Copyright by Elaine Diana Smith 1959 ORIGINS OF THE KEMALIST MOVEMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (1919-1923) by Elaine Diana Smith

Submitted to the

Faculty of the Graduate School

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

International Relations and Organization

SStf* to ■ Signatures of Committee:

Chairman: ■v\V^G

Date: f y n I 1} June 1959

The lerican Univer: Washington, D.C. TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

PREFACE...... iv

INTRODUCTION...... vii

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ...... 1

II. EARLY NATIONALIST EFFORTS TO FORM A GOVERNMENT

IN ANATOLIA (1919-1920) lU

III. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE

GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (APRIL 23, 19 2 0 ) ...... 37

IV. "NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY" THE DOCTRINAL BASIS

OF KEMALISM ...... 55

V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL GROUPINGS AND PARTIES . . . 77

VI. THE EMERGENCE OF MUSTAFA KEMAL PASHA AS THE

LEADER OF THE NEW TURKEY...... 95

VII. HOW THE SOCIOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS FACING

THE KEMALIST GOVERNMENT WERE M E T ...... 116

VIII. THE BASIC LINES OF KEMALIST FOREIGN

POLICY (1919-1923) ...... 132

XI. CONCLUSIONS...... 152

CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 15b

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 166

APPENDIX A. Chronology of Important Events (1918-1925) .... 191

APPENDIX B. The National Pact (Mill! Misak) of January 20, 1920 ...... 195 iii

CHAPTER PAGE

APPENDIX C. Communication of Mustafa Kemal to Turkish Civil and Military Authorities, March 16, 1920 .... 197

APPENDIX D. Letter to World Leaders by Mustafa Kemal, March 16, 1920 ...... 198

APPENDIX E. Fundamental Articles of the Constitutional Act of the Grand National Assembly (Law of Fundamental Organization) January 20, 1921 . . . 200

APPENDIX F. Declaration of the Government of the Grand National Assembly regarding Cherkes Ethem, January 1921 ...... 202

APPENDIX G. Nine Principles of the People’s Party, April 1, 1923 20U

APPENDIX H. Important Legislation passed by the Grand National Assembly (1920-1923)...... 206

APPENDIX I. Biographical Sketches of Prominent Turkish Leaders ...... 207

Atatftrk, Mustafa K e m a l ...... * 207

Adivar, Halide Edib (and Dr. Adnan Adivar) . . . 2lit

Bayar, Celal ...... 215

Be Is, General Refet (Refet Pasha) ...... 216

Cebesoy, General Ali Fuat (Fuat P a s h a ).... 217

Chakmak, Marshal Fevzi (Fevzi P a s h a )...... 218

Enver P a s h a ...... 219

GBkalp, Ziya ...... 220

InSntt, Ismet (Ismet P a s h a ) ...... 221

Karabekir, General Kazim (Karabekir Pasha) . . . 222

Orbay, Rauf (Rauf B e y ) ...... 223

Bekir S a m i ...... 22U

APPENDIX J. Glossary of Turkish T e r m s ...... 225 PREFACE

The author, a student of international relations and Turkish affairs, wishes to acknowledge her deep gratitude to the members of her Dissertation Committee, JJr. Kerim K. Key, Chairman, Dr. Mary E.

Bradshaw, Dr. Wendell W. Cleland, JJr. Lawrence D. Egbert, and

Dr. Abdul Aziz Said, for their direction, advice, encouragement, and helpful criticism.

Although this stucty- is concerned primarily with the Government of the Grand National Assembly and the Kemalist Movement during the period 1919-1923, special emphasis on the contribution of Mustafa

Kemal to the developments during this period has been necessary because of the predominant role he played in the establishment of the new Turkey. Whether events and circumstances produce a needed leader in times of dire crisis, or whether a great leader, no matter where he may be, creates and capitalizes on conditions propitious for his rise and is himself largely responsible for his key role, is an oft- discussed question for political theorists on which there is no unanimous agreement. This writer believes that the case of Turkey from 1919 to 1923 and the emergence of Mustafa Kemal Pasha as its leader, is noteworthy as an example of an even balancing of these alternatives. Despite the undisputed first place of Mustafa Kemal aB the igniting spark and principal moving force in Turkey during this period, other nationalist leaders made significant contributions, a fact which is sometimes overlooked.

In cases where, in the author's judgment, the flow of the text might be jeopardized, pertinent information has been included in footnotes, or appendices when too long to be treated in a footnote.

The appendices include: important documents in translation such as the National Pact of 1920, the Law of Fundamental Organization of

1921, the Nine Principles of the People’s Party of 1923, a document about Cherkes Ethem, a Circassian guerilla leader, not easily avail­ able, a list of important legislation passed by the Grand National

Assembly during 1920-1923, a brief Chronology of important events during the period for ready reference by the general reader or the student of history, and brief biographical sketches of twelve impor­ tant Turkish leaders of this period. The sketches are given in alphabetical order, except in the case of Mustafa Kemal Atattirk, who is placed first and is given more detailed treatment. A Glossary of

Turkish terms is also included in the Appendix.

The problem of spelling and transliteration of Turkish words and names has been a question on which no standard system has yet been devised or generally accepted. The use of different systems by various writers makes certain inconsistencies unavoidable. Words common in English such as Caliph, Pasha, Janissary, Ottoman, Abdul

Hamid and Kurd have been rendered in their usual form used in books in English rather than the Turkish Kalif, Papa, Yeniperi, Osmanli,

AbdtLLhamit and Ktirt, except in citations.

In the case of Turkish proper names the Turkish spelling will be used, with the exception of undotted i and other signs difficult to reproduce. It will be noted that Ahmet, Mehmet, Fuat and other vi names may also appear as Ahmed, Mehmed and Fuad. This is necessary because persons spell their names in different ways, and even the same person may spell his own name differently during various periods.

Yet another problem arises from the adoption of soyadi (family names) in 1935. A famous author who signed her name Halide Edib became Halide Edip Adivar after 1935, and the journalist Ahmed Jiknin is now Ahmet Emin Yalman. In referring to persons before the adoption of their new soyadi the following system is in general use by Turkish writers: Mustafa Kemal (AtattLrk), Ismet Papa (Inflntt),

Mahmut Celal Bey (Bayar), Ali Fuat Papa (Cebesoy), Cami Bey (Baykurt),

Rauf Bey (Orbay), and Fevzi Papa (9akmak). However, this writer will use Chakmak instead of Qakmak and Pasha instead of Papa, except in citations. Some famous personalities are better known by their old names. Nearly everyone in Turkey knows who the philosopher Kiza

Tevfik was, but few know him as Bbliikbapi. This would also apply to such persons as the journalist Yunus Nadi (Abalioglu), the historian

Ahmet Refik (Altinay) and museologist Halil Ethem (Eldem). Also certain writers have changed the form of their names such as

Kflprttlttzadeh Mehmed Fuad now uses Mehmet Fuat Kflprttlfl and Afet Inan now uses Afetinan. INTRODUCTION

Turkey, which is the pivot of United States supported defensive

organization in the Middle East, and a bulwark against Soviet penetra­ tion into the strategically important, generally unstable, and oil-rich

areas of that region, is important to the Rree World. This importance emphasizes the need to understand Turkey's present internal structure, her political system and leadership, as well as the main lines of her foreign policy. This understanding requires a knowledge of govern­ mental functions and powers during the early formative years of the

Kemalist movement when the new Turkey was born.

Bjy 1918, the Ottoman Enpire had collapsed, and out of the ruins of that Enpire, as the result of the Kemalist liberation movement, arose a smaller but more united Turkish Republic in 1923. Was this the work of one man, Mustafa Kemal Atatttrk, often called the Father of modern Turkey? If so, to what extent} and if not, who were the other contributors? What type of institutions emerged from the 1919 to 1922 period, which have been the heritage of the Republic and adopted by it? These questions will be considered in subsequent pages.

The non-military activities during the 1919 to 1923 period have hitherto not received the deserved scholarly and dispassionate study.

Most Turkish scholars have preferred to emphasize the military achieve­ ments of the War of Independence (1919-1922), and the modernization program of the Turkish Republic after 1923. In the last decade, however, the perspective of time, and the publication of important documents as viii well as the memoirs of some of the participants of the struggle for liberation, have made a wealth of information available in Turkish.

Both Western Orientalists and Turcologists, as well as Turkish scholars and the Turkish Historical Society, assert that this crucial period is singularly in need of additional research and clarification.

Most of the non-Turkish materials are very inadequate for this period of Turkish history and are based primarily on secondary sources, with the exception of Hans Kohn's translation of AtatfLrk's Speech

(Nutuk) in the Grand National Assembly during 1927 at the second

Congress of the Republican People's Party. In this speech the first

Turkish President attempted to justify his actions since 1919 to the

Turkish people and to answer some of his critics. This writer believes that the many translations from Turkish primary sources

(most of which have been published since 1950), included in this study, will provide a useful service since little material is avail­ able in English on this vital period of Turkish history. It is also hoped that the effort to describe, analyze, and evaluate events and trends during these years, will contribute to the present under­ standing of the development of Turkish domestic and external policies, and demonstrate the need of and opportunity for additional scholarly work on this period.

The traditional historical method has been followed. All pertinent secondary materials have been examined and primary sources consulted as far as possible. Among the latter, the works of Tarik Z.

Tunaya have been most helpful. Other works consulted are listed in ix footnotes and bibliography, but those of the following authorities have been of particular help: Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur,

Enver Ziya Karal, Enver Behnan §>apolyo, Ahmet gttkrB. Esmer, and Tevfik

Biyiklioglu.

This study deals primarily with the period known in Turkish history as the Period of Defense of Rights, which lasted from late

1918 to the establishment of the Republic on October 23, 1923. How­ ever, in order to present a clear and comprehensive picture of the origins of the Kemalist Movement and the Government of the Grand

National Assembly, from time to time, when warranted, some reference has been made to earlier periods and to the first few years of the

Republic.

The establishment and structure of the Grand National Assembly,

’’National Sovereignty," as the doctrinal basis of Kemalism, the causes for the emergence of Mustafa Kemal as the leader of the new Turkey, early political party alignments, economic and sociological problems, and the concept of the National Pact in the foreign policy of Turkey, have been given careful attention in this study because they all bear on developments during the period of the Turkish Republic. The writer's conclusions and observations are given at the end of the study. In addition to a critical bibliography, a selected biblio­ graphy on the early Kemalist period has been prepared in the hope that it will be useful to students of Turkish history. The appendices include pertinent documents not readily available (in English transla­ tion), and brief biographical sketches of important Turkish leaders. CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Ottoman Empire, which lasted from 1299 to 1922, reached its zenith during the sixteenth century. The Ottoman Turks conquered large portions of Asia, Arabia, Africa and the Balkans, and reached the gates of Vienna.^

The Ottomans were a subdivision of the Seljuk Turks (1070-1300), who created several Empires in Persia and in the Arab world as well as in Anatolia. The Turks trace their origins to Central Asia, and

Turkish historians claim that a number of Turkish Empires were formed in Asia, of which the Ottoman Empire was the last. In addition,

Turkish institutions and Turkish culture was affected by the Hittites and Sumerians who formed great empires in the ancient period. 2 The Seljuk and Ottoman Turks had adopted Islam. Early Turkish

1 For a brief but excellent survey of the Ottoman Empire see: Bernard Lewis, "Turkey: History," The Middle East (London: Europa Publications, 1957), 3U5-3h9» The following are among the works found most useful by this writer, on the Ottoman Empire: H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West (London: Oxford University Press, Vol I, part 1, 1950, Vol I, part 2, 1957)j Joseph Hammer-Purgstall Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches (Budapest: C. A. Hartleben, 1827-1835 I-X; Count de la;Jonquifere, L'Histoire de l 1Empire Ottoman (Paris: Hachette, 191U), I-IIj Cevdet Pasha, Tarihi Cevdet ("Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1875-1885), I-XII; Ismail Hakki Uzunpar^ill , Osmanli Tarihi (Ankara: T. T. K. Basimevi, 19U5-1956); I-IV (Ottoman History)"; "Ziya Karal, Osmanli Tarihi (Ankara: T. T. K. Basimevi, 195U), I-IV, (Ottoman History); I. H. Danigmenfl, Osmanli Tarihi Kronolojisi (Istanbul: Tttrkiye Yayinevi, 19U7-1955), I-IV (Chronology of Ottoman History).

^ For details of the conversion to Islam of Turkish tribes in Central Asia early in the 8th century A.D. see Kenneth W. Morgan (ed.), Islam - the Straight Path (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1958), p. 2^57" institutions were based on the dynamic, virile and disciplined military traditions and organizations of a people on horseback. Turkish cavalry

(Sipahi) as well as Turkish infantry (Yenigeri) became famous in the period of expansion of the Ehtpire.^

The Turks were also affected in varying degrees by Persian culture, literature, and philosophy, as well as by Arabic culture and religious traditions. In addition, Byzantine administrative bureaucracy had certain influence on Ottoman institutions. However, Ottoman cul­ tural heritage was strongly influenced by Islam. During the height of

Ottoman greatness, Islamic policy allowed the non-Muslim elements in the Empire to be governed by their own religious hierarchy •under the

Millet System.^ At the same time, during the zenith of Ottoman power

3 The standard works on the rise of the Ottoman Turks include: W. L. Langer and R. P. Blake, "The Rise of the Ottoman Turks," The American Historical Review, April, 1932; Paul Wittek, "The Rise of the Ottoman Empire," Royal Asiatic Society, London, University of London (Lecture Notes), 1938j Mehmed Fuad KBprttlflt, Les origines de 1 1 empire Ottoman (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1936); and Necip Asim and Mehmet Arif, Osmanli Tarihi (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Orhaniye, 1919). Janissary (Yeni­ geri) , or "new army" founded in the fourteenth century lasted until 1825. For a study of this subject see: Howard A. Reed, "The Destruc­ tion of the Janissaries in 1826" (unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, 1951); and Colonel Necati Tacan, Tanzimat ve ordu (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 19i|0) reprint from Tanzimat (The Tanzimat and the Army). Also useful are: Sennet Muhtar Alus. Yenigerliler ve eski Tflrk Ordusu (Istanbul: A Halit Ktttttphanesi, 1933) (The Janissaries and the Old Turkish Army); and Ahmet Cevat, Tarihi Askeri Osmani (Istanbul: Kirkambar Matbaasi, 1880) I (History of the Ottoman Army).

h For a study on the administration of the religious and ethnic minorities in the Ottoman Empire see: Alford Carleton, "The Millet System for the Government of Minorities in the Ottoman Empire," (unpub­ lished doctoral dissertation, Hartford Theological Seminary, 1937). See The Moslem World, July 1938; and Lootfy Levonian, "The Millet System in the Middle East," The Muslim World, April, 1952. 3 under Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566), the Capitulations were

instituted (1535) which allowed foreign merchants extra-territorial

rights, by the Grand Turk as a benevolent gesture.^ Later, in the

period of decline, the Millet System and the Capitulations became instru­

ments through which the Great Powers were able to gain economic control

of the Empire.^

The Ottoman Empire, which had reached its zenith in the sixteenth

century? began to decline soon thereafter as a result of both external O and internal developments.

£ Nasim Sousa, The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933) j and Philip M. Brown, Foreigners in Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 191U).

^ D. C. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929)} Afet Inan, Aperqu gdndral sur l'histoire de l 1Empire Turc Ottoman (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 19Ul)j Ziya Karamursal, Osmanli, Devletinin kurulugundan XIX uncu Asirin Yarisina kadar Mali Tarihe bir Bakip (Istanbul: Akpam Basimevi, 1936) (A Survey of the Financial History of the Ottoman State from its foundations to the middle of the nineteenth century); Hakki Yeniay, Osmanli Borplari Tarihi (Ankara: A. Ihsan Matbaasi, 1936) (History of the Ottoman Public Debt); and chapters on economic and financial problems of the Tanzimat period in Tanzimat (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 19h0) prepared by the Turkish Historical Society.

? A. H. Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1913)} §flkrtt Fuad Gticttyener, Kanuni Sultan Sflleyman (Istanbul: Anadolu Tflrk Kitabevi, 19U5) (Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent).

® For a more detailed discussion of the causes of decline of the Ottoman Empire, see: W. W. White, The Process of Change in the Ottoman Empire (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937)} William Miller, The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 193°)}J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 19h0); and Yusuf Akpura, Osmanli Imparatorlugunun dagilma devri (Istanbul: Akpam Matbaasi, 193b) (The Period of Decline of the Ottoman Empire). h The Ottoman frontiers were over-extended and difficult to defend;

and the weakness of the Ottoman Empire coincided with the expansion and

strength of its neighbors, especially the Austrian and Russian Empiree.

Many of the institutions which had served the Ottoman Empire well in

the past were outmoded and the Ottoman leadership of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries failed to modernize them and were unable to intro­

duce effective reforms to save the empire. Other reasons for the decline of the Ottoman Empire include the shifting of trade routes, its failure to participate in the industrial revolution and its failure to adopt more m o d e m military techniques until too late. Perhaps the greatest force of disintegration in the Ottoman Empire was the rise of separatist and nationalist movements following the French Revolution.^

Ottoman efforts at reform failed to curb the separatism of the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire who were encouraged to revolt by some of the Great Powers, especially Russia.^-® This made possible the rise

9 For basic information on the effects of the French Revolution in the Ottoman Empire see: Bernard Lewis, ^Impact of the French Revolu­ tion on Turkey," Journal of World History. July, 19535 Ziyaeddin Fahri Findikoglu, Fransiz Ihtilali ve Tanzimat (Istanbul: Bttrhsneddin Mat­ baasi, 193U) (The French Revolution and the Tanzimat); Halil Inalcik, '•Tanzimat ve Fransa," Tarih Vesikalari, II, 8 August, 19U2 (The Tanzi­ mat and France); and Enver Ziya Karal, Tanzimattan ewel garplilagma Hareketleri (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 19U0) (Westernization Movements before the Tanzimat), According to a work in the process of preparation, Professor Bernard Lewis stresses the fact that Ottoman reforms were started much earlier than the Tanzimat of 1839 and the Reforms of Sultan Selim III.

^ The Ottoman leadership did not seriously attempt to carry out basic reforms. Even had they tried to do so there were insurmountable administrative and institutional obstacles. Also strong reactionary groups frustrated the efforts of such reformers as Reshid Pasha and Midhat Pasha. See G. L. Lewis, Turkey (London: Ernest Benn Limited. 1955), 35-36. of new States in the Balkans under the sponsorship of the Great Powers.

The Serbs waged a successful struggle for autonomy (I80I4-I817), followed

by the Greek struggle for independence (1815-1829). Rumania began to

develop into a separate nation after 1861, and Bulgarian efforts which

started in the 1880s ended in independence in 1908.H The Arab awaken­

ing which started in the early nineteenth century with the Muhammad Ali

Revolt culminated in the Arab Revolt of 1916,^

Ottoman diplomacy after the seventeenth century, but especially

during the nineteenth century was on the defensive as compared with its

era of glory during the time of Suleiman the Magnificent, but neverthe­

less, it remained the most effective part of the weakening Ottoman

governmental system.^3 This diplomacy was able to exploit the rivalries

For the Balkan aspects of this subject one can consult: Ferdinand Schevill and W. M. Geweher, The History of the Balkan Penin­ sula (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1933)} Robert L. Wolff, The Balkans in Our Times (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956); Halil Inalcik, Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi (Ankara: T. T. K. Basimevi, 19U3) (The Tanzimat and the Bulgarian Problem) 5 and Cami Bey, Osmanli Ulkesinde hiristiyan TUrkleri (Istanbul: Sanayii Nefise Matbaasi, 1932) (Christian Turks in the Ottoman Realms).

1 P ■LC For the Arab aspects of this subject see: George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (New York: Putnam's Sons, 19lj6); Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East (191U-1921) (London: Bowes and Bowes, 1956); Celal Tevfik Karasapan.Filistin ve Sark-fll-TJrdfin (Istanbul: A. Ihsan Matbaasi, 19U2) II (Palestine and Jordan). The latter is a comprehen­ sive history of Turkish-Arab relations from earliest to recent times.

13 Barnette Miller, Beyond the Sublime Porte (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931)j Barnette Miller, "llie Palace School of Muhammad the Conqueror," Harvard Historical Monograph XVII (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19ll)j Ismail Hakki Uzunparjili, Osmanli Devletinin Saray Tegkilati (Ankara: T. T. K. Basimevi, 19U5) (The Organization of the Ottoman Palace). See also the famous Sefaretnames (reports and memoirs of diplomats) especially that of Yirmisekiz feleM Mehmet Efendi, of the European Great Powers in the Middle East and in many cases to turn events to its own advantage. A notable example of this effective­ ness was the diplomacy of the Grand Vezir Reshid Pasha when he obtained

British support against Russia in return for promises of reform,^

During the period of decline and especially during the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Government countered separatist moves in some instances, by applying ineffective suppressive measures against all liberal and nationalistic elements including Turkish nationalists, and in others by resorting to the introduction of reforms. However, it became clear to a number of Turkish statesmen and intellectual leaders of this time that the Ottoman Government was unable to cope with these uprisings and insurrections.

Since the military reverses suffered by the Ottoman Army in the eighteenth century were the immediate indications of the weakness of the Empire, the first reform movements introduced were military in nature. Most European historians claim that the Ottoman reforms of the

Fransa Sefaretnamesi (Istanbul, 1720), and Cemil Bilsel, Tanzimatin Harici Siyaseti (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 19U0) reprint from the Tanzimat (The Foreign Policy of the Tanzimat). A more detailed study on this subject was undertaken by the present writer as a special un­ published project entitled: "The Origins and Development of the Turkish Foreign Service," (unpublished Special Project 690, The American University, Washington, D.C., 1958). The entry of Turkey into the First World War on the side of the Central Powers which, in retrospect, may appear as a diplomatic error, often tends to over­ shadow other Ottoman diplomatic feats of the time.

F. E. Bailey, British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement (London: Oxford University Press, 19u2); Cevdet R. Yularkiran, foegit Paganin hatiralari (Istanbul: A Halit Kfttttphanesi, 1923) (Memoirs of Reshid Pasha) j Mehimet Selahettin, Bir Tflrk diplomatinin evraki siyasi- yesi (Istanbul: Alem Matbaasi, 1889) (The Political Records of a Turkish Diplomat)} Abdulhalim Memduh, Regit Paga (Istanbul: 1887). 7 nineteenth century were half-hearted and that the Government never really tried to put them into effect. Other writers, mostly Turkish, but also some recent Western authors, have pointed out that even had the

Ottoman Government tried to do so, the problems confronting it were so complex that the existing personnel and administrative organization could not have coped with the difficulties resulting not only from it internal problems but also from uncontrollable external influences. ^

The reform movements of the nineteenth century although falling short of avowed objectives, nevertheless began a period of Ottoman governmental transformation. The short lived Tanzimat of 1839 and the Midhat Pasha Constitution of 1876-1878, were followed by a period of absolutism under Sultan Abdul Hamid (1878-1908). In 1908, a secret opposition group known as the Young Turks seized power, inaugurated a constitution, parliamentary government and liberal reforms.^ However, internal dissension, and then several foreign wars,

^ Most European writers before the Kemalist reformation were critical of the Turks. These include such writers as J. A. R. Marriott, R. W. Seton-Watson, William Miller, and A. J. Toynbee. In his later works, however, Toynbee has modified some of his views. This will be seen if Toynbee's work, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey (London: Constable, 1923), is read in conjunction with his Turkey (New York: Scribner's, 1927). Turkish historians such as Enver Ziya Karal, Halil Inalcik, as well as the official Turkish history have tried to refute some of the unfavorable views. More recent Western writers have taken a broader and more friendly view as seen in the works of Hairy N. Howard, Donald E. Webster, Eleanor Bisbee, Lewis Thomas, G. L. Lewis, Bernard Lewis, Howard A. Reed, D.A.Rustow, Sydney N. Fisher.

^ For the period 1839-1908 the comprehensive work prepared by the Turkish Historical Society and written by specialists in various fields entitled Tanzimat (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 19ii0), was found very useful. The Midhat Pasha Ottoman Constitution of 1876 is dis­ cussed in: Mehmet Zeki Pakalin, Mithat Pa$a (Istanbul: A Sait turned the government into a military dictatorship. It was this

Government which brought Turkey into the First World War on the side

of the Central Powers. After four years of war against the Allies, the

Turks finally agreed to abandon the struggle and signed an Armistice at

Mudros on October 30, 1918. For the Turks the outlook was bleak with

the Allies occupying the capital, the Young Turk leaders having fled,

and a new Turkish Government formed which was subservient to the Allies.

Although the Tanzimat of 1839 and the Constitution of 1876 may

not be considered as noteworthy attempts at reform by some historians,

it cannot be denied that the experience gained during these two periods

as well as the developments and lessons learned from the Young Turk

period contributed much to the success of the Government of the Grand

National Assembly and the Kemalist reforms of the twentieth century.

Coincident with the rise of nationalism among the non-Muslim

and non-Turkish subjects of the Ottoman Empire, ^7 after the eighteenth

Matbaasi, 19U0) j Ali Haydar Midhat, The Life of Midhat Pasha (London: John Murray, 1903); and Norman Bentwich, "The Turkish Constitutions, 1876-192U,M The Contemporary Review. November, 19i;2. The Young Turk Revolution is discussed ably by E. E. Ramsaur, The Young Turks (Prince­ ton: Princeton University Press, 1957). See also Ahmed Bedevi Kuran, Osmanli Imparatorlugunda Inkilap Hareketleri ve Mllli Mttcadele (Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi, 1956) (Reform Movements of the Ottoman Empire and the struggle for Independence); Tarik Z. Tunaya, Tttrkiyede Siyasi Partiler (Istanbul: Dogan Kardej Yayinlari, 1952) (Political Parties in Turkey)} and Tarik Z. Tunaya, Amme hukukumuz bakimindan ikinci Megrutiyetin fikir cereyanlari (Istanbul: Istanbul University, 191*8) (Main currents of thought of the Second Constitutional Period as seen from the view­ point of our Public Law). This is a doctoral dissertation which was published with a limited number of copies.

17 The standard works on the rise of nationalism in the Middle East include: Hans Kohn, History of Nationalism in the Bast (London: G. Routledge, 1929) J Hans Kohn, Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932) j "Nationalism in the Middle East,” publication of The Saddle East Institute. Washington, D.C., 1952, century, there was also a similar rise among the Muslim-Turks of the

Empire which affected the Turks in the Empire as much as it did the non-Turkish subject peoples. This became especially true during the course of the nineteenth century when the Turkish leadership devised counter-measures to meet European penetration and non-Turkish separatist

*i Q movements by developing the policies of Pan Islamism and Pan Turanism.

However, both of these movements were later officially rejected by

Mustafa Kemal in favor of Turkism (Tflrk gttltlk) which will be discussed in Chapter II. Ziya G8kalp, a great Turkish intellectual leader, was a prime mover behind this trend. Gflkalp's ideas and works contain the predominant themes and rationale of the political philosophy of the early Kemalist period.

During the First World War, four secret agreements proposed the division of the Ottoman Empire: Constantinople Agreement (March 18,

1915), Treaty of London (April 26, 1915), Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 16,

1916), and the St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement (April 17, 1917)

The Russian Revolution had rendered void the promises given to the Tsar and the Bolsheviks formally renounced all claims to Turkish territory in 1917. The other Allies, however, were eager to enter upon their

Two significant aspects of nationalism or reaction to European penetration among Muslims and Turks are discussed in the following works: Dwight E. Lee, "Origins of Pan-Islamism," American Historical Review, December 19h2; and Charles W. Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets (London: Allen & Unwin, 1957).

19 For a text of these treaties see: J. C. Hurewitz, ed., Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, 191U- 1956 (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand and Company, 1957), Vol. II. 10 ?0 new acquisitions.

Early in 1919, the Greek Prime Minister, Venizelos, presented to the Peace Conference at Paris a formal claim to the possession of

Smyrna (Izmir). The St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement, which had assigned that region to Italy had lapsed for want of Russian ratification, and

Lloyd George and Clemenceau gave the Greek Prime Minister their backing.

The British in particular encouraged this claim in order to forestall

Italian imperialistic enterprises in Western Anatolia, since it was believed that Greece would be more amenable to British policy and con­ trol. On May 15, 1919, under the protection of Allied naval support,

Greek troops landed at Smyrna and prepared to advance into the interior.

This act was declared by the Allies to be in accordance with Article 7 of the Armistice Agreement.

The Greek invasion had a powerful impact on the war weary Turks who could not countenance the thought of being ruled by a minority element which they had considered as second class citizens. The result was the appearance of nationalist resistance groups throughout the country, especially in regions where there were no organized elements of the Ottoman Army. These scattered resistance groups were of varying

20 For a fuller treatment of this subject and a discussion of the diplomacy of the early Kemalist period see: Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 193l); G. L. Lewis, op. citj Ahmet JSttkrtt Esmer, Siyasi Tarih (Ankara: Gttney Matbaasi, 1953) (Diplomatic History); Y. Hikmet Bayur, Tilrk Devletinin Dif Siyasasi (Istanbul: A Sait Matbaasi, 19U2) (The Foreign Policy of the Turkish State); and Roderic H. Davison, "From Mudros to Lausanne," chapter in The Diplomats (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 173-209. size and although they fought bravely and well, an effective operation against the Greeks could be accomplished only by centralization and coordination. This need was met by Mustafa Kemal who arrived at Samsun in northern Anatolia four days after the Greek landing at Smyrna, and began the painful process of incorporating these groups into a nationalist movement. This movement produced an army, a de facto government and a foreign policy. Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Atatttrk) was a great hero to all Turks at this time for his military feats against the

British at Gallipoli and Syria and under the circumstances of Turkey's debasement a symbol of hope and a rallying point for those who wished to resist what they considered as allied enslavement.

From Mustafa Kemal's efforts emerged a new nationalist govern­ ment which began in Anatolia as a liberation movement in 1919, resisting partition and foreign occupation and competing with the Sultan's Govern­ ment and with foreign powers. This Government went through two main stages of development before the formation of the Republic in 1923s in

1919 it was organized as the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia (Anadolu ve Rumeli Mudafaai Hukuk Cemiyeti); and in 1920 as the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly

(Tilrkiye Bttyflk Millet Meclisi— T.B.M.M.). Each change in name repre­ sented a stage in the development of this nationalist liberation movement into a more effective government and political party, as well 12 21 as a step forward in obtaining recognition in the international field.

A knowledge of the functioning of this government of the early- period of the Kemalist movement is important for an understanding of

Turkish political developments in subsequent years. The basis of

Turkish foreign policy was set at this time and it is also during this period that the origins of Turkish political groupings are to be found.

The Government of the Grand National Assembly (1920-1923), being both an executive and legislative body, was prey to the weak­ nesses that such liaison involves. However, its form was secondary to the fact that it was under the control of a man who was determined to succeed during a time of supreme danger. Any real opposition would have to result in a thoroughgoing change rather than an evolutionary process since there were no checks and balances. Such a change would have involved a new leader which the majority of the army and the common people would not condone. Thus the structure of the Grand

National Assembly insulated Mustafa Kemal from opposition short of com­ plete change. As a revolutionary transitional institution it proved a valuable structural link between weakening Ottoman institutions and

^ Davison, o£. cit., 172, 175. For histories which discuss the broad aspects of the early Kemalist period see: Tarih (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaasi, 193h) IV (History), a history prepared by a Turkish Historical Commission; Samih Nafis Tansu, Tflrk Inkilap Tarihi (Istan­ bul: Devlet Matbaasi, 1938) (History of the Turkish Revolution); Hikmet Yusuf Bayur, Tflrk Inkilap Tarihi (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 19UO-19U3) II (History of the Turkish Revolution); Enver Ziya Karal, Tflrkiye Cumhuriyet Tarihi, 1918-1953 (Istanbul: Maarif Basimevi, 1955) Chapters I-IV (History of the Turkish Republic). 13 22 the Republican form which succeeded it.

^ Until recently, both Turkish and Western scholars have concentrated on the military achievements and events of the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922), and the Kemalist reforms after 1923. Little has been written of the internal problems and political groupings that developed during the period of the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (1920-1922). Mustafa Kemal's famous address in the Grand National Assembly (October lf>-20, 1927), has been translated into Western languages. The Turkish edition is Gazi Mustafa Kemal, Nutuk (Istanbul: Devlet Basimevi, 1938). Citations to this text will be designated Nutuk. The English edition, trans­ lated by Hans Kohn, A Speech delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal (Leipzig: K. F. Koehler, 1929), will be referred to hereafter as Speech. The Tarih,official history of Turkey published in 1933- 193U by the Turkish Historical Society (Tflrk Tarih Kurumu), has also been translated into Western languages and has reference to this subject. In addition, more detailed findings in this field are now appearing by several Turkish writers including Tarik Z. Tunaya, Enver Ziya Karal, Enver Behnan $apolyo, Tevfik Biyiklioglu, to mention a few. However, the works of these writers have not as yet been trans­ lated and are not in general reflected in European works on the subject, although Bernard Lewis and Geoffrey L. Lewis are among the Western writers who are including some of these new findings in their publications. CHAPTER II

EARLY NATIONALIST EFFORTS TO FORM A GOVERNMENT

IN ANATOLIA (1919-1920)

During the winter of 1918-1919, a loosely organized movement

composed of Turkish patriots came into being in Istanbul (Constantinople).

The aim of this movement was to see that the terms of the armistice agreement regarding Turkey were not abused by the allied powers, but these efforts were not very successful. Mustafa Kemal, one of the most ardent of this group, tried in vain to persuade the Sultan to make a stand for the Turkish cause. Furthermore, under the close watch of the Allies the everpresent threat of arrest circumscribed activities. These and other limiting factors produced by allied presence in Istanbul resulted in shifting the center of effective resistance to Anatolia. When removed to Anatolia, this patriotic move­ ment expanded and gathered strength and became a movement of nationalist liberation. Since the government of the Sultan in Istanbul did not participate in the liberation movement, Anatolia rather than European

Turkey became the center of nationalist resistance. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in the early stages of the national struggle,

European Turkey (Turkish Thrace) and its intellectual leaders made a

23 in this study Istanbul will be used rather than Constantinople, except in the case of direct quotations, since it is the official Turkish name. 15

contribution to this national liberation movement.^

Some authorities report that Mustafa Kemal’s dream was to get

to Anatolia to organize national resistance groups,^5 but that the

possibility seemed remote because his absence would arouse suspicion

and lead to future arrest. Yet this possibility became a reality when

he was appointed Inspector-General of the Third Army based in Samsun

with command of the Third and Fifteenth Army Corps. The Istanbul

Government intended this assignment to amount to banishment but the

result was quite the opposite because it provided Mustafa Kemal with

an opportunity to form a national liberation movement in Anatolia.

Even if the idea of a complete break had not been present in his plans

previously, Kemal’s early impressions of the state of affairs in

Anatolia after his arrival at Samsun on May 19, 1919, convinced him

that this was the only possibility. That Kemal was entjrusted with

such widesweeping powers, he attributes to the miscalculations of the

^ For a study of the contribution of Turkish Thrace to this national liberation movement, see: Tevfik Biyiklioglu, Trakyada •Istiklal Mttcadeleri (Ankara: T. T. K., Vol I 1955, Vol II, 195$) (The National Struggle in Thrace). The contribution of European Turkey to the liberation movement has been overlooked by many his­ torians and the extent end effectiveness of this contribution is controversial.

25 G. L. Lewis, op. cit., $k and Altemur Kilig,Mustafa Kemal Atatilrk (Washington, D. C.: Office of the Turkish Press Attache, 1958), 2, where he states: ’’After the war in 1919 the young general wrangled an appointment from the Istanbul government as an inspector general in Anatolia— presumably to administer the terms of the armistice. But his real objective was to rally various nationalistic forces under one banner.” This is also confirmed in Falih Rifki Atay, Atatflrkttn Bana Anlatiklari (Istanbul: Sel Yainlari, 1955), 107-127 (What Atatflrk Related to Me). 16

Istanbul Government as follows:

You might, perhaps, be inclined to ask why those who sent me to Anatolia with the idea of banishing me from Istanbul intrusted me with such wide powers. The answer is that they did not know them­ selves that it was necessary for me to go to Samsun to report on the spot on the unsettled conditions of the district and to take the necessary measures to deal with it. I had pointed out that in order to do this, I should be given special authority and special powers. There did not seem to be any objection to this.2°

Mustafa Kemal recounts in his Six Day Speech given in 1927 that as he began his inspection of the Third Army Corp at Sivas and the Fifteenth

Army Corps at Erzurum and was struck by the terrible condition of his countrymen, he became convinced that the old order with the sultanate and caliphate Mhad become preposterous," and that only one course remained open, "the shaping of an entirely new Turkish State founded on national independence."27

Immediately after arriving at Samsun, Kemal began getting in touch with local resistance groups. Just nine days after his arrival in Anatolia, he initiated his broader program with a general communique to the valis (provincial governors), the heads of the Fifteenth Army

Corps at Erzurum, the Twentieth at Ankara, the Thirteenth at Diyarbekir, and the Army Inspection at Konya. This communique emphasized the imminence of danger to Turkish independence and territorial integrity and scheduled a date for the governors to urge the people throughout their districts to hold mass meetings. These meetings were to demand

^ Speech, 15.

27 "Creating a Nation," Living Age, December 1, 1927, V, 333, no. 2319, p. 97k- (Fragment of the Six Day Speech), 17 the intervention of all nations and the Great Powers in the name of universal justice to put an end to what Kemal described as an intoler­ able state of affairs. Kemal emphasized that telegrams of protest were needed and that these should be sent to representatives of the Great

Powers and to the Sublime Porte. He cautioned that in order to in­ fluence foreigners, dignity and order must be maintained during the demonstrations and that no hostile action should be undertaken against the Christian population.^®

The effort was from the very first clouded with obstacles. In some communities, local authorities deemed demonstrations inadvisable because of the newly assumed power of the Greek minority residents since the arrival of Greek troops in Anatolia. There was also some hesitancy expressed on the part of Turkish Government officials and the Turkish population to acceptance of Kemal's request. This was primarily the result of war-exhaustion. Many influential military and civilian leaders expressed skepticism and indecision, mainly because many believed that Mustafa Kemal was a great general but doubted his ability as a statesman. Another obstacle was the fact that Mustafa

Kemal's governmental authority was not clear and the Robin Hood bands'^

2® Speech, op. cit., 2Uf.

29 a good study on the role of guerilla groups in the early days of the national struggle is: Enver Behnan §>apolyo, Kuvayi Milliye Tarihi: Gerilla (AnkaratAyyildiz Matbaacilik ve Gaaetecilik, T. A. §., 1957) (History of the Nationalist Forces: the Guerillas). Hereafter this will be referred to as §>apolyo, K.M.T. Gerilla. See especially pages 81i-93 of this work for the contributions of Demirci Mehmed Efe, a guerilla leader on the Aydin front. Also useful is Sureyya Sindtrgili, Demirci Mehmed Efe (Istanbul: Sel Yayinlari, 1955) which describes the activities of the guerilla leader Demirci Mehmed Efe. 18

(Efes, guerillas and tribal groups such as the Circassians) who inde­

pendently harassed the Greek advance, produced a condition of govern­

mental anarchy in Anatolia. Hence, the masses and many of the elite

did not have a supreme leader or ideal to whom they could give their

loyalty, and Mustafa Kemal, although a great hope to the Turkish soldier

in despair, had not as yet firmly established his position as the bona

fide official supreme governmental leader of the national liberation

movement. This very state of blurred governmental lines of command

convinced Kemal of the urgency of establishing some type of government

in Anatolia as soon as possible. Consequently, at the same time Kemal

was urging the people to resist the Greek invasion by both propaganda

and military means, he also devoted his attention to the problem of

establishing some kind of governmental organization through which these

activities could be effectively channeled.

Although Kemal was free of the British, once he had arrived in

Anatolia, to organize a resistance movement against them proved diffi­

cult. The Turkish Army had the power of attack only in the east, at

Erzurum under Kazim Karabekir Pasha, Commander of Turkish forces on the

Armenian front. Mustafa Kemal realized that he must have the backing

of the entire Turkish Army and began to take steps to bring this about.

A general, Ali Fuat Pasha, and Rauf Bey, famous naval commander of the

cruiser Hamidiye, came from Ankara, and Refet Bey, an army colonel, later a general, came from Samsun, 3° at Mustafa Kemal’s request. The

3° For biographical sketches of these leaders, see Appendix. 19 four men met secretly and on June 19, 1919, prepared a resolution which reads as follows:

The Central Government is under foreign control. The Turkish nation is determined to put an end to this foreign domination and this determination is proved by an ever growing number of organi­ zations springing up all over the country. The activities of these organizations must be centralized. A representative Congress must be called at Sivas. Representatives sent from Constantinople, and of whose integrity the Nationalists are doubtful must be excluded.-■*

When queried whether the purpose of the resolution was to defend the country or to start a new Government, Ali Fuat Pasha replied:

When we discussed this we had no thought of a new Government, but if defence is possible only under such condition, why should we not do s o ? 32

This reply may be another indication of the fact that the question of governmental control and formation was an important issue, and that

Kemal was working toward this e n d . 33

33- Irfan Orga, Phoenix Ascendant: The Rise of Modern Turkey (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1958), p. 77.

32 Ibid., p. 78, and J. Benoist-Mechin, Mustapha Kemal (Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 195U), pp. 207-208. Benoist-Mdchin states that on June 22, 1919 Mustafa Kemal said: "puisque le Sultan et le gouvem- ment d 1Istanbul etaient a la merci des Anglais, il fallait constituer un pouvoir nouveau en Anatolie, sous la forme d'un gouvernement pro- visoire."

33 For information on early governmental efforts by Mustafa Kemal, the following works by Tarik Z. Tunaya have been particularly useful: Tttrkiyede Siyasi Partiler (Istanbul: Dogan Karde? Yayinlari, 1952) U72-539 (Political Parties in Turkey); Tflrkiye Bflyflk Millet Meclisi Httktimeti♦nin Kurulugu ve Siyasi Karaketeri, (Istanbul: Univer­ sity of Istanbul, 1958) (The Establishment of the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and its Political Character, hereafter referred to as Tunaya, T.B.M.M. Hflkflmeti); and Osmanli Imparatorlungun- dan Tttrkiye BflyUk Millet Meclisi Hukumeti Re .limine Gegig (The Transi- tion from the Ottoman Empire to the Regime of the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly) (This work is a reprint from a work published by the University of Istanbul in 1956 honoring Ord. Prof. M.R. Sevig). These works together with Donald E. Webster, The Turkey of Atatflrk (Philadelphia: The Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939) have been found extremely useful and base much of the information in this chapter. 20

The resolution of the four leaders became a formal proclamation

on June 22, 1919, when Mustafa Kemal issued an invitation to a congress

at Sivas the following September which was to include three elected

representatives from each liva (administrative subdivision of Turkish

province), from all parts of Anatolia. This invitation has been

summarized as follows:

The territorial integrity of the Fatherland and our national independence are in danger. The Central Government is incapable of carrying out its responsibilities. A national body must be set up, free from all outside interference, to bring to the ears of the world the nation’s cry for its rights. It has been decided to hold a national congress at Sivas in the near future, to which every province is to send delegates who must, whenever necessary travel incognito.3k

At this same time, Kazim Karabekir, in command of an effective

force of over 10,000 regulars on the Eastern Caucasian front, with the

peers of Erzurum as well as the Kurdish leaders behind him, issued an

invitation to a congress at Erzurum. While the delegates to this

latter congress were assembling, the Istanbul Government ordered Kemal’s

immediate return (June 23, 1919). When Kemal refused to obey the order,

the Ottoman Ministry of Interior issued a circular communique that no

3k G. L. Lewis, o£. cit., pp. 5U-55. Also see §apolyo, Tftrkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi (Istanbul: A. H. Yajtaroglu, 1953) (History of the Turkish Republic, hereafter referred to as: §apolyo, T.C.T.) 27. ^apolyo's version in free translation is as follows: 1. The unity of the fatherland, its security and national independence are in danger. 2. The Government in Istanbul is unable to carry out its authority. 3. The national independence will have to be won by the nation’s determination and effort, li. It is necessary to establish a national commission in a place free from external pressure to make known to the world, the people’s desire for Justice. 5. The most secure place in Anatolia is Sivas where a national Congress should be called immediately. 6. Three representatives from each province should be sent imediately (to the Congress). 7. In order to be prepared for every eventuality, this should be kept a national secret. 21

official correspondence was to be carried on with him and that it was

the duty of Ottomans to disobey him. Thus, although the communiques of

Mustafa Kemal might have not met with the desired effectiveness and

response in Anatolia, these communiques did contribute toward making

the Istanbul Government realize its mistake in posting Kemal in Anatolia

in a position of authority.

The Sultan revoked Mustafa Kemal's commission as Inspector of the Third Army on July 8, 1919, and Kemal resigned not only his com­ mission, but also his connection with the army. Henceforth, he acted as a private citizen. However, this change of title did not seriously affect his position in Anatolia since most of the authorities continued to regard him as their lawful superior.

Mustafa Kemal, Rauf Bey and Colonel Arif arrived in Erzurum on

July 3, 1919 for the Congress of the "Association for the Defense of

Rights of the Eastern Provinces" called by Karabekir. This Conference took place from July 23 to August 17, 1919.^ On July 23, Mustafa

Kemal was elected chairman.

During the Congress, the Sultan's Government ordered Kazim

Karabekir to arrest Kemal and Rauf Bey, and to close the Congress, rewarding Karabekir with the position of Inspector-General, formerly held by Mustafa Kemal. Karabekir refused on all counts stating that

3$ Among Turkish materials on the Congress of Erzurum and the Congress of Sivas, the following are considered useful: Vehbi Cem Agkun, Sivas Kongresi (Sivas: Kmalj.'i-Ma.tb&gal. 19li5) (Sivas Congress) j Captain Ahmed Midillili, Tflrk istiklal harbinin baginda milli mftcadele (Ankara: Bflytik Erkani Harbiye Reisligi Matbaasi, 1928) tThe National Movement at the beginning of the War for Independence)j Yunus Nadi, Mustafa Kemal Paga Samsunda (Istanbul: Sel yayinlari, 1955) (Mustafa Kemal at Samsun). 22

he would take orders from Mustafa Kemal only. Ali Fuat Pasha tele­

graphed his support of Kemal from Ankara, and Rauf Bey pledged himself

once more to the cause of freedom,^

Before adjourning, the Congress chose a Representative Committee

(Heyet-i-temsiliye)37 ac^ ^he interim on behalf of the Nationalist

movement. The decisions reached at the Erzurum Congress were embodied

in the following important resolutions:

1. The fatherland, within the national frontiers, composes a unified whole, whose parts cannot be separated from each other.

2. In the everrt of partition of the Ottoman Empire, the national will resist unanimously, and defend itself against all forms of occupation and intervention.

3. In case the central government be unable to insure the independence and security of the country, a provisional government will be set up for this purpose. The members of this government shall be designated by the National Congress. If such a Congress be not in session, the government shall be appointed by the Representative Committee.

ii. It is essential that the national forces take the field and the nation will assert itself.

5. The Christian elements are not to be allowed special privi­ leges compromising our political rights and social equilibrium.

6. No mandate or protectorate shall be accepted.

7. Every effort shall be made to bring about the immediate convening of the National Assembly and placing it in charge of governmental affairs.3°

3& Orga, oj>. cit., pp. 78-79.

3? Ibid., Orga claims that the Heyet-i-temsiliye "could if neces­ sity arose, take the place of a temporary government in Anatolia to carry on national defence. The conference declared emphatically, however, that if the elected body formed a temporary government, it should follow the established laws of the Central Government and, after realizing the aims of the National Pact, cease to be a government." 38 Tarih IV, 36 f, as translated in Webster, og. cit., p. 79. See also §apolyo7~T.C.T. 29. The Erzurum Congress made a profound impression on the Sultan's

Government in Istanbul and the question of calling a new election was discussed seriously. However, the Congress of Sivas, scheduled for

September, caused even more reaction, because it was to include delegates from Istanbul as well as western and central Anatolia. French officers called on the Governor of Sivas and informed him that the Allies would occupy the city in five days if the Congress took place. Four British batallions arrived at Samsun with the intent of arousing local tribes­ men to arrest the delegates at the Congress. However, a detachment of nationalist infantry routed the tribesmen.

The nationalist reaction to the action taken by the Ottoman

Central Government was so intense that it contributed to increased unity among the delegates of the Sivas Congress more than any other factor.

In these circumstances, previous divisions were submerged. Circumstances had indeed favored Mustafa Kemal. Sensing unanimity and support of his policies among the delegates, Kemal exploited it to advantage by ordering military authorities to take over the telegraphs and to cut off Istanbul from the rest of the country. Kemal also sent an ultimatum to Istanbul demanding the dismissal of the Prime Minister Damat Ferit

Pasha, and the holding of new elections. Although there was no reply, the Istanbul Government was slowly becoming aware of the increasing power of the nationalists.

The Congress of Sivas, which convened on September b, 1919, based its deliberations upon the Erzurum Resolutions which it finally adopted with one major amendment. There had been agitation favoring an 2k

American mandate which led the Congress to amplify the second article

of the Resolutions by the declaration that it was able to "administer

its own affairs by its own powers."^

On September 9, 1919, the Sivas Congress issued a declaration

elaborating resolutions already passed at Erzurum and provided for a

National Assembly to meet and "settle the nation's destiny." This

declaration which in essence is the first draft of the National Pact

is the greatest product of the Sivas Conference. It is given below

in free translation.

1. The various segments of Turkey which form an indivisible whole cannot be separated from one anbther for any reason whatever.

2. It is an absolute principle that the nationalist forces are the only instrument for the realization of the national will to achieve independence.

3. If any part of the Turkish realm is occupied the whole nation will resist this act by force.

k. The special privileges which might upset the political and social equilibrium of the fatherland will not be permitted. The

39 Tarih TV, 38, as translated in Webster, op. cit., 79. Accor­ ding to Halide Edib, The Turkish Ordeal (New York: The Century Co. 1928), 16, and R. Davison, op. cit., 177-178* how far Kemal in the early days was willing to go in accepting foreign aid of some sort is open to question. He proposed at the Erzurum Congress that help be accepted from a power with no imperial interests, implying the United States although he did not name it. In September 1919 when the Harbord Commission passed through Sivas while investigating the the Armenian question, General Harbord conferred with Kemal. Kemal claims that Harbord was convinced of the justice of the nationalist program while Harbord reported that Kemal said his aim was to preserve the Ottoman Empire under the "mandatory of a single disinterested power, preferably America," and wanted the "aid of an impartial foreign oountry." See Major General James G. Harbord, "American Military Mission to Armenia," International Conciliation. CLI, June 1920, 29U-295. The present writer believes that Mustafa Kemal did not really favor any foreign mandate, even an American one. However, being a good diplomat and wishing to gain foreign approval and understanding of nationalist aims, he refrained from antagonizing foreign diplomats and made no decisive statements. 25 minorities within our borders will be accorded no special privi­ leges.

5. We will freely accept the economic assistance of nations without aims against our territorial integrity. In conformity with basic human rights, a Just peace is hereby proclaimed a national aim.

6. It is essential that a national assembly meet to save the nation from its present plight. The destiny of the nation will be entrusted to this assembly.

7. All existing patriotic and national societies will be united and will be designated as The Association for the Defense of Rumelia and Anatolia.

8. The Representative Committee selected by the Sivas Congress will administer the general organization (of the national move­ ment).

While the Sivas Declaration still considered the Sultan's government to be the lawful one, it condemned its current lack of will to resist the pressure of Allied demands which ran counter to the armi­ stice agreement. Most of the ideas in the Sivas Declaration were basically Kemal's although he was no ardent supporter of the Sultanate.

Until the pressing crisis of foreign invasion had passed, he probably felt it necessary not to disturb unduly the established order, because he needed the support of the generally moi-e conservative Turkish opinion which would have been opposed to any clear departures from traditional

Ottoman institutions. Kemal's major insistence, however, was always on national and popular sovereignty which he emphasized constantly.

§>apolyo, T.C.T., 30-31.

In addition to the information given on these internal developments and compromises in the works of Tunaya, information may be found in English in Davison, o£. cit., p. 177. 26

After being in session for a week (September U-ll, 1919), under

the chairmanship of Mustafa Kemal, the Sivas Congress elected him head

of the Representative Committee, named its permanent organization The

Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, and

then adjourned. Although there was some opposition in the ranks to

Kemal, the Congress supported him as the only man the army and the

common people might follow. Having Kemal as their leader, facilitated

the departing members in their main task of obtaining support among their neighbors and constituents for the nationalist ideal and the new governmental organization which had been established to bring this ideal to fruition.

The Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and

Rumelia (also sometimes translated as the League for the Defense of

Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia) became the framework for the govern­ ment of the nationalist movement, and began after Sivas to function as its executive organ. In its name, Mustafa Kemal, as chairman, signed telegrams and conferred with foreign representatives. Without openly attacking the Sultan, Kemal stated that until a government which had the confidence of the people should be formed, the Representative Committee would "remain in office and oontinue to conduct the affairs of the nation."^

In the meantime, Mustafa Kemal was in more or less constant communication with the Istanbul Government as well as with nationalist

^ Speech, o p . cit., pp. 125-126. patriots in Istanbul. There were members of the Istanbul Cabinet who

shared some of Kemal*s opinions but believed that working within the

Sultan's Government was the preferable means of achieving these aims.

According to Tunaya, the Association for the Defense of Rights with its

branches in Anatolia and Thrace had an important effect on the decisions

of the Ottoman Parliament in Istanbul, since nationalist reactions to

events were made known to the Parliament,through numerous telegrams

stressing the following points: (l) congratulations for the initiation

of action by the Ottoman Parliament (in an effort to gain support of

friendly Senators to the national cause)5 (2) the rejection of the

Allied occupation (Reddi-Ilhak) or the concept of rejection of occupa­

tion which became a basic tenet of the nationalist credo ; and (3)

the request for the formation of a Cabinet favorably disposed towards the nationalist movement in A n a t o l i a . ^3

In addition to keeping in contact with the Istanbul Government, from the very beginning, Mustafa Kemal endeavored to establish contact with the Allied and Associated Powers and to win their recognition of the nationalist program.

At Sivas, Mustafa Kemal conferred with both General Harbord of the United States and Georges Picot of France in an effort to win the backing of these two countries for the nationalist cause. On many occasions in 1919, Mustafa Kemal claimed that British, French, Italian, and American representatives had approved nationalist aims, or had said

^3 Tunaya, Qsmanli.Imparatorlugundan Ttirkiye Btiyttk Millet Meclisi Htikttmeti Rejimine Gegig, 13 (free translation from the Turkish). 28 that they would not interfere with the nationalist movement. He added, moreover, that close relations were already established, and that western representatives at Sivas had reported favorably to their respec­ tive governments.

Although these declarations were perhaps exaggerations aimed to win followers to the nationalist cause, they also demonstrated Kemal's consciousness of the necessity and importance of a nationalist diplo­ matic offensive. When the Istanbul Government (Damat Ferit Pasha's

Government) sent a delegation to Paris, Mustafa Kemal, informed the

Great Powers (September 11, 1919) that the Istanbul Government was illegal and that the delegation did not represent the nation.

While British and French agents in Turkey during 1919 did con­ cede that in fact there were two governments in Turkey, Mustafa Kemal refused to accept this dictum claiming that _the national will was supreme, that the Representative Committee was its only spokesman and therefore the only real government in Turkey.^

Mustafa Kemal's hand was strengthened by the conclusion of a secret agreement (September 16, 1919) between the Sultan, and England's representatives which accepted a British mandate for Turkey Kemal reacted by issuing a manifesto ordering the rupture of all communica­ tions between Istanbul and Anatolia. This order was to remain in

^ Gasi Mustafa Kemal Pascha, Die neue Tttrkei 1919-1927 III Die Dokumente zur Rede (Leipzig) no. 97, annex 1 as given in Davison, op. cit. These are the translation of Nutuk Muhteviyatina dair vesaik (Ankara: 1927) (Documents pertaining to the contents of the Ghazi's speech).

^ Webster, o£. cit., p. 80. 29 effect as long as the Damat Ferit Pasha Cabinet remained in office.

Kemal and his organization had sufficient following to influence the Istanbul Government through those deputies and ministers who had nationalist sympathies. The Damat Ferit Cabinet could not survive this influence along with the resentment aroused by the terms of the secret pact. The cabinet fell on October 2, 1919, and the succeeding one, headed by Ali Riza Pasha, sent its Minister of the Navy, Salih Pasha, to Amasya to meet with Mustafa Kemal and establish a liaison with the nationalists.

Salih Pasha and Mustafa Kemal met at Amasya for three days

(October 20-22, 1919) and ooncluded this conference with a protocol known as the Amasya Protocol which was based on the Erzurum and Sivas

Resolutions. The main points of this protocol follow:

1. The provinces inhabited by Turks shall not be ceded to enemies under any condition} no mandate or protectorate shall be accepted} i.e., the integrity and independence of the Turkish fatherland shall be safeguarded.

2. There shall be accorded to non-Muslim elements no privi­ leges which undermine the national sovereignty, or social balance.

3. The Istanbul Government recognizes the legality of the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia.

H. Only delegates approved by the Representative Committee shall be sent to the peace conference to be held between the Ottoman Empire and the Entente Powers.

5. The impending session of the Chamber of Deputies must not be held in Istanbul.h°

In affixing his signature to this document, Salih Pasha agreed to

^ T&rih IV, U2, as translated in Webster, on. cit., p. 80. See also §>apolyo, T*C.T. 33. 30

undertake the conversion of his colleagues to these principles. Unfor­

tunately, he was unable to carry out this aim in full, as the Istanbul

Cabinet proceeded with arrangements for the impending national elections

and took little or no notice of the Amasya Protocol.

The elections of October 1919 gave the Nationalists a large

majority in the Istanbul Parliament and despite the Amasya Protocol, the

meeting place for the opening of the parliament in January 1920 was to

be Istanbul.

On December 27, 1919, Mustafa Kemal moved his headquarters from

Sivas to Ankara which had the advantages of railway communication with

Istanbul, a central position in the country, and strong natural defenses.

Mustafa Kemal believed nationalist presence in Istanbul dangerous and

urged the newly elected deputies not to proceed into what he regarded | n as a trap.4 ' However, they disregarded his warnings and prepared to go

^ Orga, o£. cit., pp. 81-82 presents a different picture claiming that Mustafa Kemal was not opposed to the deputies going to Istanbul. "Kazim Karabekir summoned with Ali Fuat Papa by Mustafa Kemal, put the situation neatly when he declared that, having won a small victory, they must tread cautiously. A government in Anatolia would never gain the support of the nation unless it could be proved beyond all doubt that it was necessary. The nation would have to be inflamed before it would recognize the right to have a government in Anatolia; something drastic would first have to happen in Constantinople. . . . It was agreed that for the time being Mustafa Kemal should remain in Anatolia. Rauf, who agreed with Mustafa Kemal, was, however, impressed by Kazim Karabekir's logic. He said to Kara Bekir:

"If I went to Constantinople, instead of remaining here, if I force the Allies to raid Parliament, perhaps even deport me, could that be the reason for an Anatolian Government?"

"Of course," said Kazim Kara Bekir, "The closing of our Parlia­ ment, deportation of our important men, interference with our rights, 31

to Istanbul.

Kemal sent for the nationalist deputies to meet with him in

caucus before they went, and it was at these caucuses, for not all the

deputies were ever in Ankara at one time, that the National Pact (Milli

Misak), a declaration similar to the American Declaration of Indepen­

dence was issued. It was based on the Sivas Declaration, became the

basis of nationalist foreign policy and is a key document of mo d e m

Turkish history.

In general, the National Pact emphasized complete independence:

territorial, political, Judicial, and economic. To the nationalists,

its six main principles "represent the maximum sacrifice which can be undertaken to achieve a just and lasting peace," as well as a "stable

would be the match we could use to inflame the nation. With the cessa­ tion of the Parliament in the capital there could be only one place for it— Anatolia."

"Then I will go to Constantinople," said Rauf. "We shall succeed in that way."

Kazim Kara Bekir embraced him with some emotion. "You have courage my friend," he said. "Go, then, to Constantinople and do as we have planned. We shall succeed in our aims, we shall have the whole nation behind us." I p Bedause of its importance a translation of this document is quoted in full in the Appendix. The original text of the National Pact is in the Proceedings of the Grand National Assembly, Meclisi Mebusan Zabit Ceridesi, DBrdttnctt Devrei Intihabiye, Igtima Fevkalade, Istanbul, 17 §ubat 1920. This document has been reproduced in Turkish by T. Z. Tunaya in Osmanli Imparatorlugundan Tttrkiye Bttyttk Millet Meclisi HttkOmeti Rejimine Gegig, 19. 32 Sultanate and society."k?

The first three principles recognized the freedom of Arab territories and called for plebiscites to determine the destiny of all those areas of the Empire under Allied occupation which still con­ tained a majority of Turks. Article Four asserted inviolability of

Constantinople and Article Five guaranteed the rights of minorities.

The final article demanded the abolition of foreign capitulations and other such restrictions.

Thus, the nationalist leaders of Turkey made it clear that they would not interfere with the peoples who objected to their rule, but at the same time, they also made it evident that they intended to have no one interfere with their own independent national existence.

The National Pact was adopted by the Sultan's Parliament in

Istanbul (which oontained a majority of nationalists) on January 28,

1920. The Allies were thus notified of the Turkish demands which in

Kemal's view had to serve as the basis for peace negotiations, and

ii9 Ahmed Emin Yalrnan in his recent work, Turkey in My Time (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), op. 69-90 comments on the Pact as follows:

"The purpose of this Pact was the liquidation of the Ottoman Empire by proclaiming the independence of the provinces inhabited wholly or in large part by Arabs, and by setting the minimum boun­ daries of a Turkish homeland inhabited wholly or mostly by Turks. Furthermore, the National Pact recommended cooperation with a Western power for the sake of introducing basic reforms in the governmental machinery. The Western power in mind was the United States.

"One of the clauses of the National Pact paved the way for the organization of an 'Association for the Defense of the Rights of Asiatic and European Turkey.' Consequently, the National People's Congress became the de facto revolutionary government of all unoccupied Turkey." which now had become the official views of the Istanbul Government.

The Western powers were alarmed, not only by the Pact's demands, but

by the success of the nationalist troops in driving the French from

Mara?, about which they learned in February 1920 during the Allied

Conference at London. Thefts of arms by the nationalists from Allied

dumps in Turkey continued and allied counter-measures did not prove

effective.-^

The Allies forced the resignation of Ali Riza Pasha. He was

succeeded by Salih Pasha, who showed the same readiness to cooperate with the Nationalists as he had at Amasya when he was Minister of the

Navy. The Allies without the forces necessary to suppress the nationalist movement in Anatolia, on April 11, 1920, decided to place

Istanbul under formal military occupation and deport to Malta a score of Nationalist Deputies who were within their reach including some of the ablest nationalist leaders such as Rauf Bey, Ziya GBkalp, and

Fethi Bey.^l The leaders who could, escaped to join Mustafa Kemal in Ankara.

Information on Nationalist forces smuggling arms to Anatolia, and especially the raid of February 27, 1920, which succeeded in seizing large quantities of military equipment, and ammunition from Biga, is available in §Sapolyo, Gerilla, pp. 197-198.

For information on the Turkish leaders exiled to Malta and their contribution to the Kemalist movement see: Ali Nttzhet, Ziya GBkalpin Hayati ve Malta Mektuplari (Istanbul: Matbuat ve Ne?riyat Tttrk Anonim $irketi, 193l); and Ahmed Emin Yaiman, Turkey in Time (supra) Chapter IX, "Prisoners of the British." For biographical information on both Rauf Bey and Ziya Gttkalp, see the Appendix. For Fethi Bey (Fethi Okyar), see I. A. Gttvsa, Tttrk Meghurlari Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul: Yedi Gttn Ne?riyati, 19U6), p. 291. The Grand Vezir resisted an Allied demand that he disavow the nationalist movement, and was farced to resign. The Sultan once again appointed his brother-in-law, Damat Ferit Pasha. Ferit Pasha then declared that the nationalists were rebels against the Sultan and a fetva (Muslim juridical ruling) was issued by the Sheikh-ul-Islam,

Dttrri Zade, in support of this view ending with the words, "Is it permissible to kill these rebels?" Answer: "It is a duty to do so."-^

According to §apolyo^3 the Sultan in an attempt to make known and enforce the terms of this fetva, and to crush the nationalist movement, dispatched religious reactionary leaders into Anatolia to instigate the people to rebellion and created disciplinary forces

(Kuvayi Inzibatiye) known as the Army of the Caliphate. The so-called

Army of the Caliphate was also supported by the British and Greek forces. The Sultan, Mehmet Vahdettin, did all he could to arouse the people of Anatolia against the nationalists. He appointed Kiraz Hamdi

Pasha to lead the forces. Criminals, vagrants and unemployed persons in Istanbul were enlisted in this army and paid Turkish lira 30 a month military pay. By the orders of Stileyman Refik Pasha these forces were marched towards Izmit (near Istanbul on the Sea of Marmara).

Hurriedly commissioned officers were appointed in charge of these troops who went forth in the name of the Caliphate. The religious reactionaries or hodjas who were also sent out told the people:

52 G. L. Lewis, o£. cit.. p. 60.

53 §>apolyo, K.M.T. Gerilla, pp. 195, 201. 35

'In one of my hands is the Quran, in the other hand I hold a ferman /royal decree/ and in my heart I have Faith. I bring you the selams /greetings/ of the Sultan. Henceforth there will be no military service /draft/, there will be no taxation.' Thus, the simple peasants were tricked by this religious type of leader. They also penetrated among the soldiers and told them that the Sultan sent them greetings, that the soldiers were released from military service and could return to their villages. The troops were told that their officers were going to sacrifice them for a useless cause. They were urged to rebel against their officers and the nationalists. This resulted in a number of batallions being dispersed, and this vicious propaganda resulted in rebellions in the country.5b

On the same day as the issuing of the fetva (Muslim juridical

ruling) against the nationalists (April 11, 1920), the Sultan dissolved

the Chamber of Deputies. On this same day a long communique signed

"The Army of Occupation" explained the necessity of the occupation and was dispatched to all telegraph offices. Its essence is the following:

1. The occupation is provisional.

2. The Entente Powers have no intention of destroying the authority of the Sultanate. They desire on the contrary to rein­ force it in all places which shall remain in submission to the Ottoman administration.

3. The Entente Powers continue in their intention not to deprive the Turks of Constantinople, but if, which God forbid, any general troubles or massacres do occur, this decision will probably be modified.55

The Sultan's Government signed the Treaty of Sevres on August 10,

1920, under which Turkey was required to agree to the loss of all her former non-Turkish territories, and parts of her own domain (including

^ Ibid., pp. 200-201. These rebellions will be discussed in more detail in Chapters III and IV of this dissertation.

55 Eliot Grinnel Hears (ed.), Modern Turkey (New York: Macmillan Co., 19210, p. 631. substantial areas to the Greeks) which were embodied in the Tripartite

Agreement. If implemented, these agreements would have meant the end

of Turkey.When the Allies forced the Sultan's Representatives to

sign this treaty they underestimated the strength of Turkish nationalism, which resulted in complete repudiation of the terms of the Treaty of

\ Sevres and the vindication of the principles of the National Pact.

While the Greek landing of May 15, 1919, had sparked the nationalist movement in Turkey, the British occupation of Istanbul and

\ the Treaty of Sevres of August 10, 1920 played a key role in giving the nationalists the power and support, even from conservatives who had originally opposed the nationalists, to convert their movement into an effective separate government based on the declarations of the Con­ gresses of Erzurum and Sivas and the National Pact.

Even before the Treaty of Sevres was signed, following the official British occupation of Istanbul (March 16, 1920), as Chairman of the Representative Committee, Mustafa Kemal, on March 19, 1920, called for the convening of an assembly in Ankara. Accordingly, in

Ankara on April 23, 1920, the Government of the Turkish Grand National

Assembly held its first session and a new era in Turkish Governmental development began.

' For a text of the Treaty of Sevres see: H. W. V. Temperley (ed.), History of the Peace Conference of Paris (London: Henry Frowde & Hodder & Stoughton, 192UT Royal Institute of International Affairs publication). For a discussion of the diplomacy of the period see also: H. N. Howard, op. cit.; R. Davison, on. cit.; Ahmet §>ttkrtt Esmer, op. cit.; and Y. Hikmet Bayur, op. cit. CHAPTER III

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GRAND

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (APRIL 23, 1920)

Soon after occupying Istanbul on March 16, 1920, the British

forced Mehmet VI (Vahdettin) in his capacity of Caliph in accordance

with a fetva (Muslim juridical ruling) of the Sheikh-ul-Islam, to

condemn the Turkish national movement as contrary to Islam, and in his

capacity of Sultan, to dissolve the last Ottoman Parliament.'

Mustafa Kemal, as chairman of the Representative Committee

reacted quickly and decisively to these actions by: gathering an

assembly of muftis, cadis, and ulemas from all parts of Anatolia who

issued a counter-fetva condemning the Sultan-Caliph j and summoning a

meeting of the Turkish Grand National Assembly which immediately

claimed it was the official body of the Turkish nation. It became

increasingly evident to Mustafa Kemal that some sort of government had

to be set up in Anatolia and the closing of the parliament in Istanbul

gave him his opportunity to convoke a parliament in Ankara. The possi­

bility of the need for a more formal type of government than existed

^ William Yale, The Near East - A Modern History (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 19!?8) ,~p. 282. Particularly helpful sources for this chapter include: Yale, oj>. cit.; Webster, oo. cit. j Edib, oj>. cit.; G. L. Lewis, oj>. cit. j Irfan Orga, on. cit.; Tunaya Ttirkiyede Siyasi Partiler (supra), Osmanli Imp aratorlungundan Tttrkiye Btlyilk Millet Meclisi Hflkttmeti Rejimine Gegig (supra), and T.B.M.M. Hflkttmeti (supra). This chapter relies very heavily on the~last two works, which are the best published sources available. Tunaya's second monogram, T.B.M.M. Httkiimeti, is now available in translation at Stanford University, Palo Alto, California. It may be published soon. with the Representative Committee, was in the minds of many Turkish nationalists. Kara Vasif Bey, one of the Nationalist Deputies in

Istanbul wrote to Mustafa Kemal early in March 1920 about the rumors of a British coup d'etat and included the following references to the possible establishment of a government in Anatolia:

It is very probable that the parliament will be dissolved. In that case a temporary government will be formed in Anatolia under your leadership. If you will let us know the names of those whom it is desired should be members of this new government, we will take the recessary measures to insure their passage into Anatolia in time.

However, the official occupation of Istanbul by the Allied forces, who hitherto had ostensibly respected the sovereignty of the Ottoman Govern­ ment, took place on March 16, 1920 before Kemal could reply, and the nationalist deputies who had been able to escape and join Kemal, even if they secretly believed that a separate government should be formed, realized that it would have to be announced as temporary due to the deep attachment of the people to Ottoman traditions. Although Mustafa

Kemal wished to convoke a "Constitutional Assembly," he had to content himself with summoning it as an "Extra-ordinary Assembly," since his cjo authority was questioned.

The summons to the Assembly was issued by Mustafa Kemal in the name of the Representative Committee and was addressed to the Commanding

Generals of the Army Corps, Provincial administrators and governors.

It proclaimed that new elections were to be held to elect five

5® Edib, o£. cit., p. 139.

^ Webster, 0£. cit., p. 8£. 39 representatives from each yilayet (province) to attend an Assembly

with extra-ordinary powers in Ankara, and that in addition to the

newly elected representatives, deputies who were members of the Istanbul

Parliament were also invited to attend.^0

In addition to calling for new elections and convoking an Extra­

ordinary Assembly, Mustafa Kemal, as Chairman of the Representative

Committee of the Association for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and

Rumelia, on March 16, 1920, sent an instruction to Turkish Civil and

Military Authorities regarding the conduct they should assume and also addressed a letter to the world's leaders protesting both the Entente

Occupation of Istanbul and the arrest and exile of Turkish patriots.

He forwarded this communication through the Italian representative at

Antalya. Kemal had already received private assurances from French and

Italian officials that they were no longer whole-heartedly in support of British policy,^-

In his proclamation calling for an Assembly in Ankara, Mustafa

Kemal emphasized that it was not an act of rebellion but one designed to "protect the inviolability and independence of the Sultanate and

Caliphate.Since the occupation of the capital had paralyzed the

60 For a full text of this document see: Tunaya, Osmanli Impara- torlungundan Tilrkiye Btiytlk Millet Meclisi Httktimeti Re.jimine Gegig (supra), pp. 20-21,

61 For a text of Kemal's two Notes, see Appendix. And for an explanation and description of the rift between the allies regarding their Turkish policy, see Chapter VIII of this dissertation.

62 Tunaya, T.B.M.M. Httktimeti, p. 2. Uo organs of Government, and the Istanbul Parliament had been officially dissolved, Mustafa Kemal claimed that a meeting in Ankara to express the will of the nation was necessary.

In addition to the circumstances of foreign occupation which gave the first session of the Turkish Grand National Assembly a very special character, the heterogeneity of the background of its represen­ tatives and the manner of their election also contributed to the unique position of this governmental institution in the history of comparative governments and general constitutional development.

The representatives for this Assembly were elected by two general elections, an unusual electoral procedure for a representative body. The deputies who were invited from Istanbul had been elected in the election in the fall of 1919 and the others by the general election following Mustafa Kemal's proclamation of March 19, 1920. Both elec­ tions were based on the electoral law of 1876 which provides for five deputies to be elected from each district by secret ballot in a two- stage indirect election in which simple majorities were required. The second election, called for by Mustafa Kemal's March 19, 1920 proclama­ tion, was to be conducted so that it would be possible for the Assembly to meet in Ankara in fifteen days. Every party, grouping or society could present its own slate of candidates, and individuals could also run as independents. The highest ranking official in each voting area was to be responsible for the orderly conduct of the elections. In effect, the provincial officials had a great deal of influence in this legal type of cooption, but as compared with elections of the past, it had an increased diversity of candidates and an increased degree of

participation. Many of the delegates to the Erzurum and Sivas Con­

gresses were returned to the Ankara Meeting.^3

The deputies who formed the Assembly, electorally speaking can

be divided into three principal groups: (l) 92 deputies who trans­

ferred from the Istanbul Parliament; (2) ll* deputies who returned from

exile (13 from Malta and one from Greece); and (3) 232 deputies who were elected in accordance with the announcement of March 19. These

337 deputies were elected in the two elections from 66 constituencies.^

Soon the chosen deputies for the National Assembly started coming in, living in the improvised dormitories of the Agricultural School in

Ankara. They were a strangely assorted group which included, the old type Qur'anic school hocas (hodjas), the more modern type professors,

Anatolian provincial functionaries, bearded Kurds, generals, colonels, and former Istanbul deputies. While petty quarrels flared out from time to time, more impressive was a certain unity and sense of urgency.

Many of the intellectuals who had fled to Ankara were openly critical of Mustafa Kemal but supported him believing that the choice lay

63 Ibid., p. 3.

^ Ibid., p. ii. For a list of the names of these deputies see: T.B.M.M. Isim Defteri, D.l (Ankara: 19^3 edition) (Register of Names of the Turkish Grand National Assembly), and T.B.M.M. 'nin 23 inci Yildflntbnfl anig albflmfl (Ankara: April 19h5>) (Album commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Turkish Grand National Assembly) A most important source for information on internal political developments is Tflrkiye Bttytlk Millet Meclisi Zabit Ceridesi (Ankara: T.B.M.M. Mat- baasi, Mayis 1920 -.) (Journal of Minutes of the proceedings of the Turkish Grand National Assembly). This publication, published since May 1920, oontains the proceedings of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and is similar to the Congressional Record of the United States Congress. between this course and racial extinction. Mustafa Kemal often took

pleasure in subduing the various groups and causing them to mingle.^

Among the arrivals for the Assembly Meeting were Colonel Ismet

and Arif (the President of the closed Parliament in Istanbul and

Professor of Constitutional Law at Istanbul University). The fact that

the President of the Central Government had come to join the Nationalists was excellent propaganda for Kemal and he exploited it to the fullest.

Colonel Ismet (later Ismet Inflntt) was to become Kemal's closest and most trusted adviser. Ismet was the perfect foil for Mustafa Kemal, quiet, dependable, ready to obey orders without questioning or attempted advice.The well-known author and Istanbul University Professor,

Halide Edib, and her husband Dr. Adnan, had by this time joined the nationalists in Ankara. During the short-lived raided Parliament in

Istanbul, they had joined Rauf Bey in the struggle for independence, and unlike Rauf Bey had managed to escape to Anatolia and participate in the struggle for unity there against both domestic and foreign foes.^

Among the most plaguing and dangerous situations for the nationalists were the reactionary movements and royalist revolts

6£ Orga, o£. cit., p. 89.

66 Ibid.. p. 113. In addition to being an able soldier, Ismet Pasha's work as senior Turkish representative at the Lausanne Conference, has won him a place in history. He was Prime Minister in 1923-192U and 1925-1937 and second President of Turkey (1938-1950). Born in Izmir in 188U, Ismeii (Inflnfl) graduated from the War College and Academy, See Ibrahim Alaettin Gdvsa, oj>. cit., pp. 188-190, and A. Oktay, Who's Who in Turkey (Ankara, printed privately, 1958), p. 103.

67 For biographical sketches of Halide Edib and Dr. Adnan (Adivar) see Appendix. kl directed against them in several areas of Anatolia. These revolts

were led by royalists, and Islamic sheiks, and in some cases were

apparently encouraged by the British and other Allied Powers.^ The

best known of these reactionary movements was the Anzavur rebellion

which will be discussed presently. In addition, there were several

rebellions in Anatolia including the Adapazar, Hendek and Dtlzce Rebel­

lions. Other rebellions to be noted include the Bolu rebellion and

the Gerede rebellion, the Mudurnu rebellion, the Mihalippik rebellion,

the Yenihan rebellion, the Erbaa rebellion, the Viranpehir rebellion, the pivril rebellion, the Yozgat rebellion and the Konya rebellion.

The rebellion which almost wrecked the morale of the regular army was the Cherkes Edhem ($!erkes Ethem) Rebellion and the Green Army which will be discussed in Chapters IV and V. §>apolyo sums up these rebel­ lions as follows:^®

The fires of rebellion were started all over the country as follows: in the Izmit, Adapazar, Dttzce, Hendek, Bolu, Geyve, Nallihan, Beypazar area; in the Bozkir, Konya, Ilgin, Kadinhani, Karaman, pivril, Seydijehir, Beypehir, Kophisar area; in the Umraniye, Refahiye, Zara Hafik area; in districts such as Viranpehir, and in a number of towns and cities. The treason caused by words of ignorance, hatred and reaction spread over all the clear air of the fatherland. On the one hand, the Anzavur rebellion spread in the Bandirma, G8nen, Sursurluk, Kirmasti, Karacabey, Biga area, while Royalist punitive forces under the command of SUleyman $efik Pasha attacked the forces struggling for independence. Thus, during the year 1920, Anatolia went through frightening times.

68 For a detailed study of these movements and rebellions see: Enver Behnan §apolyo, K.M.T. Gerilla (Supra), especially pp. 195-217.

69 Webster, og. cit.. pp. 7U-77, 115.

70 Ibid., pp. 200-201. (Free translation from the Turkish). hh

As previously mentioned, among the many revolts directed at the

Kemalists by the adherents of the Sultanate during the early days of

the nationalist movement, the Anzavur rebellion in the spring of 1920

is generally considered.one of the most important. According to

General Ali Fuat (Cebesoy)^ one of the leaders of the Nationalist

Movement:

It was Damat Ferit Pasha, Prime Minister of the Royal Government in Istanbul, and his followers as well as the British, who insti­ gated Anzavur to lead a revolt against the Kemalists in Western Turkey. Anzavur selected Manyas and Gflnen as the base for his operations. When he arrived at G8nen the rebellion which had been planned for sometime broke into the open and spread to Biga. At the same time the invading Greek armies opened an offensive in Aydin. This proves that the attack on the Nationalist forces by its foreign and domestic enemies was well coordinated. The Kemalist general, Yusuf Izzet Pasha sent the 17Uth Infantry Regiment of the Fifty-Sixth Brigade under the command of Lt. Col. Rahmi Bey to quell the revolt. However, his troops were caught in an ambush and completely destroyed by the Anzavur royalist forces who declared the Nationalist Forces the enemies of religion /islam^ and the Caliphate.

Shortly before the first meeting of the Grand National Assembly,

as Anzavur, (the Circassian with the title of Pasha which had been

given to him by the Sultan) set out from Bandirma, he was met by

H A great military hero and leader of the early Kemalist period, Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) wqs descended from a prominent family and is known for his cosmopolitan view. Ali Fuat Pasha was included in the early group of leaders of the Republic who were opposed to the abolition of the Caliphate. According to Orga, o£. cit., p. 102, in 1920 when Ali Fuat Pasha was becoming increasingly popular in the West, Mustafa Kemal, convinced that the leadership could not be split, sent Ali Fuat Pasha to Moscow as the first Kemalist Ambassador where he served with distinc­ tion. B o m in 1883, he graduated from St. Joseph Lyceum in Istanbul (French) and the War College and Academy. See Gflvsa, 0£. cit., p. 79, and Otkay, oj>. cit., p. U5.

Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Milli Mttcadele Hatiralari (Istanbul; Vatan Neyriyati, 195>3) (Memoirs of the National Struggle), pp. 3bh-3h5. (Free translation from the Turkish). another Circassian, Ethem, and by Ali Fuat Pasha who stood out against

him at Bandirma, Bursa and Izmir. Ethem was the leader of an irregular

force, one of the strongest in Anatolia, and had fought bravely against

the Greeks in Izmir. His force included many ex-regular officers and

men. He saved the situation for Mustafa Kemal by defeating Anzavur

and "brought in his savage army offering dramatically his heart and

his life to Mustafa Kemal."^ These early rebellions were among the

contributing factors which dictated speed in the convening of an

assembly to establish some form of government.7 k Time was in Mustafa

Kemal's favor in regard to these rebellions, for gradually news filtered

through to the villages and many who had been fighting for the Sultan

began to join the nationalist ranks as former allegiance to the Sultan was replaced by disappointment and fury at the Sultan's behavior under the British occupation.

In addition to these revolts, Mustafa Kemal had to face resis­ tance to his leadership within the Nationalist Forces which made the need for a nationalist governing body capable of enforcement increa­ singly imperative.

Being an astute political tactician, Mustafa Kemal began holding caucuses during the first weeks of April 1920 with a nucleus of leaders and continued this practice as new deputies arrived in Ankara. The main subject was the form that the new government would take and Mustafa

73 Orga, o£. cit., p. 89.

7^ Tunaya, T.B.M.M. Htikttmeti, p. 3. Kemal was determined to obtain the support of as many deputies as possible for his views prior to the opening of the assembly. Some

leaders of western outlook favored a constituent assembly but Mustafa

Kemal did not, stating that this too closely resembled a republic, and

as such, would frighten the people. Kemal claimed that his proposal was an original one embodying a form of government uniquely suited to

Turkey. In essence it consisted of a National Assembly which would exercise all legislative and executive powers, would select the members of the cabinet (responsible individually to the assembly) to be pre­ sided over by a President of the Assembly who would have no personal responsibility. While these proposals did not meet with universal approbation, much opposition was muted due to the need for nationalist unity. In view of the precarious situation of the Turkish nation,

Kemal's wish that the entire Assembly, rather than a specific cabinet or person take the responsibility, was understandable, since the individual risk was great and moreover the direct identification of each delegate with the national struggle increased his stake in its success. Despite weaknesses in the new form, many delegates gave it their provisional support due to outside anti-nationalist pressures, and to the conviction that the personality of Mustafa Kemal Pasha was nC more than able to remedy any defficiency.'

7^ Edib, o£. cit., pp. 139-1^2 has a graphic description of these early caucuses which she witnessed. Although seeing the weak­ nesses and dangers in the Kemal proposal she concludes; "I felt that whatever shortcoming this new form might have, it gave the impression that Mustafa Kemal Pasha was leaving the entire power and responsibility with the people's representatives, and that the prevalent belief that U7 After he had his proposition accepted by what he judged to be a

sufficient number of the delegates, Mustafa Kemal began to prepare an

elaborate speech to be delivered to the Assembly, pointing out the

early stages of the nationalist movement which led to the necessity of

a new government and the basis on which he believed the Government should be established.76

A notice dated April 22, 1920, announced that all civil and

military establishments and personnel were to be under the jurisdiction

of the Turkish Grand National Assembly as of April 23, 1920, the day

that the Assembly was to have its first meeting.77

The Assembly's first session was on April 23, 1920. At the

opening ceremony the deputies all gathered together for prayer in the

mosque in a manner reminiscent of crusading knights. Following this

ceremony, the oldest deputy, ^erif Bey (from Sinop) was elected

chairman; an address was given regarding deputies who would compose

the assembly (including the exiled members in Malta on their return)

he wanted to be the sultan or the dictator of the new regime was quite groundless. In a strange way I was beginning to feel that he was to be our George Washington." (Iii2) .

7^ This speech entitled "MUtarekeden Meclisin apilmasina kadar gejen zaman zarfinda cereyan eden siyasi ahval hakkindaki nntka dinlenerek tasvip edilmistir." (The Political events that took place from the Armistice to the opening of the Assembly), was delivered by Mustafa Kemal on April 2JU, 1920, before he was elected the first President of the Assembly. It is considered one of his most moving speeches. It was published and distributed upon the proposal of Ham- dullah Suphi (TanriBver) deputy of Antalya. See T.B.M.M., Zabit Ceridesi, pp. 16-26, 30, 33-35.

77 The text of this document is available in Nutuk (1938 edition) (supra) pp. 308-309# and other clerical and administrative matters such as travel expenses

were authorized; and a commission was selected to keep the minutes of

the meeting.

A most noteworthy achievement of the first meeting was the

adoption of the following resolutions:

1. The founding of a government is absolutely necessary.

2. It is not permissible to recognize a provisional chief of state nor to establish a regency.

3. It is fundamental to recognize that the real authority in the country is the national will as represented by the Assembly. There is no power superior to the Grand National Assembly.

In The Grand National Assembly of Turkey embraces both the executive and legislative functions. A council of state, chosen from the membership of the Assembly and responsible to it, con­ ducts the affairs of state. The president of the Assembly is ex-officio president of the Council.

Note: The Sultan-Kalif, as soon as he is free from the coercion to which he submits, shall take his place within the constitu­ tional system in the manner to be determined by the Assembly.79

At the second meeting held on April 2k, Mustafa Kemal Pasha,

gave an address about ’’The Political events that took place from the

Armistice to the opening of the Assembly,’1 which is considered one of Rn the most moving speeches of his career. In this speech he presented

7® For a text and discussion of these decrees, see: T.B.M.M. Kavanin Mecmuasi, Vol I, 13hl (1923) pp. Ull, Ul7, 1+26; (Journal~of Laws of the Turkish Grand National Assembly); and T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi D.I Iptima Senesi 1 Vol I, p. 1, Vol. Ill lj?, Vol. K, 209 (l9li0 edition).

79 Tarih IV, op. cit., p. 52, as translated by Webster, op. cit., p. 8SI (italics in the original).

Orga, oj>. cit., p. 91. For a full text of this statement see: T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi (supra) 30-32, and for a summary of Mustafa Kemal’s statement see also Nutuk (supra), pp. 313—311+- U9

a motion advocating the creation of a government commission without

delay to unite the national forces under a central organization. Kemal reasoned that the need for constitutionalism and legality in itself created the need for an Assembly; and this Assembly which must be the expression of the national will, in order to express this will adequately must form a government capable of promulgating and enforcing laws.

Kemal claimed that formation of a parliamentary system with the normal executive-legislative mechanism would not be adequate in the circum­ stances. In his view, it was necessary either to dissolve the Assembly and vest an executive body with more authority, or to strengthen the legislative body, that is the Assembly, with both legislative and executive functions. In the caser of the latter alternative, Kemal envisaged the details of day to day operations being administered by a council or commission selected from the assembly membership which would be responsible individually and as a body to the Assembly. In like manner, the president of the Assembly (who is also the chief of the

Executive Council) would be held responsible for his actions by the 81 Assembly, Kemal emphasized that the Assembly must occupy itself directly with the nation's destiny because ,rWe are obliged to form a

The discussion of this speech by Mustafa Kemal is largely drawn from Tunaya, T.B.M.M. HttkBmeti, pp. 6-9. In the 1876 Constitu­ tion, the Sultan was not responsible to the Parliament and since this plan endeavored to take into consideration and profit from previous constitutions, this provision was inserted. The policy of accepting the supremacy of the Assembly became the basic feature of the Govern­ ment of the Grand National Assembly. 5o On government without a chief." He pointed out that since the Sultan-

Caliph is temporal and spiritual leader of all Turks, as well as the

spiritual leader of all Muslims, the chief aim of the new government

must be to liberate its leader who is now a virtual prisoner to the

allies, and restore him to his rightful place, rather than to form a

government with a supreme head in Anatolia and appoint a deputy Sultan.®^

That is, the Assembly, as the focal organ of the national will, must be

the supreme legal and political force in the country pending the libera­

tion of the Suitan-Caliph.

After the conclusion of his speech, the deputies wanted time to

consider the recommendations, but Mustafa Kemal, perhaps sensing inter­ minable delays, which in his view the nation could ill afford, stated:

This whole Assembly must become completely responsible in the full meaning of the term. The nation sent us here to take action, not to turn over the destiny of the nation into the hands of a few individuals•

He then asked for a secret session and made some additional proposals,

82 This statement was both conciliatory to the Conservatives who were devoted to the idea of the Suitan-Caliph, and reformist in that it would prevent any Assembly president from assuming unwarranted powers. See Tunaya, Tttrkiyede Siyasi Partiler (supra) 51*0-5111 for a discussion of this question.

This aim, as time went on, increasingly conflicted with the principle of national sovereignty and contributed toward disunity in the Assembly. This factor of disunity was removed with the abolition only of the Sultanate. See: Ali Fuat Bapgil, Tflrklye Siyasi Re.jimi ve Anayas a Prensipleri (Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi, 1957) (The Political Regime of Turkey and Its Constitutional Principles).

8^ T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesit (supra), 36-37. (Free translation from the TurkishX. pressing for an end of political indecision. Although there was

opposition to his pressure tactics, especially by Sirri Bey of Kocaeli,

and by some deputies who believed that it was not feasible to create

another government despite Kemal's pleas of urgency because there was

already another government in Istanbul,08 fi most of the Assembly members

favored the establishment of a centralized government in Anatolia,

Two main proposals vied for passagea full-fledged Assembly system;

and a modified Assembly system with a temporary Executive Committee and

a fifteen-man Parliamentary Commissi.on to study the merits of the bill

and report its recommendations to the Assembly. This latter proposal,

which was closest to Kemal's plan, was put forth by Celaddin Arif Bey

of Erzurum, professor of Constitutional Law and former President of

the Istanbul Parliament, which lent great weight to his proposal. In

the vote which followed this proposal was selected by the delegates.

An election was then held for the Presidency of the Assembly

and Mustafa Kemal Pasha was elected President.^® The members of the

Refik §evket (Ince) Bey proposed that an executive committee similar to the former Representative Committee for the Defense of Rights handle the affairs of State only on a temporary basis.

Tunaya, T.B.B.M. HilkBmeti (supra) 9, in his discussion of these two proposals classifies them as "radical" and "conciliatory or moderate," respectively.

The results based on simple majorities were as follows: Mustafa Kemal Pasha 110 votes; Celalettin Arif Bey, 109 votes. The election of the vice president was postponed for some time since a simple majority wqs not obtainable. Eventually pelebi Efendi and Haci Bektaf felebisi Cemalettin Efendi were selected. See: T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi (supra) h2-Uu 52

Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Commission were also selected 89 following the election of the President.

The Parliamentary Commission finished its deliberations on

governmental organization and presented its recommendations to the

Assembly on May 1, 1920. The plan recommended was along the lines desired by Mustafa Kemal, evidence of his overriding influence on the commission. After a long and acrimonious debate, the recommendations were passed and the eleven man Council of Ministers (also referred to as the Cabinet) stipulated in the recommendations,was s e l e c t e d . ^

There were six members for the Executive Committee: Celalettin Arif (Erzurum); Cami (Baykurt) (Aydin); Bekir Sami (Amasya); Fevzi Pasha (£akmak) (Kozan); Hamdullah Suphi (Tanriftver) (Antalya); Hakki Behip (Denizli), Ismet Bey (Indntt) (Edirne) was also attached to the com­ mittee. Mustafa Kemal, as President of the Assembly was automatically President of the Committee. The fifteen persons of the Parliamentary Commission to study the bill and recommend a basic law included: Dr. Riza Nur (Sinop); Celalettin Arif (Erzurum); Yusuf Kemal (Tengirpenk) (Kastamonu); Yunus Nadi (Abalioglu) (Izmir); Hamdullah Suphi (Tan- ridver) (Antalya); Sirri IfHz] (Izmir); Refik (Koraltan) (Konya); §Seyh Servet (Bursa); Haydar (Kiltahya); Ferit (porum); Abdttlkadir Kemali (Ogtttytt) (Kastamonu). Jelebi Efendi, deputy of Konya resigned on April 27, 1920, and Mustafa Kemal was elected on the commission in his place. At this time the opposition of Sirri Bey, deputy of Izmit was again seen as he opposed Mustafa Kemal1s election. See T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi, 70-79; and T.B.M.M. 'nin 25 inci YilddnhmUnd Anig Albttmil, 90 (supraTT

According to Tunaya, T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi. Vol. I, 198. 203, and Albflm (supra) 90-93. the first Council of Ministers of the Turkish Grand National Assembly Government consisted of the following Ministers: Muslim Divine Law: Mustafa Fehmi Efendi (Gerjeker) (Bursa); Interior: Cami Bey (Baykurt) (Aydin); Justice: Celalettin Arif Bey (Erzurum); Foreign Affairs: Bekir Sami Bey (Amasya); Health and Social Assistance: Dr. Adnan Bey (Adivar) (Istanbul); Economy: Yusuf Kemal Bey (Tengirjienk) (Kastamonu); National Defense, Fevai Pasha (Jakmak) (Kozan); Chief of the General Staff: Ismet Bey (Indnti) (Edirne); Education: Dr. Riza Nur Bey (Sinop); Finance: Hakki Behiy Bey (Denzili). With the Council of Ministers elected, the Assembly could now devote

its energies to establishing a policy platform and delineating the

functions and powers of the various organs of the Government of the

Grand National Assembly. 91 The platforrr submitted for the approval of the Assembly by the

Council of Ministers was aimed at giving the Council of Ministers suf­

ficient scope and power to carry out the independence struggle to a

successful conclusion. National unity was set forth as the prime

prerequisite for success. As platforms go, it was very brief and many

important subjects and problems were not mentioned at all. In the field of foreign policy, the Assembly was empowered to accept peace terms and to ratify peace agreements, only if they were consistent with the principles of the National Pact; in the field of domestic policy, while certain reforms were considered desirable, their introduction was to be postponed until after military victory since all attention must be devoted to this end; and in the field of military affairs, the

Nationalist forces were to be organized into a regular armed force with a centralized command.^

Although in a show of national unity this platform was approved, many problems arose which remained unresolved for some time. These included the extent to which the Council of Ministers could act on

^ For the text and discussion of this platform see T.B.B.M. Zabit Ceridesi. Vol. I (supra), 2lH-2l|6.

92 For a summary of the principles of this platform and a dis­ cussion of the problems raised, see Tunaya, T.B.M.M. Httkflmeti. 10-11. behalf of the Assembly without its majority approval, the problem of individual initiative and decentralization, and the doctrinal basis of the Assembly which clarifies its actual political character. Some of these problems were clarified with the passage of the Law of Fundamental

Organization in 1921 (also referred to as the Constitution of 1921), while others plagued the Government of the Grand National Assembly during its entire existence. CHAPTER IV

"NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY" THE DOCTRINAL

BASIS OF KEMALISM

The Turkish Grand^ National Assembly declared itself a revolu- 9li tionary organ and the custodian of the national sovereigntyj H as such,

it claimed the position of the supreme legal governmental institution of the country and admitted no rivals.

Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation. The Grand National Assembly is the true and sole representative of the nation. Legislative authority and executive power are manifested and concentrated in the Grand National Assembly.95

However, the Grand National Assembly was not without limitations on its authority since it had to operate in accordance with the regulations it passed and within its own basic aims.9^ The aim of the Assembly has

93 The designation "Grand" was given to the National Assembly to emphasize its extraordinary authority. Because at every opportunity this position of authority was reaffirmed, it has been interpreted by some scholars as a rejection of the Sultanate by Mustafa Kemal from the very beginning.

9^ According to Tunaya, Httkttmeti, among the first declarations made by the Assembly were the following: The Declaration of the Grand National Assembly to the Nation (April 26, 1920); the Declaration of the Guidance Commission (May 9, 1920)j the telegram sent to the Sultan by the Assembly (April 28, 1920)j the Declaration of the Muslim Religious Commission (May 9, 1920)$ and the Declaration on Populism (December 18, 1920). These declarations demonstrate the position which the Assembly claimed for itself as a governmental organ.

9^ Declaration of the Grand National Assembly to the Nation, translated by G. L. Lewis, 0£. cit., p. 6l. 96 Texts of legislation which reveal the aims of the Government of the Grand National Assembly during its existence (1920-1923) are to be found in Tunaya, Httkflmeti, 12. The list given by Tunaya has been reproduced for convenience in the Appendix. 56

been summarized as follows:

To liberate the Caliphate and the Sultanate, the Fatherland and the Nation, within the framework of the principles of National Sovereignty.97

An understanding of the meaning implied by the leaders of the

Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly when they used the

term "national sovereignty," is basic to an evaluation of this Govern­

ment. "National sovereignty" was the government's doctrinal base, and

as such was constantly reaffirmed, emphasized, and cited as justifica- 98 tion of action at every opportunity. This concept of national

sovereignty is broad and eludes definition; it arose from a variety

of ideologies current in Turkey.^ To the followers of Ziya Gdkalp, it

implied Turkish, that is, sovereignty based on "race" or better culture;

to others it meant the formation of Soviets, known as the gark Mefkure3i

(Eastern Ideal); and to still others who were advocates of the Garp

Mefkuresi (Western Ideal), it included the Wilsonian principle of

self-determination of nations and the inherent right of all nations to

97 Tunaya, Httkttmeti. p. 13.

96 For the text of a speech given by Mustafa Kemal entitled "Hakimiyeti Milliye" (National Sovereignty), see: Atatflrk Dedi Ki (Istanbul: Sttmer Matbaasi, 19U2) (Thus Spoke Atatttrk. This is a compilation of Kemal's speeches, declarations, and interviews and has been found most useful by this writer. The original Turkish text is given and the editor and compiler, Herbert Melzig, has given an English translation of a few of the more significant passages. This book will be referred to hereafter as Atatttrk Dedi Ki.

99 For a clear discussion of this subject see, Tunaya, Partiler pp. U72-U77. 57

independence by all and any means necessary. 100

National Sovereignty was adopted as a standard by the Defense

of Rights movement"*"^ in 1919, a natural name for such a movement in

view of its objective. The Government of the Grand National Assembly,

a later governmental stage of this early movement, conserved the legal

justification of the Defense of Rights organization and has been

considered as:

. . . the result of one of the last delayed nationalist movements under new conditions (1920) which was very similar to European national movements that took place in the course of the last century.102

The aims of the Assembly, to liberate the Sultanate and the

100 These concepts will be discussed more fully in subsequent pages of this chapter.

For a discussion of this movement and other governmental attempts prior to the Government of the Grand National Assembly, see Chapter II of this Dissertation, "Early Nationalist Efforts to Form a Government in Anatolia (1919-1920)." According to Tunaya, Partiler, p. 7h7, this movement included numerous organizations throughout the country such as the: Reddi Iggal (Rejection of the Occupation); Reddi Ilhak (Rejection of the Annexation)j Mudafaai Hukuk (Defense of Rights); Muhafazai Hukuk (Preservation of Rights)j and Istihlasi Vat an (Deliverance of the Fatherland). It was the presence of the national struggle which forced these organizations to operate actively (Tunaya). They had subdivisions in cities and villages. Their activities repre­ sented the united desire for defense and the rejection of the occupa­ tion for the nation, which is another way of stating that they subscribed to the doctrine of national sovereignty. In this same work, U72-539, Tunaya, states that the period of the Defense of Rights (October 30, 1918 to October 29, 1923) went through two main phases. The first phase which lasted until April 2, 1920, was known as the Milli Cemiyet ve Kongrelerin Mttcadelesi (Struggle by means of National Associations and Congresses) and the second phase was known as the Ttirk Bflytik Millet Meclisi Devresi (Period of the Turkish Grand National Assembly).

102 Tunaya, HttkBmeti, p. 20. 58

Caliphate within the framework of national sovereignty, were broad

enough to attract persons of different views to its support in the face

of foreign military danger. However, an examination of these aims reveals that they were obscure and at times even contradictory. The principle of national sovereignty was supported and institutions were established in accordance with this concept, but it was still declared that the Sultanate and Caliphate were to be liberated implying that the monarchy was to be continued, although it was not stipulated what would happen if the monarchy did not conform to the "national" or popular will. This situation resulted in two incompatible political systems and this incompatability plagued the Assembly in its activities until the proclamation of the Republic in 1923. The Government of the

Grand National Assembly has been aptly described as a government of

"contrasts and contradictions."^®^

This state of affairs made it especially difficult to agree on the basic principles of domestic and foreign policy which the Govern­ ment should follow. Domestically, the actual ad hoc functioning of the government because of military need, assumed more power than its legal provisions implied. However, legal and structural changes consonant with actual operation were not feasible, because any official indica­ tion of increased or more permanent assumption of power by the new government would have been vigorously opposed by the numerous conser­ vative and reactionary elements who were tenacious in their loyalty to

103 Ibid., p. 13 the Sultanate and Caliphate, jealous of their power as deputies, and wary of Mustafa Kemal.

In the field of foreign policy, the chief difficulty was to find and follow a policy compatible with the aims of the Grand National

Assembly and the National Pact which was in Turkey's best interest and free from foreign pressures. A leading Turkish scholar describes the basic lines of Turkish foreign policy which resulted, as a "pure policy of ideological independence,"^-0^ He claims this was primarily the result of the cross fire of the Western and Eastern Ideals which con­ stantly pressured the Government of the Grand National Assembly both from without and from within its membership.

Those who adhered to the Western Ideal tried to shape the new government on western lines, especially the economic, social, and educational systems which the new Turkey would adopt. In their foreign policy they were in complete agreement with those who adhered to the

Eastern Ideal since they opposed what they believed to be the policy of the West, namely a policy which aimed to convert Turkey into a series of colonies, which wou}.d prevent the development of an indepen­ dent Turkish State.

The Eastern Ideal,envisaged the Turkish national movement creating an independent state which would serve as a buffer between the

10U Tunaya, HHkttmeti, 21. Mr. Tunaya attributes the term "ideological independence" to E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik P.evolution (London: 19^3)•

10^ Edib, o£. cit., p. 171, and Tunaya, Httktimeti, pp. Iii-l6 .

106 Tunaya, HttkHmeti, pp. 16-19. 6o

Soviet Union and the West. According to Tunaya, 107 ' the Soviet Union planned to exploit this ideal by inviting Turkey, after she had attained buffer status, to form a government modeled on the Soviet pattern and ultimately join the Soviet Union through the instrument of an Eastern

Federation. This was to be accomplished through the establishment of

t nA Communist parties in Turkey.

Thus the Soviet interest shown in, and the assistance given to the Turkish Defense of Rights movement and the Government of the Grand

National Assembly has been interpreted as a tactical move aimed primarily at subverting Turkey and obtaining the maximum advantage over the West from the developments arising out of the Anatolian move­ ment, rather than a good neighbor policy. The plan of an Eastern

Federation was presented to the Congress of Eastern Nations gathering in Baku during September 1920, known as ’’The Baku Congress of Eastern

Nations.The Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly sent as its delegate, Ibrahim Tali Bey. Enver Pasha also participated

107 Ibid., p. 17.

108 For Communist parties in Turkey see: Tunaya, Partiler, pp. 531-533} and Cebesoy, Milli Mttcadele Hatiralari, pp. 506-513.

109 Works on this important Congress as it affected Turkey include: Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Moskova Hatiralari (Istanbul: Vatan Nejriyati, 1955) (Moscow Memoirs) (Cebesoy was the first Kemalist Ambassador to Moscow)} E. H. Carr, 0£. cit., p. 260} Ivar Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 195577 PP* 22-3li} C. J. Rudin and R. C. North, Soviet Russia and the East (1920-1922): A Documentary Survey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957)} and Walter Z. Laquer, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957)• 61

on an individual private basis.-1-10 Although the Defense of Rights was

mentioned several times at the Congress and Mustafa Kemal was outwardly-

supported, it is known that at this time the Soviet leaders were also

supporting the activities of Enver Pasha and were willing to see him

develop as a force against the Defense of Rights leadership, H-*- another

indication of the Soviet Union's basic aim of subverting Turkey rather

than seeing her independent and nationally sovereign.

Although the Eastern Ideal had its followers in Ankara, the men IIP who were considered most influential favored the Western thesis.

However, those who were advocates of the Eastern Ideal made no such admission claiming that Mustafa Kemal had used some of the structural

Enver Pasha was the head of the Triumvirate which brought Turkey into the war on the side of the Central Powers in 19lU. Atatflrk and Enver Pasha, who had been rivals fran the early Young Turk days, continued to distrust each other. For works on Enver Pasha dealing with his activities at this conference see: Sami Sabit Karaman, Istiklal MU each Iasi ve Enver Paya (IzM.tr’jSellttlba-IMhtbaasi., 19^8), pp. 79-8U, 109, (TheStruggle for Independence and Enver Pasha); Richard Euringen, Per Serasker Envers Ende. Irrfahrt und Kampf.eines Kllhnen Tttrken (Hamburg: 1939) j E. H. Carr. 0£. cit.; Spector, oj>. cit.; Hostler, o j d , cit., especially pp. Iu6-l56; Fuad Gflcilyener, Enver Paya (Istanbul: Anadolu Tflrk Kitabevi, 1937); Feridun Kandemir, gehit Enver Paya Tttrkistanda (Istanbul: Bariman Yayinevi, 19U6) (The Hero, Enver Pasha in Turkistan); F. Kandemir, "Enver Payanin flltlmtt, Resimli 1'arih Mecmuasi. (April, 19f?0) No. U, (The Death of Enver Pasha); M.Z. (no name given) "Enver Payanin Atatflrk hakkindabir mektubu," Resimli Tarih Mecmuasi (February, 1950) No. 2, (A letter of Enver Pasha con* cerning Atatflrk); and Joseph Castagne', Les Basmatchis (Paris: Ernest Roux, 1925) (About the Basmachi movement led by Enver Pasha in Turkestan).

m Tunaya, Hflkflmeti, p. 1 9 .

112 Edib., o£. cit., p. 171. forms proposed by them when setting up the Government of the Grand

National Assembly. This claim is dismissed by an eye witness as follows

He ^ustafa Kemal/ just considered the practical value of the loose, semi-democratic, semi-sovietic system as a basis for personal power in the future, and was shrewd enough to see that the more old land­ marks he destroyed, the easier it would be to get the people to look at his new ones.H3

The Government of the Grand National Assembly was forced to operate under the heavy pressure of these two ideological groups through the course of changing military and political events. Beginning early in 1920, nationalist policy doctrine began to appear in official documents, three of which will be considered: the "Estimate of the

Political Situation in Anatolia during 1920, the Populist Declara­ tion (December 18, 1920), and the Law of Fundamental Organization of

January 20, 1921, also known as the Constitution of 1921.

Although the leaders of the Government of the Grand National

Assembly were disillusioned with the action of the West through the

Treaty of Sevres, and consequently the appearance of some sympathy for the East resulted, this rapprochement did not have deep political sig­ nificance as far as pro-Eastem orientation was concerned, but was used as a bargaining lever in negotiations with the West. This is seen in the conclusion of "Estimate of our Political Situation in

Anatolia during 1920," which states that the closer the Assembly

1;L3 Ibid., p. 173.

llU "Vaziyetin Muhakemesi," (Estimate of the Situation) a most enlightening and little known Turkish document quoted in Tunaya, Hflkflmeti, p. 20. 63 Government leaned toward the East, the better would be its tactical position vis-a-vis the West.-^ An exerpt from this report, in addition to reinforcing this view, indicates that Turkish leaders regarded Soviet aims as counter to their basic doctrine of national sovereignty.

Countries which have relations with the Bolsheviks are forced either into social and political unity with them, or have to resist Bolshevik aggression by means of arms. We too are obliged to choose one of two alternatives. If the Allied Powers wish us to oppose the Bolsheviks, then they should at least withdraw their occupation armies from the non-Arab sections of our terri­ tories, which they have occupied for a year. But a decision which would necessitate such a sacrifice on the part of England, France, Italy and Greece could only be possible under some com­ pulsion. It is also clear that the Allied Powers knew that , they could not be compelled to withdraw their occupation forces.

The Populist Declaration of December 18, 1920, further explained the Assembly's ideological principles. It emphasized the fact that national sovereignty, the sovereignty of the people is the foundation of Constitutional Government in Turkey. Thus Turkey claimed that

Turkish government derives its power from "the consent of the governed. "H ?

The concepts embodied in the Populist Declaration and other nationalist pronouncements were historically inspired by the intellec­ tual leader of the Kemalist Revolution, Ziya Gflkalp, who proposed the

Tunaya, Httkflmeti, p. 20.

Idem, "An Estimate of our Political Situation in Anatolia during 1920," as quoted in Tunaya, Httktimeti.

Despite repeated efforts, the present writer has not as yet been able to obtain a text of this declaration. However, the informa­ tion given here has been derived from the works of Tunaya and several other writers. 6h

new concept of Tttrkgttlttk (Turkism, or modern Turkish nationalism).

Ziya Gttkalp1s ideas included populism and modernism. lift

Following the Populist Declaration of December 1920, the Grand

National Assembly began a debate on a Constitution which all admitted

to be necessary. However, after several months of debate, agreement

could not be found on various aspects of the government.such as

whether it was provisional or permanent, and consequently no document

was produced. However, Mustafa Kemal, by force of his influence,

personality and steamroller tactics ended the debate, and the Fundamen­

tal Articles of the Constitutional Act of the Government of the Grand

National Assembly were adopted.11^ This act remained in force from

January 20, 1921, its day of adoption, until April 20, 1921*, when the

Constitution under which Turkey is now governed came into effect. The provisions of this 1921 Constitution have been summarized as follows:

1. Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation.

2. Executive power and legislative authority are manifested and concentrated in the Grand National Assembly, which is the sole rightful representative of the nation.

118 por a study of GiJkalp see: Ziya Gflkalp, Tflrkpttlflgttn Esas- lari (Ankara: Matbuat ve Istihbarat Matbaasi, 1923) (Foundations of Turkism) (This is a famous work in which GBkalp formulates his concept of Tttrkism)j Enver Behnan §apolyo, Ziya Ggkalp (Istanbul: Gttven Basi- mevi, 19U3)J Uriel Heyd, Foundataons of Turkish Nationalism (London: Luzac and Co., 1950)j Hostler, o£. cit.; and Niyazi Berkes, "Ziya GBkalp, His Contribution to Turkish Nationalism," Middle East Journal. VIII (Autumn 195U) No. U.

For a text of this Constitution see: Tarih IV (Supra). 85f. For a translation of this Document see Appendix. See also, A. §eref GOzflbttyttk and Suna Kili, Tttrk Anayasa Metinleri (Ankara: Ajans-TUrk Matbaasi, 1957) (Annotated documents on the Turkish Constitutions) (This work contains a detailed discussion on Turkish Constitutions from 1876 to the present as well as some earlier documents such as the Tanzimati Hayrlye). 65

3. The Turkish State is administered by the Grand National Assembly and its Government is entitled "Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey."

. li. The Grand National Assembly is composed of members elected by the people.

5. Elections are to be held once every two years. If the holding of new elections is impossible, the session may be pro­ longed for one year only. Every member of the Grand National Assembly is a deputy not of the particular province (vilayet) electing him but of the whole nation.

6 . To the Grand National Assembly belong such fundamental rights as: putting into execution the ordinances of the sacred lawj the laying down, amending and abrogation of all lawsj the concluding of treaties and peace; the proclaiming of the defence of the fatherland (i.e., the declaring of war). For executive matters, the Grand National Assembly appoints and, if necessary, changes Ministers.

7. The President elected by the Assembly is authorized to sign in the name of the Grand National Assembly. The Committee of Executive Ministers shall elect one of their number as Presi­ dent of the Committee.120

In the summer of 1921 as the Greeks began their general advance in Anatolia and Mustafa Kemal ordered the abandonment of 100 miles of

Turkish territory, the shock to public opinion and the consternation in the Grand National Assembly that met his decision reached a climax, with cries that the person responsible for the disaster should be at the head of the army. Mustafa Kemal interpreted this challenge in accordance with his own desires, and termed it an invitation to become

Conr'ander-in-Chief, which he accepted, provided that all the authority vested in the Grand National Assembly be transferred to him personally.

Angry protests arose claiming that such a move was against the doctrine

120 q. l. Lewis, 0£. cit., pp. 6ii-65. 66

of national popular sovereignty by which supreme command was vested in

the Assembly alone. However, Mustafa Kemal stood his ground and the

following day, August $, 1921, was voted the powers he wished.1^1

With these new powers, Mustafa Kemal issued requisition decrees

ordering the confiscation of forty percent of all food, clothing,

bedding, gasoline, oil and spare parts. A register was to be compiled

of all mechanics, metal workers and men in trades of military importance.

In addition to serious local revolts, such as the one in Konya

and among the Pontos Greeks in northern Anatolia along the Black Sea

Coast, widespread looting and disorders were in effect almost every­ where the nationalist army was not in firm control.

To enforce the requisition decrees and to deal with lawbreakers,

deserter's from the army and traitors, Independence Tribunals were

established. 122 There were a number of such Tribunals throughout the

country, the most important being Tribunal No 1. in Ankara. Each

Tribunal had several members chosen from among the deputies. As they went out to inspect in Anatolia they had complete authority and were responsible to no one. They could even decide the death penalty which they often did. Following the establishment of these Tribunals the effect was almost instantaneous, desertions decreased and a degree of

121 For a text of this decree see: Decree No. lUh, August 5, 1921, Zabit Ceridesi, "Law conferring the title of Commander-in-Chief to His Excellency, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, President of the Turkish Grand National Assembly." See also Atattlrk Dedi Ki, "Mustafa Kemal'in Bapku- mandanliga Tayin Edilmesi" (Mustafa Kemal's Appointment as Commander-in- Chief), 113 (Speech to the Grand National Assembly, August 5, 1921).

122 See "Law Establishing Tribunals of Independence" (No. 2hh, July 31, 1922). 67

order was restored.

The Independence Tribunals established during the period of

1920-1923 are generally referred to as the first Tribunals of Indepen­

dence to differentiate them from the later (sometimes referred to as

the second) Tribunals of Independence established in 1926 in accordance with Article 8 of the "Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. An

important member of Atatilrk's circle who participated in both of these

Tribunals, describes the reason for their establishment and their general operation in the following quotation:

During the National Struggle in Anatolia, above all other con­ siderations was the ultimate and supreme aim of achieving uncon­ ditional and complete independence. . . . There were two institu­ tions through which treasonable actions could be punished: one was the courts of law, and the other military court martials. . . . To oppose the forces against the Nationalist Movement (the Sultanate and Caliphate Forces), strong and effective measures were necessary. 1^5

It was this need that resulted in the formation of the Tribunals of

Independence. At this time it was proposed that crimes falling under the classification of treason under the terms of the Law Against

Treason (Hiyaneti Vataniye Kanunu) of April 29, 1920, should be tried in special courts to be called Istiklal Mahkemesi (Tribunals of Inde­ pendence) .

123 Orga, op. cit., p. 100.

12/t See Webster, op. cit.. pp. 107-108 for the establishment of these Second Tribunals of Independence.

1 ^ Kilip Ali, Istiklal Mahkemeleri Hatiralari (Istanbul: Sel Yayinlar, 1955), pp. l-8 i (Memoirs of the Tribunals of Independence) (Selected translation of pertinent sections). 68

After long debate in the Assembly, this concept was finally accepted. . . . The Tribunal of Independence No. 1, was formed in Ankara, and its membership was selected from the Grand National Assembly. I, too, was elected to this tribunal. Among the others selected to our Tribunal were: Ihsan, deputy of Cebelibereket, HUseyin, deputy of Elaziz, and Cevdet, deputy of Ktttahya (now retired from being Principal of the pamlica Lycee). Since the President of the Tribunal was to be elected by the members of the Tribunal, we elected Ihsan B e y . 126

Tribunal No. 1, in addition to meeting in Ankara, was empowered to

hold sessions within the district on a mobile basis. It continued to

operate for some time after the dissolution of the other tribunals which had been formed throughout the country, and only suspended

activities with the coming of the Republic in 1923.

In 1926 Mustafa Kemal had the Ismet Pasha Government re-estab­ lish the Tribunals of Independence which have been commented upon as follows:

These Second Tribunals of Independence included the following members: Ali, deputy of Afyon (former Minister of Public Works), Rejit Galip (former Minister of Education), Ali, deputy of Rize, and Necip Ali, deputy of Denizli, and myself ^Kilip Ali/. . . . These Second Tribunals of Independence differed from the First Tribunals of Independence in that, in addition to members selected from the Grand National Assembly, they included a Public Prose­ cutor. Our Tribunal's Prosecutor was the deputy of Denizli, Necip Ali Bey, now deceased.^27

Mustafa Kemal's acts of this nature did not go unchallenged, and his days were spent in talking down criticism of his conduct of affairs, or when he deemed it necessary, using force.

Meanwhile, toward the end of 1921 the deputies who had been

126 Idem.

127 Idem. interned in Malta returned to Ankara. Many were critical of what they

regarded as Mustafa Kemal's unwarranted authoritarianism and some of

them formed a nucleus of an opoosition group.With Mustafa Kemal's

entry into Izmir on September 9, 1922, and the conclusion of the

Mudanya Armistice on October 11, 1922, which represented a complete

cease-fire removing military threats from the Government of the Grand

National Assembly, dissensions within this Government became more

vocal. The dissidents demanded that Kemal return the supreme authority

to the Assembly which he had taken during the military emergency, since

that emergency had passed. Kemal made no such move.

On October 27, 1922, the Allies sent invitations to the Peace

Conference at Lausanne to both the Government of the Grand National

Assembly and to the Sultan. This act was soon followed by the aboli­

tion of the Sultanate.'*'2^ A long and heated debate took place in the

Grand National Assembly and the initial reaction to the allied move

by the majority of deputies, was desire to depose Sultan Mehmet

Vahdettin and appoint a new Sultan-Caliph. Mustafa Kemal, however,

had a more radical proposal. He reasoned that since sovereignty belonged to the nation, rather than to an individual, the Sultanate

should be abolished, and the Caliphate only, should be conferred on

Vahdettin's successor. While the hocas (hodjas) were debating whether

128 por a discussion of the political differences with Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pasha of deputies returning from Malta, especially Rauf Bey, and the formation of the opposition group, see Chapter VII of this Dissertation: "The Emergence of Mustafa Kemal as the Leader of the New Turkey."

129 G. L. Lewis, o£. cit., p. 70. 70 it was possible to separate the Sultanate from the Caliphate, Mustafa

Kemal made the following definitive remarks which skillfully used the doctrine of national sovereignty as the basis of his argument and then with firm determination he pushed through his resolved intent:

Sovereignty and Sultanate are not given to anyone by anyone because scholarship says soj because of debate or discussion. They are taken by strength, by power, by force. By force the Ottoman dynasty seized the sovereignty and Sultanate of the Turkish nation; they have maintained this usurpation for six hun­ dred years. The Turkish nation has called a halt; it has rebelled and taken the sovereignty into its own hands. This is an accom­ plished fact. The question is not whether or not we are going to leave the sovereignty to the nation; the question is merely how to give expression to the accomplished rdality. This is going to be, come what may. If those who are present, and the Assembly and everybody see the problem in its natural light, I believe they will agree. If not, the truth will still be given proper expression. . . . As for the academic side of the matter, the learned gentle­ men need be in no doubt or anxiety. Let me give you a scientific exposition of the facts.130

A resolution was prepared and read stating that the Turkish people regarded:

the form of government in Constantinople, which is based on the sovereignty of an individual as having forever passed into history as from 16 March 1920.131

On November 17, 1922, Vahdettin escaped from Turkey and on November 18,

1922, by a vote of the Grand National Assembly, Abdttlmecit, his cousin, became C a l i p h . 132

130 Ibid., pp. 70-71. See also: Atatttrk Deki Ki, "Saltanatin Kaldirilmasi,, 193-20li. (The Abolition of the SultanateJ (Speech given by Mustafa Kemal to the Grand National Assembly on November 1, 1922).

131 G. L. Lewis, o£. cit., p. 71.

132 Feridun Kandemir, Siyasi Darginliklar (Istanbul: Ekicigil Matbaasi, 1955) II (Political Quarrelsy7”l>r"3li7"' This work will be referred to hereafter as, Darginliklar. According to Kandemir, At the Peace Conference which opened at Lausanne on November 21,

1922, Ismet Pasha headed the Turkish delegation and the doctrine of

national sovereignty, as embodied in the National Pact, was the basis

of Turkish demands. Because Ismet Pasha refused to accept certain

economic clauses primarily the Capitulations, which he regarded as

limiting Turkish sovereignty, the Conference broke off on February U,

1923. The Conference reopened on April 23, 1923, and the Treaty which

was signed on July 2k, 1923, embodied virtually all of Turkey's demands.

When questioned regarding the tenacity with which he held to the

principle of national sovereignty, Ismet Pasha replied, ^ e have

refused to accept servitude.m133 This indicates the extent to which

the Turks regarded sovereignty as an inherent right.

On October 2, 1923, Allied occupation forces left Istanbul and

on October 6 , 1923, Turkish troops entered the city. With the Treaty

of Lausanne signed, the Assembly voted on October 13, 1923, to make

Ankara the permanent seat of the Government. This shift was made to emphasize a clean break with the Ottoman past and indicated that

Anatolia was now Turkey.

Darginliklar II, 32-33, on this day Karabekir was applauded (November 1, 1922) and stated that there were two views: one the view of treason based on the rotten concepts of Byzantium, and the other formed in the clear air of Anatolia. The second should prevail, since the first view held by the Government in Istanbul resulted in working with the enemy during the war. That day Rauf Bey voiced the same sentiments and stated that the day the Sultanate was abolished should be made a national holiday. Thus, in complete unanimity, the Grand National Assembly decided to abolish the Sultanate.

133 G. L. Lewis, o j d . cit.. p . 73*

!3U Ibid., p. 76. Yale, op. cit., pp. 301-302, also discusses the significance of this move and presents the arguments pro and con of this action as seen in retrospect. 72

Because the Government of the Grand National Assembly appointed its ministers and the ministers in turn were responsible to it, with

the foreign military threat removed, the government began to run into

difficulties while the Assembly was in session. The Ministers became the victims of constant criticism both by persons who sincerely dis­

agreed with their ideas, and by those who for personal reasons wanted to replace them as Minister. This resulted in a condition of general anarchy and confusion. In addition, on October 9, 1923, an announcement appeared in an Ankara newspaper that a Republic would soon be proclaimed. Although many thinking persons realized that the present form of the Government of the Grand National Assembly was in need of revision, the October 9 announcement aroused violent controversy both in and out of the Assembly. October 27, Fethi Bey, the Prime

Minister resigned. After a stalemate in Assembly debate had been reached, the deputies sent for Mustafa Kemal who presented his ideas for a solution in the following proposal:

The form of government of the Turkish State is a Republic. The President of the Turkish Republic is elected by the whole Assembly from among its members. . . . The President is Head of the State. As such, he may, if he thinks fit, preside over the Assembly and the Council of Ministers. The Prime Minister is chosen by the President from among the members of the Assembly. . . . The other Ministers are chosen by the Prime Minister from among the members

135 Kandemir, Darginliklar II discusses this question. See especially pp. 7h-90.

136 g. L. Lewis, 0£. cit., p. 77f Webster, 0£. cit., p. 105j and Orga, o£. cit., p. 1I4I. These writers state that Mustafa Kemal ordered Fethi Bey to resign in order to precipitate a Constitutional crisis. Orga quotes Kemal as saying, "Tomorrow you will all resign. Let the Assembly show us what it can do without a Cabinet]" 73 of the Assembly and the whole Council of Ministers is then sub­ mitted to the Assembly by the President for approval.-*-37

In the debate that followed, one member realistically clarified

the situation as follows:

Once you've said, 'Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the Nation,' you can ask anyone you like; it's a Republic. That is the name of the new born baby. We're told some people don't like the name. Then they can lump it. 38

Although there were many abstentions, Mustafa Kemal's motion

when put to a vote was carried, the Law of Fundamental Organization

was appropriately amended, and Kemal was then elected the new President

of the Grand National Assembly.-*-39 with a Republic declared, and his

election as President, the only governmental obstacle which stood

between Mustafa Kemal and his aim to make Turkey into a modern state on

the Western pattern, was the Caliphate. In January and February 1921*,

Mustafa Kemal attended army maneuvers in Izmir where army loyalty was

reaffirmed, and on March 3, 1921*, he presented to the Grand National

Assembly a bill providing for the abolition of the Caliphate. ^ 0 This

137 g . L. Lewis, og. cit., pp. 77-78.

138 ibid., p. 7 8 .

139 Nutuk, p. 656; Tarih IV ( supra) 153; G. L. Lewis, op. cit.. p. 78j Webster, o£. cit., p. 105. Out of 287 members only 158 voted, and the rest abstained. The election was then declared "unanimous." See Atatflrk Dedi Ki "Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paja'nin ilk Reisictlmhur Sejilisi," pp. 21*9-250 (Gazi Mustafa Kemal1 s first election to the Presidency of the Republic) (Speech before the Grand National Assembly, October 29, 1923). lk° Lewis, o£. cit., pp. 80-81, and Orga, 0£. cit., pp. ll*l*-ll*6 , describe how Mustafa Kemal cleverly made Aga Khan and other non-Turkish Muslim leaders appear as foreign agents and the Caliphate as an outworn useless institutional relic which could only provide a framework for imperialistic intrigue besides being an obstacle to Turkish progress and a symbol of Ottoman decadence. The text of the law abolishing the Caliphate is available in Anayasa, 98-99 (Law No. 931, March 3, 1921*). bill was passed despite opposition both outside and within the Assembly

by such patriots and intellectuals as Rauf Bey, Ali Fuat Cebesoy,

Karabekir, the Adivars, and others.

On April 20, 192U, a new Constitution was passed under which

Turkey is still ruled today. It has not had any sharply divergent

amendments since its original passage. Its chief provisions are the

following

1. The Turkish State is a Republic.

2. The religion of the Turkish State is Islam (later amended). Its official language is Turkish. Its capital is the city of Ankara.

3. Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation.

U. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey is the sole rightful representative of the nation and exercises, in the name of the nation, its right of sovereignty.

J?. Legislative authority and executive power are manifested and concentrated in the Grand National Assembly,

6. The Assembly exercises its legislative authority directly.

7. The Assembly exercises its executive power through the President of the Republic, elected by it, and a Cabinet ("Council of Executive Ministers") to be chosen by him. The Assembly has at all times the power to keep a check on or to overthrow the Government.

For biographical information on these leaders see Appendix.

1^2 The text of the Constitution is now so easily available in Western books and Turkish Information Office publications that it is not reproduced in the Appendix but its main provisions are given here. It may be found, among other places in Anayasa. p. 97. 7S 8 . The judicial function is exercised in the name of the nation by independent courts in accordance with the law.1^3

It was their belief in the right of national sovereignty which

spurred the Turks: to resist the Allied occupatioh of 1919; to form

resistance groups and coordinate their activities; to hold Congresses

at Erzurum and Sivas; to draft a National Pact containing basic minimum

aims; to convene a national assembly in Ankara; to preside over the

destiny of the nation while the official government in the person of the Sultan-Caliph was regarded as a prisoner of the Allies; to carry on a military struggle to its successful conclusion; to obtain diplomatic recognition of its de facto and de jure status as well as the realiza­ tion of its foreign policy aims; to abolish a Sultanate; to draft a

Constitution; and to establish the Republic of Turkey and its Government.

Not all of this was done, however, in a spirit of unanimity.

Quite the opposite was the case because the Assembly was composed of deputies with different backgrounds and opinions which constantly clashed in varying degrees. Even in the very beginning, the only real unanimity of views among the delegates was their general agreement regarding the basic aims of the Assembly which were embodied in the oath of office as follows:

I will follow no other aim than to work for the deliverance of the Caliphate and the Sultanate and for the independence of the Fatherland and the N a t i o n . ^

■^3 g. L. Lewis, o£. cit., pp. 82-8 3 .

lUt T.B.M.M. Zabit Ceridesi. Il, 186, 213 and continuation. 76

Thus, the Turkish Grand National Assembly was united under a broad

enough framework to contain individual and political differences of view including those of Pan-Islamists, Nationalists, Socialists, Tradi­ tionalists, and even some leftists which were found among its ranks.

However, this framework was also too broad for effective operation.

Even the military emergency under which the Assembly had to operate from the very first, did not prevent the development of a variety of political ideas and groupings which became increasingly pronounced as the military danger subsided and Mustafa Kemal's '’authoritarianism” increased. CHAPTER V

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL GROUPINGS AND

PARTIES (1920-1923)

The Grand National Assembly was not so easy to manage as

Mustafa Kemal might have hoped. It had the pride and exaggerated

sense of responsibility often apparent in a newly constituted body.

Like the previous Turkish Parliaments, it might have become nothing but a debating society if it had not been for the critical position of the country. However, even the critical position of the country did not prevent the formation of competing groups within the Assembly.

These groups did not, however, correspond to political parties which had electoral backing. The four general points of view expressed were: two on the right, religious conservatives and moderate conser­ vatives; and two on the left, the majority moderately leftist, and a very small number of more or less communistic deputies at the extreme left.1^

The Assembly was composed of deputies with varied backgrounds who formerly belonged to different political parties and groupings of the Second Constitutional Period and the Armistice Period, military officers, and provincial leaders who had previously played little part in national political life. Practically all of the deputies, including even the most conservative, were critical of the Ottoman

Webster, o£. cit., pp. 96-97. Administration and its policy of subservience to the Allies in the face

of unjustified abuses in contravention of the Armistice Agreement.

They blamed Ottoman troubles on the Tanzimat reforms which they con­

sidered a superficial imitation of Europe, and on the Second Constitu­ tional Period, for what they regarded as erroneous policies. They believed that the great work of liberation could be achieved only by their own direct personal participation and this participation led to political movements and legal concepts, sometimes different, but non­ partisan in the sense that they shared the liberation aim and did not suffer the bitter partisan rivalries which existed between the Committee of Union and Progress and the Liberal Union after 1908.-^

However, the homogeneity and political unanimity of views in the

Assembly were limited to general agreement regarding basic aims.

Pressures from both outside and with the Assembly resulted in policy splits and loose groupings among the deputies. The policies of both the Soviet Union and the Great Powers toward Turkey at this time were influential in the shaping of Turkish foreign and domestic policy based on the concept of national sovereignty.

The practical necessity for friendship with Russia, despite traditional Turkish suspicions, and the policy of the Western govern­ ments to exterminate Turkey, gave rise to two distinct and conflicting trends of thought in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, known as

Tunaya, Httktimeti. pp. 11-12. 79 the Western and Eastern I d e a l s . ^ 7

In general, the Western Ideal was espoused by Mustafa Kemal who formed his following into the Defense of Eights Group. This group which was an outgrowth of the Association of the same name, had by far the majority of deputies, and could generally defeat any opposing motion. Although most of the Defense of Rights Group voted unanimously on all questions of obviously vital importance to the country's libera­ tion, there were those within the Group who opposed Kemal in matters concerning the working of the state machinery and the extent of authority which should be delegated to the Council of Ministers. This opposition came from "Anatolian notables," who for the first time were in a position of responsibility, and also from a number of highly experienced, responsible, patriotic leaders, later known as the Second Group. While at first this opposition was small, new adherents joined as personality clashes in the Grand National Assembly resulted in defection from the

Defense of Rights Group. The Second Group eventually included some of the most prominent deputies and by the spring of 1923 numbered about forty. Among the prominent members of this group were men of high calibre, many of them Revolutionary heroes and leading intellectuals such as: General Ali Fuat (Cebesoy), Admiral Rauf (Orbay), Refet

Pasha (Bele), Kazim Karabekir Pasha, Dr. Adnan (Adivar), Httseyin Cahit

Edib., o£. cit., p. 173. These two conflicting ideals are discussed in Chapter IV of this Dissertation in addition to the dis­ cussion in this chapter. 80

(Yalpin), and Ahmet Emin (Yalman)The entire group admired Mustafa

Kemal, but for differing reasons either objected to what they viewed as his authoritarian tendencies or were in conflict with Mustafa

Kemal's closest supporter, Ismet Pasha (Inflntt). The staunchest sup­ porters of Mustafa Kemal Pasha from the earliest days were Ismet Pasha and Fevzi Qakmak. The journalists supporting Mustafa Kemal included

Falih Rifki Atay and Yunus Nadi.

In addition to controlling dissidents among his generally liberal pro-Western group, the conservatives, and so-called independent pro­ clerical hocas (hodjas), Kemal's leadership, strategy, and timing were taxed even further by the task of containing, conciliating, leading, neutralizing, and subduing disruptive elements attached to the Eastern

Ideal. Threats to his leadership from the groups attached to the

Eastern Ideal were among the severest political problems Kemal had to overcome between 1920 and 1922 in the operation of his Government and the consolidation of his power. However, in spite of the difficulty of handling all these forces, Mustafa Kemal apparently intended, despite his appearing to by-pass the Grand National Assembly on occa­ sion, to work through an Assembly, rather than to disperse it and take the entire responsibility on himself.1^ To work through the Assembly

For biographic sketches of the first five names mentioned here see Appendix. For sketches of Yalpin and Yalman see Gflvsa, op. cit., pp. Uoo-Uai.

-^9 Orga, 0£. cit., p. 93 states that "Mustafa Kemal for the time being preferred to work through the Grand National Assembly but the constant opposition tired him and at times when his patience gave way he interfered needlessly in unimportant details which annoyed some deputies." 81 meant an enormous amount of talking, flattery, persuasion and bullying on Kernel's part which at times sorely taxed his patience. In many cases it meant giving in to the demands of this or that group, and even discrediting those who had acted in accordance with his previous orders and desires, once these desires had been proven unwise.

The Eastern Ideal was an:

. . . amorphous collection of ideas arising from thwarted desires for some more congenial state of affairs which should be appro­ priate to the E a s t . ^50

These ideas were very much influenced by the Russian Revolution. The man who was considered as the most important representative of the

Eastern Ideal was Hakki Behip Bey,^- Commissary of Finance in the

Government of the Grand National Assembly, and one of the few nation­ alist leaders who had seriously studied Marxist philosophy. Another man who outwardly cooperated with Hakki Behip Bey, was Hikmet Bey

(Yusuf Hikmet Bayur)-^ the grandson of Grand Vizier Kamil Pasha. Hikmet Bey apparently had been selected by Mustafa Kemal to examine

Edib, o£. cit., p. 171. The Eastern Ideal and its prota­ gonists in Turkey during this period are discussed in this work on pp. 171-182.

151 Hakki Behip Bey who came from a wealthy and prominent family, had been one of the youngest among the members of the Union and Progress Party. Halide Edib, o£. cit., p. 171 states that he "shaped his ideas according to books rather than according to events." It is said that he later committed suicide. He appeared to favor some type of con­ federation of Muslim countries organized on what he viewed as communist lines, actually closer to socialism.

1^2 Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, is a brilliant teacher and statesman as well as an outstanding writer of political science and history. 82

the possibility of collaboration with the Soviet Union, and when Com­ munism was banned, Hikmet Bey returned to the Republican People's

Party.

Besides Hakki Behiy and Hikmet Bey and their immediate followers, there were classes of people who interpreted the Eastern Ideal in

different ways. These included the tribal inregulars or guerillas, members of various communist organizations formed within and outside the Grand National Assembly,and the clerically-minded Muslim leaders.

Although Mustafa Kemal was suspicious of Soviet aims from the very beginning, for practical reasons he allowed the formation (early in 1920) of a Communist group within the Government of the Grand

National Assembly with trusted deputies in charge. This remained largely a paper organization, since by the end of 1920, it was obvious to Mustafa Kemal that Bolshevik Russia was trying to subvert rather than to help Turkey, whereupon Kemal had this organization dissolved.

Kemal came to the conclusion that total victory necessitated complete independence from all foreign ideologies and pressures,1^ and as the

1^3 "Communist organizations formed within and outside the Grand National Assembly," is the title of a section of Tunaya, Partiler. p. £30. In English a treatment of this subject is available in Lacquer, op. cit., pp. 205-221.

Since Islam has no clergy in the Christian sense, it is not accurate to use clerical in referring to Muslim religious leaders, but since most European books use it, this writer will do so also for the sake of convenience. However, the term "Muslim" will be added for clarification when necessary. Tunaya, Httkflmeti 21, states that "despite all sorts of shifts and compromises which were empirical in nature, this pattern of policy . . . ^Ideological Independence/. . . was adhered to during the struggle to obtain recognition of Turkey's national rights." 83 nationalist movement strengthened, he was able to carry out this desire.

The Soviet Union, although supporting the Kemalist forces in

Anatolia as opposed to the Sultanate in Istanbul, pressured the

Kemalists to favor a sovietistic form of government. Mustafa Kemal

rejected this thesis. Although he negotiated with the Soviets, it was

from the viewpoint of Turkish independence and indicated no acceptance

of Soviet theories. Turkish scholars claim that the Soviets tried to

split Kemalist ranks by agitating among the tribes, Kurds, Circassians,

etc.-^ Representing such a minority was Ethem, the outstanding

Circassian guerilla leader.

Ethem, who had been instrumental in crushing the Anzavur rebellion, had about three thousand men and like other irregular leaders had operated effectively during the early period of the War of

Independence. Ethem's soldiers received almost three times the pay of the soldiers in the strictly-disciplined, poorly equipped regular forces. This situation made desertion to the guerillas attractive to soldiers of the regular army.^^

For Mustafa Kemal and the nationalist government, the guerilla irregulars presented an acute problem from the very beginning. Despite the fact that these forces had contributed to the liberation movement during the early years while the nationalist government was in its

Tunaya, Partiler, p. 237, and Hflkflmeti, pp. 17-19j and Yunus Nadi. Cerkes Ethem Kuwetlerinin Ihaneti (Istanbul: Sel Yayin- lari, 1955) 12ii-2l5 (The Treason of the Cherkes Ethem Forces).

^ 7 Edib., 02. cit., p. 231. 8U formative stages, Mustafa Kemal believed that the considerable Greek

victories of this period had been due in part to lack of coordination

and clear cut lines of command among resistance forces. He decided

that it was futile to attempt to defeat the modern Greek army by

guerilla action alone and began to integrate the irregular bands into

the regular army under Ismet Pasha, his Chief of Staff. In addition

to Ismet Pasha, Fevzi Pasha, backed Mustafa Kemal in this move.^®

However, Ali Fuat Pasha and others were not convinced.

Consequently in the fall of 1920 when Mustafa Kemal ordered

Ethem to place himself under the orders of Ismet Pasha, Ethem refused

announcing that he was responsible only to the Grand National Assembly, and did not have to take orders from a single person such as Mustafa

Kemal or Ismet Pasha since he himself was of equal rank.^* The

158 Stlleyman K-ttlye, Maregal Fevzi gakmak (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 1953), Chapter II.

!59 There was some resistance to this view, especially by Ali Fuat Pasha (Cebesoy) who believed that guerilla fighting should be continued since he considered it more effective than forming a regular army. Yunus Nadi, gerkes, 121 discusses this point. Some authors claim that Ali Fuat Pasha who had been appointed Commander of the National Forces in the West in September 1919, where he served with distinction, was sent as first Kemalist Ambassador to Moscow in November 1920, because his military ideas did not always coincide with Mustafa Kemal1s, especially in regard to the role of the guerilla forces. Ismet Pasha's appointment to fill Ali Fuat Pasha's former command has been interpreted as Kemal's desire to have someone in the position who would follow his orders unquestioningly. See Orga, on. cit., p. 102.

1^0 Legally speaking Ethem was responsible to the Grand National Assembly, but the Council of Ministers headed by Mustafa Kemal spoke for the Assembly. There are differences today among Turkish scholars regarding Ethem. In general, most writers are in agreement that Ethem was a traitor, but some have been less critical in their assessment, blaming events and the Circassian's lack of judgment for the many ills which befell him. struggle which followed was one of the most dangerous internal threats

which the Government of the Grand National Assembly had to meet in the

face of a strong Greek advance. Because of this advance and in hopes

of avoiding an open break, for a time no decisive physical moves were

made against Ethem but conciliation was attempted,

On December 29, 1920, Ethem and his forces attacked and disarmed

a regiment of regular soldiers at Ktttahya. This act could not be ignored by the Government of the Grand National Assembly. The young,

and not very strong regular army under Colonel Refet (later General

Refet Bele) in early January marched against Ethem's forces and forced him to retreat. In the view of most Turkish scholars,^ 2 ^ was Ethem's treachery as well as the brilliant efforts of the young army which so suddenly reduced him from a dangerous power to a relative nothing, since the moment Ethem1s followers saw the Greek officers talking with him on friendly terms, most of his followers deserted. After his flight, Cherkes Ethem used Greek airplanes to drop leaflets justifying his actions. One of the leaflets contained the following:

OhJ Soldier.' Do not allow yourselves to become the fools of anyone. Beware of selfish and material interests. Ohi Nationi Seek thou inspiration in the past. With the help of Allah may you all meet all kinds of tragedy facing the nation, without hesitation, and help prevent those infamous wretches from sacrificing the nation for their selfish ends. I invited you to come to the defense of our country. Not to become the tools of intrigues and

l6l The Nationalists sent several delegates to negotiate with Ethem but to no avail, see Edib, o£. cit., p. 232.

162 See: Edib, o£. cit., p. 237; Yunus Nadi, gerkes, 121; Enver Behnan §5apolyo, Kuvayi Milliye Tarihi: Gerilla (Ankara: Ayyildiz Matbaasi, 1907), pp. 222-223. 86

personal ambitions] Oh] Officer friends] Give up being servants of those who command you, and become the servants of Allah. If you do not follow this advice, beware. I will be coming your way] Last minute regrets will do you no good] , Signed: Commander of the General Nationalist Forces, Ethem. 3

The Cherkes Ethem rebellion-^ gave the death blow to the

guerilla forces and ended the period of Kuvayi Milliye (Nationalist

Forces of Irregular Resistance) and the period of KtlVii'Ei Nizamiye

(Regular Army) began. The regular army was established and won the

First and Second Battles of InBnti, Sakarya, Afyon, Dulmupinar and

hurled the Greek forces of 2^0,000 into the Mediterranean, thus ending in victory, the national struggle.166

Mustafa Kemal is quoted as saying:

Before the Battle of Sakarya, we had 23,000 troops, which was increased in twenty-three days to 78,000. When the war ended in victory, we still had 78,000 troops under arms.l°7

The Cherkes Ethem incident and the victory achieved in this

respect by the Government of the Grand National Assembly was an important milestone in the consolidation of its governmental control. At the time

of the incident, the Government of the Grand National Assembly made an

1^3 §>apolyo, Gerilla, states that Ethem finally went to Athens and was placed on the list of 150 persons whom the Nationalist Govern­ ment banned from returning to Turkey. Later, he tried to obtain a pardon, but was unable to return to Turkey. He died in Beirut, Ibid., pp. 222-223.

161* The official version of this incident is given in Nutuk, and in Yunus Nadi, Jerkes.

1^5 §apolyo, Gerilla. pp. 222-223.

166 Ibid.. p. 223.

1^7 Yunus Nadi, Qerkes, p. 121. Also see: Atattlrk Dedi Ki, ”Sakarya Meydan Muharebesi,” pp. 115-131. (The Battle of SakaryaT. official declaration discrediting the movement and offering clemency l68 to deserters, which contributed to the weakening of the movement.

Ethem, while in Eskigehir, had joined an organization known as

the Yegil Ordu (Green Army) which was under the leadership of Hakki

Behip Bey. It is believed that in addition to the problem of indepen­

dent irregular bands which Kemal believed needed to be integrated into

a regular army, Ethem's connection with the Green Army influenced Kemal

in 1921 to suppress Ethem's forces and integrate them into the regular

army. Kemal believed that both Ethem's forces and the Green Army were

in the pay of the Soviet Government, since the Soviets were known to

be trying to split Kemalists and agitate among the tribes.

The name Yegil Ordu first appears in 1920, but there is still no

definite information as to whether it was a secret society of minor

importance or a wider organization. ^70 According to Mustafa Kemal,

this organization became widespread and had harmful aims and therefore

had to be dissolved. 171 However, according to another view, there

really was no definite society organized with this name, but this

168 This important document may be found in Yunus Nadi, gerkes, pp. 12^-125. A free translation of this document is given in the Appendix.

169 Tunaya, Partller, p. 237 and Htikttmeti, pp. 17-19; and Yunus Nadi, gerkes, pp. 12U-125.

170 Tunaya, Partiler, p. 531; and Httseyin Cahit Yalpin's articles in Tanin, February 11-20, 19U5. (Tanin -"Echo" was an Istanbul Daily Newspaper).

Nutuk, II, 25. 88

so-called organization was only a propaganda device to encourage

embattled Turkish guerillas fighting the Greeks to believe that an

Army was being formed in the East backed by Soviet Russia which would

come to their aid, when in fact no such plan actually existed. ^2

Another view claims that the Green Army was a socialistic organization,173

and still another states that it was one of the many guerilla groups n vl of the period. In any case, this whole subject needs further clari­

fication.

As previously related, 17 ^ the Communist Party which Kemal formed

in the Grand National Assembly (TUrkiye Kommunist Firkasi), was orga­ nized in May 1920 as a political gesture to appease Russia. Certain trusted deputies were selected by Kemal to lead the organization.

Among these leaders were: Tevfik Rilfttt Aras (later Foreign Minister of

Kemal), Mahmut Esat (important deputy)177 Yunus Nadi (famous Kemalist

1^2 This view was expressed to T. Z. Tunaya, Partiler. p. £31, by Dr. Adnan Adivar and Falih Rifki At ay, two Turkish intellectual leaders who participated in the Liberation Movement.

173 Lufti Eroglu, Tttrkiyede i?gi sinifinin tarihi (Istanbul: 1951), p. 16 (History of the Working Classes of Turkey).

l?k Mehmed Arif, Anadolu Inkilabi (Istanbul: Ikdam Matbaasi, 192U) (The Anatolian Revolution).

175 Cebesoy, Mttcadele, pp. 508-509.

176 Tunaya, Partiler, p. 531*

177 According to G8vsa, op. cit., p. 7h, Mahumt Esat (1892-19U3) (Bozkurt) was a deputy of Izmir and a professor of International Law at Ankara Political Science School and Istanbul University. He held several Cabinet positions from 192U-1930 when he retired, ibid., p. 7U. 89

journalist), and Mahmut Celal Bayar, but this organization was never

activated and remained on paper.17® This organization had no connec­

tion with the Third International since it was an official Kemalist

organization which never took form because events did not necessitate

its activation. 179 ' Kemal may have thought that if the country suddenly

went Bolshevik, it would be safer for him to have a nucleus of the

party in his hands by means of which he might get control of the new

force.In a cable to Ali Fuat Pasha dated October 31, 1920, Mustafa

Kemal Pasha stresses the necessity of assigning responsible and trusted

Nationalist leaders to form a Turkish Communist Party in order to keep

control of any Communist activity which might develop in Anatolia.

In June 1920, a secret and illegal Communist Party was also

formed in Turkey. On July 111, 1920, it issued a declaration which set

forth its aims:

The Society with its headquarters in Ankara has been established to introduce socialism and is attached to the Third International.^

178 Samet Agaoglu, Kuvayi Milliye Ruhu (Istanbul, 19^6), pp. 262- 26U (The Soul of the Nationalist Forces). Although Behip Bey was un­ doubtedly involved in this group too, his name does not appear on the group's documents but is listed with the Green Army and the Halk Istirakiyun Firkasi.

179 Tunaya, Partiler, p. E>31«

1®® Cebesoy, Moskova Hatiralari, pp. l5l-l53»

181 Cebesoy, Milli Mttcadele Hatiralari, p. £09 reproduces a coded cable, Ankara No. 638 of October 31, 1920 signed by Mustafa Kemal, President of the Grand National Assembly addressed to Ali Fuat, Com­ mander of the Western Front.

1®^ Information on this subject and the complete text of the declaration was published in Cumhuriyet (Turkish Daily Newspaper in Istanbul) July 27, 28, 1931. A discussion on Communism in Turkey during 1920 is given in serial form in Tanin (Turkish Daily Paper in Istanbul) February 11-20, 19^5. This article includes some rwealing letters. 90

Among the founders of this secret and illegal Communist Party were: Arif Orup, Retired Major Salih Zeki, and $erif Manatof. The declaration stated that there were two Governments in Turkey, one in

Istanbul, and the other, the Government of the Nationalists. The new organization stated that it had no connection with either of these governments. According to Mustafa Kemal, the Soviets had organized this party to take over Turkey while the Turkish nationalist forces were engaged in putting down the Cherkes Ethem revolt.This Communist

Party has no connection with the legal party that was organized within the Grand National Assembly} its policy directives came from the Soviet

Union. One of the basic policy directives to the Turkish Communist

Party from the Third International is given below in translation, and is a clear exposition of Soviet aims in Turkey.

1. To unite all the Middle Eastern Nationalist Movements including those of Syria and Iraq against the colonialism of the Western Allies, under the Ankara regime, and to support all move­ ments that would be favorable to Communist aims and fight all those considered inimical to Communism, such as the Caliphate.

2. To stress the fact of the impossibility of an understanding between the British and the different classes in Turkey including peasants, workers, professionals and intellectuals, and to estab­ lish close liaison with the Kemalist forces.

3. To cooperate with parties, which although not willing to accept Communism are willing to obtain Soviet friendship.

U. To explain to the Turkish workers and intellectuals that when the Turkish Nationalist Movement was sufficiently weakened by its powerful enemies to the point of surrender, the first step to be forced on the Nationalist Government was to break relations with the Soviets.

Tunaya, Partiler, p. 532. 91 5. Turks who favor the Soviet Union should, strive to take con­ trol of the Turkish Nationalist Government in order to prevent Turkey's falling under the domination of London and Paris when the Nationalist struggle ultimately collapses.

6. To engage in a widespread and effective propaganda directed toward Turkish workers and intellectuals in order to create in Communist party which would

Still another party of Communist bent was foimed at this time

and was known as the Halk Igtirakiyun Firkasi (The Party of the Parti­

cipation of the People) which is believed to have been the real

Communist Party in Turkey. It wqs organized in December 1920 by

members of the Green Army and the Secret Illegal Communist Party. Its

leaders included §>eyh Servet, Salih Zeki, Hakki Behip Bey, and Arif

Orup. They published Emek (Work), and Yeni Dtlnya (New World) .185

This party was active in Ankara and Eskipehir. It was banned

in 1921. Its members were tried by Tribunals of Independence set up by

Mustafa Kemal to try traitors. The Rauf Orbay Cabinet (July 8, 1922-

August 13, 1923) banned all Communist propaganda and activities and

Communism has been illegal in Turkey since that time. 186 During the

Government of the Grand National Assembly there were also minor sub­ versive groups about which little is known or published.

18^ Cebesoy, Moskova Hatiralari. pp. U6~1j7.

185 Tunaya, Partiler, p. 532.

186 The exact date when Communism was banned in Turkey is not clear. Different sources use 1921, 1922, and even 192$. The reason is that a Communist Party as such was never clearly accepted and its dissolution.1 is also vague in that its inclusion was implied in the term subversive movements.

187 According to Tunaya, Partiler, p. 533, the only authorita­ tive information on this subject is available in Nutuk. One other class of persons, subscribing to the Eastern Ideal,

although less numerous, were the "clericals", who were clerical in mind although not always in profession. In their ranks were distinguished individuals who had stood up for liberalism and reform ever since the days of the Tanzimat. Some of this group now believed that the Eastern

Ideal might be viewed as a revival of the first democratic age of the

Prophet Muhammad. At first Kemal used the Muslim clerics (Mollas. softas, imams, etc.) for his own purposes, actually calling the

Nationalist Movement a kind of Islamic crusade against the infidels.

Later, as he gained power, the need for their support lessened and they soon became associated with those who opposed Mustafa Kemal and his policies.

It should be noted that the so-called clerical group is distin­ guished by its heterogeneity, for in addition to liberals and intel­ lectuals, it also included extremist-fanatical-ultra-conservative allegedly pro-Islamic elements which threatened democratic development in Turkey during the Republican era as they did in the early Kemalist 108 period. This was accomplished either by gaining the support of the

^ ® In 1930 in an effort to allow the formation of an opposition party, the Serbest Cumhuriyet Firkasi (Free Party of the Republic) lasted only a few months when the Government asserted that reactionary elements, especially the Muslim clerics, had infiltrated its ranks and subverted it, and that for the safety of the country it had to be suppressed. However, Ahmet Agaoglu in Serbest Firka Hatiralarl (Istanbul: Nebioglu Yayinevi, 1950) claims that the party was becoming too popular to please the Republican People's Party Leadership. Ahmet Qnin Yalman also shares the same view in "The Struggle for Multi-Party Government in Turkey," Middle East Journal (January, 19^7). 93 masses of politically inarticulate devoutly religious but easily exploitable peasants, or by disruptive activities providing a justi­ fication to those in power for the imposition of restrictive measures which throttle the growth of liberal institutions. Even those clerics who were sincere in their support of the Liberation Movement, in the view of the majority of scholars, were not aware of political and international realities, insisting on clinging to outmoded institu­ tions, and the ideal of the Caliphate and Pan Islamism.

From the beginning of 1922, it was obvious that despite poli­ tical obstructions from opposing groups and factions, Mustafa Kemal and his associates held the leadership in the Grand National Assembly. On

December 6, 1922, Kemal announced that his group, the First Defense of

Rights Group, would be extended to form a political party throughout the nation, a Congress during April 1923 endorsed this transforma­ tion, and the Halk Firkasi (People's Party)^90 ^ s official existence.

The first term of the Grand National Assembly was approaching its legal limit, and the Entente statesmen implied that the Grand

National Assembly did not represent the will of the people. Almost as if in reply, the Grand National Assembly proclaimed that an election to choose personnel of the Second Assembly would be held immediately.

Elections were held in June 1923.

Webster, o£. cit., p. 103.

190 Later designated as Cumhuriyet Halk Firkasi t and finally as Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party). Although the newly formed Halk Firkasi had no serious rival for

the mastery of Turkey, there was opposition to the growing personal

power of Kemal which had already appeared as a splinter group and was

known as the Second Group, in contradistinction to the original, group

of about 260 who were Kemal1s closest adherents. None of this second

group, numbering about forty, were returned at the June 1923 elections.

These elections signified the emergence of Mustafa Kemal Pasha as the

undisputed leader of the new Turkey among the overwhelming majority of

the people, although this feat was not accomplished without a struggle

and at times, deep dissensions among the deputies in the Grand National

Assembly. CHAPTER VI

THE EMERGENCE OF MUSTAFA KEMAL AS THE

LEADER OF THE NEW TURKEY

Mustafa Kemal's position of leadership in the new Turkey was no accident. In his fanous Six Day Speech published under the title of

Nutuk in 1927, he pointed out that he had worked out a plan for the new Turkish state but that he had to proceed slowly so that the contents of his plan, some of them sharply contrary to tradition, would not frighten the devoutly religious and conservative Turkish populace on whose support he depended. Hence, he proceeded by stages, making each step clearly understood and profiting from experience.

With his goal in mind, he saw the importance of his role as the indispensable man, and, in his view, this position and the urgent needs of the hour justified and necessitated a degree of benevolent authoritarianism on his part which at times he did not hesitate to exhibit, as the following indicates:

Until I have done what I set out to do, pulled the Turks into a nation, I shall continue to be master.192

■*•91 Nutuk, pp. 18-19. See also Kilip Ali, Atatttrkttn Hususiyet- leri (Istanbul: Sel Yayinlari, 1955) (A Characterization of Atatttrk); Falih Rifki Atay, Atatttrkttn Bana Anlattiklari (Istanbul: Sel Yayinlar, 1955) (What Atatttrk Related to Me)j Afetinan, Atatttrkten Hatiralar (Ankara: Tttrk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1950) (Memories from Atatttrk)j and the October 1956 issue of Belleten which includes a number of articles by prominent leaders and historians about Atatttrk.

^■92 Orga, o£. cit., p. 111. 96

Mustafa Kemal described the successive stages of his unfolding

plan for the new Turkey as a series of national secrets, which he, the

responsible leader, would reveal when opportune, as follows:

I may say that it was incumbent upon me to develop our entire social organization, step by step, until it corresponded to the great capability of progress which I perceived in the soul and in the future of the nation; which I kept in my consciousness as a national secret.193

These national secrets which came out one at a time were planned by

Kemal often in consultation with his closest friends, especially Ismet

Pasha. With the assistance of Ismet Pasha, Mustafa Kemal worked and planned for the achievement of political independence for Turkey, and later in the period of reconstruction and reform, Ismet Pasha's assis­ tance and cooperation contributed much to the enactment and execution of the Kemalist modernization program.

Mustafa Kemal's first national secret was, "Independence or death]"195 This declaration has been explained as follows:

Mustafa Kemal, who represented the Turkish national feeling based his principles on the following: 'The Turkish nation proper must live as an honorable and free country. This principle can only be attained with complete independence. No matter how rich and com­ fortable, a nation without independence cannot earn a place in the , universe and does not deserve treatment better than that of slaves'. °

3 Nutuk, pp. 11-12.

19b This later period is beyond the scope of this Dissertation. 195 Nutuk, p. 10.

19^ Tarih IV, p. l£. For a similar declaration, see: Atatttrk Dedi Ki, "Hurriyet ve Istiklal Karekterimidir," 109 (Freedom and Independence are Part of My Character). (This is a reprint of an article appearing in Kemal's newspaper, Hakimiyeti Milliye, on April 23, 1921. 97 Kemal's next national secret was revealed following the military

victories of the War of Independence and was the abolition of the

Sultanate by the Government of the Grand National Assembly on November 1,

1922. With this accomplished, Kemal's next secret became apparent as

his intention to extend his Defense of Rights Group into a political

party throughout the country. He first announced this intention on

December 6, 1922, and then proceeded on a tour of various sections of

the country to inspect the army, to explain his program to the people,

and to obtain their reactions. An outstanding characteristic of

Mustafa Kemal was his awareness of the importance of propaganda and the need to learn first hand what the masses were thinking, so that he could obtain a nucleus of popular support for his program, and when feasible, keep the people abreast of his plans by well phrased and clear explanations.

Mustafa Kemal's desire to form a political party from his

Defense of Rights Group was officially enacted into law at the Congress of the League for the Defense of Rights, held in April 1923. Mustafa

Kemal's preliminary spade work, done in a manner typical of him, enabled the transformation to take place smoothly. The Party was to be known as the Halk Firkasi, ~^7 or peopie »s Party. Mustafa Kemal's

97 The Halk Firkasi, organized on September 11, 1923, was given this name officially on October 23, 1923. On November 10, 192U, it became the Cumhuriyet Halk Firkasi, and later the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party). For a detailed discussion of the Republican People's Party, see Tunaya, Partilert pp. 5ii0-56lu 98

reasons for taking this step have been evaluated as follows:

Mustafa Kemal knew well that he held the Government by force of personality, by intimidation and through the Aimy. But tliese things could not lastj even the Army would soon forget his past victories. He needed something mere permanent, so he resolved to widen the powers of the Central Committees of the Defence of National Rights which had been created in 1919. . . . As the Commander-in Chief, the Committees, of the Defence of National Rights were under his personal orders. He decided to turn them into a political weapon. . . . Under his leadership the Committee agreed to be known in the future as the Halk Partisi (The People's Party). This cemented his position, for each Committee had full local power, but were under his orders. Even a village policeman could not be appointed unless the Committee agreed.198

Reaction to the formation of the People's Party varied, from

favorable reaction by most peasants to some reserve from fellow

deputies in A n k a r a . ^99 However, it became clear that with the support

of the majority of the people and the army, Mustafa Kemal was the ruler of the new Turkey. He often spoke of this and regarded his

leadership as indispendable.

After the Congress of the League for the Defense of Rights, held in April 1923, the future of the Halk Firkasi and the test of Mustafa

Kemal's leadership was approaching in the forthcoming June 1923 elec­ tions. All candidates of the People's Party were instructed to base

198 Orga, o£. cit., 138.

199 Orga, og. cit., 138-139, states: "The peasants were delighted to hear Mustafa Kemal say, 'Together we shall make our country great. . . . You are the rulers of Turkey. . . .' They joined their local branch of the Peoples Party, declaring their loyalty to Mustafa Kemal. . . . It was the peasants who would keep the Army loyal. Back in Ankara he was received with reserve, for now that he had shown his hand so openly he was suspect. What could now stop him?" 99 their campaigns on the Dokuz Umde (Nine Principles) which had been

proclaimed by the People's Party on April 1, 1923.^°

Having won the great majority of seats in the June 1923 elections

which put his party well in control, Mustafa Kemal apparently felt

ready to reveal obliquely his next momentous secret, the proclamation

and establishment of a republic, by creating a cabinet crisis. This

secret was contained in his epoch-making announcement to the Grand

National Assembly on October 29, 1923*

The form of the government of the Turkish State is a Republic.

This was in the form of an amendment to the first article of the Law

of Fundamental Organization of 1921 and.is one of the most significant

statements ever made to the Grand National Assembly. The Republic

was proclaimed on October 29, 1923, and Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha was

elected President. The first Cabinet of the Republic was formed on

October 30, 1923, tinder the Premiership of Ismet Pasha.

However, this was not accomplished without dissension among the

ranks. Turkish historians vary in their interpretation of these

dissensions. Some claim that they were unjustified and unimportant, while others claim that they were justified and that the situation was badly handled resulting in wounds and misunderstandings which did not

200 The full text of the People's Party Nine Principles is avail­ able in Tunaya, Partiler, pp. 580-582. A summary translation of these principles as given in Tunaya is available in the Appendix. These principles may also be found in summary form in Webster, op. cit., p. 10U. For a survey on Turkish elections see Tunaya, "Elections in Turkish History," Middle Eastern Affairs, April 1951w

201 Turkish Constitution of 192U, Article One. 100 diminish with the passage of time, but increased and in some cases took on a lasting significance.

Tarih,*®2 the official Turkish history states:

In this enthusiastic and joyous picture /at the declaration of the Republic/, only a small political group was discontented, and they showed their displeasure. Among them were some persons and deputies who had attained responsible positions during the time of the Grand National Assembly Government, and some officers of the army. Although they did not voice their criticism openly at first because of their minority position in the National Assembly, they pretended that: a. The decision to declare a republic was taken without their being oonsulted; b. The decision of the Party and Assembly had been reached too hurriedly; c. They criticized and voiced their fears that as in the present case, the establishment of the Republic, someday the Caliphate too might be suddenly affected.203

Mustafa Kemal commented on these dissensions and defended his action as follows:

The only practical and safe road to success lay in taking each step at the right time. This was the way to insure the develop­ ment and betterment of the nation, and this is how I acted. This practical way, as may be well understood, provoked certain dif­ ferences of opinion of more or less importance, and caused dissen­ sion, coolness and even estrangement of our most intimate co-workers, as differences of opinion, sometimes in regard to principles, sometimes in regard to methods of execution of our programme, came up from time to time. Some of our companions who had entered the national struggle with us went over to oppose me according as the limit of their own mental appreciation led them, and in proportion to their moral courage which succumbed in the effort to develop . national life, to proclaim the Republic and to enact its laws* ^

202 As mentioned in the first chapter the Turkish Historical Society prepared an official history of Turkey entitled Tarih (History).

2°3 Tarih IV, 15U-155.

20U Nutuk. 11-12 101

Some Istanbul newspapers were critical of this sudden decision

including Ahmet Emin (Yalman)'s Vatan. Velid Ebttzziya's Tevhidi Efkar,

and Httseyin Cahit (YalpinJ's Tanin. These journalists visited Rauf

Bey in Istanbul who stated that he favored a republican form of govern­

ment but could not understand why the decision had been taken so

hurriedly and added that while he favored a republic, he was against

the dictatorial systems that many republics in recent years had

developed.205 Fuat voiced his view on similar grounds, and as

early as October 27, 1923, Ali Fuat had written in Vat an that any

change in the Constitution should have at least a two-thirds majority of the members of the Grand National Assembly.206 Qn October 31, 1923,

Httseyin Cahit wrote his now famous editorial in Tanin entitled

"Yajasin CumhuriyetJ" (Long Live the Republic), which while praising the Republic, questioned the way in which it was proclaimed, and pointed out that the important thing was the development of the right type of political ethics.Kazim Karabekir, Inspector of the First Army, reacted the same way as Rauf and Ali Fuat. The statements of Rauf, Ali

Fuat, and Karabekir, were badly received in Ankara.

20^ Kandemir, Darginliklar, II, 79. In this writer's view, Kandemir is objective although somewhat pro-Rauf and Cebesoy. Although not anti-Kemalist, he is somewhat critical of Ismet Pasha, but does it effectively by proving that Ismet was difficult to work with. The material in this book bases much of the information in this chapter. In volume three, Kandemir discusses political rivalries after 192lu

206 ibid., p. 80.

207 Ibid., p. 81. 102

Rauf Bey decided to visit Mustafa Kemal and to explain to him

that he, Rauf, was not against the Republic. Although Rauf Bey went

from Istanbul to Ankara to visit Mustafa Kemal, Kemal who was ill at the time, refused to see Rauf. Thus the political cleavages and rivalries increased in the Grand National Assembly.*^®

A Turkish historian states that the political rivalries and partisan quarrels during the Kemalist period should be divided into two main periods:209 the first period from 1920-1923 until Mustafa

Kemal solved the problem by declaring a republic; and the second period beginning in 192U which is outside the scope of this disserta­ tion. There was a short honeymoon period in 1923, although even then, tensions, although not pronounced, did exist.

To describe adequately Mustafa Kemal's emergence as the leader of the new Turkey, some mention must be made of the personal rivalries among other leaders which both prevented their rise to a position of primacy and abetted Kemal's.

Although some rivalries had existed within the Grand National

Assembly among the deputies from the very first, they became more definite with the return on October 30, 1921, of prominent Turkish leaders who had been exiled to Malta in March 1920. Among the returning exiles were Rauf Bey and Kara Vasif Bey who formed the

208 ibid., p. 82.

209 Kandemir, Darginliklar II. Another useful book on the rivalries during this period is: Ismail Habib SevtLk, 0 Zamanlar - 1920-1923 (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 1937) (In Those Days). nucleus of what was later the opposition, or second group. Although

they were officially warmly welcomed, especially Rauf Bey, and Mustafa

Kemal, through his organ the Hakimiyeti Milliye, praised them, it was

clear that he did not intend to permit a sedond leader. At the same

time, Rauf Bey at first appeared rather reluctant to take a secondary position, pleading ill health and prison fatigue.However, he was finally elected to the post of Minister of Public Works in December

1921 and served in the Grand National Assembly with distinction.^^ On January 8, 1922, Rauf Bey resigned from the Cabinet, and his colleague in the Cabinet, Refet Pasha, on that same day also resigned from his position of Minister of National Defense.212 At this time, the deputies of the Grand National Assembly moved to commend Refet

Pasha officially with a document of appreciation. Mustafa Kemal, sensing the political significance of this move, vigorously objected, claiming that such citations were suitable only for those serving on the field of battle. However, after an acrimonious debate, Kemal's objections were overruled by the deputies, which increased the disunity and ill-will between various factions in the Grand National Assembly. 213

Mustafa Kemal attributed these two key resignations to some sort of secret agreement between Rauf and Refet because of their

21° Kandemir, Darginliklar. II, Chapter I. For a discussion of this subject in French one can consult Benoist-Mechin, op. cit., pp. 30U-310. opposition to him. These opposition leaders claimed that the affairs of the Army were not going well and had proposed that a special commission be set up to study the situation in the Grand National

Assembly. When this was refused they resigned. Mustafa Kemal favored having his Chief of Staff, Fevzi Pasha, the titular head of the Com­ mission if it was to be formed, rather than Refet Pasha.21^ However, in order to break the deadlock, Kemal concluded with the following dictum

I do not object to the creation of a Commission in the Assembly to investigate the problems of the Army. But this Commission must be under my Presidency.

In addition to problems arising from the handling of the army, another cause for dissension within the Grand National Assembly, and one that increased in importance following the military victory, was whether or not to organize a new governmental structure based on the

Law of Fundamental Organization of 1921, or to go more slowly. 2^-6

The opposition forces in general wished to proceed slowly, cautiously, and what to them appeared as constitutionally.

Mustafa Kemal claimed that the main source of ideas for the opposition arose from the second article of the Defense of Rights

Group. This article pertained to the organization of government.

Kemal claimed that because an opposition had organized outside the Defense of Rights Group and was working to destroy the group, he

was forced to take firm measures, while the opposition, known as the

Second Group, rejected Kemal'a claim, stating that they were following 217 the ideals of the Group, but favored more democratic procedures.

This Second Group consisted of men who feared the strong

personal rule of Mustafa Kemal; conservatives who disagreed with

changes being forced through by Kemal; and prominent leaders who had

personal rivalries with Kemal and his associates and believed that they

had a right to the first place in the country. Examples of these

rivalries include the one between Rauf Bey and Ismet Pasha and the one

of Dr. Ali Nur and Hamdullah Suphi (TanriSver), against Hflseyin C a M t

(Yalpin) which went back to the 1908 revolution.^®

Mustafa Kemal claimed that the deputies who caused the most

trouble for him were those who in the early days believed that Turkey

could not obtain its independence based on its own resources and without outside aid.^^ This claim enabled him obliquely to cast unpatriotic and cowardly implications toward those who opposed him.

However, Kemal emphasized that such statements were not directed 220 toward all of the Second Group, and especially not toward Rauf Bey.

217 Ibid.. p. 17.

218 The early rivalries such as those from 1908 are discussed in the first volume of Kandemir, Parglnliklar. and in the works of Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, especially his Osmanli Imparatorlugunda Inkilap Haraketleri ve Mill! Mttcadeli (Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi, 195&) (Revolutionary Movements in the Ottoman Bapire and the National Struggle).

219 Kandemir, Darginliklar, H , 18. 106

The leading members of the first Group, Mustafa Kemal's Group,

were the following: Ismet Pasha (Inflntt) (Edirne)j Fevzi Pasha (fakmak)

(Kozan); Hamdullah Suphi (TanriBver) (Antalya); Recep (Peker) (Ktttahya) ;

§>ttkrtt (Kaya)(Mugla) j Kilij Ali (Gaziantep)j Yunus Nadi (Abalioglu)

(Izmir); and Falih Rifki Atay (journalist).221

The leading members of the Second Group were: Rauf (Orbay)

(Istanbul - formerly Sivas); Ali Fuat Pasha (Cebesoy) (Ankara); Dr.

Adnan Bey (Adivar) (Istanbul); Refet Pasha (Bele) (Istanbul - formerly

Izmir); Httseyin Cahit (Yalpin) (journalist); Ahmet Emin (Yalman)

(journalist); Kazim Karabekir Pasha (Istanbul - formerly Edirne);

Httseyin Avni (Erzurum); Kara Vasif (Sivas); Caleddin Arif (Erzurum);

Toppu Ihsan Bey (Cebelibereket); and Qolak Salahattin (Ulaj).222

As previously related, the cause for bitterest disagreement in

the Grand National Assembly was the propriety of forming a new govern­ ment based on the Law of Fundamental Organization before the achievement

of political independence. Early in 1922, the members of the Second

Group feared that Mustafa Kemal was trying to ignore and by-pass the

Sultanate and Caliphate and under the pressures of war would endeavor to create a Republic.Among those who feared this was Kazim

Karabekir who sent a coded message to Mustafa Kemal claiming that the

221 Summarized from Tunaya, Partiler. £37-539. The list is very long and only the most prominent deputies are included here.

222 ibid.. 537-539 for a complete list of the deputies as well as a discussion and documents pertaining to the Second Group. See also Kandemir, Darginliklar, II, 119.

223 Kandemir, Darginliklar. II, 21. 107 Law of Fundamental Organization should remain the program of the party,

and not the basis of a new form of government prior to independence.

Karabekir believed that the deputies who favored such a form would

be expressing only their own views because there had not been ample

opportunity to ascertain the views of their constituents. He stated

that the "civil and military destiny of the nation" should not be

changed hastily.22U Kemal replied in part:

All over the world there is a new Populist trend. In orJar to prevent revolutions and harmful developments, it is essential to give our development a proper direction to prevent the govern­ ment falling into the hands of irresponsible groups, to defend the national rights, and to make it possible for the people who are the real owners of this land, to have a say, and therefore, we should make use of the extraordinary conditions existing today.225

Karabekir had also objected to Kemal1s dual position as head

of the Political Group and Chief of State, claiming that Kemal should

keep himself above politics and be non-partisan. Kemal assured

Karabekir that for the present, conditions dictated that he hold both

of these positions:

I am so involved in every aspect of this Association, it is impossible for me to separate myself from it.226

Karabekir replied soon by suggesting a second house in the new structure

22 Ibid*»21-. where Karabekir's letter is reproduced in full. See also: Kandemir, Kazim Karabekir (Istanbul: Sinan Matbaasi, 19U8) (The Life of Kazim Karabekir).

225 Kandemir, Darginliklar, II, 23. This statement of Mustafa Kemal has been interpreted by some scholars as indicative of Kemal's awareness of the dangers of Bolshevism, and as a reason for his speed and decisiveness in creating a Republic in 1923.

226 ibid., 2h 108

of Government, a Senate to which

. . . men of great prestige could be elected as a check and balance against the Grand National Assembly when necessary. ^

Kemal sharply disagreed claiming that it would duplicate the work of op R the deputies who were to be elected to the Grand National Assembly.

This difference of view was to develop later into more serious quarrels

and disagreements between the two.

After the military victory, there was a short honeymoon and

divisions were forgotten. Rauf Bey, accompanied by the Minister of

Foreign Affairs, Yusuf Kemal Bey, went to Ujak and embraced Mustafa

Kemal congratulating him for the victory. Ali Fuat Pasha also came

and all went to Izmir. Refet Pasha joined them and all of them together

returned to Ankara, where they were joined by Karabekir Pasha who had

come from the East. All misunderstandings seemed forgotten. Those who held that Karabekir and Mustafa Kemal could not get along once victory was achieved, believed their fears u n f o u n d e d . 229

By steam roller tactics, by means of great vision, by sheer dictatorship, Mustafa Kemal, with the help of his co-workers, but as the igniting spark, wrested a relatively modern state from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. For this and for his many other feats he has

22? Ibid., 26. This view was held by many members of the Second Group.

228 Ibid., 25.

229 Ibid., 28. On page 29 Kandemir explains that in order to remove any rumors, the day Karabekir arrived, Mustafa Kemal embraced him in public, took him to Bursa, and had his mouthpiece, the Hakimiyeti Milli, praise Karabekir as a great national hero. The text of the release is given in Kandemir, 0£. cit., 30-31# 109 obtained and richly deserves, the unending gratitude of his people.

Since information is available in most books about Mustafa

Kemal's early childhood, youth, and activities during the Young Turk period, this subject will not be discussed in detail here.^0 Mustafa

Kemal was b o m in Salonica in 1881. Like many of Turkey's leaders he came from the European portions of the Ottoman Eknpire. His parents were conservative and of the middle classes. His father was a minor civil servant. His mother hoped that Mustafa would become a religious leader, but the young Mustafa had made up his mind to join the Army.

Like many of the young ambitious Turks of his time, he entered the

Military College, and made a mark initially as an able officer. His teacher gave him the name Kemal, which meant "perfect." Mustafa

Kemal, an ambitious young man with a magnetic personality and strong determination, was active in the Young Turk Revolution and became a military hero during World War I. Thus, when Turkey was prostrate after the defeat of 1918, Mustafa Kemal's dynamic leadership, his well defined and limited aims, and his tenacious insistence on

Turkey's right to exist as an independent state, made possible Turkish survival.231

However, it should be mentioned that Mustafa Kemal's rivalry with Enver Pasha, another young and ambitious military leader of the

230 See such works as: Bisbee, o£. cit.; Yalman, Turkey in My Time (supra)j and Orga, 0£. cit.

231 For an evaluation of Mustafa Kemal Atattlrk's character and contribution by different authorities, see the Appendix. 110

Young Turk period and World War I, is important for this rivalry and

even envy on the part of Mustafa Kemal for the better fortune of

Enver Pasha, drove Kemal to greater effort. Also, Kemal's opposition

to Enver's rather grandiose and often impractical schemes, may have

been affected by his personal dislike for Enver. While Enver Pasha

had married into the Ottoman Royal Family, Mustafa Kemal remained a

plebeian. While Enver favored entering the First World l\far on the side

of the Central Powers, Mustafa Kemal opposed it, even though he fought

effectively and bravely throughout the war. While Enver had ambitious

plans for a Greater Turkish Empire, Mustafa Kemal believed that only

a smaller, more united modern state could survive in the new world

which was emerging after the First World W a r . ^ 2

Critics of Mustafa Kemal have usually attacked him for his

amoral personal life, his alleged authoritarianism, and his devious

political maneuvering to obtain his own way. However, in the view of

this writer, the important criteria for a judgment of a great builder

of a new nation are not to be found exclusively in his personal life

and habits, but principally in his philosophy, methods for achieving his goals, administrative ability, knowledge and skill in handling people, and political foresight necessary to guide a nation.

In judging Mustafa Kemal as the leader of the new Turkey, this writer will not emphasize his moral and personal life or pass judgment

^ §erif Mardin, "Atatttrk ve Inkilaplar Mttnasebetiyle," Forum,l£.XI.56. (Atatttrk and Problems of Reform) stresses the practicality of Mustafa Kemal with his realistic, limited, and well-defined objectives as contrasted to the grandiose schemes of Enver Pasha. Ill

on this aspect of his character. This approach has already been

attempted by several western writers,^33 wea^egg in such

appraisals arises from the fact that the standards of social measure­ ment used have not always been appropriate for the geographic area involved and often result in an overemphasis of what in the broad view may be termed trivia. In the Middle East where social mores are so dissimilar from those of the West, when considering Middle Eastern leaders, the use of western traditional social concepts are not always applicable.

Mustafa Kemal was a leader with a plan. It is true that his philosophical ideas were not: original, but he seized on the political teachings of the great Turkish sociologist and philosopher Ziya Gflkalp and tried to apply his theoretical ideas in the practical field of building a state. In the early days of the twentieth century Turkish political thinking was influenced by French Positivist theories.

Ziya Gflkalp himself was strongly influenced by the ideas of Emile

Durkheim and Gustave Le Bon. Gflkalp was in search of a great leader who would save the nation. In fact, despite some differences of opinion, Gflkalp saw in Mustafa Kemal a great leader who could become the saviour of Turkey. Mustafa Kemal himself sincerely believed that

^33 Among the best known of this type of sensational reporting are: H. C. Armstrong, 0£. cit.; and Brock, ojo. cit.

23U For a more detailed study of these ideas which affected Mustafa Kemal's philosophy, see: Uriel Heyd, o£. cit.; Niyazi Berkes, op. cit.; E. E. Ramsaur, oja. cit.; Enver Behnan ^apolyo, Ziya Gflkalp Tsupra); Eleanor Bisbee, op. cit., Chapter II, "The Turks' 'Eternal Chief."' 112 he knew what was best far the nation. He had learned the workings of

Turkish politics during the Young Turk days and had seen the harm of partisan politics. He had demonstrated his military and administra­ tive ability during the Tripolitanian War against Italy (1911-1912), the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), and during World War I (191ii-19l8), when as a general he won great renown both in the Dardanelles campaign and on the Syrian front.

Atatttrk should not be described as an individual or a person, but rather as an example of thinking, a philosophy. The concept of

Kemalism is explained sometimes by an analysis of the six principles of Kemalism, also referred to as the six arrows: republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, etatism, and reformism. Actually

Kemalism never developed a full fledged set of rigid doctrines of its own and should not be confined to its outlines such as the six arrows.

It included many concepts and took many directions as required by the needs of the country and the times. Although Atatttrk was a strong nationalist, it would be incorrect to consider this nationalism as remaining outside international activities, for his actions from the very beginning indicated his interest and awareness of the need to consider international affairs and their implications for Turkey.

Mustafa Kemal's death in 1938 was a great loss and a profound shock to the Turkish nation. The extended mourning for Atatttrk by a grief-stricken nation was evidence of the keen loss which his absence had brought, and an indication of unspeakable admiration for his achievements. At this time Turkish leaders of varying political views as well as the people of Turkey resolved to carry out his plans

in the years that lay ahead. Many refer to his death as the closing

of an era, while others claim it was just the beginning of one in which

the direction the new Turkey must take was clearly established. Atatttrk remains one of the great men of the twentieth century.

While not favoring dictatorships and authoritarian methods, this writer has to admit that a strong hand at the helm was needed in the early days of the nationalist movement if there was to be national survival. It is significant to note that Mustafa Kemal, even in the early period, with very few exceptions, gained some popular support

(if only in the surrounding locale), before he carried out any specific action. He continued this policy during the Republican era when intro­ ducing reforms. His policy of going among the people, explaining in detail each stage of his program helped to keep this program mass-based and to avoid political revolution.

Since this study does not include the period beyond the estab­ lishment of the Republic in October 1923, only a brief statement will be made here to indicate the final conclusion of trends started during 2"V^ the early Kemalist days.

On November 17, 192U, Ali Fuat Pasha organized the Terakkiperver

Cumhuriyet Firkasi (Progressive Party of the Republic) in Ankara.

Important members included Kazim Karabekir Pasha, Httseyin Rauf (Orbay),

See K. Key, "Turkish Political Parties," World Affairs Interpreter, Spring 1955j and Tunaya, Partiler, 5^0-555 for a detailed and documented discussion on this subject. For an incisive survey of political development in Turkey since the Tanzimat see Bernard Lewis, "Democracy in Turkey," Middle Eastern Affairs, February, 1959. lilt

Dr. Adnan (Adivar), and Ismail Cambulat. This party attracted diverse

groups who opposed Mustafa Kemal for a number of different reasons

including objection to his personal rule, opposition to giving up

rights to Ottoman territories, and support of the Caliphate. The

party was dissolved on June 3, 1925 when it was claimed that it was

involved in the Kurdish revolt, and the Republican People' s Party

became the sole party under which the Kemalist reforms were forced

through over all opposition.

By 1930 Atatttrk's program was well under way and his position had been consolidated, so he again believed that the time was ripe to

allow increased political activity. His close friend Ali Fethi Bey

(Okyar) who had resigned during the Kurdish Revolts was requested to organize a loyal opposition, and the Serbest Cumhuriyet Firkasi (Free

Party of the Republic) formed in Istanbul on April 12, 1930 was the result. This party lasted until November 17, 1930. Atatttrk's sister,

Makbule Haniip, became the first woman member. By creating a close relationship with the new party, Atatttrk claimed he would maintain an impartial attitude toward political affairs. The party's platform favored free enterprise and its main support came from Izmir and

Istanbul. The party dissolved itself when it was alleged that reac­ tionary elements had infiltrated its ranks,^3^ ^he crisis was caused

236 Several interpretations are given of the dissolution of this party. Ahmet Agaoglu, the second most important member of the party, in his memoirs Serbest Firka Hatirlari (Istanbul: 1950) (Memoirs of the Free Party), and Ahmet Ehin Yalman, "The Struggle for Multi-Party Government in Turkey," Middle East Journal. January 19h7, claim that the new party was becoming too popular to please the Republican People's Party leadership and was consequently dissolved. n 5 by a political speech Fethi Okyar made in Izmir which resulted in

encounters between supporters and adversaries of the party.

From 1930 to 1938, the Republican People's Party was again the

only political party in Turkey. During this period it developed its program under six principles; republicanism, nationalism, populism, etatism (state capitalism), secularism, and reformism. Although there were "independent" deputies in the Grand National Assembly, they were elected on party lists and chosen by the party.

The real opposition in Turkey at this time was found inside the

Republican People's Party where it took the form of dissident groups of minority tendencies which criticized the government with varying degrees of freedom and were allowed to increase as the reform program became more consolidated. By 19U6, these groups found expression on the parliamentary level as opposition parties ushering in a two party system. ^7

For an understanding of Kemal's far-reaching reform program, the chief instrument of his political philosophy, a consideration of the economic and social conditions in the country during the early

Kemalist days is essential.

237 por details on this later period see: T. Z. Tunaya, Ziya Karal, E. B. §>apolyo, Y. H. Bayur, and other Turkish historians, as well as Nutuk, and Tarih IV. Also useful are the works of Orga, Webster, Halide Edib, and G. Lewis, available in English. CHAPTER VII

HOW THE SOCIOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS FACING

THE KEMALIST GOVERNMENT WERE MET

The Kemalist Liberation Movement, often referred to as the

Turkish Nationalist Revolution, had two phases: the first was the

establishment of a politically independent state by the military and

diplomatic triumphs during 1919-1923 culminating in the Treaty of

Lausanne and the establishment of the Republic in 1923; and the second

phase is often known as the Kemalist Reformation or Modernization

period during which drastic changes were made in the Turkish political,

economic, social and cultural structure which aimed to develop Turkey

into a modern nation.^ 8

Both of these phases were made possible by the dynamism of

Mustafa Kemal and the stability and resiliency of the Turkish people.

Turkish political and intellectual leaders had talked about reforms for nearly a century but it took the strong and often authoritarian leadership of Mustafa Kemal and his followers to change this talk into action. Among the most important changes were reconstruction and economic development, thorough secularization and de-emphasis of Islam, introduction of modern education, and vigorous public health measures.

238 For a generai survey of Turkish economic history see Afetinan, Apergu general sur l'Histoire economique Turc-Ottoman (Istanbul: Tttrk Tarih Kurumu," 19ll). 117 From the very beginning economics was a prime consideration of

the Kemalists even though they knew little about the subject.^39 The

Kemalist economic revolution is often dated from the Economic Congress

at Izmir in early 1923,^0 which made important declarations of

economic policy. These have been divided into the following four

categories aid to the agricultural producer; promotion of export

trade; protection of national industry and industrial labor; and

implementation of the railway system. Although in the beginning

Mustafa Kemal's speeches were not clear cut regarding details of

economic policy such as industrialization, the broad objectives were

never left in doubt.

Des les premier jours, Mustafa Kemal s'etait rendu compte que cette liberation de l'ame devait marcher de pair avec une libera­ tion dconomique, cette derniere ne pouvant etre atteinte que par l'enrichissement agricole et 1'industrialisation. Tels furent, sous ce rapport, les deux objectifs de la jeune Republique.

239 Yale, o j d . cit., p. 297 observes that: "The revolutionary leaders in Turkey during the past one hundred years had concerned themselves largely with political and social studies rather than with economics. They had shown very little interest in the complexities of the western economic system although they were keenly conscious of the fact that European domination of the Ottoman Empire had been based upon economic controls. The Kemalists were determined that the Turkish Republic should not be controlled by Western Capitalists."

Ilk Tflrk Iktisadi Kongresi Zabitlari (Izmir: Anadolu Matbaasi, 1923) (Minutes of the First Turkish Economic Congress), gives an account of the proceedings of this very important Congress,

2kl Robert W. Kerwin, "Etatism and the Industrialization of Turkey" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation presented to the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, 19f>6), p. 10U. (This will be subsequently referred to as Kerwin, Etatism).

2li2 Conker, Orhan and Witmeur, Emile, Redressement economique et Industrialisation de la Nouvelle Turquie (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1937), p. 320i (This will be subsequently referred to as Conker, Redressement). 118

The importance attached to economic policies was due in large part to

the economic heritage of the new leaders from the Ottoman Etapire, and

therefore in order to understand the serious problems facing Mustafa

Kemal in the period of the Government of the Grand National Assembly

and the early days of the Republic, the economic and social conditions

inherited from the defeated Ottoman Empire must be considered.

The Ottoman Empire developed a rather comprehensive guild system

and handicraft industry which declined after flourishing for several 2li3 hundred years. J Turkish manufactures such as textiles had been in

great demand in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,

but as production costs were lowered through machine production and

the Ottoman Bnpire failed to keep pace with the industrial development

of the West, Turkish handiwork was swept off the market and the

country returned to agriculture.

During the nineteenth century the middle classes came into

their own in Europe and America. This process of the rise of the middle classes was much slower in the Ottoman Empire. The non-Muslim minorities who were quicker in absorbing western techniques and

learning were active in business and trades. The Turkish middle class

consisted mainly of the civil bureaucracy, army officers, the ulema,

^ 3 Enver Ziya Karal, Tanzimattan evvel garplilayma hareketleri (Istanbul: Tilrk Tarih Kurumu Hasimevi, 19li0) (westernization Movements prior to the Tanzimat Reforms of 1839)j Ziya Karamursal, Osmanli Devletinin Kurulugundan XlXuncu asrin yarisina kadar Mali tarihine bir bakiy (Istanbul: Akyam Basimevi, 1936) (A Survey of Ottoman Finan­ cial History from the Beginning to the Middle of the Nineteenth Century); and Omer Celal Sary, Tanzimat ve Sanayimiz (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, I9I4O (The Tanzimat and Our Industry). 119 and some landowners. The Ottoman Empire had failed to participate in the industrial revolution. However, in the middle of the nineteenth century some of the larger Turkish landowners were slowly getting into the business field, but there still remained a great deal of con­ tempt for the trades and commerce among the Muslim Turks. The rise of the middle classes, therefore, took more the shape of an intellectual movement among the literati. Even after the 1908 Revolution the

Ottoman middle classes remained small in numbers. The Ottoman intel­ lectuals were primarily concerned in struggling against the political oppression of the Sultan and therefore were unable to devote much attention to social reform and the common people.

The majority of Turkish peasants were poor, illiterate, and their standard of living was barely above the subsistence level.

The l btoman Empire unilaterally abolished the Capitulations in

191U, but following the defeat of the Empire in 1918, parts of the country fell under foreign control. During the period of the Grand

National Assembly (1920-1922) little action or even thinking in the field of economic planning and policy was undertaken. However, although the basic lines of Kemalist economic policy were not clear during this period, there are certain indications of what shape this policy might take. This direction was indicated by the desperate state of existing economic conditions which demanded both immediate alleviation and some type of longer term policy in consonance with

2W* The Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leyden, 193U), IV, 9691. 120 the doctrine of national sovereignty and the development of Turkey as an independent nation state. ^

The line this policy would take was determined in great part by the concept of the new Turkey which evolved in Mustafa Kemal’s mind and the concept of government to which the other leaders who were advisers to Kemal subscribed. For the most part, Turkish leadership consisted of a definite class of officials, administrators, and military leaders from Ottoman days who traditionally expected the government to solve the problems in the country and to initiate needed policies and reforms independent of the great mass of the people whose lives were far removed from the processes of government. The most important among the Nationalist leaders were military men and a system of control from the top was familiar to them and regarded by them as effective and concrete, whereas they viewed western-type

"democratic liberalism" as abstract. The dissenting Second Group which included those of western-type liberal bent, became less influen­ tial in governmental affairs after 1922 and after the Proclamation of the Republic in 1923. Mustafa Kemal managed to eliminate their influence almost completely so that his reforms could be instituted without what he regarded as petty obstructionism.

The policy of strong leadership from the top during the Govern­ ment of the Grand National Assembly and the early days of the Republic with respect to political and military questions, has been explained

Kerwin, Etatism, Chapter III, pp. 99-103. 121

in preceding chapters of this dissertation. That this same policy

was also evident in matters of economic policy was quite a natural

development since the early leaders were less familiar with economic

matters than with military and political affairs and therefore believed

that state planning and control as well as what developed to be state

enterprise, might be a safer and more desirable system than develop­

ment from private efforts. However, during the 1920s when pressing

military and political problems were demanding immediate Government

attention, except in matters of extreme urgency, such as wartime

economic requisitioning,^4^ Mustafa Kemal and his Government left many

economic matters in abeyance hoping that private enterprise could bridge the gap as illustrated in the following:

During the early period of the Republic, the Government con­ fronted with the stupendous task of consolidating the new regime and introducing sweeping social and political reforms, could not seriously tackle the problem of industrialization. 4 '

The Treaty of Lausanne ended the foreign control of Turkey’s economy, the Great Powers recognizing the abolishing of the Capitu-

p ) O lations. 4 The long wars had wrecked most of Turkey's communications, plant and economic institutions. As the Turkish nationalist emerged to form a new Turkey, a further blow was the Exchange of Population with Greece in 1923 which deprived Turkey of many of her merchants and

2^6 por a discussion of wartime requisitioning by the Grand National Assembly see, G. Lewis, og. cit., p. 66.

Osman Okyar, "Industrialization in Turkey," Middle East Journal (June-July, 1953) 210. See also: The Economy of Turkey (Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop­ ment, 1951), p. 7.

2 W Conker, Redressement. 63-6 7. 122

c r a f t s m e n . Most of the commerce and trade, especially after the eighteenth century, had been handled by the non-Muslim minorities.

In addition to the exchange of population with Greece, there had been a continuous emigration of non-Muslims from the Ottoman Empire since before the First World War, many of whom took at least part of their wealth with them.^® Thus in 1923, the Turkish economy was not faced with merely a loss of skilled personnel, but also With a loss of material wealth which had flowed out of the Empire.

In this writer's opinion, the Kemalist decision to exchange population turned out to be wise, because despite temporary difficul­ ties, modern Turks soon replaced departing Greeks and other non-Muslim traders and artisans, and profits generally remained within Turkey.

When the Republic was established in 1923, serious obstacles stood in the way of economic development and social betterment. The social structure and the attitudes of the people evolved over centuries constituted an intangible but powerful barrier to economic development.

One of the most pressing problems which confronted the Turkish

2h9in the Exchange of Populations Turkey lost over one million Greeks and received about 380,000 Muslim Turks from Greece. For information on this subject see: Stephen P. Ladas, The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey (New York: Macmillan, 1932), pp. 728-730; Frank A. Ross, C. Luther Fry, and Elbridge Sibley, The Near East and American Philanthropy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929), p. ll»V"and Yale, og. cit., p. 296.

2^0 From 1912 to 1923 Turkey lost about 3.5 million Christian minorities. For further information on this subject see: Ladas, op. cit., pp. 338-3^5} Howard, og. cit., p. 337; Webster, og. cit., p. lllij and Leland James Gordon, American Relations with Turkey (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932), Chapters XVI and XVII. 123 Government was that of transportation. The rolling stock was worn out and there was no adequate road system. 2^1 ^ The development of agricultural marketing and mineral exploitation was often prohibitive because of the cost of transportation due to poor facilities.

The objective of the economic planners was the development of a balanced economy including both the industrial and agricultural sectors, with a view toward raising the standard of living, protecting national security, and enabling Turkey to have unqualified control over her own revenues and finances. J

Mustafa Kemal envisaged the economic development of Turkey primarily by Turkish capital and during the first decade of the

Republic, the Government relied largely on domestic private enterprise pqji to bring about industrial development, and only in a later period turned to the better known economic policy of Etatism or state capitalism. During both phases of Kemalist economic development, in order to provide the financial means to carry out economic policies, the Turkish Government established a number of financial institutions.

The first period of Kemalist economic development dates from

251 Yale, op. cit., p. 298j Ross, Fry, and Sibley, op. cit., p. 150; and Conker, Redressement, pp. 119-122.

252 Yale, op. cit., p. 298.

253 For a discussion of the economic and foreign trade policy followed by the Turkish Government after 1923, see Conker, Redressement, pp. 117-153, "Politique suivie par le Gouvemement pour favoriser une mise en valeur rationnelle des richesses naturelles et arriver a 1'affranchissement economique."

25U The Economy of Turkey (supra), 7. 12k

the establishment of the u Bank (Bank of Business)a semi-private

institution established in 1921* to help finance private industrial

enterprise. It was aided by the Sanayi ve Maden Bankasi (Bank for

Industry and Mining) established in 192?.

Although the Turkish economic planners emphasized the importance

of the creation of heavy industry, they continued to pay attention to

the agricultural sector, claiming that the development of each would

be a mutual benefit to the other:

L'industrie et agriculture sont deux elements complamentaires de la prosperite' nationals et non des entites oppose'es. L'indus­ trie doit contributor ««• matieres a transformer. VoilA pourquoi l'Etat a considers comme une de ses taches essentielles d'encou- rager le developpement des industries existantes et la creation de nouvelles entreprises, non pour emprisonner l'activite' dans les limites de l'autarkie, mais pour que la force economique de la Turquie ait sa source dans le pays meme et soit generatrice d 1independence vis*A-vis de 1 1 e'tranger. ^56

Mustafa Kemal constantly emphasized the role of agriculture and the farmer. His speech opening the Grand National Assembly on March 1,

1922, was entitled, "The Real Owner and Lord of Turkey is the

Peasant.Politically and economically, agriculture is important

Max W. Thornburg, Turkey: An Economic Appraisal (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 191*9), p. 23.

Conkeir, Redressement. 138-139.

Mustafa Kemal, "Tflrkiyenin sahibi hakikisi ve efendisi," T.B.M.M, Zabit Ceridesi. XVIII, 1-17 and also given in Atatttrk Dedi Ki, lla-l^U iSee also Mustafa Kemal's speech to the Economic Congress at Izmir, "The Plough Instead of the Sword" (Kilic yerine Sapan). Atatflrk Dedi Ki, 217-227. ------125

to Turkey since three-fourths of her people depend on the land for

their living, twenty-three percent of the land is tinder cultivation,

forty-four percent is pasture, and agricultural resources are varied

and rich in quality.

The second period of the economic development program which

started in 1933 lies outside the scope of this dissertation. The

economic policy developed during this period is known as etatism or 258 state capitalism.

From the very beginning Mustafa Kemal spoke of education as one

of Turkey's most pressing problems and rated it as second only to

transportation as the most immediate need of the Republic. 2597

Early legislation to modernize education was the Law of Unifi­

cation of Instruction of March 3, 192i*,^° which placed the medreses

(Qur'anic schools) under the control of'the Ministry of Education.

Later these medreses were abolished (1926). The Evkaf (Pious Founda­

tion) was not abolished but reorganized as the Directorate General of

^ For a study of etatism see: Qmer Celal Sarc. "Economic Policy of the New Turkey," Middle East Journal (Fall 19u8)j Webster, op. cit.; and G. Lewis, 0£. cit. There is no outstanding published work on Kemalist economic policies but the most comprehensive study on this subject is Kerwin, Etatism.

Rogs, Fry and Sibley, 0£. cit., p. l5l.

260 por -fog text of this law see Resmi Gazete, (Official Gazette), March 3> 1921*. For histories of educational development in Turkey see: Osman Ergin, Tflrkiye Maarif Tarihi (Istanbul: Osmanbey Matbaasi, 1939- 19l*3) (History of Turkish Education); International Yearbook on Educa­ tion (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 1956) XVIII; and Education in Turkey (Washington: U.S. Office of Education, Federal Security Agency, Bulletin No. 10, Govern­ ment Printing Office, 1952). 126

the Evkaf. By placing all these institutions under unified, secular

control, the nationalists were in a position to mold the new genera­

tion into the shape they wished,

During the Government of the Grand National Assembly and the

early days of the Republic, education was in a desperate state, since

the medreses were few in number and the curriculum offered was not

considered useful to modern living by the Kemalists. Furthermore,

the medreses formed a center of conservative opinion opposed to

secular Kemalism. 262

Mustafa Kemal gave much attention to the modernization of

villages and the provision of a practical primary education for vil­

lagers. The importance of modernization of villages, as opposed to

their urbanization is emphasized in the contents of the K8y Kanunu 0 (Village Law) of March 18, 192U, which was the first extensive

code of laws passed by the Grand National Assembly after the Republic

was proclaimed.2^* Later these programs developed into village

institutions known as Village Institutes which have now been super­

seded by regular schools under the Ministry of Education.

26l g . Lewis, o£. cit., p. 178.

265? Webster, oj). cit., p. 210, adding, "It might have been easier to initiate a system of modern education in Turkey had there been no medreses, for that which is sacrosanct to the pious is replaced with diffculty, no matter how much superior or more effective the new way." 2^3 See Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), March 18, 192U.

261* Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958), p. 117. 127 It should not be imagined that all the people of Turkey greeted with open arms the "improvements" which their leader was giving them in the educational, religious, and economic fields. Opposition to these moves came from both the vested interests and the masses:

Old tribal, feudal, and ecclesiastical privileged classes rarely sumbit docily to changes which menace their power, their wealth, their ways of living and ways of thinking. Nor do the masses, as represented by peasants and nomads submit eagerly to changes in the patterns of their ways of life. Hence, the political raison d'etre throughout history of the usurpers, the tyrants, ^ the autocrats, among whom Mustafa Kemal holds an honorable place. ^

The opposition centered on Mustafa Kemal's interference with Islamic institutions. To the average Turk in the 1920s, Islam not only gave meaning to life, but Islamic traditions and institutions, even if in some ways inadequate and anachronistic, had for centuries characterized the society he knew and clung to. Islam was an ideal worth dying for and its religious practices were habitual in millions of lives and regarded as an essential part of existence by these millions. How­ ever, the new nationalist leaders believed that if Turkey was to attain parity with the nations of the West, the continuance of tradi­ tional Islam as a religious system could not be tolerated. This problem was one of the most delicate which the Government was called upon to solve. Mustafa Kemal was aided by a series of incidents which served as catalysts and helped to cushion the effects of secu­ larization.

These incidents included the Arab Revolt (1915-1918) in which

Yale, o£. cit., p. 296. Muslims fought Muslims, the apparent collusion of the Sultan's Govern­

ment with Turkey's foes, and the fetvas (Muslim juridical ruling)

issued by the Ottoman Government which stated that liberation move­

ments were treasonable, contrary to the Shariat (Religious Law), and

that it was the duty of all good Muslims to oppose these movements.

The Greek invasion also had an unsettling effect on religious attitudes

and social patterns:

The thought of their territories being violated, their homes invaded and their religion insulted by the hated infidels was enough to awaken a tremendous burst of hidden energy, and the upheaval caused a favorable condition for the and reintegration of Turkish social patterns.2

All these factors convinced many Turks that there was something radically wrong with their government in Istanbul and its religious organization, although they were not completely convinced. On these doubts and fears, Mustafa Kemal was able to capitalize and receptivity to his ideas by a minority was sufficient to form a spearhead.

The Kemalists emphasized countless times that secularization and the adoption of western ways did not mean that Turkey was conceding the superiority of Christianity over Islam, but rather that in accepting ideas from the West, Turkey was merely profiting from a set of secular circumstances to which the Christian religion was itself indebted. The Kemalists based their action on the principle of removing from Islamic jurisdiction those phases of life which Western nations have removed from religious to secular domination. Despite

266 Henry Elisha Allen, The Turkish Transformation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19^27, p. U2. 129

the great outward changes which have been made in Turkey since the

Kemalist Revolutionary Period, of all of Atatttrk’s reforms, seculari­

zation is the one which has been least thoroughly absorbed by the

Turkish people, and significant homage is still given by present day political parties to the powerful "prayer-rug11 vote.^^

Many other Kemalist reforms followed the Abolition of the

Caliphate on March 3> 192lu A law in 1925 ended polygamy and gave women equal status with men in the question of divorce. Judicial codes were completely modernized and in 1926 the Swiss Civil Code, Italian

Penal Code, and German Commercial Codes were adopted replacing the old Ottoman codes. These were followed by the abolition of the fez and the adoption of the western calendar. Finally, the official separation of State and religious affairs was achieved when the Con­ stitution was amended in 1928 deleting Article 2 which had stated

p Z Q that Islam was the religion of the Turkish Republic. 00

267 For a discussion of problems involving Islam and seculari­ zation in Turkey sees Count Leon Ostrorog, The Angora Reform (London: University of London Press, 1927)J the chapters by D. A. Rustow, Howard A. Reed, and.;Niyszi Berkes in Islam and the West (The Hague: Mouton and Company, 1957)J Paul Stirling, "Religious Change in Republican Turkey," Middle East Journal, Autumn 1958)j and David C. Cuthell, Islam in Modern Turkey (Foreign Service Institute, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 1958) (A paper submitted to the Department of State in connection with Turkish language and area study). According to these recent interpretations’ secularization has split Turkish society into two groups. The majority still clinging to Muslim traditions, and a smaller group of Modernists, who though still Muslims tend to follow Western mores.

2^8 Roes, Fry and Sibley, o£. cit., p. Ih5. 130

In a society whose illiteracy exceeded ninety percent of the

population during the early years of the Kemalist movement, Mustafa

Kemal saw the great importance of communication as indicated by his

periodic visits to villages and chats with the average citizen. How­

ever, as the reform program progressed, Kemal realized that literacy

standards must be raised and although the job had to be done from the

bottom and with a long term view, he tackled the problem in a revolu­

tionary manner by his famous decrees changing the orthography of the

Turkish language.This change was indeed revolutionary and in

many ways its results are among the greatest non-military contribu­

tions made by the Kemalist movement.

By encouraging the study of history and language,Mustafa Kemal

filled the souls of the Turks with a pride in their history:

Mustafa Kemal Atatttrk, first President of Turkey, was very interested in history and realized that pride in one's country could be used as a positive and constructive force to inspire enthusiasm for the successful accomplishment of his program of reforms. He therefore, encouraged the study of Turkish history to instill pride in the Turkish heritage. 70

Another evidence of the lasting effect and tremendous influence of the

Kemalist westernization program may be seen in the following assess­

ment and analysis:

In order to succeed Ata-Turk had to create the modern Turkish language and literature, had to invent Turkish history divorced from Islam and traditions of the Ottoman Empire, and had to

269 Lemer, o£* cit., p. 112.

270 Report on Current Research on the Middle East (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1957)> pp. Iil-li2. 131 introduce the Latin alphabet and Swiss civil code from Europe. Such a radical change could be effected only through universal education administered and strictly controlled from the centre, and made compulsory by an authoritarian government. . . . After thirty-five years of national indoctrination, the new generation is certainly permeated with the consciousness of their Turkish identity and nationalist sentiments have come to the fore.271

Mustafa Kemal's reform program has been criticized by many as

being too fast and too dictatorial, but the majority of Western, as

well as Turkish scholars agree that both the conditions present in

Turkay at the time of their inception, and the results achieved by

these reforms, justifies them. One scholar adds that "even if some

mistakes be made, the general trend is sharply upward.

271 Nicholas Hans, "Nationalism and Education in Asia," Comparative Education Review (October 19f>8), p. 7.

272 Webster, op. cit., p. 171. See also: Conker, Redressement, p. 33O5 Yale, 0£. cit., p. 300; Ross, etc., o£. cit., p. Ih5; and Lerner, o£. cit., p. 112. CHAPTER VIII

THE BASIC LINES OF KEMALIST FOREIGN POLICY

(1919-1923)

The basic foreign policy aims of the Government of the Grand

National Assembly were to gain recognition abroad, to negotiate for

foreign assistance or the cessation of hostilities, and to carry out

by diplomacy whenever and wherever possible the stipulations of the

National Pact. This task was completed only when the Lausanne Treaty

was signed in July 1923.^^

The military victory in the years 1919 to 1922 could never

have been effectively exploited without Mustafa Kemal's astute direc- 27h tion of foreign policy which paralleled the military campaigns.

By early 1922 the Government of the Grand National Assembly

had won important victories in negotiations both with Russia and the

^73 por a text of this treaty see: J. C. Hurewitz (ed.), Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (supra); League of Nations Treaty Series, XXVIII (192U) llff; and Oriente Moderno, III (1923) U61-55O (collated with the Turkish textj"l

27h Among the many works which discuss the diplomacy of the early Kemalist period, the following have been found especially helpful: Harry N. Howard, o£. cit., is a basic reference and a brilliant piece of work especially because it was written in 1931 when little official material was available; G. L. Lewis, o£. cit.; Davison, on. cit.; Altemur Kilij, Turkey and the World (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1959) is an important recent contribution; A. J. Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey (supra); Ahmet §ttkrtt Esmer, Siyasi Tarih (supra); Y. Hikmet Bayur, Tttrk Dev- letinin Dig Siyasasi (supra); Cavid Oral, Akdeniz Meselesi (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 19b5) (The Mediterranean Problem); Nutuk (supra); Kandemir, Darginliklar; Tunaya, T.B.M.M. HtLkflmeti; and Tarih IV (supra). 133 West, and had passed through what is sometimes termed as the first

phase of its struggle for international position. This achievement

was the result of constant, oonsistent and active efforts on the

diplomatic front undertaken by Mustafa Kemal from the very beginning

of the liberation movement.

In the early days of the nationalist struggle, the newly con­

stituted Government of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara, was not

included in Allied negotiations regarding Turkey. The Allies did not

recognize this Government, and consequently invited the Istanbul

Government to confer on a peace treaty. Mustafa Kemal formally noti­

fied the Allied Powers of the constitution of the Ankara regime but

they still refused to recognize it. Consequently on May 11, 1920,

Tevfik Pasha, a former Grand Vezir, led the Ottoman delegation to

Sevres.

At the conference, Tevfik Pasha was delaying to obtain some

degree of national independence if possible and by doing this greatly ?7 £ angered the Allied Powers. He was replaced by Damad Ferid Pasha on June 25, 1920. The final treaty which resulted, the Treaty of

Sevres, was signed by both the Ottoman delegates and the Entente representatives and approved by the Damad Ferid Pasha Cabinet.

The negotiations at Sevres will not be considered in this dis­ sertation since they were not part of nationalist diplomacy. The

Webster, oj>. cit., p. 87. 13U

treaty itself is evidence of the Allies' and the Istanbul Govern­

ment's assumption that the Nationalists were relatively powerless and

that their government was not much more than a paper tiger unable to

carry out the principles set forth in the National Pact. If implemented,

the Treaty of Sevres' would have meant the end of an independent Turkey. 27711

This treaty has been evaluated by an American scholar as follows:

Only the poorest regions are left to the Turks for their own use— after payment of war indemnities. Whether the greater folly of Lloyd George and the other Entente politicians were their economic a-realism or their failure to anticipate the psychic effects of the robbery upon the Nationalists, one can only guess. For us, it is just another instance of the unwisdom manifested by the 1919-20 treaty dictators.27°

Not all was unity, however, in the Entente camp for during

negotiations at Sevres, the French had made an armistice with the

Nationalists 279 whereby they halted their operations on the southern

front (May 30, 1920) and hostilities were suspended for twenty days.

A principal motivation in the French action was to protect French

holdings in Syria.

Previously on February 11, 1920, the French had evacuated

Maraf after over three months of harassment by nationalist forces.

^ For a text of this treaty see: H. W. V. Temperley, (ed.) History of the Peace Conference of Paris (supra) VI, pp. 70-7U. The terms of this treaty are summarized in Tarih IV, 6iif, and are avail­ able in English translation in Webster, oj>. cit., pp. 87-88.

277 Orga, o|>. cit., p. 98.

278 Webster, oj>. cit., pp. 88-89.

279 This armistice had encouraged Tevfik Pasha to delay for more advantageous terms at the Sevres Conference. 135

On April 10, 1920, they had been forced out of Urfa by the nationalists.

The conclusion of this armistice is important principally because it

demonstrated the differences of views between the French and English

and the recognition by the French that there was a national government

in Ankara. Fighting with the French was renewed in less than twenty

days from the Armistice when French forces landed at Zonguldak (on

the Black Sea), the French claiming that the armistice anplied only to

the southern front, and the Turks interpreting it as limiting all

conflict throughout the country. A stalemate between the two countries

was to continue until February 8, 1921, when the French were ejected

from Turkey.*^

Meanwhile Mustafa Kemal was also giving attention to relations

with his eastern neighbor, Russia. Bekir Sami Bey who had previous

civil service experience in Ottoman days and was a member of the

early nationalist group, was elected Foreign Minister by the Grand

National Assembly in May 1920 and during that month set out to Moscow

on an official mission to seek aid for the nationalist cause and to

a O a For details on Turkish-French relations during this period see: Enver Ziya Karal, T.C.T. (supra) ; Ahmet §>ttkrtt Esmer, T.C.T. (supra); Ghalib Kemaly SSylemezoglu, Hariciye Hizmetinde 30~~Sene (Istanbul: Maarif Basimevi, 1955) IV; Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Tttrk Devletinin Dig Siyasasi, (supra) 90-9U; Nutuk (supra)38U: Comte Roger de Gontaut-Biron and L. Le Rdvdfrend, d'Angora a Lausanne (Paris: Plon-Hourrit et Cie, 192U); Edgar Pech, Les Allids et la Turquie (Paris: Les Presses universitaires de France, 192577 Rene Pinon. "Les Accords franco-turc," Revue des deux Mondes (August 1 , 1938) Paris. 136 281 establish treaty relationships. The delegation arrived in Moscow toward the end of July and despite the traditional Russo-Turkish

antagonism, it was to the best interests of each to give support to the other. Although the enemies were the same, the basic aim of each differed. Kemal favored a national war rather than a class war, and

Chicherin, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs who was a pro­ ponent of the class war, was working in stages toward the Russian control of the Turkish Straits.

By August 2k, 1920, Bekir Sami Bey had initialed a draft treaty with Russia but the signing was delayed for seven months because of friction over the Trans-caucasus region, and Bekir Sami's negotiations were suspended. In October 1920 a formal Russian mission came to

Ankara and the next month, the Grand National Assembly authorized diplomatic and consular representation in Russia. Kemal selected Ali 283 Fuat Pasha as the first Ambassador from the Government of the Grand

2^1 Davison, oo. cit., p. 183} Nutuk, p. 396; Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1920-1923 (London: Oxford University Press, 1925), P. 365; John Kingsley Birge, A Guide to Turkish Area Studies (Washington, D.C.: American Council of Learned Societies, 19ii9); and Orga, 02. cit., p. 98, mention earlier agreements of December 1919 and March 1920 without citing sources or indicating content. Jaschke, "Der Weg," p. 35 note 76, discusses some of the evidence and discounts the likelihood of a military convention.

282 Davison, 0£. cit., p. I8iu

283 J Cebesoy, Moskova Hatiralari, pp. 1UU-15U; Enver Ziya Karal, Turkiye Oumhuriyet Tarihi (1918-1953) (Istanbul: Maarif Basimevi, 1955), pp. 108-110; Ahmet pUkrtl Esmer, Siyasi Tarih (1919-1939) (Ankara: Gtiney, 1953), pp. 30-33} Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Yeni TttrKtyaiifriHarici Siyaseti (Istanbul: Akfam Matbaasl, 193U), p. 60. 137 Pfill National Assembly to Moscow.

With negotiations in Moscow deadlocked because of Armenia, the

nationalists set out to secure their Eastern frontier by force. Late

in September 1920, General Kazim Karabekir^'’ began an attack from

Erzurum which in six weeks swept through Kars to Alexandropol. On

December 2, 1920, Karabekir signed Ankara's first international treaty

at Alexandropol (Gtimrtt) which returned the district of Kars to

Turkish oontrol, and Bekir Sami Bey and Yusuf Kemal soon afterwards

started for Moscow to resume their suspended treaty negotiations.

Developments in the Caucasus were of interest to the Kemalists.

During the latter part of the first World War, Turkish troops had

occupied parts of the Caucasus. Thus, in the early days of the

Kemalist Movement, developments on the Eastern Anatolian front were

significant. General Kazim Karabekir's actions against the Armenians

and the Milli gura Hareketi (National Council Movement) in the

Kemal, Speech, pp. 1*29-1*30; Edib, Turkish Ordeal (supra), pp. 22l*-225; Cebesoy, Moskova Hatiralari, (supra).

Karabekir, one of the very early Kemalist supporters some­ times differed with Mustafa Kemal on matters of political policy which have been described in earlier chapters of this dissertation. For a short biographic sketch of Karabekir see Apnendix.

For a text of this treaty see: A. Poidebard, (ed.), La Transcaucase et la Renublique d'Armenie dans les textes diplomatiques 1919-1921 (Paris, 192**), p p . 56-5$ which gives the treaty text from an Armenian source; Gotthard Jftschke, "Die ttirkische-armenische Grenze und der Friedensvertrag von Gttmrti (Alexandropol)," Mitteilungen des Seminars fttr orientalischen Sprachen, XHCV (1932), II, 167-171, 173-176, gives a partial text from a Turkish source; Histoire (French edition of Tarih) 71; and Kemal, Speech, p. 1*18.

267 For a discussion on this movement see Tunaya, Partiler, pp. 1*86-1:90. 138

Eastern Turkish Anatolian provinces are fields on which little has

been written. The rise of the Armenian, Azerbaijan and Georgian

Republics in 1918 and their final absorption into the Soviet Union

by 1922 ultimately becoming Soviet Socialist Republics, is outside

AGO the scope of this study. The fact that the Soviet Union was beset

by internal problems and was unable to follow an active policy beyond

its own frontiers at this time, and in fact followed a friendly policy

toward the Kemalists, allowed the Kemalists to concentrate their

military actions against the Greeks on the Western Anatolian front.

The year 1921 was a crucial one in the nationalist diplomatic

campaign for it was during this year that:

Turkey settled her relationships with her neighbors, renewed friendships with France and Italy— thus separating these two Powers fjJQm England— and became the friend and ally of Soviet Russia. °

Early in 1921 Kemal had an opportunity to start diplomatic negotiations with the West. Turkish successes in Armenia and the victory over the Greeks at Indnfl in 1921, had influenced the Allied ministers to invite the governments of Athens and Istanbul to a con­ ference in London during February. The invitation stipulated that the

Istanbul delegation should include negotiators from Ankara.Mustafa

Kemal refused to participate until a direct invitation was sent to the

A good source on this subject is Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (New York: Philosophical Library, 195>l). The works of Cebesoy, and Hostler, listed in the bibliography, are also useful. 2®9 Howard, o£. cit., p. 26o.

290 Davison, o£. cit., p. 188. 139 nationalists which finally occurred prior to the opening of the 291 meeting in February 1921.

Bekir Sami Bey, Ankara's Foreign Minister who had just returned from negotiations in Moscow led the Turkish delegation at the London

Conference. At the conference, Bekir Sami Bey spoke for the two

Turkish governments, an indication of both the harmony and the rela­ tive power of Istanbul and Ankara. Although Bekir Sami Bey was willing to consider with reservations some of the modifications of the Sevres treaty suggested by the Entente Powers, the Greeks refused to consider any modifications whatever and launched a new offensive against Ankara 292 at the end of March. The refusal by the Greeks spared the Govern­ ment of the Grand National Assembly the necessity of refusing the pro­ posals which did not meet all the demands of the National Pact.*^

^91 Idem.

292 Davison, ojo. cit., pp. 188-189. Davison states Idem that Bekir Sami Bey had been disillusioned by what he saw in Moscow and his desire to reach an agreement with the West was quite apparent, although the demands presented at the Conference were still those of the National Pact. Howard, oo. cit., p. 260, speaking of this Conference states that "The Greeks considered themselves perfectly capable of overwhelming the Turks, though General Gouraud, who had had enough experience with the Turks warned them to the contrary. . . . Lloyd George privately encouraged the Greeks to continue their war against the Turks, if their technical advisors urged the necessity of security. Immediate renewal of hostilities in Asia Minor was the result." 293 Davison, 0£. cit., p. 189. Despite the fact that Bekir Sami Bey had arranged a mutual exchange of prisoners with Lloyd George, and had arranged for withdrawal of large numbers of French and Italian troops from large sections of Anatolia by formal treaty in return for economic concessions, thus widening the breach between the Allies by private negotiation, on his return- to Ankara he was attacked tjy Kemal and the Grand National Assembly for having made too great economic concessions which were claimed exceeded his instructions. The lUo

Meanwhile negotiations were proceeding in Moscow where Yusuf

Kemal had conducted the final negotiations for a treaty during the time of the London Conference. On March 16, 1921, Yusuf Kemal Bey signed a treaty of friendship and virtual alliance with the Government of Moscow which obtained for Turkey a favorable and stable eastern frontier and strengthened its hand for bargaining with the West. 29 h

The principal provisions of the Treaty have been summarized as follows:

The treaty of Moscow, which fits into the general scheme of treaties of security by which Russia sought to protect herself, gave to Turkey both Kars and Ardahan, while Batum was placed under a Russo-Turkish condominium. Russia accepted the abolition of the capitulations, and both parties mutually pledged themselves not to recognize any treaty or pact imposed on either by force. Moscow recognized the government at Angora, with all the terri­ tories claimed in the national pact. . . . Soviet Russia also began to furnish arms and money to Turkey, hoping not only to bolshevize the Turks, but to strengthen the Turkish position on the Straits, as a protection to Russia. Likewise, and for the same reason, the Soviet Government was interested in strengthen­ ing Turkey against the imperialism of the western Powers. Turkey was to be incorporated into the Russian system of security. Turkey, on the other hand, accepted Russian aid as a necessity, but did not wish to become Communist.295

This treaty has been the subject of much controversy and comment.

The Soviet Union has used its existence as evidence of help extended

proposed treaties were not ratified. Bekir Sami's attitude toward Russia was also criticized in Ankara and he was forced to resign as Foreign Minister. Subsequent diplomatic developments during 1921 and 1922 tended to justify Bekir Sami Bey's work.

29k Davison, op. cit., p. 191.

295 Howard, on. cit., pp. 263-26I1. For a text of the Treaty see: Jean Degras, led.) Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, I, 237, 2k2, from the Russian; Oriente Moderno, I:3~from the Turkish; Current History, XVII, no. 2 (November 1922), 277-279; Soviet Union and Peace, 27k; Hurewitz, 0£. cit.; and Tarih IV, 102, and Webster, 00. cit., p. 93 for the main provisions. lUi to the Nationalist Government in its great hour of need although many

claim that the aid sent by the Soviet Union was token. 296' Other

writers point out that .the aid was quite substantial, and the important

factor was not so much the magnitude of the material aid as the

diplomatic support of the Soviet Union at this time. It is claimed

by those who wish to detract from Mustafa Kemal, that the conclusion

of this treaty indicates his lack of foresight and petty opportunism,

since Turkish security might have been endangered by the conclusion

of such a treaty. Others claim that Mustafa Kemal, while suspicious

of the Bolsheviks, had to follow a. correct policy toward Turkey's principal neighbor, because of Western policies and the military dangers within Turkey threatening the Ankara Government.

Historical evidence as developed in Tarih IV, in the works of

Ali Fuat Cebesoy, 29771 and especially in an article by Hikmet Bayur, 298 indicates that Mustafa Kemal was highly suspicious of the Bolsheviks from the very beginning, ultimately tried to solve such problems as the Mosul controversy with England because of this suspicion, and by

1936 had definitely set Turkey's pro-western orientation.

The French, who were having problems in Syria and were at odds with Britain over many matters, were the first Western Power to

296 Webster, ojd. cit., p. 93.

^97 Aii Fuat Cebesoy, Moskova Hatiralari (supra).

^9® Hikmet Bayur, "Kuvay-i Milliye devrinde Atatttrk' tin Di$ Siyasasi," Belleten (supra) 689-699. (Atattfrk's foreign policy during the period of the national forces. The early period of the war for independence). 1U2

conclude a treaty with the Turkish Nationalists. M. Franklin-Bouillon

of France, went to Ankara in June 1921, hoping to obtain some capitu­

latory privileges for France in exchange for the withdrawal of French

troops, and negotiated on the basis of discussions and an abortive

treaty concluded with Bekir Sami Bey during the London Conference of

February 1921. This Mustafa Kemal would not allow because the National

Pact required that complete national sovereignty and independence must be the starting point. The Battle of Sakarya on September 13, 1921, may have been influential in persuading Franklin-Bouillon that he was dealing with potential victors, and the Franklin Bouillon Agreement 299 also known as the Ankara Accord was signed October 20, 1921. It was a triumph for Turkish diplomacy because it granted recognition to the

Government of the Grand National Assembly by France, was a separate peace with France which forwarded the Turkish policy of splitting the

Allies by dealing with each individually, enabled many thousands of

Turkish troops to move against the Greeks, turned over to Ankara sub­ stantial quantities of military supplies, and worried the Russians in a manner which raised the prestige of the Ankara Regime in Russian eyes since Kemal stood firm in the face of Russian objections to the

Ankara Accord.

Just a week before the conclusion of the Ankara Accord, Kazim

Karabekir, in the name of the Ankara Government had signed the Treaty

2^9 por a text of this treaty see: League of Nations Treaty Series No. 128U (1926-27), Vol. 5U, pp. 178-193; and Hurewitz, op. cit., II, pp. 97-100. 1U3 of Kars with Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, which was

modeled on the Treaty of Moscow, stabilized the eastern boundaries

of Turkey and was a declaration of mutual friendship.

The most important Muslim relationship for the Ankara Government

was established with Afghanistan by a treaty of March 1, 1921, nego­

tiated in Moscow between Yusuf Kemal and the Afghan Ambassador. It

was a mutual defense treaty and included provisions for Turkish

military instructors to be sent to Afghanistan.^^

During June 1921, following an accord signed on March 13, 1921

between Bekir Sami Bey and Count Sforza recognizing Italo-Turkish

collaboration in Antalya, Afyonkarahisar, Ktitahya, Aydin, Konya and 302 the coal mines near Zonguldak,J Italian forces left Antalya. This

agreement was not recognized by the Government of the Grand National

Assembly, but an agreement was made with Mustafa Kemal later in the

year which did not accord economic concessions such as those granted

by Bekir Sami B e y . 3^3 Thus, at the close of 1921 the British were

30° Orga, op. cit., p. 112. For a text of this treaty see: Degras, oj>. cit. t I, pp. 263-269; Hurewitz (ed.), o£. cit.

301 por a text of this treaty see: British Foreign and State Papers, CXVIII (1923) 10-11. It was partly modelled on the Russo- Afghan Treaty of the previous day, see Degras, 0£. cit., I, pp. 233-235.

302 For a text of this agreement see: Oriente Moderno (June 15, 1922) 18. 3°3 Count Carol Sforza, Diplomatic Europe since the Treaty of Versailles (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928), o'. "63, confirms Kemal's analysis of the significance of economic concessions. See also Hikmet Bayur, Tiirkiye Devletinin Dig Sivasasi (supra) 87-88; and Oriente Modemo',~1:3 (August l5, 192l) I83, and 1:8 (January l5, 1922), U69. lUU left virtually alone in their Turkish policy and the Greeks were

facing a much strengthened and steadily growing and improving Turkish

army. The Entente which had weathered the First World War appeared

to now be at an end.

The policy of the United States toward Turkey also worked to

the advantage of the Kemalists. While Turkish historians are critical

of President Wilson's Fourteen Points which raised the problem of an

Armenian mandate, the fact that the Wilson principles also supported

an independent Turkey in Anatolia countered the policy of Great

Britain and France. Also, following the information made available

to the United States Government by the Harbord and the King-Crane

Commission reports, American policy took a more friendly turn toward

Turkey. At the same time, the fact that the United States soon turned

to a policy of isolation also benefitted the cause of the Kemalists.3®^

By the beginning of 1922 the Ankara Government was well estab­

lished and its major task was to drive the Greeks out of the country

30U por details of Turkish-American relations at this period see: Leland J. Gordon, American Relations with Turkey (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932), pp. 267-289; Tunaya, Partiler. pp. UU5-UU7; Cebesoy, MUcadele, pp. 175-176; Karal, T.C.T., 10$; William A. Helseth, Turkey and the United States 178IP19U5 (Foreign Service Institute, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 1957) (Paper submitted to the Foreign Service Institute and Princeton University); Esmer, op. cit., pp. 33-37; A}.i Naci Karacan, Lozan Konferansi ve Ismet Paga (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 19U3)> 237—2^1 (The Lausanne Conference and Ismet Pasha); Y. H. Bayur, "Kuvayi Milliye Devrinde At at Ur kiln Dif Siyasa ile igili Bazi GUrttf ve Davraniflari," Be lie ten, October 1956, 662-699 (Some Views and Actions of Atatttrk on Matters connected with Foreign Policy during the Deriod of the National Struggle). 1U5

and obtain a military victory:

We could not flatter ourselves that there was any hope of success in a diplomatic way until we had driven the enemy out of our territory by force of a r m s . 305

Despite this Kemal was always attempting to obtain a bloodless victory

if this could be done on the basis of the National Pact, and Yusuf

Kemal, the Kemalist Foreign Minister, spent most of his time in

London and Paris for this very reason. On March 27, 1922, the British

and French Governments proposed further modifications of the Treaty

of Sevres and an immediate armistice with the Greek evacuation of

Turkey following the p e a c e . 3°^ Kemal insisted on immediate Greek

evacuation which was rejected and the war continued with a new Greek offensive.3®^

The Turkish nationalists made a final drive against the Greeks in August 1922 along the entire front of the Sakarya River which resulted in the Turkish occupation of Izmir on September 9 and the complete evacuation of Greek soldiers from Anatolia by September 20.3°®

3^£ Kemal, Speech, p. 5U3«

306 Howard, op. cit., op. 266-267} and Davison, 00. cit., pp. 196-197. 307 Mustafa Kemal, Ismet, Ali Fuat, Fevzi, Karabekir, and Refet Pashas were all experienced officers who had proven their ability in the Balkan and first World War. For an official summary of the Turkish War for Independence prepared by the Turkish Chief of the General Staff see: Tttrkiye Istiklal Harbi Hulasasi (Ankara: Erkani Harbiye, 1937) (Summary of the Turkish War for Independence). For a discussion of the problems that faced Greece and the errors of its leaders see: Prince Andrew of Greece, Towards Disaster (London: John Murray, 1930); and A. A. Pallas, Greece's Anatolian Adventure and After (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1937T: 308 This has been related in many books available in English including: Howard, o£. cit.; Webster, o d . cit.; Edib, o£. cit.; and Orga, o£. cit. Ilj6

A Greek army still remained in Thrace and the Turks marched northward

to deal with them but the Allied Army of Occupation at the entrance

of the neutral zone at panakkale barred their way. However, dramati­

cally, in the nick of time, came word of an armistice which was signed

at Mudanya on October 11, 1922, by which Istanbul, the Straits, and

Eastern Thrace as far as the Maritsa River were to be handed over to

the Government of the Grand National Assembly.3®9

On October 27, 1922, invitations to a peace conference at

Lausanne were sent by the Allies to both the Government of the Grand

National Assembly and to the Government of the Sultan. This action

precipitated the end of the Sultanate which was abolished on November 1,

1922, and the supremacy of the Government of the Grand National Assembly.

The Lausanne Conference convened on November 21, 1922, to compose a

peace in pursuit of the Mudajya Armistice.

The Lausanne Conference and the Treaty which followed it were

proofs of the triumph of nationalist diplomacy and international

recognition of Nationalist policy aims.

The conference of Lausanne, which met from November 1922 to July 1923, was one of the most important diplomatic gatherings after the world war. It marked the definite triumph of Turkish nationalism under Mustapha Kemal, the disastrous defeat of Greece and the end of Hellenic dreams in Asia Minor, and signified a victory of French over British policy in the region of the Near East. The conference was to consider the eastern problem in all its ramifications, bring about peace in the Levant, and make a new regime of the Straits. The long struggle of the Turks for

309 For a text of this Armistice see: Oriente Moderno, 11:6 (November 15, 1922) 337-3U5} and Sir Charles Harrington, Tim Harrington Looks Back (London, 19iil), pp. 117-128. Hi7 national independence was one of the great epics of recent world history. That independence won on the battlefields of Asia Minor was to be completed by no less notable victories in diplomacy at Lausanne.310

Turkey's chief delegate was Ismet Pasha who had been appointed

Foreign Minister just three weeks before the conference opened.3H

Ismet had pled with Mustafa Kemal that he was no diplomat312 but in retrospect he proved extremely able, acquitted himself well, and his sense of timing on compromise brought many advantages to Turkey. The

Grand National Assembly had demanded complete equality and a diplo­ matic triumph and initially the outlook was not too bright since

Ismet "represented a victorious nation which the Allied delegates tried Ol *’? to treat like a defeated nation."-' ^ On territorial and political questions Ismet was often able to accept solutions and compromise, but in matters of economics and finance in which he had limited technical knowledge or competence he was forced to rely on the expert advice of

31° Howard, o£. cit., p. 277*

333- See Davison, 0£. cit., pp. 199-200 for a description of this appointment. Rauf Bey, President of the Council of Ministers, Yusuf Kemal and several others were thought to be the logical choice to head the delegation, but Rauf Bey and Kemal were at odds over domestic politics, and Kemal, according to Kandemir, Darginliklar II, 1*2, believed that a soldier who had done well in the war, could do well in diplomacy, and although Ismet Pasha did not know English and French well and was deaf, Mustafa Kemal favored him. The appointment of Ismet Pasha by Kemal without consulting Rauf Bey, increased the friction between Kemal and Rauf, and also between Rauf and Ismet. The details of the aopointment of the delegation to Lausanne by Mustafa Kemal is described in Darginliklar II, U0-U6 ,

312 Kandemir, Darginliklar II, U6 .

313 Davison, o£. cit., pp. 278-279. 1U8 others in his delegation including Dr. Riza Nur and Hasan Saka.

The questions before the Conference fell into three main cate- J gories: (l) territorial and political problems dealing with Thrace, the Aegean islands, and the region of the Straitsj^^ (2) the problem of minorities, one of the great difficulties of the Ottoman Govern- 0*1 ^ mentj and (3) the problem of the regime of capitulations which involved the judicial, financial, and economic organization of Turkey.

At the first plenary session on November 21, the conference organized, adopted rules of procedure, and prepared itself for the tasks which awaited it. The Russian Government and its allies were heard only in restricted discussions regarding the Straits, despite vigorous Russian protests.31® This limitation of Soviet participation was considered a victory for the British, and it also proved advan­ tageous to the Kemalists.

From the opening session Ismet Pasha began at once to demand for Turkey complete equality of treatment as an independent state and stood on the principles of the National Pact, much to the exasperation of the allied negotiators, especially Lord Curzon. Ismet used the differences among the Powers to Turkish advantage and also succeeded

31k Howard, o£. cit.. pp. 278-279.

31^ Ibid., op. 281-297.

316 Ibld*» PP* 301-301.

317 Ibid.. pp. 30k-313.

31® Ibid., p. 277 for a discussion of this protest. Ik9 in walking the dangerous path between Russia and the West by threaten­

ing each with the other. This was especially true of the decision

regarding the Turkish Straits where Ismet

. . . placed the new Turkey in an advantageous position between the West and Russia. Though the decision on the Straits is sometimes represented as Curzon's triumph in splitting Turkey from Russia, it was as much Ismet1s triumph in avoiding depen­ dence on R u s s i a . 319

By January 1923, essential agreement had been reached on most of the territorial problems except for Mosul, but on the partition of the

Ottoman debt, the demand for reparations from Greece, and the capitu­ lations, Ismet would not compromise and there was no agreement. On

January 31 a draft treaty including points on which agreement had been reached was presented by the Allies to Turkey but the clauses which included to Ismet1s mind, "servitudes" made approval impossible and the conference broke up on February k, 1923.3^° On March 6 , 1923, the Grand National Assembly voted the treaty drafted at Lausanne unacceptable because of its conflict with the National Pact but decided to make counter-proposals and reopen negotiations with the

Allied Powers in a note sent to the Allies on March 8 , 1923. 3 ^

319 Davison, op. cit., p. 203. See also Harold George Nicholson, Curzon (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 193k) Chapters 10 and 11 for a good interpretation of Lausanne as a Curzon triumph. 320 Howard, o£. cit., pp. 279-280 describes briefly the main issues which caused this break-up. In the Grand National Assembly at Ankara, according to Kandemir, Darginliklar. II 29, the deputies tried to blame the failure at Lausanne on Ismet1s lack of ability and failure to follow the Council of Ministers1 instructions. However, the argu­ ments ended as Mustafa Kemal supported Ismet and said that out of patriotism everyone must back the delegation. 321 Ministere des affaires etrangeres. Documents diplomatiques. Conference de Lausanne sur les affaires du proche-orient (1922-1923) Recueil des Actes de la Conference. Premiere serie. tomes I-IV, IV, 73-7k contains a text of the Note. i£o

The main problems before the second gathering were those of the capitulations, the Ottoman public debt and the question of economic concessions.^^ The conference closed on July 2k, 1923, with the signing of the final act which embodied virtually all of Turkey1s demands. ^3

Since the negotiations for the Treaty and its textJ32k u are readily available, they will not be discussed in detail, but the major provisions will be summarized:

1. The frontier with Greece was to be the river Maritsa, but Turkey would be given an enclave west of the river opposite Adrianople, containing a section of the Adrianople-Constantinople railway, by way of reparations from Greece.

2. The frontier with Iraq would be settled by subsequent discussions with Britain.

3 . The Greek and Turkish populations of Turkey and Greece respectively were to be exchanged, except for the Greeks of Constantinople and the Turks of Western Thrace.

k. Gallipoli was to be restored to Turkish sovereignty, but the Straits were to be demilitarized. Conditions for the passage of foreign warships in peace and war to be settled later.

5. The Capitulations were to be totally abolished,3^5

322 por a discussion of Ismet Pasha's difficulties in nego­ tiating on these matters and his conflicts with Rauf Bey in Ankara which were finally settled by the intervention of Mustafa Kemal, see: Darginliklar II, 50-6k, where Kandemir relates some of the details.

3^3 For these negotiations see Receuil (supra) I-IVj and British Foreign Office Archives, Cmd. I8llu 32U For a text of this treaty see: Hurewitz (ed.), o£. cit.; League of Nations Treaty Series, XXVIII (192k) (supra) llff; and Oriente Moderno. Ill (1923) W>l-i>5>0 (collated with the Turkish text). 3 ^ G. L. Lewis, 0£. cit., pp. 73-7k. l$l Thus Turkey won the last campaign of the War for Independence.

Some of the members of the Grand National Assembly were not satisfied

with the treaty, but on August 23, 1923, 213 of the 227 deputies voted

for ratification, the Allied High Commissioners were notified, and the

evacuation of British troops from Istanbul was completed on October 2,

1923. This Turkish diplomatic triumph has been commented on by many

Turkish and western scholars including the two following analyses:

Turkish diplomacy rested, of oourse, on the military successes which allowed bargaining from a position of comparative strength. It made good use of the collapse of Allied solidarity after 1918 and of the antagonism between Russia and the West. But it could not have been successful without the severe limitation of terri­ torial objectives, laid down in the National Pact and not in­ creased thereafter. . . . These limited objectives were relent­ lessly pursued in the years 1919 to 1923 by comparatively able and stubborn men like Bekir Sami, Yusuf Kemal, and Ismet. Behind them stood Mustafa Kemal, who throughout the entire period kept in his own hands the control over major diplomatic appoint­ ments, the ultimate and sometimes immediate direction of all diplomatic negotiations, and the authority to make the results acceptable to the nationalists and the Grand National Assembly."

The Ottoman Empire had ceased to be. But a new nation state of Turkey had arisen in Anatolia under the guiding hand of Mustapha Kemal who directed its destinies along the path of modernization. The country was free from the entire system of hated capitulations, liberated from antiquated financial aid and economic bondage, and ready to begin life anew in a revived and independent spirit. After ten years of struggle, the long Odyssey was ended— Turkey had won her war for independence. '

Turkey emerged from Lausanne as a nation whose national aspirations generally speaking, had been satisfied. This allowed Turkey to concen­ trate on domestic problems.

326 Davison, o£. cit., p. 209.

327 Howard, o£. cit., p. 3llu CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

An examination of the sources pertaining to the period of the

establishment of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, reveals the

predominant role of Mustafa Kemal Atattlrk as the moving spirit of the

Turkish Revolution. Despite the coming to light of new information

based on the memoirs of other Turkish nationalist leaders, and an

analysis by Turkish constitutional historians of the Minutes of the

Grand National Assembly, the above conclusion is not materially

affected.

However, the student of Turkish history is indebted to these

new revisionist Turkish writers, who with the perspective of time and

the availability of materials hitherto unpublished, have shown that the role of the other Turkish leaders during this period also had its effect on the direction of events.

It is apparent that men such as Ismet Pasha and Fevzi Chakmak, supported AtatUrk from the early period until the consolidation of the Republic. On the other hand, even those leaders, liberals and conservatives who opposed Atatttrk, admired and respected him, but disagreed with his sometimes authoritarian methods. Despite a number of highly partisan books and articles, which stress the disagreements and rivalries in a highly dramatic and discrediting fashion as far as

Mustafa Kemal is concerned, in this writer's view, these works do not present enough substantial evidence to counter the more conservative, 153 reliable, and scholarly works of reputable historians such as Karal,

Tunaya, §>apolyo, Biyiklioglu, and such writers as Edib, Yalman and

Cebesoy, who once opposed Mustafa Kemal.

Rauf Bey no doubt played a more important role during this

period than has hitherto been revealed. It is unfortunate that this

great Turkish liberal leader has not seen fit to publish his memoirs.

Another of the great liberal leaders, Ali Fuat Cebesoy1s memoirs are

revealing in their historic contents and remarkable objectivity. The writings of Karabekir, the conservative leader, unfortunately are more

acrimonious. These three great leaders opposed AtatUrk primarily because of their reluctance to break with the past and their suspicion

and fear that AtattJrk was maneuvering himself into a position of personal leadership which might later become tyrannical. The personal quarrels, animosities, and misunderstandings among the early nationalist leaders while of secondary importance, are more significant in Turkey than they would be in the Western World, because the absence of long- established stabilizing institutions in the Turkey of 1919 to 1923 emphasized the nation's sensitivity to the ups and downs of personal power.

Another conclusion, namely that the Turkey of 1919 tb 1923 built on Muslim institutions and traditions inherited from the Ottoman

Empire, (although these institutions were in a period of decline and of little official power) was only superficially influenced by western ideas in the sociological and religious fields. Although this conclu­ sion is not clearly apparent in the writings consulted, it arises from 15U

the sociological background of Turkey during this period. The popu­

lation mostly rural and illiterate were attached to their traditions;

the Turkish middle class was small and new; but there was a sufficient

core of government personnel, professional people, and army officers

to lead a revolution inspired, by national heroes who had already

proven themselves in the Balkan and First World Wars.

The Turkish Revolution was channeled first through the Defense

of Rights Organization which arose throughout the country at the beginning of the period. The genius of Atattirk transformed these dis­ organized and spontaneous national resistance groups into a remarkable institution so well described by Professor Tunaya in his monograph on the Government of the Grand National Assembly, This Government in

Ankara not only had to devise methods of dealing with the oolitical groupings in Anatolia aid to conduct a war against foreign invasion, but also had to deal skillfully with the problems arising from the existence of a Government in Istanbul, until the realization of the ultimate aim held by the majority of the nationalists, namely the establishment of a Republic in 1923. <•-

The success of the Turkish military forces during the War for

Independence was due to the Turkish military tradition, and the experienced and able Turkish military leadership, but it was also due to the long Turkish experience in diplomacy dating from the Ottoman

Empire, and to favorable external circumstances. Kemalist diplomatic negotiations during the course of the War for Independence aimed at splitting Turkey's enemies by dealing with each individually and 155 exploiting existing rivalries or creating additional ones. This policy resulted in the virtual isolation of England from her former allies, as far as her Turkish policy was concerned, by the time of the

Mudanya Armistice which greatly strengthened the Turkish position.

A series of external events and developments also favored the

Kemalists. Greek Government mistakes in policy and planning helped to neutralize some of the Greek superiority in numbers and equipment.

Great Power war-weariness and rivalries which developed between the

British, French and Italians, gave the skillful Kemalist an opportunity to drive a diplomatic wedge and thus exploit the situation. American-

Turkish relations also favored the Kemalists since the United State

Senate's lack of supnort for President Wilson's Fourteen Points and prooosals for an American mandate over parts of the former Ottoman

Empire, prevented the creation of an Armenia under American mandate.

Moreover, Admiral Bristol, the American High Commissioner for Turkey, from the very beginning was generally friendly toward the Kemalist cause and the United States did not support the British and French policy of opposing the Kemalist movement. The Bolshevik Revolution which weakened Russia was another external event favoring the Kemalist cause. The new Soviet Russian Government followed a friendly policy toward the Kemalists. Although the Soviets may have had ulterior motives in adopting this new policy toward Turkey, and despite the fact that the total material aid that the Soviets made available to the Kemalists might not have been substantial, the fact that the

Soviet Union supported the Kemalists in the early critical stages of 156

the War for Independence benefited the Turkish Kemalist cause. Turkish

historians, while stressing the ulterior motives of the Soviets and

the fact that the aid involved was small, admit that Soviet diplomatic

support at this time was crucial. Had the Soviets sided with the

Allies and the Greeks, the Kemalists would have found themselves

threatened on two major fronts.

The basis of Kemalist diplomacy and probably the most signifi­

cant concept that developed in those formative years of the new Turkey was the ideal of national sovereignty as crystallized in the National

Pact of 1920. The philosophy of the National Pact rejected foreign controls, instilled a new spirit in the thinking of the people, and gave direction to Kemalist foreign policy which has basically con­ tinued to this day. Despite the occupation of Turkish territory by the Western Great Powers and their Greek ally, Turkey's fundamental nationalist ideals inspired by the French Revolution, developed by the Young Turks, and formulated by the Great Turkish sociologist Ziya

Gdkalp in his concept of Turkism, rejected Soviet Russia's Communist ideology, even from the earliest days. The institutions and national philosophy developed by Atatttrk and his followers during the period following the establishment of the Republic have launched modern

Turkey toward developing a parliamentary Republic in which popular government and democratic processes, despite the vicissitudes of day by day politics and the ups and downs of political and economic developments, is leading toward a stable and democratic nation. BIBLIOGRAPHY CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

The principal bibliographies and guides to Turkish history and the Kemalist period include several publications in Turkish and other languages. Among these the most useful is Herbert Melzig's Atatllrk

Bibliografyasi (Ankara: Zerbamat Basimevi, 19Ul) which includes

German and French translations and comments. John Kingsley Birge,

A Guide to Turkish Area Study (Washington: American Council of

Learned Societies, 19b9) is useful but includes mainly works in non-

Turkish languages. Enver Koray, Tttrkiye Tarih Y ayi.nlari Bibliografyasi

(Ankara: Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1952) is a most useful bibliography of Turkish historical works. Also of value is M. T. Acaroglu, "TUrk

Tarihinin Bibliografya Kaynaklari," Belleten, April 195U which is a study dealing with the bibliographical sources of Turkish history.

A most important recent contribution on the bibliography of AtatUrk and his period is M. Orhan Durusoy and M. Muzaffer GBkman, (eds.),

Atatttrk ve Devrimleri Bibliografyasi (Ankara: Tttrk Tarih Kurumu

Basimevi, 1957).

A survey of materials on the Turkish Nationalist Movement and the period of the Government of the Grand National Assembly (1919-

1923) will indicate that information for this period of Turkish history is surprisingly sparse in Western sources. While there is some infor­ mation on the diplomatic history, non-Turkish sources are inadequate as far as internal problems and constitutional history are concerned.

By going through a large numbers of books dealing with Turkey and

Atatflrk, one can gather some information on this early period (see selected bibliography). However, most of this information is super­ ficial and undocumented. The main primary source available in several

European languages, including English, is Professor Hans Kohn's trans­ lation of Atatttrk's Speech in the Grand National Assembly made in 1927.

This is an important source since in trying to justify his actions to the Turkish people and answer his critics, AtatUrk presents important documents since 1919. Another source of some importance is the memoirs of European and American statesmen and diplomats such as Lloyd George,

Clemenceau, Woodrow Wilson, Ambassador Sherrill and Ambassador Grew.

Other sources include such reports as the Harbord Report, and the the Report of the King-Crane Commission. H. C. Armstrong's Grey-Wolf, although a well-written and well-known book, is sensational and not documented. On the other hand, Count Leon Ostrorog, The Angora

Reform is quite useful, especially as it is one of the few books that discuss internal problems and is good for the legal reforms. Among the writers who were found especially useful in different aspects of

Kemalist history one can list Arnold J. Toynbee, Bernard Lewis,

G. L. Lewis, Jean Deny, Gotthard Jftschke, Harry N. Howard, Roderic H.

Davison, Lewis V. Thomas, Donald E. Webster, D. A, Rustow and Howard

Reed.

There are also several Turkish writers who have written in

English on some aspects of Kemalist history which are worth noting.

The works of Halide Edib (Adivar), Ahmet Emin (Yalman) and especially the recent contribution of Irfan Orga Phoenix Ascendant (London:

Robert Hale, 1958) were all found very useful. While materials on the War of Independence itself and the period of reforms after the establishment of the Republic were quite

adequately treated by Turkish historians, little appeared on the internal problems and the period of the Government of the Grand National

Assembly until recently. Since about 1950 several important works have appeared in Turkish based on documentary sources. Not only have

Turkish historians analyzed the Proceedings of Grand National Assembly and written monographs based on these records, but hitherto inaccesible archival materials have been exploited, and participants in the Kemalist revolution have published their memoirs. The main Turkish sources for the history of this period, however, is still the Nutuk, Atatttrk's speech in the Grand National Assembly, and its supporting documents known as the Nutuk Muhteviyatina dair vesaik (Documents pertaining to the contents of the speech of Gazi Mustafa Kemal). Other documents compiled by Herbert Melzig pertaining to the Kemalist period, which has a brief introduction in English is Atatttrk Dedi Ki (Ankara: Stimer

Matbaasi, 19U2) (Thus Spoke Atatttrk). In addition to the Resmi

Gazete (Official Gazette), the T.B.M.K. Zabit Ceridesi (The Proceed­ ings of the Turkish Grand National Assembly) are the main documentary sources for a study of the history of this period.

For the constitutional aspects of Turkish history A. §>. G8ztibtiyt!k and Suna Kili, Tiirk Anayasa Metinleri (Ankara: Ajans-Tflrk Matbaasi,

1957) (Turkish constitutions with commentary) and Ali Fuat Bajgil,

Ttlrkiye Siyasi Re.jimi ve Anayasa Prensipleri (Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi,

1957) (The Political Regime and Constitutional Principles of Turkey) l6l

should be consulted.

A number of registers and albums and who1s who type of publica­

tions exist which are also considered useful sources. These include

T.B.M.K. Isim Defteri (Ankara, 19U3 edition) (Register of Names of

the deputies in the Turkish GNA, includes information on the early

period), T.B.M.M. nin 25 inci YildBnttmtt Ani^ AlbUmtt (Ankara, April 23,

191:5) (Album commemorating the 25th anniversary of the establishment

of the Turkish Grand National Assembly), and I. A. GBvsa, Tttrk

Meghurlari Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul: Yedi GUn Nejriyati, 19U6) (Ency­

clopaedia of Famous Turks).

Among the more important recent publications are the contri­ butions of Dr. Tarik Z. Tunaya, who has published works based on archival and documentary materials with special emphasis on the period under study in this paper. His Tttrkiyede Sjyasi Partiler, (Istanbul,

1952) (Political Parties in Turkey) is a major contribution. He has included in this comprehensive study, in addition to texts of documents, analytical essays setting the tone of each period. One of the items which this student found most valuable for the understanding of the early revolutionary period is Tunaya1s monograph entitled Osmanli

Imparatorlugundan Tflrkiye BUyflk Millet Meclisi Httkflmeti Rejimirie Gegig

(Istanbul: I. Akgun Matbaasi, 1956, a 22-page study based on the proceedings of the Grand National Assembly and archival materials dealing with the Transition of the Ottoman Empire to the Regime of the

Government of the Grand National Assembly) which covers the period

1918-1920. 162-

Another invaluable monograph of 21 pages is Tttrkiye Bttyttk Millet

Heclisi Httkttmeti1nin Kurulugu ve Siyasi Karakteri (Istanbul: Istanbul

Universitesi, 1958) (The Establishment of the Government of the Turkish

Grand National Assembly and Its Political Character).

Among other pertinent sources for the history of the Kemalist

Revolution the following works are considered useful. Enver Ziya Karal,

Tttrkiye Cumhuri.yet Tarihi (1918-1955) (Istanbul: Maarif Basimevi, 1957)

(History of the Turkish Republic); Nafis S. Tansu, Tttrk Inkilap Tarihi

(Istanbul: Ikbal Kitabevi, 1938) (History of the Turkish Revolution);

Col. Kehmet Arif, Anadolu Inkilabi (Istanbul: Ikdam Matbaasi, 192)4)

(The Anatolian Revolution); Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Tttrk Inkilap Tarihi

(Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 19UO-19U3), especially vols. I-II (History of the Turkish Revolution); Tevfik Biyiklioglu, Trakyada Killi Mticadele

(Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, Vol. I, 1955, Vol. II, 1956)

(The National Struggle in Thrace, second volume consists of documents);

Enver Behnan £apolyo, Kemal Atatttrk ve M i H i Mttcadele Tarihi (Ankara:

Berkalp Kitabevi, 19UU) (Kemal Atatttrk and the History of the National

Struggle); and other works of §5apolyo including Kuvayi Milliye Tarihi -

Gerilla (Ankara: Ayyildiz Matbaasi, 1957) (History of the Nationalist

Forces - Guerrillas). In addition to local histories dealing with the

Revolutionary period in the various provinces such as the works of

Nurettin Peker, Istiklal Savagi resim ve Vesikalarla (Istanbul: Gttn

Basimevi, 1955) (which deals with the War of Independence 1918-1923 in the Black Sea and northern provinces, and includes important texts of documents and photographs), there are a number of works on the activities of Mustafa Kemal, Celal Bayar, Ismet Inttntt and other Turkish

leaders by such writers as Cemal Kutay, Peyami Safa, Kandemir, Ziya

$akir and others which are worth noting. Especially important for

internal problems and domestic history are recent publications of the

Sel Yayinlari and the Ekicigil Yayinlari which have published the memoirs and impressions of a number of important leaders and partici­ pants of the early Kemalist period. Among these writers are such famous political leaders as Kilip Ali, journalists such as Falih P.ifki

Atey and Yunus Nadi (Abalioglu) and others. Perhaps one of the most important recent contributions to the history of this early period is the works of first Kemalist Ambassador to Moscow, General Ali Fuat

Cebesoy, which is considered an important source not only for domestic but also for diplomatic history of the early Kemalist period. This is a three volume work. Milli Mttcadele Hatiralari (Istanbul: Vatan

Me^riyati, 1953) (Memoirs of the National Struggle), Moskova Hatiralari

(1920-1922) (Istanbul: Vatan Nejriyati, 1955) (Moscow Memoirs) and

General Ali Fuat Cebesoyun Siyasi Hatiralari (Istanbul: Vatan Nejriyati,

1957) (The Political Memoirs of General Ali Fuat Cebesoy) are essential items in the library of every student of Turkish history. The works of Dr. Afetinan, the Turkish historian and personal friend of Atatttrk are also significant for the study of both the political developments of this period and the personality and ideas of Atatttrk. An example of this type of study is Afetninan's Atatflrkten Hatiralar (Ankara:

Tttrk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1950) (Memories from Atatttrk).

In diplomatic history, Western sources are as good or in some cases better than Turkish sources, but in order to get the Turkish viewpoint it is essential to consult Turkish histories. Among these

are the following works that deal in part with the history of the

Kemalist period. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Tttrkiye Devletinin Dig Siyasi

(Istanbul: A. Sait Matbaasi, 19U2) (The Foreign Policy of the Turkish

State); Ahmet §ttkrtt Esmer, Siyasi Tarih (Ankara: Gttney Matbaasi, 1953)

(Diplomatic History); Cavid Oral, Akdeniz Meselesi (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet

Matbaasi, 19U5) 2 vols. (The Mediterranean Problem); Cemil Bilsel,

Tttrk Bogazlari (Istanbul: Hak Kitabevi, 19U8) (The Turkish Straits);

Rifki Salim Burgak, Tttrk-Russ-Ingiliz Httnasebetleri 1791-19i|l (Istanbul:

Aydinlik Matbaasi, 19U6 (Turkish-Russian-British Relations 1791-19^1);

Akdes Nimet Kurat, Tttrk-Ingiliz Mttnasebetlerine Kisa Bir Bakig (1553-

1952) (Ankara: Tttrk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1952) (A Short Survey of

Turco-British relations), and the various works dealing with the

Lausanne Conference listed in the selected bibliographical list are useful for diplomatic history of the Kemalist period. Another type of source is the memoirs of Turkish diplomats, a good example being the four volume work of Ghalib Kemaly SBylemezoglu, Hariciye Hizmetinde

30 Sene (1892-1922) (Istanbul: T>arif Basimevi, 1955), especially volume 1+. Other works of this type are the memoirs and writings of

Tevfik Karasapan, Rttsen Egref ttnaydin, and Cevat Ayikalin to mention a few.

While the above mentioned sources are adequate for a general survey of Kemalist history, students of Turkish history and specialists in this field are waiting anxiously for the further publication of new materials on the origins of the Kemalist movement and the early days

of the nationalist struggle for independence. The Institute of the

Turkish Revolution at Ankara has a journal and publishes the findings

of Turkish scholars which thus become available to students of Turkish

history abroad who know Turkish. In addition to this Tttrk Inkilap

Tarihi Enstitttstt Argivi Btilteni, the important articles which appear

in Turkish journals such as the Tarih Vesikalari and Belleten are most useful for this period of Turkish history. The files of Turkish newspapers, especially Hakimiyet-i Hilliye and Milliyet are also important sources since they contain editorials, articles, announce­ ments and laws. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

MATERIALS IK TURKISH

Primary Sources

Atattlrktln SBylev ve Demegleri 1919-1938. (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 19L57 I-III. Ttirk Inkilap Tarihi Enstittlstl Yayinlari No. 1) (The Speeches and Addresses of Atattirk 1919-1938. Published by the Institute for the History of the Turkish Revolution, publica­ tion No. 1).

Egilmez, Cafer Tayyar. I. Kolordu Komutani, Mi.Hi Komutan, General. Istanbul Htlkumeti ve Mustafa Kemal Paga ile yapilan muhaberelere ait bagka yerde jikmamig vesikalar, fotograflar, ve hatiralar. (T. Biyiklioglu, Trakyada Milli Mtlcadele, II. Ankara, 1956). General Egilimez, Commander of the First Army Corps. Documents, photographs, memoirs. Includes hitherto unpublished correspondence between Atattirk and the Royal Ottoman Government in Istanbul).

Erkani Harbiye-i Umumiye, Harp Tarihi Dairesi Argivi. (Turkish Chief of the General Staff, War Department History Archives).

Harb Tarihi Vesikalari Dergisi. (Ankara: Erkani Harbiye Umumiye Reisligi, Harp Tarihi Dairesi). (Quarterly Journal of the Turkish Chief of Staff, War Department Historical Section in which his­ torical documents are published since September 1952).

Ilk Ttirk Iktisadi Kongresi Zabitlari (Izmir: Anadolu Matbaasi, 1923) (Minutes of the first Turkish Economic Congress),

InBntl, Ismet. Ismet Paganin Siyasi ve Igtimai Nutuklari. (Ankara: Bagvekalet Matbaasi, 19337* (The Political and Social Speeches of the second President of Turkey, Ismet InBntl).

Kemal, Gazi Mustafa. Mustafa Kemalin Mtltareke Defteri. (Istanbul: Sel Yayinlari No. 11, Hisar Matbaasi, 195^). Note-book of Mustafa Kemal Atattirk during the Armistice Period 1918).

______. Nutuk. (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaasi, 1938). (Atattirk*s Speech in the Grand National Assembly, October 15-20, 1927). There is a new edition in 2 volumes published by the Ttirk Devrim Tarihi Enstittisii, Istanbul 1950-1952. There is an English translation by Hans Kohn.

______. Nutuk Kuhteviyatina dair vesaik. (Ankara, 1927) (Documents pertaining to the contents of the Ghazi's Speech). 167 Lozan Konferansi TUrk Murahhas Heyetine Vekiller Heyeti Tarafindan Verilen Talimat. Faik Regid Unat Dosyasi. (Instructions to the Turkish Mission to the Lausanne Conference sent by the Chamber of

Deouties. The Faik Reshid Unat file. In Biyiklioglu. II, d o . 10U-105).

Melzig, Herbert. At at Ur k Dedi Ki. (Ankara: Sttmer Matbaasi, 19h2) (Thus Spoke Ataturk). Consists of speeches and documents.

Mutareke Yillarindan Vesikalar. Toplayan: Namik Ambarcioglu. (Istanbul: Vakit Basimevi, 19lt6). (Documents pertaining to the Armistice Period of 1918 compiled and edited by Namik Ambarcioglu).

Resmi Gazete. Ankara. (Official Gazette).

§ahingiray, Ozel, ed. Celal Bayarinin Stiylev ve Demegleri 1921-1938, ekonomik konulara dair. (Ankara: Dogug Ltd., 1955). (Speeches and Addresses of the third President of Turkey on economic subjects made during 1921-1938).

§ahingiray, Ozel. Celal Bayarin T.B.M. Meclisinde Yaptigi Kanun Tekliflerinin Esbabi Mucibeleri, 1920-1937. (Ankara: Dogug MatbaaHT-!^^!^ (Bills presented to the Grand National Assembly by Celal Bayar during 1920-1937).

Ttirk Inkilap Tarihi Enstittisti Argivi. (Archives of the Institute of the History of the Revolution. Documents appear in the Bulletin of the Institute).

Ttirkiye Btiytik Millet Meclisi Albtim. (Ankara: T.B.H.M. Matbaasi). (Handbook containing information about the Grand National Assembly, deputies, statistical data, one volume per parliamentary session).

Ttirkiye Btiytik Millet Meclisi Isim Defteri. Devre I-IV, Ankara, 19h3; Dtinem VII-VIII & Devre IX, Ankara, 19U6, 1950, 1955. (Name Registers, Grand National Assembly).

Ttirkiye Btiytik Millet -Meclisinde Kabul Edilen Tegkilati Esasiye ve Sair Kanunlar. (Istanbul: Tasnif Eden H, K. 192li) (The Turkish Constitution and Other Laws passed by the Grand National Assembly).

Ttirkiye Btiytik Millet Meclisi, Kavanin Mecmuasi. Ankara. (Journal of laws and decrees of the Grand National Assembly).

Ttirkiye Btiytik Millet Meclisi Zabit Ceridesi. (Ankara: Btiytik Millet Meclisi Matbaasi, Haziran 23, 1920 -V) (Minutes and Official Proceedings of the Grand National Assembly). Also known as T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi.

Ttirkiye Btiytik Millet Meclisi. Yillik. (Annual of the Grand National Assembly. One volume per parliimentary session). 168

Ttirkiye Btiytik Millet Meclisi. Yirmibeginci Yil DBntimflnti Anig. (Ankara: T.B.M.M. Matbaasi, 19U5). (25th Anniversary of the Founding of the Grand National Assembly, Celebration Publication).

Ttirkiye Istiklal Harbi Hulasasi, 1919-1922. (Ankara: Erkani Harbiye Umumiye Reisligi, 1937). (Summary of the Turkish War of Indepen­ dence prepared by the Turkish Chief of the General Staff, for the second Historical Congress).

Ttirk Tarih Kongresi. Birinci Ttirk Tarih Kongresi Konferanslar ve Ktizakere Zabitlaril (Istanbul: Matbaacilik ve Negriyat T.A.§., 1932). (Proceedings of the First Turkish Historical Conference held in 1932, and every five years: 1932, 1937, 19^2, 19U7, 1952, 1957). Ttirk Tarihin Ana Hatlari. (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaasi, 1931) (Basic Lines of Turkish History prepared by a Turkish Historical Com­ mission setting the new policy for an interpretation of history).

Secondary Sources

Books

Abalioglu, Yunus Nadi. Ankaranin Ilk Gtinleri. (Istanbul: Sel Yayin­ lari No. U, Hisar Matbaasi, 1955) (Early Days of Ankara.) Deals with Kemalists in 1920-21.

______. gerkes Ethem Kuwetlerinin Ihaneti. (Istanbul: Sel Yayin­ lari No. 167 Hisar Matbaasi, 1955) (The Treason of the Cherkes Ethem Forces).

______. Mustafa Kemal Paga Samsunda. (Istanbul: Sel Yayinlari No. 7, Hisar Matbaasi, 1955) (Mustafa Kemal Pasha at Samsun).

ApiksBzcti, Httsntt. Istiklal Harbinde Kastamonu. (Kastamonu: Kastamonu Matbaasi, 1933). (Kastamonu during the War for Independence).

Adem, Halil. Mustafa Kemallerin Kitabi. (Istanbul: Mahmut Bey Matbaasi, 1925). (The Book”of the Mustafa Kemals).

Adivar, Halide Edib (compiler). Doktor Abdtilhak Adnan Adivar. (Istanbul: Ahmet Halit Yagaroglu, 1956). (Life and works of a great Turkish intellectual by his wife a writer in her own right).

Adivar, Abdtilhak Adnan & Halide Edib. Ttirkiyede §ark, Garp ve Amerika Tesirleri. (Istanbul: Dogan Kardeg Yayinlari A. p. Basimevi, 1955). (Eastern, Western, and American Influences in Turkey). 169

Afetinan (Afet Inan). Atatflrkten Hatlralar. (Ankara: Ttirk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 195>0). (Memories from Atattirk by his close friend historian Professor Dr. Afetinan, Turkey's outstanding woman historian.)

______, Gazi M. Kemal Atattirk ve Ttirk Tarih Kurumu. (Ankara: T.T.K. Basimevi, 1953) (Ghazi M. Kemal Atattirk and the Turkish Historical Society).

______. Kemal Atattlrktl Anar ken. (Ankara: Gtizel Sanatlar Matbaasi, 19^6). (While remembering Atattirk).

Agaoglu, Ahmet. Serbest Firka Hatiralari. (Istanbul: Nebioglu Yayinlari No. 10, 1 95 o). (Memoirs of the Free Party of the Republic). This is the memoirs of Ahmet Agaoglu, one of the principal leaders of the above mentioned party, published by his son Samet Agaoglu.

Agaoglu, Samet. Kuwayi Milliye Ruhu. (Istanbul: Nebioglu Yayinevi, 19U5). (The Soul of the Nationalist Forces).

Altinay, Ahmet Refik. Ttirk Istiklal Harbi. (Istanbul: Hilmi Ktlttlpha- nesi, 1929). (History of the Turkish War for Independence).

Aras, Tevfik Rtlpttl. G8rtl$lerim. (Istanbul: Tan Basimevi, 191:5). ("My Views" by a former Kemalist Foreign Minister).

Arif, Col. Mehmet. Anadolu Inkilabi - Mtlcahedat Hatiralari. (Istanbul: Ikdam Matbaasi, 192h). (The Anatolian Revolution— memoirs of the struggle for independence).

Arisan, Abdullah Galip. Birinci Ttirkiye Btiytik Millet Meclisinde Bugtlnktl Beyaz Ihtilalciler 1916-1920. (Ankara: Dirlik Basim Yayinlari, 1955TT (The White Revolutionaries of today in the First Turkish Grand National Assembly 1918-1920).

A^kun, Vehbi Cem. Sivas Kongresi. (Sivas: Kamil Matbaasi, 19U5). (The Congress of Sivas -1919)•

Atattirk, Gazi Mustafa Kemal, Ttirkiye Reisicumhuru: Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihalu (Ankara: Ttirk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 195^6)"! (Conversations with Atattirk, President of Turkey ana his officers. Preface by Ambassador Rtl^en Ejref Unaydin, a Turkish literary figure in his own right).

At ay, Falih Rifki. Atattfrkttn B ana Anlattiklari. (Istanbul: Sel Yayinlari No. 6 , Hissr Matbaasi, 1955) • (What Atattirk related to me. By a well-known Turkish journalist). 170

Banoglu, Niyazi Ahmet. Ismet InUntt. (Istanbul: Vakit Matbaasi, 19U3). (InBntt, a short study).

. Maregal Fevzi gakmak. (Istanbul: Vakit Matbaasi, 19^3)• (Marshal Chakmak, a short study).

Baggil, Ali Fuad. TUrkiye Siyasi Rejimi ve /.nay as a Presipleri. (Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi, 19571". (The Turkish Political Regime and Its Constitutional Principles).

Bayar, Celal. Atattfrkttn Hatiralari. (Istanbul: Sel Yayinlari No. 1, Hisar Matbaasi, 1955). (Memoirs of Atattirk by President Bayar, third President of Turkey).

Baykal, Kazim. Atatttrkttn Hayati. Memleket ve Millete Yaptigi En Bttyttk Hizmetieri. (Diyarbakir: Diyarbakir Matbaasi, n.d.). (The Life of Atattirk, and his great services to his country and his nation).

Baysal, Mediha Muzaffer. Inkilabin Ruhu. (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaasi, 1933)• (The Spirit of the Revolution).

Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet. Son Yirmibeg Yillik Tarihimize Bakiglar. (Istanbul: Devlet Basimevi, 1938). (A look at the last twenty- five years of our history).

______. TUrkiye Devletinin Dig Siyasasi. (Istanbul: A. Sait Matbaasi, 19b2 (The Foreign Policy of the Turkish State).

_____ . Tttrk Inkilabi Tarihi. (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 19h0- 19143) • (History of the Turkish Revolution. Vol. I-II (part 1-2), Vol. Ill, Ankara: TUrk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1955 part 1, 1956 part 2).

______. Yeni TUrkiye Devletinin Harici Siyaseti. (Istanbul: Bttrhanettin Matbaasi, 1935). (The Foreign Policy of the New Turkish State).

Bilsel, Cemil. Tttrk Bogazlari. (Istanbul: Hale Kitabevi, 19^8). (The Turkish Straits).

Birinci Bttyttk Millet Meclisinin Agilmasi ve Isyanlar. (Istanbul: Sel Yayinlari No. 10, Hisar Matbaasi, 19557. (Opening of the First Grand National Assembly and the Rebellions).

Biyiklioglu, Tevfik. Trakyada Milli MUcadele. (Ankara: TUrk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, Vol. I, 1955, Vol. II, 1956). (The National Struggle in Thrace.) By vice-president of the Turkish Historical Society. Second volume consists of documents. 171

Bozkurt,iiahmut Esat. At a tttrk Ihtilali. (Istanbul: Bttrhanettin Matbaasi, 19U0). (The Atattirk Revolution).

Burgak, Rifki Salim. Ttirk-Russ-Ingiliz Mtinasibetleri 1791-19hl. (Istanbul: Aydinlik Matbaasi, 19H&)T (Turkish-Russian-British Relations 1791-19U1)• Cebesoy, General Ali Fuat. Milli Mticadele Hatiralari. (Istanbul: Vatan Negriyati, 1953). (Memoirs of the National Struggle by Ali Fuat Pasha, Turkish General and First Kemalist Ambassador to Moscow in 1920).

. Moskova Hatiralari. (Istanbul: Vatan Negriyati, 1955). (Moscow Memoirs).

______. Gl. Ali Fuat Cebesoyun Siyasi Hatiralari (Istanbul: Vatan Negriyati, 1957). (The Political Memoirs of General Ali Fuat Cebesoy).

Caferoglu, Ahmet. Ttirk Dili Tarihi Notlari. (Istanbul: Burhanettin Basimevi, 19h7)T (Notes on the History of the Turkish Language).

Jaliglar, General Izzettin. Istiklal Harbi Hatirati. (Istanbul: Ktittiphanesi, 1932). (Memoirs of the War for Independence). fapan, Ktintir Sttleyman (compiler). Atatttrkttn ttlmez sttzleri. (Istanbul: £igir Kitabevi, 1938). (The Immortal Words of Atattirk).

^avdarli, Riza. Rus Pronagandasi ve Ttirkiye Kominform Veletleri. (Istanbul: Gttven Basimevi., n.d.)^ (Russian Propaganda and the Upstarts of the Turkish Cominform)•

Demiray, Tahsin. TUrkiyede Son 50 Yillik Ig Politika. Gizli Cemiyetler, Komiteler ve Par tiler. (Istanbul: Ttirkiye Basimevi., 1955). (ihe domestic policy of Turkey during the last 50 years. Secret societies, committees and parties). Written by the head of the small Peasant Party of Turkey and editor of a Turkish Yearbook.

Demirkaya, Nafi. Atattirk ve Inflnti Bagkanliklarinda Cumhuriyet Yillari (Ankara: Stimer Matbaasi, 1972)^ (The Years of the Republic under the leadership of Atattirk and Inflnti).

Dursunoglu, Cevat. Milli Httcadelede Erzurum. (Ankara: T. C. Ziraat Bankasi Basimevi, 19^671 (Erzurum in the National Struggle).

Duru, Zahide. Ebedi §ef Atattirk. (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 19U5)• (The Eternal Chief Atattirk).

__ . Milli gef Inflnti. (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 19^5). (The National Chief Inflnti). 172

Edip, Egref, ed., Milli Savag Tarihinden bir sahife. (Istanbul: gttkrtt pelikalay - narrator. Istanbul: Sinan Matbaasi, 1950). (A Page from the History of the National War).

Efe, Cemal. Istiklal Savaginda Adanalilarin Kahramanlik Destanlari. (Istanbul: BUrhaneddin Matbaasi, 1937). "(The Heroic Achieve­ ments of the People of Adana during the War for Independence).

Elgin, E. T. Tttrk Inkilabi Yahut gark ve Garp. (Istanbul: Nttmune Matbaasi, 19bo)( (The Turkish Revolution or the Eastern and Western Question).

Emre, Ahmet Cevat. Atatttrkttn Inkilap Hedefi ve Tarih Tezi. (Istan­ bul: Ekin Basimevi, 1956) (The Aim of Atattirk's Reforms and His Thesis of History).

Ener, Suat. Istiklal Harbinin Ana Hatlari. (Ankara: Harbokulu Matbaasi, 1937). (The Basic Lines of the War for Independence).

Engin, Arin (Saffet Engin). Atattirkgttltikte Pi 1 ve Din. (Istanbul: Ozytirek Basimevi, 1955). (Ataturkrs policies on language and religion. By a Turkist whose name was formerly Saffet Engin).

Engin, Arin. Atattirkgtilttk ve Moskofluk-Ttlrkltik Savaglari. (Istan­ bul: Siralar Basimevi, 1955)7 (Atattirkism and Moscovite- Turkish Wars).

Engin, Mehmet Saffet (Arin Engin). Kemalizm Inkilabinin Prensioleri. (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 1939). (The Principles of the Kemalist Heformation).

Engin, Mehmet Saffet. Ttirkiyede Demokrasi Inkilabi. (Istanbul: Felsefe ve Igtimaiyat Kulliyati, 19297. (The Development of Democracy in Turkey).

Ergin, Osman. Ttirkiye Maarif Tarihi.(Istanbul: Osmanbey Matbaasi, 1939-19b3). (History of Turkish Education).

Ertem, Sadri Etem. Ttirk Inkilabinin Karakterleri. (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaasi, 193377 (The Characteristics of the Turkish Revolution).

Esmer, Ahmet gttkrtt. Siyasi Tarih 1919-1939. (Ankara: Gtiney Matbaasi, 1953). (Diplomatic History 1919-1939 by a well-known journalist and scholar).

Gflkalp, Ziya. Ttirkgtiltigtin Esaslari. (Ankara: Serdengegti Negriyati, 1950). (The Principles of Turkism by the great Turkish sociolo­ gist Gflkalp, edited by Osman Yttksel, 3rd edition). 173 Gflksel, Ali Nttzhet. Ziya Gflkalp Hayati ve Malta Hektuplari. (Ankara: Matbuat ve Negriyat T.A.g., 193l)." (The Life of GBkalp and His Malta Letters). Fourteen letters of the Great Turkish patriot from his exile in Malta.

GBr, Hamdi Namik. Istiklal Muzicesi. (Ankara: Ege Matbaasi, 1956). (The Miracle of Independence). Deals with the War of Turkish Independence.

Gflzttbttytik, A.g. and Kili, S. Ttirk Anayasa Metinleri. (Ankara: Ajans-Tttrk Matbaasi, 195l)~. (Annoted Comments of Turkish con­ stitutions) .

Gttloglu, Faruk Riza. Ismet Inflnti: Hayati ve gahsiyeti. (Istanbul: Bozkurt Basimevi, 19I1O). (Inflnti, his Life and Personality).

Gttnaltay, M. gemsettin. Ztilmetten Nura. (Istanbul: Evkaf-i Islamiye Matbaasi, 1925). (From Darkness to Light. By former President of the Turkish Historical Society and former Cabinet Minister).

Gttngflr, Selahattin. Atattirke Kafa Tutanlar. En Saglam Vesikalarla Yakin Tarihln En Merakli Yapraklari. ~Clstanbul: Hadise Yayinevi, 1955). (Those who opposed Atattirk. The most interesting pages of recent history based on reliable documents).

_____ . Yakinlarinin Agzindan Atattirk. (Istanbul: Genglik Kitabevi, I9TD4). (Atattirk as seen by those Close to Him).

Gttrer, Cevat Abbas. Ebedi gef Atattirktin Zengin Tarihinden Birkag Yaprak. (Istanbul: Halk Basimevi, 1939). (A few pages from the Eternal Chief Atattirk's Rich History).

Gttven, Ztihtti. Anzavur Isyani. Istkilal Savagi Tarihinden Aci Bir Safha. (Istanbril: Aydinlik Basimevi, 191j3)( (The Anzavur rebellion— a bitter incident in the history of the Struggle for Independence). Deals with royalist Circassian forces fighting the Kemalists.

Hakki, Ismail. Istiklal Harbi. (Istanbul: Harbiye Mektebi Matbaasi, 1931). (The War for Independence).

Hilafet ve Milli Hakimiyet. (Ankara: Matbuat ve Istihbarat Matbaasi, 1923J7 (The Caliphate and National Sovereignty). A Nationalist pamphlet.

Igdemir, Ulug. Ataturk 1880-1938. (Ankara: Ulus Basimevi, 1939). (Atattirk 1880-1938, by a historian and secretary of the Turkish Historical Society Igdemir). 17U Ileri, Suphi Nuri. Sevr ve :Lozano. (Istanbul: Arkadag Matbaasi, 193U). (Treaties of Sevres and Lausanne).

Incedayi, Cevdet Kerim. Ttirk Istiklal Harbi. (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Ebttzziya, 1939). (The Turkish War for Independence by a Cabinet Minister).

Iskit, Server. Ttirkiye Matbuat Idareleri ve Politikalari. (Istanbul: Tan Basimevi, 19h3)• (Turkish Press Administration and Policies).

Kandemir, F. Atattirk-Inflntt, Inflnti-Maregal Darginligi. (Istanbul: Ekicigill Matbaasi, 1957)■ (The Quarrels of Atattirk-Inflntt, Inflnti Marshal Chakmak).

______. Kazim Karabekir. (Istanbul: Sinan Matbaasi, I9I18). (The Life of General Karabekir).

______. Siyasi Marginliklar. (Istanbul: Nurosmaniye, Ekincigil Matbaasi, 1955). (Political Quarrels). Deals with political disagreements of Atattirk, Inflnti, Cebesoy, Chakmak, Fethi Okyar, etc.

Karabekir, Kazim. Istiklal Harbimizin Esaslari. (Istanbul: Vatan Negriyati, 1957)7 (The basic principles Our 'War for Independence).

Karacan, Ali Naci. Lozan Konferansi ve Ismet Paga. (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 19U3)• (The Lausanne Conference and Ismet Pasha).

Karal, Enver Ziya (compiler). Atattirkten Dflgtinceler. (Ankara: Ttirk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1956)7 (Thoughts from Atattirk).

______. Ttirkiye Cumhuriyet Tarihi (1918-1955). (Istanbul: Maarif Basimevi, 1957)( (History of the Turkish Republic).

Karaman, General Sami Sabit. Trabzon ve Kars Hatiralari 1921-1922. Istiklal Mticadelesi ve Enver Paga. (Izmit: Izmit Selltilflz Matbaasi, 19U9)7 (Memoirs of Trabizond end Kars 1921-1922. The Independence Struggle and Enver Pasha).

Karaosmanoglu, Yakup Kadri. Atattirk. (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 19U6). (Life of Atattirk— by a famous literary figure and diplomat).

______. Zoraki Diplomat. Hatira ve Mtigahede. (Istanbul: Inkilap Kitabevi, 19557. (Reluctant Diplomat. Memoirs and Observations).

Karasapan, Celal Tevfik. Filistin ve gark-til-ffrdtin. (Istanbul: Ahmet Ihsan Basimevi, Vol. I, II, 19U37.(Palestine and Jordan). A history of Turkish relations with these Arab states from earliest times to 19li0 . 175

Kayalioglu, Hamdi. Ttirkiye her geyden tisttin. (Istanbul: Ikdam Matbaasi, 1927). (Turkey above all things).

Kilig, Ali. Atattirktin Htistisiyetleri. (Istanbul: Sel Yayinlari No. 2, Hisar Matbaasi, 1955). (Characteristics of Atattirk by one of his close associates).

______. Istiklal liakemesi Hatiralari. (Istanbul: Sel Yayinlari No« 9, Hisar Matbaasi, 1955). (Memoirs of the Tribunals of Independence by one of its chief members).

______. Kilig Ali Hatiralarini Anlati.yor. (Istanbul: Sel Yayinlari., Hisar Matbaasi, 1955). (Memoirs of Kilig Ali).

Kural, Muhtar M. Atattirk Diktatflr Mtidtir? (Istanbul: Gtivcn Basimevi, 19U9). (Was Atattirk a Dictator?).

Kuran, Ahmed Bedevi. Osmanli Imparatorlugunda Inkllao Hareketleri ve Milli Mticadele. (Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi., 19*56)7 (Revolu­ tionary movements in the Ottoman Empire and the National Struggle).

Kutay, Cemal. Atattirk - Enver Paga Hadiseleri. Yakin Tarihin Meghul Sahifeleri. (Istanbul: Tarih Konuguyor Serileri, 1956). (The Atattirk-Enver Pasha Incidents. The Unknown Pages of Recent History).

_____ . Bir fllti nefsini mtidafaa edi.yor 1 gerkes Ethem Hadisesi. Ismet Paga Cerkes Ethem gekigmesi. Milli Mticadelenin Meghul Hadisesi. (Istanbul: Ercan Matbaasi, 195^)7 (A dead man defends his honorl The Cherkes Ethem incident. The Ismet Pasha Cherkes Ethem struggle. An unknown incident of the National Struggle).

______. Celal Bayar. (Istanbul: Kenan Basimevi, Vol. I, 1939, Vol. II, 1939, Vol. Ill, 19h0, Vol. IV, 19U0). (The Life and Achieve­ ments of Celal Bayar, third President of Turkey from earliest days 1908 to 1937).

______. Fevzi.gakmak Atattirkti Tevkif Edecekti. (Istanbul: Tarih Konuguyor Serileri, 1956). (Fevzi Chakmak was to have arrested Atattirk).

______. Htikumetler inginde ahlak igln mticadele. Cumhuriyet devrinde suiistimaller, divani aliler, Meclis tahkikati. (Istanbul: Ercan Matbaasi, 1956)( (Struggle for ethical practices in the govern­ ment. Corruption, high tribunals, parliamentary investigations during the period of the Republic.) Text includes documents in the original old Arabic script.

_____ . Karabekir Ermenistani Nasil Yok Etti? (Istanbul: Tarih Konuguyor Serileri, 1956). (How General Karabekir Destroyed Armenia.) 176

______. Milli >Hlcadelede Yegil Ordu Efsanesi. (Istanbul: Tarih Konuguyor Serileri, 1956)7 (The Legend or fairy tale of the Green Army during the National Struggle).

______. Mtitarekede Puntos Suikasdi. (Istanbul: Tarih Konguyor Serileri, 1956). (The Crime of Puntos during the Armistice). Deals with an attempt at creating a Greek republic of Pontus out of the Turkish Black Sea coast).

______. Ttirkiyede ilk komtinistler. (Istanbul: Tarih Konuguyor Serileri, 1956). (The first Communists in Turkey. No. 6 of a series of historical studies).

______. Ttirkiye istikal ve htirriyet mticadeleleri tarihi. (Istanbul: Ercan Matbaasi, 1956)7 (History of the struggle for independence and liberty in Turkey).

Ktilge, Sttleyman. Maregal Fevzi gakmak: Siyasi ve Hususi Hayati. (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 195377 (The Political and Private Life of Marshal Chakmak).

Lutfi, Semih, ed. Dtinya Agliyor Atattirk. (Istanbul: S. Lutfi Kitabevi, 1939)) (The World is Weeping, Atattirk). Collection of articles and poems by prominent persons written at the time of Atattirk's death in 1938).

Macit, B. (later known as Sarig). Lozan Kahramani Ismet Paga. (Istanbul: Gttneg Matbaasi, 193H17(Ismet Pasha Hero of Lausanne).

Malkog, Nami. 920 yilinin kurtulug savaglari. (Istanbul: Askeri Mecmua Tarih Kismi, No. h8, Askeri Matbaa, 1937). (The fighting during 1920 in the War for Turkish Independence).

Mamag, Turgut Can. Tarih Boyunca Ttirk-Pus Mtinasebetleri. (Istanbul: Vakit Matbaasi, 1955). (Turkish-Russian relations during the course of history).

Melzig, Herbert (compiler). Inflnti Diyor Ki. (Istanbul: Ulkti Basimevi, 19U3). (Inflnti says that . . . the political ideas of Inflnti).

Melzig, Herbert. Ismet Inflnti, Millet ve Insaniyet. (Istanbul: Kanaat Kitabevi, 19U3)7 (ismet Inflnti, the Nation and Humanity. Speeches of Inflnti).

Midillili, Stivari Ytizbagisi Ahmet. Ttirk Istiklal Harbinin Baginda Milli Mticadele. (Ankara: Btiytik Erkaniharbiye Reisligi Matbaasi, 1928). (The National Struggle at the beginning of the War for Independence by a cavalry captain). 177

Morkaya, Burhan Cahit. Atatttrkttn iki cephesi. (Istanbul: Kanaat Kitabevi, 1939) . (Two sides of Atattirk).

. Mudanya, Lozan, Ankara. (Istanbul: Kanaat Kitabevi, 1933)# (Mudania Armistice, Lausanne Conference)•

Nadas, Muhlis. Milli Mudafaa Politikasi. (Istanbul: Inkilap Kitabevi, 1956)7 (The policy of National Defense).

Ongunsu, Hamit & Teker, Muhsin. Ttirkiye Tarihi. (Istanbul: Dev-let Matbaasi, 1930). (History of Turkey).

Oral, Cavid. Akdeniz Meselesi. (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 19U5, Vols. I, II)) (Mediterranean Problems).

Ortag, Yusuf Ziya. Ismet Inflnti. (Istanbul: Halk Basimevi, 19l|6). (Ismet Inflnti).

Okeren, Haluk. Birinci ve Ikinci Inflnti Zaferleri. (Izmir: C. Ihsan Basimevi.19^37) (The victories of the first and second Battles of Inflnti).

©zoguz, Esat. Adananin kurtulug mticadeleri hatiralari. (Istanbul: fllkti Matbaasi, 1931))) (Memoirs of the struggle for liberation of Adana).

Peker, Nurettin. Istiklal Savagi Resim ve Vesikalarla. (Istanbul: Gtin Basimevi, 1955). (The War for Independence with illustra­ tions and documents). Deals with period 1918-1923. Important source for documents pertaining to the War for Independence.

Sabis, General Ali Ihsan. Harb Hatiralarim. (Istanbul: Inkilap Kitabevi, 191:3) • Vols. 1-3, 2nd ed. C^y War Memoirs).

Safa, Peyami. Ismet Paga. (Istanbul: Orhaniye Matbaasi, n.d.). (Life of Ismet Pasha).

______. Muhterem Heyet-i Vekile Reisimiz Rauf Bey. (Istanbul: Orhaniye Matbaasi, n.d.J) (The Honorable Chairman of Our Chamber of Deputies, Rauf Bey).

______. Refet Paga. (Istanbul: Orhaniye Matbaasi, n.d.). (The Life of General Refet Pasha).

______. Tttrk Inkilabina bakiglar. (Istanbul: Kanaat Kitabevi, n.d.). (A Look at the Turkish Revolution).

Samancigil, K. Cumhuriyetin tig btiytigft. (Istanbul: Emniyet Kitabevi, 19U3)• (The three Great Leaders of the Republic: Atattirk, Inflnti, Chakmak). 178

Sanay, Recai. Ttirk Casusu Ingiliz Kemal. (Istanbul: Nebioglu Yayinevi, 191+7) - (English Kemal, a Turkish Spy).

Saribay, Salim. Istiklal Savaginda Mudurnu-Bolu-Dtizce. (Aydin: C.H.P. Matbaasi, 19l;3)) (Mudurnu-Bolu-Dtizce in northern Turkey south of Istanbul during the War for Independence).

Sarig, Behget Macit. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Tarihgesi. (Istanbul: A. Sait Matbaasi, 1937). (History of the Republican People's Party).

. Gazi ve eserleri. (Istanbul: SUhulet Ktittiph&nesi, 193U). (The Ghazi and His Achievements).

Sertelli, Iskender F. Atattirk Bizi Nasil Kurtardi? (Istanbul: H. Direng Matbaasi, 19 h?). (How Atattirk Saved Us).

Sertoglu, Murat. Btiytik Atattirk. XV Yil hatirasi albttmfl. 18^1-1938. (Istanbul: Usttinel yayinevi, 1953)'. (The Great Atattirk. XVth Anniversary album. 1881-1938).

Sevttk, Ismail Habib. 0 Zamanlar 1920-1923.. (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 1937). Tin those days— 1929-1923).

Seyfi, Ali Riza. Gazi ve Inkilap. (Istanbul: Remzi Kttttiphanesi, 1933)• (The Ghazi and the Revolution).

Siliflz, Remzi. Hatay ve Milli Mticadele Yillsrl. (Bursa: Ankara Kitabevi, 1937;. (Hatay and the Years of the National Struggle). Deals with the early aspects of the Alexandretta question.

Sindirgil, Sureyya. Demirci Hehmed Efe. (Istanbul: Sel Yayinlari, 1955). Deals with achievements of guerilla leader in Aydin area during early period 1919-1920.

Sogucali, §evket. Istiklal Harbinde olaylar. (Ankara: Yeni Cezaevi Basimevi, 19hr()~. (Events of the War for Independence).

Sflylemezoglu, Ghalib Kemaly. Hariciye Hizmetinde 30 Sene, 1892-1922. (Istanbul: Maarif Basimevi, 1955), Vol. IV. (Thirty Years in the Turkish Foreign Service. Memoirs of a former Turkish Minister to Moscow. The last volume covers the period of the National Struggle).

Su, Mtikerrem Kamil. Ttirkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi. (Istanbul: Kanaat Yayinlari, 1957). (History of the Turkish Renublic).

§akir, Ziya. Atattirk Btiytik §efin hususi, askeri, si.yasi hayati. (Istanbul: tilkti Basimevi, 19367 (Atattirk: the personal private, military, and political life of the Great Chief). 179 . Ismet Inflntinti Hayati. (Istanbul: Tan Matbaasi, 1939). (The Life of Ismet InflnttTT

§>apolyo, Enver Behnan. Atattirk. (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 19U3). (A biography of Atattirk).

______. Inflnti. (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 19U3)• (A biography of Inflnti).

______. Kemal Atattirk ve Milli Mticadele Tarihi. (Ankara: Berkalp Kitabevi, 19Uli). (Kemal Atattirk and the History of the National Struggle).

______. Kuvayi Milliye Tarihi - C-erilla. (Ankara: Ayyildiz Matbaasi, 1957). (History of the Nationalist Forces). Deals with the Kemalist guerilla forces in the early days of the Revolution.

______. Ttirkiye Cumhuri.yeti, Tarihi. (Istanbul: Ahmet Halit Yagaroglu, 1953)• (History of the Turkish Renublic).

. Ziya Gflkalo ve Ittihadi Terakki ve Kegrutiyet Tarihi. (Ankara: Berkalp Kitabevi, 19U3) • (Eiya Gflkalp and the History of the Committee of Union and Progress and the Second Constitu­ tional Period of 1908-1918).

Tahsin, Suad. Ttirkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Haliki Gazi Mustafa Kemal. (Istanbul: Akgam Matbaasi, 19337. (The Turkish Republic and Its Founder Ghazi Mustafa Kemal).

Tamer, Ergun. Resimlerle Cumhuriyet Tarihi. (Istanbul: Ozytirek Yayinevi, 19557 (Pictorial history of the Republic).

Tan, K. Turhan. Atattirk. (Istanbul: Kanaat Ktittiphanesi, n.d.). (Atattirk).

Tanju, Haluk Cemal. Atattirk 1881-1938. (Istanbul: Etiman Kitabevi, 1939). (Atattirk l M l - 1938) .

Tansu, Samih Nafis. Ttirk Inkilap Tarihi ve Btiytik Harpten Sonra Avruoa. (Istanbul: Ikbal Ktittiphanesi, 1938). (History of the Turkish Revolution and Europe After the First World War).

Tarih. (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaasi, Vols. Ill, 1933, IV, 193U). (History. A history prepared by the Turkish Historical Commission. Vols. Ill and TV deal with the period of the Reoublic).

Tflkin, Ismail Husrev. Ismet Inflnti. (Ankara: Bagbakanlik Matbaasi, 19U6). (Ismet InflntiTI Tukin, Cemal. Bugtinkti Ayr up a Devletler Manzumesinin Dogugu ve Ttirkiyenin bu manzumeye duhultt) (Ankara: Recep Ulusoglu Basimevi, 1938). "(The birth of the order of today's European Nations and Turkey's adherence to this order). 180

Tukin, Cemil. Osmanli Imparatorlugu devrinde bogazlar meselesi. (Istanbul: Universite Matbaacilik Komandit §>., 19b7). (The Question of the Straits during the neriod of the Ottoman Empire). Includes section on Montreux and later events .

Tunaya, Tarik Z. Osmanli Imparatorlugunda Ttirkiye Btiytik Millet Meclisi . Hukumeti Re.jimine GegisT (Istanbul: Ismail Akgttn Matbaasi, 1956). (From the Ottoman Emoire to the Early Days of the Grand National Assembly Government).

. Ttirkiye Btiytik Milletinin Kurulugu ve Siyasi Karakteri (Istanbul: Universitesi, 1956)) (The Establishment of the Govern­ ment of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and Its Political Character).

______. Ttirkiyede Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952. (Istanbul: Dogan Kardeg Yayinlari, 1952)) (Political Parties in Turkey). (The years 1919-1923 ^re treated in pages U72-5UO. Fully documented).

Tttmerdem, Ismail Hakki. Ttirk Istiklal Harbi. (Istanbul: Resimliay Matbaasi, 19bl). (The Turkish War for Independence).

Ttirkgeldi, Ali. Mondros ve Mudanya Mfltarekeleri Tarihi. (Ankara: Gttney, 19U8). (History of Mudros and Mudania Armistices).

Ttirkttn Altin Kitabi. (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 1928, Vols. I, II). (The Golden Book of the Turks). Deals with the life and achievements of Atattirk. Prepared by a commission. Sections written by the well known historians Afetinan and Ihsan Sungu.

Umur, Hasan. Samsunda Mtidafftayi Hukuk. (Istanbul: Tan Matbaasi, 19Ub). (The Defense of -tights organization in Samsun in 1919).

Unat, Faik Regat. Ismet Inflnti. (Ankara: Maarif Matbaasi, 19)'5). (Ismet Inflnti).

Yakinlarindan Hatiralar. (Istanbul: Sel Yayinlari No. 8, Hisar Matbaasi, 195517 TMemoirs of persons who were close to Atattirk).

Yalg.in, Tekin. Gazinin Destani. (Istanbul: A. Halit Ktittiphanesi, 1932). (The Odyssey of the Ghazi - Atattirk).

Yazman, M. §evki. Btiytik Taaruz Nasil Oldu? (Istanbul: Akgam Matbaasi, 1933)• (How the Great Offensive took place during the Turkish War for Independence).

______. Istiklal Harbi Nasil Oldu? (Istanbul: Kenan Matbaasi, 1938). (How the War of Independence Took Place). 181

Yalyinkaya, Ekrem. Muhtasar Ttirkiye Tarihi. (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 19kl-19k3> h vols.T* (History of Turkey entitled A Short History of Turkey, but it has 1* volumes).

______. Muhtasar Ttirkiye Tarihine Zeyil. Tanzimat devri ile ondan sonraki yirminci asirda Ttirkiye. linci kisim. (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 19lkyf. {Supplement to the Short History of Turkey). Deals with the Tanzimat period of the 19th century and the 20th century.

Yticer, Riza Ruzjen. Atattirk * s ait birkag fikra ve hatira. (Istanbul:. §>aka Basimevi, 19 Hf). (Memoirs of Atattirk and a few anecdotes about him).

Zeki, Osman. Kuvayi Milliye. (Istanbul: Evkaf-i Islamiye Matbaasi, 1922). (The toational Forces).

Turkish Periodicals

Ayin Tarihi (History of the Month).

Belleten (Bulletin of the Turkish Historical Society).

Forum (Ankara bi-weekly economic and cultural journal).

Resimli Tarih Mecmuasi (illustrated Historical Journal).

Tarih Dtinyasi (The World of History).

Tarihi Qsmani Enctimeni Mecmuasi (Journal of the Ottoman Historical CommissionJT

Ttirk Tarih Enctimen Mecmuasi (Journal of the Turkish Historical Commission).

Tarih Vesikalari (Historical Documents Journal).

Ttirkiyat Mecmuasi (Journal of the Turcology Department of the University of Istanbul).

Vakiflar Dergisi (Journal of the Pious I'oundations of Turkey).

Also to be noted are the journals of the University of Istanbul and the University of Ankara.

Turkish Encyclopaedias and Guides

Acaroglu, M. T., "Ttirk Tarihinin Bibliografya Kaynaklari," Belletfen, Ankara, April, 195U. (Bibliographical sources of Turkish History). 182

Durusoy, M. 0. and GBkman, M. M., eds. Atattirk veDevrimleri Biblio­ gr afyasi (Ankara: Ttirk Tarihi Kurumu Basimevi., 1957). (A Bibliography of Atattirk and his period).

GBvsa, Ibrahim Alaettin. Ttirk Meghurlari Ansiklopedisi. (Istanbul: Yedigttn Negriyati, 19h&). (Encyclopaedia of Famous Turks).

Koray, Enver. Ttirkiye Tarih Yayinlari Bibliografyasi. (Ankara: Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1952). (Bibliography of Turkish Historical Works published in Turkey from 1729 to 1950).

Melzig, Herbert. Atattirk Bibliografyasi (Ankara: Zerbamat Basimesi, 19 Ul). (A bibliography of works on Atattirk, includes German and French translations).

Ttirkiye Bibliografyasi (old form 1928-195U) (Monthly listing of all books published in Turkey prepared by the Ministry of Education since 1928).

Ttirkiye Bibliografyasi (new form). (Ankara: Milli Ktttttphane Biblio- grafa Enstitttsti Yayimlari, Ttirk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1955 - ) (Quarterly bibliography published by the Turkish National Library since 1955).

Islam Ansiklopedisi (Encyclopaedia of Islam).

Islam-Ttirk Ansiklopedisi (Islam-Turkish Encyclopaedia).

Newspapers

Hakimiyet-i Milliye (National Sovereignty).

Cumhuriyet (Republic).

Akgam (Evening).

Tanin (Echo).

Vatan (Fatherland). 183

MATERIALS IN NON-TURKISH LANGUAGES

Primary Sources

Baker, Ray S. Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement. (New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1922)3 vols.

Davis, Helen M. Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of the States in the Near and Middle East. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 19U7. 2nd edition 19d3)•

Degras, Jane (ed.). Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy. (London: Oxford University Press, 1951).

George, David Lloyd. The Truth About the Peace Treaties. (London: Victor Gollanez, 1938) 2 vols.

Gooch, G. P. and Temperley, H. (eds.). British Documents on the Origins of the War (1898-191U), Vol. X, The Near and Kiddle East on the Eve of War. (London: H.M.S.O., 1936)•

Great Britain. Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923 (London: Cmd. l8l).i, 1923).

_____ . Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939. (London: Oxford University Press, 19)48, Series 1, Vol. 1, edited by Woodward E. L. and Butker R.).

______. Parliamentary Papers, 1923, Treaty Series No. l6 . (London: Cmd. 1929, H.M.S.O.,"19237. Manual on Turanians and Pan-Turanianism. (London: H.M.S.O, "1918).

Harbord Report. U.S. Military Mission to Armenia. Conditions in the Near East. Reported by Major General James C. Harbord. (Washing­ ton: 1920 66th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Document 266).

Hughes, C. B. and Bristol, Admiral. Papers Relating to the Foreign Policy of the United States, 192li. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939), Vol. II.

Hurewitz, J. C. Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand and Co., 19^7), 2 vols.

France, Ministere des affaires e'trangeres. Documents diplomatiques. Conference de Lausanne. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1923), 2 vols. 181

Kemal, Mustapha Ghazi. A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic, October 1927. (Leipzig: K. E. Koehler, 1929). (Translated by Hans Kohn).

King-Crane. King-Crane Commission to Negotiate Peace, August 28, 1919. (Paris Peace Conference, XII). See also "King-Crane Report on the Near East," Editor and Publisher, LV, 27, 2nd section, December 2, 1922.

Lansing, Robert L. The Peace Negotiations. (New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1921)7

Nicolson, Harold George. Curzon: the Last Phase, 1919-1921?. (London: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 193U).

Seymour, Charles, ed. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1928), ii vols.

Temperley, T. W. V., ed. A History of the Peace Conference of Paris. (London: Oxford University Press, 1920-192ii), Vol. IV.

Thompson, Charles R. The Peace Conference Day by Day. (New York: Brentano's, 1920).

Toynbee, A. J., ed. Survey of International Affairs. (London: Oxford University Press, 192!?, RHA) .

United States. U.S. Embassy Archives, Constantinople, 1919-1923. Unpublished correspondence, 1923, Vol. 21. The Chester Concession. History of the Chester Project, Series 6 , Vol. $2, Turkey, No. 10.

______. U.S. Department of State. Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs. (Washington: 1919-19235.

Woodrow Wilson, Papers of. (Washington, D.C.: Division of Manuscripts Library of CongressTT

Secondary Sources

(Adivar), Halide Edip. The Turkish Ordeal. (New York: The Century Company, 1928). Considered important as a source.

. The Rebirth of Turkey. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930).

______. Turkey Faces West. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930).

(Adivar), Abdulhak Adnan. "Interaction of Islamic and Western Thought in Turkey," Near Eastern Culture and Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951). Edited by T. Cuyler Young. 185 Allen, Henry Elisha. The Turkish Transformation. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1935) •

Armstrong, H. C. Grey Wolf - Mustafa Kemal, an intimate study of a dictator. (London: Arthur Baker, Ltd., 1937)7

Benoist-Mechin, J. Mustapha Kemal (Paris: Edition Albin Michel, 1957).

Bisbee, Eleanor. The New Turks. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951).

Bischoff, Norbert de. La Turquie dans le Monde. (Paris: Payot, 1936). Original in German, also available in Turkish.

Bonne, Alfred. State and Economics in the Middle East. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 2nd ed., 1955).

Bridge, Ann. The Dark Moment. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952). Historical novel, excellent for atmosphere of early Kemalist period.

Brock, Ray. Ghost on Horseback: the Incredible Atatttrk. (Mew York: Duell, 195U). Unreliable and sensational.

Bullard, Sir Reader. Britain and the Middle East from Earliest Times to 1950. (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 195l).

Churchill, Sir Winston. The World Crisis, 1911-1918. (London: Macmillan and Company, 1975).

Conker, Orhan. Redressement economique et industrialisation de la nouvelle Turquie. (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1937)•

Davison, Roderic H. "From Mudros to Lausanne," chapter in The Diplomats. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953).

Ebon, Martin. World Communism Today. (New York: Whittlesey House, 1978) (Pp. 7213122 on Turkey) .

Fernau, F. W. Moslems on the March. (New York: Knopf, 1957) (Chap­ ter 8 on Turkey). Translated from the German by E. W. Dickes.

Frye, Richard N.,ed. Islam and the West. (The Hague: Mouton and Company, 1957). Important chapters on Turkey by Howard A. Reed, D. Rustow, and N. Berkes.

Gates, Caleb F. Not to Me Only. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). By a former President of Robert College.

Gentizon, Paul. Mustapha Kemal ou 1'Orient en Marche. (Paris: Edition Bossard, 1929). 186

Gordon, Leland James. American Relations with Turkey 1830-1930. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 193277

Heyd, Uriel. Foundations of Turkish Nationalism. (London: Luzac and Company, 1950).

Hostler, Charles W. Turkism and the Soviets. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1957).

Howard, Harry N. The Partition of Turkey: a diplomatic history 1913- 1923. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1931).

IBRD. The Economy of Turkey. (Washington: IBRD, 195}).

Jftckh, Ernest. The Rising Crescent. (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 19U7).

Jaeschke, Gotthard, and Pritsch, Erich. Die Tjlrkei Seit den Weltkriege Geschichtskalender, 1919-1929. (Berlin-BaJhlem: Gesellschaft ft!r Islamkunde, 1929).

Kerwin, Robert W. "Etatism and the Industrialization of Turkey" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, 1956).

Kilip, Altemur. Turkey and the World. (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959).

Kirk, George. A Short History of the Middle East. (London: Methuen and 'Company, 19787*

Kohn, Hans. Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East. (London: G. Routledge, 193277

Krai, August Ritter von. Kamal Atattirk1 s Land. (Wien-Leipzig: Wilhelm Braumtlller, 1938).

Ladas, Stephen P. The Exchange of Minorities, Bulgaria. Greece and Turkey. (New York: Macmillan, 1932).

Lamouche, L. Col. Histoire de la Turquie. (Paris: Payot, 1953).

Laqueur, Walter Z., ed., The Middle East in Transition. (New York: Praeger, 1958).

______. Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East. (New York: Praeger, 1957).

Lenczowski, George. The Middle East in World Affairs. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952). 18?

Lerner, David. The Passing of the Traditional Society. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958).

Lewis, Bernard. Turkey. (London: Hutchinson & Company, 1970).

Lewis, Geoffrey L. Turkey. (London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1955).

Luke, Sir Harry. The Old Turkey and the New. (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1955).

Mantram, Robert. Histoire de la Turquie. (Paris: Presses universi- taires, 1952).

Marriott, J. A. R. The Eastern Question. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970, 2nd edition).

Mears, Eliot Grinnell, ed. Modern Turkey. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1927).

Mikusch, Dagobert von. Gazi Mustafa Hemal. (Leipzig: Paul List Verlag, 1931).

Miller, William. The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936).

Orga, Irfan. Phoenix Ascendant: The Rise of Modern Turkey. (London: Robert Hale, Ltd., 1 9 5 8 ) . Important new contribution.

Ostrorog, Count Leon. The Angora Reform. (London: University of London Press, 1927). Useful for domestic problems and legal reforms.

Price, M. Philips. A History of Turkey: from Empire to Republic. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1956J7

Roux, Jean-Paul. La Turquie. (Paris: Payot, 1953).

Sforza, Count Carlo. Batisseurs de l1Europe Moderne. (Paris: Librarie Gallimard, 1931).

Sherrill, Ambassador Charles H. A Year's Embassy to Mustapha Kemal. (New York: Methuen and Company, 1937).

Shah, Sirdar Ikbal Ali. Kamal: Maker of Modern Turkey. (London: Herbert Joseph Publisher, 1937T7

Sousa, Nasim. The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933)•

Shotwell, James T. and Deak, Francis. Turkey at the Straits. (New York: Macmillan, 1970). Toynbee, Arnold J. The Western Question in Greece and Turkey. (London: Constable and Company, 192377

______, and Kirkwood, K. P. Turkey. (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1927).

Thomas, Lewis V., and Frye, Richard N. The United States and Turkey and Iran. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19E>l7.'

Thornburg, Rax Weston. Turkey: An Economic Appraisal. (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 197977 '

Ward, Barbara. Turkey. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).

Waugh, Sir Telford. Turkey, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow. (London: Chapmann and Hall, Ltd., 1930).

Webster, Donald E. The Turkey of Atattirk. (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939) .

Wortham, H. E. Mustafa Kemal of Turkey. (London: The Holmes Press, 1930).

Yale, William. The Near East— A Modern History. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1958).

Yalman, Ahmed Emin. Turkey in the World War. (New Haven: Yale University Press, T930).

Turkey in My Time. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956).

Non-Turkish Periodicals

American Historical Review.

Current History.

Middle East Journal.

Middle Eastern Affairs.

Oriens.

Oriente M odemo.

Survey of International Affairs. (Royal Institute of International AffairsJT 189

Non-Turkish Encyclopaedias and Guides

Birge, J. K. A Guide to Turkish Areas Study, (Washington, D.C.: American Council of Learned Societies, 19li9).

The Encyclopaedia of Islam. (Leyden). APPENDICES 191 APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS (1918-1925)

1918

July 1; - Vahdettin, Mehmed VI, Sultan.

October 30 - Mudros Armistice, effective October 31•

November 13 - Allied and Associated Naval forces enter Istanbul.

1919 March 10 - Mudafaai Hukuku Milliye Cemiyeti (formation of the National Association for the Defense of Rights).

April 29 - Landing of the Italian army at Antalya, first step in taking over of southwestern Anatolia.

May lU - Reddi Ilhak Cemiyeti (Association for the Rejection of Annexation) formed.

May 15 - Landing of Greeks at Smyrna (Izmir) with Allied approval.

May 19 - Mustafa Kemal Pasha lands in Sam sun.

May 30 - First shot fired in the Odemij Ayvalik front near Izmir.

June 10 - Formation of the Thrace-Pajaeli Association for the Defense of Rights.

June 22 - The Amaysa Proclamation.

July 11 - Mustafa Kemal Pasha outlawed by the Istanbul Government.

July 11 - Formation of Anadolu ve Rumeli Mttdafaai Hukuk Cemiyeti (Association for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia).

July 23 - Erzurum Congress.

July 31 - Balikesir Congress.

August 16 - Alafehir Congress.

September U - Sivas Congress.

October 22 - Amasya Protocol (October 20-22).

December 27 - Mustafa Kemal Pasha arrives in Ankara. 192

1920

January 28 - Adoption of National Pact.

March 13 - Anzavur rebellion. :

March 16 - Official Allied occupation of Istanbul, arrest and deportation of prominent Turkish nationalist leaders.

April 11- Last Ottoman Parliament dissolved.

April 18 - Formation of the Kuvayi Inzibatiye (RoyalistCaliohate Army to put down Kemalist movement).

April 23 - Opening of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

August 10 - Treaty of Sevres.

November 8 - Decision to form regular Aj?m?/ and disband irregulars.

December 3 - Treaty of Gtlmrtt.

December 29 - Cherkes Ethem rebellion.

1921

January 6 - Cherkes Ethem (^erkez Ethem) rebellion crushed.

January 10 - Victory of the First Battle of Inflnti.

January 20 - Adoption of the 1921 Constitution.

March 16 - Treaty of Moscow (Turco-Russian).

April 1 - Victory of the Second Battle of Inflnti.

May 21 - Armistice with the French at Adana.

August 23 - Battle of Sakarya starts.

September 13 - Turkish victory over Greeks at Battle of Sakarya - turning point in war.

October 13 - Treaty of Kars.

October 20 - Treaty of Ankara (Franklin-Bouillon).

1922

August 18 - Beginning of Turkish counter-offensive against Greeks. 193 August 26 - Battle of Afyon Karahisar.

August 30 - Battle of Dumlupinar.

September 9 - Liberation of Izmir by Kemalist forces.

October 11 - Armistice of Mudanya.

November 1 - Abolition of the Sultanate.

November 17 - Sultan Mehmet Vahdettin flees from Istanbul on British warship. Abdttlmecit called to Caliphate.

November 20 - Opening of the Lausanne Conference.

1923

July 2h - Treaty of Lausanne signed.

October 6 - Kemalist forces enter Istanbul.

October 13 - Ankara becomes capital of Turkey (October lU).

October 29 - Declaration of the Turkish Reoublic and Mustafa Kemal becomes first President of Turkey.

192U

March 3 - Caliphate abolished.

April 20 - Basic revised Constitution adopted.

November 8 - An important session of the Grand National Assembly in which the Second Group suggested a parliamentary inquiry which was not well received by the First Group and after the Government received a vote of confidence (1 I48 votes out of 167) thus rejecting the inquiry, eleven deputies resigned from the Republican People's Party.

November 17 - Formation of the Progressive Party of the Republic (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Firkasi).

1925 February 11 - §eyh Sait Rebellion - Sheikh Said Kurdish Rebellion.

March U - Takriri Sttldln Kanunu (Law to re-establish law and order).

June 3 - Progressive Party of the Republic dissolved. November 25 - Reforms involving headress (Hats).

December 17 - Turco-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality 19* APPENDIX B

THE NATIONAL PACT (MILLI MISAK)

Text of the National Pact - January 20, 1920.

The members of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies recognize and affiim that the independence of the State and the future of the Nation can be assured by an absolute adherence to the following principles, which represent the maximum of sacrifices which can be endured to achieve a just and lasting peace, and that the continued existence of a stable Ottoman Sultanate and society is impossible if we do not adhere to the said principles:

Article 1. Inasmuch as it is necessary that the destinies of the portions of the Turkish Empire which are peopled by Arab majorities, and which on the conclusion of the Armistice of October 30, 1918, were under occupation by enemy forces, should be determined in accordance with a free plebiscite of the inhabitants, all such territories (whether within or outside the lines of the said Armi­ stice) which are inhabited by an Ottoman Muslim majority, who are united in religion, in race and in aim, are imbued with sentiments of mutual regard, are prepared for individual sacrifice, and have an absolute respect for one another's racial rights and for social circum­ stances, form a whole which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in law.

Article 2. We are willing that, in the case of the three sancaks which united themselves by . . . provincial Subdivi­ sion/ . . . a general vote to the mother country when they were first free, recourse whould again be had, if necessary, to a free popular vote.

Article 3. The determination, also of the juridical status of Western Thrace, which has been made dependent on the Turkish peace, must be effected in accordance with a vote which shall be given by the inhabitants, in complete freedom.

Article li. The security of the city of Istanbul (which is the seat of the Kalifate of Islam, the capital of the Sultanate, and the headquarters of the Ottoman Government) and like­ wise the security of the Sea of Mamara must be protected from every danger. Provided this principle is maintained, whatever decision may be arrived at jointly by us and 196

all other Governments concerned, regarding the opening of the Bosforus to the commerce and traffic of the world, shall be valid.

Article 5. The rights of Minorities as defined in the treaties con­ cluded between the Entente powers and their enemies and certain of their associates shall be confirmed and assured by us— in reliance on the belief that the Muslim minorities in neighboring countries will also be given the benefit of the same rights.

Article 6 . It is a fundamental condition of our life and continued existence that we, like every country, should enjoy complete independence and liberty in the matter of assur­ ing the means of our development, in order that our national and economic development may be so rendered possible, that it should be possible to conduct our affairs in the form of a more modern and regular adminis­ tration.

For this reason we are opposed to restriction inimical to our development in political, Judicial, financial, and other fields.

The conditions of settlement of what our indebtedness shall be shown to be, shall likewise not be contrary to such principles.A-1

As given in Ahmed Emin, Turkey in the World War (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1930), p. 276f. 197

APPENDIX C

COMMUNICATION OF MUSTAFA KEMAL AS HEAD OF THE REPRESENTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE RIGHTS OF ANATOLIA AND RTJMELIA, TO TURKISH CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

Ankara, March 16, 1920

TELEGRAM. URGENT.

Although still convinced of the solidarity of the entire Muslim and civilized world, which is inspired by feelings of humanity, our nation will not be able for the time being to maintain connection with the friendly or hostile world outside.

The humane attitude which we shall adopt toward the Christian population dwelling in our country will be all the more appreciated at the present time, and the possibility that the Christian population will not enjoy any apparent or real protection from any of the foreign Governments will be conclusive evidence of the civilizing factors existing in the characters of our race. I request you to proceed in strict accordance with the law and enforce it with vigor if any persons should act contrary to the interests of our country and dis­ turb order and quiet in the country. Administer the law impartially, without distinction of race or creed. And I beg you to treat all those who do their duty as citizens in a conciliatory spirit and show due solicitude for them; pay honor and obedience to the local authori­ ties. Finally, I request you to communicate the above urgently to all persons concerned and bring it before the people in such manner as appears most expedient to you.

Mustafa Kemal In the name of the Union J.UI_ one l^eiexiae ui ii-i-giioo.

A 0 Speech (supra) 357, as given in Webster, on. cit., p. 8ln 198

APPENDIX C

LETTER TO WORLD LEADERS BY MUSTAFA KEMAL AS HEAD OF THE REPRESENTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF RIGHTS OF ANATOLIA AND RUMELIA.

Ankara, March l6, 1920.

To the Italian Representative in Antalya

To be forwarded to:

The Diplomatic Representatives of England, France, and Italy; The Diplomatic Representatives of the United States in Istanbul; The Foreign Ministers in Neutral Countries; The Legislative Chambers of France, England, and Italy.

All the official buildings in Istanbul, including the Chamber of Deputies, which represents the symbol of our national independence, have been formally and forcibly occupied by the troops of the Entente Powers, and they have proceeded to arrest a great number of patriots who have been acting in accord with the aims of the national movement. This last blow, which has just been directed against the sovereignty and freedom of the Ottomans who are resolved to defend their lives and their independence at all costs— at the principles that have been regarded by humanity and civilization of the twentieth century as sacred, such as the sense of freedom, of nationality and of country; at the principles also of m odem society and human conscience which has created them.

As for ourselves, we are imbued with the sacred character of the struggle we have entered upon for the defense of our rights and independence, and we are convinced that there is no power on earth that can deprive a nation of its right of existence.

We are not content to leave it to official Europe and America, but to the Europe and America of science, culture, and civilization, to judge rightly the character of this step, which constitutes a conspiracy such as history has never recorded down to the present day and which is incompatible with the honor and self-respect of the peoples who have joined it. It is actually based on downright dis­ honesty. By an Armistice based on Wilson's principles, the nation has been deprived of all means of defense. Once more, and for the last time, we draw your attention to the great responsibility in the eyes of history which the event will involve. 199 Next to God, the lawfulness of our cause and its sacred char­ acter are our surest strongholds in these painful hours of difficulty.

MUSTAFA KEMAL In the name of the Representative Committee of the Union for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia.^"^

^"3 Speech (supra), 360f, as given in V/ebster, op. cit., pp. 8U- 85. 200

APPENDIX E

FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ACT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

1. Sovereignty belongs without reserve to the nation. The system of administration is based on the principle that the people personally and effectively direct their own destinies.

2. The executive and legislative functions are combined in the Grand National Assembly as the true and only representative of the nation.

3. The Turkish State is governed by the Grand National Assembly; its government is called the "Government of the Grand National Assembly."

it. The Grand National Assembly is composed of members elected by the people of the vilayets.

5. The elections to the Grand National Assembly are held every two years. Members are elected for two years but may be reelected. The retiring body continues its functions until the sitting of the new body. In case elections cannot be held, the term of the incumbent legislature may be prolonged only one year. Each member of the Grand National Assembly represents not the province which elects him but the entire nation.

6. The entire Assembly convenes the first of November without summons.

7. The basic rights of the application of religious laws (already in force), the promulgation and codification or abrogation of laws, the making of conventions and pe??.e treaties, and the procla­ mation of the defense of the homeland belcng to the Grand National Assembly. The religious and juridical pro/isions of the laws enacted shall be such as best conform to the public opinion, and the needs of the times, as well as established customs. The functions and respon­ sibilities of the Cabinet shall be fixed by special law.

8. The Grand National Assembly administers the branches of the government through its appointees, who are under its direction, responsible to it, and replaced if need be.

9. The President elected by the Grand National Assembly in general session is its President throughout the term of the Parliament. 201

In this capacity he is authorized to sign in the name of the Assembly and to ratify decisions of the Cabinet. The Cabinet elects one of its own members its Chairmen. But the President of the Grand National Assembly is ex-officio President of the Cabinet,

10. The provisions of the Constitution (1876, 1908) which are not contradictory to the principles herein remain in effect.

Tarih IV (supra) 8£f, as translated by Webster, op. cit., pp. 97-98. (Also known as the Law of Fundamental Organization, No, 89, January 20, 1921). 202

APPENDIX F

DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GRAND NATIONAL

ASSEMBLY REGARDING THE CHERKES ETHEM

Ethem Bey, the former commander of the Seyyar Kuwetler (Mobile Forces) or Irregular Forces, No. 1, and his brothers Tevfik Bey and Reshid Bey, who for quite a while now have harrassed the population by their oppressive and irresponsible actions, have shown a tendency to form a feudal type of government, based on raids and brigandage. They have in actual fact rebelled against the authority and the laws of the Grand National Assembly.

The Turkish Grand National Assembly, in order to prevent the shedding of fraternal blood, has on several occasions counselled and advised them to desist (from these treasonable actions) and has invited them to follow the path of justice and truth. In return for all this benevolence shown to them by the Government, Ethem and his brothers have tried to gain Bolshevik supoort, have through various means attempted to instigate rebellions in the Armed Forces and in the country, and through allying themselves with the Greeks, have taken treasonable actions. Today, along with the Greeks, whom they encouraged to attack (the Nationalist Forces) on the Western Front, they are fighting the Fatherland.

Ethem and his brothers, in trying to destroy national unity and the country's independence in cooperation with the enemy, have attempted to use the forces which they joined to defend the Fatherland for personal and treasonable ends. However, their attempts to drag these (Circassian) forces has failed and been seen through, and group after group of these (Circassian) forces have deserted them to join the Government forces. The Government's effective measures, as well as the refusal of the units forming the Irregular Forces to partici­ pate in treason against their Fatherland, has reduced them (Ethem's Forces) to only 300 persons. The Grand National Assembly oonsiders only Ethem, Tevfik, and Reshid, responsible. If the other chieftains and fighters, who like previous groups of their comrades will surrender to the Government, they will be pardoned. The traitors, Ethem, Tevfik and Reshid, who have tried to form a brigand government in order to plunder Anatolia from end to end, before achieving this end, have fallen to the condition they deserve by being in the lines of the enemies (of the country).

The Turkish Grand National Assembly which is fully aware of its historical responsibility with the help of Allah, and depending 203

on national unity, which is stronger than ever before, announces and declares that it will carry out its duty for the salvation of the Fatherland and the Nation against both domestic and foreign enemies*^"5

Yunus Nadi, gerkes, pp. 12U-125>. (This is a free trans­ lation of the Declaration made in January 1921). 20JLi

APPENDIX G

THE NINE PRINCIPLES OF THE PEOPLE'S PARTY

(Dokuz Umde (Nine Principles) Proclaimed by the People's Party April 1, 1923V

1. Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation.

2. The Grand National Assembly which is the real representa­ tive of the Turkish people, abolished the Sultanate on November 1, 1922. The Caliphate which is an office dependent upon the Grand National Assembly, deals with Islam on an international basis.

3. The most important duty of the Government is to defend the security and to maintain order in the country.

1). Judicial Reforms.

5. a. Tax reform involving livestock; b. Measures to increase production and improve the marketing of tobacco, bearing in mind the best interests of the nation; c. Reforms in financial institutions to make credit avail­ able to industry, commerce, and other sectors of the economy; d. The capital of the Agricultural Bank will be issued, and measures will be taken to assist farmers more effectively; e. Efforts to make agricultural machinery and equipment easily available to farmers will be made by imoorts; f. Measures will be taJcen to protect and develop to a maximum degree those industries which depend upon raw materials found within the country; g. Plans will be made and action taken with regard to rail­ roads which are urgently needed in various parts of the country; h. In order to improve the quality of elementary education and to meet the requirements of the country, the educational system will be given increased attention and publicity, espe­ cially as regards faculty and staff appointment, promotion and training; i. Health and social assistance establishments and facili­ ties will be improved and the helpless taken care of; j. Scientific developments which are considered appropriate for the improvement of our forests, mines, and animal husbandry will be instituted.

6. The period of obligatory military service will be reduced.

?. Reserve officers and veterans benefits, etc. 205

8. An efficient Civil Service and Government to serve the people will be established.

9. Reconstruction of the country destroyed by the war will be undertaken.

Signed, April 8, 1923,

Gazi Mustafa Kemal President of the Association for the . , Defense of Rights for Anatolia and Rumelia

A-6 Tunaya, Partiler, pp. 580-582. (Free translation). 20 6

APPENDIX H

IMPORTANT LEGISLATION PASSED BI THE GOVERNMENT 01-' THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (1920-1923)

The Lew on Treason (No 2, April 19, 1336, 1920); Law establishing gendarmerie units from infantry and cavalry classes (No 9, June 7, 1920); Law on the deliberative quorum (No 18, September 5, 1920); Law regarding deserters (No 21, September 11, 1920); Law on Medal of Independence (No 6 6 , November 29, 1920); Law of Fundamental Organization (Constitution) (No 85, January 20, 1337, 1921) (See Aopendix D of this dissertation for a translation); Law for com­ memorating April 23, as a national holiday (No 112, April 23, 1921); Law commuting prison terms of Giresunlu Ziynikoglu Temel (No 126, May 28, 1921); Law communting prison terms of condemned persons who served loyally and showed bravery during national wars (No 135, July 15, 1921); Law pertaining to the Treaty between Turkey and Afghanistan (No IkO, July 21, 1921); Law pertaining to the Treaty between Turkey and (Soviet) Russia (No II4I, July 21, 1921); Law conferring title of Commander-in-Chief to his Excellency Mustafa Kemal Pasha, President of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (No IUJ.1, August 5, 1921); Law conferring title of Gazi (Victor) and rank of Marshal to His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Pasha (No 153, September 19, 1921); Law establishing Tribunals of Independence (No 2Wh July 31, 1338, 1922); Law amending certain articles of the Constitution (No 36b, October 29, 1339, 1923). General Assembly decrees which reveal the aims of the Government of the Grand National Assembly include the following numbers: 2, b, 5, 16. 23, 26, 28 , 37, 10U, 108, 307, 300, 313, 3bl-3kh, 36)j, and 365.A “7

^■"7 Tunaya, Htikttmeti, p. 12. (Free translation). According to Tunaya, the above legislation reveals the aims of the government of the Grand National Assembly. It is reproduced here for the con­ venience of students of Turkish history. 207

APPENDIX I

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF PROMINENT TURKISH LEADERS

ATATttRK, MUSTAFA KEMAL (1881-1938) (Mustafa Kemal Pasha)

Mustafa Kemal Pasha was born in Salonica in 1881. He graduated

from the Staff College as a captain in 190U. Mustafa Kemal partici­

pated in the Tripolitanian War (1911-1912), the Balkan Wars (1912-1913),

and the First World War (I9l)i-19l8). In 1919 he became the leader of

the Nationalist Movement in Anatolia.^"®

An evaluation and appraisal of Mustafa Kemal is not easy since

most public and published statements about him by prominent Turkish

spokesmen and his contemporaries are naturally rather guarded and not

always frank. However, even in such laudatory works, one can always

find useful information and even sometimes direct or implied criti- A-9 cism. ' Most of the published statements, now that Atatttrk is dead,

consist either of memoirs praising his achievements, or exposes belittling him.

Among sources in European languages is the very incisive but

A“8 Gflvsa, op. cit., pp. 50-^3.

■^"9 a few examples of such works are: Samih Nafiz Tansu, Tttrk Inkilap Tarihi (Istanbul: Ikbal Kitabevi, 1938) (History of the Turkish Revolution); 'Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Atatttrk (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 1939)5 Enver Behnan §apolyo, Atatttrk Tlstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 19^3); Zahide Duru, Ebedi gef Atatttrk (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 19U5) (The Eternal Chief, Atatttrk); Muhtar Kural, Atatttrk Diktatttr Mttdtir? (Istanbul: Gttven Basimev-', 19)i9) (Was Atatttrk a Dictator?); Burhan Cahit f'orkaya, Atatttrkfln iki cephesi (Istanbul: Kanaat Kitabevi, 1939) (The Two Bides of AtatttrkJT 208 A-10 somewhat sensational book by H. C. Armstrong. Another book, which is mainly based on Armstrong and is even less reliable is Ray

Brock's recent study.A"^ A more favorable and interesting work is A-12 that of Ambassador Sherrill, and other biographies, articles and A-13 evaluations on Mustafa Kemal have appeared in western languages.

In addition, nearly every general book on Turkey including the works of Bisbee, Webster, G. Lewis, Liman van Sanders, Jean Deny, Halide

Edib, Urga, or the more general memoirs such as Ambassador Grew's

Turbulent Era, discuss Mustafa Kemal's personality and characteris­ tics. However, much of the best information which one gathers about

Atatttrk from those who knew him, whether Turks or non-Turks, is in personal statements not for general publication. Although there is general appreciation of his achievements, observations and opinions vary. Persons who believe in the eighteenth century type of liberalism

A-10 h . C. Armstrong, Grey Wolf - Mustafa Kemal, an Intimate Study of a Dictator (London: Arthur Baker, Ltd., 1937).

A-ll Ray Brock, Ghost on Horseback: The Story of the Incredible Atatttrk (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 19^).

Charles H. Sherrill, A Year's Embassy to Mustafa Kemal (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 193^).

A-13 These include: Orga, oj>. cit.; H. E. Wortham, Mustafa Kemal of Turkey (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1931); Hans Froemberger, Kemal Atatttrk: A Biography (London: Jarrolds Co., 1937) Translated by Kennett Kirkness; Dagohert von Mlkusch, Mustapha Kemal (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Doran, 1931); Aziz Hanki Bey, Turcs et Atatttrk (Cairo: F. E. Noury & Fils, 1939); Jean Deny, (ed.), Souvenirs du Gazi Moustafa Kemal Pacha (Paris: Librairie Orientalists Paul Geuthner, 1927); and Mahmut Bey, "Le Ghazi et la Revolution," Le Millet, Novem­ ber 26, 1929 to February 8, 1930 (Eleven Installments)-. 209

and the Natural Rights philosophy, are very critical of Mustafa

Kemal’s personal authoritarianism. On the other hand, those who feel

that in countries where constitutional government is new, strong

leadership is essential, often endeavor to rationalize some of his

actions. It should be pointed out here that strong government does

not necessarily mean dictatorship, since popular support and partici­

pation is the basis of real stability.

During the period after Atatttrk*s death in October 1939, many

eulogies appeared in the Turkish and world press. These have been A-lii gathered in a book entitled Dttnya Agliyorl Atatttrk. This type of

work is useless for the critical historian. Somewhat more useful is

Tflrkttn Altin Kitabi,A ~ ^ parts of which have been translated. The

memoirs of such writers as Professor Afetinan, a woman historian and

close collaborator of Atatttrk, are valuable despite some personal A-16 bias. In this connection, the articles which appear on each

anniversary of Atatttrk's death are usually of minor historical value,

except that in 1956, the eighteenth anniversary, a rather comprehensive

Dttnya Agliyorl Atatttrk (Istanbul: S. Lutfi Kitabevi, 1939) (The World is Weeping, Atatttrk).

A-15 Tttrkfln Altin Kitabi (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 1928) (The Golden Book of the Turks)."

A-16 Afetinan, Atatttrkten Hatlralar (Ankara: Tflrk Tarih Kurumu, 1950) (Memories from Atatttrk). Afetinan is a famous woman historian who worked with Atatttrk in the preparation of the new history of Turkey. Her articles about her conversations and work with Atatttrk have appeared in the Belleten, the journal of the Turkish Historical Society. 210

collection of articles on Atatttrk were published in B e l l e t e n .A" ^-7

From the many published appraisals of Mustafa Kernel's character

and contribution, a few examples have been selected to indicate the

general line of thinking contained in evaluations made by his contem­

poraries.

Regarding Mustafa Kemal's military prowess, Ali Fuat Cebesoy

(although opposed to Mustafa Kemal in the Grand National Assembly), A-18 in "Mustafa Kemal Milli-Lider" states that Turkey was fortunate

to have such a great leader in the dark days of the Armistice Period,

and discusses Mustafa Kemal's many military achievements. Tevfik

Biyiklioglu in an interesting article entitled "Bajkumandan Atatttrk'ttn

Kisa bir Portresi,"^ ^ depicts the high quality of Atatttrk's leader­

ship during the First World War and the War of Independence as well as

chronicling important events of the period. Irfan Orga claims that

Mustafa Kemal's genius was primarily in the military field:

He was only a genius in military terms. The reforms he brought in were borrowed. He modelled the rebirth of his country on the West .... The genius of Mustafa Kemal's brilliance was already passing by the time he declared a Republic. He was emphatically a man of action, not of P e a c e . A-20

A-17 Belleten, October 1956 issue.

A-18 Ali Fuat Cebesoy, "Mustafa Kemal Milli-Lider," Belleten, October 1956, 5U9-555. (Mustafa Kemal as a National Leader]")

A-19 Tevfik Biyiklioglu, "Bajkumandan Atatttrk'ttn Kisa bir Portresi," Belleten, October 1956, 701-735. (A brief characterization of the Commander-in-Chief, Atatttrk).

A_2° Orga, o£. cit., p. 152. 211

A general evaluation of Mustafa Kemal1 s character is made by

R. Httsrev Gerede, former Ambassador to Germany, in his article

entitled "Atatttrk"A“21 in which he described Atatttrk as the creator

of a new regime under seven headings: (l) background and personality}

(2) his inner circlej (3) his marital and social concepts} (U) his

genius and mysticism} (5) his personal magnetism} (6) his reformism}

and (7) his concept of religion. In this study Ambassador Gerede

endeavors to refute some of the criticisms of Atatttrk*s personal life.

Ismail Habib SevttkA“22 £t s o comments on Mustafa Kemal1s sagacity in

having well-defined and limited aims as demonstrated by his refusal when a delegation of Muslims from India proposed to offer him the

Caliphate:

The Kalifate can give us no strength, whereas it will raise the enmity of the Powers who have numerous Muslim subjects. -23

Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoglu, Minister to Switzerland and a famous

Turkish literary figure in an article "Tttrk Milleti ve Atatttrk,"A-2U emphasizes the fact that Atatttrk was very annoyed when he was described as a great man such as Napoleon. Karaosmanoglu claims that Atatttrk considered the nation as all important and himself as a citizen of

A-21 Httsrev Gerede, "Atatttrk," Belleten, October 1956, 5t>5- 570.

A-22 Ismail Habib Sevflk, Ataturk I gin (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 1939) (For Atatttrk).

A-23 Ibid., p. 75.

A-2U Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoglu, "Tttrk Milleti ve Atatttrk," Belleten, October 1956, 531-5U8. (The Turkish Nation and Atatttrk). 212 that nation in accordance with the populist concept which he espoused.

Dr. Professor Afetinan in an article entitled, "Gazi Mustafa Kemal

Atatttrk ve Kttltttr Meseleleri, discusses Atatttrk's cultural con­ cepts for the new Turkey.

Atatttrk's views in the field of history and political science are discussed in several articles. Professor Dr. Ekrem Akurgal in

A 26 "Tarih iimi ve Atatttrk,"^ in addition to discussing Atatttrk's ideas of history, stresses the terms of the choice which Atatttrk had to make between the Eastern and Western concepts. Hikmet Bayur, former

Minister of Education and Turkish Professor of Constitutional History in an article entitled, "Kuvay-i Milliye Devrinde Atatttrk'ttn Dip

Siyasasi ile ilgili bazi Gflrttp ve Davraniplar," ^-27

Atatttrk's views and actions pertaining to foreign policy during the early days of the independence struggle, and is particularly important because of the treatment of Turkish relations with Russia.

Atatttrk's contribution to Turkey is summarized by the two following quotations:

He destroyed the old Turkey, blazing a trail of fire through the nation's mind, blasting ideologies— and from the ashes of the

A-25 professor Dr. Afetinan, "Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatttrk ve Kttltttr Meseleleri," Belleten, October 1956, 557-563 (Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatttrk and Cultural Problems).

A-26 ur> Professor Ekrem Akurgal, "Tarih ilmi ve Atatttrk," Belleten, October 1956, 571-58U (The Science of History and Atatttrk).

A-27 Hikmet Bayur, "Kuvay-i Milliye Devrinde Atatttrk'ttn Dip Siyasasi ile ilgili bazi GBrtlp ve Davraniplar," Belleten, October 1956, 619-632 (Atatttrk's views and actions pertaining to foreign policy during the early days of the national struggle). 213

past arose the tremulous shape of his civilized dream: Turkey— the m o d e m phoenix bird who consumed herself in the fire of revolution in order to live again.

Mustafa Kemal did not have a definite rigid philosophy which can be placed in a mould, he only showed the nation a direction. The ooncept of populism as envisaged twenty-five years ago has little in common with today’s idea. Atatttrk's real greatness was not due to the originality of his concepts, but rather arises, from the accuracy and success of the direction he gave. Those who love Atatttrk the most are the first to admit that Atatttrk was not always right and that he not always thought right. Thus one who loves Atatttrk does not have to accept that all he did and thought were right, but rather it is sufficient to believe that the general direction he gave was fundamentally right.A-29

■^-28 orga, ojd. cit., pp. 188-189. A-29 Rjitatttrk'ttn Anlamak,” Forum. November 15, 1958. (An Understanding of Atatttrk). This was an unsigned editorial which is given above in translation. 2lU

HALIDE EDIB (Adivar) (188U - )

Eft. ABDULHAK ADNAN ADIVAR (1882-1955)

Halide Edib was born in Istanbul in 188U, and is a graduate of

the American College for Girls in Istanbul. She is a novelist and

intellectual leader of note, and has been active in Turkish educational

and political circles since 1908. She married Dr. Adivar, her second

husband, in 1917. Halide Edib and her husband joined the Kemalist

Movement in 1920. However, they opposed Atatttrk1s personal rule and

joined the opposition Progressive Party of the Republic. They left

Turkey to live abroad in 1926 but returned in 1939 after the death of

Atatttrk. Both were elected deputies to the Grand National Assembly.

Since 19U0 Halide Edib has been a professor of English literature at

the University of Istanbul.

Dr. Adnan Adivar was born in Gallipoli in 1882. He studied at the Medical Faculties of Istanbul and Berlin Universities and was a medical doctor. He served in the Balkan and First World Wars and

joined the Kemalist Movement. He held important positions in the

Ministry of Health and was a member of the Grand National Assembly.

He was also a well-known Islamic scholar. He died in 1955.^“^^

A 30 GBvsa, 0£. cit., pp. 15-16. For an obituary of Dr. Adivar see Oriens, October 30, 1955. 215

CELAL BAYAR (1881* - ). (Mahmut Celal Bey)

Celal Bayar was born in Gemlik in 1881*. His father was a

teacher and mlifti Abdullah Fehmi Efendi. Celal Bey was a leader of the

Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress in Izmir after 1908. He

studied at the French school in Bursa and entered the Deutscher Orient

Bank and rose to an executive position by 1907. In 1919 Celal Bey organized guerrilla resistance forces against the Greek landings in

Izmir area. He joined the Kemalist movement and held important posi­ tions in the field of economic work. He was a member of the Turkish delegation to the Lausanne Conference in 1923. He had been a deputy for Izmir in the Ottoman Parliament and was a deputy in the early

Kemalist Government, holding several Ministerial posts including

Minister of Economy and later Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister for Exchange of Population and Land Resettlement. In

1921* he became director of the newly created l£ Bankasi (Business Bank).

In 1932 he was again appointed Minister of Economy. Celal Bayar was

Prime Minister under Atatttrk from 1937 to 1939. In 191*5 Celal Bayar left the Republican People’s Party and organized the Democratic Party with Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan and Fuat Kflpi/flltl. With the victory of the Democratic Party in May 1950, he was eledted the third President of the Turkish R e p u b l i c . ^“^l

A-31 G8vsa, ojo. cit., pp. 63—61*. See also Cemal Kuntay, Celal Bayar (Istanbul: Kenan Basimevi, 1939-191*1) 1* vols., and a shorter work by the same author entitled Celal Bayar: Bir Tflrkttn Biografyasi (Istanbul: Onan Matbaasi, 1950). 216

REFET PASHA (General Refet Bele) (1881 - )

Refet Pasha was born in Istanbul in 1881. A graduate of the

Chief of Staff College, he served in the First World War and was a

full colonel in the early days of the War of Independence. As a

result of his heroism in the Battles of InBnfl and Sakarya, he was

promoted to the rank of general. Mustafa Kemal Pasha sent him as the

representative of the Nationalist Government to Istanbul. He later held important positions in the Government, including Minister of

National Defense and was elected deputy to the Grand National Assembly.

Refet Pasha Joined the opposition Progressive Party of the Republic which lasted from November 17, 192li to June 3, 1925. Refet Pasha

A OO continued as a deputy in the Grand National Assembly for many years. J

a“32 G8vas, o£. cit., p. 70. See also Peyami Safa, Refet Pasha (Istanbul: Orhaniye Matbaasi, n.d.). 217

ALI FUAT CEBESOY (All Fuat Pasha) (1883 - )

All Fuat Pasha was born in Istanbul in 1883. He graduated from

St. Joseph Lyceum (French) and the Army Staff College as a captain in

1905. He fought in the Balkan Wars and the First World War.

A great military hero and leader of the early Kemalist period,

Ali Fuat Cebesoy was descended from a prominent family and is known for A-33 his cosmopolitan views. As the first Kemalist Ambassador to the

Soviet Union in 1920,he not only carried out Atatttrk's instruc­ tions but also helped in creating policy. Ali Fuat Pasha opposed the transformation of Turkish guerilla forces into a regular Army in

1920-1921 period and later was among those who opposed the abolition of the Caliphate in 192U.

After his mission to Moscow, Ali Fuat Pasha re-entered the Army in 1923 and was Inspector of the 2nd Army. He was elected deputy from

Ankara, and joined the opposition Progressive Party of the Republic in

192U. After going into retirement for five years, he re-entered politics at the personal request of Atattlrk in 1933. In 1936 he was elected deputy from Konya. He held the Ministerial posts of Public

Works and Communications. He is presently in retirement writing his memoirs.

A-33 Oktay, 0£. cit., p. 1*5 and GBvsa, ojo. cit., pp. 78-79*

A-3U Gen. Ali Fuat Cebesoyun Siyasi Hatiralari (Istanbul: Vatan Neyriyati, 19^7) (The Political Memoirs of General Ali Fuat Cebesoy). 218

MARSHAL FEVZI CHAKMAK (Fevzi Pasha) (1876-19#)

Fevsi Chakmak was b o m in Istanbul in 1876. His father was an

officer and his mother came from an upper middle class family. He

graduated from the Military School of Harbiye in 1895 and the Military

Staff College in 1898. He was married in 1905, to Fitnat hanim,

daughter of an officer. Chakmak was known as a Conservative and reli­

gious man. He fought in the Balkan War and the First World War, and \ as the Chief of the General Staff in Istanbul in 1919, was able to

help the Nationalists during 1920 by sending them military equipment.

He resigned from the position of Chief of the Ottoman General Staff,

when the Damat Ferit Pasha cabinet was formed to crush the Kemalist

Movement, and joined the Kemalists in Anatolia on April 8, 1920. On

May 3, 1920 he was appointed by the Grand National Assembly, both

Minister of Defense and Head of the Council of Ministers. The Grand

National Assembly made him a full general, and he was Chief of Staff

in the Grand National Assembly April 3, 1921. At this time Mustafa

Kernel was made the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies. After the Battle

of Sakarya, Fevzi Pasha was promoted to Marshal of the Armies on Septem­

ber 29, 1922. He remained Chief of the General Staff from 1922 to 19W*,

when he was elected on an independent ticket as deputy for Istanbul.

He remained loyal to Atatflrk during the whole period, and helped in the

election of InBntt to the presidency in 1938. Following political

differences with InBntt, Chakmak was chosen the titular head of the A-^5 opposition Nation Party. He died in 1950 before the general elections.

A“35 GBvsa, oj>. cit.. p. 90. See also Sflleyman Kttlpe, Maregal Fevzi Qakmak (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaasi, 1953)• 219

ENVER PASHA (1881-1922)

Enver Pasha was b o m in Istanbul in 1881. He graduated from the

Army Staff College with the rank of captain in 1903 and joined the

Young Turk Movement in Salonica several years before 1908. In 1909 he

was military attache in Berlin. He fought in the Tripolitanian War of

1911, and the Balkan Wars, and was involved in the assassination of

Minister of War wazim Pasha in 1913. He became a leader of the Com­ mittee of Union and Progress. He married into the royal family by marrying Prince Sttleyman Efendi's daughter Princess Naciye. Enver and

Mustafa Kemal were rivals and did not like each other personally and disagreed on political policies. In 1913 Enver Pasha became Minister of War and was instrumental in involving the Ottoman tinpire in the

First World War on the side of the Central Powers. He favored a Pan-

Turkist policy and hoped to built a Greater Turkey. However, as a result of the defeat of the Central Powers in 1918 he escaped from

Istanbul and was finally killed in Turkestan in 1922 fighting the

Bolsheviks.

As head of the Committee of Union and Progress Triumvirate which included Talat Pasha and Carnal (Djemal) Pasha (1913-1918) he led the

Ottoman linpire through the war years. He has been criticized by some

Turkish historians for his rash policies and military blunders. Despite A o A his errors, he is sometimes depicted as a romantic and dashing leader. J

A-36 G8vsa, op. cit., p. 116. See also Muallim Fuad Gttcttyener, Enver Pasha (Istanbul, 1937)j Kurt Okay, Enver Pascha, der grosse freund Deutschlands (Berlin, 1935) j «J. Castagne", Les Basmatchls (Paris, 1928) j C.W. Hostler, Turkish and the Soviets (London: Allen and Unwin, 19^7), pp. Ih8-l56. 220

ZIYA GflKALP (Ziya Bey)(1875-192U)

Ziya GBkalp was born in Diyarbakir in 1875 of middle class

parents and attended military and political science schools. He

joined the Young Turk movement after 1908 and became a professor at

the University of Istanbul. GBkalp was the intellectual leader of both the Young Turk and Kemalist Revolution. He was a member of the

Committee of Union and Progress and was exiled to Malta by the Allied

and Associated Powers when they occupied Istanbul in 1920. Ziya

GBkalp was released with other Turkish leaders in Malta and returned to Turkey to join the Kemalist Movement. This great Turkish philo­ sopher and sociologist was influenced by the ideas of the French sociologist tinile Durkheim (1858-1917) and French Positivist thinking.

He developed the concept of TttrkgttlBk (Turkism). GBkalp founded several important journals and wrote a number of important works. In his search for a "Great Man" in history to save Turkey, he saw in

Mustafa Kemal the qualities for this Saviour.^"37

^”37 QBvsa, o£. cit., pp. 152-153* See also the following for the life and works of GBkalp: E. B. §apolyo, Ziya GBkalp (Istanbul* Gflven Basimevi, 19U3) 5 U. Heyd, Foundation of Turlcish Nationalism (London: Luzac, 19h9); Niyazi Berkes, "Ziya GBkalp," Middle East Journal, Autumn, 195U. 221

ISMET DJONtf (1881* - ) (Ismet Pasha)

Ismet Pasha was b o m in Izmir in 188H. His father was a promi­ nent jurist. He graduated from the War College and the Array Staff

College in 1906 with the rank of captain, and participated in the Balkan

Wars of 1912-1913 and World War I. Colonel Ismet joined the Nationalist

Movement in Ankara on March 20, 1920 and rose rapidly to the rank of general. As the victory of the Battles of InBnfl in 1921, he became a national hero.

Ismet Pasha was not only an able soldier and statesman, but also one of the early Kemalist diplomats, whose work, as senior Turkish representative at the Lausanne Conference in 1923, has won him a place in history. He was Prime Minister in 1923-192U and 1925-1937* and was the second President of the Turkish Republic from 1938 to 1950.

Opinions differ as to whether it was the genius of Atattlrk which directed Ismet Pasha at Lausanne, or whether it was Atattlrk who depended upon Ismet Inflnfl for the victory of Turkish diplomacy at the Conference A-39 Table. The truth is probably that both leaders were complimentary and their personalities and abilities balanced each other. Ismet InOntl retired from public life in 1937, probably because of disagreements on

/ policy with Atattlrk. He is at present the head of the opposition

Republican People's Party.

A-38 Gdvas, o£. cit.. pp. 188-190; and A. Oktay, 0£. cit.. p. 103.

^“39 Ismet Indntl's role in the Lausanne Treaty is discussed in Rocleric H. Davison "Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne," in The Diplomats. 1918-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953)* PP« 172-209. See also D.b. Webster, oj>. cit., pp. 289-291, Ali waci Karacan, Lozan Konferansi ve Ismet Paga (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 19U3) (The Lausanne Conference and Ismet Pasha). 222

KAZIM KARABEKIR PASHA (1882-191+9)

General Karabekir was b o m in Istanbul in 1882. He was the

son of Mehmet Emin Pasha of a well known family in Karaman. Graduated

from the Military School and Staff College as a captain in 190$, he

served the Balkan and First World War. After the Armistice of 1918

he had managed to keep his troops intact in Eastern Anatolia. He joined

the Kemalist Movement and defeated the Armenians in December 1920.

Karabekir was one of the group that did not favor the abolition of the

Caliphate and in 1921+ joined the opposition Progressive Party of the

Republic. He went into retirement in 1926, but returned to public

life after the death of Atattlrk in 1938. He was elected Republican

People's Party deputy from Istanbul in 1939 and became the President of the Grand National Assembly in 191+6. After a number of articles and speeches delivered critizing Atattlrk he became a controversial figure. He died in 191+9

A-1+0 G8vsa, op. cit., p. 206. See also F. Kandemir, Kazim Karabekir (Istanbul: Sinan Matbaasi, 191*8). 223

HtJSEYIN RAUF ORBAY (Rauf Bey) (1881 - )

Rauf Bey is best known as a naval hero, but he also held

important positions in the Ottoman Government and the Kemalist period.

B o m in Istanbul in 1881, Rauf Bey was a graduate of the Naval

Academy (1905) and won fame as the captain of the cruiser Hamidiye

during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). He was Minister of the Ottoman

Navy during the First World War, and signed the Mudros Armistice of

1918.

Rauf Bey, who was in exile in Malta returned to Turkey and was

the only Ottoman Minister to Join the Kemalists. While a liberal,

Rauf Bey disagreed with Atattlrk in regard to the abolition of the

Caliphate. He joined the Progressive Party of the Republic in 192U

which was dissolved in 1925. Rauf Bey went into retirement in 1926

and returned to public life after Atatflrk's death in 1938. He was

elected deputy of Kastsmonu. Rauf Bey was ambassador to London from

19L2 to 19Ui and his views on foreign affairs were significant in

• their influence in Turkish foreign policy during and after the War.

Rauf Orbay is now in retirement. He is considered an elder statesman.

Unfortunately, he has not written his memoirs,^”^

A-l»l GBvsa, og. cit., pp. 292-293. See also Peyami Safa, Muhterem Heyet-i Veklle Reislmiz Rauf Bey (Istanbul: Orhaniye Matbaasi, no date) (The Chairman of bur Council of Ministers, the Honorable Rauf Bey) 22k

BEKIR SAMI (n.a. - 1932)

Bekir Sami Bey, served in different government positions during

the early 1900s including that of Governor of Trabzon following the

1908 Young Turk Revolution. Although an official of the early Kemalist period, he did not promote any outstanding new ideas or policies, but followed the Kemalist policy set forth by Atatflrk and InBntt. He is important mainly as one of the very first Kemalist foreign office officials and diplomats. He was the first Kemalist Foreign Minister in 1920, and the first diplomatic negotiator sent to Moscow (May 1920).

He was sent to London during the February-March 1921, but his negotia­ tions there were rejected by Mustafa Kemal as unsatisfactory because they did not fulfill the minimum nationalist aims embodied in the

Milli Misak (National Pact). The date of his birth is unknown, he was

A -)i9 a graduate of Galatasaray, and died in 1932.

^“^2 GBvsa, 0£. cit., p. 69. APPENDIX J

GLOSSARY OF TURKISH TERMS

Anadolui Anatolia, Asia Minor Bay: (before name) Mr. m o d e m usage Bey: (following name) Mr.j title. Older usage Bflyflk Millet Meclisi: Grand National Assembly Cihat: Jihadj Muslim Holy War Cumhuriyet: republic 9erkes: Circassian Efendi: Effendi, a title (following name) Mr. Etatism: State capitalism, statism Fetva: Muslim juridical decision or ruling Firka: Political party, army brigade Firman: Ferman, royal decree Garp Mefkuresi: Western ideal Gazi: Ghazi, victor, conqueror Gerilla: Guerilla Grand Vizier: Prime Minister Haci: Hadji, pilgrim, one who has been to Mecca Hakim: judge Hakimiyet-i milliye: National sovereignty Halk: people, folk Halkjilik: populism, "Democratic” spirit Hanim: (following name) Mrs., Miss (old usage). New usage, bay an before name. Harp: War Harbiye Mektebi: War College Heyet: commission, body Hiiafet: Caliphate Hoca: Hodja, mosque school teacher, religious functionary Hukuk: Law, jurisprudence Hflktimet: Government Hflrriyet: liberty, freedom Ihtilal: revolution, insurrection Iktisadi: economic Imam: Muslim preacher, leader of public worship in mosque Imperatorluk: empire Inkilap: reformation, revolution Inkiraz: decline, decay, fall Islahat: reforms Istikl&l: independence Ip: labor, work, task, business Ittihadi Islam: Pan-Islamism Ittihat ve Terakki Firkasi: Committee.of Union and Progress Kadi: cadi, Muslim judge Kanun: Law Kanunu Esasi: fundamental law, constitution Kismet: fate, destiny Kuran: Koran, Qur'an Kuvay-i inzibatiye: disciplinary forces, Army of the Caliphate Kuvay-i milliye: nationalist forces, irregular Kemalist forces Kuvay-i nizamiye: regular Army Lira: basic money unit, Turkish pound Liva: administrative subdivision of Ottoman province Maarif: education, public instruction Maliye: finance Matbaa: printing-house Matbuat: press Mebus: deputy Mecelle: Mejelle, Muslim Civil Code Meclis: Majlis, Medjlis, parliament, council Meclis-i Mebusan: parliament, chamber of deputies Mecmua: journal, magazine Medrese: Madrassah, Muslim school attached to mosque Memleket: country, fatherland Memur: official, functionary Merkez: center, headquarters, seat of government Mejrutiyet: constitutional government Milli Misak: National Pact Millet: nation Millet system: Ottoman administration of non-Muslim subjects Milli Mefkure: National ideal Molla: Mulla, Muslim municipal judge, learned man, doctor of theology Muhtar: alderman, village headman Muhtariyet: autonomy Muntazam: regular Muaavat: equality Mutedil: moderate Mtldtlr: Director Mtlfti: Doctor of Islamic law, rank of Mufti Mttlkiye Mektebi: Political Science School, Civil Service School Nejriyat: publication Nizamname: regulation Nutuk: speech Osraanli: Ottoman Osmanli Imperatorlugu: Ottoman Empire Pad!yah: Sovereign, Sultan, King Paja: General, also civilian title Reddi ilhak: rejection of annexation or occupation Rum: Greek minority in Ottoman Empire (from "Roman") Rumeli: Rumelia 227

Sadrazam: Prime Minister, Minister Sancak: Sandjak, administrative provincial subdivision of the Ottoman Empire Seyyar kuwetler: mobile forces, irregular forces Softa: student of Muslim theology, fanatic Soyadi! family name (family names were adopted in Turkey in 1935) Sfinni: Sunni, Sunnite sect of Islam 5ark mefkuresi: Eastern ideal §eriyet: Sheriat, Shari'a, Muslim divine law, sacred law $eyh: Sheikh, Chief, preacher §>eyhuli8lam: Sheikh-ul-Islam, head of Muslim hierarchy §5ii: Shi'a, Shiite, Shiite sect of Islam §ura: council, assembly, board $uray-i devlet: Council of State Tanzimatj Reformation of 1839 Tarihs history Turan: legendary homeland of the Turks in Turkestan Turanci: Turanist, Pan-Turanist Tttrjttltlk: TurkLsm Tttrkiye: Turkey Tflrkiye Cumhuriyeti: Turkish Republic Tfirk Ocagis Turkish Hearth, a cultural society Tttrk Yurdus Turkish Homeland, a cultural society and journal Ulema: savants, learned men of Islam, interpreters of the Qur’an Vali: Governor of a province Vilayet: Province Vatan: Homeland, fatherland Vekalet: Ministry Vekil: Minister Vezirs: vezier, minister Yeniperi: Janissaries, nNew soldiers'* Yunanistan: Greece Yunanli: Greek Zabit: officer Ziraat: agriculture