The War of the Polish Succession
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University of Kentucky UKnowledge European History History 1980 The King's Honor and the King's Cardinal: The War of the Polish Succession John L. Sutton University of Pittsburgh - Johnstown Click here to let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Thanks to the University of Kentucky Libraries and the University Press of Kentucky, this book is freely available to current faculty, students, and staff at the University of Kentucky. Find other University of Kentucky Books at uknowledge.uky.edu/upk. For more information, please contact UKnowledge at [email protected]. Recommended Citation Sutton, John L., "The King's Honor and the King's Cardinal: The War of the Polish Succession" (1980). European History. 23. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/upk_european_history/23 The King's Honor & the King's Cardinal The War of the Polish Succession John L. Sutton THE UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KENTUCKY To JACK E. FREEMAN Soldier, scholar, administrator Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Sutton, John L 1917- The King's honor and the king's Cardinal. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Polish Succession, War of, 1733-1738. I. Title. DK4326.5.S95 943.8'02 80-51021 ISBN: 978-0-8131-5501-2 Copyright© 1980 by The University Press of Kentucky Scholarly publisher for the Commonwealth, serving Berea College, Centre College of Kentucky, Eastern Kentucky University, The Filson Club, Georgetown College, Kentucky Historical Society, Kentucky State University, Morehead State University, Murray State University, Northern Kentucky University, Transylvania University, University of Kentucky, University of Louisville, and Western Kentucky University. Editorial and Sales Offices: Lexington, Kentucky 40506 CONTENTS Preface v 1. A Problem of Succession I 2. The Commitment to War IO 3· The Habsburg Position 2 7 4· The Road to Danzig 43 5· Military Operations North of the Alps in 1733 63 6. The War in Italy to May 1734 88 7. The Siege of Danzig I I 2 8. The War in the Rhineland in 1734 IJ5 g. Military Climax and Denouement I 62 10. The Negotiations I9I Notes 2I I Bibliographical Note 24 5 Index 246 This page intentionally left blank PREFACE The War of the Polish Succession has long been a part of the fur niture of European history courses. It must be mentioned if only to account for the period from 1715 to 1740 and because it was a general European war. But one usually gives it a few words of recognition and then passes on, presumably to bigger and better things. I was drawn to examine it more closely when it occurred to me that in a century noted for-sometimes applauded for limited warfare, this war was perhaps the best example of all and yet has been given the least attention by historians. I can find no work devoted to it in the major languages of Western Europe. I saw it also as a case where the two superpowers of their day, France and Austria, had come into conflict once again but, with unusual care on both sides, had managed the struggle so as to cause no mortal injury to either. This was accomplished despite the participation of almost all the continental powers great and small, including the emerging states of Russia and Prussia. I also became aware that particularly in English the events of the war were thinly treated in historical works, perhaps because England did not participate directly in the conflict. And some of the spe cific crises of the war-the French attempt to lift the siege of Danzig, for example-are little known. A European historian of very wide knowledge admitted that the story of Count Piela was unknown to him. Beyond the broader aspects of the war and its meaning to the eighteenth-century balance of power, the diplomatic and mili tary conventions of the time were significant, and they were ob served with great care in the War of the Polish Succession. These were restraints which, with some exceptions, kept the war with in bounds. The men who exercised these restraints-Cardinal Vl PREFACE Fleury, Prince Eugene, Horace Walpole, for example-were in teresting individuals and I sought to know what dialogue, official and unofficial, passed among them in the course of the fighting and the negotiations. In Paris, Vienna, and London (the sequence reflects the amount of time spent in each) the people of the archives, diplo matic and military, were unfailingly helpful. William H. McNeill and Owen Connelly read parts of the manuscript and encour aged me. The University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown granted me a semester's leave to finish the work. My wife and the editor of this volume picked out many inconsistencies and cloudy pas sages. For those which remain and for the work as a whole I must accept the responsibility. CHAPTER ONE A Problem of Succession On a day in the last week of August 1733, six horsemen left the great castle of Chambord in the Loire Valley of France and took the road to Brittany. Five of the men were obviously an escort for the sixth, whom they treated with great respect and addressed as "Your Majesty." The escorting riders understood the sensitivity and importance of their mission, for they had been told that they were to accompany Stanislas Leszczynski, the father-in-law of King Louis XV, from his estate at Chambord to a rendezvous with the French fleet which would take him to Poland. Stanislas was addressed as royalty because he was the former king of Poland, who had been hustled off his throne by the Russians some years before and replaced by a German prince. But on 1 February that prince had died, and the elective Polish throne would be vacant until a king was chosen by the Polish nobility and gentry. All Europe waited to see whether France would back Stanislas as a candidate against the solemn warnings of the Rus sians and the Austrians. Frenchmen talked of the honor of the Bourbon house at stake. The Poles had called a Diet of Election to convene in late August. Could or would Stanislas present him self in Warsaw? There were many rumors. According to one, the exiled king was already secretly in Warsaw; another had it that he was cross ing Prussia by permission of the king of Prussia; a third that he was preparing to arrive at the port of Danzig with a French naval escort. The Russian ambassador in Warsaw reported the rumors 2 PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION to his capital and recommended using any justification to arrest Stanislas on the Baltic Sea. 1 In Paris the British ambassador, Lord Waldegrave, had been watching for any move that might indicate a French fleet moving into the Baltic with Stanislas. He was aware that the ships were ready at Brest, but in June thought it rather "remote" that the French would send Stanislas to Poland.2 Other observers in France were watching too and were promptly aware of a meet ing on 22 August between Stanislas and French Foreign Minister Chauvelin at Versailles. One of these observers noted in his diary that after the meeting Stanislas departed Versailles, dined at the chateau of Meudon nearby, and left for Brest.3 Some days and hours later Stanislas was seen embarking on the Brittany coast where a French fleet was at anchor. A salvo of cannon was fired. The fleet commander, the marquis de La Luzerne, welcomed him on board and the fleet sailed for the Baltic. The horsemen who had escorted him to Brittany must have felt satis fied that they had accomplished their mission. But all was not as it seemed. Stanislas did not sail away at high tide with the French fleet. It was not even Stanislas who went to Brittany and was seen boarding a ship. While the five horsemen were galloping westward toward Brittany with their charge, the real Stanislas was rolling rapidly eastward in a German-style vehicle with three trusted companions. Stanlislas had indeed met with Chauvelin on 22 August and had left for Chambord, possibly dining at Meudon as well. But on the way he was diverted to the estate of a Cardinal Bissi where a Commander Thianges appeared, a man similar in ap pearance to Stanislas. Thianges put on Stanislas's clothes and continued the trip to Chambord. It was he who, the next day or day after, left for Brittany with an escort who thought he was King Stanislas.4 Chauvelin had arranged it all, perhaps with old Cardinal Fleury-the first minister of Louis XV -looking over his shoul der with some misgivings. As early as 22 March, Chauvelin wrote to the governor of Alsace, Marshal Du Bourg, asking that trusted officer and personal friend of Stanislas to look into ways by which Stanislas could leave the country in secret. Money for PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION 3 secret expenses was set aside, and the special German-style vehi cle, a chaise a deux allemande, was procured by Du Bourg and sent to Paris; Chauvelin queried Du Bourg on the strictness of border inspections in the German states next to France and ad vised that two passports would be needed under the names of George Baur and Ernst Brauback, German businessmen travel ing with two domestics.5 Stanislas had lived through enough adventures when he lost his throne many years before and was unhappy about crossing Europe incognito. But there was no way out, and he was driven away acting the part of a private secretary to his traveling com panion, the chevalier d'Andlau, an Alsatian who spoke fluent German.