Conceptualizing the “Arab Threat” The History and Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism, 1967-1974

By:

Gretta M. Ziminsky

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TABLE OF CONTENTS:

Title and Signature Page------0

Acknowledgements------2

Abstract------–------3

Introduction------4

Chapter 1------28

Chapter 2------52

Chapter 3------73

Conclusion------95

Bibliography------100

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my thesis advisor Dr. Ibrahim al-Marashi for the research guidance he provided. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Kim Quinney. Her office door was always open whenever I ran into a hard spot. Without her kindness and guidance my thesis would not be what it is. Thank you Dr. Katherine Hijar for always being willing to help me along in my journey. Thank you Patty Cañas for letting me discuss anything and everything with you to ease my frustrations, our talks always put me in high spirits.

Lastly, thank you to everyone in my graduate program that have become dear friends of mine. I enjoyed our time together so very much.

Thank You,

Gretta Ziminsky 3

ABSTRACT There is a great deal of scholarship dedicated to the study of and U.S. counterterrorism, especially in the years following the 9/11 events. Many of the historical works since 9/11 examine the development of U.S. counterterrorism in the Middle East, however, most works are dedicated to the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism since the 1980s, with the proliferation of political Islam. Additionally, historical scholarship on this topic is often teleological and traces the development of all previous terrorist attacks towards the dramatic 9/11 attacks. In almost all of the recent works, one learns that terrorism does in fact have a history, however, that history has little to do with the until after the attacks of 9/11. This thesis argues that that is not in fact true, and that terrorism has complex history that has much to do with the United States three decades prior to 9/11. The administration, along with a small number of radical

Arab-, transformed and re-conceptualized the threat of terrorism as both international, and directly connected to individuals of Arab descent. Whereas the terms

“guerilla” and “terrorist,” before the emergence of Arab-Palestinian international terrorism, were and could be applied to various groups who perpetrated politically motivated attacks (e.g. airline hijackings, bombings, and taking), the international terrorist threat became conceptualized, almost exclusively, as inherently Arab. This has much to do with the policy agendas and the geopolitical interests of the Nixon administration. By examining the evolution of the American conceptualization of the international terrorist, through a Cold War lens and its actual connection to the Middle East, this this shows that the Nixon administration, due to foreign and domestic interest, magnified a small threat and institutionalized the perception of the “Arab-terrorist” in American society.

Keywords: US Counterterrorism, Nixon Administration, Operation Boulder, Terrorism, Nixon’s Foreign Policy

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Introduction:

The events of 11 September 2001, produced an unexpected new reality for the world to consider. The devastating and dramatic display of terrorist destruction broadcasted on live television was, for much of the American public, an initial exposure to the Arab-Muslim world of the Middle East. The consequences of the terror attacks of 9/11 continue to unfold and disrupt the international community, and sixteen years later it is still too soon to predict when or if the global conflict will conclude. However, it is not too soon to examine how and why transnational terrorism first emerged and how transnational terrorism and U.S. counterterrorism and conceptualization of the terrorist threat have evolved since their emergence. The American involvement in the Middle East, and the experience of modern transnational terrorism materialized more than three decades before 9/11, during the later years of the Cold War. For forty-seven years, the U.S. policymakers translated international relations through a Cold War context, and deterring Soviet influence and superpower confrontation throughout the world.

Although the collapse of the and the end of the Cold War allowed the United States to emerge as the sole world superpower, the zero-sum policy strategy used in the Middle East in the previous decades authorized the reduction of complex decisions to a simplistic notion of whether states or individuals were Soviet-backed radical or U.S.-backed, moderate Arabs, willing to negotiate with . This bipolar strategy not only exacerbated destructive regional issues in the Arab world, but it also facilitated a reshaped American conceptualization of Arabs and the Arab region and divided the Middle East in a binary, orientalist manner that was shaped by Cold War policy and American exceptionalism.

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Today one of the perceived existential threats to the United States is terrorism; however, the terrorism that America fears is poorly defined in words and rather well understood through the race and religious characteristics of the perpetrators. Currently, the radical Islamist groups of the Middle East are considered to be one of the greatest threats to freedom and .

However, the Palestinian terrorist organizations of the established the foundation for the conceptual turn in the evolution of political violence. Although Cold War competition in the

Middle East produced the environment necessary for regional violence to develop into an international threat, the Palestinian helped structure the American perception of the transnational terrorist threat defined by irrational violence and characteristically Arab. The consequence of the 9/11 attacks, among many others, is the complete negation of the nation's knowledge of recent Cold War history of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and how said policies effected the development of international terrorism. However, in order to understand the actions and policies of the recent U.S. presidential administrations, in regard to combatting modern transnational terrorism, it is imperative to trace the history and evolution of how the modern terrorist threat has been conceptualized, discussed, and countered since its inception.

The 1970s mark a time when the world was confronted with a rancorous new reality that challenged international security. Through a ceaseless fight, the Palestinian terrorist organizations succeeded in both revealing the destructive power of transnational terrorism, and dramatically displaying the plight of the to the world. In the early years of the 1970s, the amount of international terrorist attacks directed at U.S. installations abroad proliferated greatly. Although the attacks were predominantly carried out by terrorist groups of 6

Latin America and Western Europe1, the symbolic and dramatic nature of the attacks in 1969, 1970, and 1972, are some of the most significant events in the history of U.S. counterterrorism. These attacks mark integral shifts in how both the U.S. government and

American public conceptualized the terrorist and terrorist threat.

Chapter Outlines: Chapter One:

Chapter one discusses the political environment of the Middle East that led to the creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and splinter groups, and how the Nixon administration responded to the United States’ first experiences with international terrorism.

This chapter uses the 1969 hijarcking of TWA 840 and the 1970 - Crisis to show how the Palestinian nationalist organizations challenged the Nixon administration, undermining the pursued détente in the region. The transnational nature of the Black September crisis challenged the policy approach because it weakened the state-to-state diplomacy strategy used during the Cold War.2

Nixon initiated détente in order to reduce the threat of nuclear war between the two superpowers, and to veer American public attention from the ongoing domestic unrest3 by broadcasting his extraordinary foreign policy successes. Détente was also pursued to bring a calmer environment to regions involved in Cold War conflicts. However, the emergence of transnational Palestinian terrorist organizations halted Nixon and Kissinger’s realist approach, as

1 According to a study conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), between the years of 1968- 1979, there were a total of 3,336 international terrorist incidents, 1,348 of them directed against US targets. The majority of the attacks directed against US targets were conducted by terrorist organizations from Latin America (492), Western Europe (366), and the Middle East and North Africa (244). 2 Détente, a French word meaning relaxation of or release from tensions, is known as the period of improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. 3 The American people were demanding an end to the War, social change, and racial and gender equality. 7 the administration’s foreign policy proved to be incompatible with non-state actors. Nixon and

Kissinger’s employment of a progressively forceful and generalized position towards the Arab nations of the Middle East in response to the Black September crisis marked an important shift in the history of U.S. foreign policy. The Palestinian terrorist organizations, primarily the PLO and

The Popular Front for the Liberation of (PFLP), disrupted the pragmatic foreign policy approach of the Nixon administration. Nixon’s quest for détente in the Middle East was structured to sustain the U.S.-Soviet balance of relations in the region, contain and/or diminish any growth of Soviet influence on Arab governments, and to work with the Soviet Union in creating a lasting peace between the Arabs and . To maintain détente between the two super powers in the Middle East, President Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry

Kissinger, relied almost exclusively on state-to-state diplomacy when dealing with the Arab-

Israeli conflict. With the emergence of Palestinian international terrorism, Nixon and Kissinger failed to recognize the literal statelessness and transnational capabilities of the PLO and the

PFLP. The notion of non-state actors who undertake spectacular terrorist attacks and have the potential to disrupt both the regional and international community was difficult to conceptualize in Cold War and détente era diplomacy in the region.

During the Black September Crisis of 1970, Nixon and Kissinger firmly fixed the fedayeen in the context of an international threat through the global framework of the U.S. conflict with the Soviet Union. By failing to conceptualize the Palestinian refugee problem through the context of a regional history and adapt policies towards resolving it, the Nixon

Administration, according to Kissinger, projected the idea that the fedayeen were representatives of the “global Communist challenge.”4 Thus, the 1970 Black September Crisis marked the

4 , The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), p. 573. 8 beginning of viewing Arabs, and more specifically, the Palestinian fedayeen as an international issue that must be combatted on a global level to ensure the security of freedom and democracy throughout the world.

Chapter Two:

Chapter two examines the global implications of the Nixon administration’s response to the 1972 , a terrorist attack which took place during the in

Munich. The attack ended in tragedy and severely impacted the international community.

Whereas the 1970 Black September Crisis started to reveal, to the U.S. government elites, the potential threat transnational terrorism posed to foreign policy agendas, the exposed to the American public—in real time—the catastrophic capabilities of the transnational terrorist. This event led the Nixon administration to create the first official U.S. counterterrorism policies, almost exclusively focused on Arabs. The attack also initiated a legal debate in the international community regarding a globally agree- upon and the creation of permanent, official counterterrorism procedures.

The Munich Massacre marks yet another shift in the conceptualization of international terrorism and firmly fixed Arabs as the greatest terrorist threat to both American and international security. This chapter also examines the conceptual shift of the Nixon administration in the aftermath of the Munich Massacre to show how this attack, although not directed at the United States, was used as a catalyst for the Nixon administration to fight terrorism on an international battlefield. This chapter studies how Cold War policies, such as détente; U.S. geopolitical interests in the region, and foreign and domestic pressures shaped

Nixon’s response to the Munich Massacre. This chapter also looks at how this single event became known as the archetypal act of international terrorism and continues to be influential and 9 memorialized today. The Munich Massacre further developed the American conception of the terrorist threat. Essentially, Chapter Two explains why the Munich Massacre and the subsequent policies are significantly more far-reaching than that of the previous event, and how the Munich incident added to shifting the Nixon administration’s notion of and reaction to international terrorism so significantly.

Chapter Three:

Chapter three looks further into the evolving American conceptualization of the terrorist threat. The Munich Massacre exposed the danger of transnational terrorism, but it also generalized that threat as primarily Arab. In 1972, as a direct consequence of the Munich

Massacre, the Nixon administration launched a new program—initially covert, but later revealed to the American public—named Operation Boulder. The Boulder initiative was a discriminatory policy in the United States against those of Arab descent, both citizens and noncitizens alike. It called for extensive reviews, background checks, and interrogations of Arabs by the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA), the State Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

The U.S. government claimed the program was in response to the new terrorist threat; however, it is important to note that during this time most terrorist incidents in the United States associated with the Arab-Israeli conflict were committed by the Jewish Defense League (JDL), a far-right religious political organization.5

This chapter uses Operation Boulder as an example of how the Nixon administration used the Munich Massacre and Arab-Palestinian terrorism as an emotional tool to further their ideological and realist foreign policy agendas, by appeasing both domestic and international

5 Elaine Hagopian, “Minority Rights in a Nation-State: The Nixon Administration's Campaign against Arab-Americans” Journal of Palestine Studies, 5(1/2), 97-114. Accessed January 5, 2017. article.jstor.com 10 demands. As U.S. economic and geopolitical interests in the Middle Eastern region became increasingly important, the Nixon administration over simplified situations in order to play upon the genuine public fears and concerns to justify the U.S. foreign policy agenda. In this particular case, the Boulder investigations were initiated to calm the fear of the American public, to satisfy the anger of the American-Jewish community, and to contain Israeli retaliation for the Munich event. These actions would help both the reelection of Nixon on the domestic front and help prevent the possibility of super power confrontation on the international front.

Over the three-year span of the program, some 65,478 names of those of ‘- speaking decent’ were checked against files of the FBI and CIA; however, these checks only resulted in the denial of 17 visa applicants overall.6 Nevertheless, the propaganda efforts of

Operation Boulder were the first time the U.S. government executed policy that conceptualized

Arabs, especially Palestinians, in America and the Middle East as inherently anti-Semitic and terroristic. This chapter explains how the failure of the Nixon administration to recognize the

Palestinian plight correctly from its inception, led to an extremely menacing and prejudice situation not only for the countries of the Middle East and the international community, but for citizen and noncitizen Arabs in American society.

Literature:

History of Terrorism

There is a great deal of scholarship dedicated to the research and study of terrorism and U.S. counterterrorism throughout various academic disciplines, especially in the years following the

6 "A Plan to Screen Terrorist Ends: U.S. Project to Block Arabs is not 'Cost Effective'." , April 24, 1975. http://www.nytimes.com/1975/04/24/archives/a-plan-to-screen-terrorists-ends-us- project-to-block-arabs-was-not.html?_r=1.

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9/11 events. Some notable works address the historical aspects of terrorism, from antiquity to the time that most scholars deem its modern inception in the nineteenth century. These works address the roots of modern terrorism as the French Revolution and offer widespread global histories that trace terrorism from ancient times to present day.

Bruce Hoffman, one of the most renowned scholars on contemporary terrorism, in his book Inside Terrorism, examines various aspects of terrorism through time. Hoffman, like many other scholars, examines the major waves of terrorism through chronological analysis. He discusses the origins of contemporary terrorism, which he attributes to the end of World War II, the internationalization of terrorism, religious terrorism, and what he supposes the future trends in terrorist warfare will be. While Hoffman’s book provides a comprehensive history on terrorism, it is and his analytical focus is hard to distinguish. Nevertheless, his book provides extensive footnotes, and offers a solid base in the study of terrorism.

The : From Antiquity to Al Qaeda edited by Gerard Chaliand provides an authoritative and comprehensive study on terrorism. As an expert in geopolitics, irregular warfare, and military strategy, Chaliand provides an interesting perspective on the evolution of terrorism. As a collaborative work, this book gives interesting analyses on a long and complex history. Like other comprehensive chronological works on terrorism, The History of Terrorism argues that terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It is a weapon that the weak have used against the strong that can be traced to the beginning of warfare itself. While Chaliand’s work provides insight in how terrorism is perceived throughout history, the book only vaguely covers the terrorism of the 1970s, and thoroughly analyzes the roots of Islamic terrorism of the

1980s. 12

The Terrorist Trap by Jeffrey D. Simon, enters the historical conversation on terrorist attacks against the United States. His work differs from the previously mentioned research because Simon deals exclusively with attacks targeting the United States, whether at home or abroad. Simon’s research traces the U.S. government’s response to terrorist attacks from

Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Wars to Bill Clinton’s experience with homegrown terrorists.

As an expert on terrorism, international security, and political violence, Simon examines the political, social, and psychological implications of terrorism. Simon’s work is particularly useful to my thesis because he focuses a great deal on the Arab-Israeli conflict. While the Palestinian international terrorist organizations are not the sole focus of his study, Simon argues that terrorism will never be completely absent in the world because it grows out of economic, social, and political grievances that have yet to be resolved. These works give a greater understanding of the history of terrorism, and provide opportunity for scholars to ask new questions about the nature of terrorism and national identity. Over the last sixteen years, scholars have attempted to lend new perspective to the expanding historiography of terrorism and how one might incorporate such works into the existing narratives of the U.S. past.

Defining Terrorism

A second trend in scholarship on terrorism begins with the definitional issue. According to most historical research, there is no concrete definition of terrorism. And, while historians, social scientists, and political scientists continually debate the definitional issue, all share similar basic elements that differentiate terrorism from other methods of violence.7 Most scholars can agree that terrorism is generally a politically driven act that uses a stunning form of

7 Beverly, Gage, “Terrorism and the American Experience: A State of the Field.” The Journal of American History, June 2011, 73-94. Accessed April 5, 2017. http://archive.oah.org/special- issues/teaching/2011_06/article.pdf 13 communication to reach a large audience that is far from the target being used. However, the confusion and debate surrounding the definition of terrorism comes from distinguishing the actor. Can states employ terrorism? Why is guerilla warfare not considered terrorism? These definitional questions show how meanings and conceptions of terrorism have evolved in accordance to the historical and political context.

According to Beverly Gage, a professor of history at Yale University, in her article

“Terrorism and the American Experience: A State of the Field,” the scholarship on terrorism has developed closely with political anxieties of the time. During the French Revolution, social scientists viewed terrorism as a consequence of the anti-capitalist revolts; labor revolutionaries and anarchists were deemed the terrorists. However, sixty years later, after a long silence in academic scholarship on terrorism, it was the anti-colonialists and New Left radicals that were creating issues in world order, and so, they were deemed the new “terrorists” of the time. As

Gage notes, “[i]n both cases, academic directions coincided with policy interests; scholars turned to the study of terrorism when their governments did.”8

In Disciplining Terror: How the Experts Invented “Terrorism,” Lisa Stampnitzky explains how the American understanding of “terrorism” has been constructed by expert knowledge, public perceptions, and U.S. policy. She argues that defining, conceptualizing, and reacting to terrorist organizations and terrorist attacks has changed greatly depending on the historical circumstances the United States has been faced with. Stampnitzky’s work is valuable for understanding the evolution of American conceptualization of terrorism. She focuses her research on examining how researchers and self-proclaimed “terrorist experts” crafted both the public’s and government’s understanding of terrorism, and as a result have great effects on U.S.

8 Ibid., 75. 14 counterterrorism policies. While the arguments of Gage and Stampnitzky appear to be quite opposite of one another, they are also quite similar. Whereas Stampnitzky argues that in the

1970s the academic circles defined terrorism, and Gage argues it was the government, both argue that the phenomena of terrorism is directly shaped by a historical and political context.

The scholarship on defining and conceptualizing terrorism reemerged as a relatively small, but important area of academic investigation during the 1970s. Although there was great civil unrest in the domestic sphere of the United States, it was what was happening beyond U.S. borders that gave rise to more academic analysis on the issue of terrorism. With the emergence of various revolutionary groups in Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East, scholars once again grappled with the definitional issues of what classified as a terrorist. It was at this time that the term terrorist began being restricted exclusively to the actions of non-state actors. This helped with investigative uniformity, but it also “reinforced the highly politicized definitions offered by governments deeply invested in discrediting rebel groups.9” Yet, although a few valuable studies on the history of terrorism are written during the 1970s, historical scholarship was geared significantly more towards , and violent movements, rather than terrorism specifically.

The threat or issues with terrorism did not play an autonomous role in the developing scholarly conversation until the aftermath of 9/11. According to Gage, “[t]errorism as a subject was both visible and invisible, absent and present, before September 2001. What changed on

9/11 was not so much the history itself but, to borrow Hofstadter’s words, ‘our sudden awareness of it.’”10 After the 9/11 attacks and the sudden awareness of terrorism, most works on terrorism veer towards focusing on more current events. The past sixteen years have seen an influx of

9 Ibid., 78. 10 Ibid., 81. 15 scholarship on terrorism from various disciplines, yet historians still maintain a small role in the academic conversation. This has much to do with the fact that the “new terrorism” that emerged in September 2001, creates an idea that the ‘newness’ is “something uniquely dangerous, terrifying, and utterly ahistorical.” 11 However, according to Isabelle Duyvesteyn in her article

“How New is the New Terrorism,” there is nothing characteristically new about the 9/11 attacks.

She argues that her article,

challenges the idea that these features are new to terrorism and points out that essential continuities exist between old terrorism and new terrorism, such as the territorial focus, the transnational links, and the network structures. Continuity also exists in the overlap between important aims that the terrorist organizations set themselves. Political, ideological, and religious themes strongly overlap, making clear goal-oriented distinctions problematic, if not impossible.12 Furthermore, Duyvesteyn argues that the only way to understand the actual newness of terrorism is through historical investigation.

Post 9/11 Scholarship on U.S. Counterterrorism:

Many of the historical works since 9/11 examine the development of terrorism and U.S. counterterrorism in the Middle East, however, most historical scholarship is dedicated to the evolution of terrorism and U.S. counterterrorism since the 1980s, when President officially declared the first U.S. “war on international terrorism”. This occurred in the aftermath of the Iranian hostage crisis with the development and proliferation of political Islam.

Furthermore, like in past scholarship, much of the research points to the history of the U.S. government’s problems of defining and identifying terrorism. Additionally, scholarship is often teleological and traces the development of all previous terrorist attacks towards the dramatic 9/11 attacks. In almost all of the recent works on terrorism, one learns that terrorism does in fact have

11 Ibid., 81. 12 Isabelle Duyvesteyn, “How New is the New Terrorism?” Edited by Bruce Hoffman. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 27, no. 5 (September 2004): 439-54. Accessed April 8, 2017. https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=207734 16 a history, but it seems that history has little to do with the United States until after the attacks of

9/11. Few scholars have studied transnational terrorism and U.S. counterterrorism policies from inception, and through the conceptual framework of the Cold War and realist foreign policy structures that developed during the U.S. struggle against Soviet influence. The common approach to historical scholarship on transnational terrorism generally overlooks the effects of the Palestinian terrorist attacks of the early 1970s.

Timothy Naftali’s book Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism, traces the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism policies since the end of World War II. As a diplomatic historian, and previous director of the Presidential Library, Naftali’s scholarship aims at placing the current U.S. in a historical context. He argues that while the U.S. government took some small steps in combatting terrorism, there was little enthusiasm among multiple administrations to allow terrorism to be characterized as a high priority threat. Ultimately, according to Naftali, the “blind spot” in U.S. national security that led to the 9/11 attacks was the failure to imagine international terrorism as a domestic threat to the

United States, because it continuously remained a secondary problem to other foreign policy efforts. While Naftali’s book is exceptionally valuable for a comprehensive understanding of the changing counterterrorism policies of the United States, he gives little attention to explaining the U.S. evolution of conceptualizing Arabs as the primary terrorist threat.

Political historian Robert Kumamoto in International Terrorism and American Foreign

Relations 1945-1976 studies the evolution of terrorism in three different regions; Palestine from

1945-1948, from 1954-1962, and The Middle East from 1968-1976. Kumamoto analyzes how international terrorism impacted American foreign relations in these specific areas.

Kumamoto argues that since the emergence of transnational terrorism, the U.S. government 17 lacked a cohesive or well-structured policy towards combatting it. According to Kumamoto, this was largely due to the incapability of successive U.S. administrations to separate the issue of terrorism from the Cold War. Although Kumamoto’s work gives valuable analysis on the history of international terrorism, he focuses much of his research on the definitional problems associated with terrorism. And, while the first and second chapters of his research provide extensive primary documents, the third chapter relies more on secondary sources. Fortunately, since the publishing of Kumamoto’s work in 1999, a great many government documents pertaining to international terrorism and American foreign relations in the Middle East from

1968-1976 have now been declassified and digitized, allowing for a more comprehensive understanding of the history of international terrorism and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East on a federal level.

Yonah Alexander, a professor and expert on terrorism and Michael B. Kraft, a senior advisor in the State Department Counterterrorism Office, in Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism

Policy Volume 1, give a thorough understanding of how the pre-9/11 counterterrorism policies of the U.S. government evolved through the continuously changing and innovating terrorist threat.

According to the authors, the raw historical evidence presented in their study reveals “an adaptation to an evolving and ever more dangerous enemy.”13 However, the authors note that while terrorist organizations were evolving and innovating with technology and globalization, the documents they present show the lack of reactive attention to terrorism until after the events of 9/11.14 While this work focuses a great deal on U.S. counterterrorism, it does not stress the importance of the 1970s, nor does it give an in-depth explanation as to why the U.S. government

13 Yonah Alexander and Michael Kraft, Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy Volume 1. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007 xviii. 14 Ibid., xviii. 18 showed, symbolically a huge concern, yet in reality a lack of attention towards the international terrorist threat. According to the authors, America’s chief error in combatting terrorism was the failure to adapt to the globalizing terrorist threat.

Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past edited by Robert J. Art and

Louise Richardson gives an evaluation on how democratic states have dealt with terrorists in the past, and what we can learn for the future by studying them. This book includes fifteen different comparative analyses on various terrorist attacks and what measures particular democratic governments took for the success or failure of combatting. Overall, the authors conclude that although there are some instances of successfully combatting terrorism, there are more failures. They believe that the United States should “consider ways to dampen the fuel that stoked the fire of terrorism: fear.”15 While their work provides detailed case study analyses, it lacks historical perspective and understanding.

U.S. Foreign Policy in The Middle East:

Another area of scholarship that lends invaluable information to my study, is the history of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, particularly from the years of 1967-1973. William B.

Quandt, a member on the National Security Council during the Nixon and Carter administrations, in his 1977 work Decade of Decisions: American Foreign Policy Toward the

Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976, provides a comprehensive study that examines U.S. policy and diplomacy in the Middle East from the Six-Day War to the election of . There are three main interests that resulted in complex U.S. policy formations in the Middle East during

15 Robert J. Art, and Louise Richardson, Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2007, x. 19 this decade: the growing U.S. dependence on Arab oil, the continuing superpower rivalry of the

Cold War, and the problematic Arab-Israeli conflict.

Quandt argues that the national interest, domestic politics, bureaucratic intricacies, and psychology of presidential decision making all have a relationship in the process of policy development in the Middle East. The author focuses a great deal on the issues associated with

Nixon’s reactive policies during crises in the Middle East. The reactive policies during crises are some of the most important to consider, because it is during said crises that the bureaucratic and domestic restraints are less confining. Quandt notes that “too often in the past, it has taken a major crisis to engage the attention of the president; and too often, the policies set in times of crisis have persisted well beyond their usefulness.”16 Although Quandt does not focus solely on the threat of Arab terrorism in his research, his theories on U.S. foreign policy formation when analyzing the Nixon administration’s conceptualization of and reactions towards their first encounters with transnational terrorist organizations give an interesting perspective.

In Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and U.S.-Middle East Relations in the 1970s,

Salim Yaqub argues that the 1970s were a fundamental period for U.S.-Middle East relations for a variety of reasons. As professor of History at UCSB and an expert on U.S. foreign relations,

Yaqub focuses his work on the shrinking legacy of Western European in the Middle

East, and the rising strategic and economic interests of both the Soviet Union and the United

States. Yaqub’s work gives a greater understanding of how the Cold War race for influence and resources effected various areas of the Middle East. While he does not focus exclusively on international terrorism and U.S. counterterrorism, he gives a new perspective on how the Cold

War effected U.S. relations in many Middle Eastern states.

16 William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967- 1976. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, 288. 20

The Question of Palestine by Edward Said gives a further examination of the Arab-Israel conflict by focusing exclusively on the history of the Palestinian question. Said gives an in- depth history of the Palestinians by examining Palestine from the view point of the Palestinians,

Zionism from the standpoint of its victims, Palestinian self-determination, and the aftermath of the . Said covers the issue of Palestinian representation and the liberal

West, in an attempt to explain Palestinian frustrations, , and the motivations behind Palestinian terrorism. While his work is not entirely objective, it is integral to this study as it provides a comprehensive history of the relations between the Palestinians and the West.

American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945 by Douglas

Little, examines the U.S. relationship with the Middle East from 1945-2003. Little focuses much of his work on the inconsistent policies, attitudes, and interests the United States has in the

Middle East. He examines how the persistent stereotypical, preconceived notions of the

American public towards the Middle East, allowed for U.S. policy to be shaped by overconfidence and obliviousness when trying to reshape the region in its own image. Little explains U.S. policy in the Middle East as Orientalist by using Edwards Said’s theory of

Orientalism. Little draws on what Said explains as the discursive constructions of the region created in the early nineteenth century that formed the Western misrepresentation of the East and its peoples. According to both Little and Said, this continued to shape the American perception of the region well into the twentieth century.17 The theory of Orientalism argues that Western powers created a binary ideology amid Eastern and Western societies as a means of justification for attempting to extend authority, influence, and power in the region. Through this dichotomy,

17 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: , 1978). 21 false representations were constructed about the Orient and the Oriental that instilled the notion that the uncivilized, radical East required the rule and control of the civilized, moderate West. By applying the theory of orientalist thinking when analyzing U.S. foreign policy in the Middle

East, Little’s book presented a new and useful perspective on the history of US-Middle East relations.

All of the aforementioned works give invaluable analyses on the history and evolution of terrorism, U.S. counterterrorism, and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. However, most mention the early 1970s and Palestinian terrorism very briefly, and do not consider how the Cold

War, realist foreign policies of Nixon and Kissinger and Arab-Palestinian terrorists had integral roles in shaping U.S. counterterrorism policies, actions, and conceptualization of the international terrorist. The works analyze the rhetoric of high-ranking government representatives and focus on various terrorist attacks, but do not give a complete view of why specific terrorist events shaped the American perception of and policies towards international terrorism in the early 1970s, or why the Arab terrorist groups, and Arab individuals in general, were considered a much greater threat than other terrorist groups.

In addition, the works do not provide in-depth analyses on the rise of international terrorism in the Middle East connected with Nixon and Kissinger’s key foreign policy concerns in the area. There is ample literature on terrorism and U.S. counterterrorism, a great amount of scholarship on the Nixon administration’s foreign policy in the Middle East; however, the two are most often divorced from one another in scholarship and scarcely considered in conjunction.

This creates a gap in the historical conversation that needs to be filled.

Conceptually, the greatest noteworthy international threat of terrorism that concerned the

U.S. government in the early 1970s came from the Middle East. This new threat was, 22 predominately, consequence of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Many scholars identify the airline hijackings of the flight in July 1968 and another in 1969 as the most monumental events in what is termed modern, transnational terrorism. The day that the Arab-Palestinian nationalist organizations extended the area and degree of their terrorist tactics to a transnational nature— from previously only directing attacks towards the Israeli government, to bringing their fight and plight globally—a new era of anticolonial transnational terrorism began. This new wave of terrorism targeted Western powers and representatives. Yet, the historical scholarship on terrorism makes no clear indication that this time marks any significant turning point in the history U.S. counterterrorism.

Although current historical scholarship portrays the U.S. government’s view of international terrorism as more of a nuisance than threat, within the larger Cold War struggle, the actions of the Arab-Palestinian transnational terrorist organizations of the 1970s and the subsequent policies continue to have current implications. Naftali’s Blind spot is one of the only comprehensive works on U.S. counterterrorism policies before 9/11. This inattention seems unusual assuming the topic’s recognizable significance for contemporary historians and policy makers.

U.S. Interest in the Middle East: Israel and the Other:

The relationship between the United States and Israel is extraordinarily complex and highly debated among scholars.18 Nevertheless, addressing the U.S. commitment to Israel is

18 Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Pr. of Harvard Univ. Pr., 1982); William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005); Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: Western Partisanship in the Middle East," Public Opinion Quarterly 33, no. 4 (1969); Robert O. Smith, More Desired than our Owne Salvation: The Roots of Christian (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013). 23 imperative in order to understand U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, Nixon’s counterterrorism measures, and the conceptualization of the international terrorist. Since the establishment of the nation of Israel in 1948, the United States had supported and recognized

Israel’s right to exist. However, after 1967, the United States, more than any other country in the world, made sure to remain committed to the safety of Israel. The two countries never had a formal treaty as to why they were so closely bound, or to what extent the informal commitment would venture. The lax and ill-defined commitment led to great ambiguity and disagreement among U.S. officials and the foreign policies created. It reinforced past stereotypes and preconceived notions of Arabs in general—in both foreign and domestic arenas—and fueled regional frustrations in the Middle East, especially among the Palestinians.

Some scholars have argued that the guaranteed commitment to Israel supported by U.S. policy makers and the majority of the American public, stem from a moral obligation. While the creation of a interfered with the goals of the Palestinian Arabs, a place of refuge for the Jewish people, following the Holocaust of World War Two, was a far more urgent need than that of the Palestinians.19 Additionally, Israel was a democratic state and shared many of the same values as the United States. Having a democratic nation at the center of an immensely important, majority non-democratic region was seen as a strategic asset for U.S. interests, and, for the Nixon administration, helped justify certain foreign and domestic policies. Israel could also aid the United States in preventing or lifting an Arab oil embargo through military means, if necessary. Quandt explains this theory by saying, “Israel was valuable as an anti-Soviet bastion in a sea of radical Arab states.”20

19 Quandt, Decade of Decisions. 11. 20 Ibid., 12. 24

In addition to corresponding political values, there is the notion that U.S. unwavering commitment to Israel was based on the ideas of shared religious beliefs and cultural values. The

Jewish Bible, is the Old Testament of the Christian Bible. Within their shared religious book, the geneses of the Jewish connection and right to Israel go back over 2,000 years, when God promised the land forever to his faithful servant. The promise was first made to Abraham21, then again to his son Isaac22, and next to Isaac's son Jacob.23 The land promised was defined by the territory from the River of to the Euphrates river.24 While the history of the Jewish right to

Israel is combined with legend, allegory, and sacred religious belief, the establishment of a

Jewish state, after 2,000 years of stateless existence, is seen by some as fulfilled biblical prophecy. Indeed, having similar moral and religious values allowed the U.S. a better understanding of the Jewish people and state. Unlike their Arab neighbors, many of the Jewish people immigrating to Israel in the 1940s, had lived in Western Europe for centuries, and their cultural attributes reflected that fact. While there are numerous theories as to why the United

States has committed to the responsibility of Israel’s security,25 and allowed Jewish lobbyists influence in foreign and domestic policies, this research will highlight the idea of shared political, religious, and cultural characteristics between the United States and Israel as the general reasoning to the unwavering commitment to Israel and the obligation of maintaining its security, thus shaping Nixon’s foreign policy agenda and the often-anti-Arab measures in the

United States.

21 Genesis 15:18-21 22 Genesis 26:3 23 Genesis 28:13 24 Exodus 23:31 25 See Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Pr. of Harvard Univ. Pr., 1982); William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005). 25

If Israel was imagined by U.S. policymakers and the American public as the beacon of modern, Western ideologies in the region, what stood in direct contrast, were the radical Arab nations surrounding it. As Matthew Jacobs, a professor of history at the University of Florida, states in his book Imagining The Middle East: The Building of an American Foreign Policy,

1918-1967, “the exercise of U.S. power—cultural, economic, military, and political—in the

Middle East has been enabled, justified, and sustained through the ways Americans have thought about and interpreted the region, the people who inhabit it, and the forces at play there.”26 The discursive constructions of the region created in the early nineteenth century generated the

Western misrepresentation of the East and its peoples. However, as the United States became more dependent on Arab oil and closer allied themselves with Israel after 1967, new Arab stereotypes, of course influenced by past ones, were used to justify Nixon’s counterterrorism measures that focused, for the most part, on Arabs at home and abroad. The preconceived, stereotypical notions of the Arab people, influenced by orientalist views and the actions of a small group of radical Palestinians, created a binary, parochial logic in regard to the rationalization of U.S. involvement in the Middle East and conceptualizing Arabs as a threat to

U.S. national security and international security as a whole.

Methodology:

As a historical study on the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism, foreign policy, and conceptualization of the terrorist threat in America, during the Nixon administration, my thesis questions the intersection of politics and policy and how one conceptualizes and identifies the relations between an existential threat and specific foreign policy agendas. This study takes both

26 Matthew F. Jacobs, Imagining the Middle East: The Building of an American Foreign Policy, 1918 - 1967 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2011) 1. 26 a chronological and thematic approach in order to show how the realist foreign policy agenda of the Nixon administration during the Cold War not only shaped new policies, but also the conceptualization of the Arab-terrorist.

The chronological approach to my study gives a better understanding of how U.S. policies against and conception of international terrorism greatly changed over time, rather than the actual terrorist attacks themselves. By firmly fixing the Arab-Palestinian in the context of an international threat through the global framework of the U.S. conflict with the Soviet Union, the

U.S. government tried to conceptualize terrorism as something that could be identified, defined and successively acted upon. The terrorist attacks I focus on were perpetrated by the Arab-

Palestinian groups. These groups transformed the previous structure of meaning surrounding terrorism. The Nixon administration internally discounted the threat level of international terrorism, but, publically and rhetorically intensified and shaped the international terrorist threat and conception as overwhelmingly Arab. This resulted in the creation of the institutionalized and stereotypical understanding of who the international terrorists were, based on ethnic origin, rather than defining what constitutes as international terrorism.

My research applies discursive analysis to hundreds of official texts and declassified government documents, from the CIA, FBI, and State Department. These documents are written by key figures and policy elites in the Nixon administration, including President Nixon, Henry

Kissinger, Secretary of State, William Rodgers, among others. These documents are available both in online archives, and in the archives of the Nixon Library. The analysis of discursive themes throughout the government documentation shows how the conception of the Arab- terrorist was greatly shaped by preconceived stereotypical notions, political gain, and diplomatic circumstances. 27

The second research method I use is case study analyses. I examine three attacks orchestrated by the Palestinian terrorist organizations in 1969, 1970 and 1972 through commission reports from the Department of Defense, the CIA, phone conversations of key government officials, and various committee and subcommittee meetings. These sources, in particular, show how the Nixon administration shaped and broadcasted the threat of international terrorism through more rhetoric than reality. While this study does not intend to discount the actual risk that international terrorism did and continues to pose to the United States, framing the terrorist threat as primarily Arab lead to a gross generalization in public perception and long- lasting impacts on international relations.

My third research method is content analysis. I analyze how the Nixon administration and various U.S. federal agencies, mention, theorize, and explain international terrorism, in the context of a particular event. Additionally, I examine how said theories and explanations change in various forms of communication, particular time frames, and the changing international climate. By studying official government reports, government contracted research studies, academic journals of the time, statistical data, popular polls, and newspaper articles, I find that the evolution of conceptualizing the terrorist threat is distinctly shaped by the junction of culture and politics.

The aim of my study is to bring focus to the evolution of America’s experience with and conceptualization of international terrorism— topics of both social and political significance today—and situate them in a historical perspective.

28

Chapter 1. The Rise of International Terrorism

Introduction:

Richard Nixon was the first president in American history to view transnational terrorism as a problem to be dealt with by the federal government. Although his first efforts to combat terrorism were relatively minor compared to today, such as suggesting ways to manage the proliferating problem of airline hijacking, U.S. counterterrorism policies during the Nixon administration evolved into an essential and eternal fixture of the federal government, creating an institutionalized conception of the terrorist and the terrorist threat.

Originally, combatting international terrorism was not on Nixon’s foreign policy agenda.

Like the preceding Johnson administration, Nixon saw terrorism as a regional issue, using the terms guerrilla, insurgent, and terrorist interchangeably. Aside from aerial hijackings—which were seen as more of a nuisance than an international danger, and not connected to any one race or nation—there appeared to be little to no interest in conceptualizing international terrorism in the early days of the Nixon presidency.

Nixon had a realist policy perspective and concentrated on concrete threats to U.S. national security and U.S. interests when discussing foreign policy. The Nixon campaign appealed to the common fears and anxieties of the American public, playing politics for security.

In the 1968 presidential campaign, Nixon promised a "return to traditional values and ‘law and order.'" He also promised, "peace at home and abroad.” He called upon the “silent majority” of

Americans to renew their confidence in the American government and back his policy of seeking 29 a negotiated peace in Vietnam and easing tensions with the Soviet Union.27 His promises to build better relations, while simultaneously continuing the superpower competition and with communist Soviet Union, and to end the war in Vietnam were essential in winning the presidential race.

Nixon began his presidency with the objective of shifting control over foreign policy from the State Department to the White House.28 Throughout his presidency, Nixon established ways to keep the State Department, particularly Secretary of State William Rogers, out of the assessment and implementation of critical U.S. foreign policy decisions. Instead, Nixon placed foreign policy control with his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger. Together, Nixon and Kissinger bypassed the specialists of the State Department and positioned the role of foreign policy making within the White House.29 The results of such a decision were subjective conclusions and decisions shaped by the individual understandings of Nixon and Kissinger.

"Nixon and Kissinger," according to William Bundy, a previous intelligence expert, CIA analyst, and foreign affairs advisor to John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson,"[were] steered by examples and stereotypes drawn from their own experiences."30

Although the Nixon foreign policy platform focused primarily on the Cold War with the

Soviet Union and ending the , he also reestablished the concern to develop a series

27 “The President: 1968 Campaign.” Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum. Accessed February 3, 2017. https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/thelife/apolitician/thepresident/ 28 Nixon wrote in his memoirs that “[f]rom the outset of my administration, however, I planned to direct foreign policy from the White House.” Nixon also increased the power of the National Security Council, headed by Henry Kissinger, to use as a White House surrogate of the State Department. 29 Donna Urschel. “Foreign Affairs in the Nixon Era: Historical Witnesses Discuss Transatlantic Relations.” Foreign Affairs in the Nixon Era (July/August 2003)- Library of Congress Information Bulletin. Accessed February 18, 2017. https://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/0307-8/policy.html 30 William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency. New York: Hill & Wang, 1998. 515. https://networks.h-net.org/node/9997/reviews/10508/nelson-bundy-tangled- web-making-foreign-policy-nixon-presidency 30 of actions that would allow a peace between the Arabs and Israelis and reduce tensions in the

Middle East. However, Nixon and Kissinger were unable to fully separate the Arab-Israeli peace process from Cold War realities. The Nixon administration adapted their realist, détente style policies to conflicts in the Middle East, which proved to be useless when confronted with the stateless Arab-Palestinian international terrorist organizations.

Background on the Six-Day War and the Rise of Palestinian Terrorism:

The national aspirations of the Palestinian people began to crystallize in the 1950s with the massive exodus of the Palestinians from the land that was established as the Jewish state of

Israel in 1948. This postwar led to the problem of Palestinian refugees and the creation of more unified Arab-Palestinian nationalist organizations. By the early 1960s, the

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a more radicalized political group, had arisen. The

PLO also had two large factions, , and The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

(PFLP). The PLO were established in 1964, during the Summit in . The goal of the Arab League in establishing the PLO was to use the group as a weapon against Israel, and declared itself as the legitimate governing voice of the Palestinian people. Fatah was established in the late 1950s by and joined forces with the PLO in 1968. Fatah was a strong promoter of commando-styled actions rather than conventional warfare.31 Fatah devoted itself to liberating Palestine through armed conflict delivered by the Palestinians themselves. While most

Arab governments opposed Fatah and their terrorist tactics, was an exception. Syria offered Fatah weapons, funding, and training.32 The primary concern of Fatah during the mid-

1960s was Israel. Robert Kumamoto, explains the American perspective of the Palestinian

31 Hanan Alon, Countering Palestinian Terrorism in Israel: Toward a Policy Analysis of Countermeasures. August 1980. Accessed January, 2017, from RAND Corporation website: Article.RAND.com 22. 32 Ibid., 22. 31 terrorists at this time by saying, “so long as Israel considered Fatah no more than an irritant during these years there certainly were no overt reasons for U.S. concern about the scattered news of the group’s operations.”33

On 5 June 1967, in reaction to increasingly heightened tensions and the mobilization of the Egyptian military along the Israeli border, Israel launched a preemptive attack against its

Arab neighbors. Before a negotiated cease-fire was in place, Israel had managed to triple its size by taking Syria’s Golan Heights, Egypt’s and , and Jordan’s West

Bank, including Jerusalem’s Old City. This war not only physically impacted the Arab world, but also caused deep psychological damage. Anti-Israel rhetoric within the Arab world reached a new high and the people of Palestine became convinced that the Arab League could not aid them in their fight against Israel, and that negotiation and moderation did not allow them national rights and independence. The Palestinian fedayeen acted through a persistent war of terrorism.

Although terrorism was not a new phenomenon in the Arab-Israeli conflict, it was after the Six-

Day War that terrorism became fundamentally connected to the Palestinian plight, in the eyes of the West.

The PFLP—a secular Marxist group founded in 1967 by , and the second largest group that forms the PLO—initiated some of the most spectacular terrorist attacks of the early 1970s. From 1967-1972, the PFLP became known for the revolutionary tactic of airline hijacking. And, as their attacks or attempted attacks became more internationalized and publicized, the American public and U.S. government began seeing the Palestinian cause as a terroristic, anti-Israel nuisance to be suppressed, in order to maintain the security of Israel and geopolitical interests.

33 Robert Kumamoto, International Terrorism and American Foreign Relations: 1947-1976. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999, 116. 32

Arabs at Home and Abroad:

The support for Israel within American society was at an all-time high during the late

1960s and early 1970s. According to a series of Gallup public opinion polls from the years of

1967-1983, at no time had sympathy for the Arabs approached that of Israel. It is important to note that neutrality or sympathy for neither side also had a high percentage rate. In the sixteen- year span, on average, only seven percent of the American population favored the Arabs, while an average of forty-eight percent favored Israel.34 With an essentially pro-Israeli and anti-Arab emotion felt throughout the United States, the suppression of Palestinian nationalism and the build-up of Israel’s security continued as the dominant goals in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle

East. Furthermore, the declaration of explicit threats against Israel and those who support Israel, made by radical Arabs, continued to perpetuate the pro-Israel and anti-Arab sentiment in the

United States.

Shortly after the Six-Day War, Arab leaders throughout the region announced no peace agreement, no negotiations, and no recognition of Israel.35 The war also fueled anti-American sentiment throughout the Arab world and beyond. While the extent of U.S. military aid to Israel during the Six-Day War is uncertain, because had previously been the main weapons supplier to Israel during this time, Arab media, primarily from Egypt, reported that the United

States and Britain assisted Israel to victory.36 Although both Western nations denied the

34 Roy Licklider, Political Power and the Arab Oil Weapon: The Experience of Five Industrial Nations. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~licklide/PoliticalPowerandtheArabOilWeapon.pdf 35 Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001, 124. 36 “Middle East Deadlock is One of the Major Foreign Policy Problems Facing Nixon.” Jewish Telegraphic Agency. January 21, 1969. Accessed November 18, 2016. http://www.jta.org/1969/01/21/archive/middle-east-deadlock-is-one-of-major-foreign-policy-problems- facing-nixon 33 allegations, the brutal defeat that Israel served the Arab nations was understood through the context of American involvement and aid. In response to the perceived U.S. involvement, five

Arab countries broke off diplomatic relations with the United States.37 Anti-American sentiment and the heightened use of Palestinian terrorism as a weapon in the struggle against both Israel and those who supported Israel proliferated throughout the Arab world and into areas as far east as Iran and Pakistan.

The Aftermath of Resolution 242:

The months following the Six-Day War proved to be trying for the members. While most countries agreed that a resolution was the only way of creating lasting peace in the region, what said resolution should entail differed among nations. The Soviet Union and Syria tried, through proposed U.N. resolutions, to condemn Israel as the aggressor and order an immediate withdrawal from all territories seized during the 1967 War.38 The United States and Britain proposed that peace should first be established before Israel withdrew from territories occupied during the war. After much deliberation Resolution 242 was accepted on 22 November

1967.39 The resolution stated,

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 2. Affirms further the necessity (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones40

37 Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, , 4/1/66- 12/3/67. Secret; Nodis. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d21 38 “S/PV.1381 of 20 November 1967.” United Nations. Accessed January 18, 2017, 4-17 UN Descision Proposal . 39 “S/Res/242 (1967) of 22 November 1967.” United Nations. Accessed January 18, 2017. https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/7D35E1F729DF491C85256EE700686136 40 Ibid. 34

The U.N. security council agreed to pass Resolution 242 because the phrases used and goals stated were quite ambiguous.41 Both Israel and neighboring Arab nations seemed to be receiving what they wanted, however, the respective interpretations were quite different.

Whereas the Arabs viewed the “withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” as the return of all captured territory and the restoration of pre-1967 borders, the Israelis viewed “their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force” as reason for continued occupation of the lands in order to maintain their security.42 Yet, as is clear in the wording of the resolution, respect and acknowledgment of sovereignty and independence is only given to "every State in the area.” The literal statelessness of the Palestinian people denied them the right of respect, sovereignty, and independence.

Instead, the resolution defined the Palestinian situation as a “refugee problem” that needed to be settled by the legitimate States of the United Nations. The aftermath of the Six-Day War and

Resolution 242 created a time of increased consistency in the political and ideological goals of the radical Palestinian nationalist organizations.

By January of 1969, President Nixon vowed to push for a more active search for an impartial Arab-Israeli agreement, however, his main concern was deterring Soviet influence in the Middle East, and ending the Vietnam War. Nixon and his advisors had little interest in or

41 National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, Entry 5177, Lot 78D443, Box 1, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret; Nodis. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76ve11p2/d142. 42 Kumamoto, International Terrorism and American Foreign Relations. 117. 35 knowledge of the Palestinian problem43, or its political implications.44 Nevertheless, against the environment of intensifying violence and escalating terrorist and guerilla activity by the

Palestinian fedayeen, and the growing hostilities between the Arab states and Israel, the United

States began establishing itself as supportive of Israel’s control of occupied territories awaiting

Arab compliance to make peace. The problems with such a policy soon became clear to the

Nixon administration.45

Nixon and the Rise of Palestinian International Terrorism:

Initially, the Nixon administration’s foreign policy in the Middle East did not consider combatting international terrorism, but rather repairing relationships and gaining a better reputation for the United States in the region. The United States had been losing the battle for political influence in the Middle East to the Soviet Union since the Six Day War.46 Nixon and

Kissinger were unyielding anticommunists and in being so, conducted foreign policy through a realist or state to state diplomatic perspective; competition between the United States and the

Soviet Union in all parts of the globe.47 By viewing all conflicts as proxy wars between the

United States and the Soviet Union, the Nixon administration failed to recognize that the countries of the Middle East had a long history of their own disparities and conflicts before the competing superpowers had intervened in the region. The result of this lack of understanding

43 Donald Neff, “Nixon’s Middle East Policy: From Balance to Bias.” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1/2, America and the Palestinians: (Winter/Spring 1990), pp. 121-152. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.csusm.edu/stable/pdf/41858941.pdf?refreqid=excelsior:081bc7ef311ea4d3b 0c51537433d790e 44 "Nixon's Strategy in the Middle East." MERIP Reports, no. 13 (1972): 3-8. doi:10.2307/3012227; Christison. Perceptions of Palestine. 124. 45 Quandt, Decade of Decisions. 71. 46 Timothy Naftali, “The Impotence of Power” Nixon and Counterterrorism Version 1.2. Draft Section for Study of US Counterterrorism Strategy, 1968-1993, 2. http://www.washingtondecoded.com/files/tnrmn.pdf;"Nixon's Strategy in the Middle East." MERIP Reports, no. 13 (1972): 3-8. doi:10.2307/3012227. 47 Neff, “Nixon’s Middle East Policy.” 131. 36 was confusion regarding the motivations and threats posed by the Palestinian fedayeen. At a moment when the United States was laying the groundwork for some of its first counterterrorism policies in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Nixon administration could not strategize beyond the Cold War zero-sum perspective.

According to Donald Neff, an American historian and writer for Middle East

International, Time, and The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, in his article “Nixon’s

Middle East Policy: From Balance to Bias,” Nixon’s way of thinking was “determined by the rhetoric of the Cold War” which “overcame his common sense and all the facts to the contrary.”48 Nixon came into office with a plan to create a more “even handed” policy approach in the Arab-Israeli conflict. He considered his predecessors as too pro-Israel, and disapproved of how much power domestic Israeli supporters and lobby had in shaping U.S. policy. According to his memoir Nixon wrote, “[i]n the quarter-century since the end of World War II this attitude had become so deeply ingrained that many saw the corollary of not being pro-Israel as being anti-Israeli, or even anti-Semitic. I tried unsuccessfully to convince them that this was not the case.”49 This statement shows that Nixon was determined to limit the power of Israel’s domestic supporters and, according to Kissinger, often boasted the fact that the Jewish lobby had little power over him.50 Yet, throughout his tenure, Nixon continued to increase military and economic aid to Israel and ally the United States diplomatically closer to Israel. By the end of his time in office, Nixon was known as the most pro-Israel U.S. president in American history.51 Nixon and

Kissinger’s consolidation of foreign policy power to the White House, their realist perspective on the conflict in the Middle East and terrorism, the misinterpretation of Soviet power and influence

48 Ibid., 134. 49 Ibid., 122. 50 Ibid., 123. 51 Ibid., 123. 37 in the region, and the inability to recognize or correctly conceptualize a the terrorist threat, independent of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, all impacted Nixon’s departure from his previous objective of an even handed approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Said circumstances, by association, had a direct effect on the conceptualization of international terrorism and the policies created to combat it.

In 1969, the Middle East and the Palestinian problem continued to be a low priority for the president. In fact, Nixon assigned the Middle East to his secretary of state, Rogers. This action is telling as to where Nixon placed the importance of the Middle East conflict on his foreign policy agenda. Although Rogers had experience in government, Nixon appointed him as secretary of state despite the fact that he had little to no experience in foreign affairs, let alone the complex conflict occurring in the Middle East. Considering Nixon’s ultimate goal of shifting foreign policy power to the White House, appointing an inexperienced secretary of state allowed for an easier transition of power. Rogers dedicated all of the State Department’s power and resources to the conflict in the Middle East. Kissinger, in any official capacity, did not have policy forming jurisdiction in the Middle East, but the region quickly became of great interest and involvement for him.

By 1970, Kissinger conducted almost all U.S. policy formation in the Middle East, often bypassing Rogers and the State Department as a whole from any real influence in the policy forming and decision-making process. The power struggle between Kissinger and Rogers is one of many reasons as to why the Nixon administration could not establish coherent foreign policy in the Middle East. Nixon and Kissinger failed to see the importance and centrality of the

Palestinians in the peace process. Instead, they attempted to thwart any gain in political strength 38 the Palestinians might obtain.52 As a result, Nixon was incapable of looking at the Middle East except through the context of the pro-Soviet radical Arabs whose sole desire was the destruction of Israel. According to Kathleen Christison, a political analyst for the CIA from 1963-1979, in

Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy, “although it became more acceptable to talk about the Palestinian people's needs, U.S. policymaking horizons remained limited by the refusal to deal with the PLO, and this refusal came to form a new blind spot within the frame of reference.”53

TWA 840 Hijacking:

On August 29th, 1969, (TWA) Flight 840 on route from Rome to

Tel Aviv was hijacked by two members of the PFLP. The attack was thought to be directed at capturing a Jewish passenger blamed for crimes against Palestinians.54 Although the notion of transnational Palestinian terrorism was not yet considered a direct threat to the United States, this particular hijacking roused instant concern from the U.S. government at a higher level than earlier hijackings had. Previously, the majority of hijackings experienced by American airline companies were committed by U.S. citizens. These citizens instructed the pilot to fly to for various reasons.55 Although the United States and Cuba did not have diplomatic relations, due to the growing number of aircraft hijackings, the two governments had come to an agreement on what actions to take when hijacking situations did occur. The earlier plane hijackings to Cuba were generally nonpolitical in motivation and did not result in any deaths or injuries. Thus, U.S.

52 Christison, Perceptions of Palestine.124. 53 Ibid., 126. 54 "L.A. Jet Blown Up After it is Hijacked to Syria by Arabs." 1969. Los Angeles Times, Aug 30, 1969. Article Link ;National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12. Secret; Exdis, 5. History.State.Gov 55 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 780, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for information. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76ve01/d122 39 airlines and the American public viewed such instances as more of the inconvenience of air travel than a life threating danger.56

The TWA flight 840, originating in Los Angeles, stopping in Rome, and scheduled to land in , was the first U.S. registered aircraft to be hijacked by a foreign, politically motivated Palestinian nationalist organization. After boarding the flight in Rome, two Palestinian commandos hijacked the aircraft and forced the pilot to land in . The Syrian government allowed the plane to land and permitted the crew and passengers to safely exit the aircraft.57 After the were taken off the plane, a bomb was detonated that destroyed the cockpit of the aircraft.

The State Department took the lead on overseeing the response to the event, while

President Nixon took a less public role. The fact that State was appointed the lead role in this situation indicates the fact that, at first, Nixon did not see the hijacking as a top priority or global threat. Rogers criticized the seizing of the American aircraft and insisted that the Syrian government take direct action against the Palestinian commandos.

Immediately following the landing of the TWA flight in Damascus, Rogers made a public announcement saying that he “hoped the Syrian government would not associate itself in any way with an act of ‘international piracy’ by Arab commandos.” Israeli Transport Minister,

Moshe Carmel, echoed Roger’s statement and insisted that the international community take

“urgent moves to prevent further ‘piracy in the air by Arab terrorists’” Carmel went on to say that the “serious crime of aircraft and passenger piracy, if condoned by society, will expand to include airliners of additional flags and may turn into an epidemic that endangers human life and

56 Naftali, “Impotence of Power.” 5. 57 L.A. Jet Blown Up After it is Hijacked to Syria by Arabs." 1969. Los Angeles Times, Aug 30, 1969. 40 human society.”58 The hostage situation created a new state of affairs that the State Department had little experience with.

On August 30, Syria released all of the flight crew and passengers that did not hold

Israeli passports. Initially, there were five Israeli citizens that were detained; however, the Israeli women were released shortly after and the two male Israeli citizens remained in custody of the

Syrian government.

Although the State Department took the lead on the situation, State viewed the event through a globalist perspective.59 If U.S. backed Israel took military action against Soviet-backed

Syria, it could potentially end in superpower confrontation. In a State Department telegram sent from Tel Aviv to the American Embassy in Italy, Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abba Eban, pressured the State Department to act in rescuing the hostages held in Syria by threatening, “[i]f the Israelis will not be released with all the passengers, the situation will become infinitely graver.”60 Additionally, Israeli threats also jeopardized the integrity of U.S. air carriers.

According to a State Department telegram sent to Acting Assistant Secretary of State for

Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Davies, TWA was receiving bomb threats related to the

Israeli hostages held in Syria. According to Davies, the “TWA was receiving telegrams and phone calls whose content gave indication of organization and, this morning, a threat that bombs would be placed on all TWA flights if Israelis not released from Syria by end of day.”61 In an

58 Ibid. 59 National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Seelye and April Glaspie (NEA/ARN) on September 19; cleared by Jones, Wahl, Loy, Davies and Lloyd; and approved by Sisco. History.State.Gov 60 National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv. Drafted and approved by Davies and cleared by Eliot. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d8 61 National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Baas and Davies, cleared by Lloyd, and approved by Davies. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d12 41 attempt to prevent an exacerbated situation, the State Department suggested a form of “quiet diplomacy” between Syria and Israel, introducing a hostage trade plan between the two countries.62 Israel, however, was quite firm in not conceding to Syrian demands of hostage trade.

According to Israeli Foreign Minister Eban, “the idea of linking the release of the two Israelis with Israel’s release of the two Syrian pilots in its custody was intolerable. Each time Israel captured a Syrian prisoner of war Syria would simply highjack an Israeli plane.”63 This statement, however, disregards the fact that the hijacking was neither planned nor implemented by the Syrian government. Although Syria was detaining the two Israeli citizens, they capitalized on the situation the non-state actors of the PFLP presented them with.

With almost three months of strained negotiations and constant retaliation threats from

Israel, the Department of State was at a standstill of how to handle the hostage situation. They feared Israeli retaliation and tried to suppress it, yet, the U.S. government had no diplomatic relations or authoritative negotiation power over the Syrian government. This was due to the outcome of the Six-Day War. This diplomatic situation left the United States in a very vulnerable situation when trying to create a hostage trade agreement between Israel and Syria.

In early November of 1969, Egypt joined the hostage negotiation process. Egypt proposed that it would hand over the two recently captured Israeli hostages if Israel would “hand over to UAR the Egyptian Pilot, seventeen POWS from Six Day War, crews of two fishing vessels recently captured in Israeli territorial waters, eleven Egyptian civilians recently brought back from raid on

62 National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, , and Rome. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d10 63 National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Atherton on September 23, and approved by Brown on September 27. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d26 42

UAR, and, as condition sine qua non, the two Syrian pilots.”64 Although Israel was asked to release far more individuals with this agreement, on 5 December 1969, the Syrian government released the hijacked aircraft and Israeli passengers, in exchange for thirteen Syrian prisoners, two of which were the MIG pilots held as prisoners in Israel, and roughly fifty Egyptian nationals.65 It is important to note that the historical record gives no in-depth explanation as to why Israel was willing to release far more individuals and negotiate the hostage release agreement only when the government of Egypt became involved in the discussions.

Overall, the State Department was successful in negotiating the release of Israeli hostages in exchange for Syrian and Egyptian hostages by indirect state to state negotiations channeled through the Italian government. The TWA flight 840 hijacking proved that negotiating was the only option available to deter any escalated confrontation or retaliation between Syria and Israel.

Although Nixon had publicly denounced hijacking numerous times, the TWA flight 840 event brought no detailed evaluation of how to prevent or handle such incidents in the future. This shows the relative insignificance of both airline hijacking and the PFLP at this time. The lack of concentration on the actual perpetrators of the hijacking demonstrates how the notion of transnational attacks executed by non-state actors had not yet been conceptualized as a threat that could potentially cause both domestic and international ramifications for the Nixon administration. It would not be until September of 1970, that the PFLP would gain the attention

64 National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; The Embassy reported that Rafael had told the DCM that Israel would participate in a three-way exchange with Syria and Egypt, conducted through the ICRC, to resolve the TWA Flight 840 hostage incident. He stressed the need for secrecy to avoid public debate in Israel. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76ve01/d32 65 National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AV 12 US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Baas, cleared by Davies, Seelye, and Brown, and approved by Sisco. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d36 43 of the U.S. President and be conceptualized as a threat to the safety and security of the global community.

1970 Black September/Jordan Crisis:

On , 1970, four separate groups of terrorists belonging to the PFLP simultaneously hijacked four passenger planes headed to the United States from Europe.66 Two of the hijackers attempting to take an El Al flight were detained by observant air marshals before the hijacking was a success. The three successful groups of PFLP members flew the jets to an airfield in Jordan and held over three hundred passengers hostage for a list of demands. To gain more global attention, on September 12, 1970, the terrorists blew up the empty planes.67

The PFLP took the hostages on buses, releasing over 200 of them to the Intercontinental

Hotel in , Jordan.68 The hijackers kept the other 100 American, Israeli, German, Dutch,

Swiss, and British hostages in undisclosed locations throughout Amman.69 The event of

September 6, 1970, was America’s first real experience in handling what Nixon saw as a national crisis that was perpetrated by non-state international terrorists.

As the 1970 Jordan Crisis continued to develop, Henry Kissinger assumed the role of

Middle East policy formation. His strategic and realist perspective laid the foundation for U.S. conceptualization of the Palestinian terrorist threat. No longer could the issue of Palestine be

66 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings. For Official Use Only. Received in the White House Situation Room at 12:28 a.m. September 7. Copies were sent to Saunders and Dunn. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v24/d202 67 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings. Confidential. The NEA Working Group was formed to coordinate information and responses to the hijacking crisis. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v24/d204 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 44 viewed as a refugee problem, resolved through negotiations of official Arab states and Israel, but rather an international menace firmly fixed on the Soviet side of the Cold War conflict.

Shortly after the hijackings took place, Nixon released a public statement condemning the

PFLP and hijackings, but, much like the TWA hijacking of 1969, he chose to take a less publically visible position in the management of the event. Although, initially, Kissinger and

Rogers were both handling the Jordan crisis, a disagreement on how to best manage the emergency eventually pushed Rogers out. Rogers suggested direct talks with the PFLP in order to “reassure nervous adversaries that [the U.S.] intended them no harm.”70 Kissinger, however, staunchly opposed Roger’s suggestion. Kissinger “favored a communication to Arab governments that the killing of hostages would have serious consequences.”71 The notion of punishing Arab governments for the actions of a small group of terrorists they had no real control over, is an example of the state to state, realist foreign policy procedures of Nixon and Kissinger.

It also outlines the start of the generalization and association of all Arab nations with terrorism.

Ultimately, Nixon favored Kissinger’s plan over Roger’s.72

Washington’s Special Actions Group (WSAG), headed by Kissinger, eventually took the sole lead on the crisis. He held meetings with his top national security personnel discussing how the U.S. should respond to the PFLP’s actions. Kissinger also made efforts to efficiently consider the hijacking problem facing the international community. According to a memorandum for the President from Kissinger, “the UN Security Council has been convened at

3 p.m. today to consider the hijacking problem. This issue was debated in the General Assembly

70 Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,1979. Location 12565 71 Ibid., Location 12581 72 Ibid., Location 12581 45 last year but this is the first time it will be placed formally before the Security Council.”73 For the first time, the Nixon administration was making hijacking a formal security concern for the global community. This is an indication that the administration started to recognize that the terrorism of the Palestinian fedayeen was actually transnational and potential domestic and international threat.

As Nixon and Kissinger grappled with safely freeing the hostages, they also had to consider an even more complex situation as Jordan became further engulfed in great civil turmoil. This ongoing conflict was extraordinarily significant to Nixon and Kissinger because it involved the U.S. backed Hashemite monarchy of Jordan against the Soviet and Syrian-backed

PFLP. Nixon could not allow the King of Jordan to fall to the hands of the fedayeen radicals, due to strategic interest. Jordan’s King, Hussein, was one of the only pro-western moderate Arab rulers of the Middle East and seen as an asset to the United States. According to a WSAG meeting on September 9, there were three contingency plans in the process of development, “(a) extricate the hostage personnel, (b) evacuate American citizens from Jordan if the situation there deteriorates further, and (c) intervene to support King Hussein if he requests us to do so.”74 Yet, due to the fragility of the situation, Kissinger informed Nixon that initiating a step towards military action was highly unfavorable and could possibly spark a major international confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Therefore, as the U.S. government experienced its first high-profile confrontation with Palestinian terrorism, due to

Cold War policy, the Palestinian fedayeen were factored into the radical Soviet side of the international equation.

73 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 330, Hijackings. Secret. Sent for information. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d52 74 Ibid. 46

According to Henry Kissinger, the problem that faced the U.S. government was twofold.75 While the safety of the hostages should be considered, the larger threat was “if the fedayeen could use Jordan as their principal base and in the process destroy the authority of the

King—one of the few rulers in the region distinguished by moderation and pro-Western sympathies—the entire Middle East would be revolutionized.”76 If U.S. or Israeli military action was used to rescue the hostages, not only could it result in direct superpower confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, but it could further ignite the civil unrest that was occurring in Jordan at the time, and possibly weaken King Hussein in the process.

According to Quandt, at the peak of the crisis, the U.S. government viewed the situation through the perspective of U.S.-Soviet relations, rather than an Arab-Israeli or Palestinian conflict.77 He states that Nixon and Kissinger “held a particularly stark view of Soviet intentions, and as they began to reshape American policy in the midst of the Jordan civil war, it was the U.S.-Soviet perspective that dominated their thinking.”78 The result of this way of thinking was a further continuation of relying on the typical state to state negotiating tactics previously used.

As the crisis in Jordan continued, Nixon and Kissinger were aware of the instability of the situation, and the Soviet Union made no moves in supporting the PFLP in their hostage taking pursuit. Although the United States, Germany, and Britain had their airborne units on high alert, the United States decided not to rescue the hostages through military force. However, as Syrian military tanks began advancing into Jordan, in order to aid the PFLP in their fight against the Jordanian military, the U.S. cautionary approach to the situation deteriorated.

75 Kissinger, White House Years. location 12465. 76 Ibid., Location 12465. 77 Quandt, Decade of Decisions. 105. 78 Ibid., 106. 47

Kissinger planned and negotiated with Israel on land and air strikes in Jordan.79 Israel prepared to strike with the support of the United States.

Nixon and Kissinger’s concern for the safety and stability of Hussein’s monarchy became a significantly greater national security concern than that of the American hostages being held by the PFLP. This was a result of the realist foreign policy concerns and the ultimate objective of maintaining the power balance in the region.

Although the terrorists did not kill or harm any of the passengers, the event dragged on for weeks and drew the world’s attention to the brewing conflict in Jordan and the danger of

Palestinian transnational terrorism. By September 29, all of the hostages were released by the

PFLP, in exchange for the release of Palestinians held in the prisons of , Britain, and Switzerland. Israel also released some Libyan and Palestinian prisoners after they could confirm the hostages were released.

Nixon’s Seven-Point Program:

In the midst of the Jordan Crisis, on 11 , Nixon presented a new seven- point program to deal with airline hijacking. Four of the points indicate Nixon’s focus on state- to-state participation and diplomacy when dealing with aerial hijackers. In point number four,

Nixon directed the State Department to fully examine, with other foreign governments, the best way to deter future hijackers. In point number five, he stresses the importance of all countries accepting a multilateral convention on punishment of hijackers to be considered at the

International Conference held by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), calling upon other governments to become “parties to these conventions.” In point six, Nixon outlines

U.S. policy towards hijacking stating that the “United States Government hold[s] the countries in

79 Kissinger, White House Years. 48 which hijacked planes are landed responsible for taking appropriate steps to protect the lives and the property of U.S. citizens." He ends with point seven which explains the efforts of the United

States and the in requesting an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security

Council, to consider how best to combat the problem.80 Nixon’s plan called upon international organizations like the UN and ICAO to solve the crisis, yet the hijackings were carried out by non-state actors with no seat, say, or loyalty to the laws created by the international organizations. The Nixon administration made no reference to talking directly with the PFLP, instead, they relied exclusively on state actors, situated outside of the conflict, to implement a resolution. The solution for Nixon was rallying states through international institutes, rather than dealing with the event as a regional issue. Such actions are an example of Nixon’s inability to act outside of his conventional realist foreign policy approach. It also shows the administration’s impotence in establishing ways to discipline the actual perpetrators, instead, generalizing entire nations and focusing sanctions on the official states and their handling of terrorists.

One of Nixon’s sanctions included the separation from any nation whose citizens committed acts of international air piracy. He called on all large airline companies to abstain from flying to any nation that harbored terrorists, and not allowing said nation's aircraft to use the international airports of the powerful world nations.81

According to a New York Times article written by an observer of the event, the sanction proposed by president Nixon could possibly be effective in lessening a number of airline hijackings, however, it could also lead to significantly larger problems. The observer writes in

80 Richard Nixon, “Richard Nixon: 1970: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President.” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: (Richard Millhous), September 11 [291]. 743.Public Papers of the President 81 James Reston, “Impotence of Power,” The New York Times, September 11, 1970, p. 40. http://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/11/archives/the-impotence-of-power.html?_r=0 49 his article that “the sanction is not precise, and in the case of Jordan would actually punish the government that is fighting the guerillas.”82 Nixon’s pragmatic approach to dealing with aircraft piracy had the potential of isolating entire nations due to the acts of a small group of individuals.

This created the potential for an act of terrorism to be deemed an international crisis and thus combatted and perceived as a critical concern for U.S. national security in the eyes of both elite government representatives and the U.S. public.83

The Aftermath:

As the crisis in Jordan ended, the Nixon administration felt successful in handling the first major terrorist incident they were faced with. The handling of the hostage crises served as an example of how to manage an international emergency of that nature. The hijackings became a turning point in the evolution of international terrorism.84 Although the threat of the

Palestinian terrorists was not yet conceptualized or inflated, this event did further enforce the notion that in the context of the Cold War, a regional conflict could quickly escalate into an international crisis.85 Yet, the new policies created to better deter and/or combat airline hijacking were directed at punishing entire nations rather than Palestinian terrorists. The sanctions created by Nixon and Kissinger were only proficient enough to punish the disobliging nation and not the

PFLP. This indicates the inability to establish a direct way of punishing the PFLP or future non- state airline hijackers.

The main concern of the Nixon administration was not creating a cohesive counterterrorism policy, but rather the stability of Jordan and the furthering of U.S. strategic

82 Ibid. 83 Jeffrey D. Simon, “Misperceiving the Terrorist Threat." RAND Corp, Santa Monica, June 1987. 1. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2008/R3423.pdf 84 Jeffrey D. Simon, The Terrorist Trap: America’s Experience with Terrorism. Indiana University Press, 2001. 137. 85 Naftali, “Impotence of Power.” 3 50 interests in the region. King Hussein was back in power and no longer threatened, the fedayeen organizations had been greatly weakened and expelled to , and no superpower confrontation or direct military involvement was needed. Additionally, the Israeli military further established their role as a strategic asset to America by their readiness to intercede militarily in the area, at the request of the U.S. government.

The September 6 hijackings challenged the Nixon administration’s usual practice of state-to-state diplomacy and the practice of détente in the region. The lack of direct talks with the

PFLP themselves—because they were not official state actors, and therefore could not be directly punished by any government—further indicates the inability of Nixon and Kissinger to conceptualize the threat of a non-state actor. Furthermore, because the hijackings took place during a civil conflict in Jordan, the progression in both circumstances altered the understanding of the events.

The Jordan/Black September Crisis made it challenging to conceptualize terrorism separate from the conventional interests of security and influence in the Middle East.86 Nixon and Kissinger failed to distinguish the transnational nature of the PFLP. The notion of non-state actors who accomplish spectacular attacks on both foreign and domestic targets conflicted with the routine practice of Cold War and détente era diplomacy in the region. Due to the unique nature of the simultaneous events and failing to conceptualize the Palestinian problem through the context of a regional history, the Jordan crisis marked the beginning of viewing the

Palestinian fedayeen as representative of the “global Communist challenge.”87 This created the perception that the Palestinian fedayeen were an international issue that must be combatted on a global level to ensure the security of freedom and democracy throughout the world. Nixon’s

86 Simon, “Misperceiving the Terrorist Threat.” 4. 87 Kissinger, The White House Years. 573. 51 fixation with actual or illusory Soviet threats repeatedly led to misconceptions of regional situations.

By summer of 1972, the Nixon administration observed the issue of international terrorism as more of a nuisance, but, a nuisance directly connected to radical Arabs nationalism.

The counterterrorism policies of the Nixon administration were defined through state-to-state negotiations and makeshift policymaking. However, within the hectic environment of Watergate and election campaigning, it would take a terrorist event of a much more violent nature for the

Nixon administration to take more public measures in combatting international terrorism.

52

Chapter 2. The Munich Massacre

Introduction:

On 5 , the world was exposed to the power and devastation of international terrorism. During the Olympic Games in Munich, a Palestinian terrorist organization called Black September—named after the crushing defeat and expulsion of the fedayeen in Jordan during the 1970 Black September Crisis—killed two Israeli Olympic athletes and took nine more hostage. After a failed rescue attempt made by the German police, all nine of the Israeli hostages died, along with multiple Palestinians, and one German police officer.

Although there had been numerous acts of political violence, hostage taking, and aerial hijackings from 1967-1972, the Munich Massacre marked a fundamental transformation in the history of U.S. counterterrorism policies and is often noted as the birth of modern transnational terrorism.88

According to Naftali, “in the wake of the killings, both the State Department and the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) instituted changes in how they handled Palestinian violence.

The terms counterterrorism and international terrorism formally entered the Washington political lexicon as the U.S. government established its first groups to manage the problem.”89 In response to the event, David Martin, a staff member of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, asked the CIA for any information that the Agency might have on the subject that was now termed

88 Lisa Stampnitzky, Disciplining Terror: How the Experts Invented “Terrorism.” (Cambridge: University Printing House, 2013) 21. 89 Timothy Naftali, Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism. (Perseus Books Group, New York. 2005) 55. 53

“The Terrorist International.”90 While the statement regarding international terrorism given to the Internal Security Subcommittee on October 31, 1972 remains classified, it is clear that the notion of international terrorist networks—previously not fully considered—had become a threat that required more recognition and conception from the U.S. government’s intelligence community.

The Munich Massacre not only affected U.S. conceptions of terrorism, but also greatly impacted the global community. The notion of Palestinian terrorists with no borders and no regard for innocent civilian lives, produced the environment necessary to develop permanent counterterrorism actions on both a national and international level. Although the 1970 Black

September Crisis began revealing the danger and capability of international terrorists, it was not broadcasted in real-time to a world audience. The Munich Massacre, however, publically exposed the international terrorist threat, because the world watched the tragedy unfold, live, from their homes. The brutal attack was condemned by most world leaders. It also revealed to the people of the United States that Palestinian terrorism was not just an inconsistent spectacle, but a growing and intensifying threat. These circumstances encouraged Nixon to not only create the first official U.S. counterterrorism policies, but also a counterterrorism campaign throughout the international community.

The attack also initiated an international legal debate on the creation of a globally agreed upon definition of terrorism and the creation of permanent official counterterrorism procedures.

The Munich Massacre marks yet another shift in the conceptualization of international terrorism and firmly fixed the Arab Palestinians as the greatest terrorist threat to both national and international security. Certain acts of political violence were now deemed international terrorism.

90 Office of Legislative Counsel, 17 . CIA-RDP74B004, 3. (accessed January 20, 2017). CIA Library Reading Room Archive. 54

This created the catalyst necessary for the Nixon administration to combat terrorism on an international level, creating new policies almost exclusively focused on the Arab-Palestinian organizations.

The Munich Massacre produced great change in the Department of State’s Office of

Security (SY), and how they dealt with the protection of U.S. diplomats and American representatives abroad. While the historical record leaves no solid evidence as to exactly why the mission of SY changed so dramatically, it is most likely due to a mixture of politics and legitimate safety precautions. According to a State Department report, the Munich event caused a reevaluation and expansion of physical and defensive security measures throughout the U.S. government in its entirety.91 The crisis marked three fundamental shifts in dealing with U.S. diplomatic security by redefining and altering traditional security measures. This laid the groundwork for diplomatic security as it is known today.92

First, the Munich event allowed for diplomatic security to become the top concern when creating U.S. foreign policy. Second, it altered the focus and expanded the responsibilities of SY.

While previously not a main concern for SY, after the Munich crisis, terrorism became one of the three most essential subjects that SY handled and operated. Before Munich, SY’s main focus was conducting background investigations and threat evaluation; however, the event changed

SY’s attention to counterterrorism, and gaining the personnel and advanced technology required to actually combat it. Third, Munich brought a new conception of the terrorist threat which

91 Mark T. Hove, History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 2011) 212.State Government Documents, Organization (accessed March 5, 2017). 92 Ibid., 212. 55 prompted the attention of top government personnel. The White House, Congress, and the

Secretary of State were all brought into the process of diplomatic security policymaking.93

Before Munich, Nixon and his advisors viewed it best for the president to take a non- public role in the handling of terrorist and hostage taking situations. Although Nixon was involved in the decision-making process as the previous hostage taking incidents unfolded, in the event that the situation ended badly, it was best for the president to not publicly be the individual to blame for the outcome. However, the widespread exposure to and condemnation of the

Munich Massacre created the demand for Nixon to take action against international terrorism, in an extremely public way. Nixon’s response to the Munich Massacre, although the actual attack was not directed at the United States or its citizens, allowed for the establishment of the existential terrorist threat conception, by making extreme changes in policies, laws, and government institutions. The visible and conceptual shift of the Nixon administration in the aftermath of the attack, laid the foundation for U.S. counterterrorism, shaped by a discursive connection with an oversimplified identity and ideology.

The CCCT:

On September 25, 1972, Nixon established the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism

(CCCT)94, to satisfy the nation’s growing fear of the terrorist threat, and to be more prepared if a similar situation were to happen again. Nixon envisioned the new committee to be a collaboration of top security personnel that reported to him on “the measures that are being taken to combat terrorism” in order to show that “we are moving effectively against the problem of

93 Ibid., 212. 94 Richard Nixon: "Memorandum Establishing a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.," September 25, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3596 56 thwarting acts of terrorism both here and abroad.”95 In addition, the committee was to “devise procedures for reacting swiftly and effectively to acts of terrorism that occur” and to “report to the President, from time to time, concerning the foregoing.”96 Unfortunately, a committee with such broad goals and extensive, interdepartmental top level personnel was unable to be effective, largely due to bureaucratic intricacies. According to a hearing before the subcommittee on the

Near East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives in June

1974, the CCCT had only met once since its establishment two years earlier, and that was shortly after President Nixon’s statement on its creation.97

In the hearing, Lewis Hoffacker, the Special Assistant to Secretary of State for Terrorism explained there was a working group with low-level representatives from various departments that served the purpose of the CCCT. When Lee Hamilton, the chairman of the subcommittee asked why the CCCT had not met more, Hoffacker stated “there was one effort made to call the

Cabinet Committee together. We couldn’t find a quorum, you might say. It was very hard to get that many department and agency heads together.”98 Although the Working Group created for the CCCT met more often than the committee themselves, bureaucratic issues continued to thwart any cohesive and consistent policies.

The American public viewed the Black September terrorists as a new danger that threatened the international community, however, the staff at the State Department were at a loss

95 United States, The Department of State bulletin. v.67 no.1736-1748 Oct-Dec & Ind. 1972. Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 475. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=msu.31293008122099;view=1up;seq=133 96 Ibid., 475. 97U.S. Congress. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs. International Terrorism: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia. 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., June 11, 18, 19, and 24, 1974. 13. Babel Hathi-Trust Archive 98 Ibid., 13. 57 of what could actually be done about terrorism99, and the National Security Council had a greater concern for the Israeli reaction to the Munich attack than the international terrorists themselves.100 According to a memorandum for Henry Kissinger from Samuel M. Hoskinson, a

National Security Council staff, the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv “reports that the Israeli public appears stunned. They expect that if more Israeli lives are lost the reaction in Israel will be extremely bitter and could transcend the Fedayeen issue and bring on a souring of public attitudes towards any efforts to reach peace with the Arabs.”101 This statement shows how the complex international situation, and U.S. diplomatic relations and geopolitical interests made the incident a top concern, and said U.S. interests were key in creating the appropriate response to the incident.

Kissinger knew the potentially disastrous effects that the Munich event would create in the international community if the U.S. response was not precise. Kissinger expressed his grave concern about the situation in a conversation with Nixon by saying, “[n]ow, and this thing could easily turn now. My great fear is, started because the Austrians had been frustrated for 15 years, had the Archduke assassinated, the Germans and the whole world was outraged.”102

Kissinger’s fear of an all-out war in the Middle East was shaped by Cold War realities. Since the

Jordan Crisis in 1970, the U.S.-Israel alliance was at one of the strongest points in the history of

99 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 368, 1976 Olympics. Secret. History State Government Libary and Archives; Hoskinson reported on the Israeli hostage situation in Munich and commented that the Department of State was at a loss over how to apply pressure on the terrorists. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid., https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d90. 102 Transcript of Telephone Conversation between Richard M. Nixon, William P. Rogers, Henry A. Kissinger, Alexander Haig. Conversation 771-2, September 6, 1972, 8:13 am-9:48am, Oval Office. Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Vol E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969-1972, released by the Office of the Historian. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e1/45513.htm. 58 the diplomatic relationship. However, in the aftermath of the Munich incident, that relationship was greatly tested. The foreign policy interests whereupon U.S.-Israel relations were formed structured nearly all other U.S. policy in the rest of the Middle East, however, Cold War policy, such as détente and realist objectives, made reacting to the Munich incident far more complicated for Nixon.

Differing from Kissinger to some degree, President Nixon was concerned with reacting with a statesman like and tough appearance. While he did not want to disrupt or further ignite any conflicts in the Middle East, Nixon did not treat the event or the Palestinian terrorists to be of great importance to U.S. foreign policy. His greatest concern was how he portrayed his sympathies to Israel and capitalized on public fear to appear “tough” in his actions to both the domestic and international communities. In excerpts of telephone conversations, the night of the massacre, between President Nixon, the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security

Affairs Haig, Secretary of State Rogers, and Attorney General Kleindiest, Nixon explains the best way of handling the Munich situation—for the sake of interest—and his utmost concerns,

“[u]nder the circumstances we ought to discuss with the Russians and do something. The whole world is going to be shocked by this. Think we have got to take it up…out of interest. We are going to intervene in it.” Haig responded: “The Israelis are going to react.” Nixon then asked: “Who are they going to hit though?” Haig suggested: “Lebanon, though—they will find out where based—.” Nixon responded: “They are capable of it. They have got to hit somebody, don’t you think?” Haig agreed.103

Only ten minutes later President Nixon called Haig again and said:

103 Transcript of telephone conversation between Haig and Nixon, December 5, 10:35 p.m.; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Telcons, 1972 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d91. 59

“This isn’t of course a very big thing. You could talk to Rogers about this. The United States should indicate that they will break diplomatic relations with countries that harbor any sort of guerrilla groups. Hell, what do we care about Lebanon. Think we have to be awfully tough. I want you to run that by a couple of people. Any nation that harbors or gives sanctuary to these international outlaws we will cut off all economic support—obviously Lebanon. Jordan’s another. Don’t know who else we have relations with—.”

Haig interrupted: “We may have some Chinese problem on this.”

The President replied: “Screw the Chinese on this one. Be very tough.”104

The phone conversation between president Nixon and Haig shows Nixon’s main concern in regard to handling U.S. reaction to the Munich Massacre. He considered the dangers of

Israel’s emotional reaction, and wanted to project a “tough” U.S. appearance to the rest of the world. The Munich Massacre gave Israel the justification needed for an attack or invasion of

Lebanon; however, any rise in U.S. support for Israel in the days following the Munich incident, could reestablish and intensify the Soviet Union’s influence and relations with Arab nations.

Nixon’s suggestion to cut off all diplomatic relations and economic support to nations that “harbor any sort of guerrilla groups,” shows his consistent realist, state-to-state foreign policy approach. Because the nation threatened by Israeli retaliation, Lebanon, had little economic or diplomatic benefits to the United States, cutting off all diplomatic and economic relations with said nation, rather than resolving the issue through diplomacy, seemed to be the most beneficial action to take. It would portray the toughness of Nixon to the international community, satisfy the domestic anxieties, and potentially deter any growth of Soviet influence on other Arab states. It is important to note that the Munich Massacre occurred during the U.S. presidential reelection campaign, which further explains why Nixon felt appearance and the easing of domestic anxieties to be some of the most important aspects of the U.S. response.

104 Transcript of telephone conversation between Haig and Nixon, December 5, 10:45 p.m.; ibid. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d91. 60

Per the President’s request, Haig called William Rogers, Secretary of State, at 10:55 P.M that same day. Both Haig and Rogers were not in favor of President Nixon’s plan to break relations with the nations that give sanctuary to terrorists. In the phone conversation,

Haig states to Rogers: “he has asked you to come over and sit down and see where to go on this. He’s threatened to break relations with nations that harbor or give sanctuary to these guerrillas.”

Rogers objected: “He can’t do that, especially when we don’t know which nations. What we are trying to do tonight—we are trying to get some protection against a JDL blowup. We are taking whatever security precautions there are to take.”

Haig noted: “That’s what I told him.” Rogers understood that “we did everything we could. We got in touch with the Olympic Delegation, sent out telegrams, talked to the German Government… and… talked today about what kind of reprisals we might make.”

Haig proposed: “Tomorrow we should call for calm.”

Rogers Noted: “There are financial angels— and . too. We have got to be careful.” Haig concurred: “He always wants to do something. We have to be careful not to do something he will regret.”105

The conversation between Haig and Rogers explains the issues with Nixon’s action proposal. The U.S. government could not impair the progress they had made with both the

Soviet Union and important Arab States by allowing an emotionally driven Israeli reaction to initiate the possibility of another war in the Middle East, this time with both superpowers involved. Therefore, the Nixon administration would have to cultivate a system of reactions that controlled Israeli anger yet, somehow symbolically appease the public’s outcry and anxiety towards the situation through an expression of great grief and concern. Outside rhetorical expressions of sympathy and concern, the White House focused on creating an operable reaction that would not jeopardize U.S. interests. Nixon wanted the U.S.-Israel alliance to remain, however, also remain in a way that both the domestic and international interests of the United

105 Transcript of telephone conversation between Haig and Rogers, December 5, 10:55 p.m.; ibid. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d91. 61

States were being served. Kissinger saw the value of using the UN, as it could momentarily calm

Israeli reaction.

On 6 September 1972, Samuel Hoskinson sent a memorandum for Kissinger on the

Munich killings and how the United States should respond. According to Hoskinson, the response should be through careful, operational measures. Yet, he also states,

“[t]he hard reality, however, is that there is really very little we, or any major power, can do to rectify this situation or make sure that it will not happen again. We can attempt to focus world moral indignation and press for tighter international security measures, but we will remain vulnerable to the dedicated extremist.”

He continues by saying,

“[t]his being the case, it would seem best at this point to strike a statesmanlike posture; deeply concerned but not over reacting. We will want to do everything reasonably possible to help avert similar tragedies in the future, but should not let our sense of outrage lead us into actions which could jeopardize other important interests which we have in the Middle East.”106

The environment surrounding the U.S. security advisors in the aftermath of the Munich killings was filled with both confusion and disagreement. There was a general consensus that an overreaction to the incident could produce a dangerous situation for world powers, however, a passive or mild reaction could potentially disrupt important interests. This ultimately resulted in a campaign that was more rhetoric than reality.

On 11 September 1972, there was a National Security Council meeting attended by

President Nixon, William Rogers, Henry Kissinger, and Alexander Haig. The general theme of the discussion was how to deter Israeli retaliation to the Munich Massacre. President Nixon stated that the “US must pursue a delicate line which demonstrated justified sympathy for Israel

106 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 368, 1976 Olympics. Secret. Sent for action. Kissinger wrote: “Thanks, Sam” on the first page. Attached but not published was a memorandum for the President to use at a meeting with Rogers and Kissinger. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d92. 62 but which did not serve to encourage Israeli retaliation which could only further escalate tensions and dangers in the Middle East.”107 While Nixon noted that he had assured that the

United States was “working diligently on the terrorist problem,” Rogers stated that the State

Department was not in favor of suggesting that the Security Council convene “on the terrorist issue.”108 President Nixon agreed and stated that “this kind of action would butt us up against

China and the Soviet Union but if the US were to go to the Security Council condemning countries which harbor guerrillas, this would in effect support Israel while at the same time not encouraging it to take escalatory retaliatory action.”109 The group continued discussing the actions that the United States should take in order to deal with the crisis, all centered around controlling Israeli retaliatory action.110 Kissinger suggested that the government attorneys develop a new set of principles that included “something on border crossing, something on countries who harbor organizations which operate beyond their borders and in this way the US would go to the Security Council in a statesmanlike posture and solicit the views of other nations.”111 When Secretary Rogers stated that it would be impossible to get any kind of UN council agreement on actions, Kissinger agreed, but stated that it could “serve as a deterrent to

Israeli action.”112 Again, symbolically and rhetorically showing that the Nixon administration was being tough, and that international terrorism should be considered an extreme threat; however, not taking any concrete action against the international terrorists.

107 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Memcons, Jan-Dec 1972. Secret. Drafted by Haig on September 11. Haig stated that the meeting began at 10 a.m., but according to the President’s Daily Diary it began at 8:30 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d94. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid. 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid. 63

There are many reasons as to why the National Security Council was not inclined to take an effective action against international terrorism. First and foremost, condemning all acts of international terrorism would not have any expectation of passing in a UN Council meeting, considering that only, at best, seven countries would vote in favor, and nine votes are required to pass a UN resolution.113 The President and Kissinger also agreed that although the Munich situation does not “soften up the Israeli attitudes,” it does underline “the need for seeking a solution to the Middle East situation..”114 The President also told Secretary Rogers that they should give “some thought to what the Congress could do on terrorism.”115 Kissinger noted, in regards to UN resolutions on terrorism, “[o]f course, nothing will come out. Nothing ever comes out. But we could make a lot of statesman-like speeches about curbing terrorism.”116 Overall,

Israeli retaliatory reactions, how to deter them, and appealing to public emotions of fear were thoroughly discussed in the meetings, yet, most were in agreement that there was very little that could actually be done to deter terrorist attacks in the future.

In the wake of the Munich Tragedy, President Nixon charged Secretary Rogers with the responsibility of mobilizing the international community to take action to combat terrorism.117

This charge is significant as it further shows the symbolic and rhetorical nature of Nixon’s

113 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 368, 1976 Olympics. Secret. Sent for action. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: “OBE.” There is no indication that Kissinger agreed or disagreed with any of the recommendations. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d96 114 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Memcons, Jan-Dec, 1972. Secret. Drafted by Haig on September 11. Haig stated that the meeting began at 10 a.m., but according to the President’s Daily Diary it began at 8:30 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d94 115 Ibid. 116 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 771-5. No classification marking. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d95 117 National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential. Drafted by G. Norman Anderson of (NEA/EGY). Copies were sent to 55 embassies. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d99 64 counterterrorism policies. To the American public, the Secretary of State is one of the most important cabinet members and, as a senior official in the U.S. federal government, has great say and decision-making power. However, as previously mentioned in chapter one, the actual power of the Secretary of State was granted to Nixon and Kissinger. Appointing Rogers the responsibility of taking action to combat terrorism, shows the relative lack of actual importance the issue held.

One of the main goals in this mobilizing process was to “get across to Arabs the negative effects that support of or failure to disassociate selves from terrorism have on Arab image and real interests.”118 According to Secretary Rogers in a State Department telegram sent to the embassy of the United Kingdom and other posts, the Munich tragedy further tarnished the image of all Arabs, not just in American public opinion, but throughout the world.119 In the telegram

Rogers states, “[d]espite fact that most responsible Arabs privately recognize negative impact of terrorism on Arab interests, their failure, by and large, to disassociate themselves from terrorist acts places even these responsible elements in role of supporters of terrorism in eyes of world.”120 In Rogers view, Arab governments simply stating no connection with the terrorists was not credible in world opinion, because the terrorists carry Arab passports, broadcast and print from Arab capitals, and operate from Arab nations.

Another objective of Secretary Rogers was maintaining the momentum the Munich tragedy had stirred up throughout the world. In a memorandum to President Nixon on 18

September 1972, Rogers explains how the actions that the United States took in the aftermath of

118 National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential. Drafted by G. Norman Anderson of (NEA/EGY). Copies were sent to 55 embassies. Cleared by Sisco, Fessenden, Ross, Phillip H. Stoddard (INR/DDR/RNA), Herz, Hummel, Davies, and Atherton; and approved by Rogers. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d99 119 Ibid. 120 Ibid. 65 the event have had a “considerable impact in imparting a sense of urgency on this questions

[terrorism] throughout the world community.”121 Furthermore the forceful remarks made by both the President and his Council clearly signal the “seriousness of our concern and our determination to convince others that the time has come to get tough in the fight against terrorism.”122 Rogers established two special committees in the State Department. The first, headed by Assistant Secretary Sisco, encouraged and directed international actions against terrorism. The second, headed by Acting Deputy Under Secretary Donelan, ensured the protection of foreign persons in the United States.123 Rogers also took steps to implement a more rigid visa screening application process in the United States in order to deter any potential terrorist from entering the country.124 Rogers also looked into ways the U.S. government could implement tighter investigations and controls on foreign groups in the United States, such as, those “advocating or practicing political terrorism; e.g., the Palestine Liberation Office in New

York, and groups of Arab and Iranian students in this country.”125 Three days later, a memorandum from Rogers to Nixon states that posts abroad have been instructed to conduct an intense examination of all Arab visa applicants. He also stated that the Immigration and

Naturalization Service (INS) have given the FBI the names and locations of all Arab students

121 National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential. Drafted by Atherton on September 14 and cleared by Donelan, Sisco, Armitage, Boyd, Wright, Fessenden, and Ross. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d102 122 National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d102 123 National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential. Drafted by Atherton on September 14 and cleared by Donelan, Sisco, Armitage, Boyd, Wright, Fessenden, and Ross. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d102 124 Ibid. 125 Ibid; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8. Confidential. Drafted by Donelan on September 20. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve01/d103 66 that were currently living in the United States.126 Chapter three of this study will go into further detail on the Arab screening processes conducted in the aftermath of the Munich Massacre.

Beyond symbolic and rhetorical measures, the U.S. intelligence community did alter their focus to some degree. In the weeks following the Munich Massacre, there was a growing awareness within the CIA that international terrorism posed a threat to U.S. interests and required further analysis.127 Whereas in the previous years the intelligence community was under no direct pressure to pay close attention to terrorist organizations or the analysis of terrorism, the introduction of Arab-Palestinian international terrorist activity, especially after the 1972 Munich

Olympics, caused a strengthened concern to the matter. However, according to Studies in

Intelligence, a classified journal of CIA and Intelligence Community analysts, in the issue

“Terrorism Analysis in the CIA: The Gradual Awakening (1972-1980),” in the fall of 1972 and thereafter until the late 1970s, the Directorate of Operations (DO) took the central position in establishing a counterterrorism program rather than the Directorate of Intelligence (DI).128 This is mainly due to the fact that “the White House and Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Helms viewed terrorism as primarily an operational and collection problem and were less interested in

Agency analysis of the problem.”129 This is significant because although the public rhetoric of the international terrorist was filled with mentions of dangerous terrorist, world-wide networks, terrorists and terrorism continued to be considered on an operational level rather than on an intelligence level.

126 Ibid. 127 “Terrorism Analysis in the CIA: The Gradual Awakening (1972-1980)” Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51, No. 1 20. 128 “Terrorism Analysis in the CIA.” 23. 129 Ibid., 23. 67

Although “Terrorism Analysis in the CIA” argues that having the DO dominant rather than the DI may have had significant impact on how the CIA handled the responsibility of terrorism—giving the study and analysis of the issue only modest attention—the articles states,

“the historical record offers no explicit justifications for this relative inattentiveness to the issue.”130 Nevertheless, the DO created some tools and resources for simple analysis and information on terrorism and shared them with a limited readership, primarily the CCCT, who, as previously mentioned, were quite ineffective in their counterterrorism pursuit. An example of this is the Weekly Situation Report on International Terrorism (WSRIT). The WSRIT, first published in November 1972, contained very brief reports on past attacks, present problems, and future predictions in international terrorism.131 The first WSRIT report circulated was eight pages long and discusses the hijacking of airliner by Palestinian terrorists, the arrest of a Palestinian terrorist in possession of twenty-one letter bombs, the spread of letter bombs, terrorism in Latin America, and the training of Arab terrorists by the Black Panther Party in

Algiers.132 The WSRIT was extraordinarily brief and highly speculative. For example, the section on the training of Arab terrorists by the Black Panther Party in Algiers states,

Five Palestinian commandos, described as “African blacks,” are reported to be training with American Black Panthers in Algiers for the purpose of learning idioms and mannerisms of black American soldiers. The commandos were to hijack a Lufthansa aircraft to secure the release of the three Arab terrorists jailed in Munich. There has been no confirmation of this report, nor any further information regarding possible re-targeting of the group as a consequence of the successful Lufthansa hijack of 29 October 1972. (Comment: A knowledgeable source in Algiers considers these reports “unrealistic” in light of the low esteem in which the Black Panthers are now held by both the Algerian Government and the Fatah representative in Algiers.)133

130United States. Central Intelligence Agency. “Refocusing Analytic Priorities: Terrorism Analysis in the CIA: The Gradual Awakening” (1972-1980). 1st ed. Vol. 51. Studies in Intelligence. CIA, 1982. 23. 131 “Terrorism Analysis in the CIA.” 25 132 Central Intelligence Agency. Weekly Situation Report on International Terrorism. November 1, 1972. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-01209A000100010001-7.pdf 133 Ibid., 8. 68

Although it would seem this report provides useful information, the general tone is uncertainty.

Language such as “no confirmation,” “[no] further information,” and “unrealistic [reports]” gives little authority to the intelligence and insight provided. Such brevity and uncertainty is seen throughout the WSRIT in its early days. Nevertheless, international terrorism was a previously neglected topic, and WSRIT aided, somewhat, in filling that gap.134 According to the Incident

Command System (ICS), as reported to the National Security Council (NSC), “[the] WSRIT fills a real need for the blending of current and intermediate coverage.” The WSRIT was also described by a DI specialist in terrorism as “the single most useful source of material on terrorism.”135 The demand for an extensive analysis on international terrorism that was intelligence and research driven rather than operationally oriented, came about in a slow and gradual manner. It was not until 1976—when the DI took over the analysis of terrorism, replacing the WSRIT with International Terrorism—that analysts “concentrated on conceptualizing international terrorism and projecting its likely future development.”136

As Nixon tried to implement new, domestic anti-terror measures in the United States, efforts to combat terrorism on an international front were met with disagreement and reluctance from other nations. One of the key problems was with definition. According to a 1973 U.N.

General Assembly on international terrorism, there was no cohesion among the world nations on how to define the term. In the assembly, they describe the issue by saying, “[r]eference was also made to the lack of precisions of resolution 3034 as to the means of the term ‘international terrorism’ and to the diverse acceptations of a term which could be interpreted as encompassing many forms of violence linked to war and political oppression and which, moreover, had a

134 “Terrorism Analysis in the CIA.” 25. 135 Ibid. 136 Ibid., 26. 69 highly emotional content.”137 Whereas the United States was determined to take measures to prevent terrorism and any act of violence that assaulted international order, other nations believed that such measures would categorize the legitimate struggle for self-determination of people under foreign occupation as terrorism.138 Saudi Arabia argued that one could not describe all acts of violence linked to self-determination or national liberation as terrorism, instead, it would be helpful to confront the underlying causes of terrorism which were “misery, frustration, grievance, and despair, and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes.”139 According to Ben Saul in his article “Attempts to Define ‘Terrorism’ in International Law, “there was little support for the US initiative in a

General Assembly deadlocked by Cold War politics and ideological divide between developed and developing states, particularly over self-determination.”140 At the end of the assembly, there was no agreed upon definition.

Although many of Nixon’s efforts to establish counterterrorism policies were stilted, he did accomplish some international agreement in regard to combatting terrorism and strengthening international security during the early 1970s. Nixon instituted new civil aviation laws that were agreed upon by some United Nations members. The first was The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970141, the second was The

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept.

137 “Report of the Ad Hoc Committee On International Terrorism” General Assembly Official Records: Twenty-eight session. Supplement No. 28. United Nations, New York, 1973. 5. http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/dot/A9028.pdf. 138 House Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 19 June 1974. 139 Ibid. 140 Saul, Ben. "Attempts to Define 'Terrorism' in International Law." Netherlands International Law Review 52, no. 1 (05, 2005): 57-83. Netherlands International Law Review Article. 70. 141 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention), 22 U.S.T. 1641. 70

23142, and the third was The International Civil Aviation Organization in August 1973, creating harsher punishment for hijackers and nations harboring them.143 In addition to harsher punishments for airline hijackers, the U.S. Department of Transportation declared that there would be a 100 percent screening of all passengers and their luggage, beginning in January

1973.144

Thomas Franck, a lawyer, professor, and expert on international law, in his article

“Preliminary Thoughts Towards an International Convention on Terrorism” states that “one of the foremost political hurdles faced by the Ad Hoc Committee was the relationship between its mandate to study the causes of terrorism and its objective of preparing an instrument for the prevention of international terrorism.”145 Studying the underlying causes of terrorism was a long-term and extensive project, however, according to Franck, the General Assembly could not proceed with their objectives of definition and solution without first completing the study of cause.146 Although not all conventions ended in success, the problem of international terrorism, particularly Arab terrorism, was discussed and projected as a global issue.

While defining and conceptualizing international terrorism proved to be quite problematic for the United States and many other nations of the world, another major difficulty confronted U.S. policymakers when evaluating terrorist organizations—how to deal with “state

142 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention), 24 U.S.T. 564. 143 Thomas M. Franck, Bert B. Lockwood, “Thoughts Towards an International Convention on Terrorism.” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 68, No. 1 (January, 1974), pp. 69-90. Published by American Society of International Law; Cambridge University Press. The American Journal Of International Law Article (accessed March 2, 2017). 144 Naftali, Blind Spot. 66. 145 Franck, “Preliminary Thoughts Towards an International Convention on Terrorism.” 72. 146 Ibid., 73. 71 support of international terrorism.”147 According to John Murphy in his article “The Soviet

Union and International Terrorism,” U.S. Congress had struggled with creating legislation and punishment for states that supported international terrorists, and what exactly would be considered state support.148 Following the terrorist event in Munich, the U.S. Congress began drafting legislation as to what state support of international terrorism entailed. The following acts were considered, by U.S. officials, to be deliberate state support,

(1) Furnishing arms, explosives, or lethal substances to individuals, groups, or organizations with the likelihood that they will be used in the commission of any act of international terrorism; (2) Planning, directing, providing training for, or assisting in the execution of any act of international terrorism; (3) Providing direct financial support for the commission of any act of international terrorism; (4) Providing diplomatic facilities intended to aid or abet the commission of any act of international terrorism; or (5) Allowing the use of its territory as a sanctuary from extradition or prosecution for any act of international terrorism.149

The acts stated were intentionally broad and able to embrace a variety of situations.

According to Murphy, “most particularly it would appear to cover Soviet furnishing of arms to insurgency groups because of the likelihood that arms furnished to such groups will be used in at least a few instances to commit acts of international terrorism.”150 While the responses of the

United States and members of the U.N. in the aftermath of the Munich event indicated a noteworthy juncture in the war against international terrorism, such initiatives and legislations proved to be more rhetoric than genuine action.151 Kumamoto argues that this outcome should

147 John F. Murphy and Donald R. Brady, “The Soviet Union and International Terrorism.” The International Lawayer, Vol. 16 No. 1 (1982): 139-48. 146. The International Lawyer Article 148 Ibid., 146.

149 The Soviet Union and International Terrorism John F. Murphy 146; John F. Murphy, “National Security, Foreign Policy and Individual Rights: The Quandary of United States Export Controls” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Oct., 1981), pp. 791-834 http://www.jstor.org/stable/759642

150 Murphy, “The Soviet Union and International Terrorism.” 147. 151 Komomato, International Terrorism and American Foreign Relations. 151. 72 have been sensibly anticipated. Because terrorist attacks are conducted outside the “system,” it should be assumed that systematic approaches taken to deal with the threat or actor will inevitably fail.152

The Munich Massacre shifted the international conception of terrorism and created the catalyst necessary to create an institutionalized counterterrorism committee in the United States that focused on Arab-terrorism. This development, however, was not necessarily a response to an existential threat, but a result of Nixon’s Cold War policies, state-to-state negotiations, geopolitical concerns, and domestic considerations. Nixon’s approach to show sympathetic and in-direct support for Israel, while also appealing to the public’s emotion, took a revolutionary fight of the Palestinians and characterized it as a new, existential international terrorist threat that impacted both the international and domestic communities and generalized almost all Arabs as potential terrorists.

152 Ibid., 153. 73

Chapter 3. Operation Boulder

Introduction:

Arabs and Muslims, far before the 9/11 attacks, were subjected to discriminatory policies, instituted by the Nixon administration. The Munich Massacre exposed the danger of transnational terrorism, but it also generalized that threat as primarily Arab-Palestinian. In 1972, as a direct consequence of the Munich event, the Nixon administration launched a new program—initially covert but eventually leaked and known by the American public—the name of the program was Operation Boulder. The Boulder initiative is one of the first blatantly discriminatory policies against Arabs instituted by the U.S. government. It was first established by Nixon in response to the so-called ever-growing terrorist threat. Operation Boulder is one of the earliest intensive initiatives made by the U.S. government to target, interrogate, and surveil

Arabs, citizens and non-citizens alike. While the perceptions and stereotypes of Arabs and

Muslims in U.S. popular culture are well researched and documented, little is written on the U.S. federal government’s role in shaping those conceptions through policy and rhetoric.

Operation Boulder is perhaps one of the least researched topics regarding the history of the U.S. conceptualization of the international terrorist. This is mainly due to the lack of declassified documents on the program. However, studying Operation Boulder in conjunction with Nixon’s foreign policy objectives in the Middle East, the terrorist attacks leading up to the program, newspaper articles and interviews from Arabs impacted by the program, and the few documents that are declassified on the Boulder initiative sheds new light on the formation of the

American conceptualization of international terrorism and the revocation of civil liberties of

Arab-Americans. Although Operation Boulder was officially cancelled in 1975, the damage of racializing, support of profiling, and loss of civil liberties for Arabs in both the United States and 74 the international community created an institutionalized prejudice shaped by specific Cold War ideology and foreign policy agendas that were, for the most part, overwhelming anti-Arab.

The tragedy of the Munich Massacre established the required atmosphere for the

American public to be influenced by demagoguery and propaganda acknowledging the unwanted

‘other’ in its homeland; and, it was the policies instituted by the U.S. federal government that continued to target Arabs for assumption of terrorist connection. Susan Akram, a Professor of

Law at Boston University, describes the government’s influence as “[d]eliberate misinformation, distortion and institutionalized existing in government, law enforcement and influential institutions that target Arabs and Muslims both within the U.S. and abroad.”153

The Boulder investigations were initiated to calm the fear of the American public, created by the Munich Massacre, to satisfy the anger of the American-Jewish community and lobbyist groups, to contain Israeli retaliation to the Munich event, to maintain détente in the Middle East, and to continue U.S.-Israel relations. Operation Boulder is an example of how the Nixon administration used the Munich Massacre and Arab-Palestinian terrorism as an emotional tool to further their ideological and realist foreign policy agendas, by appeasing to both domestic and international demands. The Nixon administration over simplified and generalized situations to play upon the genuine public fears and concerns. These actions helped both the reelection of

Nixon on the domestic front and helped prevent the possibility of super power confrontation on the international front.

153 Susan M. Akram, "The Aftermath of September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims in America." Arab Studies Quarterly 24, no. 2 (Spring, 2002): 61. http://ezproxy.csusm.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.csusm.edu/docview/220603916?accountid=10363. 75

Conceptualizing Arabs in American Society:

America has a long history of racializing and ‘othering’ specific groups of people based on race, culture, and/or religion; however, the anti-Arab sentiment felt throughout much of the

United States during the 1970s is somewhat unique in that it does not fit the standard molds of

‘othering’ seen throughout the U.S. narrative, and it has international consequences that can still be seen today. Traditionally, (at least since the time of increased international migration mobility) it was not uncommon for the majority of the American populace to feel resentment towards new immigrant populations. This antipathy usually targeted the group with the largest and most recent influx of peoples at the time. The anti-immigrant sentiment is mainly due to economic and cultural factors such as employment competition and the immigrant group’s ability and willingness or unwillingness to assimilate into American society.154 However, according to the Migration Policy Institute, from 1960-1980, immigrants155 from the Middle East residing in the United States account for less than .04% of the immigrant population at the time.156 Thus, the anti-immigrant theory does not give a sound explanation for the demonization of Arabs in

America during this time.

While there are many theories on the process of racialization in America, none pin-point the specific reasons as to why the U.S. government and, in return, much of the American public,

154 Harell, A., Soroka, S. and Iyengar, S. (2017), Locus of Control and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Political Psychology, 38: 245–260. doi:10.1111/pops.12338. p 1 155 The term "immigrants" (or "foreign born") refers to people residing in the United States who were not U.S. citizens at birth. This population includes naturalized citizens, lawful permanent residents (LPRs), certain legal nonimmigrants (e.g., persons on student or work visas), those admitted under refugee or asylee status, and persons illegally residing in the United States. 156 MPI tabulation of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series for the 2000 Decennial Census (5% sample); data for 1960 to 1990 are from Campbell J. Gibson and Emily Lennon, "Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850 to 1990" (Working Paper No. 29, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, DC, 1999). http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/us- immigration-trends#history 76 in the 1970s, conceptualized and stereotyped Arabs as inherently terroristic and a more significant threat to national and international security than their terrorist counterpart of a different race or region of origin.157

Donald Stockton, a professor of political science at the University of Michigan-Dearborn, argues that stereotypes are constantly reused and can be applied to any group. According to a collaborative study titled The Development of Arab-American Identity, in the article by Stockton and Dr. Nabeel Abraham titled “Ethnic Archetypes and the Arab Image,” many of the stereotypes used for Arabs were also used at an earlier time for people of Jewish or Japanese decent. Stockton states, “[b]y depicting the Other as inferior in some significant way, stereotypes permit the stereotyper to feel superior and infallible and therefore to transgress with impunity against the victim.”158 In Stockton’s study, he finds that the terrorist troupe is one of the most common stereotypes associated with the conceptualization of Arabs in American society.

Terrorism is a frightening word, often ill-defined, that conjures up images of demonical souls determined to inflict pain on the innocent for no reason other than to see people suffer. Terrorists allegedly enjoy violence, exacting a particular pleasure at seeing the innocent suffer. They are often portrayed as leering gleefully at their evil deeds. It is one of the most pervasive themes used against Arabs. The fact that Arabs are more often the victims of brutality than its perpetrators is largely overlooked.159

157 According to Global Terrorism Database (GTD), between the years of 1970-1972, there were a total of (779) terrorist attacks or attempted terrorist attacks in the United States. Majority of the attacks were perpetrated by Left-Wing Radicals, Black Nationalists, and White extremists. However, (58) were carried out by terrorist groups associated with Puerto Rico, Cuba, or other Latin American countries, (27) were carried out by the JDL or Jewish Armed Resistance, and (2) were carried out by Arab groups, specifically the Black September Organization, who in fact arrive in America, illegally, through Canada; According to the GTD, a terrorist attack is the threatening or “actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.”

158 Ernest N. MacCarus, The Development of Arab-American identity (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1997) 6. 159 Ibid., 147. 77

Racializing and stereotyping specific groups has destructive consequences on the groups being affected. However, if the federal government capitalizes on said racialization and stereotypes for justification and rationalization of foreign policy objectives, the conceptualization of the stereotyped group not only becomes further perpetuated and institutionalized, but can also lead to miscalculation on a national or international level.

Stockton argues that false conceptions about a group or community of people has an obvious impact on the victims, but, on a “grander scale, stereotypes can justify major policy decisions; thus, by stereotyping Islam as barbaric and Muslims as depraved—stereotypes going back to the time of the Crusades—a people will not question its government’s policies when, for example, it bombs a Qaddafi without just cause.”160 Although during the 1970s, the religious aspect of the terrorist perpetrators was not necessarily the sole focal point of the Arab stereotype, the same idea of government policy formation shaped by stereotypical notions can be applied to

Nixon’s counterterrorism policies. Because two of the most broadcasted and one of the deadliest terrorist attacks of the time had been perpetrated by Arab-Palestinian terrorist groups, the foreign policies and counterterrorism measures taken by the Nixon administration were justified through this context.

Abraham adds an essential factor to the study by examining “Anti-Arab Racism and

Violence in the United States.” According to Abraham, anti-Arab violence is often not reported or broadcasted in the United States; however, violence in general, or anti-American violence more specifically, committed by Arabs is widely publicized and discussed. While Abraham’s study tends to focus more on the anti-Arab sentiment of the 1980s, it too, can be seen during the

Nixon administration. According to an advertisement printed in the New York Times by The

160 Ibid., 6. 78

Civil Liberties Committee Association of Arab-American University Graduates, on ,

1972, titled “Is the Nixon Administration Playing Politics with Civil Liberties?” there had been no acts of terrorism committed by the Arab ethnic community in the U.S. at that time; however,

“[t]his stands in sharp contrast to the fact that Arab diplomatic missions and Arabs residing and working in the U.S. have actually been the victims of terroristic assaults.”161 The problem with overlooking anti-Arab violence in America and abroad, yet broadcasting anti-American or anti-

Israel sentiment felt by Arabs, or simply, the expression of disagreement with the political situation, lead to a gross generalization and misconception and further justified the Nixon

Administration’s foreign policy agenda and strong alliance with Israel, in the Middle East.

The problem with stereotypes is that they create an ahistorical notion of the people being generalized. It is the denial of agency and change over time. Stockton describes it as,

“..somehow their traits [are] fixed or defined at some ancient moment and since that time their behavior has been predetermined and ahistorical.”162 As tensions arose in the Middle East in the wake of the Munich Massacre, ancient stereotypes and preconceived notions that were so distant and irrelevant to the present-day actualities were adapted to construct the enemy ‘other’.163 An example of such is seen in the Cambridge Survey Research study conducted in 1975. The study gave participants a series of images and asked them: “Does each word apply more to the Arabs or more to the Israelis?” According to the study, half of the participants agreed that the terms

“greedy,” “arrogant,” and “barbaric” pertained to the Arabs. The study also shows that a relative few described the Arabs as “peaceful,” “honest,” “friendly,” or as “like Americans,” while the

161 New York Times. October 29, 1972. 4E New York Times Archive and Time Machine Article. 162 The Development of Arab-American Identity, 120. 163 Richard Cohen, "A Caricature of the Arab Mind," The Washington Post, November 17, 1989, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-1223534.html?refid=easy_hf. 79 majority applied those terms to define the Israelis.164 Seymour Lipset, an American political sociologist, in his commentary Carter vs. Israel: What the Polls Reveal, concluded that no matter the question or the manner in which the question is asked, American sympathy for Israel has continued almost unwavering since 1967; and, often times not only sympathetic for Israel, but far more supportive of Israel, in general, than of all Arab nations.165

Shelley Slade, in her article “The Image of the Arab in America: Analysis of a Poll on

American Attitudes,” argues that because the U.S. government was so closely aligned with

Israel, and the many Arab nations aligned more towards the Soviet Union, in a Cold War context, the perception of Arabs projected to the public, through official media outlets, described

Arabs as “threatening our political, as well as economic, security.”166 The goal of this chapter is not to analyze the history of Arab representation in popular culture, but rather to show how policy impacted said representations. The “threat” aspect of Slade’s argument is of great interest to this chapter.

Below is a table showing the results of one of the many polls conducted in Slate’s research. This table aids in the explanation as to why many Americans believed the Arabs, the

Arab world, and the Arab terrorist to be far greater threats to national and international security than other races who came from similarly tumultuous regions and perpetrated similar terrorist acts.

164 Seymore M. Lipset, "Carter vs. Israel: What the Polls Reveal," Commentary Magazine, November 1, 1977, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/carter-vs-israel-what-the-polls-reveal/. 165 Ibid. 166 Shelley Slade, “The Image of the Arab in America: Analysis of a Poll.” The Middle East Journal 35 (1981): 143-162. 1. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.csusm.edu/stable/pdf/4326196.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A0f2c4b3f2511a5 4d33e019d409f5bbfb 80

Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Spring, 1981), pp. 143-162 Published by: Middle East Institute Stable URL: Link to U.S. Public Polls Accessed: 29-09-2017 18:39 UTC

81

As shown above, unlike the American conception of the Latin American, the image of the

Arab did not, necessarily, project common Third World stereotypes of desperateness and underdevelopment, per se.167 Instead, American society conceptualized the Arab as bloodthirsty and treacherous. Slate’s 1981 study, based on extensive analysis of polls taken, finds that the majority of Americans, at the time, had a low opinion of Arabs and most had a high opinion of

Israel. According to the study, this is due to the fact that the majority of Americans conceptualized Arabs as “anti-Christian and militantly unfriendly towards the US.” Slate argues that these results show that the “low opinion of Arabs is a defensive reaction rather than an

American feeling of superiority towards a Third World people.”168 This defensive reaction is due partly to the foreign and domestic, overwhelming anti-Arab and “threat” based policy formations of the Nixon administration.

Helen Hatab Samhan, Executive Director of Arab American Institute Foundation, argues that the foundation of Arab racism in America is not centered on excluding a group as inferior, but rather, almost purely political in nature. This has much to do with the realist foreign policy formations of the Nixon administration. Samhan refers to this as political racism.169 Operation

Boulder is a clear indication that the Nixon Administration projected the image of Arabs as inherently violent and terroristic. This is not simply a stereotypical and discursive creation, but the consequence of particular incidents, politics, and foreign policy arrangements.

Civil Liberties in a Democratic State:

167 Ibid.,143. 168 Ibid., 145. 169 Helen Hatab Samhan, “Politics and Exclusion: The Arab American Experience” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Winter, 1987), pp. 11-28, Politics and Exclusion: The Arab American Experience. 82

Historical research on the American conceptualization of the Arab “threat” must consider previous times in American history when a specific minority group was demonized or seen as a

“threat” to the security of the nation, due to conflicts occurring outside of the United States. The

Japanese-Americans during WWII are an excellent example of such. The United States have constitutionally established a comprehensive and equity based democratic nation, however, depending on historical circumstances or external events and threats, exclude various minority- citizen groups from such equity.170 The Japanese-Americans were rounded up and placed in camps—for their own “safety”—but in reality, the citizens of Japanese descent were seen as a national security concern to the United States. According to Samhan, “[r]ightly or wrongly, the assumption was that ethnicity is the basis of loyalty rather than citizenship of the nation-state.

Based on this assumption, the move immediately excluded these citizens from the rights of the constitution.”171

While the memory of the Japanese internments camps is looked upon as the “regrettable” past of the United States, similar injustices impacted the Arabs in the United States and abroad.

Sanham expertly dissects this issue by asking the question, “[i]f civil liberties can be so easily withdrawn or abridged on the basis of ethnic association (or other identifying categories), is there any point to citizenship in a modern, secular, pluralistic nation-state which claims to offer constitutional guarantees against such discrimination?”172 Although the Munich Massacre justified, in the mind of the average non-Arab American citizen, the revocation of certain civil rights of the Arab-American community, the Nixon administration, out of interest, capitalized by

170 Helen Hatab Samhan, “Politics and Exclusion: The Arab American Experience” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Winter, 1987), pp. 11-28, Politics and Exclusion: The Arab American Experience Link 171 Ibid., 99. 172 Ibid., 99. 83 inflating a minor threat, through preconceived stereotypes, to better serve the foreign policy agendas of the nation and maintain a powerful and statesman like appearance on the domestic and international front.

Operation Boulder:

In the wake of the Munich event, Nixon changed how the U.S. government controlled foreign visitors. Before Munich, the United States allowed up to 600,000 foreign visitors to stay in the nation for ten days without any screening or previous approval if they claimed, “in transit” status, and, according to Secretary of State William Rogers, that loophole was officially closed by November 1972.173 Changing U.S. foreign visitor policy due to the actions of a small group of Arab-Palestinians is significant in that it showed both the American public and the rest of the world that the Arab terrorists posed such a significant threat that the previous U.S. policy on foreign visitors needed significant adjustment.

The attack at the Munich Olympics did not involve any U.S. citizens, however, it did involve the closest U.S. ally in the Middle East, Israel. Due to Nixon’s realist understanding of world politics, the U.S. reaction to the Munich Massacre, had to be calculated, yet, not too aggressive that it could potentially disrupt the power balance and oil-supply in the region. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Nixon focused on deterring Israeli retaliation by broadcasting the revolutionary measures the United States were taking in order to prevent transnational terrorism.

Operation Boulder was “national and international in scope” and involved “all federal agencies concerned with international travel,” including, State Department, Transportation

173 William Rogers, Secretary of State, Memorandum For the President, “Actions to Combat International Terrorism,” November 7, 1972. Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969-1972, https://20012009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e1/45557.htm. 84

Department, Bureau of Customs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, as well as, the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Executive

Protection Service.174 According to a letter written by The American Civil Liberties Union to the

Attorney General of the United States,

The thrust of Operation Boulder centered on ‘ethnic Arabs’ who were so defined on the basis of a person’s parentage. The specific investigative and enforcement techniques and practices which have been employed in numerous instances under Operation Boulder raise serious moral and legal questions as to their validity and have had particularly onerous effects on the lives of individual ‘ethnic Arabs’ who have been subjected to the techniques and practices in question, as well as on the larger Arab-American community.

The letter goes on to argue that the screening process of Arabs and Arab-Americans was in complete violation of the U.S. constitution by stating,

[t]he use of selective enforcement [emphasis in original document] of U.S. laws against ‘ethnic Arabs,’ particularly those laws dealing with immigration and naturalization, and the use of technical violations of immigration status as ostensible grounds for proceedings when, in point of fact, the basis is an undisclosed investigative FBI report, is constitutionally infirm under First, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments.175

Yet, for the most part, according to the polls taken, among the U.S. population, revoking the civil liberties and the constitutional rights from the Arab-American population was necessary for the security of the nation. This is due to both the preconceived, stereotypical notions of Arabs already present in American society, the unwavering support of Israel, and, U.S. government’s demagoguery which helped shape the perception of Arabs in general, their associated political opinions, and their activist groups, as an extreme threat to the security of the nation.

A 1972 New York Times Article titled “U.S. Check Arabs to Block Terror,” states that

Nixon made a public promise to help protect any Israeli citizen visiting or residing in the United

174 Source: National Archives, RG 59, M/CT Files: Lot 77 D 30, Visa-Operation Boulder, 1972–74. Confidential. Drafted by Gatch History State Government Historical Documents; Letter to the Attorney General of the United States from ACLU Esq..Detroit, Michigan, Chicago, Illinois, New York, N.Y. “RE:Operation Boulder,” February 8, 1974. Intel Files Operation Boulder Archives https://declassifiedboulder.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/detroitletter.pdf 175 Ibid., 2. 85

States, from terrorist attacks. The article explains the president had “begun a major effort to identify Arabs residing in this country who are suspected of planning terrorism and to screen travelers from Arab nations more carefully.”176 When the New York Times reached out to a spokesman for the INS, he described the operation as “a very touchy one,” and “declined today to elaborate on whit [sic] steps were being taken to pin point potential terrorists and which Federal agencies, besides his own, were involved.”177 The district director of the INS in New York, Sol

Marks, stressed the fact that the U.S. government had no intention of harassing Arab students,

Arab-Americans, or Arab nationals, only those they believed involved in terrorist activity.178

However, according to many Arab-Americans and Arab students, they were harassed, interrogated, and followed, by U.S. federal agents, for no stated reason, in the aftermath of the Munich attack.179

The Association of Arab-American University Graduates (AAUG) and other sources, believed part of the reasoning for Operation Boulder and subsequent monitoring and interrogations was to provide Israeli intelligence agencies, such as the Mosad, with information on Arabs, Arab-

Americans, and Arab students living in the United States.180 A former Israeli intelligence officer stated that the FBI often shared information with Israel on Arabs living in the United States, some of which were U.S. citizens. But, he also asserts, in a Chicago Times article, “sources indicate they believe the main thrust of Arab activity in the U.S. is not terrorism.” He continues by saying, “the

176 New York Times, October 5, 1972. http://www.nytimes.com/1972/10/05/archives/us-checks-arabs-to- block-terror-residents-and-travelers-are-being.html 177 Ibid. 178 Ibid. 179 Ibid.

180 Association of Arab-American University Graduate Information Paper (No. 10) edited by M.C. Bassiouni, “The Civil Rights of Arab-Americans” AAUG Inc. Detroit, Michigan, 1974; “Israel Fighting Terror with Terror,” Washington Post, October 15, 1972; Elaine Hagopian. “Minority Rights in a Nation- State: The Nixon Administration’s Campaign against Arab-Americans” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 5, No. ½ (Autumn, 1975), pp. 97-114. 86 main aim has been political,” and describes “Palestinian organization representatives here as

‘agents of influence,’ not terrorists.”181 Conversely, Richard Held, supervisor of the FBI’s Chicago office defends the Arab interrogations and intelligence sharing, in the Independent Press-

Telegram, by saying, “[w]e are quite concerned about what might happen to U.S. citizens if the bombs start going off right here.”182 In the same article, spokesman for the Anti-defamation

League, B’nai B’rith, said that he “also keeps files on the more active Arabs living here and routinely passes them on to the FBI.”183 Overall, however, most Arabs living in the United States, both citizens and non-citizens alike, agreed that one of the main reasons as to why the Boulder operations were initiated was to “silence the Arab viewpoint on the ‘Near East’ question.” And, that it had “nothing to do with national security.”184 Additionally in a May 1973 New York Times article by Seymour M. Hersh, since 1970, the CIA continued to find no “substantial evidence” to support the Nixon administration’s claim that leaders of the Arab bloc, especially Egypt, influenced and financed radical activities of the Arab student population. According to the article,

For years there had been indications, the source said, that there were Arab students in the United States who were probably financed by [Mideast] embassy money who were trying to draw support against Israel. To our knowledge there were no serious efforts beyond that. By that I mean there were no illegal activities by those students—no recruiting American spies and no bomb‐throwing.”

So, this begs the question as to why the surveillance and interrogations of Arabs throughout various U.S. federal agencies were continued and broadcasted until 1975? According to the article, the CIA’s findings were “rejected by high-level White House aides who arranged

181 Chicago Tribune, Sun, Jul 13, 1975. 182 Independent Press-Telegram, Sun, Jul 13, 1975, 7. 183 Ibid. 184 Chicago Tribune, Sun, Jul 13, 1975. 87 in late 1970 for 35 agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation to open overseas intelligence posts in 20 countries.”185

Abdeen Jabara, an Arab-American attorney who was under extensive investigation during the Boulder operation, and later won a thirteen-yearlong legal battle with the FBI and

NSA for illegal wiretapping and violation of constitutional rights, wrote that Boulder can “only be understood against the background of the definite pressure that has been brought to bear by

Israel and its supporters in the U.S.”186 However, Jabara also argues that the Zionist lobby was not the chief motivation for U.S. policy, it was, ultimately, the pursuit of political and economic interests in the region.187 By stereotyping and generalizing all Arabs as terrorists and a national security concern, the Nixon administration was able to continue their foreign policy agenda in the Middle East and satisfy powerful Jewish lobbyists in the United States.

Hisan Diab, an American citizen by birth and associate professor of pharmacology at the

University of Chicago was approached and questioned, multiple times, by the FBI in the wake of the Munich event. Diab expressed that he was not necessarily against the precautionary measures taken by the U.S. government’s security and intelligence agencies and stated, “[i]f there is a reason for it, I don’t mind if they continue. But now it seems that just because you are an Arab you are a terrorist.”188 The Boulder initiative was based almost exclusively on the racialization of Arabs, rather than the nation an individual was originally from or held a passport from. What was important, was the racial origins of the individual. For example, according to a

185 Seymour M. Hersh, “Alien-Radical Tie Disputed by C.I.A.” New York Times, May 25, 1973. http://www.nytimes.com/1973/05/25/archives/alienradical-tie-disputed-by-cia-6970-studies-rejected-by- white.html. 186 Pamela Pennock, The Rise of the Arab American Left: Activists, Allies, and Their Fight Against Imperialism and Racism, 1960-1980. University of North Carolina Press, 2017. 154-157. 187 Ibid. 188 Chicago Tribune, July 13, 1975. 88

State Department telegram from Washington D.C. to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, the Secretary of State sent word that other peoples, such as, Armenians residing in and holding passports from

Arab countries should not be interrogated, screened, or considered “Arab ethnics under terms of

Operation Boulder.”189 This telegram indicates that it was not the citizens of the various Arab nations, whether hostile or friendly to the United States, that posed the existential threat, but the overall ‘Arab-ness’ of an individual, even if he/she was an American citizen by birth.

According to a New York Times article written in October 1972, in the aftermath of the

Munich Olympic killings, Arab residents and visitors reported to have faced harsh treatment from the security departments of both Western Europe and the United States. This harsh treatment produced a deeper resentment of the West in the Arab world. According to the article,

“[t]he anti-Western mood is fed by well-publicized accounts of expulsions of Arab students and workers from European countries and the vexation caused by security controls on travelers that the Arabs consider discriminatory.”190 The article highlights an example of the incidents that

Arabs felt discriminated against by sharing the experience of a Lebanese interior decorator,

Michel Harmouche. According to Harmouche, he, along with three other Arab travelers on a flight, were taken to a small room for over seven hours of interrogation. According to the interview, the West German immigration official asked Harmouche, when noticing his passport case, “Do you hide your passport because you are ashamed of being an Arab?” When

Harmouche answered that he was proud to be an Arab, “the official asked, ‘if he was also proud of what you people did at the Olympics,’ referring to the killing of 11 Israelis as result of an

189 DOS “Operation Boulder Message” . 190 Juan De Onis, “Reports of Harsh Treatment of Arabs in West Since Munich Killings” New York Times, October 22, 1972. http://www.nytimes.com/1972/10/22/archives/reports-of-harsh-treatment-of- arabs-in-west-since-munich-killings.html. 89 attack by Palestinian commandos.”191 In the same article, an unnamed Arab graduate of the

University of California commented on Arab reaction to “what they feel is a Western rejection of all Arabs because of the action of a few extremists.” He continues by saying, “[i]t is one thing for you in the United States to take the side of Israel. We think you are wrong, but that is your choice. It is another thing, however, when you say, you lousy Arabs, to hell with you.”192 The generalizations and discrimination of Arabs was felt throughout most of the western Europe in addition to the United States. Nixon’s policies had international ramifications.

The Los Angeles Times described a similar example in an article saying that incidents of such nature typify “the subsurface and largely unpublicized war against potential Mideast terrorists being waged by a dozen U.S. agencies working in tandem with local police and foreign governments.”193 While there were many other terrorist organizations throughout the world,194 in the eyes of the West, Arab terrorists posed the greatest threat to national security and world order. The overall effect of Operation Boulder reinforced the image of Arabs as terrorists and a national security threat, thus producing an environment of fear, suspicion, and enmity towards

Arabs and Arab-Americans who held a more critical view of Israel and U.S. foreign policy in the

Middle East.

191 Ibid. 192 Ibid. 193 Jackson, Robert L. and John J. Goldman. "War on Terror: Police of World Pool Resources." Los Angeles Times (1923-Current File), Jan 08, 1973. 194 Some well-known terrorist organizations that were conducting attacks at this time were the (RAF), also known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, a far-left group founded in West Germany in 1970. RAF members were inspired by the Palestinian cause, and some, including Baader and Meinhof trained in Gaza and the with PFLP and PLO members. The Sandinista National Liberation Front, (FSLN) also known as simply the Sandinistas, a Nicaraguan resistance group that supported Marxist revolutionary movements throughout Latin America. The (JRA), a communist group founded in Lebanon in 1971. The JRA supported the Palestinian cause and aided the PFLP in the . And, the , a Communist youth organization and Italy’s most sizeable terrorist group. 90

Silencing Arabs in America:

Another major effect of the Boulder operation was the silencing of many Arab voices in

American society. According to an article in The Chicago Times, “…Arabs are afraid to speak out for fear the FBI will suddenly become interested in them.” An anonymous interviewee, when asked about voicing his views on the situation in the Middle East and the current circumstances facing Arabs in America stated, “I have a good job with the state, I’m not going to rock the boat.”195 This statement is indicative of the trials Arabs in America faced when trying to voice their opinion as a constitutional right or advocate their position on U.S. foreign policy in the

Middle East. Arabs faced the possibility of federal surveillance and interrogation, visa revocation, and even deportation if they allowed themselves to standout in American society.

According to an interview with Ibrahim abu-Lughod, a Northwestern University political scientist, “[t]he object of this whole campaign is to silence the Arab viewpoint on the whole

(Near East) question.” He continues by saying, “[i]t has nothing to do with national security.”196

Additionally, the investigations and interrogations of Arabs in American society during the

Boulder program left lasting effects on the Arab community in the United States. For example, in

1975, leaders of the Arab Community Center in Chicago claimed the social gatherings where

Arab-Americans would come together to read Arabic journals and magazines and practice the

Arabic language, had come to a halt. Their reasoning as why was that FBI surveillance had frightened off many of the members. The president of the Arab Community Center, Jaser Zayyad stated,

[f]ewer people come to the center now because the FBI has asked too many questions about it. We used to get 20 people in here on week nights and as many as 50 on

195 Chicago Tribune, July 13, 1975. 196 Independent Press-Telegram. “U.S. Arabs protesting close FBI surveillance,” July 13, 1975. 91

weekends, now we’re lucky if we get a couple of directors on week nights. We have talked about closing the place for lack of attendance.”197

The singling out of “ethnic-Arabs,” justified through the concept of “collective guilt by ethnic association,”198 carried out through deliberate efforts of intimidation and harassment by the federal government, led to a stigmatization of the Arab community in its entirety. And also led to lasting effects within the Arab community itself. The Boulder program spread fear and insecurity within much of the Arab society of the United States, and in return silenced political voices and democratic, constitutional rights guaranteed to them.

Taking A Stand:

Although many Arab-Americans and Arab students were silenced by U.S. policy and

Operation Boulder, there were many Arab activists who fought for their constitutional rights and the rights of the Arab community. The Association of Arab-American University Graduates

(AAUG) was one such group. Its president, lawyer Abdeen Jabara, as well as many others within the association began to confront the status of civil rights in the Arab-American community. The

AAUG argued that Arabs were not only being denied basic constitutional rights, but the negative images and conceptualizations of Arabs as aggressive and terroristic invigorated animosity of the

Arab community by American society in general. In their previously mentioned New York Times advertisement, the AAUG wrote, “[u]ndermining the civil liberties of one ethnic group is the first stage in a process of steady erosion which can eventually extend to all groups. Such measures also set the precedent for further acts of discrimination and legal repression.”199

197 “FBI Snooping Angers Arabs in U.S. Chicago Tribune, Sunday, July 13, 1975. 198 New York Times. October 29, 1972. 4E. 199 Ibid. 92

Jabara and other members of the AAUG informed many in the Arab community of their basic civil rights and pledged to aid the “ethnic-Arabs” being illegally monitored and harassed, due to Operation Boulder, with legal advice and representation.200 Additionally, many Arab-

Americans established or reinvigorated other organizations to help advocate for the civil rights of the community. Some of these groups are, The Organization of Arab Students first established in

1967, the National Association of Arab Americans established in 1972, and the Arab Community

Center for Economic and Social Services (ACCESS), established in 1971.

In a Los Angeles Times article titled “Mideast War Spurs Unprecedented Formation of

Arab Groups in U.S.,” the newly formed National Association of Arab-Americans (NAAA), and the leaders of other Arab-American advocacy groups stated several goals associated with their organizations, they were attempting “to neutralize what they say is a bias in the U.S. government and media against the Arabs.” They were fighting for the prevention of “further U.S. military involvement in the Middle East and military aid for Middle Eastern countries.” And, they were helping to provide “coordination for pro-Arab groups in cities with a significant number of Arab-

Americans such as Detroit, Chicago, New York, Los Angeles and Boston.”201 Although these groups fought for the civil and political rights of Arab-Americans, the continuing expansion of

U.S. political, and economic interest in the Middle East, mirrored an increase in the systematic policies of the U.S. government and law enforcement that intentionally fixated on Arabs and

Arab-Americans.

According to a Democrat and Chronicle article titled “Arab-American ‘Fed-Up’ With

Situation Here,” the author, Phillip Nobile states,

200 Elaine Hagopian. “Minority Right in a Nation-State” 201 Bryce Nelson, "Mideast War Spurs Unprecedented Formation of Arab Groups in U.S." Los Angeles Times (1923-Current File), Oct 25, 1973. http://ezproxy.csusm.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest- com.ezproxy.csusm.edu/docview/157441509?accountid=10363 93

It’s not easy being an Arab-American, not if you care about what’s happening in the Middle East. Arab propaganda doesn’t have a chance against the powerful Jewish lobby in the United States. Everybody knows that Arabs are the bad guys and the Israelis are the good guys.202

In the article, Nobile interviews Margaret Abdel-Ahad Pennar, a public affairs official of the AAUG. He asks, “Are Arab-Americans getting a raw deal in this country?” Pennar responds,

“We sure are. Americans know stereotypes, not real Arabs. Arab policy is being misrepresented by the U.S. government and this hostility is bound to reflect on us.”203 The misrepresentation of

Arabs, by the U.S. government, reinforced stereotypical notions of the ‘ethnic-Arab,’ but also led to increased hostility towards and suspicion of Arabs in general, particularly, the politically active Arabs that voiced their opinions on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.

Conclusion:

Overall, Operation Boulder and anti-Arab policies initiated by the Nixon administration had lasting effects internationally and domestically. The failure to create an “even-handed” policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict, created more hostile circumstances in both the Middle East and the United States. The Nixon administration failed to protect the constitutional rights of the

Arab-American minority group, in fact, the government used the revocation of Arab-American civil liberties to empower an internal political advantage. Operation Boulder and subsequent

Nixon era foreign and domestic policies in regard to the Middle East and Arabs, show that anti-

Arab sentiments in the United States existed and continue to survive and adapt to foreign policy agendas. Yet, the historical conversation rarely argues the roots of the modern American conceptualization of the “Arab-terrorist” or the “Arab-threat”. The animosity towards Arabs and

202Philip Nobile, “Arab-American ‘Fed-Up’ With Situation Here,” Democrat and Chronicle, June 03, 1973. 203 Ibid. 94

Muslims, in American society during the 1970s, is not only shaped through traditional racist stereotypes, but also in the politics and policies of the Nixon administration.

95

Conclusion:

The evolution of Nixon’s foreign policy and counterterrorism measures have lasting impacts on both diplomatic relations in the Middle East and the American conceptualization of

Arabs, Muslims, and the international-terrorist threat. This is extraordinarily important, especially for today, as it shows that far before President Donald Trump’s ‘Muslim-Ban,’

President George W. Bush’s Global War on Terror, and President Ronald Reagan’s preventive war against terrorism, the Nixon administration, along with a small number of radical Arab-

Palestinians, transformed and re-conceptualized the threat of terrorism as both international, and directly connected to individuals of Arab descent. Whereas the terms “guerilla” and “terrorist,” before the emergence of Arab-Palestinian international terrorism, were and could be applied to various groups who perpetrated politically motivated attacks (e.g. airline hijackings, bombings, and hostage taking), the international terrorist threat became conceptualized, almost exclusively, as inherently Arab. This has much to do with the Cold War policy agendas and the geopolitical interests of the Nixon administration.

It is important to recognized this transition as an evolutionary process in American history. There is little argument against the fact that terrorism has a long history, stretching back as far as ancient times; however, most histories do not consider the United States to be a large part of that history until after the 9/11 attacks. There are, of course, exceptions to this, as a small number of works do mention the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis and the policies of the subsequent

Reagan administration. Yet, for the most part, these works remain teleological and further enforce the idea that the 9/11 events shaped both the U.S. government’s counterterrorism policies and the public’s conceptualization of the terrorist threat. Additionally, historians tend to 96 be reluctant to focus their studies solely on the evolution of conceptualizing Arabs and Muslims as terrorists. For the most part, histories on terrorism seek to challenge the preconceived notion of Muslims—or other specific religions, races, or cultures—being more inherently terroristic.

However, this approach does little in explaining how, even before the events of 9/11, Arabs and

Muslims became known as the existential terrorist threat. By failing to examine the evolution of the American conceptualization of the international terrorist, through a Cold War lens and its actual connection to the Middle East, historians neglect the fact that the Nixon administration, due to foreign and domestic interest, magnified a small threat and institutionalized the perception of the “Arab-terrorist” in American society.

The dramatic terrorist attacks perpetrated by only a few hundred Palestinian radicals undeniably sanctioned some global recognition to the Palestinian plight; however, by viewing the statelessness of the non-terrorist Palestinian refugees as a second thought, at best, while simultaneously stereotyping most Arabs as perpetrators or supporters of the terrorist attacks that were committed, the Nixon administration were provided the justification needed to continue their foreign policy agenda both internationally and domestically, while furthering the support and arming of Israel. In return, the counterterrorism policies of the Nixon administration led to the disenfranchisement of Arabs in both the domestic and international community.

Although there is no denying the horrific and devastating effects of the 9/11 attacks, it is important to understand that the U.S. government’s response to these attacks and the U.S. public’s acceptance of the response were not based solely on the magnitude of 9/11. The pre- emptive strikes, subsequent invasion of , infringement of Arab-American civil rights, and the recent ban on Muslim majority countries, should be viewed as the result of the evolutionary 97 process of the U.S. government’s projected conceptualization of international terrorism, shaped—at its inception—through the Nixon administration’s realist view and geopolitical interest of Cold War struggles against the Soviet Union.

Reagan’s strategy of using brute military force to counter terrorism, Bush’s response to the 9/11 attacks, and Trump’s ‘Muslim Ban,’ are a metamorphosed replication of previous Nixon era policies.204 Studying the evolution of how U.S. policy elites shaped the general American conceptualization of the terrorist and terrorism shows how the misconception of the “Arab- terrorist” has and continues to act as a political and nationalistic resource that further justifies foreign policy decisions.

As Stampnitzky states in her research,

[t]he emergence of the war on terror can be explained only by paying attention to the interactions between political actors (within and outside the Bush administration) and the pre-existing foundation of rhetoric about ‘terrorism’ and the logics of managing the problem that had emerged over the past decades. The world that began to emerge on September 11, 2001, did not erase, but, rather, built upon the three decades of counterterrorism knowledge and practices that had preceded it.205

While the radical Islamist groups of the Middle East, such as The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), are considered some of the greatest threats to U.S. national security, freedom, and democracy, the Palestinian terrorist organizations and subsequent U.S. federal reactions and policies of the 1970s established the foundation for the conceptual turn in the evolution of political violence.

204 Lisa Stampnitzky, Disciplining Terror, 170. 205 Ibid., 175. 98

Hindsight allows historians to see and recognize things that were not yet available to those at the time; however, it seems that, even today, Arabs in America and abroad, are subject to destructive domestic and foreign policies. The recent travel ban initiated by President Trump results in the denial of United States access to refugees of war torn Syria, is an example of such.

With over half a million dead, roughly the same amount wounded, and an estimated 11 million refugees forced to flee their country, today, Syria is conceptualized by much of the

American public as the major arena for the spread of international terrorism and violent religious sectarianism. What makes this war so complex is not only the various factional groups at odds, but the foreign governments that are involved to varying degrees. As the prolonged state sponsored civil war in Syria proceeds, the growing fear of the “Muslim-terrorist,” and the well- publicized attacks perpetrated by “Arab-Muslim-terrorists,” whether affiliated with ISIS or not, will continue to disenfranchise millions of Syrian refugees that are helpless and landless as a result.

As the United States approaches the coming years, it is quite clear that discussing policies and relations with many countries of the Middle East, and the terrorist organizations that hold citizenship to them, will be a high priority for both policymakers and security advisors.

Examining history allows one to realize that complex, geopolitically angled foreign and domestic policies often produce devastating, institutionalized consequences that are felt worldwide.

In order to understand the current issues facing the United States and the surrounding world, it is imperative that policymakers and security advisors face the past in order to create a less destructive future. Historical research, if presented correctly, has the ability to act as a mirror to the United States through which it sees itself and foreign policies in a historical perspective. For after all, in an attempt to aggrandize U.S. power, resources, and influence in the 99

Middle East during the last decades of the Cold War, the Nixon administration facilitated the necessary environment to justify foreign and domestic policies that continue to have extraordinary ramifications for both the domestic and international communities.

100

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