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Scholarship Repository University of Minnesota Law School Articles Faculty Scholarship 2007 Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG Kristin Hickman University of Minnesota Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Kristin Hickman, Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG, 26 VA. TAX REV. 905 (2007), available at https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/64. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. OF LENITY, CHEVRON, AND KPMG Kristin E. Hickman* I. INTRODU CTION ............................................................................. 906 II. T H E PRO BLEM ............................................................................... 911 A. Competing Doctrines: Lenity Versus Deference ................ 912 B. Case Law at the Crossroads................................................. 918 C. KPMG: A Case in Point....................................................... 924 1. B LIP S ............................................................................... 925 2. FLIPS and O PIS ............................................................. 929 D . Im p lications ........................................................................... 932 III. POTENTIAL RESOLUTIONS .......................................................... 933 A. Supreme Court Signals: Lenity Trumps .............................. 933 B. Academic Theory: Lenity as a Third Step .......................... 936 C. A Willfulness Exception ....................................................... 938 IV. THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION .......................... 940 V . C ON CLU SIO N ................................................................................. 942 Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to Brad Clary, Richard Frase, Cal Johnson, Heidi Kitrosser, Kevin Reitz, Ted Sampsell- Jones, Larry Solan, David Stras, and participants in the Squaretable series at the University of Minnesota Law School for their helpful comments and suggestions in connection with this essay. Thanks to Lindsey Tonsager for her research assistance. Thanks also to the Federalist Society for Law & Public Policy Studies and to Deloitte & Touche for their generous support in making possible the symposium that inspired this essay. Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 26:905 I. INTRODUCTION Despite a mixed track record in challenging tax shelters in civil enforcement actions, the federal government has started prosecuting tax shelter cases criminally. One of the top accounting firms, KPMG, and several of its partners and managers have come under scrutiny for developing and promoting certain tax shelters known colloquially as BLIPS, FLIP, OPIS, and SOS.' Under threat of criminal indictment, KPMG decided to save itself. KPMG admitted criminal culpability, paid a fine, and agreed to implement a compliance and ethics program and submit to several years of government monitoring in exchange for deferred prosecution. Meanwhile, the government's criminal prosecution of several former KPMG tax professionals continues to work its way through the federal district courts.4 Yet some believe that the tax shelters promoted by KPMG were not clearly abusive, or at least not criminally so.' One federal district court has decided that a key statutory element of the BLIPS structure was consistent with then-existing interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code (Code).6 1 See, e.g., Sheryl Stratton, Criminal Tax Enforcement of Legal-Source Income Cases Is Up, 113 TAx NOTES 392 (Oct. 30, 2006) (noting DOJ Tax Division's current emphasis on tax shelter prosecutions); Armando Gomez & Brian Duncan, Detection & Dissection: How the IRS Identifies and Combats Tax Shelters and Regulates Those Who Advise On Aggressive Transactions, 736 PLI/TAx 951, 1009-10 (2006) (noting a shift in criminal prosecutions from nonfilers, drug dealers, and tax protesters to more mainstream tax matters). 2 BLIPS, FLIP, OPIS, and SOS are acronyms for Bond Linked Issue Premium Structures, Foreign Leveraged Investment Program, Offshore Portfolio Investment Strategy, and Short Option Strategy, respectively. See discussion infra notes 94-127 and accompanying text (discussing the BLIPS, FLIP, and OPIS transactions). 3 See KPMG Deferred ProsecutionAgreement Dated August 26, 2005, reprinted in 1571 PLI/CoRP. 659 (2006). 4 See, e.g., United States v. Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that defendant's conversations with firm counsel were not privileged); United States v. Stein, 461 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (adjourning trial sine die due to late production of discovery and pending resolution of legal fee issues); United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that government violated defendants' right to counsel); Superseding Indictment, United States v. Stein, N. S1 05 Crim. 0888(LAK), 2005 WL 4168176 (Oct. 17, 2005). 5 See, e.g., Robert Weisberg & David Mills, A Very Strange Indictment, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2005 at A16 (criticizing the government's case against KPMG). 6 See Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608, 615-19, 625-26 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (ruling for the taxpayer on the BLIPS structure's interpretation of the term "liabilities" under Internal Revenue Code (Code) section 752). The Klamath opinion arose in a civil action, not a criminal prosecution, and did not conclusively resolve the case in favor of the taxpayer. See discussion infra notes 2007] Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG Many who are more skeptical of the KPMG shelters nevertheless are concerned about distinguishing the actions of the defendant tax professionals from those of ordinary tax planners under the specter of criminal enforcement. Tax shelters have a bad reputation, for good and obvious reasons. Among other things, abusive tax shelters illegitimately deprive the government of much-needed revenue and generally breed disrespect for the tax system. Note that in that last sentence I added the word "abusive." Not all tax shelters fall into that category, at least in the eyes of the law.8 While most tax experts agree that abusive tax 107-10 (discussing the Klamath opinion further). The Klamath court has since decided the case in favor of the government on economic substance grounds, though the court also found various civil penalties assessed by the government to be inapplicable. See Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, __ F. Supp. 2d __ 2007 WL 283790 (E.D. Tex. 2007). ' See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, KPMG: Has the Prosecution Overcharged the Crime?, 112 TAx NOTES 405 (July 31, 2006) (noting concerns of many practitioners, analyzing the government's case in United States v. Stein, and suggesting that the government may have overreached); Editorial, KPMG In Wonderland, WALL ST. J. Oct. 6, 2005, at A14 (describing prosecutions as "troubling"); John Klotsche, Text of Klotsche Remarks at Tax Controversy Seminar, 2006 TNT 30-31 (Feb. 14, 2006) (attempting to justify tax shelter prosecutions and distinguish actions prosecuted from permissible tax planning from Internal Revenue Service (Service) perspective); see also Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and the Compaq Case, 88 TAX NOTES 221, 230 (July 10, 2000) (noting the general discomfort of many leading tax practitioners with the government's emphasis on penalties and case-by- case discretion to define tax abuse and combat tax shelters). Not everyone is dismayed by the government's aggressive posture. See, e.g., Darryll K. Jones, CriminalizingTax Shelters and the "Damn-Well" Reflex, 110 TAx NOTEs 285 (Jan. 16, 2006) (defending criminal prosecutions of tax shelter promoters generally). 8 Code section 6662 defines a "tax shelter" as "a partnership or other entity, an investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or arrangement, if a significant purpose of such partnership, entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax." I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii). Other provisions of the Code offer definitions of the same term. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 461(i)(3) (adopting a broader definition inclusive of that of Code § 6662); I.R.C. § 4965(e) (defining "prohibited tax shelter transaction" by cross reference to other terms defined in Code section 6707A). None of these definitions has proven particularly useful in combating abusing tax shelters; and some transactions that the government labels as tax shelters have "worked," meaning at the very least that the courts recognized their consistency with existing law, even if Congress subsequently amends the tax laws to alter the consequences of such transactions. See infra note 12 and related text. Hence, Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4 more broadly identifies several categories of transactions that participating taxpayers must report to assist the Service in ferreting out abusive tax shelters, only one of which is listed transactions. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(a), (b) (2006). Yet while the reportable transaction regulations are targeted at tax shelter 908 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 26:905 shelters are a big problem, 9 they disagree over precisely how to distinguish ordinary non-shelter tax planning from tax shelters, and legitimate from abusive tax shelters. ° The federal tax laws are