: and —2011-2012 Disclaimer Contact the Geospatial Technologies Project geotech © Copyright 2015 Geospatial Technologies Project Program Associate Acknowledgement Acronym(List( ( SPLM% % Sudan%People’s%Liberation%Movement%% % SPLM6N% Sudan%People’s%Liberation%Movement6North%% % SPLA%% % Sudan%People’s%Liberation%Army% % SPLA6N%% Sudan%People’s%Liberation%Army6North% % JEM% % Justice%and%Equality%Movement% % SAF% % Sudanese%Armed%Forces% % PDF% % Popular%Defense%Force% % NISS% % National%Intelligence%and%Security%Services% JIU% % Joint%Integrated%Units% % AAA% % %Administrative%Area% % CPA% % Comprehensive%Peace%Agreement% % UNHCR% United%Nations%High%Commission%for%Refugees% % HHI% % Harvard%Humanitarian%Initiative Introduction( % On%9%January%2005,%the%Sudan%People’s%Liberation%Movement%(SPLM)%and%the%Government%of% Sudan%signed%a%series%of%agreements%known%as%both%the%Comprehensive%Peace%Agreement% (CPA)%and%the%Naivasha%Agreement,%the%aim%of%which%was%to%bring%an%end%to%the%second% Sudanese%civil%war.%%Among%other%features,%the%CPA%stipulated%that%South%Sudan%would%hold%a% referendum%between%9%and%15%January%2011%to%decide%the%matter%of%independence.%A% referendum%on%the%status%of%the%disputed%oil%rich%Abyei%Region%was%initially%scheduled%for%the% same%time.1% % The%referendum%resulted%in%South%Sudan%voting%to%form%an%independent%state.%Immediately% following%the%referendum,%violence%erupted%in%several%locations%throughout%Sudan%and%South% Sudan.%Fighting%occurred%in%the%Abyei%Administrative%Area%(AAA),%the%Nuba%Mountain%Region,% Darfur,%Blue%Nile,%and%the%Heglig%region.%These%conflicts%involved%multiple%parties,%including% governments%and%non6state%actors.%This%study,%however,%will%focus%exclusively%on%the%conflicts%in% Abyei%and%Heglig,%as%these%are%the%only%areas%where%control%of%territory%was%disputed%between% Sudan%and%South%Sudan.%% ( Conflict)in)Abyei) ( The%2005%CPA%accorded%the%AAA%a%special%status,%which%granted%administrative%control%to%a% locally%elected%Executive%Council.%Residents%were%given%citizenship%in%both%the%Sudanese%state%of% Western%Kordofan%and%the%South%Sudanese%state%of%Bahr%el%Ghazal.%The%residents%would%then%be% afforded%the%opportunity%to%vote%on%whether%to%retain%the%AAA’s%special%administrative%status%in% the%North,%to%become%part%of%Bahr%el%Ghazal%in%South%Sudan,%or%to%recognize%the%1%January%1956% border%that%would%place%most%of%the%area%in%Sudan.2% % In%the%months%leading%up%to%the%Abyei%referendum,%however,%officials%from%the%north%and%south% were%unable%to%reach%an%agreement%on%whether%the%Misseriya%would%be%allowed%to%participate.3% The%Misseriya%are%a%group%of%Arab%semi6nomadic%pastoralists%who%traditionally%migrate%south% through%Abyei%each%year%between%September%and%January%and%return%to%their%wet%season% grazing%grounds%north%of%Abyei%in%May.4%In%recent%years,%these%migrations%have%led%to%attacks%on% the%Dinka%Ngok%ethnic%group%that%resides%in%the%AAA%year%round.%According%to%the%United% Nations%High%Commissioner%for%Refugees%(UNHCR),%these%attacks%are%“often%at%the%instigation%of% political%leaders%in%”%and%the%Misseriya%“shoot%the%men%and%enslave%the%women%and% children.”%5% !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1%Reuters.%“Sudan%Abyei%vote%deadline%“impossible”%–%north.”%14%October%2010.%http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/14/oukwd6uk6sudan6 south6idAFTRE69D53J20101014%accessed%on%27%February%2015.% 2%United%Nations%Mission%in%Sudan.%Abyei)protocol:)Fact)sheet,)(2009;)http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Fact%20Sheets/FS6 abyeiprotocol.pdf)% 3%Carnegie%Endowment%for%International%Peace.%“The%Comprehensive%Peace%Agreement.”%4%January%2011.% http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/01/04/comprehensive6peace6agreement/2frz%accessed%on%27%February%2015.% 4%Harvard%Humanitarian%Initiative:%The%Signal%Program%on%Human%Security%and%Technology.%Sudan)Anatomy)of)a)Conflict%(2013;% http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sudan%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20Conflict_Signal.pdf).% 5%UNHCR:%Refworld.%“World%Directory%of%minorities%and%indigenous%peoples%–%Sudan:%Dinka.”%July%2008.%% http://www.refworld.org/docid/49749ca551.html%accessed%on%27%February%2015.%

! 1% As%early%as%mid62010,%reports%indicated%that%both%northern%and%southern6aligned%forces%were% mobilizing%in%and%around%the%Abyei%region.6%These%mobilizations%were%in%direct%violation%of%the% CPA%and%included%reports%that%the%Sudanese%Armed%Forces%(SAF)%had%opened%multiple%Popular% Defense%Force%(PDF)%Misseriya%militia%training%camps%near%the%towns%of%Muglad,%Meiram,% Debab,%and%Sitaib%northeast%of%Abyei.7%Coinciding%with%these%military%preparations,%incidents%of% violence%were%reported%in%Abyei.%At%the%same%time,%it%was%reported%that%the%Sudan%People’s% Liberation%Army%(SPLA)%was%moving%troops%and%materiel%into%Abyei%and%arming%the%local% population.8% % Two%days%before%the%southern%Sudan%referendum,%Misseriya%militias%reportedly%attacked%police% forces%stationed%at%Maker%Abior%in%the%AAA.%Attacks%were%also%reported%near%Miakok,%Todach,% and%Shegei.9%In%response%to%these%attacks,%two%meetings%in%Kadugli%were%scheduled.%As%a%result% of%these%conferences,%the%SAF%agreed%to%open%the%main%road%leading%to%Abyei%town.%In%addition,% two%Joint%Integrated%Units%(JIU)%battalions,%one%comprised%of%SAF%forces%and%one%comprised%of% SPLA%forces,%would%replace%the%police%in%Abyei%town%who%had%been%sent%from%the%South%Sudan% capitol%of%Juba.%Finally,%various%Misseriya%grazing%routes%were%agreed%upon.%% % The%security%conditions%continued%to%deteriorate,%however,%as%convoys%of%South%Sudanese%were% reportedly%attacked%by%Misseriya%forces%as%they%travelled%to%South%Sudan%for%the%referendum.% Further%violence%occurred%on%27%February%2011%in%Todach,%northeast%of%Abyei%town.%Subsequent% attacks%occurred%on%4%March%in%Tajalei,%on%9%March%in%Maker%Abior,%and%on%21%March%in%Dungop.% Though%there%are%conflicting%reports,%the%pattern%of%these%attacks%–primarily%on%Dinka%towns% and%SPLA%aligned%garrisons–%“Indicate%coordinated%action%by%Misseriya,%PDF%and%SAF%elements% to%achieve%multiple%objectives%in%the%Abyei%Area%before%the%May%2011%invasion%of%Abyei%town.”% 10% % The%invasion%of%Abyei%by%SAF%forces%followed%contested%reports%claiming%that%a%United%Nations% (UN)%escorted%SAF%JIU%convoy%was%attacked%by%SPLA%forces%in%Dokura%on%19%May%2011.%%On%20% May%2011,%the%nearby%towns%of%Todach%and%Tajalei%came%under%artillery%fire%from%SAF%forces.%In% addition,%SAF%forces%also%closed%roads%in%and%out%of%Abyei.%On%21%May%2011,%SAF%forces%moved% into%Abyei.%On%the%same%day,%President%Omar%Al%Bashir%dissolved%the%Abyei%Administration,%and% on%30%May%Brigadier%Izz%Al%Din%Ousman%was%appointed%as%temporary%Military%Governor.% % % ) ) ) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 6%Small%arms%Survey.%Sudan)human)security)baseline)assessment%(2%June%2011;%http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts6 figures/abyei/HSBA6Armed6Groups6Militarization6Abyei.pdf)% 7%Harvard%Humanitarian%Initiative:%The%Signal%Program%on%Human%Security%and%Technology.%Sudan)Anatomy)of)a)Conflict%(2013;% http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sudan%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20Conflict_Signal.pdf).% 8%Enough.%“As%politicians%talk,%movements%on%the%ground%in%Abyei.”%22%November%2010.%http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/politicians6talk6 movements6ground6abyei%accessed%on%27%February%2015.% 9%Harvard%Humanitarian%Initiative:%The%Signal%Program%on%Human%Security%and%Technology.%Sudan)Anatomy)of)a)Conflict%(2013;% http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sudan%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20Conflict_Signal.pdf).% 10%Harvard%Humanitarian%Initiative:%The%Signal%Program%on%Human%Security%and%Technology.%Sudan)Anatomy)of)a)Conflict%(2013;% http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sudan%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20Conflict_Signal.pdf).%

! 2% Conflict)in)Heglig) % % The%oil%rich%Heglig%region%lies%east%of%Abyei%near%the%border%between%Sudan%and%South%Sudan.% Sudan%claims%the%territory%based%on%its%demarcation%of%the%1956%border%and%has%maintained%a% military%presence%in%the%area%since%the%1970s.%The%government%of%South%Sudan%disputes%this% demarcation%and%Heglig’s%final%status%remains%contested%today.11% % Following%South%Sudan’s%vote%for%independence%in%2011,%Sudan%and%South%Sudan%were%unable% to%reach%an%agreement%on%transit%fees%for%oil.%%South%Sudan%contains%the%majority%of%the%oil% fields,%making%the%government%of%Sudan%partially%dependent%on%these%transit%fees%for%funding.% As%part%of%this%dispute,%South%Sudan%ordered%a%halt%to%oil%production%on%20%January%2012.12%On% 22%February%2012,%South%Sudan%expelled%the%president%of%the%Chinese6Malaysian%consortium,% PETRODAR,%for%not%cooperating%with%South%Sudan%in%the%dispute.13% % On%21%March%2012,%General%Mohamed%Atta,%director%of%Sudan’s%National%Intelligence%and% Security%Services%(NISS)%claimed%that%a%force%of%Sudan%People’s%Liberation%Army%6%North%(SPLA6N)% and%Justice%and%Equality%Movement%(JEM)%troops%attacked%the%town%of%Heglig.14%On%26%March,% clashes%occurred%between%SAF%and%SPLA%forces%near%the%border%at%Teshwin.15%Fighting% continued%with%confirmed%reports%of%SAF%aircraft%bombing%SPLA%positions%near%the%border.16%On% 9%April%2012,%SPLA%forces%attacked%Heglig%again%and%General%James%Gatduel%Gatluak%of%the% SPLA’s%4th%Division%claimed%to%have%advanced%30km%north%of%the%town.17%By%20%April%2012,%SPLA% forces%had%pulled%back%from%Heglig,%though%clashes%continued%until%29%April%2012.18% % Data(and(Methods( ( The%conflicts%in%Abyei%and%Heglig%were%analyzed%using%multiple%high6resolution%satellite%images.% Analysis%looked%for%signs%of%impending%military%hostility.%These%signs%included%the%build%up%of% troops,%expansion%of%infrastructure,%and%changes%in%residential%patterns.%Sites%were%selected% based%on%media%reports,%knowledge%of%existing%force%deployments,%and%the%locations%of%key% pieces%of%infrastructure.%Though%knowledge%of%how%the%conflict%progressed%was%used,%site% selection%also%tried%to%take%into%account%those%sites%that%would%likely%have%been%of%interest%to%an%

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 11%Harvard%Humanitarian%Initiative:%The%Signal%Program%on%Human%Security%and%Technology.%Sudan)Anatomy)of)a)Conflict%(2013;% http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sudan%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20Conflict_Signal.pdf).% 12%Enough.%“Fact%sheet:%What%could%the%oil%shutdown%mean%for%South%Sudan.”%March%2012.% http://www.enoughproject.org/files/OilShutdown.pdf%accessed%on%27%February%2015.% 13%Sudan%Tribune.%“South%Sudan%to%review%oil%contracts%after%expelling%PETRODAR%chief.%%http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article41682% accessed%on%27%February%2015.% 14%Sudan%Vision.%“Sudanese%armed%forces,%other%organized%forces%repulse%rebel%attack%on%Higlig.% http://news.sudanvisiondaily.com/details.html?rsnpid=208245%accessed%on%27%February%2015.% 15%Harvard%Humanitarian%Initiative:%The%Signal%Program%on%Human%Security%and%Technology.%Sudan)Anatomy)of)a)Conflict%(2013;% http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sudan%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20Conflict_Signal.pdf).% 16%Ahram%Online.%“Sudan%renews%airstrikes%of%South%Sudan%Oil%Region.”%27%March%2012.% http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/37783/World/%20Region/Sudan6renews6airstrikes6of6South6Sudan6oil6region.aspx%accessed%on% 27%February%2015.% 17%Sudan%Tribune.%“Updated:%SPLA%claim%seizure%of%South%Kordofan’s%Heglig%oil%area.”%10%April%2012.% http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=42191%accessed%on%27%February%2015.% 18%Harvard%Humanitarian%Initiative:%The%Signal%Program%on%Human%Security%and%Technology.%Sudan)Anatomy)of)a)Conflict%(2013;% http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sudan%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20Conflict_Signal.pdf).%

! 3% organization%monitoring%the%situation%at%the%time.%% % Images%of%each%site%were%acquired%based%on%a%timeline%of%key%events%created%from%media% reports%and%other%sources.%This%timeline%was%used%to%target%before%and%after%images%of%major% events.%At%least%three%images%of%each%site%were%acquired%to%establish%what%the%site%looked%like% before,%during,%and%after%the%conflict% % Three%types%of%locations%were%selected%for%analysis:%towns,%frontline%military%bases,%and%rear% area%military%bases.%Five%towns%near%the%disputed%border%were%analyzed:%Abyei,%Heglig,%Agok,% ,%and%Jau.%The%towns%of%Abyei%and%Heglig%are%the%major%population%centers%in%the%two% contested%areas.%Agok%is%a%small%town%that%lies%on%the%border%between%the%AAA%and%South% Sudan.%Bentiu%and%Jau%are%two%South%Sudanese%towns%near%the%border%of%the%Heglig%area%and% are%reportedly%home%to%the%SPLA’s%4th%and%9th%Divisions,%respectively.% % Three%major%SAF%military%bases%located%away%from%the%border%were%selected%on%the%basis%that% equipment%would%have%to%move%through%them%before%arriving%at%the%front.%These%three%bases% were%the%El%Obeid%Airbase,%the%Kadugli%Army%Base,%and%the%Kadugli%Airbase.%Six%forward%military% positions%were%also%selected%for%analysis:%the%Talodi%Airbase,%the%Goli%militia%camp,%the%Teshwin% East%SPLA%camp,%the%Teshwin%West%SAF%camp,%the%Heglig%South%SAF%camp,%and%the%Heglig%Army% Base.%Military%action%occurred%at%all%six%of%these%sites%at%various%points%in%the%conflict.% ) Furthermore,%some%sites%that%would%have%been%selected%were%not,%as%they%were%covered%by%the% Harvard%Humanitarian%Initiative’s%(HHI)%report%Sudan:)Anatomy)of)a)Conflict.%This%report%used%a% large%number%of%satellite%images%to%assess%the%conflicts%in%the%Abyei%Area,%Nuba%Mountains,% Darfur,%Blue%Nile%State,%and%Heglig.%The%figures%of%these%sites%published%in%this%report%will%be% discussed%in%later%sections.%These%sites%include%the%militia%camps%at%Sitaib,%Debab,%and%Meiram;% the%AAA%villages%of%Tajelei,%Todach,%and%Noong;%the%SAF%Military%base%at%Nyama;%and%the% Sudanese%town%of%Kharassana%(Figure%1).%% ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

! 4% Figure)1:)Selected)Sites)in)Sudan)and)South)Sudan

) %

! 5% Table)1:)Images)of)Major)SAF)Military)Bases) Location( Image(Date( Sensor( Image(ID( El%Obeid%Airbase% 22%October%2010% WorldView62% 10300100073e0100% El%Obeid%Airbase% 19%January%2011% QuickBird62% 101001000CDEF700% El%Obeid%Airbase% 13%November%2011% QuickBird62% 101001000E74F200% El%Obeid%Airbase% 7%December%2012% Geoeye61% 2012120708345041603031601361% (1236281)% Kadugli%Airbase% 21%January%2011% WorldView62% 1030010009288D00% Kadugli%Airbase% 2%April%2011% WorldView62% 103001000A8E7300% Kadugli%Airbase% 16%November%2011% Geoeye61% 2011111608350121603031602674% (1110964)% Kadugli%Airbase% 12%February%2012% QuickBird62% 101001000EE63500% Kadugli%Airbase% 24%April%2012% WorldView61% 102001001BC77600% Kadugli%Army%Base% 21%January%2011% WorldView62% 1030010009288D00% Kadugli%Army%Base% 3%October%2011% Geoeye61% 2011100308323361603031601125% (1095190)% Kadugli%Army%Base% 12%February%2012% QuickBird62% 101001000EE63500% Kadugli%Army%Base% 24%April%2012% WorldView61% 102001001BC77600% % Table)2:)Images)of)sites)involved)in)the)Abyei)Area)Conflict) Location( Image(Date( Sensor( Image(ID( Abyei%Town% 5%December%2010% WorldView62% 1030010008cf4c00% Abyei%Town% 26%January%2011% WorldView62% 1030010009af3500% Abyei%Town% 16%February%2011% Ikonos62% 2011021608423150000011605548% Abyei%Town% 27%May%2011% Geoeye61% 2011052708342741603031600933% (1054810)% Agok% 4%January%2011% WorldView62% 10300100083C7800% % Agok% 16%February%2011% Ikonos62% 2011021608424550000011605546% Agok% 2%July%2011% Geoeye61% 2011070208454081603031602719% (1065875)% Goli% 19%December%2010% WorldView62% 1030010008995700% Goli% 10%January%2011% WorldView62% 103001000861A800% Goli% 30%November%2011% Geoeye61% 2011113008463721603031601729% (1115346)% % ) ) ) ) ) ) )

! 6% Table)3:)Images)of)sites)involved)in)the)Heglig)Area)Conflict) Location( Image(Date( Sensor( Image(ID( Bentiu% 13%February%2011% Ikonos62% 2011021308350080000011601179% Bentiu% 26%June%2011% Geoeye61% 2011062608274281603031609082% (1063952)% Bentiu% 7%January%2012% Geoeye61% 2012010708323561603031604793% (1126165)% Heglig%South% 17%November%2011% WorldView62% 103001000EBBB000% Heglig%South% 1%April%2012% QuickBird62% 101001000F1F4D00% Heglig%South% 18%May%2012% Geoeye61% 2012051808400301603031601690% (1168547)% Heglig%Army%Base% 27%February%2011% Ikonos62% 2011022708433560000011623341% Heglig%Army%Base% 17%November%2011% WorldView62% 103001000EBBB000% Heglig%Army%Base% 1%April%2012% QuickBird62% 101001000F1F4D00% Heglig%Army%Base% 18%May%2012% Geoeye61% 2012051808391641603031601689% (1168544)% Heglig%Town% 27%February%2011% Ikonos62% 2011022708431740000011623340% Heglig%Town% 7%January%2012% Geoeye61% 2012010708305501603031604791% (1126160)% Heglig%Town% 1%April%2012% QuickBird62% 101001000F1F4D00% Heglig%Town% 18%May%2012% Geoeye61% 2012051808391641603031601689% (1168544)% Jau% 30%September%2010% Geoeye61% 2010093008273341603031603690% (662384)% Jau% 15%January%2011% Geoeye61% 2011011508260781603031609200% (1017637)% Jau% 16%December%2011% Geoeye61% 2011121608292581603031601296% (1119789)% Jau% 31%January%2012% QuickBird62% 101001000ED81D00% Talodi%Airbase% 2%February%2011% Ikonos62% 2011020208323000000011618520% Talodi%Airbase% 4%January%2012% Geoeye61% 2012010408222201603031602747% (1125270)% Talodi%Airbase% 18%December%2012% Geoeye61% 2012121808353441603031607008% (1239418)% Teshwin%East% 13%February%2011% Ikonos62% 2011021308341330000011601176% Teshwin%East% 13%March%2012% WorldView61% 102001001B59AD00% Teshwin%East% 18%May%2012% Geoeye61% 2012051808400301603031601690% (1168547)% Teshwin%West% 9%December%2011% QuickBird62% 101001000E95D100% Teshwin%West% 1%April%2012% QuickBird62% 101001000F1F4D00% Teshwin%West% 18%May%2012% Geoeye61% 2012051808400301603031601690% (1168547)% ( (

! 7% Results( ( El)Obeid)Airbase)) ( Four%images%of%the%El%Obeid%Airbase%were%acquired.%%The%image%taken%22%October%2010%shows% the%base%three%months%prior%to%the%South%Sudan%referendum%and%the%image%taken%19%January% 2011%shows%the%base%four%days%after.%The%image%from%13%November%2011%shows%the%base%after% the%Abyei%conflict%but%before%the%conflict%in%Heglig,%while%the%image%from%7%December%2012% shows%the%base%after%the%Heglig%conflict.%Over%this%time%period,%a%number%of%different%military% aircraft%were%present%(Figure%2).% % Figure)2:)Aircraft)at)El)Obeid)Airbase%

) Multiple)aircraft)including)attack)helicopters,)fighter)jets,)and)Antonov)bombers)were)present)at)El)Obeid)Airbase) between)22)October)2010)(A))and)7)December)2012)(D).)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)13.1586) N,)30.2356)E.)

! 8% On%22%October%2010%(Figure%2A),%two%commercial6class%aircraft%(red%arrows)%were%present%as% well%as%a%small6unidentified%fixed%wing%aircraft%(yellow%arrow).%This%small%plane%was%present%in% the%same%location%on%all%dates,%suggesting%that%it%was%not%moved%over%the%duration%of%the% conflict.%In%addition,%one%Antonov%plane%and%two%Mil%Mi624%attack%helicopters%were%present.%On% 19%January%2011%(Figure%2B),%the%two%commercial%class%jets%were%gone,%as%were%the%two%Mil%Mi6 24%Helicopters,%but%two%Mil%Mi68%transport%helicopters%were%now%present.%By%13%November% 2011%(Figure%2C),%two%Antonov%bombers,%two%MiG629%fighters,%four%Su625%fighters,%and%four%Mil% Mi624%attack%helicopters%were%present.%On%7%December%2012%(Figure%2D),%the%two%MiG629% fighters%were%present,%as%was%one%Antonov,%one%Mil%Mi624%attack%helicopter%and%three% Nanchang%A65%ground%attack%aircraft.% % El%Obeid%also%contained%a%large%materials%depot%just%west%of%the%airfield%(Figure%3).%The%area%was% approximately%.674%km2%and%was%protected%by%multiple%revetments,%bunkers,%and%guard%posts.%% On%22%October%2010,%it%contained%multiple%large%structures%and%stacks%of%shipping%containers.% Over%the%course%of%the%conflict,%almost%all%material%was%moved%out%of%the%depot%and%most%of%the% fortifications%were%removed.% % Figure)3:)El)Obeid)Materials)Depot%

) On)22)October)2010)(A),)the)depot)was)filled)with)materials)and)surrounded)by)multiple)bunkers,)revetments,)and) guard)posts)(red)dots).)On)19)January)2011)(B),)the)area)remained)largely)unchanged.) % ) ) )

! 9% By)13)November)2011)(C),)much)of)the)materiel)had)been)removed,)as)were)three)defensive)positions)(blue)dots).) By)7)December)2012)(D),)almost)all)of)the)structures)and)materiel)had)been)removed)and)only)six)of)the)original)24) defensive)positions)remained.)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)13.1586)N,)30.2279)E.) ) At%the%same%time%that%fortifications%and%materiel%were%being%removed%from%the%supply%depot% west%of%the%air%strip,%south%and%east6facing%fortifications%were%being%improved%on%the%east%side% of%the%base%(Figure%4).%This%included%adding%revetments,%artillery,%tents,%and%other%vehicles.% % ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

! 10% Figure)4:)Improvements)in)South)and)East)Facing)Fortifications

) On)22)October)2010)(A),)two)artillery)pieces)were)present)behind)revetments)(red)box))and)the)front)ends)of)three) tanks)could)be)seen)under)a)white)structure)(red)arrow).)By)19)January)2011)(B),)one)artillery)piece)had)been) moved)(red)boxes))and)two)small)structures)(green)arrows))had)been)added.)

) By)13)November)2011)(C),)the)white)structure)had)been)partly)destroyed)(orange)arrow))and)three)tanks)were) present)(red)arrow).)A)third)revetment)with)an)artillery)piece)had)been)added)(blue)arrow).)By)7)December)2012) (D),)three)military)vehicles)(red)arr0ws),)four)small)structures)(green)arrows),)and)a)revetment)(blue)arrow))had) been)added.)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)13.1455)N,)30.2339)E.) ) ) ) ) )

! 11% Kadugli)Airbase)( ( As%part%of%the%CPA,%South%Kordofan%held%gubernatorial%elections%between%2%May%2011%and%4% May%2011.%Prior%to%the%election,%several%major%party%candidates%withdrew%amidst%allegations%of% voter%intimidation%and%election%rigging,%and%SAF%aligned%militias%reportedly%razed%the%town%of%El% Feid%during%the%campaign%period.%Tensions%in%South%Kordofan%continued%to%rise%following%the% election%of%the%National%Congress%Party%candidate%and%fighting%broke%out%between%SAF%and%SPLA% forces%near%Kadugli%in%June%2011.%The%conflict%widened%to%include%attacks%on%the%Nuba%people% who%inhabit%the%Nuba%Mountains%in%South%Kordofan%and%were%aligned%with%the%SPLA%during%the% first%and%second%Sudanese%civil%wars.%This%conflict%was%extensively%documented%by%the%Harvard% Humanitarian%Initiative’s%Signal%project%and%is%being%discussed%here%to%note%that%much%of%the% activity%at%the%Kadugli%Airbase%and%Army%Base%may%be%related%to%this%conflict%rather%than%the% Abyei%and%Heglig%border%engagements.% % The%Kadugli%Airbase%is%a%large%airfield%northwest%of%the%city%of%Kadugli,%the%capital%of%South% Kordofan%State%in%Sudan.%Five%images%of%the%base%were%acquired%to%monitor%its%activity%during% the%conflict.%The%first%was%taken%on%21%January%2011,%just%after%the%South%Sudan%Independence% Referendum.%The%image%taken%on%2%April%2011%shows%the%base%while%tensions%in%Abyei%were% rising.%An%additional%image%was%taken%following%the%Abyei%conflict%on%16%November%2011.%The% final%two%images,%taken%on%12%February%2012%and%24%April%2012,%show%the%base%while%the% conflict%in%Heglig%was%developing.%%% % The%base%consists%of%one%runway%and%two%aprons.%In%the%first%three%images,%aircraft%were% observed%on%the%east%apron%but%not%the%west%apron%(Figure%5).%In%the%image%taken%12%February% 2012,%no%aircraft%were%observed%at%the%base,%and%in%the%final%image,%aircraft%were%stationed%on% the%west%apron%but%not%the%east%apron%(Figure%6).% % On%21%January%2011%(Figure%5A),%seven%aircraft,%six%helicopters%and%one%fixed6wing,%were%present% at%the%base.%The%dimensions%of%the%fixed6wing%aircraft%were%consistent%with%those%of%an% Antonov.%The%helicopters%were%consistent%with%the%dimensions%of%Mil%Mi68%transports.%On%2% April%2011%(Figure%5B),%the%Antonov%had%been%removed.%Six%Mil%Mi68%helicopters%were%present.% The%rotors%on%five%of%these%helicopters%were%in%identical%positions%to%those%observed%on%21% January%2011,%which%suggests%that%they%were%not%moved%in%the%interim.%By%16%November%2011% (Figure%5C),%only%one%Mil%Mi68%remained%and%one%Mi626%heavy%transport%helicopter%was%also% present.% % On%12%February%2012%(Figure%6A),%no%aircraft%were%present%at%the%base.%It%could%not%be% determined%if%this%was%a%result%of%aircraft%being%moved%to%another%location%or%aircraft%being% engaged%in%operations%at%the%time%of%image%acquisition.%By%24%April%2012%(Figure%6B),%seven%Mil% Mi68%helicopters%were%present%in%the%west%hanger%area.% % ) ) )

! 12% Figure)5:)Aircraft)on)east)apron)

On)21)January)2011)(A),)an)Antonov)(red)box))was) present)as)were)six)Mil)Mi[8)helicopters)(blue)boxes).) On)2)April)2011)(B),)the)Antonov)had)been)removed.) Six)Mil)Mi[8)helicopters)were)present,)all)but)one) (yellow)box))with)identical)rotor)configurations)as)in) image)A.)By)16)November)2011,)just)one)Mil)Mi[8) (blue)box))was)present.)One)Mi[26)heavy)transport) helicopter)(purple)box))was)also)present.)Images) DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)11.1403)N,) 29.6990)E.)

) ) Figure)6:)Aircraft)at)the)west)apron)

)) On)12)February)2012)(A),)no)aircraft)were)present)but)by)24)April)2012)(B))seven)Mil)Mi[8)helicopters)(Blue)boxes)) were)in)the)west)hanger)area.)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)11.1351)N,)29.6923)E.) ) ) )

! 13% Kadugli)Army)Base)) ( The%Kadugli%Army%Base%lies%southeast%of%the%city%of%Kadugli%along%the%road%leading%to%%the%town% of%Talodi.%Four%images%of%the%base%were%aquired%to%monitor%activity%during%the%conflict.%The%first% was%taken%on%21%January%2011,%soon%after%the%South%Sudan%Independence%Referendum.%The% second%image,%taken%on%3%October%2011,%shows%the%base%after%the%conflict%in%Abyei.%The%final% two%images%were%taken%on%12%February%2012%and%24%April%2012,%and%show%the%base%in%the% months%leading%up%to%the%Heglig%conflict.%%% % Between%21%January%2011%and%24%April%2012,%base%fortifications%increased%substantially.%%Nearly% eight%kilometers%of%trenches%and%earthworks%were%dug%and%numerous%revetments%with%artillery% were%added.%A%checkpoint%along%the%road%was%also%fortified%with%earthworks.%This%checkpoint,% along%with%the%fact%that%the%new%artillery%positions%faced%south%and%east%strongly,%implies%that% the%Sudanese%government%was%concerned%about%attacks%from%southeast%of%Kadugli.%%%% % Each%image%showed%an%increase%in%the%extent%of%trenches%and%earthworks%(Figure%7).%Between% 21%January%2011%and%3%October%2011,%4.1%km%of%trenches%and%earthworks%were%constructed% around%the%base.%On%12%February%2012,%a%large%trench%measuring%3.1%km%was%observed%east%of% the%base%and%crossing%the%road%to%Talodi.%By%24%April%2012,%an%aditional%6oo%m%had%been%added% to%that%trench.) ) Figure)7:)Trenches)and)earthworks)added)to)Kadugli)Army)Base)

% 4.1)km)of)trenches)and)earthworks)(red)line))were)constructed)around)Kadugli)Army)Base)between)21)January)2011) (A))and)3)October)2011)(B).))

! 14% % Between)3)October)2011)(C))and)12)February)2012,)a)3.1)km)trench)had)been)dug.)An)additional)600m)was)added) by)24)April)2012.)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)10.9683)N,)29.7593)E.) ) As%part%of%the%expansion%that%took%place%between%21%January%2011%and%3%October%2011,%a% checkpoint%was%fortified%along%the%road%between%Kadugli%and%Talodi%(Figure%8)% % Figure)8:)Fortified)checkpoint)on)the)road)between)Kadugli)and)Talodi)

% Between)21)January)2011)(A))and)October)2011)(B,))earthworks)were)added)around)an)existing)checkpoint)(yellow) arrows))and)small)structures)had)been)built)behind)the)new)earthworks)noted)in)figure)6)(red)arrows).)Images) DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)10.9679)N,)29.7587)E.) ) While%fortifications%were%being%expanded,%the%Kadugli%Army%Base%received%reinforcements%of% troops%and%artillery.%Figure%9%shows%an%estimated%250%trucks%appearing%at%the%base%between%21%

! 15% January%2011%and%3%October%2011.%Figures%10%and%11%show%artillery%and%tanks%being%added%to% the%base%as%well.%These%artillery%pieces%and%tanks%were%positioned%in%different%places%around%the% base%during%2011%and%2012.%By%24%April%2012,%most%had%been%removed%from%the%base.% ) Figure)9:)New)trucks)in)the)Kadugli)Army)Base)

) Between)21)January)2011)(A))and)3)October)2011)(B),)approximately)250)trucks)were)positioned)in)the)main)square) of)the)base.)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)10.9643)N,)29.7504)E.) ) Figure)10:)Artillery)and)tanks)positioned)facing)south)

) On)21)January)2011)(A),)three)artillery)pieces)were)present)(red)boxes).)By)3)October)2011,)five)artillery)pieces)were) present)(red)boxes),)as)were)three)tanks)(orange)arrows),)and)four)new)revetments)had)been)constructed)(blue) arrows).)

! 16% ) On)12)February)2012)(C),)the)three)tanks)were)in)the)same)position)as)on)3)October)2011)(orange)arrows),)three) artillery)pieces)were)present)(red)boxes))and)three)new)revetments)had)been)constructed)(blue)arrows).)By)24)April) 2012)(D),)the)tanks)were)gone.)One)larger)artillery)piece)was)present)(yellow)boxes))as)well)as)three)artillery)pieces) of)the)same)size)as)previously)observed)(red)boxes).)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)10.9597)N,) 29.7496)E.) ) Figure)11:)Artillery)positioned)facing)East.)

%% On)21)January)2011)(A),)this)area)of)the)base)was)largely)empty.)By)3)October)2011)(B),)four)heavy)vehicles)(green) box),)one)tank)(orange)arrow))and)four)trucks)with)large)trailers)(yellow)boxes))were)present.%

! 17% ) On)12)February)2012)(C),)three)revetments)(blue)arrows))had)been)constructed)and)three)artillery)pieces)were) present)(red)boxes).)By)24)April)2012)(D),)the)artillery)pieces)had)been)removed.)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis) AAAS.)Coordinates)10.9622)N,)29.7527)E.) ) Agok)) ( Agok%is%a%small%town%on%the%border%between%South%Sudan%and%the%Abyei%Area.%It%is%situated% along%the%main%north6south%road%connecting%Sudan%to%South%Sudan.%A%second%road%runs%east% from%the%center%of%the%town.%Three%images%were%acquired.%The%first,%from%4%January%2011,% shows%the%town%before%the%South%Sudan%Independence%Referendum.%The%second,%from%16% February%2011,%shows%the%town%a%month%after.%The%final%image%was%taken%on%2%July%2011,% following%the%conflict%in%Abyei.% % There%were%very%few%changes%to%Agok%over%the%course%of%the%conflict.%Between%4%January%2011% and%16%February%2011,%approximately%55%new%structures%were%built.%These%were%scattered% throughout%the%town.%Most%of%these%are%small%and%were%constructed%near%existing%structures% (Figure%12),%suggesting%that%they%were%residential%in%nature.% ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

! 18% Figure)12:)New)structures)in)Agok)

% Four)structures)(red)dots))were)added)to)an)area)of)Agok)between)4)January)2011)(A))and)16)February)2011)(B).) Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.3587)N,)28.5844)E.) ) By%2%July%2011,%an%estimated%270%additional%structures%had%been%added%to%Agok.%These%new% structures%were%scattered%throughout%the%town.%Approximately%75%structures%in%Agok%were% removed%in%the%same%time%period.%These%were%predominantly%roadside%structures%clustered%in% the%center%of%the%town%(Figure%13).%No%signs%of%fire%were%observed%in%this%area,%implying%that%the% structures%were%not%burned.% % Figure)13:)Structures)removed)and)added)to)Agok

) Between)16)February)2011)(A))and)2)July)2011)(B),)42)structures)were)(blue)dots))while)53)were)removed)(red)dots)) without)signs)of)fire)damage.)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.3469)N,)28.5812)E.)

! 19% Goli)) ( Goli%is%a%small%outpost%situated%north%of%Abyei%Town%along%the%main%road%that%connects%Sudan% and%South%Sudan.%The%Harvard%Humanitarian%report%identified%this%area%as%containing%two%militia% camps%during%the%conflict.19%Three%images%of%the%area%were%acquired%to%analyze%signs%of%an% impending%conflict%in%the%days%before%the%South%Sudan%Independence%Referendum,%as%well%as%to% provide%a%before%and%after%analysis%of%the%entire%conflict.%These%images%included%5%km%of%the% road%and%approximately%2.5%km%on%either%side%of%it.%The%first%image%was%captured%on%19% December%2010.%A%second%image%was%captured%on%10%January%2011.%The%final%image%was% captured%on%30%November%2011,%after%the%end%of%the%Abyei%conflict.% % There%were%minimal%changes%in%the%area%in%the%run%up%to%the%referendum.%East%of%the%road,%new% heavy%vehicle%tracks%were%observed%on%10%January%2011%(Figure%14).%In%addition,%on%19% December%2010,%twelve%vehicles%were%observed%on%this%segment%of%the%road%while%no%vehicles% were%present%on%10%January%2011.% % Figure)14:)New)tread)tracks)east)of)the)road)

% Heavy)vehicle)tracks)(yellow)arrows))appeared)east)of)the)main)road)between)19)December)2010)(A))and)10) January)2011)(B).)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.8011)N,)28.4882)E.) ) The%area%changed%more%drastically%between%10%January%2011%and%30%November%2011.%A%possible% military%encampment%was%constructed%and%abandoned%(Figure%15).%In%the%town%of%Goli,%many%of% the%original%structures%were%removed%and%new%structures%were%built%(Figure%16).%In%addition,%a% second%settlement,%south%of%Goli,%was%created%(Figure%17).%Finally,%five%vehicles%were%observed% on%the%road%on%30%November%2011.% % !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 19%Harvard%Humanitarian%Initiative:%The%Signal%Program%on%Human%Security%and%Technology.%Sudan)Anatomy)of)a)Conflict%(2013;% http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sudan%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20Conflict_Signal.pdf).%

! 20% Figure)15:)Abandoned)military)camp))

% Between)10)January)2011)(A))and)30)November)2011)(B),)earthworks)for)a)potential)military)camp)(yellow)arrow)) were)constructed)though)the)camp)was)subsequently)abandoned.)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.) Coordinates)9.8238)N,)28.4775)E.) ) Figure)16:)Structures)removed)and)then)added)in)Goli)

) Between)10)January)2011)(A))and)30)November)2011)(B),)71)structures)in)Goli)were)removed)(red)dots).)Forty[four) structures)were)then)added)(blue)dots).)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.8337)N,)28.4785)E.) ) ) ) ) ) )

! 21% Figure)17:)New)settlement)constructed)south)of)Goli)

) Between)10)January)2011)(A))and)30)November)2011)(B),)a)settlement)(yellow)arrow))containing)42)structures)was) built)south)of)Goli.)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.8214)N,)28.479)E.) ) Abyei)Town)) % Abyei%town%is%the%capitol%of%the%Abyei%Administrative%Area%and%its%most%populous%settlement.%It% is%situated%near%the%center%of%the%AAA%along%the%main%road%connecting%Sudan%and%South%Sudan.% On%21%May%2011,%SAF%aligned%forces%captured%Abyei%town.%The%following%ten%days%marked%the% height%of%violence%during%the%Abyei%conflict%with%SAF%aligned%forces%looting%Abyei%town.% % Four%images%of%Abyei%town%were%captured%for%this%analysis.%The%first,%from%5%December%2010,% shows%the%town%prior%to%the%South%Sudan%Independence%Referendum,%while%the%image%captured% on%26%January%2011%shows%the%town%after.%An%image%was%obtained%on%16%February%2011,%while% tensions%were%escalating%in%the%Abyei%Administrative%Area.%The%final%image%was%captured%on%27% May%2011,%after%the%town%had%been%looted.% % Between%5%December%2010%and%26%January%2011,%changes%in%Abyei%town%predominantly%took% the%form%of%additional%structures.%During%this%time,%over%750%new%structures%were%added%while% only%approximately%65%were%removed.%Most%of%these%new%structures%appear%to%have%been%small% white%tents%(Figure%18).%% % ) ) ) ) ) )

! 22% Figure)18:)New)and)removed)structures)in)Abyei)town)

) Between)5)December)2010)(A))and)26)January)2011)(B),)four)structures)were)removed)(red)dots))while,)48)were) added)(blue)dots))in)an)area)of)Abyei)town.)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.5874)N,)28.4333)E.) ) By%16%February%2011,%over%180%new%structures%had%been%added,%while%approximately%20%were% removed.%At%the%central%depot,%two%Mil%Mi624%helicopters%were%added%to%the%single%Mil%Mi68% helicopter%that%was%present%on%both%5%December%2010%and%26%January%2011%(Figure%19).%Next%to% the%same%depot,%ten%structures%were%added%inside%an%area%enclosed%by%earthworks%(Figure%20).% ) Figure)19:)Military)helicopters)in)Abyei)town)

) On)5)December)2010)(A),)a)Mil)Mi[8)transport)helicopter)was)present)(blue)arrow).)On)16)February)2011)(B),)the) Mil)Mi[8)helicopter)was)still)present)(blue)arrow))but)two)Mil)Mi[24)attack)helicopters)(yellow)arrows))had)been) added.)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.5860)N,)28.4496)E.)

! 23% Figure)20:)New)structures)at)the)central)depot)in)Abyei)town

) Ten)structures)(red)box))were)added)to)an)earthworks)enclosed)area)next)to)the)central)depot)between)26)January) 2011)(A))and)16)February)2011)(B).)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.5849)N,)28.4458)E.) ) The%image%taken%on%27%May%2011,%after%SAF%forces%took%the%town,%revealed%substantial%changes.% Over%2,200%structures%were%removed,%often%with%signs%of%fire%damage%(Figure%21).%Seven%tanks% and%three%artillery%pieces%were%observed%in%one%area%close%to%burned%structures.%In%addition,% three%trucks%hauling%trailers%with%additional%military%vehicles%were%observed.% ) Figure)21:)Military)equipment)and)burned)structures)in)Abyei)town%

% Between)16)February)2011)(A))and)27)May)2011)(B,))multiple)structures)were)burned)(red)arrows).)Seven)tanks) (green)box),)three)artillery)pieces)(red)boxes),)and)three)trailers)hauling)military)vehicles)(yellow)box))were)also) observed.)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.5896)N,)28.4364)E.)

! 24% Two%military%helicopters,%consistent%with%the%dimensions%of%Mil%Mi68%transports,%were%present% at%the%central%depot%as%well%(Figure%22).%The%central%depot%itself%largely%escaped%damage%though,% structures%across%the%road%were%destroyed.% ) Figure)22:)Military)helicopters)and)damage)in)the)central)depot)

% Between)16)February)2011)(A))and)27)May)2011)(B),)two)Mil)Mi[24)helicopters)(yellow)arrows))were)removed)while) a)Mil)Mi[8)helicopter)(blue)arrows))was)added.)Structures)across)the)road)from)the)central)depot)were)destroyed)by) fire)(yellow)box))while)structures)within)the)depot)were)unharmed.)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.) Coordinates)9.5860)N,)28.4496)E.) % The%ten%structures%that%were%added%to%the%area%next%to%the%central%depot%between%26%January% 2011%and%16%February%2011%were%removed%by%26%May%2011%(Figure%23).%However,%structures% that%were%added%inside%the%depot%itself%were%not%removed.% ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

! 25% Figure)23:)Structures)removed)next)to)the)central)depot)

Between 16 February 2011 (A) and 27 May 2011 (B), ten structures (red box) in an area next to the central depot were removed, though not with signs of fire. Inside the depot, seven structures were added (yellow box). Images) DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.5849)N,)28.4458)E.% ( Talodi)) ( Talodi%is%a%mid6sized%town%in%South%Kordofan%State,%Sudan.%It%is%situated%approximately%55%km% from%the%border%between%Sudan%and%South%Sudan.%It%lies%approximately%125%km%northwest%of% Heglig,%250%km%northwest%of%Abyei%town,%and%85%km%southeast%of%Kadugli.%Reports%indicate%that% SAF%aircraft%used%the%airfield%in%Talodi%during%the%conflict%in%Heglig%as%well%as%the%violence%that% took%place%in%the%Nuba%Mountains.20%As%a%result,%at%various%times,%fighting%occurred%in%and% around%Talodi%as%SPLM6N%forces%attempted%to%dislodge%the%SAF%from%the%town.% % Three%images%of%Talodi%were%acquired%to%monitor%changes%in%the%town%over%the%course%of%the% conflict.%An%image%taken%on%2%February%2011%shows%the%town%just%after%the%South%Sudan% Independence%Referendum.%A%second%image,%captured%on%4%January%2012,%shows%the%town%after %the%Abyei%conflict%but%before%the%Heglig%conflict.%The%final%image,%captured%on%18%December% 2012,%shows%the%town%after%the%conflicts%had%ended.% % During%this%time,%extensive%improvements%to%the%infrastructure%and%fortifications%in%and%around% Talodi%were%observed.%Multiple%new%military%camps%were%observed.%The%airfield%was%improved% and%a%new%dam%was%constructed%west%of%the%town.%In%addition,%there%was%an%increase%in%the% number%of%structures%in%the%town.%% %

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 20%Harvard%Humanitarian%Initiative:%The%Signal%Program%on%Human%Security%and%Technology.%Sudan)Anatomy)of)a)Conflict%(2013;% http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sudan%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20Conflict_Signal.pdf).%

! 26% Between%2%February%2011%and%4%January%2012,%over%600%structures%were%added,%while%only% approximately%150%were%removed.%Between%4%January%2012%and%18%December%2012,%over%400% structures%were%added,%while%approximately%340%were%removed%(Figure%24).%None%of%the% removed%structures%showed%signs%of%fire%damage.%The%changes%in%the%number%of%structures%may,% therefore,%imply%that%internally%displaced%persons%entered%the%town%during%the%conflict%and%later% left%when%violence%subsided.% ) Figure)24:)Structures)added)and)removed)in)Talodi)

) Numerous)small,)tent[like)structures)(red)arrows)) were)added)to)Talodi)between)2)February)2011)(A)) and)4)January)2012)(B).)By)18)December)2012)(C),)the) structures)had)been)removed)without)signs)of)fire) damage.)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.) Coordinates)10.6401)N,)30.3859)E.)

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) % During%this%time,%substantial%improvements%to%the%airfield%were%made%(Figure%25).%On%2% February%2011,%the%airfield%consisted%of%a%small,%poorly%defined,%dirt%landing%strip.%By%18%

! 27% December%2012,%an%1,800%meter%long%paved%runway%was%present.%%In%addition,%a%second%300% meter%long%runway%and%flight%apron%were%added%parallel%to%and%east%of%the%main%runway.% Support%facilities%were%also%added.%Fortifications%around%the%airfield%were%improved%as%well.%On% 18%December%2012,%earthworks%ringed%the%runways%and%a%compound,%consistent%with%the%layout% of%SAF%camps,%had%been%built%east%of%the%runway%(Figure%25).% ) Figure)25:)Improvements)to)the)Talodi)Airfield)

% Between)2)February)2011)(A))and)4)January)2012)(B),) the)runway)was)extended)and)straightened)(red) arrow),)an)earthworks)barrier)was)constructed) around)it)(blue)arrow),)and)a)nearby)compound)was) cleared)(orange)arrow).)By)18)December)2012,)the) runway)was)paved)(red)arrow),)a)second,)smaller) runway)and)apron)were)constructed)(yellow)arrow),) support)structures)were)added)to)the)nearby) compound)(orange)arrow),)and)a)military)compound) was)added)(green)box,)Figure)27).)Images) DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)10.6231)N,) 30.3970)E.)

% % % No%obviously%military%equipment%was%observed%at%the%compound%east%of%the%airport,%but%the% layout%was%consistent%with%that%of%SAF%camps%(Figure%26).%Similar%circular%rings%of%earthworks% with%multiple%smaller%structures%arranged%inside%were%observed%in%multiple%other%study%sites,%

! 28% often%with%tanks%or%artillery%present.%This,%and%the%compound’s%close%proximity%to%the%airfield,% suggests%that%it%was%military%in%nature.% % %Figure)26:)Suspected)military)compound)east)of)the)Talodi)airfield)

% A)compound)with)a)similar)layout)to)SAF)camps)appeared)east)of)the)airfield)between)4)January)2012(A))and)18) December)2012)(B).)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.5860)N,)28.4496)E.)10.6292)N,)30.4037)E.) % A%separate%compound%was%observed%just%south%of%the%runway%in%the%4%January%2012%image% (Figure%27).%The%compound%was%removed%by%18%December%2012.%No%obvious%military%equipment% was%observed%within%it%and%the%compound%was%laid%out%differently%from%most%observed%SAF% camps.%The%earthworks%were%built%in%a%rectangular%rather%than%circular%pattern.%The%tents%within% the%compound%were%also%larger%than%in%most%observed%SAF%camps.%Its%proximity%to%the%airfield,% however,%suggests%that%it%could%have%been%military%in%nature.% % ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

! 29% Figure)27:)Suspected)temporary)military)compound)south)of)the)Talodi)airfield%

% Between)2)February)2011)(A))and)4)January)2012)(B),) an)earthworks)enclosed)compound,)containing)17) structures,)was)observed)south)of)the)airfield.)By)18) December)2012)(C),)the)compound)had)been) removed.)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.) Coordinates)10.6126)N,)30.4021)E.)

% % % A%third%compound%was%constructed%between%2%February%2011%and%4%January%2012.%This% compound%was%situated%on%the%road%leading%south%from%Talodi%and%was%arranged%in%a%manner% consistent%with%SAF%camps%(Figure%28).%On%18%December%2012,%an%artillery%piece%and%two% vehicles%with%treaded%tracks%were%observed,%confirming%the%camp’s%military%nature.%% % ) ) ) ) )

! 30% Figure)28:)SAF)camp)on)the)road)south)of)Talodi)

) On)2)February)2011,)construction)was)occurring)west) of)the)road)and)two)barriers)were)stretched)across) the)road)(blue)arrows).)By)4)January)2012)(B),)an) earthworks)ringed)camp)was)present)with)one) revetment)(yellow)circle).)On)18)December)2012)(C),) two)new)revetments)were)present)(yellow)circles))as) well)as)one)artillery)piece)(green)square))and)two) treaded)vehicles)(red)arrows).)Images)DigitalGlobe)|) Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)10.6088)N,)30.3814)E.)

) ) % In%addition%to%the%expansion%of%the%airfield%and%the%construction%of%military%compounds,%the% Sudanese%government%constructed%a%dam%west%of%Talodi%(Figure%29).%On%18%December%2012,%a% manmade%lake,%measuring%approximately%425%meters%by%85%meters,%had%already%formed.%% %

! 31% Figure)29:)Dam)constructed)west)of)Talodi

) A)dam)was)constructed)between)4)January)2012)(A))and)18)December)2012)(B).)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis) AAAS.)Coordinates)10.6381)N,)30.3693)E.) ) Bentiu)and)Rubkona)) ( The%towns%of%Bentiu%and%Rubkona%%State,%South%Sudan%are%situated%approximately%90%km% southeast%of%the%town%of%Heglig%and%60%km%southeast%of%the%border%between%Sudan%and%South% Sudan.%The%main%road%connecting%the%Heglig%area%to%South%Sudan%runs%through%both%towns%and% a%key%bridge%spanning%a%tributary%of%the%White%Nile%marks%the%border%between%them.%In% addition,%the%SPLA%4th%Division%is%reportedly%located%in%Rubkona.21%Rubkona%was%also%home%to% Elich%Oil%Company%and%Petronas%compounds.% ( The%Harvard%Humanitarian%Initiative%reported%that%SAF%forces%bombed%the%bridge%connecting% Bentiu%and%Rubkona%on%14%April%2012.%As%a%result%of%the%military%significance%of%the%bridge%and% the%presence%of%the%SPLA%4th%Division,%three%images%of%the%area%from%prior%to%the%bombings%were% acquired.%The%first%image%was%captured%on%13%February%2011,%just%after%the%South%Sudan% Independence%Referendum.%The%second%was%captured%on%26%June%2011,%after%the%violence%in% Abyei%had%subsided.%The%final%image%was%captured%on%7%January%2012,%as%tensions%in%Heglig%were% escalating.%The%imagery%obtained%includes%all%of%Rubkona,%the%Elich%Oil%Company%and%Petronas% compounds,%the%bridge%connecting%the%two%towns,%and%the%northern%half%of%Bentiu.%No%image% was%captured%following%the%Heglig%conflict%to%avoid%duplicating%analysis%performed%by%the% Harvard%Humanitarian%Initiative.% % Analysis%of%these%images%revealed%no%major%changes%to%either%town%over%the%course%of%the% conflict.%A%negligible%number%of%structures%were%removed%and%added%throughout%the%towns%and% !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 21%Harvard%Humanitarian%Initiative:%The%Signal%Program%on%Human%Security%and%Technology.%Sudan)Anatomy)of)a)Conflict%(2013;% http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sudan%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20Conflict_Signal.pdf).%

! 32% no%construction%occurred%at%either%oil%company%compound.%Furthermore,%no%military%equipment% was%observed%in%either%town.%The%only%observation%of%note%was%the%addition%of%a%camp%on%the% south%side%of%the%river,%northeast%of%the%bridge%between%26%June%2011%and%7%January%2012% (Figure%30).%No%military%equipment%was%observed%at%this%location.%Several%boats%were%present%in% the%river%next%to%the%camp%suggesting%that%the%camp%might%have%been%a%depot%of%some%sort%for% goods%moving%along%the%river.% ) Figure)30:)New)riverside)camp)near)Bentiu)and)Rubkona)

% Between)26)June)2011)(A))and)7)January)2012)(B),)a)camp)was)constructed)along)the)river)near)Bentiu)and) Rubkona.)The)presence)of)multiple)boats)(red)arrows))suggests)that)the)camp)may)have)been)associated)with)the) transport)of)goods)along)the)river.)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.2881)N,)29.8132)E.) ( Jau( ( Jau%is%a%mid6sized%town%straddling%the%border%between%Sudan%and%South%Sudan%approximately% 70%km%northeast%of%Heglig%and%60%km%southwest%of%Talodi.22%It%includes%several%settlements% arranged%on%the%eastern%shores%of%lake%Jau.%%In%2011,%Jau%was%reportedly%the%home%of%the%SPLA’s% 9th%Division,%and%the%Government%of%Sudan%accused%the%SPLA%of%moving%troops%through%Jau%into% South%Kordofan%before%the%May%Gubernatorial%elections.%% % Four%images%of%Jau%were%acquired%to%monitor%activity%in%and%around%the%town%before%and%during% the%conflicts%in%Abyei%and%Heglig.%The%first%was%captured%on%30%September%2010%and%the%second% on%15%January%2011.%These%two%images%were%obtained%to%monitor%activity%leading%up%to%the% South%Sudan%Independence%Referendum.%The%third%image%was%captured%on%16%December%2011,% after%the%outbreak%of%violence%in%the%Nuba%Mountains%but%before%the%Heglig%conflict.%The%final% !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 22%UNOSAT.%Lake)Abiad:)New)building)structures)and)road)works)near)northern/southern)Sudanese)border.)(14%February%2011;)http://unosat6 maps.web.cern.ch/unosat6maps/SD/CE20101201SDN/UNOSAT_SDN_CE2011_20110131_LakeAbiad6Report_v1_HR.pdf%)% %

! 33% image%was%captured%on%31%January%2012,%after%the%conflict%in%Heglig%had%subsided.%It%should%be% noted%that%the%final%image%covered%only%the%southern%half%of%the%study%area.% % The%town%of%Jau%was%largely%unchanged%between%30%September%2010%and%15%January%2011.%A% negligible%number%of%structures%were%added%and%removed%within%the%town%and%there%were%no% expansions%of%roads%or%other%infrastructure.%However,%in%an%area%situated%between%the%northern% and%southern%settlements,%two%camps%of%tightly%packed%structures%or%tents%were%erected%(Figure% 31).%% % Figure)31:)Two)temporary)camps)in)Jau%%

% Between)30)September)2010)(A))and)15)January)2011) (B),)two)camps)of)tightly)packed)structures)or)tents) (red)boxes),)arranged)in)rows,)were)constructed)near) Jau.)By)16)December)2011)(C),)these)structures)had) been)removed)with)no)signs)of)fighting)or)fire.)Images) DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)10.2785)N,) 29.9971)E.)

% % % % %

! 34% On%15%January%2011,%approximately%260%total%structures%were%observed%arranged%in%rows.%This%is% in%contrast%to%the%usual%pattern%of%residential%compounds,%which%incorporates%multiple% structures,%arranged%in%circles%around%a%central%area.%This%implies%that%these%structures%were%not% constructed%as%part%of%the%normal%migration%or%population%expansion.%%These%camps%were% removed%by%16%December%2011%without%signs%of%fighting%or%fire%damage.% % By%16%December%2011,%fighting%had%substantially%damaged%the%town.%Over%1,100%structures% were%destroyed,%often%with%signs%of%fire%damage.%Multiple%heavy%vehicle%tracks%were%observed% throughout%the%town%in%close%proximity%to%destroyed%structures.%In%the%northern%section%of%the% town,%remnants%of%earthworks%and%defensive%positions%were%also%observed%(Figure%32).%A%new% road,%leading%north,%had%also%been%constructed%(Figure%33).%On%31%January%2012,%the%town%was% largely%unchanged.%% ) Figure)32:)Destroyed)structures)and)abandoned)earthworks)in)Jau)

) Between)15)January)2011)(A))and)16)December)2011)(B),)multiple)structures)were)destroyed)with)signs)of)fire)(blue) arrows),)often)with)vehicle)tracks)nearby)(orange)arrows).)In)addition,)rings)of)fortifications)had)been)constructed) and)subsequently)abandoned)(red)arrows).))Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)10.3406)N,)29.9643) E.) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

! 35% Figure)33:)New)road)leading)north)from)Jau)

) Between)15)January)2011)(A))and)16)December)2011)(B),)a)new)road)was)constructed)leading)north)from)Jau)(red) arrow).)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)10.3283)N,)29.9759)E.) ) Teshwin)East)) ( The%Teshwin%area%lies%on%the%border%between%Sudan%and%South%Sudan%in%the%southeast%corner%of% the%Heglig%region.%Clashes%between%SAF%and%SPLA%forces%were%reported%in%this%area%on%26%March% 2012.23%Reports%indicate%that%SPLA%crossed%the%border%in%response%to%the%SAF%Air%Force%bombing% sites%in%South%Sudan.%% % The%Teshwin%East%site%is%situated%in%Unity%State,%South%Sudan,%on%the%road%leading%northeast%out% of%Heglig%into%South%Sudan%and%is%approximately%5%km%from%the%border.%The%site%contains%two% probable%SPLA%encampments%as%well%as%two%industrial%compounds.%These%compounds%are%likely% related%to%oil%extraction.%% % Three%images%were%acquired%to%monitor%the%area%before%and%during%the%Heglig%conflict.%The%first% was%captured%on%23%February%2011,%shortly%after%the%South%Sudan%Independence%Referendum.% The%second%was%captured%on%13%March%2012,%just%prior%to%the%26%March%2012%clashes.%The%final% image%was%captured%on%18%May%2012,%as%the%conflict%was%beginning%to%subside.%% % Minor%changes%occurred%in%the%area%between%13%February%2011%and%13%March%2012.%At%the% southern%suspected%SPLA%camp,%there%was%a%slight%reduction%in%the%number%of%structures% present.%On%13%February%2011,%there%were%81%structures%while%on%13%March%2012,%only%70%were% counted%(Figure%34).%At%the%northern%camp,%the%number%of%structures%increased%from%37%to%50%

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 23%Sudan%Tribune.%“Mini6war%on%north6south%Sudan%borders%leads%to%cancellation%of%Bashir’s%trip%to%Juba.%26%March%2012.% http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=42041%accessed%on%27%February%2015.%

! 36% (Figure%35).%The%two%industrial%compounds%remained%unchanged%with%no%new%construction%and% no%structures%removed.% % Figure)34:)Structures)removed)from)the)southern)camp)

) Structures)(red)arrows))were)removed)from)the)southern)camp)between)13)February)2011)(A))and)13)March)2012) (B).)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.8052)N,)29.5804)E.) ) Figure)35:)Structures)added)to)the)northern)camp)

) Structures)(red)arrows))were)added)to)the)northern)camp)between)13)February)2011)(A))and)13)March)2012)(B).) Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.8203)N,)29.5819)E.) ) Between%13%March%2012%and%18%May%2012,%there%was%no%change%in%the%number%of%structures%at% the%northern%camp.%At%the%southern%camp,%however,%nearly%all%of%the%original%structures%were%

! 37% removed.%%The%Harvard%Humanitarian%Initiative%analyzed%an%image%captured%on%16%April%2012,% which%revealed%signs%of%fire%damage%at%the%camp.24%By%18%May%2012,%a%new%line%of%fortifications% had%been%dug%with%new%tents%behind%it.%A%tank%was%also%present%at%this%location%(Figure%36).% ) Figure)36:)Changes)to)the)southern)camp)

) Between)13)March)2012)(A))and)18)May)2012)(B))almost)all)structures)were)removed)from)the)camp.)A)new)ring)of) small)fortifications)(blue)arrow))and)four)structures)(yellow)arrow))had)been)constructed.)A)tank)was)also)present) (red)arrow).)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.8052)N,)29.5804)E.) % The%new%fortifications%were%part%of%a%line%of%small%foxholes%that%stretched%from%the%southern% SPLA%camp%to%the%northern%industrial%compound.%This%line%extended%for%nearly%2%km%(figure%37)% and%connected%to%both%the%southern%and%northern%camps.%A%separate,%shorter,%line%of%foxholes% was%constructed%to%the%west%of%the%southern%industrial%compound%(Figure%38).% %

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 24%Harvard%Humanitarian%Initiative:%The%Signal%Program%on%Human%Security%and%Technology.%Sudan)Anatomy)of)a)Conflict%(2013;% http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sudan%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20Conflict_Signal.pdf).%

! 38% Figure)37:)Line)of)foxholes)around)the)northern)industrial)compound

% Between)13)March)2012)(A))and)18)May)2012)(B),)a)2)km)line)of)foxholes)(red)arrows))was)constructed)linking)the) northern)possible)SPLA)camp)(blue)arrow))to)the)southern)camp)(figure)37).)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.) Coordinates)9.8184)N,)29.5793)E.) ) Figure)38:)Foxholes)west)of)the)southern)industrial)compound

) Between)13)March)2012)(A))and)18)May)2012)(B),)a)line)of)foxholes)was)constructed)(red)arrows))west)of)the) southern)industrial)compound.)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.7846)N,)29.5903)E.) ) Teshwin)West)) ( The%Teshwin%West%site%lies%in%the%southeast%corner%of%the%Heglig%area,%approximately%2%km%west% of%the%border%between%Sudan%and%South%Sudan.%It%is%situated%at%the%intersection%of%the%road%

! 39% leading%from%Rubkona%to%Bentiu%and%the%road%leading%east%to%the%Teshwin%East%site.%Before%the% Heglig%conflict,%the%site%contained%two%probable%SAF%camps.% % Three%images%were%acquired%to%monitor%this%crossroads%during%the%Heglig%conflict.%%The%first% image%was%captured%on%9%December%2011%and%shows%the%area%before%the%conflict.%The%second,% from%1%April%2012,%shows%the%area%shortly%after%the%reported%SPLA%incursion.%The%final%image,% from%18%May%2012,%was%captured%as%the%conflict%was%beginning%to%subside.% % Substantial%damage%was%observed%in%both%SAF%camps%between%9%December%2011%and%1%April% 2012.%In%the%larger,%southern%camp,%almost%every%structure%was%destroyed%with%obvious%signs%of% fire%damage%(Figure%39).%% ) Figure)39:)Destruction)of)structures)at)the)southern)camp)

) Between)9)December)2011)(A))and)1)April)2012)(B),)almost)every)structure)was)destroyed)by)fire.)Images) DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.7689)N,)29.5190)E.) % In%the%smaller,%northern%camp,%approximately%half%of%the%structures%were%removed%with%signs%of% fire%damage%(Figure%40).%In%addition,%construction%began%on%earthworks%stretching%north%from% the%camp.%A%line%of%foxholes%extended%north%from%these%earthworks%and%crossed%the%road% before%looping%south%(Figure%41).%Multiple%vehicles%were%observed%inside%this%defensive%ring.% ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

! 40% Figure)40:)Destruction)of)structures)at)the)northern)camp)

% Between)9)December)2011)(A))and)1)April)2012)(B),)almost)half)of)the)structures)were)destroyed)by)fire)(red) arrows).)Construction)of)earthworks)had)also)begun)(yellow)arrows).)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.) Coordinates)9.7754)N,)29.5133)E.) ) Figure)41:)Fortifications)north)of)the)northern)camp)

% Earthworks)(yellow)arrow))were)constructed)north)of)the)camp)between)9)December)2011)(A))and)1)April)2012)(B).) A)ring)of)foxholes)extended)north)from)the)earthworks)and)south)across)the)road)(orange)arrows).)Multiple)vehicles) were)observed)inside)this)ring)(blue)arrows).)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.7788)N,)29.5134) E.) % By%18%May%2012,%SAF%forces%reoccupied%and%expanded%the%northern%camp%(Figure%42).%%Three% artillery%pieces%were%observed%behind%revetments.%Three%tanks%were%also%observed.%Multiple%

! 41% other%vehicles%were%present%behind%revetments%and%multiple%empty%revetments%were%also% present%both%inside%the%camp%and%inside%the%larger%ring%of%defensive%positions%(Figure%43).%The% majority%of%this%equipment%was%positioned%facing%south.% % Figure)42:)Reoccupation)and)expansion)of)the)northern)camp)

) The)northern)camp)was)expanded)between)1)April)2012)(A))and)18)May)2012)(B).)Three)artillery)pieces)(red)boxes),) three)tanks)(green)arrows))and)multiple)other)vehicles)positioned)behind)revetments)(blue)arrows))were)present.) Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.7754)N,)29.5133)E.) ) Figure)43:)Revetments)north)of)the)northern)camp)

) Between)1)April)2012)(A))and)18)May)2012)(B),)earthworks)north)of)northern)camp)were)expanded)(yellow)arrow)) and)two)revetments)were)added)(red)arrows).)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.7788)N,)29.5134) E.)

! 42% Multiple%roadblocks%were%constructed%across%the%road%to%Bentiu%and%the%road%towards%the% Teshwin%East%site%(Figure%44).%A%power%station%at%the%intersection%of%these%roads%was%destroyed% and%two%utility%poles%had%fallen.%At%the%southern%edge%of%the%image,%a%new%line%of%foxholes%was% also%observed.%No%military%equipment%was%observed%nearby%so%these%positions%may%have%been% abandoned%by%the%time%the%image%was%acquired%(Figure%45).% % Figure)44:)Roadblocks)and)destroyed)power)station))

) Between)1)April)2012)(A))and)18)May)2012)(B),)four)roadblocks)were)erected)(red)arrows).)In)addition,)the)power) station)was)destroyed)(yellow)arrow))and)two)utility)poles)had)fallen)(blue)arrows).)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis) AAAS.)Coordinates)9.7745)N,)29.5181)E.) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

! 43% Figure)45:)Line)of)foxholes)crosses)the)road)in)the)south)

) Between)1)April)2012)(A))and)18)May)2012)(B),)a)line)of)foxholes)had)been)constructed)(red)arrows).)Images) DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.7519)N,)29.5339)E.) ) Heglig)South)) ( The%Heglig%South%site%is%located%along%the%main%road%leading%from%Heglig%to%Rubkona%and%Bentiu.% It%is%situated%approximately%13%km%northwest%of%the%border%between%Sudan%and%South%Sudan% and%18%km%southeast%of%Heglig.%At%the%end%of%the%Heglig%conflict,%this%site%was%chosen%as%the% location%of%two%new%SAF%camps.%%% % Three%images%were%acquired%to%monitor%this%area%for%the%duration%of%the%Heglig%conflict.%The% first%image%was%captured%on%17%November%2011%and%shows%the%area%prior%to%the%conflict.%The% second%was%taken%on%1%April%2012,%shortly%before%SPLA%forces%reported%capturing%Heglig.%The% final%image%was%captured%on%18%May%2012%and%shows%the%area%as%the%violence%was%subsiding.% % On%17%November%2011,%the%only%settlement%in%the%area%was%a%small%camp%of%seven%structures.% By%1%April%2012,%an%earthen%berm%had%been%constructed%on%the%south%side%of%the%camp%(Figure% 46).%% % ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

! 44% Figure)46:)Earthen)berm)added)to)a)camp)

% Between)17)November)2011)(A))and)1)April)2012)(B),)an)earthen)berm)was)added)to)the)camp)(red)arrow).)Images) DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.8296)N,)29.4747)E.) ) Three%revetments%had%also%been%constructed%south%of%the%camp%and%on%the%opposite%side%of%the% road.%The%revetments%were%empty,%but%vehicle%tracks%were%observed%leading%into%them%(Figure% 47).%% ) Figure)47:)Empty)revetments)southeast)of)the)camp)

) Between)17)November)2011)(A))and)1)April)2012)(B),)three)revetments)were)constructed)(green)arrows).)Heavy) vehicle)tracks)were)observed)leading)into)the)revetments.)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.8268) N,)29.4788)E.) )

! 45% During%the%same%time%period,%a%linear%feature%was%constructed%west%of%the%road.%It%is%unclear% what%this%feature%is%as%it%extends%outside%the%image’s%northern%extent%(Figure%48).%% % Figure)48:)Unidentified)linear)feature)constructed)west)of)the)camp

) A)linear)feature)(red)arrow))extending)north)of)the)image)was)constructed)between)17)November)2011)(A))and)1) April)2012)(B).)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.8283)N,)29.4752)E.) % By%18%May%2012,%the%camp%had%been%expanded.%A%second%earthen%berm%was%constructed% completely%enclosing%the%original%camp.%Multiple%new%structures%and%a%tank%were%observed% inside%the%new%berm%(Figure%49).%In%addition%a%line%of%foxholes%was%constructed%to%the%north%of% the%camp%and%across%the%road.%A%trench%was%also%dug%south%of%the%camp%and%construction%had% begun%on%a%road%leading%east%from%the%main%road%(Figure%50).%% % ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

! 46% Figure)49:)Major)expansions)to)the)SAF)Camp)

) Between)1)April)2012)(A))and)18)May)2012)(B),)a)large)earthen)berm)was)constructed)encircling)the)SAF)camp.) Multiple)structures)were)added)and)a)tank)was)observed)(green)arrow).)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.) Coordinates)9.8296)N,)29.4747)E.) ) Figure)50:)Fortifications)and)roads)under)construction)

) Between)1)April)2012)(A))and)18)May)2012)(B),)a)trench)was)dug)south)of)the)SAF)camp)(orange)arrow).)A)line)of) foxholes)had)also)been)constructed)(green)arrows))and)construction)on)a)road)had)begun)(yellow)arrow).)Images) DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.8283)N,)29.4752)E.) )

! 47% Multiple%heavy%vehicles%were%observed%working%on%this%road%as%well%as%clearing%the%area%that% would%become%the%second%SAF%camp%observed%by%the%Harvard%Humanitarian%Initiative%(Figure% 51).25% % Figure)51:)Heavy)vehicles)at)a)future)SAF)camp)site)

% Multiple)heavy)vehicles)(blue)arrows))were)observed)on)18)May)2012)(B))beginning)construction)on)a)SAF)camp.) Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.8330)N,)29.4769)E.) ) Heglig)Army)Base)) ( The%Heglig%Army%Base%site%is%located%10%km%south%of%Heglig%on%the%road%connecting%Heglig%to% Rubkona.%It%is%strategically%situated%near%several%oil%wells%and%processing%facilities.%The%base%was% the%largest%SAF%encampment%in%the%area%prior%to%the%start%of%the%Heglig%conflict%and%was%the%site% of%clashes%during%the%conflict.% % Four%images%were%acquired%to%monitor%the%base%from%2011%to%2012.%The%first%image%was% captured%on%27%February%2011,%soon%after%the%South%Sudan%Independence%Referendum.%The% second%image%was%captured%on%17%November%2011%and%shows%the%base%after%the%conflict%in% Abyei%had%subsided%but%before%the%conflict%in%Heglig.%%The%third%image,%from%1%April%2012,%shows% the%base%shortly%before%the%SPLA%reported%capturing%Heglig.%The%final%image%was%captured%on%18% May%2012%and%shows%the%area%as%violence%was%subsiding.%% % During%the%time%covered%by%the%first%three%images,%the%number%of%structures%at%the%base% increased.%There%were%29%structures%present%on%27%February%2011%and%55%present%on%17% November%2011.%By%1%April%2012,%the%number%of%structures%had%increased%to%83.%Two%artillery% pieces%were%present%throughout%these%three%images%as%well.%Between%17%November%2011%and%1% !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 25%Harvard%Humanitarian%Initiative:%The%Signal%Program%on%Human%Security%and%Technology.%Sudan)Anatomy)of)a)Conflict%(2013;% http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sudan%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20Conflict_Signal.pdf).%

! 48% April%2012,%at%least%one%tank,%and%several%other%vehicles%were%also%added.%In%addition,%the% southern%entrance%to%the%camp%was%barricaded%with%an%earthen%berm%(Figure%52).% % Figure)52:)Changes)to)the)SAF)encampment)

% Multiple)structures)(blue)arrows))were)added)to)the)SAF)encampment)between)27)February)2011)(A))and)17) November)2012)(B).)Two)artillery)pieces)were)present)in)both)images)(red)boxes).)

% By)1)April)2012)(C),)the)southern)entrance)had)been)barricaded)(red)arrow).)One)tank)(green)arrow))and)multiple) other)vehicles)(yellow)arrows))were)also)added.)By)18)May)2012)(D),)the)base)had)been)reoccupied)and)expanded.) Four)artillery)pieces)(red)boxes))and)3)tanks)(green)arrows))were)present)and)the)number)of)structures)had) increased.)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.9094)N,)29.4226)E.) %

! 49% An%image%acquired%by%the%Harvard%Humanitarian%Initiative%from%18%April%2012%shows%that%the% base%was%destroyed%between%1%April%2012%and%18%April%2012.26%In%this%image,%most%of%the% structures%were%removed%with%substantial%signs%of%fire%and%no%military%vehicles%were%present.%By% 18%May%2012,%SAF%forces%had%reoccupied%the%base.%Over%120%structures%were%observed%in%this% image%as%well%as%three%tanks%and%four%artillery%pieces%(Figure%52C).%Multiple%other%vehicles%were% also%present.%% % Construction%of%oil%facilities%proceeded%throughout%the%run%up%to%the%Heglig%conflict.%Between%27% February%2011%and%17%November%2011,%five%large%areas%were%cleared%in%preparation%for% construction%(Figure%53).%Eight%more%areas%had%been%cleared%by%1%April%2012%and%numerous% industrial%structures%had%been%constructed.%Fire%damage%to%some%of%these%structures%was% observed%in%the%1%April%2012%image%but%most%of%the%areas%were%unharmed%(Figure%54).%The%early% appearance%of%damage%indicates%that%fighting%occurred%in%the%area%prior%to%the%destruction%of% the%SAF%base.% % Figure)53:)Expansion)of)oil)facilities)

) Between)27)February)2011)(A))and)1)April)2012)(B),)13)areas)were)cleared)in)preparation)for)oil)drilling)(blue)boxes,) red)box)shows)area)in)Figure)55,)green)box)shows)SAF)camp).)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates) 9.0933)N,)29.4225)E.) )

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 26%Harvard%Humanitarian%Initiative:%The%Signal%Program%on%Human%Security%and%Technology.%Sudan)Anatomy)of)a)Conflict%(2013;% http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sudan%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20Conflict_Signal.pdf).%

! 50% Figure)54:)Construction)and)damage)to)an)oil)facility

) Between)17)November)2011)(A))and)1)April)2012)(B),)an)oil)derrick)(red)arrow))and)support)structures)were) constructed.)Some)of)the)support)structures)were)damaged)by)fire)(yellow)arrows).)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis) AAAS.)Coordinates)9.8991)N,)29.4309)E.) ) Heglig)) ( The%town%of%Heglig%is%the%largest%settlement%in%the%Heglig%area.%It%is%located%at%the%junction%of% two%roads%leading%north%into%South%Kordofan%and%the%road%leading%south%to%Rubkona.%The%area’s% largest%airport%is%also%in%Heglig.%The%town%itself%contains%numerous%warehouses%and%material% depots%that%support%oil%drilling%in%the%area.%% % On%21%March,%the%area%in%and%around%Heglig%came%under%attack%from%both%Justice%and%Equality% Movement%(JEM)%and%SPLA6N%forces.%By%9%April%2012,%the%SPLA%claimed%to%have%advanced%30%km% north%of%Heglig.%On%14%April%2012,%the%SAF%claimed%to%have%retaken%Heglig,%though%the%SPLA% disputed%that%report.27%By%20%April%2012,%SAF%forces%had%retaken%Heglig%and%the%SPLA%had%pulled% back%to%the%border.% % Four%images%of%Heglig%were%acquired%to%monitor%the%town%for%the%duration%of%the%conflict.%The% first%image%was%captured%on%27%February%2011,%shortly%after%the%South%Sudan%Independence% Referendum.%The%second%image%shows%the%town%on%7%January%2012.%The%third%image%was% captured%on%1%April%2012,%just%a%few%days%before%SPLA%forces%attacked%the%town.%The%final% image,%from%18%May%2012,%shows%the%town%after%the%conflict%had%subsided.%It%should%be%noted% that%the%final%image%covers%a%smaller%area%than%the%other%three%images;%the%northernmost%1,800% meters%was%not%available.% %

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 27%BBC%News.%“Khartoum%forces%‘bomb%South%Sudan%town’.”%14%April%2012.%http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world6africa617712848%accessed%on%27% February%2015.%

! 51% Activity%in%the%town%appeared%largely%unaffected%in%the%images%captured%prior%to%the%attack.% Thousands%of%trucks%were%visible%throughout%the%town%at%multiple%depots.%Multiple%pipelines% were%extended%and%large%areas%were%cleared%in%preparation%for%the%construction%of%oil%facilities.% The%number%of%structures%in%the%town%remains%largely%unchanged%as%well.% % The%18%May%2012%image,%however,%revealed%damage%throughout%the%town.%Most%of%the%depots% and%infrastructure%were%unharmed,%though%one%depot%showed%substantial%signs%of%fire%(Figure% 55),%while%the%roof%was%destroyed%on%another%warehouse%in%a%different%complex%(Figure%56).%% ) Figure)55:)Damage)to)an)industrial)compound)

% Between)1)April)2012)(A))and)18)May)2012)(B),)several)structures)were)damaged)by)fire)(yellow)arrows))and)the) roof)on)another)structure)was)destroyed)(red)arrow).)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)10.0081)N,) 29.3975)E.) ) However,%a%number%of%residential%structures%were%destroyed.%The%Harvard%Humanitarian% Initiative’s%analysis%showed%razed%structures%in%the%northern%section%of%the%town,%outside%of%the% extent%of%the%image%acquired%on%18%May%2012.28%A%residential%area%in%the%southern%section%of% the%town%was%also%razed%(Figure%57).% ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 28%Harvard%Humanitarian%Initiative:%The%Signal%Program%on%Human%Security%and%Technology.%Sudan)Anatomy)of)a)Conflict%(2013;% http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sudan%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20Conflict_Signal.pdf).%

! 52% Figure)56:)Damaged)warehouse))

) At)a)separate)location,)only)one)structure)was)damaged)(red)arrow))between)1)April)2012)(A))and)18)May)2012)(B).) All)other)structures)showed)no)signs)of)damage.)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.9972)N,) 29.4021)E.) % Figure)57:)Destroyed)residential)structures))

) Between)1)April)2012)(A))and)18)May)2012)(B),)every)residential)structure)in)an)enclave)at)the)southern)edge)of) town)(red)box))was)destroyed.)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.9668)N,)29.4058)E.) ) A%number%of%aircraft%were%observed%at%the%airport%during%this%time%period.%On%27%February%2011,% a%helicopter,%possibly%a%Mil%Mi68%was%present,%as%was%a%commercial%class%jet%plane.%A%similar% plane%was%present%on%7%January%2012,%as%was%a%small%helicopter%with%a%four6bladed%rotor.%On%1% April%2012,%this%helicopter%had%not%been%moved.%Three%Mil%Mi624%helicopters%and%an%Antonov%

! 53% plane%were%also%present.%On%18%May%2012,%the%Mil%Mi624%helicopters%were%still%at%the%airport,% but%the%Antonov%and%the%smaller%helicopter%had%been%moved%(Figure%58).% % Figure)58:)Military)aircraft)at)Heglig)Airport

) On)27)February)2011)(A),)a)commercial)jet)(orange)box))and)a)Mil)Mi[8)helicopter)(blue)box))were)observed.)On)7) January)2012)(B),)a)similar)commercial)jet)(orange)box))was)present)as)was)a)small)helicopter)(yellow)box).)

) On)1)April)2012)(C),)the)small)helicopter)was)in)the)same)place)with)the)same)rotor)configuration)(yellow)box).) Three)Mil)Mi[24)helicopters)(green)box))and)an)Antonov)plane)(red)box))were)also)present.)By)18)May)2012)(D),) only)the)three)Mil)Mi[24)helicopters)remained.)Images)DigitalGlobe)|)Analysis)AAAS.)Coordinates)9.9974)N,) 29.3981)E.) ) ( (

! 54% Discussion( ( Rear)Military)Bases) % Three%of%the%selected%sites%were%military%bases%that%were%positioned%far%from%the%disputed% border.%%These%sites%were%observed%to%monitor%the%movement%of%materiel%to%the%front%lines.%The% airbase%at%El%Obeid,%the%airbase%at%Kadugli,%and%the%army%base%at%Kadugli%represented%three% permanent%military%positions%in%Kordofan.%Four%images%were%acquired%of%the%El%Obeid%Airbase% and%the%Kadugli%Army%Base.%Five%images%were%acquired%of%the%Kadugli%Airbase.%These%images% covered%a%time%period%from%before%the%South%Sudan%Independence%Referendum%until%after%the% conflict%in%Heglig%had%subsided.%As%a%result,%the%time%between%two%images%at%the%same%location% ranged%from%a%minimum%of%2.5%months%to%a%maximum%of%11%months.%% % The%low%temporal%resolution%provided%by%these%images%proved%to%be%the%greatest%challenge%for% analysis.%%At%all%three%locations,%changes%in%the%numbers%and%positions%of%troops%and%equipment% were%observed.%However,%it%was%difficult%to%determine%the%significance%of%these%changes.%For% example,%the%number%and%types%of%aircraft%present%at%the%Kadugli%Airbase%included%seen%Mi%Mil6 8%helicopters,%one%Antonov,%and%one%Mi626%heavy%transport%helicopter.%However,%none%of%the% images%contained%all%of%these%aircraft%at%the%same%time,%and%in%one%image%no%aircraft%were% present.%It%is%unclear%whether%these%differences%represented%actual%changes%in%the%deployment% of%aircraft%in%Sudan%during%the%conflict%or%if%they%merely%reflected%which%aircraft%were%not% actively%engaged%in%operations%while%the%image%was%being%captured.%A%higher%temporal% resolution%might%have%allowed%for%an%accurate%baseline%to%be%established%so%that%changes%could% be%tracked%over%the%course%of%the%conflict.% % Drawing%conclusions%from%analysis%of%these%sites%was%further%complicated%by%the%conflict%in%the% Nuba%Mountains%that%occurred%in%the%months%between%the%Abyei%and%Heglig%conflicts.%This% conflict%was%not%specifically%targeted%for%study,%as%it%was%deemed%to%be%primarily%an%intrastate% conflict.%However,%given%the%complex%and%interconnected%history%of%the%South%Sudanese% independence%movement%and%the%shifting%alliances%of%the%ethnic%militia%groups%it%involved,%it%is% impossible%to%completely%separate%fighting%in%one%area%of%the%region%from%fighting%in%others.%% % This%fact%was%particularly%relevant%in%analyzing%the%two%bases%at%Kadugli.%Kadugli,%as%the%capitol% of%South%Kordofan,%played%a%key%role%in%the%Nuba%Mountain%conflict%that%followed%the%state’s% gubernatorial%elections.%Materiel%arriving%in%the%base%could,%therefore,%have%been%destined%for% the%Nuba%Mountains%rather%than%the%border%with%South%Sudan.%The%deployment%of%artillery% around%the%army%base,%as%well%as%the%increased%fortifications,%strongly%implies%that%the%SAF%was% concerned%with%the%security%of%the%city%of%Kadugli.%As%a%result,%increases%in%materiel%may%have% not%been%a%result%of%the%violence%near%the%border.% % The%removal%of%materiel%from%the%El%Obeid%depot%was%one%of%the%most%interesting%observations% of%the%project.%At%some%point%between%19%January%2011%and%13%November%2011,%the%SAF%began% moving%large%quantities%of%materiel%out%of%the%depot,%presumably%to%support%military%activities.% With%more%frequent%imagery,%it%might%have%been%possible%to%observe%more%precisely%when%

! 55% these%moves%began.%It%still%would%have%been%impossible%to%determine%the%exact%destination%of% these%materiel%based%on%the%imagery,%but%the%knowledge%that%the%SAF%had%begun%moving% materiel%could%be%useful%to%organizations%interested%in%the%area.% % Conflict)in)the)Abyei)Area) ( Three%sites%in%the%Abyei%area%were%selected%to%document%the%conflict%that%occurred%within%the% AAA.%Four%images%of%Abyei%and%three%images%of%both%Agok%and%Goli%were%acquired.%These% images%were%all%captured%between%December%2010%and%November%2011%and%with%the%time% between%two%images%of%the%same%site%ranging%from%less%than%one%month%to%almost%eleven% months.%As%with%the%rear%military%bases,%low%temporal%resolution%contributed%to%difficulties% determining%exactly%what%happened.%For%instance,%drastic%changes%were%observed%at%the% northern%settlement%at%Goli%between%10%January%2011%and%30%November%2011.%Most%of%the% structures%in%the%original%settlement%had%been%removed%and%new%structures%had%been%built.%The% remnants%of%a%military%camp%were%also%observed.%Due%to%the%time%between%images,%it%was% impossible%to%determine%in%what%order%structures%in%the%settlement%were%removed,%the%camp% was%constructed,%new%structures%in%the%settlement%were%built,%and%the%camp%was%abandoned.% Depending%on%the%order%of%events,%different%conclusions%could%be%drawn.% % Analysis%of%the%town%of%Agok%revealed%surprisingly%little%activity%throughout%the%conflict.%The% town%lies%directly%on%the%border%between%Sudan%and%South%Sudan%but%no%troops%were%observed% in%any%of%the%three%images.%A%small%number%of%new%structures%were%observed%in%the%weeks% leading%up%to%the%conflict%but%not%enough%to%suggest%that%large%numbers%of%civilians%were% moving%into%the%town.%Damage%was%observed%by%the%end%of%the%conflict,%but%most%was%confined% to%one%small%area%along%the%main%road.%This%is%in%contrast%to%the%widespread%destruction%that% was%observed%in%the%town%of%Abyei.%These%facts%suggest%that%despite%its%position%on%the%border,% Agok%was%not%seen%as%a%key%location%by%the%various%military%forces%operating%in%the%area.% % In%the%town%of%Abyei,%the%most%significant%observation%in%the%images%preceding%the%conflict%was% the%addition%of%over%750%new%structures.%These%primarily%appeared%to%be%small%white%tents.%The% addition%of%such%a%large%number%of%temporary%structures%implies%the%movement%of%a%large% number%of%civilians%into%the%town.%The%reason%for%this%movement,%however,%cannot%be% determined%based%on%imagery%alone.%It%could%have%been%the%result%of%civilians%fleeing%to%the% town%in%anticipation%of%violence%but%it%could%also%have%merely%been%a%natural%increase%in% population%resulting%from%annual%migration%patterns.%% % The%addition%of%two%Mil%Mi624%helicopters%to%Abyei%between%26%January%2011%and%16%February% 2011%could%also%have%represented%a%sign%of%impending%conflict.%However,%this%addition%may%not% have%actually%represented%new%materiel%being%moved%into%the%area.%It%is%possible%that%these% helicopters%were%in%the%area,%but%actively%engaged%when%the%image%was%captured%on%16%January% 2011.%% % Finally,%the%imagery%from%27%May%2011%showed%that%the%central%depot%in%Abyei%was%almost% entirely%spared%from%destruction.%Structures%nearby%were%clearly%burned,%but%the%depot%was%

! 56% untouched.%This%implies%that%the%SAF%deliberately%avoided%targeting%the%compound.%A%similar% lack%of%destruction%of%large%compounds%was%observed%in%Heglig.% % % It%should%also%be%noted%that%multiple%sites%in%the%area%were%not%covered%by%this%study%to%avoid% duplicating%the%work%done%by%the%Harvard%Humanitarian%Initiative.%In%its%assessment%of%the% Abyei%conflict,%new%militia%camps%were%observed%prior%to%the%conflict%near%three%towns%north% and%west%of%the%Abyei%Administrative%Area;%Sitaib,%Debab,%and%Meiram.%In%addition,%increases%in% the%number%of%troops%present%at%the%SAF%base%at%Nyama%and%the%SAF%airbase%at%Muglad%were% also%observed.%These%observations%were%strong%indicators%of%imminent%violence%in%Abyei.%% % Conflict)in)Heglig) ( Eight%sites%in%Heglig%were%selected%to%document%the%conflict%in%the%region.%These%sites%can%be% further%separated%into%the%five%sites%within%the%Heglig%region%and%three%sites%near%Heglig%but%in% South%Sudan.%The%three%sites%outside%of%Heglig%6%Bentiu,%Jau,%and%Talodi%6%were%towns%where% military%forces%were%reportedly%stationed.%The%sites%in%the%Heglig%area%were%the%town%itself%and% four%front%line%military%encampments:%Heglig%Army%Base,%Heglig%South,%Teshwin%East,%and% Teshwin%West.%Imagery%was%acquired%from%between%the%beginning%of%2011%and%the%end%of%2012.% Three%images%were%acquired%for%each%site%except%for%the%town%of%Heglig%and%the%Heglig%Army% Base%for%which%four%images%were%acquired.%The%time%between%two%images%of%the%same%site% ranged%from%1.5%months%to%11%months.% % Analysis%of%three%sites%outside%of%the%Heglig%area%revealed%some%signs%of%impending%violence.%In% Jau,%the%addition%of%260%structures%between%30%September%2010%and%15%January%2011%appears% to%have%been%of%a%military%build%up.%Though%there%were%no%conclusive%observations,%such%as% artillery%or%tanks,%to%confirm%that%the%camps%were%of%a%military%variety,%the%layout%of%the% structures%was%much%more%orderly%than%most%temporary%camps%that%were%observed%throughout% this%region.%These%structures%were%arranged%in%lines%in%two%adjacent%camps.%Most%other% temporary%camps%included%fewer%structures,%normally%about%a%dozen,%and%were%arranged%in%a% circle%with%more%space%between%structures.%% % However,%the%fact%that%multiple%structures%were%destroyed%in%Jau%by%16%December%2011,%prior%to% the%start%of%the%Heglig%conflict,%implies%that%these%troops%were%not%actually%engaged%in%Heglig.% More%frequent%images%could%provide%additional%information.%With%the%number%of%images% obtained,%it%was%impossible%to%determine%in%what%order%the%tents%were%removed,%the%town%was% attacked,%and%the%road%north%was%expanded.% % In%contrast%to%Jau,%Bentiu%showed%no%signs%of%impending%conflict%prior%to%the%outbreak%of% violence.%The%location%of%an%SPLA%base%could%not%be%confirmed%and%it%is%possible%that%it%was%not% actually%located%within%the%boundaries%of%the%acquired%images.%Though%the%depot%that%was% observed%on%7%January%2012%could%have%included%military%equipment,%no%obviously%military% equipment%was%observed%in%the%area%and%the%depot’s%contents%could%have%been%civilian%goods% transported%along%the%river.%

! 57% % Over%the%course%of%the%conflict,%dramatic%changes%were%observed%at%Talodi.%The%exact%order%of% these%changes%is%difficult%to%determine,%as%the%three%images%were%captured%with%11%months% between%them.%Despite%the%low%temporal%resolution,%however,%certain%observations%can%be% made.%The%airport%was%dramatically%expanded%between%2%February%2011%and%18%December% 2012.%In%4%January%2012,%however,%the%expansion%appears%to%have%just%begun.%The%runway%was% expanded,%but%it%had%not%been%paved.%The%18%December%2012%image,%however,%shows%the%paved% runway%and%a%second%runway%and%apron.%This%implies%that%much%of%the%expansion%occurred%after% the%conflict%in%the%Nuba%Mountains%had%subsided.%Similarly,%the%eastern%and%southern%bases% were%significantly%expanded%in%this%period.%Such%expansion,%in%addition%to%the%construction%of%a% dam,%suggests%the%Government%of%Sudan%decided%that%the%town%of%Talodi%was%strategically% important,%and%added%troops%and%infrastructure%to%strengthen%it.%This%could%have%been%done%in% preparation%for%the%Heglig%conflict,%but%it%may%also%have%been%a%response%to%the%conflict%after%it% had%ended.% % Analysis%of%the%five%sites%in%the%Heglig%area%revealed%few%signs%of%impending%violence%but%many% signs%of%increased%military%activity%following%the%conflict.%In%the%two%Teshwin%sites,%for%instance,% no%buildup%of%troops%was%observed%prior%to%the%outbreak%of%violence.%The%imagery%taken%after% the%conflict,%however,%showed%a%major%expansion%in%the%SAF%base%at%Teshwin%West,%roadblocks% near%the%base,%and%lines%of%foxholes%to%the%south,%as%well%as%lines%of%foxholes%near%major% infrastructure%in%Teshwin%East.%% % The%Heglig%South%site%revealed%a%similar%pattern.%The%camp%was%not%significantly%expanded%prior% to%the%conflict.%After%violence%had%subsided,%however,%a%much%larger%base%was%constructed.%At% the%Heglig%Army%Base,%new%structures%were%observed%between%27%February%2011%and%17% November%2011.%New%tanks%were%observed%and%a%barrier%had%been%constructed%across%an% entrance%by%1%April%2012.%The%low%temporal%resolution%raises%difficulties%for%establishing%an% exact%timeline,%however.%The%expansion%of%structures%observed%on%17%November%2011%may%have% been%in%response%to%escalating%tensions%in%Heglig.%It%could%also%have%been%a%response%to%violence% in%the%Nuba%Mountain%region%or%in%Abyei.%In%addition,%the%1%April%2012%image%was%captured%after% the%first%clashes%were%reported%in%Teshwin.%These%new%vehicles%may%have%been%present%in%the% Heglig%Area%prior%to%the%conflict,%but%were%deployed%to%the%base%following%those%clashes.% % At%the%Heglig%and%Heglig%Army%Base%sites,%oil6drilling%activity%appeared%to%have%continued% despite%the%potential%for%conflict.%Multiple%large%areas%were%cleared%in%preparation%for%derricks% in%the%months%leading%up%to%the%attack%on%Heglig.%In%Heglig,%activity%at%the%depots%and% improvements%to%infrastructure%continued%as%well.%Activity%only%halted%after%many%of%the% residential%areas%of%Heglig%had%been%razed.%During%the%attack,%damage%to%industrial%areas%was% confined%to%a%single%compound%and%one%additional%warehouse.% ( Conclusions( ( Several%conclusions%can%be%drawn%from%this%study%about%using%satellite%imagery%to%monitor%a% border%conflict.%The%first%is%that%temporal%resolution%will%impact%what%can%be%observed%and%what%

! 58% conclusions%can%be%drawn.%Multiple,%frequent%images%of%a%site%enable%an%observer%to%establish%a% baseline%of%normal%activity.%Deviations%from%this%baseline%can%then%be%observed.%With%a%small% sample%of%images%of%a%site,%it%can%be%difficult%to%determine%if%changes%between%images%is%a%result% of%actual%changes%on%the%ground%or%just%a%result%of%the%conditions%at%the%specific%time%each% image%was%captured.%% % Similarly,%targeting%sites%that%will%be%important%to%a%conflict%can%be%difficult.%No%significant% observations%were%made%at%Agok%despite%the%town%being%situated%on%the%border%between%Sudan% and%South%Sudan.%Similarly,%the%images%acquired%of%Bentiu%did%not%contain%the%SPLA%base% reported%to%be%in%the%area.%It%is%possible%that%the%base%was%situated%nearby,%but%in%an%area%not% covered%by%the%image.%As%a%result,%no%observations%could%be%made%of%activity%at%this%base.% % Specific%to%the%Sudan%and%South%Sudan%conflict,%imagery%taken%prior%to%the%Abyei%conflict%reveals% one%way%that%violence%in%the%area%can%progress.%This%conflict%began%with%attacks%by%Misseriya% militia%groups%on%the%permanent%Dinka%residents.%Prior%to%the%conflict,%militia%camps%appeared% outside%of%Abyei.%This%is%in%keeping%with%Omar%Bashir’s%longstanding%practice%of%arming%militia% groups%before%conflicts%start.%Identifying%and%monitoring%these%camps%would,%therefore,%be%a% productive%use%of%satellite%imagery.% % The%Heglig%conflict%followed%a%different%pattern%with%no%obvious%buildup%of%troops%beforehand.% This%implies%that%early%fighting%occurred%between%troops%already%stationed%near%the%border.%It% was%only%after%the%conflict%that%the%SAF%bases%in%Heglig%were%substantially%expanded.%Finally,%the% additional%infrastructure%and%military%equipment%at%Talodi%implies%that%the%government%of% Sudan%considers%the%town%to%be%of%strategic%importance.%Identifying%other%infrastructure% projects%could%help%determine%which%towns%the%regime%considers%to%be%of%high%value.%These% towns%could%then%be%a%focus%for%monitoring.% ) )

! 59% www.aaas.org/geotech/borders