Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks PR.Ollferation August 1993 of WEAPONS of MASS OTA-ISC-559 ~
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Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks PR.OllFERATION August 1993 Of WEAPONS Of MASS OTA-ISC-559 ~..... ION NTIS order #PB94-107612 GPO stock #052-003-01335-5 Recommended Citation: U.S. Congress, Office of “kchnology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Rish, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993). Foreword hroughout history, human beings have been able to annihilate each other without weapons of mass destruction. However, the development of such weapons has greatly reduced the time and effort needed to kill, giving small nations and even subnational groups the ability to destroy lives on a scale that few nations could otherwiseT manage. Such mass killing does not require state-of-the-art technology; the basic technologies underlying chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons date back to World Wars I and II. Now, modern technologies—and the ever-increasing flow of goods, information, and people across national borders-can place these deadly capabilities in many more hands. Occasionally, the United States may directly influence another state’s decision to pursue weapons of mass destruction. More often, nonproliferation efforts of the United States-together with other countries and international institutions such as the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency—must operate indirectly. By establishing a system of obstacles, disincentives, rewards, and international norms or rules of behavior, nonproliferation measures are intended to lessen the desire for and increase the costs of acquiring these weapons. The challenge is to accomplish this objective in a world where states still threaten one another, and where military power is still viewed as the ultimate guarantor of national survival. Even so, several recent international trends offer us hope that proliferation might be slowed or even reversed. OTA has been asked by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, with the endorsement of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, to assist Congress in its efforts to strengthen and broaden U.S. policies to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This report describes what nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons can do, analyzes the consequences of their spread for the United States and the world, and summarizes technical aspects of monitoring and controlling their production. (A separate background paper analyzes the technologies underlying nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and delivery systems in greater depth.) This report also explains the array of policy tools that can be used to combat proliferation, identifying tradeoffs and choices that confront policymakers. A forthcoming report will analyze specific sets of nonproliferation policy options in detail. OTA gratefully acknowledges the contributions of many individuals, firms, and government agencies who assisted its research and writing for this report. Roger C. Herdman, Director A dvisory Panel James E. Goodby, chairl Robert G. Gough Marvin M. Miller Distinguished Service Professor Senior Member, Technical Staff Senior Research Scientist Carnegie-Mellon University Sandia National Laboratories Department of Nuclear Engineering Massachusetts Institute of Technology James F. Leonard, chair2 Elisa D. Harris3 Executive Director Senior Research Analyst Janne E. Nolan Washington Council on The Brookings Institution Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Non-Proliferation The Brookings Institution Geoffrey Kemp George Anzelon Senior Associate William C. Potter Associate Division Leader Carnegie Endowment for Director Lawrence Livermore National International Peace Center for Russian and Soviet Studies Laboratory Monterey Institute of Joshua Lederberg4 International Studies Will D. Carpenter Rockefeller University chemical Industry Consultant Barbara Hatch Rosenberg John W. Lewis Division of Natural Sciences Lewis A. Dunn Center for International State University of Assistant Vice President Security and Arms Control New York at Purchase Science Applications Stanford University International Corp. Lawrence Scheinman Lee W. Mercer Associate Director Randall Forsberg Corporate Export Manager Peace Studies Program Executive Director Digital Equipment Corp. Cornell University Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies Matthew S. Meselson Leonard S. Spector Department of Biochemistry Senior Associate Thomas R. Fox and Molecular Biology Carnegie Endowment for Director Harvard University International Peace Office of National Security Technology Stephen M. Meyer Sergio C. Trindade Pacific Northwest Laboratories President Center for International Studies 2 Massachusetts Institute of SE T International, Ltd. Alan R. Goldhammer Technology Director of Technical Affairs Industrial Biotechnology Gary Milhollin Association Director 1 Resigned Max. 22, 1993. Wisconsin Project on Nuclear 2 P=l mem~r ~ti J- 1 ~ 193; John M. Googin Arms Control Panel chair after June 1, 1993. Senior Staff Consultant 3 Resigned Jan. 29, 1S93.” Martin Marietta Energy 4 ~-officio; Ivkmbr of ~olo~ Systems, Inc. Assessment Advisory Council. NOTE: OTA appciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panel members. The panel does not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report ~d the accuracy of its contents. - -- Iv — Preject Staff Peter Blair Gerald L. Epstein ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF Assistant Director, OTA Project Director Energy, Materials, and International Jacqueline Robinson Boykin Security Division Thomas H. Karas Office Administrator Alan Shaw Jonathan B. Tucker Louise Staley Program Manager Administrative Secretary International Security and CONTRACTORS Commerce Program Dan Fenstermacher v Additional Reviewers Steve Fetter Joseph Pilat John Steinbruner University of Maryland Center for National Security Director, Foreign Policy Studies College Park, MD Studies Program Los Alamos National Laboratory The Brookings Institution Thomas W. Graham Los Alamos, NM Washington, DC International Security program, Rockefeller Foundation Lawrence Sequist Victor A. Utgoff New York, NY Office of the Secretary of Defense Deputy Director-Strategy, Forces, Washington, DC and Resources Division Institute for Defense Analyses Alexandria, VA NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the reviewers. l%e panel does not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report and the accuracy of its contents. vi 1 contents 1 Introduction and Summary 1 Introduction 2 Major Findings 4 Weapon Characteristics and Comparisons 7 Implications of Proliferation 11 Proliferation Threats and Prospects 12 The Nonproliferation Policy Context 19 Conflicting Objectives 25 Conflicting Approaches 29 Technical Basis for Monitoring and Controlling Proliferation 32 2 Assessing the Risks 45 Weapons of Mass Destruction 46 Weapon Effects Compared 52 Near-Term Proliferation Threats: Suspected Proliferant Nations 63 Implications of Proliferation 69 A New Dimension to Proliferation: Risks From the Breakup of the Soviet Union 75 Appendix 2-A-Sources on Tables Listing Countries of Chemical and Biological Weapon Concern 79 3 Policy Background 83 Imposing Obstacles to Proliferation 84 Disincentives to Proliferants 93 Rewards for Abstention 98 When Nonproliferation Fails 109 Special and Urgent: Limiting Proliferation From the Former Soviet Union 111 Appendix 3-A-Costs and Benefits of Onsite Inspections for Nonproliferation Regimes 113 Index 117 vii Introduction and Summary 1 ince the end of the Cold War, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has become much more prominent in U.S. national security and foreign policy planning. Revelations about Iraqi, North Korean, South African,s and Israeli nuclear weapon programs, the possibility of a nuclear arms race in South Asia, and the multidimensional conflicts in the Middle East all point to the immediacy of this problem. Adding a dangerous new twist is the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a superpower armed with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons whose successor states are wracked by economic crises and political instability. At least three main factors underlie this renewed emphasis on proliferation. First, the reduced military threat from the former Soviet Union has increased the relative importance of lesser powers, especially if armed with weapons of mass destruction. Second, certain international political and technological trends are increasing the threat to international security from prolifera- tion. Third, new opportunities are opening for enhancing the current international regimes designed to stem proliferation. Since at least as far back as the 1960s, when it sponsored the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the United States has recog- nized that proliferation is a global problem and combating it requires high levels of international cooperation. This country has also exerted unilateral influence, successfully in several cases, to discourage proliferation; it will no doubt continue to do so. Nevertheless, placing priority on nonproliferation will require the further development and enforcement of interna- tional norms and behavior supporting that objective. Inter-