EUROPE AND : TEST CASE FOR THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY Jonathan Spyer*

Since its beginnings in 1990, the Iraq crisis has exposed the dilemmas and paradoxes at the heart of European attempts to build a common foreign and security policy. It has also illustrated the varying aspects of U.S.-Europe relations. This article looks into the stances adopted by the main European countries and the debates within EU institutions regarding events in Iraq and the extent and nature of their engagement with that country in the post- Saddam era.

BACKGROUND Iraqi oppositionists—who maintained a strong presence in London— and official Differences in the European and U.S. circles were few.2 approaches to the issue of Iraq began to As this article will show, the split emerge already in the 1990s. This period, between the “Atlanticist” British and the following the successful expulsion of Iraq French, with their desire to balance the from Kuwait in 1991, was characterized by power of the , has been a key a policy of containment. Alongside this division throughout in the European policy, however, the United States became response to Iraq as well as to other foreign progressively more involved in advocating policy issues. A general European suspicion democracy for Arab states, a process which of bold unilateral actions by states outside had no parallel in Europe. The slow of the framework of international movement in Washington from a policy of institutions is also a crucial element. Less containment to one of regime change pronounced in the United Kingdom, this is reached a significant milestone in 1998, a theme constantly repeated by French and with the Clinton Administration passing the German critics of the invasion of Iraq. Iraq Liberation Act.1 No parallel movement Europe's Common Foreign and Security took place in Europe. Policy (CFSP) came into being following European opposition to a policy of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. In 1999, the regime change in Iraq meant that little CFSP was solidified through the creation of deliberation had taken place in Europe as to the position of its high representative.3 The what a post-Saddam Iraq might look like. Iraq crisis was the most significant test with There was also a pronounced wariness in which the CFSP had yet been required to continental Europe regarding the Iraqi contend. Iraq, however, saw the EU failing opposition. Even a December 2002 to act as one. Rather, the approach of real conference on the subject of democracy in crisis resulted in the major powers of the Iraq had to be moved from Brussels to EU splitting—with in a familiar London because of the sensitivity of the fashion pioneering opposition to the U.S.- subject for continental Europeans. In led plans for invasion of Iraq; Germany Britain too, the country closest to the supporting the French stance (the Iraq crisis United States on Iraq, relations between saw Germany adopting the unfamiliar

94 Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 2007) Europe and Iraq stance of defiance of the United States); and As military action began to look more the UK aligning itself firmly alongside and more inevitable in the first months of America and committing troops to the 2003, French President Jacques Chirac invasion.4 Other European countries in became the main spokesman for the view essence gathered around one or other of that UN weapons inspectors needed more these positions. time to search Iraq for banned arms. He backed a request by the UN's chief nuclear DIVISIONS IN THE APPROACH TO weapons inspector, Muhammad al- WAR Barada’i, for an extension of “several months.”7 The French president noted that Concern at the ambitions of the Saddam his country was coordinating its positions Hussein regime and at the possibility that closely with Germany. Germany indeed Iraq was concealing aspects of its weapons voiced its opposition to a UN Security of mass destruction (WMD) program from Council vote on military action and, unlike UN inspection teams was common to the France, indicated that it would oppose any United States and all EU nations. On the request for UN support for military action.8 basis of this shared concern, Security The French desire to act as a Council Resolution 1441 was passed on counterweight to the United States on the November 9, 2002, with the appearance of international stage is, as noted above, a unity within the EU.5 Evidence of a perennial feature of international affairs. differing orientation toward the use of force Germany, however, has been among the among EU countries, however, was already most pro-U.S. countries in Europe, and so discernible. its emergent opposition to the U.S. stand on In France and Germany, the willingness Iraq was more surprising. It may be seen as to break openly with Washington on this an aspect of Berlin’s increasing desire to issue was particularly noticeable from the play an independent, assertive role in outset. The U.S. Administration noted and international affairs in line with its own was angered by the use of populist anti-war public opinion, as well as very deep rhetoric made by then German Chancellor skepticism in Europe regarding the reasons Gerhard Schroeder in his bid for re-election for war with Iraq.9 in September 2002. It was the first sign of a Opposed to the emergent Franco- new atmosphere of mutual impatience and German alliance against the war were exasperation between the United States and countries representing both “Old” and certain countries in Western Europe. “New” Europe, in Secretary Rumsfeld's Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's terms. In the former category, both UK much-quoted comments made at this time Prime Minister and Spanish differentiating between “Old Europe”— Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar were France and Germany—and “New firmly with the U.S. view regarding the Europe”—the former Communist countries danger represented by Iraq, the brutally of Central Europe, who were more repressive nature of its regime, and its sympathetic to America's stance on Iraq, expansionist and WMD ambitions. There confirmed the attitude of mutual suspicion was clear resentment on the part of both emerging between the U.S. Administration these men for what they regarded as the and the French and German governments.6 high-handed attitude of the French president and the sense in which his attitude

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Jonathan Spyer seemed to imply a situation of natural countries had “missed an excellent French leadership in Europe. opportunity to keep silent.”12 Blair placed more stress than did the There was a consensus in Europe that United States on the need for a clear international action of one kind or another international mandate for action over Iraq, over Iraq was necessary. Yet it was and was a leading voice in arguing for a differing outlooks regarding the efficacy of second UN Security Council resolution the use of force, the importance of the role before any further steps were taken. This of international institutions, and—not position was vital from the point of view of least—the power of the United States as the British prime minister's domestic much as analysis of the Iraq situation itself standing, but in practice served only to that seemed to determine the stance taken. sharpen the differences between the British These differing stances did not remain and French positions, rendering less likely on the declarative level alone. With no the possibility of a joint European second UN resolution forthcoming, the UK, response.10 along with Spain and backed by the As mentioned above, this rift between Netherlands, Italy, and Poland, committed the UK and France over the Iraq question troops to the invasion of Iraq. The war thus cast into bold relief two starkly different proceeded without the second UN positions regarding the role of Europe in resolution desired by the UK and with the world affairs. Blair, in the Atlanticist open opposition of France and Germany. approach favored by nearly all post-1945 These latter countries found themselves in British prime ministers, sought to align with an unlikely alliance with Russia over the the United States while seeking to influence war. it and to embed U.S. action in international The build-up to the Iraq War of 2003 consensus. Chirac, again in line with his witnessed an unprecedented situation, own Gaullist tradition, considered that the which revealed deep and basic divisions building of alternative alliances and acting within Europe over the conduct of as a counter-weight to American dominance international affairs. These differences were was the proper European role. These were based on known, differing conceptions of the poles around which other member states Europe's role. Yet the nature of the crisis now gathered themselves.11 led to the differences acquiring a hitherto Thus, broadly supportive of the French unseen sharpness. and German position were Belgium, Robert Kagan, famously, expressed the Greece, Luxembourg, and neutral states view that “Americans are from Mars, such as the Republic of Ireland. In the Europeans are from Venus.”13 The Iraq Atlanticist corner, meanwhile, apart from crisis, however, indicates that within the UK were to be found Spain, Italy, Europe, both partially-“Martian” and Holland, and—less emphatically—Portugal “Venusian” tendencies exist. France and and Denmark. The additional support of Germany were committed to a view that Central European and Baltic EU member stressed the absolute centrality of states for the U.S. position, as declared in international institutions as the only basis February 2003, served to anger the French for international order and for action by and led to President Chirac's famous states in defense of that order. outburst that the government of these The United States, in contrast, as by far the strongest single state, exhibited a

96 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June 2007) Europe and Iraq greater willingness to act alone or in and influence of other states, and of course cooperation with coalitions specifically economic interests. created for the achievement of specific goals. Atlanticist-inclined European states, EU AND EUROPEAN STATES' most significantly the UK and Spain, were POLICY ON IRAQ FOLLOWING THE to a degree caught between the two INVASION approaches. British Prime Minister Tony Blair was known to be concerned following In observing the direction and nature of the conclusion of the conventional state of European policy since the invasion, the hostilities in Iraq at the possibility of a real following section will focus on three areas: split of the developed world into opposing the political/diplomatic, economic, and power blocs. Blair was undoubtedly no less military/counterterror fields. sincerely committed to the goals of the war in Iraq than was the U.S. president. Yet the Politics and Diplomacy secondary goal of preventing such a rift from deepening was important for Britain.14 Following the invasion and the The sharp rifts in the approach to war in destruction of the regime, Iraq led to the emergence of popular, the initial stance taken by France, as the caricatured versions of the two sides’ main Western opponent of the war, was for motivations. In Europe, the slogans of the the rapid ending of the U.S. and British large demonstrations that took place in the occupation, and, in its place, the creation of capitals depicted the American motivation a UN administration of Iraq. There was for war as based on a desire for access to little attempt to disguise the fact that the Iraqi mineral resources or a wish on the part French view of the invasion as an of the U.S. president to continue the task of illegitimate act was at work here. This toppling Saddam, which his father had view, and the subsequent failure of the begun in 1991. In the United States, United States and its allies to find the Iraqi meanwhile, supporters of the war portrayed WMD, over which the war was fought, the French and German stance as motivated formed an important backdrop to the by the desire for contracts with Iraq or an subsequent stance taken by France and inherent fearfulness of decisive Germany. It has been noted that France and international action. other European countries were keener on In fact, however, what was revealed in UN involvement in Iraq than was the UN the approach to the war were basic itself at that time.15 This was despite the differences in the view of the international evidence that the UN did not enjoy high system, which did not disappear with the levels of legitimacy and popularity among U.S. decision to rely only on the “coalition ordinary Iraqis, and hence its involvement of the willing,” and which have continued was no clear panacea or solution to the to inform the approaches of European issue of occupation. countries to Iraq in the period following the The French were also highly critical of invasion. These different perceptions derive the political arrangements put in place by from a combination of intellectual the United States following the war. On conception and orientation, the self-interest April 5, 2003, French Foreign Minister and the desire of states to offset the power Dominique de Villepin was scathing about U.S. plans for reconstruction in postwar

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Iraq. The French foreign minister criticized of secret memos sent by Prime Minister the United States for the issuing of Tony Blair's envoy John Sawers to 10 contracts to U.S. companies. Iraq, he said, Downing Street depict early severe doubts should not be seen as a “paradise for on the part of senior British Foreign Office invaders,” or a pie in which all could have a personnel.18 finger. De Villepin's statements were made Sawers's dispatches, of course, may tell at a joint press conference with the German us as much about internal differences and Russian foreign ministers and are within the UK regarding Iraq policy as they indicative of the atmosphere of anger and do about the actual state of affairs in Iraq. suspicion engendered by the war.16 Some of the criticisms, however, later For France and its allies in the anti-war became commonly expressed. This camp, the issue of the rapid recovery of included the sense of insufficient planning Iraqi sovereignty and the ending of the for the postwar period and the wholesale American occupation was paramount from sackings of Ba’th Party members— the outset. In this regard, the French including very junior ones—from their justified their failure to engage closely with posts, which critics believed needlessly bodies associated with the Coalition hampered efforts to build up coherent Provisional Authority (CPA) by claiming administrative structures in Iraq in the that to doing so would legitimize an period following the war.19 invasion and occupation to which France Despite these misgivings, British had been opposed. As 2003 wore on, it diplomacy centered on mending the became apparent that this stance was not transatlantic rift. Tony Blair was worried at winning France friends within Iraq itself. the possibility that the differences that An article in Le Monde in March 2004 emerged during the war could lead to “two depicted this. The article spoke to Iraqis rival centers of power,” as he put it at the from a variety of backgrounds and ethnic time. He sought common ground, while origins. It found that French failure to never retreating from his staunch defense of engage with postwar Iraq had led to the war itself. The British commitment of widespread disillusionment and hostility troops in Iraq remained the most significant among Iraqis, including those Iraqis after that of the United States.20 fiercely opposed to the U.S. invasion.17 The differing outlooks of the UK and For the UK, leader of the “pro-war” France were not fundamentally altered by faction among European countries, the most the war itself. Nor have they been changed pressing diplomatic problem following the by subsequent developments. On June 28, war was preventing further deterioration in 2004, power was formally handed over by U.S.-EU relations. The British had their CPA Head to an interim Iraqi own criticisms of U.S. handling of the government to be led by Ayad Alawi.21 The occupation in the first months. There were handover took place in secret, against the differences with the United States over backdrop of the continuing insurgency and military tactics, with British observers bloodshed in Iraq. British Prime Minister critical of the performance of the 3rd Tony Blair was the only European leader to Infantry Division in , and be aware that the handover of power was particularly of the performance of the team made earlier—an indication of Britain's role under General Jay Garner, who for a short as the European country closest to the period administered postwar Iraq. A series United States.

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France again led the charge in its who formulated it. Whatever the ringing trenchant criticism of the new arrangements declarations emerging from Brussels, emerging after June 2004. The French were European countries remained deeply critical of the make-up of the new divided. government, which they maintained did not A year after the war, while the two represent a sufficient departure from the camps remained clearly defined, there was previous, U.S.-led administration. Some movement between them. As mentioned, observers, however, felt that French the essential dividing line in European diplomacy was wrong-footed by the June perceptions on Iraq ran between France and 2004 transfer of power and the appointment Germany on the one hand, and Britain and of Prime Minister Alawi. The French had the Spain of Jose Maria Aznar on the other. placed such an emphasis on the need for a Smaller neutral countries then tended to transfer of power, that their continued align with France and Germany, and a trenchant criticism seemed at times more number of new member states were with intent on deliberate obstruction than the UK and Spain. In mid-2004, however, constructive engagement. following Aznar's defeat in elections by the From June 2004, the beginnings of a Spanish Socialist Party of Jose Luis more general cautious re-engagement of EU Rodriguez Zapatero, Spain effectively countries with the new Iraq can begin to be crossed over to the other camp. Zapatero discerned. A strategy paper produced by the announced his intention of withdrawing his EU the same month recommended an active country's forces from Iraq. Spain had European engagement with the new Iraqi committed a force of 1,400 troops. government. The document envisaged the Zapatero, demonstrating his fealty to the EU inviting Iraq to join the EU's Strategic French view of events in Iraq, initially Partnership for the Mediterranean and the stated that he might be willing to see Middle East. It also recommended that EU Spanish forces stay as part of a UN-led states join in pushing for Iraq to be solution in Iraq. Since this was clearly not admitted to the World Trade Organization, on the horizon, he ordered their withdrawal, and that the EU should reinstate favored which began on April 20, 2004, and was trading partner relations with Baghdad.22 completed within six weeks.23 This document, while representing a Yet the Spanish departure significant change in tone from the EU, has notwithstanding, the involvement even of suffered from many of the usual drawbacks anti-war countries with the new Iraq was of policy statements issued by the EU. That slowly moving ahead. The announcement is, while it laid out a coherent and new on November 22, 2004 of elections in Iraq general strategy for the EU to follow, it had played a further important role in the slow, little to say regarding the immediate short- cautious re-engagement of European term priorities that the EU needed to adopt countries. Events were clearly moving regarding events in Iraq. As such, it served forward, and regardless of differences over to paper over the very real differences the policy that had led to the occupation of between member states and Iraq, rather than Iraq, it was clear that European countries really confronting and then reconciling would only harm themselves by being them. sidelined from engagement with the forces The result was that the new strategy had now emerging to dominate the new Iraq. At less impact than had been hoped by those the same time, the presence of insurgency

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Jonathan Spyer and the sense of vindication among In the run-up to the elections, U.S. countries that had opposed the war limited Secretary of State Colin Powell publicly the scope of involvement. expressed his hopes that the Organization Holland, which had supported the war for Security and Cooperation in Europe and which held the EU presidency in the (OSCE), which played an important role in year 2004, was keen to promote practical supervising elections in Ukraine, would assistance in the elections. A mission was undertake similar tasks in Iraq. This did not sent with the intention of exploring the take place, however, and the responsibility possibility of European monitors taking part for international supervision of the elections in the Iraqi polls. Divisions among member of January 30 was undertaken by a states hampered these efforts, however, and relatively small group of 35 UN staffers. it proved impossible to secure agreement The European Commission donated the among member states for the commitment sum of 31.5 million Euros toward of observers. preparation for the elections, which The general sense regarding the included a training program for Iraqi government of Ayad Alawi was one of observers of the electoral process and the caution and skepticism among formerly deployment of three European experts to anti-war European countries. The European Baghdad to work with the UN mission.24 “hands off” attitude toward Alawi's The small size of this group was attributed administration contrasted sharply with to the problematic security situation in Iraq. European attitudes to aid and involvement In addition, an ad hoc group called the elsewhere in the region, for example in the International Mission for Iraqi Elections Palestinian Authority area. Whereas there, monitored the electoral process from European countries have been particularly Jordan, because of fears related to the conspicuous in their grassroots efforts to security situation.25 This mission included aid social and political processes (for members from Britain, but no other EU example, the prominent European role in country. the PA elections of January 2006, and the Despite determined attempts by Sunni extensive social and educational projects insurgents to disrupt the elections, the maintained by European governments and January polls were hailed as a success. The NGOs dealing with all aspects of life in the model of genuine but limited European Palestinian areas), in Iraq, the attitude has support for the political process in Iraq was been more circumspect. In Iraq, there has here established, and has not been been a desire to make involvement substantially deviated from in subsequent conditional on progress toward democracy landmark events in Iraq. Thus, EU while, crucially, avoiding what might be involvement in the referendum on the seen as a European endorsement of, or constitution consisted of a 20 million Euro partnership with, what is seen as the U.S. contribution toward the constitutional project of the invasion and re-making of process, which again was channeled Iraq. This attitude does not, of course, apply through UN bodies working on the to EU member states such as the UK, which referendum.26 The successful conduct of supported the war. Yet the sharp divisions the referendum was welcomed by European that continued in the postwar period served governments and by the Commission. Yet to prevent a common, coherent European direct European involvement was not a stance. feature of the referendum process.

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The same situation held for the Iraqi derive a sense of vindication from elections of December 2005. Once again, subsequent events in Iraq. At the same time, the European Commission provided a however, as representative bodies have limited amount of assistance for the emerged in Iraq, so a limited engagement election, channeled through UN-controlled with them has taken place. bodies. The victory of the United Iraqi The next section will consider how this Alliance, a Shi’a religious-led list, in the dynamic has been reflected in the areas of elections was an indicator that the putting in European economic and commercial place of an electoral framework had not engagement with the new Iraq and will also served to alter fundamentally the discuss European attitudes to the ongoing confessional and ethnic basis of politics in insurgency in the country. Iraq. The possibility of growing Iranian influence in Iraq now became a matter of European Economic Relations with the concern. New Iraq The “hands off” policy of France, Germany, and the countries that had European funding and aid for the opposed the war seemed to them to be reconstruction of Iraq has been limited. justified by as the failure to return stability Once again, the opposition of principal to Iraq following the toppling of Saddam European countries to the invasion has been Hussein. Further defections from the pro- the key factor here. At the Madrid donor U.S. camp took place in 2006. Elections in conference in October 2003, shortly Italy in May 2006, brought back to power a following the invasion, the total of $33 coalition led by the Socialist Party. The billion was contributed for the new prime minister, Romano Prodi, used reconstruction of Iraq. Of this sum, fully his first speech in parliament following his $20 billion came from the United States, $5 victory to issue a harsh criticism of the war billion was donated by Japan, and $1 billion in Iraq. He referred to it as a “grave error” by the UK. France declined to make any that could ignite war across the Middle contribution. In total, $1.5 billion was East. Prodi announced his intention to donated by other EU member states. withdraw Italy's commitment of 2,700 European levels of aid to the new Iraq have troops in Iraq.27 This, together with the remained at a modest level. The European substantial cutting down of the Polish Commission as a body has donated 518.5 contingent in Iraq, left the United States million Euros. Individual contributions with its British allies almost alone in have varied according to the stance toward attempting to maintain their commitments the war taken by the country, but have in Iraq. remained overall low.28 Thus, the very sharp divisions that In November 2004, the sensitive issue existed from the outset in the views of of Iraq's public debt was addressed in an major European countries regarding the agreement between the new government in U.S.-led enterprise in Iraq persisted Iraq and Paris Club member states.29 A following the conclusion of the major debt reduction plan was agreed upon, conventional phase of the conflict. These which would bring the debt down by 80 differences have served to prevent the percent over three phases, linked to Iraq's emergence of a coherent, pan-European compliance with the IMF standard policy. Europeans who opposed the war program.30

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Regarding trade with Iraq, the United the outset stressed the need to develop a States is its main trading partner, with 40.7 UN-led security effort in Iraq, as an aspect percent of the total amount traded. The EU of their broader desire for greater UN is second, with 20.7 percent. The EU is also involvement. the second largest exporter to Iraq. France and Germany, having opposed Regarding imports, as Iraqi oil production the invasion, felt themselves under no has picked up, so energy exports to Europe obligation to commit forces to police post- have correspondingly increased. Iraq is now Saddam Iraq or to oppose the efforts of tenth among the major energy supplies to Sunni Arab insurgents in the center of the Europe. Iraq is responsible, however, for country. Yet even countries that had only 1.4 percent of the total of European supported the war provided only small energy imports. There is thus a long way to contingents in the post-conventional phase go before pre-1991 levels of trade are of the conflict. The entire occupation force regained. Trade fell sharply in 1991, before was, of course, also of relatively modest picking up again after the beginning of the dimensions—an aspect which would later oil-for-food program in 1997. By 2001, the be the subject of much criticism. Britain EU accounted for 33.3 percent of overall took security responsibility in the Shi’a trade and 55 percent of Iraq's imports, after south of the country, centering its which it began to decrease once again. 31 operations in Basra. The British army, with European economic engagement with its experience in Northern Ireland and other Iraq is thus increasing, and can be expected post-1945 insurgency situations, was to continue to increase depending, confident in its ability to maintain order in ultimately, on the level of stability in Iraq. the Shi’a south successfully, where in any European aid for reconstruction in Iraq, case there was little immediate interest in a however, has been modest, and here strategy of rebellion. Italy, Spain, and political factors are significant. Countries Poland also committed forces at the outset. that opposed the war have been reluctant to Smaller commitments were made by contribute largely to the rebuilding of Iraq Denmark, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, the in a process that they regarded as Czech Republic, and Norway. fundamentally illegitimate. The French As the insurgency gained pace in late refusal to make a donation of any kind at 2003, there was some British criticism of the conference in Madrid in October 2003 U.S. tactics and strategy. The British, in the offers perhaps the clearest example of this. much more peaceful south, stressed attempts to work with and coopt potentially Europe and the Insurgency hostile forces, including the Mahdi army of the young firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Again, the approaches of European The U.S. view was, initially at least, a more countries to the insurgency in Iraq, and to across-the-board opposition to all illegally broader questions of security, cannot be constituted militias. The British considered separated from their core interpretation of that their own approach—which they the Iraq invasion. For France and Germany, viewed as more respectful of existing local the insurgency at least tacitly seemed to power structures and traditions and less offer a vindication of their warnings openly assertive—stood a greater chance of regarding the very advisability of the success. invasion. The French attitude on security at

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In practice, however, in the course of costs the chaos in Iraq, which, of course, 2004, British and U.S. practices were will be disaster for the whole region."32 tending toward convergence. A number of De Villepin had been among the most violent incidents placed a clear limit on the vocal and active French opponents of the extent of British ability to co-opt and war in 2003. However, statements of this cooperate with local organizations. The type have not translated into substantive aid United States, meanwhile, found its own in combating the insurgency, nor in major way toward limited dialogue with Sunni contributions to the building up of the new militias, for example, in its contacts with Iraqi security forces. The pattern in which such organizations to end the Fallujah countries opposed to the war have preferred situation in April 2004. At the same time, to hang back rather than be associated with the British desire and belief in the what they regard as a failed policy has possibility of a more police-oriented, less remained. The general sense in Europe— military approach has remained a constant certainly among European public opinion— and observable point of disagreement is that the Iraqi invasion has been an between the UK and the United States. unsuccessful enterprise. This is the case As detailed above, changes in also in countries such as the UK, where government in a number of countries, such government policy has remained consistent as Spain and Italy, have led to a reduction in its support for the war, active of the European military commitment in engagement in counter-insurgency, and the Iraq. European commitment to involvement building up of the new Iraq.33 in civil policing has been similarly limited. However, the trend—as witnessed in In the course of 2005, however, Spain and Italy—has been for countries following the beginnings of greater initially supportive of the war to go over to European engagement in Iraq and moves the more skeptical camp. The result is that toward greater Iraqi self-government and regarding European security commitments, elections, the views of the governments of efforts by coalition allies have been toward countries opposed to the war became more seeking to maintain existing commitments nuanced. While opposition to the original (with limited success) rather than project in Iraq remained, there was a expanding the European representation. growing sense that what was now important was the successful maintenance of the CONCLUSIONS situation in order to avoid the collapse of the country into chaos, which was in the A combination of widespread prewar interest of none but the forces of radical opposition to the policy of invading Iraq, a Islam. Thus, in December 2005, when sense that initial doubts have been asked on CNN regarding the issue of a vindicated, and genuine apprehension at the timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. and deepening uncertainty regarding the future coalition forces from Iraq, French Prime of Iraq have limited European willingness Minister Dominique de Villepin did not to engage in the reconstruction of Iraq. This issue a demand for the immediate end of has applied even to areas where the foreign military involvement in Iraq. European contribution could not have been Rather, he said that "the real timetable is construed as retrospective justification for the Iraqi situation…. We should avoid at all the policy of invasion.

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This policy has not been of policy, and can only be understood with unambiguous benefit to European countries. reference to these, rather than in practical There is evidence, for example, to suggest limitations preventing efforts from being that France's opposition to the policy of made. These issues of policy have served to invasion could paradoxically have been to prevent a united European response on Iraq. the benefit of the French in engaging with The European response on Iraq offers the new Iraq, and the reluctance of France the latest proof for the survival of specific to engage was a source of disappointment and sometimes opposed foreign policy and surprise to some Iraqis. orientations among leading European states. Clearly, these arguments apply in the British Atlanticism versus the French desire main to the anti-war camp in Europe. to balance U.S. power internationally Europe remains split between the camp led remains the key divide. Despite the by Britain, which includes a number of existence of bureaucratic bodies attesting to new, Central European member states, and the existence of a Europe-wide foreign the camp led by France, which includes a policy, the experience of Iraq from 2003 number of smaller, traditionally neutral until now indicates that no such policy can countries. Since the Iraq War of 2003, two be said to exist in a meaningful sense. major European countries—Spain and Italy—have, in effect, passed from the * Dr. Jonathan Spyer has served as a British-led camp to the French-led camp as special advisor on international affairs to a result of elections in those countries. Israeli Cabinet ministers. He is currently a Germany, meanwhile, has gone over to the research fellow at the Global Research in broadly Atlanticist camp as a result of International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, general elections. Current chancellor Herzliya, Israel. Angela Merkel was publicly critical of Gerhard Schroeder's Iraq policy when she was leader of the German opposition, and she also made her opposition clear during visits to the United States.34 NOTES

A paper produced in 2004 at a pro-Blair 1 think tank in London suggested that ample Vernon Loeb, "Saddam's Iraqi Foes opportunities for a constructive European Heartened by Clinton," Washington Post, role in Iraq existed, for example, in November 16, 1998, http://www.washingtonpost.com. assistance in security reform, mediating 2 with insurgents, and helping political Richard Youngs, “Europe and Iraq: From parties to develop. “Existing challenges,” stand-off to engagement?,” Foreign Policy Centre, October, 2004. p. 6. the writer concluded, “provide ample 3 opportunity for the EU to apply its own From "How the EU Conducts its External 35 Relations," http://www.eu-del.org.il. experience and expertise to good effect.” 4 While European engagement has increased Philippe Lemaitre, "An EU 'Advance since 2004, strong factors militate against Guard' Should Lead the Way," European the likelihood that European involvement Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Spring 2003), http://www.europeanaffairs.org. will move substantially beyond current 5 levels. The reasons for this reluctance are to "Security Council Holds Iraq in Material be found in issues of high politics and Breach of Disarmament Obligations," UN

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press release, SC/7564, November 8, 2002, Times, October 19, 2004, http://www.un.org. http://www.nytimes.com. 6 "Outrage at 'old Europe' remarks," BBC 19 "Officials: Ban on Baathists delays Iraqi News, January 23, 2003, government," CNN, May 19, 2003, http://www.bbc.co.uk. http://www.cnn.com. 7 "EU allies unite against Iraq war," BBC 20 Helm, "Blair fears new Cold War." News, January 25, 2003, 21 "U.S. returns sovereignty to Iraq," CNN, http://www.bbc.co.uk. June 28, 2004, http://www.cnn.com. 8 Ibid. 22 See "The EU's relations with Iraq - 9 Charles Grant, "Germany's Foreign Overview," Policy: What Can be Learned from the http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations Schroder Years?," Centre for European /iraq/intro/. Reform, September 2, 2005, 23 "Spain PM firm on Iraq withdrawal," http://www.cer.org.uk. BBC Online, March 17, 2004, 10 Gerard Baker, James Blitz, Judy http://www.bbc.co.uk. Dempsey, Robert Graham, Quentin Peel, 24 " Commission offers fresh support for the and Mark Turner, "Blair's Mission electoral process in Iraq," European Impossible: The Doomed Effort to Win a Commission website, November 4, 2004, Second UN Resolution," Financial Times, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations May 29, 2003, http://www.ft.com. . 11 Brian Crowe, "EU-US Relations and the 25 Robin Wright, "No Foreign Observers to Implications of Iraq," American Diplomacy, Monitor Vote in Iraq," Washington Post, February 17, 2003, http://www.unc.edu. January 22, 2005, 12 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, "Fury as http://www.washingtonpost.com. Chirac threatens new EU states," Daily 26 "Iraq: Situation after referendum on Telegraph, February 18, 2003, Constitution," speech by European http://www.telegraph.co.uk. Commissioner for External Relations and 13 Robert Kagan, "Power and weakness," European Neighborhood policy Benita Policy Review, No. 113. (June/July 2002), Ferrero-Waldner in European Parliament in http://www.policyreview.org. Strasbourg, November 16, 2005, European 14 Toby Helm, "Blair fears new Cold War Commission website, over rift with US," Daily Telegraph, April http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations 29, 2003, http://www.telegraph.co.uk. . 15 Youngs, “Europe and Iraq.” 27 John Hooper and Suzanne Goldenberg, 16 "France, Germany, Russia Call for UN "Prodi signals early end to Italian role in Central Role in Postwar Iraq," China Iraq 'occupation'," The Guardian, May 19, Peoples' Daily, April 5, 2003, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk. http://english.people.com.cn. 28 Esther Pan, "Madrid Donor Conference," 17 Remy Ourdan, "France's Policy is Still Council of Foreign Relations, October 30, Sharply Criticized by Iraqis," Le Monde, 2003, http://www.cfr.org. March 18, 2004. 29 The Paris Club is an association of major 18 Michael Gordon, "The Strategy to Secure creditor nations. It has nineteen members, Iraq Did not Foresee a 2nd War," New York including France, the United States, the

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UK, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Finland. 30 Craig S. Smith, "Major Creditors in Accord to Waive 80% of Iraq Debt," New York Times, November 22, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com. 31 See "Bilateral Trade Relations," European Commission website, for further details on Europe's past and current economic relationship with Iraq, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/trade/issues/bilate ral/countries/iraq. 32 John Ward Anderson, "EU Leaders and public differ on pullout in Iraq," Washington Post, December 9, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com. 33 Ibid. 34 John C. Hulsman and Nile Gardiner, "US-German relations in the Merkel era," Backgrounder # 1907, Heritage Foundation Policy research and analysis, January 11, 2006, http://www.heritage.org; "German- Iraqi business conference highlights opportunities," July 22, 2005, http://www.portaliraq.com. Since a gradual increase in engagement of formerly anti- war countries may be traced from mid-2004 onwards, Mrs. Merkel was not confronted with a policy of strict disengagement from Iraq and has not radically increased levels of involvement. Germany was among the Paris Club members who voted to relieve Iraq's debts in November 2004. By that year, the value of German exports to Iraq totaled $479 million, about prewar level. This example is quoted to show that the situation is not black and white. Increased European engagement, particularly in the economic sphere, is occurring to a limited degree. 35 Youngs, “Europe and Iraq.”

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