurgent captives and commander's, 3-6 suspects, 9-7 of counterintelligence interest humane treatment, 9-7 supported commander's, 3-1 illiterates, 9-10 procedures informant technique, 9-10 insurgent captive, 9-9 accountability, 4-1, 4-13 insurgent methods of resistance, 9-7 administrative tasks, 5-2 insurgent vulnerability to interrogation, area cordon, 9-9 9-6 assign category, 3-1 interrogation operations, 9-9 captured document log, 4-2, 4-3 interrogator skills and abilities, 9-4 captured document tag, 4-1 interrogation support to, 9-3 captured enemy documents, 4-1, 4-9, A-11 knowledgeability of sources, 9-8 captured material exploitation center, 4-9 law and order maintenance, 9-2 categories of PW, A-4 limitations to US assistance, 9-4 chaplain, 3-7 local leader, 9-9 collection mission update, 5-3 main and local forces, 9-8 collection priority, 6-0 militia, 9-8 commander's information requirements, peacekeeping operations, 9-1, 9-2 3-0, 3-1 peacetime contingency operations, 9-1, 9-3 commander's priority intelligence political cadre, 9-8 requirements, 3-0, 3-1 population, 9-6 communications, 5-1 screening techniques, 9-9 communications and cryptographic source, 9-6 documents, 4-4 sympathizer, 9-8 confiscation of documents, 4-12 terminology, 9-1 counterintelligence operations, P terrorism counteraction, 9-1, 9-3 date-time group, 4-0 detainee personnel record, 3-0 mid-intensity conflict, 9-1 disposal of documents, 4-11 documents captured with a source, 4-11 question guide for NBC operations, 1-8 document evacuation, 4-1, 4-8, 4-9, 4-12 humane treatment, 5-4 document inventory 4-2 insurgency, J-1 electronic warfare, P, 4-9 1949 Geneva Conventions, J-0 evaluation of documents, 4-12 prisoners of war, 5-2 examine documents, 3-0 prohibition of coercion, 5-5 guards, 5-1 questioning of prisoners, 5-4 high-intensity conflict, P recognition of documents, 4-12 humane treatment, 9-7 recordkeeping, 3-12 impounded documents, 4-12 Red Cross, 3-7 intelligence and electronic warfare returned documents, 4-12 operations, 5-0 S2, 5-0 intelligence annex, 5-0 S3, 5-0 intelligence cycle, 7-3 SALUTE, 3-9, 4-4, 4-8, E-0 interpreter, 3-15 sample detainee personnel record, B-0 interpreter preparation phase, 3-14 screeners, 3-0, 3-1, 4-5, 5-1 interrogating, 3-8, 3-15 screening report format, F-1, F-2 interrogation guides, I-0,143 senior interrogator, 5-2 armored troops, 1-4 signals intelligence, 4-9 artillerymen, 1-4 source evacuation, 5-1 drivers, 1-2 STANAG extracts, A-1 engineer troops, 1-6 STANAG 1059, 4-0, A-2 guerrilla personnel, 1-8 STANAG 2033, 8-0, A-2 liaison officers, 1-3 STANAG 2044, A-6 local civilians, 1-7 STANAG 2084, 4-0, A-10 medical corpsmen, 1-6 tactical interrogation report, G-0, G-7 members of machine-gun and motor technical control and analysis element, units, 1-7 4-4, 4-9 messengers, 1-0 technical documents, 4-4, 4-9 patrol leaders and patrol members, 1-2 termination, 3-13 political and propaganda personnel, 1-8 trace actions, 4-2 prisoner of war captive tag, D-1 translation report, 4-8 prisoner of war identity card, C-0 transmittal documents, 4-9, 4-10 reconnaissance troops, 1-7 radio and telephone operators, 1-1 prockssing, 2-2 riflemen, 1-0 approach, 3-0 squad and platoon leaders and cycle, 5-2 company commanders, 1-1 EPW captive tag, 3-0 interrogation site, 3-14, 5-1 intelligence and electronic warfare, 2-7 liaison, 7-1 intelligence process, 2-1, 2-2 low-intensity conflict, P interrogation, 3-0, 5-2 medic, 3-7 observe the source, 3-0 medical support, 5-1 planning and preparation, 3-0 methods of interpretation, 3-14 prescreening, 3-0 military police, 3-0 questioning, 3-0 modern Army recordkeeping system, 5-3 reporting, 3-0 movement, 5-1 screeners, 3-0 neurolinguistics, 1-5 screening, 3-0, 5-2 nuclear, biological, and chemical, P documents, 4-4 planning and preparation, 3-3 source, 9-9 prepare and move to deployment site, termination, 3-0 3-14, 5-0, 5-1 prohibition against use of force, 1-1 priority, 4-8, 4-9 prisoners of war, 2-7 international law, 1-1,1-5 question guards, 3-0 law of land warfare, 1-5 legal status of insurgents, 9-6 questioning of prisoners, 5-4 question guide for NBC operations, 1-8 questioning techniques, 3-7 humane treatment, 5-4 compound and negative, 3-9 insurgency, J-1 control, 3-8 prisoners of war, 5-2 direct, 3-7 prohibition of coercion, 5-5 f0110~-~p, 3-8 questioning of prisoners, 5-4 leading, 3-8 The Hague and Geneva Conventions, P, nonpertinent, 3-8 1-5, 2-7, 3-5, 3-7, 8-2, 9-6, 9-7, J-1 prepared, 3-8 Uniform Code of Military Justice, P, 2-7, repeated, 3-8 3-5 vague, 3-8 recognition of documents, 4-12 questioning, 3-0, 3-7, 7-0 recording information, 3-12 collection mission, 6-4 SALUTE, 3-9, 4-4, 4-8 collection priority, 6-0 sequence, 3-9 guards, 3-3 strength, 2-6 hearsay information, 3-9 tactics, 2-6 hot and cold leads, 3-9 training, 2-6 information requirements, 3-9 reporting, 2-2, 3-0, 3-13, 7-0 interrogation, 5-1 interrogation guides, I-0,I-8 DISUM, 6-4 armored troops, 1-4 documents captured with a source, 4-11 artillerymen, 1-4 information requirements, 3-9, 3-13 drivers, 1-2 intelligence annex, 5-0 engineer troops, 1-6 intelligence dissemination, 6-4 guerrilla personnel, 1-8 INTREP. 6-4 liaison officers, 1-3 INTSUM, 6-4 local civilians, 1-7 interrogation reports, 8-1 medical corpsmen, 1-6 PERINTREP, 6-4 members of machine-gun and motor preparation of. 3-15 units, 1-7 priority intelligence requirements, 3-9, messengers, 1-0 3-13 patrol leaders and patrol members, 1-2 questioning, 3-0 political and propaganda personnel, 1-8 record information. 3-1 prisoner of war captive tag, D-1 recording documents category, 4-5 prisoner of war identity card, C-0 S2. 5-0 reconnaissance troops, 1-7 ~3; 5-0 radio and telephone operators, 1-1 SALUTE report, 8-1, E-0, E-1 riflemen, 1-0 sample translation report, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10 squad and platoon leaders and screeners, 3-1 company commanders, 1-1 screening code, 3-1 map reading, 1-5 screening report, 3-1, F-0, F-2 map tracking, 1-5, 3-10 situation map, 5-3 destination common point of reference, SALUTE, 3-1, 4-6 3-10 SUPINTREP, 6-4 exploit dispositions, 3-11 tactical interrogation report, G-0, G-7 initial common point of reference, 3-10 translation, 4-6 point of capture, 3-10 transmittal documents, 4-9, 4-10 segment and exploit the route writing and speaking skills, 1-4 segments, 3-11 missions, 2-6 screening, 3-0, 4-4, 5-1, 5-2, 8-2, 9-9 modify sequences of, 3-3 assign category, 3-1 OB elements, 2-7 categories of PW, A-4 PIR, 2-6, 3-9 CEDS, 4-0 question guide for NBC operations, 1-8 CEDs captured with a source, 4-11 code, 3-1 corps or echelons above corps, 1-2 EPW captive tag, 3-0 defectors, 9-8 evaluation of documents, 4-12 hostile and antagonistic, 1-2 examine documents, 3-0 human intelligence, 2-7 guards, 5-1 human sources, 1-1 observe the source, 3-0 illiterates, 9-10 prescreening, 3-0 imagery intelligence, 6-4 priority intelligence requirements of informant technique, 9-10 counterintelligence interest, 3-1 insurgent captive, 9-9 question guards, 3-0, 3-3, 3-4 interrogation operations, 9-9 recognition of documents, 4-12 knowledgeability briefs, 8-1 report, 3-1, F-0, F-1, F-2 local leader, 9-9 SALUTE report, 3-9, 4-4, 4-8, E-0 long-term memory, 6-1 screeners, 3-0, 3-1, 4-5, 5-1 main and local forces, 9-8 sources, 2-7 militia, 9-8 techniques, 9-9 neutral and nonpartisan, 1-2 senior interrogator, 3-3,3-4 political cadre, 9-8 prisoner of war, 1-0, C-0, D-1 administrative tasks, 5-2 sample detainee personnel record, B-0 advice and assistance, 5-0 screening, 9-9 CED processing cycle, 5-2 short-term memory, 6-1 collection mission update, 5-3 signals intelligence, 6-4 communications, 5-1 sources of information, 1-1 establish site, 5-1 sympathizer, 9-8 interrogation, 5-1 screening, 5-1 target development, 2-2 evacuation, 5-1 combat information, 2-3 guards, 5-1 combat operations, 2-4 intelligence annex, 5-0 command and control, 2-4 interrogation operations, 5-0 command, control, and communications, interrogation process, 5-1 2-3, 2-4 medical support, 5-1 command, control, and communications movement, 5-1 countermeasures, 2-4 planning and preparation, 3-3 counterintelligence, 2-4 prepare and move to deloyment site, 5-0, high-payoff targets, 2-3. 2-4 5-1 high value targets, 2-2 recordkeeping, 5-3 information requirements, 2-2 reporting, 5-2 intelligence officer, 2-3 S2,5-0 operations security, 2-3, 2-4 S3, 5-0 order of battle, 2-3 screening, 5-2 priority intelligence requirements, 2-2, 2-3 situation map, 5-3 radio electronic combat, 2-3 specific information requirements, 2-2, situation development, 2-2 2-3. 2-4 terrain, 2-2 battalion, 2-3 weather, 2-2 brigade, 2-3 targeting data, 2-3 sources,P, 1-1, 1-4, 2-7, 3-0, 9-6, 9-8 weather and terrain, 2-3 accessible information overtime, 6-2 termination, 3-0, 3-12, 3-13, 3-15, 7-1 anent or friendlv civilian., 9-9- captive tag, 3-0 " phase, 3-12 captured enemy documents, 1-1, 4-11, 4-12, questioning, 3-0 4-13 returned documents. 4-12 category A, 8-0 source evacuation, 5-1 cooperative and friendly, 1-2 training, 1-4, 2-6 map tracking, 1-5 neurolinguistics, 1-5 enemy material and equipment, 1-5 order of battle, 1-4 entry-level training, 1-4 scientific and technical enhancement, 7-1 foreign language, 1-4 security, 1-5 international agreements, 1-5 specialized skills and knowledge, 1-4 interrogator, 6-7 target country, 1-4 language, 6-7, 7-1 map reading, 1-5 translating, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7 FM 34-52 8 MAY 1987

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR. General, United States Army Chief of Staff

Official:

R. L. DILWORTH Brigadier General, United States Army The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, USAR, andARNG:To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11A, Require- ments for Intelligence Interrogation (Qty rqr block no. 278).

* U.S. GOVERWENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1987 726-041/41055