Blancke 2019 Pseudoscience and the End of Dialogue
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Argumentation and Fallacies in Creationist Writings Against Evolutionary Theory Petteri Nieminen1,2* and Anne-Mari Mustonen1
Nieminen and Mustonen Evolution: Education and Outreach 2014, 7:11 http://www.evolution-outreach.com/content/7/1/11 RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access Argumentation and fallacies in creationist writings against evolutionary theory Petteri Nieminen1,2* and Anne-Mari Mustonen1 Abstract Background: The creationist–evolutionist conflict is perhaps the most significant example of a debate about a well-supported scientific theory not readily accepted by the public. Methods: We analyzed creationist texts according to type (young earth creationism, old earth creationism or intelligent design) and context (with or without discussion of “scientific” data). Results: The analysis revealed numerous fallacies including the direct ad hominem—portraying evolutionists as racists, unreliable or gullible—and the indirect ad hominem, where evolutionists are accused of breaking the rules of debate that they themselves have dictated. Poisoning the well fallacy stated that evolutionists would not consider supernatural explanations in any situation due to their pre-existing refusal of theism. Appeals to consequences and guilt by association linked evolutionary theory to atrocities, and slippery slopes to abortion, euthanasia and genocide. False dilemmas, hasty generalizations and straw man fallacies were also common. The prevalence of these fallacies was equal in young earth creationism and intelligent design/old earth creationism. The direct and indirect ad hominem were also prevalent in pro-evolutionary texts. Conclusions: While the fallacious arguments are irrelevant when discussing evolutionary theory from the scientific point of view, they can be effective for the reception of creationist claims, especially if the audience has biases. Thus, the recognition of these fallacies and their dismissal as irrelevant should be accompanied by attempts to avoid counter-fallacies and by the recognition of the context, in which the fallacies are presented. -
Scientific Communities in the Developing World Scientific Communities in the Developing World
Scientific Communities in the Developing World Scientific Communities in the Developing World Edited by jacques Caillard V.V. Krishna Roland Waast Sage Publications New Delhiflhousand Oaks/London Copyright @) Jacques Gaillard, V.V. Krishna and Roland Waast, 1997. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. First published in 1997 by Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd M-32, Greater Kailash Market I New Delhi 110 048 Sage Publications Inc Sage Publications Ltd 2455 Teller Road 6 Bonhill Street Thousand Oaks, California 91320 London EC2A 4PU Published by Tejeshwar Singh for Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, phototypeset by Pagewell Photosetters, Pondicherry and printed at Chaman Enterprises, Delhi. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Scientific communities in the developing world I edited by Jacques Gaillard, V.V. Krishna, Roland Waast. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Science-Developing countries--History. 2. Science-Social aspect- Developing countries--History. I. Gaillard, Jacques, 1951- . 11. Krishna, V.V. 111. Waast, Roland, 1940- . Q127.2.S44 306.4'5'091724--dc20 1996 9617807 ISBN: 81-7036565-1 (India-hb) &8039-9330-7 (US-hb) Sage Production Editor: Sumitra Srinivasan Contents List of Tables List of Figures Preface 1. Introduction: Scientific Communities in the Developing World Jacques Gaillard, V.V. Krishna and Roland Waast Part 1: Scientific Communities in Africa 2. Sisyphus or the Scientific Communities of Algeria Ali El Kenz and Roland Waast 3. -
There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning
There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning 1. Empiricism and the Question of Empirical Reasons Empiricism may be defined as the view there is no a priori justification for any synthetic claim. Critics object that empiricism cannot account for all the kinds of knowledge we seem to possess, such as moral knowledge, metaphysical knowledge, mathematical knowledge, and modal knowledge.1 In some cases, empiricists try to account for these types of knowledge; in other cases, they shrug off the objections, happily concluding, for example, that there is no moral knowledge, or that there is no metaphysical knowledge.2 But empiricism cannot shrug off just any type of knowledge; to be minimally plausible, empiricism must, for example, at least be able to account for paradigm instances of empirical knowledge, including especially scientific knowledge. Empirical knowledge can be divided into three categories: (a) knowledge by direct observation; (b) knowledge that is deductively inferred from observations; and (c) knowledge that is non-deductively inferred from observations, including knowledge arrived at by induction and inference to the best explanation. Category (c) includes all scientific knowledge. This category is of particular import to empiricists, many of whom take scientific knowledge as a sort of paradigm for knowledge in general; indeed, this forms a central source of motivation for empiricism.3 Thus, if there is any kind of knowledge that empiricists need to be able to account for, it is knowledge of type (c). I use the term “empirical reasoning” to refer to the reasoning involved in acquiring this type of knowledge – that is, to any instance of reasoning in which (i) the premises are justified directly by observation, (ii) the reasoning is non- deductive, and (iii) the reasoning provides adequate justification for the conclusion. -
The Law and the Brain: Judging Scientific Evidence of Intent
The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process Volume 1 Issue 2 Article 4 1999 The Law and the Brain: Judging Scientific videnceE of Intent Erica Beecher-Monas Edgar Garcia-Rill Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/appellatepracticeprocess Part of the Evidence Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons Recommended Citation Erica Beecher-Monas and Edgar Garcia-Rill, The Law and the Brain: Judging Scientific videnceE of Intent, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 243 (1999). Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/appellatepracticeprocess/vol1/iss2/4 This document is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process by an authorized administrator of Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE LAW AND THE BRAIN: JUDGING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE OF INTENT Erica Beecher-Monas* and Edgar Garcia-Rill, Ph.D.** INTRODUCTION As evidentiary gatekeepers, judges must be ready to evaluate expert testimony about science and the brain. A wide variety of cases present issues of mental state, many doubtless with battling experts seeking to testify on these issues. This poses a dilemma for nonspecialist judges. How is a nonscientist to judge scientific evidence? How can a nonscientist decide if testimony about mental state meets the criteria of good science? This essay offers a general overview of the issue of evaluating scientific evidence and is aimed at exploring the issues involved, but not attempting easy answers. Of necessity, this requires thinking about how science works. -
Urban Myths Mythical Cryptids
Ziptales Advanced Library Worksheet 2 Urban Myths Mythical Cryptids ‘What is a myth? It is a story that pretends to be real, but is in fact unbelievable. Like many urban myths it has been passed around (usually by word of mouth), acquiring variations and embellishments as it goes. It is a close cousin of the tall tale. There are mythical stories about almost any aspect of life’. What do we get when urban myths meet the animal kingdom? We find a branch of pseudoscience called cryptozoology. Cryptozoology refers to the study of and search for creatures whose existence has not been proven. These creatures (or crytpids as they are known) appear in myths and legends or alleged sightings. Some examples include: sea serpents, phantom cats, unicorns, bunyips, giant anacondas, yowies and thunderbirds. Some have even been given actual names you may have heard of – do Yeti, Owlman, Mothman, Cyclops, Bigfoot and the Loch Ness Monster sound familiar? Task 1: Choose one of the cryptids from the list above (or perhaps one that you may already know of) and write an informative text identifying the following aspects of this mythical creature: ◊ Description ◊ Features ◊ Location ◊ First Sighting ◊ Subsequent Sightings ◊ Interesting Facts (e.g. how is it used in popular culture? Has it been featured in written or visual texts?) Task 2: Cryptozoologists claim there have been cases where species now accepted by the scientific community were initially considered urban myths. Can you locate any examples of creatures whose existence has now been proven but formerly thought to be cryptids? Extension Activities: • Cryptozoology is called a ‘pseudoscience’ because it relies solely on anecdotes and reported sightings rather than actual evidence. -
The Role of Social Context in the Production of Scientific Knowledge
University of Tennessee, Knoxville TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange Supervised Undergraduate Student Research Chancellor’s Honors Program Projects and Creative Work 5-2015 The Role of Social Context in the Production of Scientific Knowledge Kristen Lynn Beard [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj Part of the Philosophy of Science Commons Recommended Citation Beard, Kristen Lynn, "The Role of Social Context in the Production of Scientific nowledgeK " (2015). Chancellor’s Honors Program Projects. https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj/1852 This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Supervised Undergraduate Student Research and Creative Work at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Chancellor’s Honors Program Projects by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Role of Social Context in the Production of Scientific Knowledge Kristen Lynn Beard The University of Tennessee, Knoxville Chancellor’s Honors Program Department of Philosophy Undergraduate Thesis Submitted December 8, 2014 Thesis Advisor: Dr. Nora Berenstain Beard 1 Model 1: The Influence of Social Context on the Scientific Method Beard 2 Introduction: Scientific Knowledge as Both Social and Rational A person may believe that a certain theory is true and explain that he does so, for instance, because it is the best explanation he has of the facts or because it gives him the most satisfying world picture. This does not make him irrational, but I take it to be part of empiricism to disdain such reasons. -
Bringing Science and Scientists to Life in Post-Secondary Science Education
Sci & Educ DOI 10.1007/s11191-010-9310-7 The Story Behind the Science: Bringing Science and Scientists to Life in Post-Secondary Science Education Michael P. Clough Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 Abstract With funding from the United States National Science Foundation, 30 histor- ical short stories designed to teach science content and draw students’ attention to the nature of science (NOS) have been created for post-secondary introductory astronomy, biology, chemistry, geology, and physics courses. The project rationale, story development and structure, and freely available stories at the project website are presented. 1 Introduction The phrase ‘‘nature of science’’ (NOS) has been used for some time, particularly in the science education community, in referring to what science is, how science works, the epistemological and ontological foundations underlying science, the culture of science, and how society both influences and reacts to scientific activities (Clough 2006). Accurately understanding the NOS is crucial for science literacy (AAAS 1989; Matthews 1994; McComas and Olson 1998; NRC 1996) and can perhaps play an important role in enticing students to further their science education. Matthews (1994), McComas et al. (1998) and others have argued that knowledge of scientists and how science works will enhance students’ understanding of science as a human endeavor; increase interest in science and science classes; improve student learning of science content; and promote better social decision-making. Morris Shamos (1995) claimed that understanding the NOS is the most important component of scientific literacy because that knowledge, accurate or not, is what citizens use when assessing public issues involving science and technology. -
The Role of Participation in a Techno-Scientific Controversy
PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION Participatory Governance and Institutional Innovation [PAGANINI] Contract No. CIT2-CT-2004-505791 . Deliverable Number 16 Work Package 6 _ GM Food THE ROLE OF PARTICIPATION IN A TECHNO-SCIENTIFIC CONTROVERSY Larry Reynolds and Bronislaw Szerszynski with Maria Kousis and Yannis Volakakis 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technology Participatory Governance and Institutional Innovation [PAGANINI] Contract No. CIT2-CT-2004-505791 . Deliverable Number 16 WORK PACKAGE 6 _ GM FOOD THE ROLE OF PARTICIPATION IN A TECHNO-SCIENTIFIC CONTROVERSY Larry Reynolds and Bronislaw Szerszynski with Maria Kousis and Yannis Volakakis 1 The Paganini Project Focussing on selected key areas of the 6th EU Framework Programme for Research and Technology, PAGANINI investigates the ways in which participatory practices contribute to problem solving in a number of highly contentious fields of EU governance. PAGANINI looks at a particular dynamic cluster of policy areas concerned with what we call “the politics of life”: medicine, health, food, energy, and environment. Under “politics of life” we refer to dimensions of life that are only to a limited extent under human control - or where the public has good reasons to suspect that there are serious limitations to socio-political control and steering. At the same time, “politics of life” areas are strongly connected to normative, moral and value-based factors, such as a sense of responsibility towards the non-human nature, future generations and/or one‟s -
Climate Change: How Do We Know We're Not Wrong? Naomi Oreskes
Changing Planet: Past, Present, Future Lecture 4 – Climate Change: How Do We Know We’re Not Wrong? Naomi Oreskes, PhD 1. Start of Lecture Four (0:16) [ANNOUNCER:] From the Howard Hughes Medical Institute...The 2012 Holiday Lectures on Science. This year's lectures: "Changing Planet: Past, Present, Future," will be given by Dr. Andrew Knoll, Professor of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology at Harvard University; Dr. Naomi Oreskes, Professor of History and Science Studies at the University of California, San Diego; and Dr. Daniel Schrag, Professor of Earth and Planetary Sciences at Harvard University. The fourth lecture is titled: Climate Change: How Do We Know We're Not Wrong? And now, a brief video to introduce our lecturer Dr. Naomi Oreskes. 2. Profile of Dr. Naomi Oreskes (1:14) [DR. ORESKES:] One thing that's really important for all people to understand is that the whole notion of certainty is mistaken, and it's something that climate skeptics and deniers and the opponents of evolution really exploit. Many of us think that scientific knowledge is certain, so therefore if someone comes along and points out the uncertainties in a certain scientific body of knowledge, we think that undermines the science, we think that means that there's a problem in the science, and so part of my message is to say that that view of science is incorrect, that the reality of science is that it's always uncertain because if we're actually doing research, it means that we're asking questions, and if we're asking questions, then by definition we're asking questions about things we don't already know about, so uncertainty is part of the lifeblood of science, it's something we need to embrace and realize it's a good thing, not a bad thing. -
Rhetoric for Becoming Otherwise
The Pennsylvania State University The Graduate School College of the Liberal Arts RHETORIC FOR BECOMING OTHERWISE: LIFE, LITERATURE, GENEALOGY, FLIGHT A Dissertation in English by Abram D. Anders © 2009 Abram D. Anders Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy August 2009 ii The dissertation of Abram D. Anders was reviewed and approved* by the following: Richard M. Doyle Professor of English and Science, Technology and Society Dissertation Advisor Chair of Committee Jeffrey T. Nealon Liberal Arts Research Professor of English Xiaoye You Assistant Professor of English and Asian Studies Robert A. Yarber, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Art Robert R. Edwards Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of English and Comparative Literature Department of English Graduate Director *Signatures are on file in the Graduate School. iii ABSTRACT Rhetoric for Becoming Otherwise begins with the Isocratean premise that thought, speech, writing are best understood as bridges between the already said of language and the emerging circumstances that are the occasions for their production. This argument is rehearsed across a variety of domains and instances following Isocrates exhortation that the rhetorician or practitioner of philosophia can only model the movement of discourse without expecting to provide any “true knowledge” or “absolute theory” for how to encounter the problematics of an endlessly deferred present. As a matter of rhetoric, becoming otherwise is the continually renewed task of creating something new from the resources of language and for the demands of an ever deferred present—Presocratics versus Classicists (Chapter 1). As a matter of health, becoming otherwise is the necessity of overcoming limitation and suffering in order to achieve new norms of health and pursue the ever changing opportunities of a self‐developing capacity for producing new capacities—Normativity versus Normalization (Chapter 2). -
“Hard-Won” Consensus Brent Ranalli
Ranalli • Climate SCienCe, ChaRaCteR, and the “haRd-Won” ConSenSuS Brent Ranalli Climate Science, Character, and the “Hard-Won” Consensus ABSTRACT: What makes a consensus among scientists credible and convincing? This paper introduces the notion of a “hard-won” consensus and uses examples from recent debates over climate change science to show that this heuristic stan- dard for evaluating the quality of a consensus is widely shared. The extent to which a consensus is “hard won” can be understood to depend on the personal qualities of the participating experts; the article demonstrates the continuing util- ity of the norms of modern science introduced by Robert K. Merton by showing that individuals on both sides of the climate science debate rely intuitively on Mertonian ideas—interpreted in terms of character—to frame their arguments. INTRodUCTIoN he late Michael Crichton, science fiction writer and climate con- trarian, once remarked: “Whenever you hear the consensus of Tscientists agrees on something or other, reach for your wallet, because you’re being had. In science consensus is irrelevant. What is relevant is reproducible results” (Crichton 2003). Reproducibility of results and other methodological criteria are indeed the proper basis for scientific judgments. But Crichton is wrong to say that consensus is irrel- evant. Consensus among scientists serves to certify facts for the lay public.1 Those on the periphery of the scientific enterprise (i.e., policy makers and the public), who don’t have the time or the expertise or the equipment to check results for themselves, necessarily rely on the testimony of those at the center. -
Sacred Rhetorical Invention in the String Theory Movement
University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Communication Studies Theses, Dissertations, and Student Research Communication Studies, Department of Spring 4-12-2011 Secular Salvation: Sacred Rhetorical Invention in the String Theory Movement Brent Yergensen University of Nebraska-Lincoln, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/commstuddiss Part of the Speech and Rhetorical Studies Commons Yergensen, Brent, "Secular Salvation: Sacred Rhetorical Invention in the String Theory Movement" (2011). Communication Studies Theses, Dissertations, and Student Research. 6. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/commstuddiss/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Communication Studies, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Communication Studies Theses, Dissertations, and Student Research by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. SECULAR SALVATION: SACRED RHETORICAL INVENTION IN THE STRING THEORY MOVEMENT by Brent Yergensen A DISSERTATION Presented to the Faculty of The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Major: Communication Studies Under the Supervision of Dr. Ronald Lee Lincoln, Nebraska April, 2011 ii SECULAR SALVATION: SACRED RHETORICAL INVENTION IN THE STRING THEORY MOVEMENT Brent Yergensen, Ph.D. University of Nebraska, 2011 Advisor: Ronald Lee String theory is argued by its proponents to be the Theory of Everything. It achieves this status in physics because it provides unification for contradictory laws of physics, namely quantum mechanics and general relativity. While based on advanced theoretical mathematics, its public discourse is growing in prevalence and its rhetorical power is leading to a scientific revolution, even among the public.