Geoforum 33 2002) 1±14 www.elsevier.com/locate/geoforum
The political ecology of poverty alleviation in Zimbabwe's Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources CAMPFIRE) B. Ikubolajeh Logan a, William G. Moseley b
a Department of Geography, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602-2502, USA b Department of Geography, Northern Illinois University, Dekalb, IL 60115-2854, USA Received 13 November 2000; in revised form 25 June 2001
Abstract The CAMPFIRE program in Zimbabwe is one of a `new breed' of strategies designed to tackle environmental management at the grassroots level. CAMPFIRE aims to help rural communities to manage their resources, especially wildlife, for their own local development. The program's central objective is to alleviate rural poverty by giving rural communities autonomy over resource management and to demonstrate to them that wildlife is not necessarily a hindrance to arable agriculture, ``but a resource that could be managed and `cultivated' to provide income and food''. In this paper, we assess two important elements of CAMPFIRE: poverty alleviation and local empowerment and comment on the program's performance in achieving these highly interconnected objectives. We analyze the program's achievements in poverty alleviation by exploring tenurial patterns, resource ownership and the allocation of proceeds from resource exploitation; and its progress in local empowerment by examining its administrative and decision making structures. We conclude that the program cannot eectively achieve the goal of poverty alleviation without ®rst addressing the administrative and legal structures that underlie the country's political ecology. Ó 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Political ecology; Poverty alleviation; Community-empowerment; CAMPFIRE
1. Introduction sorship of the country's Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management DNPWLM with a focus on Over the past few decades, rural-based, grassroots game management), the World Wildlife Fund with a programs GRPs) have become increasingly popular in focus on resource conservation), the Zimbabwe Trust the Third World. These community-based enterprises an NGO, with a focus on rural development), and the have gained impetus in the 1990s from ecotourism and University of Zimbabwe Center for Applied Social Sci- the global environmental movement and its associated ence with a primary interest in policy research) Mur- international conferences, especially Rio, the 1992 phree, 1997). CAMPFIRE is one of the most celebrated United Nations Conference on Environment and De- of its genre because of its perceived success in taking velopment cf. Ahmed and Doeleman, 1995). GRPs aim policy and its rewards `to the people' Metcalf, 1994; to encourage local communities to engage in sustainable Camp®re Collaborative Group, 1991; CASS, WWF, resource management for their own direct as opposed ZimTrust, 1989; CASS, 1998). The program aspires to to national) economic development. In this sense, GRPs reduce rural poverty by convincing local communities are, ®rst and foremost, poverty alleviation programs that wildlife is an economic asset rather than an im- that are underpinned by a conservation philosophy. pediment to agricultural production. Its de®nition of Zimbabwe's Communal Areas Management Pro- agriculture, therefore, compares arable cultivation, cat- gramme for Indigenous Resources CAMPFIRE) is a tle rearing and wildlife management as economic alter- GRP established in 1989 under the direction and spon- natives vying for the use of the same scarce land and water resources. CAMPFIRE approaches wildlife management both E-mail addresses: [email protected] B.I. Logan), moseley@geog. as an antidote for rural poverty and as a proactive niu.edu W.G. Moseley). mechanism for redressing the negative economic im-
0016-7185/01/$ - see front matter Ó 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 0 1 6 - 7 1 8 5 0 1 ) 0 0 027-6 2 B.I. Logan, W.G. Moseley / Geoforum 33 02002) 1±14 pacts of environmental crises like droughts. The pro- Broch-Due and Schroeder, 2000). A number of recent gram is guided by three fundamental principles towards political ecology studies speci®cally examine land tenure these ends: i) wildlife is an agricultural resource and issues and human±wildlife interactions in eastern and game management may be perceived as a form of agri- southern Africa e.g., Shivji, 1998; Neumann, 1999; Igoe culture; ii) tensions should not exist between arable and Brockington, 1999). agriculture and game management since scarce re- Our approach to poverty alleviation is restricted to sources are being allocated to the best economic alter- the program's stated objective to increase rural food native; iii) game management can be a complement to access. In this sense, poverty alleviation may be assessed arable agriculture and vice versa, ipso facto, there by comparing household income from food crop har- should be no con¯ict between the economic survival of vests and game management household revenues ob- agricultural communities and the foraging needs of tained directly from the program). Admittedly, wildlife cf. Murphree, 1993, 1997). households are likely also to gain bene®ts from com- General perception that CAMPFIRE has successfully munity-wide projects. However, the longer term bene®ts put these principles into practice has led to widespread of rural education and health projects are beyond the scrutiny of its implementation strategies, performance scope of this study. record, impacts on rural communities, and possible The rest of the discussion in this paper is in three transferability to other African countries with similar sections. After presenting a brief background to the resources see, for example, Derman, 1991; King, 1994; program in Section 2, we use Section 3 to assess our Hill, 1996; Metcalf, 1994; Wunder, 1997; Dix, 1996; initial proposition by outlining the political ecology of CASS, 1998; Patel, 1998). We attempt to contribute to poverty, ®rst from a general conceptual perspective, and this general discourse by contemplating upon the im- second with speci®c reference to rural food access under pacts of the program on poverty alleviation and com- CAMPFIRE. 1 In Section 4, we discuss CAMPFIRE's munity empowerment. We frame this broad objective in limitations at poverty alleviation by drawing attention terms of the working proposition that certain design and to two problems: i) design shortcomings related to the administrative weaknesses of CAMPFIRE limit its de®nition of the community of resource owners; ii) ability to redress problems of resource autonomy and, implementation shortcomings related a) to failures in therefore, to tackle eectively the political ecology of the legal transformation of state resources to commons rural poverty in Zimbabwe. resources, and b) to administrative bottlenecks that This study is based largely on a critical review of the undermine local autonomy in resource management. literature, including the synthesis of a number of case studies of speci®c CAMPFIRE programs. This analysis is supplemented by information from over 160 semi- 2. Background to CAMPFIRE structured interviews that were conducted by the second author in 1996 with villagers and civil servants in 25 of One of the more robust features of CAMPFIRE is Zimbabwe's 50 districts) in order to understand the seen to be its local, Zimbabwean origin. As noted by Zimbabwean rural economy Earl and Moseley, 1996). Murphree 1997, p. 1) `its initial conception was in a The CAMPFIRE program was often discussed within government agency and not by ``NGOs'' and their al- the context of these interviews in areas of the country lies;... and its implementation has had a high degree of where the programme was active. heterogeneity'. There is sucient evidence to indicate We contextualize political ecology in Zimbabwe in that the program's original conception aspired to true terms of the historical, administrative and legal struc- bottom-up planning with a focus on community input tures that relegate the poor to marginal areas, and the and autonomy. This objective apparently emanated legal structures within which CAMPFIRE is being im- from the experiences of an earlier program, Wildlife plemented and which maintain the status quo in re- Industries New Development for All WINDFALL), source distribution and control. Political ecology initiated in 1978 as a conservation strategy by ecologists broadly refers to the political economy of human±en- at the DNPWLM Derman, 1996). WINDFALL's ma- vironment interactions. Bryant and Bailey 1997) note jor goal was to reduce soil degradation in the communal that political ecology helps situate the ®ndings of local areas. The program's poverty alleviation goals were level empirical research in theoretical and comparative subsidiary to its broader environmental concerns. Eco- perspective. Unequal relations between actors are a key nomic bene®ts to rural communities were speci®c to factor in understanding patterns of human±environment minimizing con¯icts between wildlife and local agricul- interaction and associated environmental problems. A ture, increasing the protein intake of villagers by making variety of approaches to political ecology have been discussed in the literature see, for example, Blaikie, 1985; Blaikie and Brook®eld, 1987; Watts, 1987; Basset, 1 Our de®nition of food security is limited to the narrow case of the 1988; Peet and Watts, 1996; Stott and Sullivan, 2000; amount of food harvest with or without CAMPFIRE. B.I. Logan, W.G. Moseley / Geoforum 33 02002) 1±14 3 meat from wildlife culls in adjacent game reserves ¯awed in terms of meeting these goals, and that its im- available to them, and improving rural economic plementation may have deviated rather signi®cantly wherewithal by reverting to villagers some of the funds from some of its fundamental principles. Both of these from safari hunting Murphree, 1997; Moore, 1997). problems place serious limitations on the program's By many accounts cf. CASS, 1998; Moore, 1997), poverty alleviation potential. WINDFALL failed to achieve these broad objectives for a variety of reasons. Rhodesia' s racially based decision making system made the administrative distance be- 3. CAMPFIRE and poverty alleviation through food tween local communities and the actual decision makers access quite cumbersome. The conservation objectives of the program were also in¯uenced by the desire of the CAMPFIRE's poverty alleviation objectives are Rhodesian government to maintain a racially based based on the principle that a strong relationship exists political ecology in which the most productive land was between poverty and environmental degradation e.g., under white control. Since land redistribution was Mellor, 1988; Beckerman, 1992; World Bank, 1992, anathema to the minority government, WINDFALL 1996; UNCED, 1993; Barrett, 1996). 2 The Brundtland was a policy windfall in the sense that it provided a Report, one of the earliest documents to advance this mechanism by which the status quo could be maintained relationship, asserts that `[t]hose who are poor and without addressing land reform, an important aspect of hungry will often destroy their immediate environment the rural political ecology. Simultaneously, the program in order to survive...' WCED, 1987, p. 28). This ar- encouraged rural communities to believe that they could gument further supports contentions that poverty often eke out a living in marginal areas by becoming custo- leads to unsustainable agriculture and food insecurity dians of wildlife for the lucrative gaming industry. With Timberlake, 1987; Durning, 1989); and deforestation its primary focus on environmental conservation, through inecient energy practices Arday®o, 1986). WINDFALL avoided the complexities of the country's The perceived proclivity of poor societies for environ- political ecology, especially the contentious issues of mental degradation is explained in terms of their high land redistribution and legal control over resources. rate of time preference and related high personal and Two instructive lessons that came out of the WIND- social discount rates. As Broad 1994, p. 812) points out, FALL experience are that resource conservation is as `[t]he poor are short-term maximizers who are forced to much a socioeconomic as an ecological task, and that a degrade in order to survive'. Murphree's statement be- successful rural resource management program must in- low situates the Zimbabwe case in similar circumstances: corporate local knowledge and participation in its design and implementation Moore, 1997). One of CAMP- [g]rowing population in Zimbabwe has resulted in FIRE's initial objectives was to meld ecological and the increased exploitation of marginal land for sub- economic goals together by grounding the program in sistence agriculture which would have been better local conceptions of community and resource ownership. suited for wildlife... A culture of poverty [exists] The mission to ground CAMPFIRE's implementa- in which the individual is preoccupied with survival tion in the local context is guided by several principles in the present and where any eective concern for formulated by ecologists, many of whom had partici- the future is missing. A culture of poverty is one pated in WINDFALL: local resources must have value in which the future is discounted at a very high rate. in terms of local calculus local communities must be This is a recipe for accelerated degradation because able to assess the dierential worth of their assets in poverty is both the cause and the eect of environ- their own terms); local communities should be made to mental degradation. Murphree, 1993, 1±2). recognize that increasingly better game management would bring them increasingly higher revenues; the greatest share of the revenues from the exploitation of The view that the poor may be their own worst en- game should revert to the local community Rural vironmental enemies undergirds three, closely interre- District Councils RDCs) must ensure that the com- lated, CAMPFIRE goals: i) to reduce poverty as a munity in which wildlife is shot receives at least 80% of necessary if not sucient) condition for environmental the revenues from the kill); and production and man- conservation and game management and ii) to trans- agement decisions about resources and the dispensation form the structure of resource control from state to of the funds accruing from their exploitation, should be communal ownership and iii) to manage game within made at the local level. Given these guidelines, it is clear that CAMPFIRE places more emphasis than its prede- 2 cessor on bridging the ecological-economics gap in re- There is a broad literature questioning the poverty induced environmental degradation thesis e.g., Logan, 1991; Broad, 1994; source management. Much of the CAMPFIRE research Martinez-Alier, 1995; Reardon and Vosti, 1995; Hueting, 1996; Scherr, suggests, however, that the program's structure may be 2000; Moseley, 2001). 4 B.I. Logan, W.G. Moseley / Geoforum 33 02002) 1±14
Table 1 Sources of CAMPFIRE revenues
Revenue type Description
Trophy hunting This provides the highest proportion of income under CAMPFIRE. Trophy hunters are willing to pay higher fees and require less infrastructure than other types of tourists Nature tourism A distant second to trophy hunting in terms of revenues. Five CAMPFIRE Districts earned money from tourism in 1993 Harvesting natural products Communities sell natural products such as crocodile, timber and river sand. Skins and ivory are sold from `problem animals' Live animal sales An occasional source of revenue. For example, Guruve District sold 10 roan antelope, earning US$50,000 in 1994 Meat cropping Culling impala and other abundant wildlife species for their meat and selling their skins is a common practice in program areas. This is done under the supervision of the Department of National Parks. Revenues from this source have been negligible since 1990
Source: Africa Resources Trust 1995a). the new tenure structure as a means towards increased arabani District to US $375,000 in Kariba District food production and reduced poverty. In essence, pov- Nyaminyami communal area) Africa Resources Trust, erty alleviation, environmental conservation and game 1995a). Revenue variations are signi®cant even within management are seen to be synergistic, each serving as a districts and between short time periods. In 1990, solution for the other, each feeding o the other. This Kanyurira obtained $74,190 up from $47,000 in 1989) underlying sentiment is captured in the following state- while adjacent Chapoto obtained $24,075 down from ment by USAID 1997, p. 1) `CAMPFIRE provides $53,000 in 1989) Hasler, 1991). opportunities to villages to generate additional earnings Funds obtained from the program are used to build through sustainable use of natural resources... First or upgrade educational and health facilities, improve hand experience of the economic bene®ts derived from transport infrastructure, and subsidize household in- sustainable wildlife management has led to improved comes. The projects bring in other community bene®ts supervision of communally owned natural resources'. such as shareholder dividends and employment in co- Notwithstanding broad armations of this nature, the operative activities. extent to which the program's poverty alleviation goals The data in Table 2 show that the estimated annual through food production and other means are being monetary bene®t from CAMPFIRE in 1996/97 was successfully obtained is still open to debate. Z$84 per household US$8.4 in 1996 exchange rates). In 1989 when CAMPFIRE was initiated, USAID However, only 52% of this amount Z$43.68 per disbursement for village support was US$186,268, in- household), instead of the 80% prescribed by the pro- creasing to US$906,400 by 1996/97. This amount, typi- gram, was actually distributed to communities. Since cally start-up advances to communities, is to be repaid game management withdraws resources from agricul- in order to provide funds to enroll other communities in ture, this income could be used to assess the poverty the program. During the start-up phase, the CAMP- alleviation impacts of the program in terms of foregone FIRE agency also provides technical support to survey agricultural production. resources, and train wildlife managers. After the project The household revenue of Z$43.68 derived from is operational, the agency reduces both its ®nancial and CAMPFIRE can be used to purchase 17.47 kg of maize technical support with the expectation that the project grain at 1996 prices of Z$2.5/kg. Given an average rural will become self-reliant. household size of 5.6 persons Government of Zimba- By the end of 1997, there were one hundred and bwe, 1996) this amount of maize grain could feed a rural eighty-®ve communities about 200,000 households) in- family for six days, based on two empirical estimates for volved in CAMPFIRE projects, many in areas like Zimbabwe: i) the energy value for maize grain is 3630 Binga, Chipinge, Chiredzi, Hurungwe, Hwange, Kariba, kcal per kilogram Platt, 1962) 3 and ii) the average Karoi, and Nyanga, which have the potential to bene®t rural Zimbabwean 4 requires a minimum of 1900 kcal of from tourism and wildlife management USAID, 1998). food energy per day Food and Agricultural Organiza- Program communities generate income from a variety of sources, including trophy hunting, nature tourism, live animal sales and meat cropping Table 1). Consumptive activities, such as trophy hunting, accounted for 90% of 3 Although dated, this study continues to be the reference point for all revenues in 1996/97 USAID, 1998). estimating the caloric value of African foods. 4 This ®gure does not disaggregate the population but refers to a per CAMPFIRE revenues vary widely by district. In capita requirement, i.e., the mean requirement across the age/sex 1993, gross incomes ranged from US $8,000 in Muz- range. B.I. Logan, W.G. Moseley / Geoforum 33 02002) 1±14 5
Table 2 Indicator data for CAMPFIRE Project
Indicator 1989 1996/97
No. of communities in program 15 185 No. of households in program 9000 200,000 No. of stand-alone programs 0 2 CAMPFIRE bene®ts USD) $349,811 $1,732,452 USAID disbursements to $186,268 $906,400 Bene®ts per household $Zim) $44 $84 Percentage of CAMPFIRE revenues to communities Not available 52% to communities 15±25% to RDCs Percentage of CAMPFIRE revenue from 100% 90% consumptive activities Status of natural resources and wildlife Rapid habitat loss and Moderate habitat loss and stable declining wildlife wildlife population
Source: USAID 1998). tion, 1993). With a per capita requirement of 0.52 kg of harvest for Binga which is likely to be closer to reality maize per day 1900 kcal/3630 kcal), a 5.6 person family because it is based on a localized study), food access, in would require 2.9 kg of grain per day 5:6 persons  terms of total harvest, seems to decrease under the 0:52 kg=day. 17.47 kg of maize would last the family program's wildlife management focus. It is noteworthy about six days 17.47 kg/2.9 kg per day). that there is no empirical evidence to date not even The opportunity costs of participating in the program from program organizers) to suggest that household can be estimated in terms of crop damage from wildlife. incomes from CAMPFIRE participation is sucient to A recent survey in Sinamusanga Ward, Binga District, oset crop damage/food loss in any community. Essen- by Wunder 1997) indicates that villagers lose 8.25% of tially, there is, as yet, no evidence of net household their maize, sorghum and millet, annually, primarily to bene®t from CAMPFIRE participation when this is elephant and hippo damage. Another study by one of estimated in terms of access to food. the present authors Earl and Moseley, 1996) estimates Although our analyses represent, at best, a broad that the average annual agricultural output per house- approximation, they point to inadequacies in CAMP- hold in Binga is about 582 kg. Given these two basic FIRE's food security goals. In addition to the direct benchmarks crop production-crop damage), crop loss crop losses mentioned above, many CAMPFIRE to wildlife in Binga is approximately 48 kg of grain households forfeit a quarter of their animal protein in- 8:25  582 kg) or 16.4 days of food for the household take due to the restrictions on hunting imposed by 48 kg/2.9 kg). Even this broad scale of analysis suggests program administrators. Household losses are aggra- that the ratio of bene®t to loss in Binga is 6:16. vated by the disproportionate allocation of safari reve- Similar calculations can be made using the national nues in favor of the Rural District Councils RDCs) we average for maize and millet harvests in communal areas shall return to this point in a later section). for the 1990±1996 period, given as 198 kg per capita or Thomas 1995, p. 9) notes that `[t]he strategies 1109 kg per 5.6 person household FEWS and NEWU, adopted by individual participants in CAMPFIRE will 1998). In this case the loss related to wildlife damage depend upon their perception that the costs incurred in would be 91.5 kg 8.25%  1109 kg) or 31.5 days of food ``producing'' wildlife are more than oset by the bene®ts 91.5/2.9 kg). The crop loss estimate would be even received in return' see also, Nhira, 1993; Alexander and higher 277 kg of grain or 96 days of food 5 if recent McGregor, 1996). A thorough study to determine these damage estimates for Guruve District 25%) were used net bene®ts would have to include a wide array of losses Kleitz, 1998). including cash crops and animals) and bene®ts in- As shown in Table 3, based on existing evidence, the cluding long term returns from community-wide pro- household opportunity costs of participating in the jects). 6 However, it would seem that the program's CAMPFIRE program in terms of food harvest) can be poverty alleviation record is questionable when assessed estimated variously as 16.4, 31.5 and 96 days of food. strictly in terms of food access harvests less crop Using these estimates, food loss varies from 10 days in damage and loss of meat plus safari revenues). Binga using one harvest estimate) to as much as 90 days in Guruve. Even if one accepts the more conservative 6 The problematic nature of community projects is shown in Chapoto Ward where the local committee is unrepresentative of the 5 This loss would be higher if one included cash crops in total crop ethnic and social diversity of the village and community decisions production. alienates some households. 6 B.I. Logan, W.G. Moseley / Geoforum 33 02002) 1±14
Table 3 Bene®ts and costs of participating in the CAMPFIRE program in terms of food production
Area Bene®t Cost Net days of food lost or Grain weight Days of food for Loss estimate Harvest Loss estimate Days of food lost gained for kg) household %) kg) kg) for household household)
Sinamusanga 17.47 6 8.25a 582b 48 16.4 )10.4 Ward Binga District) Sinamusanga 17.47 6 8.25a 1109c 91.5 31.5 )25.5 Ward Binga District) Guruve District 17.47 6 25d 1109c 277 96 )90 a Loss estimate for Sinamusanga Ward from Wunder 1997, p. 171). b Harvest estimate for Sinamusanga Ward from Earl and Moseley 1996, p. 69) c National average harvest for communal lands for the 1990±96 period FEWS and NEWU, 1997). d Loss estimate from Kleitz 1998).
The program's record on environmental manage- substitute for arable agriculture, and that local com- ment, the second part of the poverty environment munities have not been made to feel that game man- equation, is also rather mixed. The information in agement is the best economic option for their scarce Table 2 indicates that the natural environment has resources. improved from `rapid habitat loss and declining wild- life' in 1989 to `moderate habitat loss and stable wild- life' in 1997. Unfortunately, USAID does not explain 4. CAMPFIRE and the political ecology of resource how `rapid' and `moderate' have been operationalized. management The information suggests implicitly that increased wildlife population is necessarily benign on the envi- What are some possible explanations for CAMP- ronment and on local communities. However, there FIRE's limited progress in obtaining its goal of poverty may not be sucient justi®cation for this position. alleviation through increased food access, wildlife Many CAMPFIRE households continue to engage in management and community empowerment? This arable production because wildlife management has yet question may be explored by assessing some important to demonstrate that it can provide a subsistence stan- issues in the political ecology of resource management in dard of living. In this situation, increased game means a country where resource distribution has traditionally increased competition between agriculture and wildlife been race based, and where rural poverty can be reduced management. only through profound restructuring of the mechanisms The human±environment achievements of the pro- of resource control. When CAMPFIRE is viewed within gram, therefore, can be assessed in terms of the tensions this context, its shortcomings at poverty alleviation may between arable production and wildlife management be attributed partly to its avoidance both in design and and the various ways in which this aects the ability of implementation) of certain historical and political real- communities to meet their subsistence needs: reduced ities surrounding resource ownership in the country cf. standards of living because RDCs do not have sucient Bell and Hotchkiss, 1989; Moore, 1993; Hasler, 1995). funds to compensate everyone for crop damage; de- In this section, we explore three critical dimensions of generation of the local natural capital stock due to the this problem: i) the design criteria for community combined population of game and humans cf. Cum- ownership of resources; ii) the legal structure of re- ming et al., 1997; Ben-Shar, 1996); reduced community source ownership the framework within which access to meat due to strict control of hunting by the CAMPFIRE seeks to transform state owned resources CAMPFIRE agency; escalating tensions between com- to communal ownership); and, iii) the administrative munities and wildlife because communities have little allocation of resource revenues. authority in game management for example, in one case, villagers wanted a destructive bull elephant killed, 4.1. Community ownership and community empowerment: but the safari hunter brought in by CAMPFIRE con- which community? sidered the `trophy' too small for the price he was pay- ing, and elected to pursue bigger game in another Community empowerment is conceived by the village). These drawbacks suggest that game manage- Zimbabwean government to be a process of decen- ment has not been transformed to a complement of, or tralization Murombedzi, 1992). In the speci®c context B.I. Logan, W.G. Moseley / Geoforum 33 02002) 1±14 7 of CAMPFIRE, community empowerment takes on by an unusual mixture of Shona, Ndebele and Tonga the narrow meaning of giving local communities con- speaking people Breslin, 1994) who have dierent trol over their resources in terms of complete usu- rights to dierent types of resources under dierent fructry rights. An empowered community is one in situations. As another example, the Chapoto commu- which government involvement in resource manage- nity comprises agriculturists, cattle herders and hunter- ment is limited to the role of facilitator and arbitrator, gatherers of dierent ethnic groups, a heterogeneity that not decision maker. is further complicated by class dierences Cousins et There are signi®cant questions surrounding the al., 1990; Hasler, 1991; Cousins, 1993). The social het- practicalities of community empowerment in a context erogeneity of geographically contiguous communities is where the de®nition of community might have a variety often compounded by population migration into of meanings and undertones. CAMPFIRE de®nes a CAMPFIRE areas see, for example, Murombedzi, community to be a unit of production and decision 1990). making each village, ward and district). Further stip- The notion of community is also both time dependent ulations are that a community should be at a contig- and resource speci®c. The ¯uidity of these intersections uous geographical and a cohesive social scale to is re¯ected in the case of Masoka Nabane et al., 1996) facilitate sound management decision-making Mur- where everyone residing in the village when CAMP- phree, 1997); and that it should be self-de®ned. The FIRE was initiated is regarded as part of the community three community attributes, geographic contiguity, so- for program bene®ts. On the other hand, immigrants cial homogeneity, and self-de®nition, are intuitively those who came after the initiation of the program) are reasonable policy guidelines. Yet, the ®rst two are divided into two groups: those from the surrounding fraught with conceptual and practical impediments to Valley geographically contiguous) and those from other the third, that is, to coherent local self-de®nition and regions geographically non-contiguous). While the resource sovereignty. former can become CAMPFIRE members by following An initial problem is the problematic assumption that CAMPFIRE procedures, the latter are required to go geographically contiguous units are necessarily socially through a ®ve year probationary period time depen- homogenous units that also represent resource owner- dent) before becoming CAMPFIRE members. Mem- ship units. Even though a village may be physically bership to the resource community in this case is represented on the landscape as a cohesive group of geographically unbounded, while being socially and huts, its actual kinship and lineage structure may have time bounded. quite a dierent spatial manifestation with boundaries By contrast, research among the Tonga of Binga and that are semi-permeable and in constant ¯ux. These in Bulilima and Tsholotsho Nabane et al., 1996) show kinship ties are often geographically and socially untidy, that in all three districts, permission from the chief to possibly involving stakeholders in non-contiguous areas. settle in an area automatically entitles a household to As Cousins 1993, p. 9) points out, communities can CAMPFIRE bene®ts. Many residents in the last two contain multiple overlapping identi®cations and exist as even state a desire for immigrants to serve as buer ``communities within communities''. Community de®- between them and wild game see also Dzingirai, 1994). nition is transient and the physical borders shift in re- In two of these three cases, even though admission to the sponse to dierent criteria. Those who might be local community corresponds to acceptance into the considered part of a community in one context may be resource community, newer residents pay a high price by considered outsiders in other contexts Cohen, 1985; their geographic location closer to the margins with the Scoones and Wilson, 1988). game population. Although geographic contiguity may be administra- These examples re¯ect the need for caution in as- tively useful and convenient, there are cases in which suming that geographic contiguity and social proximity geographically contiguous units can represent an an- are coincident on the landscape. In many instances, cestral community but not necessarily a resource own- members of a resource community may be spatially ership community. Geographically contiguous units disconnected by being temporarily absent, making a may not even be socially homogenous, but may be living in a nearby town or farmstead. Their physical marked by contradictory forces of cohesiveness and absence in no way suggests that they abrogate their tension: the former include lineage relations and kinship rights to community resources. It is also not inconceiv- ties attributes which have often been seen as the hall- able that a spatially proximate group can have less rights marks of traditional societies), while the latter include to resources than those who are much further away. wage dierences, unequal access to land and other ag- Recent migrants often ®t this case. ricultural inputs, and gender factors that have often Besides placing limitations on the de®nition of com- been disregarded in discourse which project communal munity, the geographic contiguity constraint is bedev- systems as homogenous social and economic units). iled by the mobility and seasonality of the resource in Communities in Gokwe, for example, are characterized question. As one author notes, it is rather questionable 8 B.I. Logan, W.G. Moseley / Geoforum 33 02002) 1±14 to place geographic contiguity restrictions on a resource fers from signi®cant crop damage due to elephant for- that has a `fugitive' nature which allows it: aging in the wet season. By the dry season when safari hunting occurs, most of the elephants have migrated to ...to in¯ict costs within one community while ben- Tsholotsho District which does not bear much crop e®ts from its use accrue in another...It is clear that damage. Tsholotsho has argued, correctly, that accord- wildlife as a resource aects, and is aected by, a ing to CAMPFIRE guidelines, it is the `producer' of the variety of groups. One or more may be small and resource, and should not have to share its revenues with reasonably homogenous. Others, because of the na- Bulilima. On these bases, in 1991, the Tsholotsho RDC ture of the resource, will be larger and more heter- terminated its participation in an ongoing quota ar- ogenous. These overlapping jurisdictions produce rangement between the two districts. Similar problems complex management problems which require in- involving territoriality, jurisdiction and ownership, oc- novative institutional arrangements Thomas, cur even at smaller geographic scales. For example the 1995, p. 2). westernmost wards of Bulilima bear the heaviest cost of game management, and have reasonable grounds to These diculties are illustrated in a hypothetical demand a greater share of safari revenues. Yet, the RDC schematic Fig. 1). CAMPFIRE programs are typically has decided that all seven wards should share the reve- organized by districts A and B in the diagram) which nues equally. are then divided into wards 1±8 in the diagram). Although the costs of game management are sig- However, the range of game, especially elephants and ni®cantly dierent from one location to another, some bualo the grey area) is often inconsistent with these districts, wards, and households which bear small administrative divisions. Several problems associated costs, enjoy substantially large relative bene®ts. In this with the de®nition of community and the distribution of way, some members of the communal society bene®t income from resource exploitation are re¯ected in the from the `free rider' principle encountered so often schematic. The ®rst is a free rider problem. Wards 1, 2 under an open access regime. This has ensued partly and 3 District A) and 5, 6, and 8 District B) bear none from the fact that the program's de®nition of the of the costs of wildlife damage but are considered to be community of owners vis a vis a `foot loose' resource part of the resource community because of their geo- seriously limits the transformation of resource man- graphic contiguity in the same district. Even portions of agement from open access to communal ownership. As Wards 4 and 7 share this problem. Another complexity enunciated in Bargaining Theory cf. Pearce and may be introduced if wildlife spend part of the year in Turner, 1990; see also, Bromley, 1992), for a commu- Ward 4 and destroy their crops, but are actually shot in nal property regime to operate properly, every partic- Ward 7. Since the two are not contiguous administra- ipant must bear costs, bene®ts accruing to participants tively they are not in the same district) Ward 4 bears the must be proportional to their actual costs and fore- costs of game management but does not enjoy any of the gone opportunity, there must be mutual assurance bene®ts. among participants that they will cooperate volun- Studies of CAMPFIRE communities in Guruve, tarily, and there must be self-imposed restrictions on Bulilima and Tshoilotsho Districts see, for example, resource consumption by all parties. Nearly all of these Hawkes, 1991; Thomas, 1995; Nabane et al., 1996) show requirements are abrogated both by the fugitive nature the potential volatility of these problems. Bulilima suf- of the resource and the rigid CAMPFIRE structure. Many participants at the village and ward levels have no assurance of mutual cooperation because decisions made at the district level, and the rules of engagement are disconnected from the locality. As long as the mutual cooperation rule breaks down, the operation of communality is also likely to break down. In addition, for some communities, eort of access is costless or nearly so due to the mobility of the resource), the discount rate is high because game management is often below the livelihood standards provided by ag- riculture), and the preservation value is low because game continues to be perceived as a deterrent to, and not a substitute for agriculture). In summary, the geographic contiguity constraint Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of the spatial tension between administra- tive divisions Districts and Wards) and wildlife range key: Dis- places signi®cant limitations on CAMPFIRE's poverty tricts Areas A and B; Wards Areas 1±8; Wildlife range Grey area alleviation potential when this is assessed in terms of in Wards 4 and 7). food access. Community as a conceptual, administrative B.I. Logan, W.G. Moseley / Geoforum 33 02002) 1±14 9 and resource unit, may mean dierent things in dierent sightful analyses of the land reform question see Ziny- localities. The de®nition changes over time and with ama, 1986; Amin, 1988; Moyo, 1995). 7 The inability of regard to the nature of the entitlements involved. the GOZ to reform the tenure laws means that Although geographic proximity cannot be ignored, it is CAMPFIRE is being implemented in legal limbo and problematic as the central guiding principle for resource within a legal structure that places serious limitations on management because membership in a common prop- the program's resource autonomy objectives. erty regime is partly a social and partly a geographic Soil conservation, especially in marginal areas, was problem. One of the tasks facing CAMPFIRE is to one of the main goals of the precolonial state's 1951 relax the geographic contiguity constraint so that each Native Land Husbandry Act NHLA), which is con- community can apply its own group membership crite- sidered by many to have laid the legislative foundation ria. The goal of community de®nition for resource for communal property rights in Zimbabwe. The Act management may best be served by reverting to the made it possible for individuals in communal areas to be original program idea that a community must be self- vested with private rights over land, with the assumption de®ned. At the same time, the geographic contiguity that privatization provides more incentives than com- constraint could be relaxed on a case by case basis to munal ownership for environmental stewardship. The respond to dierent local cultural idiosyncracies while Act required communal farmers to engage in intensive keeping the fugitive nature of the resource in mind. agriculture, with special emphasis on investments in Flexibility and adjustability are hallmarks of a suc- physical works to retard soil erosion. Its emphasis on cessful rural development program. These goals may be conservation over poverty alleviation at least from the achieved for example, by paying some attention to the point of view of the rural population) led to its sub- natural range of the more pro®table species, example version in many communal areas. Instead of improving elephants. In Fig. 1, the program's unit of administra- conservation works to obtain private tenure over mar- tion might be recon®gured to coincide with the natural ginally productive land, many rural communities opted resource unit by paying attention to community self- to extend arable agriculture to lands for which they had de®nition. only grazing rights, and to forests. They further sub- verted the government's conservation goals by encour- 4.2. The legal structure of land tenure and community aging in-migration in order to extend their territoriality. autonomy Ranger 1985) notes that by 1967, partly as a result of the interplay between the colonial government legisla- In addition to the conceptual and practical problems tion and local response, the population of Tanda was surrounding the constitution of a community, CAMP- 7350 people and 7000 cattle, in a resettlement area that FIRE's poverty alleviation potential is handicapped by was designated to support only 200 families. Between its avoidance of the tenure issue. The program's land 1945 and 1967, agricultural output in the area dropped tenure guideline speci®es that resource ownership is to from 20±40 bags per acre to 2±5 bags per acre largely as be established on the basis of a `...communal property a result of decreasing soil fertility. In eect, with the regime with strong tenurial rights...' Murphree, 1997, NHLA, environmental deterioration was accelerated, p. 7) in order to transfer proprietorship and decision- occupancy of marginal lands expanded through popu- making from the state to the community, and to trans- lation increase, and food production declined both in form land use from state ownership and de facto open aggregate and per capita terms. access to the commons. This prescription is aimed at The 1967 Tribal Trust Land Act and the 1969 Land redressing decades of policies under which rural land Tenures Act were aimed, in part, at responding to some was transformed to commercial and state ownership for of these setbacks by setting three primary goals: evict a thorough discussion of the history of colonial land blacks from `European lands', further expand the es- administration, see for example, Ilie, 1990; Thomas, tablishment of blacks in new communal areas, permit a 1995; Murphree, 1997). land market in communal areas for grazing and arable Despite the fact that land reform provided an im- agriculture. These two acts laid the foundation for the portant stimulus for the liberation struggle, and 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act which granted stewardship CAMPFIRES's own initial acknowledgment of tenure or custodianship over wildlife to communal land own- as an important element of resource management, the ers. None of these three pieces of legislation granted Government of Zimbabwe GOZ) has been unable to implement signi®cant land redistribution policies. The racially based, colonial resource ownership structure 7 remains largely in place, most CAMPFIRE communi- Since the latter part of 1998, the GOZ has taken a number of steps ties are located in the marginal zones of production Fig. to address land reform, the most signi®cant the listing of farms that would be bought for redistribution. However, most farms on the list 2) and land reform continues to be a contentious issue have subsequently been delisted and land reform seems to have within CAMPFIRE and in the larger economy for in- reached another impasse. 10 B.I. Logan, W.G. Moseley / Geoforum 33 02002) 1±14
Fig. 2. Communal lands and natural regions in Zimbabwe. resource proprietorship to communal societies. As sense that anything that does not ®t into one of the Murphree 1993, p. 3) observes: existing legal systems becomes communal by process of elimination. Legally, these' communities still do not have ``ap- As in the colonial era, rural communities have reacted propriate authority''. This has been granted to to postcolonial tenure legislation by extending commu- councils, which are large, heterogeneous adminis- nal control to adjacent `state' or unoccupied lands, ex- trative units rather than units of production. Wild- tending arable agriculture to grazing lands, and life production comes from their sub-units... but extending their territoriality by allowing `squatting' by they do not have the same position in law regarding outsiders on grazing lands Murombedzi, 1990). the proprietorship of wildlife. CAMPFIRE operates in these circumstances of dis- juncture between the legal and community de®nitions of Although the GOZ sanctioned the privatization of resource ownership and between conservation goals and communal lands in the 1982 Communal Lands Act, the the legal structure within which they must be obtained. legislation speci®cally arrogates authority over land to A reasonable case can be made that rural poverty District Councils rather than to local customary rulers. cannot be resolved in Zimbabwe without adequate at- Even though the Customary Law and Local Courts Act tention to land reform. The fact that CAMPFIRE does of 1990 allows local customary courts to preside over not pretend to address this central issue of contested civil cases, it speci®cally precludes them from presiding power in resource allocation places serious limitations over cases involving land. In fact, Murombedzi 1990, on its poverty alleviation potential. This problem is 1992) observes that GOZ tenure and conservation pol- further exacerbated by the program's implicit emphasis icies do not speci®cally de®ne communal land tenure. In on safari hunting and ecotourism which generate funds eect, the communal system is a de facto system in the primarily for the central government in the form of B.I. Logan, W.G. Moseley / Geoforum 33 02002) 1±14 11 taxes) as well as for Zimbabwe's, largely white, tourist made at the top of the administrative hierarchy. In operators. In this context, CAMPFIRE might be repli- some ways, this strips the community of its resource cating the mistake of WlNDFALL by leaving the legal sovereignty and its control over translating its desire to land tenure structure intact while encouraging commu- join CAMPFIRE into actual policy. By ascribing to nities to have an optimistic outlook regarding the itself the role of ®nal arbiter in the process, the prospects for poverty alleviation in the country's mar- CAMPFIRE agency actually deprives communities of ginal agroecological zones. As Neumann 1997, p. 8) their authority to decide whether or not to engage in notes, ``if the displacements and colonial-implemented game management. Even when a village is approved spatial practices remain intact, what is fundamentally for the program all decisions concerning the wild life `new' about the new approach?''. resource are made by the RDCs and safari companies It is clear that there exists a signi®cant gap between on behalf of the villagers. In the case of Binga, for the law, tenure policy, conservation policy and example, the RDC and the safari company together CAMPFIRE aspirations. CAMPFIRE does not operate decided to build an electric fence to control game much in a legal vacuum. The program's goal of giving local to the displeasure of the community. When the vil- authority control over their own resources is hampered lagers were ®nally persuaded into believing in the by legal limitations some of which go back to the co- usefulness of the fence, their suggestions regarding its lonial period, and a conservation philosophy which as- placement vis a vis community activities, were com- sumes that local communities cannot be legally trusted pletely ignored Dzingirai, 1995). The unspoken phi- to oversee the environment. If rural communities cannot losophy underlying such actions is that any RDC have legal control over their resources, by de®nition, the decision which goes against village wishes is merely the program cannot give them full resource autonomy. unfortunate short term by-product of longer term Hopefully, land reform and related resource issues will community income and development. be a central theme in the ongoing process of constitu- Also, rivalry and contested power at the district level tional reform in the country. are driven by economic calculations often outside the scope of local communities. Considerations surrounding 4.3. CAMPFIRE administration and community auton- district administrative costs and funds for the national omy CAMPFIRE administration encourage the councils to arrogate much authority to themselves at the expense of The administrative structure of CAMPFIRE ensues local communities. Even though RDCs are directed by primarily from the legal structure upon which it is policy to return 80% of safari revenues to the local founded. As shown earlier, the government has main- communities and retain 20% for themselves 15 to tained legal authority over land, thereby, giving the state manage CAMPFIRE and ®ve for general administra- implicit authority to act as manager, administrator, fa- tion and development), on an average, only 52% of the cilitator, ombudsman and general overseer of commu- total income generated from the program reverts to lo- nity resources. Government control operates through a cal communities. In 1996/97, 25% of total revenues was hierarchical administrative system comprised of Village retained by RDCs and another 25% was used by pro- Development Committees Vidcos) representing 100 gram administrators at the national level Africa Re- households or approximately 1000 people, Ward De- sources Trust, 1995b; Table 1). velopment Committees Wadcos) comprised of six vil- This problem is exempli®ed by the case of Guruve lages or approximately 6000 people, and District District, in the Zambezi River Valley where the RDC Development Committees comprised of the elected receives 40% of the total revenues from two safari con- chairperson of each Wadco and district administrators cessions but very little of this trickles down to the ward appointed by the government. level. It is estimated that 95% of the total revenues re- This administrative structure places some limitations ceived at the village level go towards community de- on the program's potential for local empowerment in a velopment, most households 71%) receive no monetary number of ways. As one example, the ¯ow of authority bene®ts at all from the program and of those which do, from the district down to the village gives the RDCs only 3% estimate that it constitutes as much as 40% of which, by their composition are partial government household income Kleitz, 1998). organs) control over ward and village decisions Mur- In summary, the CAMPFIRE record on local em- ombedzi, 1992; Hill, 1996). Nhira 1993, p. 4) makes the powerment and community autonomy over resources is case that even the Vidcos and Wadcos can be perceived questionable. Even those who acclaim the program's as agents of the state rather than of the community `... successes reduced poaching, improved environmental because they have little autonomous action beyond conservation, community-funded development projects) serving as conduits for ideas emanating from the state.' Murphree, 1995) cannot avoid pointing to serious At an even more basic level, the ®nal decision on a failures in community empowerment. As Murphree village's suitability for membership in CAMPFIRE is 1993, p. 6) reiterates: 12 B.I. Logan, W.G. Moseley / Geoforum 33 02002) 1±14 A scenario in which communal land wildlife reve- cussion to demonstrate that geographically contiguous nues are now appropriated by the new rural district communities may be socially heterogeneous and may councils would have disastrous implications... An not always constitute the community of resource owners uncertainty about their proprietorial rights would and that the opposite is also true). From an imple- be reintroduced in these communities...an inevita- mentational perspective, the top-down administrative ble drop in direct wildlife revenues to these commu- structure of the program leaves limited decision-making nities... Motivation to collectively manage and use avenues for rural communities and allows the CAMP- natural resources in these communities would fall FIRE agency to expropriate community resources for its while motivation for private exploitation of these own use. In essence, the nebulous constitution of the resources poaching) would increase... Con¯icts community of resource owners given the geographic between producer communities and councils will contiguity constraint), the absence of local control over rise... communal land farmers will no longer toler- resources given the legal structure) and a lack of local ate a system where they pay the costs for the exis- oversight of the revenues from resource exploitation tence of wildlife while others reap the bene®ts of given the administration of the program) collude to- its value. gether to reduce the program's poverty alleviation im- pacts.
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