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Perfidy: a Christian & Muslim Summary

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Perfidy: a Christian & Muslim Summary ESSAY PERFIDY: A CHRISTIAN & MUSLIM SUMMARY MarK CoppenGer Shrewd and innocent as a sheep among wolves (Matt. 10:16), or merely a wolf in sheep’s clothing? ahab stuck her neck out to have lied, though she may well mendacity had been abrogated Rhelp the two spies Joshua have done so only because, as a or qualified.2 dispatched to reconnoiter pagan, she wasn’t aware of the Jericho, and she’s duly honored Mosaic Law. She was rewarded In Summa Theologica, Thomas later in Hebrews 11’s “Faith Hall for “benevolence” rather than Aquinas took up the question of Fame.” Though, as revealed in “deceit,” for “benignity of mind, of truth-telling in his remarks Joshua 2, she lied to city author- not the iniquity of lying.”1 on ambushes, which some ities to protect the undercover count as illicit deception, since Israelites, these courageous those who hide say, in effect, men of God didn’t rebuke her AUGUSTINE & AQUINAS “Nobody dangerous is awaiting for speaking falsehood. Rather, For Augustine, the prohibition you here.” Turns out, both he they cherished the care and intel against lying was absolute. In and Augustine, whom he cited she provided them and made his essays on the subject, he in this connection, made al- sure she was safe when the city appealed to the Decalogue’s lowance for this practice. After was sacked. So, we might be proscription of “false witness,” all, we don’t have an obliga- inclined to excuse her for tell- to Jesus’ directive that we stick tion to reveal everything we ing the city cops, “They went fastidiously to “yea” and “nay,” know. Indeed, God Himself told thataway!” when she well knew and to Paul’s insistence that the Joshua to “lay ambushes for the Hebrews were hiding on “new man” should “put away the city of Hai” (Josh. 8:2), and the premises. But Augustine lying.” Furthermore, Augustine Jesus counseled his followers would have none of that. He found no scriptural reason to to conceal certain things from maintained she was wrong to think the condemnation of derisive unbelievers—“Give 49 not that which is holy to dogs” is a forensic concept centered thing, along with another good (Matt. 7:6). But Thomas drew on slander and libel in the court thing—putting him in a literal the line against telling someone of public opinion and perjury box in the hoosegow. something false or the breaking against an innocent party in a of promises. These are “always court of law. Both turn on the The issue is not whether I con- unlawful.”3 issue of willful harm to those cealed as opposed to signaled who don’t deserve it. a state of affairs, but rather It strikes me that this is slic- the nature of the one to whom ing things a bit thin. Insisting What constitutes harm? I’d sug- the concealing or signaling is that the distinction between gest it boils down to loss of free- aimed. There are no absolute “withholding or concealing” and dom. If a madman kidnaps me moral rules against impris- “presenting or telling” marks and locks me in a basement, he’s onments and falsehoods, but the beginning of a lie could lead taken away my freedom to move there are rules against unjust- to absurdities: such as insist- about the world according to my ly-imposed imprisonments and ing there’s a morally relevant values and plans. If the county falsehoods. difference between putting on sheriff locks me in a basement camouflage—with streaks of jail cell because I drove drunk David Gushee makes the point grease paint on your face and into a busy crosswalk, he de- in Kingdom Ethics, where he grass in your helmet band—and prives me of the same oppor- draws on the example and writ- 1) intending to withhold knowl- tunities—he harms me in the ings of Dietrich Bonhoeffer vis- edge of your presence, and 2) same way—but justly so. It’s à-vis the Nazis. He argues that intending to present yourself as not the locking in a basement “you have to ask in what way a part of the vegetation. In both per se that’s wrong, but the un- person is entitled to demand cases, the intention is to give the deserved confinement therein. truth speech from others.” He enemy the wrong impression. Some harms are warranted. posits “implicit covenants” for candor, the sort not suitable So, what shall we say of lying with the SS, the Nazi Party’s THE PRINCIPLE BEHIND THE or deception? It too is a form of elite paramilitary organization.4 RULE confining or shackling some- Popular images of the Decalogue one—in this case with a false tablets sometimes render the narrative—to a condition lim- ROOM FOR RUSES & FEINTS sixth commandment as “do iting the person’s ability to act Just war tradition has followed not kill” and the ninth com- judiciously. If you tell me that this thinking, permitting great mandment as “do not lie.” Both you have a medical degree when leeway for deception. Examples renderings are misleading. In you don’t, you not only steal abound: the former instance, it should something (credit for having read, “do not murder.” Among professional credentials), but • Confederate General Adam other reasons, we know this you also put me in a dangerous Johnson, with a force of only because in the very next chap- position of trust, hedging me ter, Exodus 21, God prescribed about with dangerously false 12 men, compelled 2,000 the death penalty for certain expectations. Indiana militiamen to evac- offenders. As for the latter com- uate Newburgh, Indiana. He mandment, the ninth, the sense The harm of a lie is perfectly fit- simply mounted stovepipes of the actual wording, “do not ting for catching a bank robber on his wagons, creating the 5 bear false witness,” and the seeking confidential treatment impression of artillery. modifier, “against thy neighbor,” for the broken leg he suffered • Another Confederate gen- is often downplayed, even when when jumping from the teller’s eral, Nathan Bedford For- accurately quoted. In trying to counter. If we can trick him by rest, sent mounted troops understand either command- offering, on the dark web, clan- through dry cornfields ment, we stumble when we fix destine medical services for fel- “shouting orders to non-exis- on the rule with no sense of con- ons and entice him to visit our tent units.” A single horse and “clinic” (where he’ll be nabbed), text or the underlying principle, rider could sound like ten.6 namely justice. we’ve done something proper. Our phony statements “put him • In southeast England, Killing is morally evil when it in a box” and deprived him of World War II Allied forces takes an innocent life inten- the freedom to make a well-in- employed “wetbobs” (fake tionally. Bearing false witness formed choice, but that’s a good landing craft assault ships) 50 and “bigbobs” (fake landing 2003, The Telegraph explained Bible allows “ruse, wiles, or craft tank ships) with the crime: tricks” in war, but there are oil seepage, wash-laden “tricks that are unacceptable clotheslines, etc., to deceive The feigning of civilian, and forbidden” in all cases. the Germans about the lo- non-combatant status is cation of the impending one of the acts of perfidy For instance, were I to invasion of the continent.7 specifically prohibited by assure somebody that if the first protocol to the he came to see me in an • In 1943 the British took Geneva Conventions, allotted place, I would be the corpse of an indigent, adopted in 1977. Other there to speak with him, Glyndwr Michael—who examples of perfidy are and he came according died by suicide—dressed misusing a flag of surren- to my assurance, and I and outfitted him as a mil- der and pretending to be surprised him there by itary courier (“Acting Major wounded. some trick to harm him or William Martin”), and cast kill or capture him, such him ashore on the Spanish Although this protocol an act would be right evil coast, where Germans ac- has not been ratified by treason.11 cessed his bogus message the United States—or, and acted accordingly, indeed, Iraq—perfidy is In the seventeenth century, shifting troops to Greece a generally accepted prin- Samuel von Pufendorf seconded to meet an invasion which ciple of international law. this sentiment, saying in On the was actually set for Sicily.8 Article 37 of the first pro- Duty of Man and Citizen that tocol defines it in terms of • During one of the kami- one has the “right to use fraud betraying a confidence. and deceit against an enemy, kaze attacks on the Fifth Troops might reasonably provided one does not violate Fleet as it lay off Okinawa drop their guard when one’s pledge of faith. Hence, in the Spring of 1945, naval approached by civilians one may deceive an enemy by historian Samuel Eliot or men with white flags; false statements or fictitious Morison “observed two it is therefore perfidious stories, but never by promises aircraft apparently locked to misuse the status of a or agreements.12 in a deadly dog fight. Sud- non-combatant.10 denly, they broke off the The notion has been echoed fight, and both dived on Contempt for perfidy is cut from repeatedly, as in the American American warships. The the broader just war cloth. It Civil War, when General Orders, dog fight had been a clever, honors the jus ad bellum prin- No.
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