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Morton Halperin Instructor: Mr Understanding the Vietnam War: An Insider's Perspective Interviewer: Rebecca Hyde Interviewee: Morton Halperin Instructor: Mr. Alex Haight Date of Submission: February 13, 2008 Statement of Purpose The purpose of this American Oral History Project and my interview with Morton Halperin, a Pentagon employee during the Vietnam War, is to better understand a commonly misconstrued event. The knowledge acquired from speaking to a person who was aware of many aspects of the war can provide deep insight into a side of the Vietnam War that some choose to ignore. Dr. Halperin's experiences with policy planning and his involvement with the production of the Pentagon Papers allow him to accurately explain the events as well as the reasoning of the American government, unaffected by biases and rumors that spread among the dissatisfied public. The interview allows any reader to better understand, from the perspective of a person involved with the government's actions, what truly happened in the Vietnam War, why the American public had a sudden change of heart, and how the outcome should be interpreted. Biography Morton Halperin was born on June 13, 1938, in Brooklyn, New York. Growing up with his older brother, Mort attended Lafayette High School, and his mother took care of the two children while his father worked. By this time, Mort had already developed an early interest in international affairs, and attended Columbia College in order to earn his bachelor's degree in Political Science by 1958. Mort then moved on to earn a master's degree and a Ph.D. in International Relations from Yale University. By 1960, Morton began his career path by becoming a research associate at the Harvard Center for International Affairs, the first of many jobs dealing with research, affairs, policy planning, and national security. By 1964, the time the Vietnam War was in its early stages of development, Morton was working on nuclear insurgence and was not following the war with great interest. However, Mort, like many others, supported America's venture. During these early years, Morton held positions at Harvard University, including Instructor in Government and Assistant Professor of Government. By 1966, Mort began to question the war, about the same time period that he became a special assistant for planning to the assistant Secretary of Defense and later a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. These careers led Mort into direct involvement with the war, dealing with policy planning shortly after the Tet Offensive1 and producing the Pentagon Papers throughout 1968. Today, Mort lives in Washington, D.C., and works for the Center for American Progress, the Open Society Policy Center, and the Open Society Institute. He has three children, and in 2005, married Diane Orentlicher, a world-renowned expert on human rights and a professor of law at American University. 1 The Tet Offensive is regarded by many historians as a turning point for public support of the war. An unsuccessful communist attack on South Vietnam during Tet (the Vietnamese New Year) convinced the American people that Johnson's strategy of increasing forces would not lead the United States to victory. An Unlikely Failure: Background of the Vietnam War and American Involvement President Lyndon B. Johnson once stated, "A President's hardest task is not to do what is right, but to know what is right." These words exemplify the confusion, uncertainty, and controversy surrounding America's most infamous disappointment: The Vietnam War. Rooted deep in the French colonization of the area beginning in 1857, the war was fought on the soil of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos from 1964 to 1975, and proved to be much more severe than initially imagined. Intense warfare took place between North and South Vietnam as the United States, under Presidents John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard Nixon, steadily dug itself deeper into its own ditch of involvement. The slippery slope constantly forced America, and other international powers such as Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea, to commit and sacrifice more and more as the length of the war began to grow. What was once predicted to be a simple intervention soon transformed into the United States' longest and most unpopular war in the country's history. To complicate the matter, the war seemed to be an inconceivable struggle for America, though the powerful nation had nearly every advantage playing on its side. The unexpected uphill battle challenged the government in many ways: ever-increasing demands of both money and troops, mixed with the war's wild unpopularity with the public, forced the presidents and their administrations into a tug-of-war. In order to better understand the perspective of a person who worked under the Johnson and Nixon Administrations, one must be informed of the government's unsuccessful wartime policies, issues surrounding public disapproval, and controversy surrounding the publication of private government information. Though the bulk of the war was fought during the mid-twentieth century, its seeds were planted nearly a century beforehand with the massive French invasion and colonization of Indochina. Accompanied by the sudden upsurge of capitalism in France was a need for foreign markets and a desire for more territory. Napoleon III ordered the naval commander in East Asia to attack the harbor city of Tourane and convert it into a French military base. On September 1, 1858, Genouilly2 sailed into the harbor city with fourteen ships and 2,500 men, occupying the town within one day. However, the French commander felt that no substantial progress would be made in the area and soon looked on to capture Saigon, the largest city in Vietnam. By this time, Vietnamese resistance prepared themselves and stopped the French from gaining any territories past Saigon, though they struggled to maintain their success. In 1862, the nations signed a treaty which ceded Tourane, Saigon, and three other territories to France. Sixteen years later, France controlled the entire country. French control altered the area politically, economically, and socially, with a corrupt power that exploited many citizens. The nations making up Indochina, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, had gained independence from China a century prior, yet struggled to cope or take action against France's colonization. Initially only minor changes were made, but as time passed, alterations became more severe. "French colonialism didn't make much difference…at first. But from 1900 on, the colonial government began to transform the village economy into part of the world capitalist system" (Neale 9). Early on, France also failed to do much to put many of its policies into play. "Until the middle of the 19th century, however, France did little to advance its vague policy goals of unrestrained trade and unrestricted religious proselytization" (Haley 1). Though late in 2 A French Naval commander. taking action, France was able to make an impact and cruelly took advantage of the poverty-stricken Vietnamese citizens. As a result, a separation between the upper class and the lower class began to form. The chasm between the haves and have-nots was steadily widening as those with power aimed to deprive those without. Landlords in the villages acquired more money and power while peasants found themselves in a vicious spiral of debt. "As the landlords became more powerful, they took more and more of the rice produced and the peasants took less" (Neale 10). The landlords then made hefty revenue from their increased supply of resources by trading the rice to assorted cities in return for miscellaneous goods. "In 1903, the highest ranking Vietnamese in the colonial system earned less than the lowliest French official" (Karnow 114). By 1940, five or six families controlled thirty to forty percent of the land in the village of My Thuy Phong, and the poorest ninety percent controlled roughly a third of the land. On top of stealing the peasants' goods and reaping the benefits themselves, those in power soon realized that they had the ability to charge more for village land. Peasants' paychecks plummeted as mortgages and taxes shot up. Those who were not able to pay their dues were arrested. Famines were widespread and poverty was common. The culture and lifestyle in Vietnam was also radically altered as the French took control of more aspects of life. French colonialism transformed the "old class of feudal landlords and imperial officers into a new class of capitalist landlords and colonial officials" (Neale 13). Education was also modified as children of this class attended new government schools for about three years, learned the French language, often became government officials and officers in the army or police, and were made aware that they owed their wealth to France. Chinese characters were banned and replaced with either French or quoc ngu3. "By the eve of World War II, fewer than one fifth of all school-age boys were attending classes…A French governor of Cochinchina had commented: '…We have been manufacturing illiterates'" (Karnow 115). Not to be ignored was the division between the North and South4. The nation had been divided both geographically and culturally, into two native kingdoms, Tonkin and Annan, in the north, and Cochin China in the south. This separation made "communication difficult and administration awkward" (Jones 593). The Vietnamese did not remain silent: a chain of rebellions and resistance resulted in an eruption of war. Tax revolts were widespread and nationalistic leaders began to arise, such as Phan Boi Chau, Phan Chu Trinh, and, the most prominent, Ho Chi Minh5. Searching for alternative ideas to fighting off the French colonists, many turned to Communism. The new political group formed, recruited Minh to be the leader, and gained popularity, "After all, people became Communists because they wanted to change the world…" (Neale 18).
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