Essays on State-Building and Sectarian Violence
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Essays on State-Building and Sectarian Violence by Jared F. Daugherty Department of Political Science Duke University Date: Approved: Kyle Beardsley, Supervisor Laia Balcells Peter Feaver Jack Knight Paula McClain Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University 2016 Abstract Essays on State-Building and Sectarian Violence by Jared F. Daugherty Department of Political Science Duke University Date: Approved: Kyle Beardsley, Supervisor Laia Balcells Peter Feaver Jack Knight Paula McClain An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University 2016 Copyright c 2016 by Jared F. Daugherty All rights reserved except the rights granted by the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial Licence Abstract This dissertation seeks to explain the role of governmental and non-governmental actors in increasing/reducing the emergence of intergroup conflict after war, when group differ- ences have been a salient aspect of group mobilization. This question emerges from several interrelated branches of scholarship on self-enforcing institutions and power-sharing ar- rangements, group fragmentation and demographic change, collective mobilization for collectively-targeted violence, and conflict termination and the post-conflict quality of peace. This question is investigated through quantitative analyses performed at the sub- national, national, and cross-national level on the effect of elite competition on the like- lihood of violence committed on the basis of group difference after war. These quantita- tive analyses are each accompanied by qualitative, case study analyses drawn from the American Reconstruction South, Iraq, and C^oted'Ivoire that illustrate and clarify the mechanisms evaluated through quantitative analysis. Shared findings suggest the correlation of reduced political competition with the in- creased likelihood of violence committed on the basis of group difference. Separate find- ings shed light on how covariates related to governmental control over rent extraction and armed forces, decentralization, and citizenship can lead to a reduction in violence. However, these same quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that the control of the state can be perceived as a threat after the end of conflict. Further, together these find- ings suggest the political nature of violence committed on the basis of group difference as opposed to this violence being correlated with ethnic identity or resource scarcity alone. Together, these combined analyses shed light on how and why political identities are formed and mobilized for the purpose of committing political violence after war. In this sense, they shed light on the factors that constrain post-conflict violence in deeply divided iv societies, and contribute to relevant academic, policy, and normative questions. v To Callie Mae, John, Norma, and Robert vi Contents Abstract iv List of Tables xii List of Figures xiii Acknowledgements xv 1 Introduction1 1.1 Motivating Puzzle................................2 1.2 Research Question...............................3 1.3 Literature Review................................6 1.3.1 Power-sharing and institutional self-enforcement...........7 1.3.2 Group fragmentation and demographic change............ 15 1.3.3 Collective mobilization for collectively-targeted violence....... 19 1.3.4 Conflict termination and the post-conflict quality of peace..... 27 1.4 Component Essays............................... 34 1.4.1 Cross-national analysis......................... 34 1.4.2 National analysis............................ 36 1.4.3 Sub-national analysis.......................... 37 2 Post-Conflict Citizenship and Sectarian Violence: Cross-National Anal- ysis of Group-Level Conflict After War 41 2.1 Introduction................................... 42 2.2 Literature Review................................ 44 2.2.1 Citizenship and conflict......................... 44 2.2.2 Post-conflict power-sharing & displacement.............. 47 vii 2.3 Theory...................................... 49 2.4 Hypothesis.................................... 53 2.5 Model...................................... 53 2.6 Data....................................... 53 2.6.1 Dependent variable........................... 54 2.6.2 Key independent variable....................... 56 2.6.3 Control variables:............................ 57 2.7 Findings..................................... 61 2.8 Case Study................................... 73 2.9 Pre-conflict................................... 76 2.9.1 Elite competition under an authoritarian party regime....... 76 2.9.2 Regime change and electoral mobilization of ethno-regional coalitions 78 2.9.3 Comparison between pre-conflict C^oted'Ivoire with Ghana..... 83 2.10 Post-conflict................................... 85 2.10.1 Citizenship and the negotiation of conflict termination....... 85 2.10.2 Citizenship and post-conflict group-level conflict........... 89 2.10.3 Summary................................ 93 2.11 Conclusion.................................... 95 3 Post-Conflict Status Reversal, Regional Inequality, and Intergroup An- tagonism: National Analysis of Group-Level Conflict After War in Post- Conflict Iraq 96 3.1 Introduction................................... 97 3.2 Literature Review................................ 100 3.2.1 Ethnic conflict onset.......................... 101 3.2.2 Post-conflict transitional mechanisms and reform.......... 104 3.3 Theory...................................... 106 3.4 Hypotheses................................... 112 3.5 Operationalization............................... 113 viii 3.5.1 Case selection.............................. 113 3.5.2 Data................................... 115 3.6 Estimation Method............................... 120 3.7 Findings..................................... 121 3.7.1 Detail.................................. 123 3.8 Case Study................................... 130 3.9 Pre-conflict................................... 133 3.9.1 Elite position.............................. 133 3.10 Post-conflict................................... 135 3.10.1 Elite perception of post-conflict decentralization as a threat.... 135 3.10.2 Indirect support for violence committed on the basis of group identity139 3.10.3 Direct support for violence committed on the basis of group identity 147 3.11 Conclusion.................................... 153 4 Post-Conflict Elite Resentment, State Capacity, and Communal Vio- lence: Sub-National Analysis of Group-Level Conflict After War in Post- Conflict North Carolina 157 4.1 Introduction................................... 158 4.2 Literature Review................................ 161 4.2.1 Lynching................................. 161 4.2.2 State capacity and civil conflict.................... 164 4.2.3 Post-war peace and conflict...................... 166 4.2.4 Summary................................ 168 4.3 Theory...................................... 170 4.3.1 Mechanism of Elite Control and Contention............. 175 4.4 Hypotheses................................... 176 4.5 Operationalization and Method of Analysis.................. 177 4.5.1 Dataset................................. 177 4.5.2 Method................................. 180 4.5.3 Missingness and Imputation...................... 181 ix 4.6 Findings..................................... 182 4.6.1 Tables of Coefficient Estimates.................... 183 4.7 Case Study................................... 190 4.8 Pre-conflict................................... 191 4.9 Post-conflict................................... 196 4.9.1 Indirect support for violence committed on the basis of group identity196 4.9.2 Direct support for violence committed on the basis of group identity 208 4.9.3 Counter-argument........................... 218 4.10 Conclusion.................................... 221 5 Conclusion 224 5.1 Restatement of Puzzle............................. 226 5.2 Responding to Research Questions from Existing Scholarship........ 227 5.2.1 Power-sharing and institutional self-enforcement........... 227 5.2.2 Group fragmentation and demographic change............ 229 5.2.3 Collective mobilization for collectively-targeted violence....... 231 5.2.4 Conflict termination and the post-conflict quality of peace..... 232 5.3 Responding to the Overall Research Question................ 233 5.4 Extensions.................................... 241 5.4.1 Peacekeeping intervention....................... 243 5.4.2 Permissions over the scope of private action in authoritarian regimes (restriction of change)......................... 246 5.4.3 Mediation of group fragmentation by private networks....... 248 5.5 Research goals.................................. 250 6 References 252 A Citizenship & Nationality Laws for \Post-Conflict Citizenship and Sec- tarian Violence" Analysis 275 A.1 Coding Decisions................................ 276 A.2 Post-Conflict Legislation Regulating Citizenship and Nationality...... 278 x B Post-Conflict Citizenship Regimes Dataset for \Post-Conflict Citizen- ship and Sectarian Violence" Analysis 300 C Maps Illustrating Dependent & Independent Variables from \Post-Conflict Status Reversal, Regional Inequality, and Intergroup Antagonism" Anal- ysis 306 D Maps Illustrating Dependent & Independent Variables from \Post-Conflict Elite Resentment, State Capacity, and Communal