University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2015 A New Reading of Kant's Theory of Punishment Robert Hoffman University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Hoffman, Robert, "A New Reading of Kant's Theory of Punishment" (2015). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 1063. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1063 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1063 For more information, please contact [email protected]. A New Reading of Kant's Theory of Punishment Abstract There are deep, insurmountable difficulties with the aditionaltr interpretation of Immanuel Kantâ??s writings on the subject of punishment. Although it is undeniable that throughout his published writings on practical philosophy â?? and in particular in his Metaphysics of Morals â?? he consistently advocates for the view that punishment can only be justified as a direct response to an individualâ??s act of wrongdoing, his status as one of the foremost theorists in the retributivist pantheon is philosophically untenable. In this dissertation, I articulate the ways in which Kantâ??s explicit support for retributivism directly contradicts more foundational elements of his practical philosophy and argue instead that he has the resources to consistently construct a deterrent theory of punishment. In particular, I highlight Kantâ??s division of duties and his conception of the state to demonstrate that the idea of a political community retributively responding to moral desert is wholly incompatible with Kantian principles. In order to overcome these obstacles, I develop a new approach to Kantian deterrence â?? which I call Kantian Protective Deterrence â?? that grounds the stateâ??s right to exercise coercive force against its citizens in what Kant understood to be its fundamental role of protecting each individual citizen from violations of her or his right to exercise external freedoms. Degree Type Dissertation Degree Name Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Graduate Group Philosophy First Advisor Paul Guyer Keywords Immanuel Kant, Punishment Subject Categories Philosophy This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1063 A NEW READING OF KANT’S THEORY OF PUNISHMENT Robert Hoffman A DISSERTATION in Philosophy Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2015 Supervisor of Dissertation ________________________________ Paul Guyer Jonathan Nelson Professor of Humanities and Philosophy Graduate Group Chairperson ________________________________ Michael Weisberg Associate Professor of Philosophy Dissertation Committee Samuel Freeman, Avalon Professor in the Humanities, Philosophy Adrienne Martin, Akshata Murty '02 and Rishi Sunak Associate Professor of Philosophy Charles Larmore, W. Duncan MacMillan Family Professor in the Humanities Karen Detlefsen, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Education A NEW READING OF KANT’S THEORY OF PUNISHMENT COPYRIGHT 2015 Robert Russell Hoffman For my parents. iii I am indebted to a great many people for their assistance, advice, encouragement and support over the course of this project. A dissertation is a learning process in more ways than one, and I have been exceptionally fortunate to have so many remarkable teachers. Paul Guyer – my supervisor – not only guided the development of the projeect, but also my development as a philosopher. I also owe a great debt to Samuel Freeman and Adrienne Martin, who served on my committee since its beginning, and to Charles Larmore, who generously contributed to the project the last few years. Their insight and feedback helped to shape the direction and scope of the dissertation, and it is immeasurably better for their input. Finally, I must thank Karen Detlefsen, who regularly went well beyond the call of duty when I was most in need of assistance or guidance. It is hard to overstate the amount I have learned from and relied on my fellow graduate students over the past six years. Chris Melenovksy and Justin Bernstein helped sharpen and refine my understanding of political philosophy, and Wiebke Deimling’s insight into Kant has likewise proved invaluable. I am also forever indebted to Emily Parke, Rob Willison, and Hal Parker, whose friendship and support from my very first day of graduate school made this process far more enjoyable and rewarding than it would have otherwise been. Finally, I would be remiss if I did not recognize that producing a dissertation is as much a personal undertaking as it is an academic one. As such, I am indebted to my parents and to my brothers, John and Michael. And, of course, I cannot possibly describe all I owe to Heather, who not only made any of this possible, but also worthwhile. iv ABSTRACT A NEW READING OF KANT’S THEORY OF PUNISHMENT Robert R. Hoffman Paul Guyer There are deep, insurmountable difficulties with the traditional interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s writings on the subject of punishment. Although it is undeniable that throughout his published writings on practical philosophy – and in particular in his Metaphysics of Morals – he consistently advocates for the view that punishment can only be justified as a direct response to an individual’s act of wrongdoing, his status as one of the foremost theorists in the retributivist pantheon is philosophically untenable. In this dissertation, I articulate the ways in which Kant’s explicit support for retributivism directly contradicts more foundational elements of his practical philosophy and argue instead that he has the resources to consistently construct a deterrent theory of punishment. In particular, I highlight Kant’s division of duties and his conception of the state to demonstrate that the idea of a political community retributively responding to moral desert is wholly incompatible with Kantian principles. In order to overcome these obstacles, I develop a new approach to Kantian deterrence – which I call Kantian Protective Deterrence – that grounds the state’s right to exercise coercive force against its citizens in what Kant understood to be its fundamental role of protecting each individual citizen from violations of her or his right to exercise external freedoms. v Table of Contents 1 Kantian Protective Deterrence: An Introduction 1 1.1 A Changing Scholarship 4 1.2 A New Direction 10 1.3 A ‘Theory’ of Punishment 14 1.4 Outline 20 2 A History of Violence: Punishment and the State in Early Modern Europe 26 2.1 Punishment as a Natural Right 30 2.2 Punishment as a State Construction: The Strict Contractarians 50 2.3 Punishment as a State Construction: The Normativists 67 3 Defining Punishment: Coercion and Right 83 3.1 Kant’s Definition of Punishment 85 3.2 Coercion and the Division of Duties 94 3.3 Allurement and Reward 118 4 Justifying Punishment: Deterring Threats to Freedom 127 4.1 Kant’s Retributivism 130 4.2 Standard Kantian Deterrence 140 4.3 Kantian Protective Deterrence 152 5 The Liability of Punishment: All and Only the Guilty 164 5.1 Liability and Mixed Theories 167 5.2 Punishing Only Those Who Have Done Wrong 177 5.3 Punishing All Those Who Have Done Wrong 184 6 The Methods and Amount of Punishment: Ius Talionis vs. Rehabilitation 194 6.1 The Methods of Punishment 197 6.2 The Amount of Punishment 201 6.3 Alternatives to Ius Talionis 206 6.4 The Formula of Humanity and Rehabilitation 213 6.5 Execution 223 7 Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: Resisting and Punishing State Authority 231 7.1 Opposing State Power 234 7.2 Punishing Former Authorities 256 7.3 International Punishment 265 Conclusion The Future of Kant’s Theory of Punishment 273 Bibliography 278 vi 1 Kantian Protective Deterrence: An Introduction Immanuel Kant is frequently hailed as the foremost philosopher of the Enlightenment. His work in moral philosophy has inspired a tradition of thinking that still stands as one of the dominant approaches to answering normative questions. The values of unconditional respect for human persons, strict commitment to inviolable rights, and the intrinsic worth of autonomy and agency – all hallmarks of the fragile but precious moral progress in modern times – find unequivocal support and foundation in his writings. The influence of Kant’s insight, originality, and breadth of thought is almost impossible to overstate. His prominence and significance within the history of moral philosophy alone would warrant a careful consideration of Kant’s views on the subject of punishment. As it happens, however, there is additional reason to study his position: namely, Kant’s reputation as one of the central, foundational philosophers of the retributivist school of thought. Retributivism – the belief that punishment is justified as a response to the wrong actions and moral desert of the perpetrator – has persisted as one of the dominant theories of punishment, from the earliest points in human history to today. Kant, in turn, is regularly singled out as the first philosopher in modern times to provide a secular, rather than religious, basis for retributivism. So great is his identification with the retributive view that it is sometimes merely labeled the deontological approach to punishment. 1 Kant’s reputation as a theorist of retributivism is well-earned. In his Metaphysics of Morals, he describes punishment as being justified only when it is an immediate response to an act of criminal wrongdoing: “Punishment can never be inflicted merely as a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society. It must always be inflicted upon him only because he has committed a crime” (6:331).1 The state’s response to criminal wrongdoing is analytically necessitated (27:552) and should take the form of ius talionis (the law of retribution): an eye for an eye (6:332). Failure to respond in this way makes a state complicit in the act of wrongdoing, even in such an extreme condition as the state’s dissolution (6:333).