EUROPE AND IRAQ: TEST CASE FOR THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY Jonathan Spyer* Since its beginnings in 1990, the Iraq crisis has exposed the dilemmas and paradoxes at the heart of European attempts to build a common foreign and security policy. It has also illustrated the varying aspects of U.S.-Europe relations. This article looks into the stances adopted by the main European countries and the debates within EU institutions regarding events in Iraq and the extent and nature of their engagement with that country in the post- Saddam era. BACKGROUND Iraqi oppositionists—who maintained a strong presence in London— and official Differences in the European and U.S. circles were few.2 approaches to the issue of Iraq began to As this article will show, the split emerge already in the 1990s. This period, between the “Atlanticist” British and the following the successful expulsion of Iraq French, with their desire to balance the from Kuwait in 1991, was characterized by power of the United States, has been a key a policy of containment. Alongside this division throughout in the European policy, however, the United States became response to Iraq as well as to other foreign progressively more involved in advocating policy issues. A general European suspicion democracy for Arab states, a process which of bold unilateral actions by states outside had no parallel in Europe. The slow of the framework of international movement in Washington from a policy of institutions is also a crucial element. Less containment to one of regime change pronounced in the United Kingdom, this is reached a significant milestone in 1998, a theme constantly repeated by French and with the Clinton Administration passing the German critics of the invasion of Iraq. Iraq Liberation Act.1 No parallel movement Europe's Common Foreign and Security took place in Europe. Policy (CFSP) came into being following European opposition to a policy of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. In 1999, the regime change in Iraq meant that little CFSP was solidified through the creation of deliberation had taken place in Europe as to the position of its high representative.3 The what a post-Saddam Iraq might look like. Iraq crisis was the most significant test with There was also a pronounced wariness in which the CFSP had yet been required to continental Europe regarding the Iraqi contend. Iraq, however, saw the EU failing opposition. Even a December 2002 to act as one. Rather, the approach of real conference on the subject of democracy in crisis resulted in the major powers of the Iraq had to be moved from Brussels to EU splitting—with France in a familiar London because of the sensitivity of the fashion pioneering opposition to the U.S.- subject for continental Europeans. In led plans for invasion of Iraq; Germany Britain too, the country closest to the supporting the French stance (the Iraq crisis United States on Iraq, relations between saw Germany adopting the unfamiliar 94 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 2007) Europe and Iraq stance of defiance of the United States); and As military action began to look more the UK aligning itself firmly alongside and more inevitable in the first months of America and committing troops to the 2003, French President Jacques Chirac invasion.4 Other European countries in became the main spokesman for the view essence gathered around one or other of that UN weapons inspectors needed more these positions. time to search Iraq for banned arms. He backed a request by the UN's chief nuclear DIVISIONS IN THE APPROACH TO weapons inspector, Muhammad al- WAR Barada’i, for an extension of “several months.”7 The French president noted that Concern at the ambitions of the Saddam his country was coordinating its positions Hussein regime and at the possibility that closely with Germany. Germany indeed Iraq was concealing aspects of its weapons voiced its opposition to a UN Security of mass destruction (WMD) program from Council vote on military action and, unlike UN inspection teams was common to the France, indicated that it would oppose any United States and all EU nations. On the request for UN support for military action.8 basis of this shared concern, Security The French desire to act as a Council Resolution 1441 was passed on counterweight to the United States on the November 9, 2002, with the appearance of international stage is, as noted above, a unity within the EU.5 Evidence of a perennial feature of international affairs. differing orientation toward the use of force Germany, however, has been among the among EU countries, however, was already most pro-U.S. countries in Europe, and so discernible. its emergent opposition to the U.S. stand on In France and Germany, the willingness Iraq was more surprising. It may be seen as to break openly with Washington on this an aspect of Berlin’s increasing desire to issue was particularly noticeable from the play an independent, assertive role in outset. The U.S. Administration noted and international affairs in line with its own was angered by the use of populist anti-war public opinion, as well as very deep rhetoric made by then German Chancellor skepticism in Europe regarding the reasons Gerhard Schroeder in his bid for re-election for war with Iraq.9 in September 2002. It was the first sign of a Opposed to the emergent Franco- new atmosphere of mutual impatience and German alliance against the war were exasperation between the United States and countries representing both “Old” and certain countries in Western Europe. “New” Europe, in Secretary Rumsfeld's Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's terms. In the former category, both UK much-quoted comments made at this time Prime Minister Tony Blair and Spanish differentiating between “Old Europe”— Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar were France and Germany—and “New firmly with the U.S. view regarding the Europe”—the former Communist countries danger represented by Iraq, the brutally of Central Europe, who were more repressive nature of its regime, and its sympathetic to America's stance on Iraq, expansionist and WMD ambitions. There confirmed the attitude of mutual suspicion was clear resentment on the part of both emerging between the U.S. Administration these men for what they regarded as the and the French and German governments.6 high-handed attitude of the French president and the sense in which his attitude Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 2007) 95 Jonathan Spyer seemed to imply a situation of natural countries had “missed an excellent French leadership in Europe. opportunity to keep silent.”12 Blair placed more stress than did the There was a consensus in Europe that United States on the need for a clear international action of one kind or another international mandate for action over Iraq, over Iraq was necessary. Yet it was and was a leading voice in arguing for a differing outlooks regarding the efficacy of second UN Security Council resolution the use of force, the importance of the role before any further steps were taken. This of international institutions, and—not position was vital from the point of view of least—the power of the United States as the British prime minister's domestic much as analysis of the Iraq situation itself standing, but in practice served only to that seemed to determine the stance taken. sharpen the differences between the British These differing stances did not remain and French positions, rendering less likely on the declarative level alone. With no the possibility of a joint European second UN resolution forthcoming, the UK, response.10 along with Spain and backed by the As mentioned above, this rift between Netherlands, Italy, and Poland, committed the UK and France over the Iraq question troops to the invasion of Iraq. The war thus cast into bold relief two starkly different proceeded without the second UN positions regarding the role of Europe in resolution desired by the UK and with the world affairs. Blair, in the Atlanticist open opposition of France and Germany. approach favored by nearly all post-1945 These latter countries found themselves in British prime ministers, sought to align with an unlikely alliance with Russia over the the United States while seeking to influence war. it and to embed U.S. action in international The build-up to the Iraq War of 2003 consensus. Chirac, again in line with his witnessed an unprecedented situation, own Gaullist tradition, considered that the which revealed deep and basic divisions building of alternative alliances and acting within Europe over the conduct of as a counter-weight to American dominance international affairs. These differences were was the proper European role. These were based on known, differing conceptions of the poles around which other member states Europe's role. Yet the nature of the crisis now gathered themselves.11 led to the differences acquiring a hitherto Thus, broadly supportive of the French unseen sharpness. and German position were Belgium, Robert Kagan, famously, expressed the Greece, Luxembourg, and neutral states view that “Americans are from Mars, such as the Republic of Ireland. In the Europeans are from Venus.”13 The Iraq Atlanticist corner, meanwhile, apart from crisis, however, indicates that within the UK were to be found Spain, Italy, Europe, both partially-“Martian” and Holland, and—less emphatically—Portugal “Venusian” tendencies exist. France and and Denmark. The additional support of Germany were committed to a view that Central European and Baltic EU member stressed the absolute centrality of states for the U.S. position, as declared in international institutions as the only basis February 2003, served to anger the French for international order and for action by and led to President Chirac's famous states in defense of that order.