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The Heirs of Angkor: an Analysis of Khmer Rouge Viability

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Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 1995-06 The heirs of Angkor: an analysis of Khmer Rouge viability Locke, Charles E. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/31459 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 19960123 060 THESIS THE HEIRS OF ANGKOR: AN ANALYSIS OF KHMER ROUGE VIABILITY by Charles E. Locke, Jr. June, 1995 Thesis Advisor: Roman Laba Second Reader: Claude A. Buss Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. *■" (SfBP'^;(f'3T|l|1 5 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-018 Public reporting burden tor this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports. 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) REPORT DATE REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED JUNE 1995 Master's Thesis TITLE AND SUBTITLE THE HEIRS OF ANGKOR: AN ANALYSIS OF 5. FUNDING NUMBERS KHMER ROUGE VIABILITY 6. AUTHOR(S) Locke, Jr., Charles E. 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION Monterey CA 93943-5000 REPORT NUMBER SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) The purpose of this thesis is to address the question: "What accounts for Khmer Rouge viability?" One approach, which will be used in this thesis, is to analyze the Khmer Rouge through their "self- definitions"~located in their myths, rituals, and symbols—to better understand how they perceive themselves, their cause, and their future and how those perceptions can be used to defeat adversaries. This study focuses on insurgent activity as a battle of ideas using the Khmer Rouge as a case study To analyze the application of this plane to insurgent viability, this study looked to the "symbolic dimension," a medium of political exchange that defines reality through symbolic means. To provide a linkage between symbols and viability, the symbolic actions of the Khmer Rouge are applied to five elements of insurgent viability: legitimacy, popular support, organization, external support, and defeating adversarial response. All five elements are covered from the origins of the insurgency in the 1950s, through their victory in 1975 and demise in 1979, concluding with their actions today. This thesis demonstrates that the Khmer Rouge insurgency relies on symbolic activity as one means of viability. Using ethnic discrimination myths and nationalist rituals, the insurgents swept to power in a rural based movement. However, fanatical beliefs in myths of common blood ties and racial purity drove the regime to destruction. To resurrect the movement, the Khmer Rouge play on the weakness of the present government utilizing democratic symbols as well as former racist themes to replace the malevolent image of their governing years with an image of their perception as heirs to rulership. 14. SUBJECT TERMS CAMBODIA, KHMER ROUGE, INSURGENCY, LOW 15. NUMBER OF INTENSITY CONFLICT, GUERRILLA WARFARE, SMALL WARS, SYMBOLS PAGES ?17 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICA- 18. SECURITY CLASSIFI- 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICA- 20. LIMITATION OF TION OF REPORT CATION OF THIS PAGE TION OF ABSTRACT ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 298-102 11 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. THE HEIRS OF ANGKOR: AN ANALYSIS OF KHMER ROUGE VIABILITY Charles E. Locke, Jr. Major, United States Marine Corps B.A., Rice University, 1981 M.A., University of Oklahoma, 1992 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June f! Author: Charles E. Löckk Jr. Approved by: Roman Laba, Thesis Advisor Claude A. Buss, Second Reader Thomas C. Bruneau, Chairman Department of National Security Affairs in IV ABSTRACT The purpose of this thesis is to address the question: "What accounts for Khmer Rouge viability?" One approach, which will be used in this thesis, is to analyze the Khmer Rouge through their "self-definitions"--located in their myths, rituals, and symbols—to better understand how they perceive themselves, their cause, and their future and how those perceptions can be used to defeat adversaries. This study focuses on insurgent activity as a battle of ideas using the Khmer Rouge as a case study. To analyze the application of this plane to insurgent viability, this study looked to the "symbolic dimension," a medium of political exchange that defines reality through symbolic means. To provide a linkage between symbols and viability, the symbolic actions of the Khmer Rouge are applied to five elements of insurgent viability: legitimacy, popular support, organization, external support, and defeating adversarial response. All five elements are covered from the origins of the insurgency in the 1950s, through their victory in 1975 and demise in 1979, concluding with their actions today. This thesis demonstrates that the Khmer Rouge insurgency relies on symbolic activity as one means of viability. Using ethnic discrimination myths and nationalist rituals, the insurgents swept to power in a rural based movement. However, fanatical beliefs in myths of common blood ties and racial purity drove the regime to destruction. To resurrect the movement, the Khmer Rouge play on the weakness of the present government utilizing democratic symbols as well as former racist themes to replace the malevolent image of their governing years with an image of their perception as heirs to rulership. VI TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTR DDUCTION 1 A. BATTLE OF PERCEPTIONS 3 B. SYMBOLIC STUDIES 5 C. METHODOLOGY 6 D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 9 II. INSURGENCY AS SYMBOLIC ACTION 13 A. SYMBOLS DEFINED 16 B. SYMBOLIC SOURCES 20 C. APPLICABILITY TO INSURGENCY .... 21 D. LEGITIMACY 22 E. POPULAR SUPPORT 23 F. ORGANIZATION 24 G. EXTERNAL SUPPORT 26 H. DEFEATING ADVERSARIAL RESPONSE 26 I. CONCLUSIONS 28 Ill THE ROOTS: HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL SOURCES OF KHMER ROUGE SYMBOLIC ACTIONS 31 A. BRUTALITY FROM THE PAST 33 B. ANGKOR REDISCOVERED 34 C. ETHNIC MAKEUP 36 D. CULTURAL TIES 38 vii E. FOREIGN INVASIONS 39 F. THE COUP 40 G. CONCLUSIONS 41 IV. THE INSURGENTS: THE KHMER ROUGE FROM ORIGINS TO 19 75 43 A. LEGITIMACY 44 B. POPULAR SUPPORT 49 C. ORGANIZATION 55 D. EXTERNAL SUPPORT 67 E. DEFEATING ADVERSARIAL RESPONSE . * 68 F. CONCLUSIONS 69 V. THE RULERS: THE KHMER ROUGE FROM 1975 TO 1979 .... 73 A. LEGITIMACY 74 B. POPULAR SUPPORT 76 C. ORGANIZATION 83 D. EXTERNAL SUPPORT 99 E. DEFEATING ADVERSARIAL RESPONSE 101 F. CONCLUSIONS 118 VI. THE OUTLAWS: THE KHMER ROUGE FROM 1979 TO 1995 . 121 A. LEGITIMACY 123 B. POPULAR SUPPORT 126 C. ORGANIZATION 131 vm D. EXTERNAL SUPPORT 135 E. DEFEATING ADVERSARIAL RESPONSE 145 F. CONCLUSIONS 170 VII. THE HEIRS: THE KHMER ROUGE EPILOGUE 173 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 179 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 193 xx X EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The purpose of this thesis is to address the question: "What accounts for Khmer Rouge viability?" One approach, which will be used in this thesis, is to analyze the Khmer Rouge through their "self-definitions"—located in their myths, rituals, and symbols—to better understand how they perceive themselves, their cause, and their future and how those perceptions can be used to defeat adversaries.1 Organized in 1951, the Communist Party of Kampuchea won a striking victory in Cambodia. The communists, fighting under the title of "Khmer Rouge" ("Red Khmer"), an epithet given them by the reigning Cambodian monarch, seized the country by 1975. For 44 months, Khmer Rouge authority in Cambodia became symbolized by the "killing fields"— execution areas complete with shallow graves for those designated enemies of the revolution. By 1979, the revolution was over. More than one million dead lay as testimony to the revolution's destructive power and failed policies. Today, fifteen years after their fall from power at the hands of invading Vietnamese forces, the Khmer Rouge continue to reign over almost a quarter of Cambodian territory. But the "killing fields" are becoming overgrown, concealed under fresh images sown by the insurgency to fit their new circumstances. Although responsible for committing national genocide, the insurgency continues to seek authority over the remaining population. By systematically undermining the newly elected Cambodian government, just as they methodically eliminated opponents of their regime years before, the Khmer Rouge remain a viable and deadly opponent. This study contends the symbolic activity of the Khmer Rouge lends viability to the movement because insurgency is a battle not only on the corporeal plane but the incorporeal plane as well. Political scientist J. Bowyer Bell likens the insurgent to a "dreamer," who "pursue[s] the armed struggle and shapes his world through perception into an ecosystem that 'Roman Laba, The Roots of Solidarity: A Political Sociology of Poland's Working-Class Democratization, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 126. XI allows the dream to persist, expand, contaminate the many, and drive the war."2 The ecosystem Bell suggests can be related to Murray Edelman's examination of symbolic actions. Edelman suggests that shared values allow insurgents to seek a difficult objective like control of the state.
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