Just War Theory

CHAPTER FOUR JUST WAR THEORY Laurens van Apeldoorn Introduction It is often said that ‘just war theory’ is the dominant intellectual tradition in the ethics of war. The ethics of war is a subfield of philosophy aimed at providing a systematic investigation of the normative principles that apply to conduct in warfare. In identifying just war theory as the dominant position in this field, the term is usually used to refer to a loosely connected body of philosophical reflection that can be traced back to phi- losophers of Greek and Roman antiquity, scholastic theologians such as Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), Francisco de Vitoria (1492–1546), Francisco Suarez (1548–1617), Alberico Gentili (1552–1608), and (early) modern phi- losophers such as Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), Samuel von Pufendorf (1632– 1694), Emerich de Vattel (1714–1767), and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). These thinkers stake out measured defenses of the permissibility of resorting to war, and for that reason, just war theory is often contrasted with realism and pacifism—realism, very roughly, being the view that moral concerns have no place in the subject of warfare—that, in Thucydides words, ‘the strong do as they wish and the weak suffer as they must’, and pacifism being the view that resorting to war can never be morally justified. Between these extremes just war theory is thought to establish a middle ground. Like realism it recognises that warfare is a ‘necessary evil’ and can therefore sometimes be morally justified. On the other hand it acknowledges, like pacifism, that warfare has many morally reprehensible consequences and ought to only be pursued as a last resort. As several commentators have recently pointed out, however, the indiscriminate use of the term ‘just war theory’ is potentially misleading (Haggenmacher 1992; Reichberg 2008). They argue that we should instead identify two general approaches or ‘paradigms’ within the tradition, which they call the ‘just war’ and the ‘regular war’ paradigm respectively. Although authors in the tradition often do not fall neatly into either cate- gory, the internal consistency of the paradigms can be brought out clearly enough to help us better understand the nature of the debate. This is in 54 laurens van apeldoorn part due to a closely related distinction: the evaluation of warfare can be divided into two fundamentally distinct issues. On the one hand, there is a set of issues related to the decision to use force. Such considerations are commonly referred to with the Latin phrase jus ad bellum—the rightfulness of resorting to war. On the other hand, there is a set of issues related to conduct in war. Once the fighting has started one might ask what is permitted, required, or forbidden in the conduct of hostilities. These are so called jus in bello considerations—rightfulness in war.1 The just war paradigm is centrally concerned with whether the resort to force is just or lawful and is therefore most closely associated with jus ad bellum. The regular war paradigm, conversely, primarily focuses on jus in bello. 1. The Just War Paradigm A canonical example of the just war paradigm can be found in the work of Thomas Aquinas, the thirteenth century Catholic theologian and phi- losopher. Aquinas identifies ‘just cause’ as one of three conditions that must hold to justify waging an offensive war. ‘A just war’, Aquinas writes, ‘is customarily described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly’ (Aquinas 1920: IIaIIae.40.1). A just cause for war is the redress of some past wrong by another party. In a just war there will therefore be always one party (a state or political community) that has acted unjustly and is therefore liable to an attack. The two other conditions for a just war are first that the war is initi- ated by a legitimate authority and is publicly announced, and secondly that it is fought with the ‘right intention’. With regard to the former, Aquinas argues that this is so because war is aimed at redressing injus- tices. If an individual seeks to right an injustice it is possible to pursue his or her cause within the institutions of the state. Political communi- ties themselves, however, have no such avenues open to them. That is why in order to secure justice and protect the common good, legitimate political authorities must have the right to declare war. With regard to the latter condition Aquinas argues that a war is unjust if waged with 1 One can also distinguish a third set of issues, jus post bellum, justice in the peace settlement but that falls outside of the scope of this introductory chapter. See for example Bass (2004)..

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