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Abadi Presses for Control of Iraqi Borders

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Abadi Presses for Control of Iraqi Borders 4 October 29, 2017 Cover Story Iraq Abadi presses for control of Iraqi borders Mamoon Alabbasi a referendum on Kurdistan’s inde- pendence void after the Kurdish leader offered to “freeze” it. London Iraqi forces have reclaimed most of the disputed areas that raqi Prime Minister Haider al- were under peshmerga control Abadi ordered Iraqi forces to since 2014, giving Abadi unprec- reclaim control of two of the edented public support. country’s border areas, one “Iraq is getting stronger, getting held by Islamic State (ISIS) unified,” Abadi told the Washing- Imilitants and the other manned ton Post and other Western media. by peshmerga fighters loyal to He hinted that this sense of Kurdistan Regional Government unity would gradually push away (KRG) President Masoud Barzani. Iran’s meddling in Iraq’s affairs. Iraqi forces launched an offen- “I think others or the interfer- sive in Anbar province to capture ence of others in the affairs of Iraq the last ISIS-held towns of Qaim, will become less and less. This is which is on the border with Syria, a new-built confidence among and Rawa. At the same time, Iraqi Iraqis, the Iraqi national feeling, military backed by the Popular which our aim is to increase — Mobilisation Forces (PMF) moved people’s attachment to their own towards Dohuk province to claim country,” Abadi said. control of the Faysh Khabur bor- Tehran’s sphere of influence der post with Turkey. goes beyond its traditional allies Abadi ordered a 24-hour sus- — Shia Arabs and Shia Turkmen pension to military operations — and reaches Sunni Kurds, too. against peshmerga fighters to al- Observers said the referendum low them to hand over control of strengthened Iran’s grip on Iraq. the border area, which Iraqi au- “The Kurdish referendum has thorities say is critical for oil ex- further empowered undisciplined ports. [Iran-backed] militias, giving Show of confidence. Iraqi forces launch rockets against Kurdish peshmerga positions in the area of The decision to engage in two them another reason to remain Faysh Khabur on the Turkish and Syrian borders, on October 26. (AFP) military operations simultane- long after [ISIS] is defeated,” wrote ously was considered a show of Denise Natali, the director at the confidence by Abadi but critics Centre for Strategic Research, on (SAME) Forum in London. Collett, the defence attaché of the policy towards all its citizens. say it may overstretch Iraqi forces. the website warontherocks.com. “What’s important for Iraq is: British Embassy in Iraq. “Other- Krieg blamed former Prime Min- They are also present in Kirkuk “To help stabilise Iraq after [ISIS] Stabilisation, stabilisation, sta- wise, another form of Daesh will ister Nuri al-Maliki for many of the after retaking the city along with and check nefarious Iranian influ- bilisation,” said Brigadier Gareth come back,” he said, using the Ara- country’s failures. The Iraqi Army other disputed territories from ences, the United States needs to bic acronym for ISIS. had many Maliki loyalists, which peshmerga control. reinforce a strong and sovereign Collett said people in the areas is why its soldiers ran away in the US Army Lieutenant-General Iraqi state,” argued Natali. “Plead- liberated from ISIS must be pro- face of ISIS in 2014, said Krieg. Paul Funk said the dispute be- ing with and coddling Kurdish of- vided with jobs so they earn their Pro-Iran politicians such as Maliki tween the central government ficials is not a policy and does not own money and do not need in- threaten the prospect of an inclu- and the KRG was diverting re- advance US interests.” ducements offered to them by ISIS sive Iraq, he added. sources as well as intelligence and Despite the distraction of the recruiters. “Sunni Arabs have suffered focus from the war on ISIS. “We Kurdish referendum and the He added that it was important torture, rape and extra judicial don’t need Iraqis killing Iraqis military success against ISIS, the Tehran’s sphere of for the anti-ISIS coalition “not to killing,” at the hands of the Shia- when we’ve got [ISIS] to kill out threat of the militant group has influence goes walk away from Iraq” immediate- majority forces. “They also faced in the west,” Funk told the Associ- not been eradicated. beyond its ly after defeating the militants on ethnic cleaning” carried out by ated Press. Iraq needs stability and inclu- traditional allies — the battlefield because they could Kurdish peshmerga fighters. The United Nations and the siveness in order to make sure Shia Arabs and Shia regroup. That’s why Sunni Arabs “feel like United States urged Baghdad and that ISIS and other jihadist groups Speaking at the same event, An- second-class citizens,” said Krieg. the KRG to stop clashes and en- do not resurface, observers said Turkmen — but dreas Krieg, an assistant professor In sensitive areas, people should gage in dialogue. Abadi insisted during a conference organised by reaches Sunni at King’s College London, said Iraq be policed by members of their that Barzani declare the results of the South Asia and Middle East Kurds, too. needs to adopt a more inclusive own communities, he added. Iraqi Kurds see fortunes reversed after referendum n less than a month the for- among the rapid reversal Iraq’s been frozen. This took place in a Emma Sky wrote in the Atlantic tunes of Iraqi Kurdistan, its Kurds have suffered. climate dominated by the threat that, because the “United States leaders and inhabitants have Paul Iddon, an Irish journalist posed by the PMF and after the stated that it would not take sides James Snell reversed. in Erbil, said: “Friends and locals I United States effectively failed to in what it viewed as a dispute Iraqi Kurds voted over- know feel betrayed. In the imme- demonstrate any support between the Iraqi government and is a British journalist. whelmingly in favour of diate aftermath of Kirkuk, people for Iraq’s Kurds. the KDP, instigated by Barzani,” independence and optimism were devastated and felt demoral- mediation between the KRG and Iappeared to reign. The referendum, ised. Kirkuk is everything to a lot of Iraqi state forces “is unlikely to be however, brought complications people here.” from Americans.” and immediate repercussions and Initially, despite stories of ex- Kamal Chomani, a non-resident illuminated systemic problems tensive resistance from peshmerga fellow at the Tahrir Institute for within the Kurdistan Regional Gov- around Kirkuk, there was little Middle East Policy in Washington, ernment (KRG), including political violence. It is assumed that a covert said: [The KRG] has “realised that, and economic dysfunction and deal had been struck by the PUK, if they do not suspend it, then general social malaise. whose peshmerga largely defended the situation will get even more Then the unthinkable occurred. Kirkuk, and the advancing Iraqi severe and if they do not resolve Iraq’s federal government, aided state and PMF forces. the issues, then Baghdad will heavily by Iran-sponsored militias Hawez noted that on October take other measures.” in the form of the Popular Mobilisa- 23 there He said: “The KDP and PUK tion Forces (PMF), moved to oc- had been are afraid for their existence cupy territory that had been under limited n o w.” Kurdish control since 2014. What clashes Barzani, who has been followed was a remarkable reversal in Altun blamed for much of the cri- of fortune for the KRG. Kupri sis, is likely to leave office. “Peshmerga has retreated from between He already exceeded the all disputed areas without excep- Kirkuk limits of his official term. tion,” said Abdulla Hawez, a King’s and Erbil Paradoxically, this leaves College London researcher looking but there the way clear for continued at Kurdish politics and society. The have been KDP control of Iraqi Kurd- retreat was an embarrassment and no further istan politics by other means created great tension within Iraqi fighting in but offers little prospect of a Kurdistan. that area. solution to the crisis. KRG President Masoud Barzani, Since then, there has been ad- The PMF and Iraqi forces who is among the leadership of the ditional fighting between the PMF have moved deeper into Kurd- Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and the peshmerga. “Clashes were ish territory. Rumours abound blamed the opposition Patriotic reported in Makhmur in Erbil prov- that the PMF, unrestrained by Union of Kurdistan (PUK) for the ince and in Mahmudiyah, near [the] international pressure, may retreat. Rabia border crossing with Syria push the KRG into a confronta- The situation was exacerbated and in Telskuf in north-eastern tion. In truth, however, the Iraqi in recent days. Hawez said: “Now Mosul,” Hawez said. state and the Iran-backed PMF with KRG President Iraqi forces and PMF are advancing Aside from rare outbreaks of which it is working have secured a Masoud Barzani, even further. So Kurdish leaders are violence, however, the KRG appears strategic triumph. They have stolen who has been realising, if they just leave areas, to be seeking to avoid confronta- the initiative from the KRG. the Iraqi forces won’t stop there but tion. Its peshmerga is capable of Major reversal. A member of Calling the referendum, which blamed for much push to advance even further.” fighting the PMF and Iraqi state Iraqi federal forces holds the seemed to symbolise a new age of of the crisis, is Many Iraqi Kurds are deeply forces but are deliberately refrain- Kurdish flag upside down after Kurdish prosperity and promise, disheartened. The loss of Kirkuk, ing from doing so. Iraq’s central government appears to have been a terrible likely to leave a symbolic city with real signifi- The KRG announced that the forces seized Kurdish positions mistake, all the more bitter because office.
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