Aufsatz Antulio J. Echevarria II A Crisis in Warfighting: German Tactical Discussions in the Late Nineteenth Century Assessments of German military thinking for the quarter-century prior to the First World War have been highly critical of its contributions to tactical and stra- tegic thought. Contemporary critiques range from the military analyses of Charles ä Court Repington, a former British colonel turned war correspondent for The Times in 1900, to the historical and political essays of Hans Delbrück, Imperial Germany's first, albeit unofficial, civilian military historian since the early 1880's. Repington, who had observed the German army's field maneuvers from 1905 to 1911, reproached it for »being the slave of a single idea,« namely, tactical envel- opment; incidentally, French criticisms of German tactics echoed those of Rep- ington1. Delbrück attacked the General Staff's predilection for annihilation strat- egy and its belief that modern war required nothing less than the complete de- feat of the enemy during the long literary duel that developed over interpreta- tions of the military theories of Frederick the Great and Carl von Clausewitz2. More recently, Clausewitzian scholars like Herbert Rosinski criticized the in- tellectual dogmatism of Count Alfred von Schlieffen, the Imperial German Ar- my's Chief of the General Staff from 1891 to 1905, and his contemporaries, the so-called epigones, whom they have labeled as »second-hand and second-rate« thinkers3. Other historians maintain that the German army of the pre-war years was more an instrument for internal repression than national defense4. While 1 Charles ä Court Repington, »Tendencies of the German Army«, in Essays and Criticisms, 2nd Ed. (London, 1913), 213. Harsher views are reflected in his series, »The German Army Maneuvers«, The Times, October 12, 14, 17,19, 24, 28, 1911. See also Jay Luvaas, The Education of an Army (Chicago, 1964), 314-15. For French views see, Major de Pardieu, A Critical Study of German Tactics and of the New German Regulations, trans. Charles F. Martin, (Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1912). 2 Arden Bucholz, Hans Delbrück and the German Military Establishment: War Images in Conflict (Iowa City, 1985); and Gordon A. Craig, »Delbrück: The Military Historian«, in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J., 1986), 326-353. 3 See: Herbert Rosinski, »Scharnhorst to Schlieffen: The Rise and Decline of German Mil- itary Thought«, Naval War College Review 29 (1976): 83-103; Werner Hahlweg, »Das Clausewitzbild einst und jetzt«, in Vom Kriege. Hinterlassenes Werk des Generals Carl von Clausewitz, 19th Ed., ed. Werner Hahlweg (Bonn, 1989), 1-170; Ulrich Marwedel, Carl von Clausewitz. Persönlichkeit und Wirkungsgeschichte seines Werkes bis 1918 (Boppard, 1978); Jehuda L. Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clause- witz and Schlieffen and their Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars (Westport, Conn., 1986). 4 See: Martin Kitchen, The German Officer Corps 1890-1914 (Oxford, 1968); Eckart Kehr, Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy. Essays on German History, trans, by Gre- te Heinz, ed. and intr. by Gordon Craig (Berkeley, Calif., 1977); Bernd F. Schulte, Die deutsche Armee 1900-1914: Zwischen Beharren und Verändern (Düsseldorf, 1977); and Vor dem Kriegsausbruch 1914: Deutschland, die Türkei und der Balkan (Düsseldorf, 1980); and Heiger Ostertag, Bildung, Ausbildung und Erziehung des Offizierkorps im deutschen Kaiser- reich 1871 bis 1981: Eliteideal, Anspruch und Wirklichkeit (Frankfurt a.M., 1990). Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 55 (1996), S. 51-68 © Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Potsdam 52 MGM 55 (1996) Antulio J. Echevarria II these criticisms reflect a fair amount of truth, none has examined how the rapid pace of technological change affected the Imperial Army's military theory. In fact, the dramatic increase in the effectiveness of modern weaponry, particularly in the last third of the nineteenth century, had created a profound crisis for the Prusso-German approach to war; and the epigones, these second-hand and sec- ond-rate thinkers, responded to it with solutions that were both practicable and forward looking in nature. I. The Crisis By the turn of the century, military writers both within and outside Germany realized that four new phenomena were exercising a decisive influence on the conduct of war: 1) improved road networks; 2) railroads; 3) electric telegraphs; and 4) long-range, rapid-firing rifles and cannon5. These new developments, many believed, had, even since the Franco-Prussian War, fundamentally altered the conduct of war itself, irretrievably separating its present forms from those of the past. The improvements in long-range, rapid-firing rifles and cannon were of particular concern, for they afforded a defending enemy significant advantages in firepower, thereby threatening to make the successful execution of an infantry attack, especially a frontal one, impossible. As Field Marshal Helmuth von Molt- ke (1800-1891), the Prusso-German army's famous Chief of Staff of the General Staff, had written in 1858, the universal and fundamental improvements in in- fantry weapons alone necessitated »a change in the tactics of all branches. [...] The firepower of an infantry platoon [today] surpasses the range and destructive ef- fect of the case-shot of a six-pounder cannon6.« Later, Prince Kraft zu Hohen- lohe-Ingelfingen (1827-1892), a much decorated artillery officer of the wars against Austria and France, would write that the recent improvements in firearms meant that the defender could offer »unconquerable resistance against an attack direct- ed against his front, as long as he has sufficient ammunition, his men fire calm- ly, and he has not suffered heavy losses in the front line«7. This development, in turn, threatened to undermine the German approach to war which, following the wisdom of Clausewitz and the practical guidance of Moltke, depended almost 5 R. v. Caemmerer, Entwickelung der strategischen Wissenschaft im 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin, 1904), 123. Similar observations were made outside Germany by noted military think- ers like G.F.R. Henderson, The Science of War. A Collection of Essays and Lectures 1892-1903, ed. N. Malcolm, (London, 1905), esp. 372-5. 6 »Bemerkungen vom 12. Juli 1858 über Veränderungen in der Taktik infolge des verbes- serten Infanteriegewehrs«, in Helmuth von Moltke, Moltkes Militärische Werke, Vol. II, Part 2, Die Thätigkeit als Chef des Generalstabes der Armee im Frieden, ed. by Großen Ge- neralstabe (Berlin, 1900), 7. See also his essays: »Bemerkungen vom April 1861 über den Einfluß der verbesserten Feuerwaffen auf die Taktik«, and »Bemerkungen vom Jahre 1865 über den Einfluß der verbesserten Feuerwaffen auf die Taktik«, in the same volume, pp. 27-41 and 47-65, respectively. 7 Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Letters on Infantry, trans, by N.L. Walford (London, 1892), Letter X, 127. Similar thoughts are echoed in August Keim, »Der ge- genwärtige Stand der Gefechtslehre und die Ausbildung zum Gefecht«, Beihefte zum Militär-Wochenblatt (Hereafter, Beihefte), No. 1 (1890): 1-22. A Crisis in Warfighting 53 entirely upon achieving success at the tactical level8. In short, if the infantry attack could not be driven home, the possibility of obtaining decisive victory, too, was jeopardized. By the mid-nineteenth century, the face of battle had indeed changed. Weap- ons like the breech-loading needle gun, so named because it used a long, nee- dle-like striker to fire its cartridge, gave the Prussians a decisive edge over the Danes in the Schleswig-Holstein War in 1864, and over the Austrians in the War of 18669. Its rate of fire was three times that of the muzzle-loader; and it allowed the soldier to load and fire in the prone position, thus reducing his exposure to enemy fire10. Consequently, at engagements like Lundby, the Prussians inflicted casualties on the Danes at a rate of about thirty to one11. Likewise, at the battle of Podol, the Prussians defeated an Austrian counter-attack, inflicting losses at a rate of nearly ten to one12. Such was the pace of technological change, however, that by the Franco-Prussian War the needle gun was already obsolete. The French chassepot exceeded it in range by more than 1,000 yards, offered greater accuracy even at close range, and was capable of a higher rate of fire13. Conse- quently, at battles like Spichern and St. Privat, the Prussians lost more than twice as many casualties as the French. In fact, at St. Privat, the Prussian Guard Divi- sion suffered over 8,000 casualties, more than half its combat strength, in a single frontal assault that lasted less than twenty minutes14. »These faults«, wrote Ho- henlohe-Ingelfingen, »were due not to particular individuals [... but to] the sys- tem and the principles followed. [...] New inventions entail changes, and the old movements, which we have loved, pass away like dreams15.« By the 1880's, in 8 See, for example: »Aus den Verordnungen für die höheren Truppenführer vom 24. Juni 1869«, and »Aufsatz vom Jahre 1871 >Ueber Strategie«^ in Moltke, Militärische Werke (see fn. 6), II, 2, pp. 175 and 291-93, respectively; and compare Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book III, Chapter 1, »Strategy«. 9 Gordon A. Craig, The Battle of Königgrätz: Prussia's Victory over Austria (Philadelphia, New York, 1964), 20-21. 10 Dennis E. Showalter, Railroads and Rifles. Soldiers, Technology, and the Unification of Ger- many (Hamden, Conn., 1975), 115-16 and 125-26; and »Infantry Weapons, Infantry Tactics and the Armies of Germany, 1849-64«, European Studies Review 4 (April 1974): 119^0. 11 Lundby was a company-sized engagement fought between Danish and Prussian in- fantry detachments of 180 and 120 men respectively that lasted barely twenty minutes. Der Deutsch-Dänische Krieg 1864, 2 Vols., ed. by Großen Generalstab, (Berlin, 1886-87), II, 706-713; Theodor Fontane, Der Schleswig-Holsteinsche Krieg im fahre 1864 (Berlin, 1866), 346-47.