In Amenas Inquest 7 January 2015

Conclusion In Amenas Inquest 7 January 2015

1 Wednesday, 7 January 2015 1 country to the crisis. That involved leading both the 2 (10.30 am) 2 staff that we had in Algier at the time. I had 15 UK 3 (Proceedings delayed) 3 staff and 60 Algerian staff. We also had a massive 4 (10.40 am) 4 influx of staff from the region and from London to help 5 THE CORONER: Mr Barr, I hope that you and everybody have 5 us manage what was a huge crisis. There were over -- 6 had what I'll call the open ruling so far as the PII 6 115 extra people came in in the process of those first 7 application was concerned, and that the proposal is that 7 few days. So managing that operation ensuring that the 8 that and the gist that is referred to in it will go up 8 information flow was absolutely what we needed to manage 9 on the inquest website. 9 the operation were key tasks. 10 MR BARR: Sir, yes, there is absolutely no objection to that 10 Q. Turning first of all to the matters before the attack at 11 and I should say that I have with me today my leader, 11 In Amenas happened. What engagement did the embassy 12 Mr Glasson 12 have with the partner companies in the JV? 13 THE CORONER: Good. Very nice to see him and you and 13 A. That would happen at various levels. I would see the 14 everyone. Yes. 14 country manager for BP in Algiers, who would pass 15 MS DOLAN: The first witness this morning is Mr Roper. 15 through and would come and see me and we would have 16 MR MARTYN ROPER (sworn) 16 a meeting. I also went down to Hassi Messaoud which is 17 Questions from MS DOLAN 17 the main centre for oil and gas, for gas production 18 MS DOLAN: Good morning, Mr Roper. I think you have 18 principally in Algeria where BP had their main office in 19 provided a statement for the inquest back in October 19 Algeria. So I went to Hassi Messaoud and I had meetings 20 last year. 20 with BP there. 21 A. Mmm. 21 There were also meetings at other levels in the 22 Q. Can you give us your full name please and your 22 embassy. So, for example, the deputy head of mission, 23 professional association? 23 the deputy ambassador would have meetings more on 24 A. Martyn Keith Roper. I'm a diplomat with the Foreign 24 security with people from the Algiers BP office. My 25 Office. 25 defence attaché attended some of those meetings as well

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1 Q. And I think at the time of the matters we are concerned 1 but it was principally the deputy head of mission and we 2 with you were the ambassador to Algeria? 2 had a regional security officer based in Algiers who 3 A. Yes, that's correct. 3 also was part of meetings in Algeria which BP would also 4 Q. For what period were you the ambassador to Algeria? 4 have been present. 5 A. I was the ambassador from December 2010 until May 2014. 5 Q. Can you tell us in broad terms what those security 6 Q. And in a nutshell what's the responsibility of an 6 liaisons are concerning? 7 ambassador? I know there are many but can you 7 A. It is effectively exchange of information, gathering 8 encapsulate them? 8 information, finding out what other people know, 9 A. The ambassador is the overall channel of communication 9 discussing any issues that have arisen and we, as the 10 between the host government, the government of Algeria, 10 British government, would give our assessment as 11 and the UK authorities and my responsibilities were to 11 reflected in our travel advice of the current security 12 oversee, manage and drive forward our objectives, our 12 climate in the country. 13 strategy for the bilateral relationship with Algeria. 13 Q. And you said exchange of information, in what broad 14 Q. And I think in the circumstances of the attack that 14 terms again are the avenues of information that the 15 happened at In Amenas you also had responsibility in 15 embassy has access to? 16 respect of the UK response to that? 16 A. The embassy gathers information, which is its role to be 17 A. Yes, yes, I mean, I was the most senior representative 17 as up-to-date as possible about what is happening in the 18 in Algeria liaising with the Algerian authorities. 18 country and we gather information from a wide range of 19 I had the responsibility to provide accurate and 19 sources. That could be the Algerian government. It 20 up-to-date information about what was happening on the 20 could be contacts outside the Algerian government in 21 ground to the crisis teams in London, to the Prime 21 Algeria, so contacts across the whole range of society, 22 Minister himself who was leading the effort in 22 of society in Algeria. So academics, other embassies, 23 Government through the Government machinery, the COBRA 23 other governments who are active in Algeria, companies 24 system. And in Algier itself as the ambassador I was 24 that are operating in the region, so we would seek to 25 the crisis leader handling the overall response in 25 develop as many contacts as possible to help us build

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1 a picture of what was happening in the country. 1 impact on regional security but Algeria was still seen 2 Q. And therefore do we understand that when you talk about 2 as one of the few countries in the region which had an 3 the liaison with BP someone is then passing information 3 effective state system, state security system, 4 to you as well as you passing information to them, they 4 a government system which was still effective at all 5 are one of your sources of information as well as you 5 levels across the country. 6 providing them information? 6 But clearly the developments of the Arab Spring, and 7 A. Absolutely. It is a two way exchange of information and 7 there were additional attacks in the year before 8 I think BP would look on the British embassy and other 8 In Amenas, they were a matter of concern. In the 9 embassies in Algeria as a source of information as they 9 context of Algeria that had been going on for quite some 10 build up their own security picture of the risks and the 10 time. There had frequently been attacks against the 11 threats from what is happening in Algeria affecting 11 Algerian state system since the 90s and that was the 12 their staff. 12 situation then. 13 Q. At the time of the incident was the embassy aware of any 13 Q. So was there any perception to the embassy that in the 14 threats towards In Amenas? 14 year or so before the In Amenas attack there had been 15 A. No. We were aware that there was a high threat of 15 any deterioration in the security situation? 16 terrorism in Algeria and we were aware that there had 16 A. Yes. Of course, because of the regional situation, that 17 been numerous threats made by Al Qaeda in the Islamic 17 because of what was happening in the region there was 18 Maghreb, which was the main group operating in Algeria. 18 a huge concern that there were areas in Northern Mali, 19 They had made threats regularly over many years against 19 Libya and Niger which had become ungoverned space and 20 western interests. That was taken to include British 20 terrorists were able to move freely around in those 21 interests in Algeria, which would be the embassy, 21 areas. So yes, that was an increased concern based on 22 embassy staff. It would be any British nationals 22 what had happened since the Arab Spring. The Algerian 23 working for foreign companies. It would be any British 23 authorities were themselves extremely worried about that 24 companies working in Algeria. So it had been known for 24 but they had an effective system of control. They were 25 a long time that there was a threat against British 25 one of the best resourced governments in the region in

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1 interests from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. 1 terms of their military spending. They were often in 2 Q. Therefore, is that the threat that you are talking about 2 the top ten of countries in the world in terms of their 3 being reflected in the travel advice? 3 military expenditure. 4 A. Yes, yes. 4 So they were seen as being in a better position than 5 Q. I am not going to ask you more about travel advice 5 many of the other governments in the region to protect 6 because I know we have Mr Bristow attending and he is 6 their own country. 7 able to assist us with that. 7 Q. One comment you make in your statement is that the area 8 A. Okay. 8 was flooded with arms of all sorts. Can you expand upon 9 Q. You say in your witness statement, at paragraph 10, that 9 that, please? 10 your view was that the internal security situation in 10 A. I think that's intended as the area as a whole. I have 11 Algeria was steadily improving since the 90s. Can I ask 11 just alluded to the risks after the collapse of Gaddafi 12 you about that in the context because we have had some 12 in Libya to these large areas where terrorists could 13 witnesses who have said that actually coming up to the 13 move about with impunity effectively and because of the 14 time of the In Amenas attack there actually had been 14 fall of Gaddafi and arms and weapons getting into the 15 some deterioration in the sense of incursions of 15 hands of terrorists groups, which clearly happened, 16 terrorists attacking Algerian military targets, or 16 that's -- there were more arms and weapons in the 17 Gendarme targets, further into the country. So in that 17 region, not specifically in Algeria about which 18 context can I ask you about that? 18 I wouldn't have information. 19 A. In the context of the situation in the 90s when Algeria 19 Q. But I think you note that there was some newspaper 20 went through a most brutal internal civil conflict, with 20 reports about Algeria seizing smuggled missiles and so 21 over 100,000 people killed, the picture overall in 21 forth from Libya? 22 Algeria was of a country taking back control of its own 22 A. Yes. 23 country and security. So it was a steadily improving 23 Q. And we have also in the course of the inquest seen some 24 picture. Clearly with the Arab Spring and the 24 internet and news reports of caches of weapons said to 25 repercussions from the Arab Spring that had a negative 25 have been found in various places in the desert area.

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1 When those newspaper reports appeared what did the 1 got this covered and if they said yes, ask them, well, 2 embassy do in response to seeing those? 2 what are the measures that are there in place? But 3 A. The first point to make about press reports in Algeria 3 would you expect them to tell you that? 4 is that we have to be very sceptical about any press 4 A. We could certainly go to them. We had very good access. 5 reports in Algeria, and this was based on our own 5 I had very good access to whoever I wanted to see. My 6 contacts in the Algerian government, and outside the 6 defence attaché could go in regularly but there was only 7 Algerian government, telling us to be extremely careful 7 one point of contact for him within the system. I think 8 of any reports in the Algerian press. 8 it is an open question or it is a difficult question to 9 We would check them. If there were reports which we 9 answer as to whether we would get the information back 10 were extremely concerned about we would check them with 10 that we were necessarily looking for and that's partly 11 our own contacts, with other contacts that we had made 11 about the way the system in Algeria works and the way 12 but the starting point was to be extremely sceptical 12 information is dealt with and sometimes protected within 13 because often newspaper reports were inaccurate and the 13 the Algerian system. And the people that you are 14 Algerian government told us many times not to believe 14 necessarily talking to may not be the ones who have all 15 a specific article. We were aware that there were 15 the information that you are seeking. 16 elements within the Algerian administration that were 16 MS DOLAN: And I think you had also drawn to your attention 17 using the press for their own benefit, their own ends, 17 an article from November 2012 from the El Khabbar paper 18 and the timing of articles appearing in the press was 18 suggesting that security forces had thwarted an attack, 19 also at times highly questionable. 19 a planned attack on oil and gas installations in the 20 So we were very wary of any articles and it 20 southern desert area? 21 certainly wouldn't be advisable to be basing policy on 21 A. Yes. 22 anything which appeared in the Algerian press. 22 Q. Do you have any particular knowledge about that article 23 Q. And I think you particularly comment that the article 23 or what the embassy, whether the embassy knew about that 24 in February 2012 suggesting that there had been missiles 24 article? 25 seized from Libya, you were led to understand that that 25 A. I can't say for definite that we did see that article

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1 was an inaccurate report? 1 and we have searched and checked to see if there is any 2 A. Yes, yes. We were told categorically by the Algerian 2 electronic evidence to show that we did look at it at 3 authorities that that was incorrect. They insisted that 3 the time and we haven't been able to find any but 4 they had effective security at their airports and there 4 I think it is possible and likely that we did discuss it 5 was absolutely no threat to aircraft coming in and out 5 because often in Algeria articles like that would get 6 of Algeria from missiles which may or may not have been 6 circulated even after it had appeared in the press they 7 seized by terrorists after the fall of Gaddafi. So that 7 would go round on social media which we followed very, 8 article was a very good example of why you need to be 8 very closely. 9 very sceptical of Algerian press articles. 9 But that article that I have seen and looked at 10 Q. Were there times when specific threats would be passed 10 doesn't change the nature of the threat in any way. It 11 on to you by the Algerian authorities? 11 was -- it doesn't add anything to the nature of the 12 A. The nature of the Algerian system, it was such that that 12 threat and again, with the benefit of hindsight, what 13 sort of information wasn't what you would expect to 13 I would say about that article is that this group that 14 receive. I mean, Algeria was part of the Soviet camp in 14 is mentioned here, the Sahara group, there was civil 15 the Cold War. There is a culture of secrecy and keeping 15 unrest or political unrest in Ourgla around that time 16 things to themselves so it wasn't the culture to be 16 and it is possible that that article was an attempt to 17 sharing and spreading information of that type. But 17 discredit people around that particular group by linking 18 when we specifically asked a question and asked them to 18 them with terrorism. That's one possible motivation for 19 respond then we always got a reply and we got a reply 19 that article. I don't know that for definite but it 20 quickly. 20 just underlines this point about the need for real 21 THE CORONER: Can I just ask about that more broadly and not 21 caution in interpreting any articles in the Algerian 22 with any particular issue in mind but if you were 22 press. 23 concerned about whether they had got a particular 23 Q. Are you basing that on the timing of it because of 24 security concern covered or not could you go to them, 24 course that article is reporting in November 2012 events 25 I suppose you could go to them and ask, well, have you 25 which appear to be said to have happened in the spring

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1 of that -- 1 I also spoke to the terrorism adviser to President 2 A. Yes, Algeria had a lot of social unrest in many areas 2 Bouteflika. But getting information from anybody in 3 which the government, because of its vast oil wealth, 3 those early hours because of the nature of the incident 4 was able to deal with by usually providing what the 4 was extremely difficult whilst the incident was 5 protesters were seeking. There had been around that 5 underway. 6 time social unrest in Ourgla, which is in the south, so 6 Q. You have commented in your statement that Algeria takes 7 it is possible that there may have been an attempt to 7 a robust approach to terrorism? 8 discredit groups locally and using a newspaper article 8 A. Yes. 9 to do that. That is one interpretation that if we 9 Q. Can you unpack that and tell us what you mean by that? 10 discussed that article at the time we would have come up 10 A. I mean Algeria because of its history, I mentioned the 11 with but I cannot be certain today that we discussed 11 90s and the very difficult times that Algeria went 12 that at the time. 12 through in the 90s. Algeria has a policy of not 13 Q. Can I turn now to the events during the attack and 13 negotiating with terrorists. They don't pay ransoms, 14 I think the embassy became aware of the attack through 14 they have a policy which is very close to that of the UK 15 a call from a member of the public in the first 15 of non paying of ransoms which they believe will just 16 instance. Can you help us with how the first news broke 16 fuel more terrorism. My advice to London from the 17 at the embassy? 17 beginning was that I believed Algeria would seek to 18 A. Yes, I think the Foreign Office in London got a call 18 bring this incident to an end as quickly as possible. 19 from families who had loved ones caught up in the 19 They were extremely concerned about the gas plant being 20 incident and then we rang those families sort of 20 blown up, that it represents, I think, over 10 per cent 21 straight away from Algiers to check the information that 21 of the Algerian economy and their economy is 97 per cent 22 they had. So we heard about it very early on the 22 oil and gas. They were extremely concerned about any 23 morning of the 16th. 23 foreign hostages being taken out of the country. 24 Q. And what then happened once you heard of the events? 24 Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb had made a lot of money 25 A. Once we'd established -- we established pretty quickly 25 from terrorists and ransoms in previous years which was

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1 that this was a serious incident and a major crisis. We 1 then used against Algeria in its own territory, so they 2 immediately went into crisis mode. We implemented what 2 were very, very concerned to avoid that. So my advice 3 is called our emergency crisis plan which all embassies 3 was that Algeria would seek to bring this incident to an 4 overseas have ready just for this type of incident. So 4 end as quickly as possible. 5 I declared a crisis and we had individuals who had been 5 Q. You have said that Algeria don't negotiate with 6 trained in specific roles and knew what their role would 6 terrorists. Do you mean they absolutely don't speak 7 be were a crisis to erupt. We immediately went into 7 with them or they don't give concessions? 8 those roles and then I as crisis leader led our response 8 A. The latter. I think they will speak to them and, 9 to that. Clearly the first thing we did was to try to 9 I don't know for definite, but we are fairly sure there 10 establish with the Algerian authorities what they knew 10 was contact between the Algerians and the terrorists 11 and what was happening and I think by 9 o'clock of that 11 during this incident but they won't offer concessions 12 morning they had confirmed to us that an attack was 12 and they won't -- certainly some of the requests that 13 underway. They were aware that there were foreign 13 were being made to free prisoners to provide safe 14 nationals and British nationals involved in that but 14 passage to Mali, those were not the sorts of concessions 15 they had no further information at that point. 15 which the Algerian government was ever likely to concede 16 I emphasised very strongly our concern for the safety 16 to. 17 and welfare of British nationals and all nationals 17 Q. That approach by Algeria to terrorists is well enough 18 caught up in that incident. 18 known for the terrorists to have been well aware before 19 Q. And your direct contact is with whom? 19 this began that safe passage, the prisoner release, the 20 A. My direct contact on a daily basis is with the director 20 other things they were demanding were not likely to be 21 general in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is the 21 offered, or is -- 22 contact that all ambassadors have on a day-to-day basis, 22 A. My view is that it is known which I think underlines 23 but I also knew very well that the deputy foreign 23 just what an awful threat we are dealing with if people 24 minister, who I tried to speak to, unfortunately was out 24 were willing to go through that knowing actually that it 25 of the country. I spoke to the foreign minister and 25 was probably likely they would not come out of it alive

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1 and I think they were aware of that. Algeria's track 1 and all of those meetings were also used to pass 2 record on that has been established for a very long time 2 messages at relevant times. 3 and the terrorists would certainly have been aware of 3 Q. And just to understand that, because your defence 4 that. Certainly those that planned it and the leaders 4 attaché has spoken directly to General Mekri in a sense 5 of the terrorist group. 5 this is going directly to the Algerian army, as well as 6 Q. You mentioned that you assumed there was communication 6 your contacts at government level -- 7 between the Algerian authorities and the terrorists. 7 A. Yes. 8 Was there any direct communication between the 8 Q. -- that is a direct army contact? 9 terrorists and anybody in the British embassy? 9 A. Yes, to make sure we were giving the message direct to 10 A. No, no, there wasn't. We were aware of the messages 10 the military as well as to the civilian government, yes. 11 that were coming through because the terrorists were in 11 Q. I think that as time went on after the worst of the 12 touch with some of the family members. So we were aware 12 crisis was over you travelled to In Amenas town 13 of what was being said but we had no direct contact with 13 yourself? 14 the terrorists and in fact that wouldn't have been the 14 A. Yes, I did. I did. I went down on the 19th, which was 15 right thing to do anyway because our policy is to try to 15 the Saturday whilst in the morning operations were still 16 have one channel of communication and not have different 16 sort of continuing at the base but I travelled down 17 people talking to those involved in it. 17 because it was so important to try to get there to 18 Q. And what we know from the British perspective is that 18 gather as much information to be on hand to help with 19 a lot of communication from one of the terrorists, 19 the evacuation of British nationals who were caught up 20 Shedad, was with BP, a single person at BP? 20 in the incident. And by going down I was able to, I met 21 A. Essentially with BP, yes. 21 the energy minister who was down there as well. I was 22 Q. That was in line with the policy as you understand it of 22 able to meet the local mayor of In Amenas and we were 23 what the practice should be, one person as the focus 23 able to get more information than we were getting in 24 for -- 24 Algiers. 25 A. We are getting into what happened at the London end 25 Q. And of course one of your unfortunate roles down there

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1 which is probably more appropriate for my colleague, 1 was to negotiate the release of the bodies of some of 2 Mr Bristow, who I think you are seeing later. 2 the victims as well? 3 Q. I think one of your colleagues though did get a call 3 A. Yes, yes. I was very concerned to ensure that the 4 from Stephen McFaul, one of the hostages? 4 bodies of the victims of this tragedy were treated with 5 A. We did, yes. One of my colleagues did receive a call 5 dignity and respect. On the first day that we went down 6 who asked us to press on the Algerian authorities the 6 we were able to get to the morgue pretty quickly and we 7 importance of stopping the -- there was some low level 7 did, we were able to see three of the victims in the 8 firing going on around the BdV, the base where most 8 morgue. Informally we passed that information back to 9 people were on the first day and those messages were 9 London immediately but the responsibility for that 10 passed on to the Algerian authorities. 10 process was SO15's who were also with us, not on the 11 Q. And who exactly was it that message was being passed on 11 first day but on the second day. And I will just say 12 to, do you know? 12 SO15 I think did a really first class job in very, very 13 A. The messages were passed twice. I did it at my level 13 difficult circumstances through -- over the next couple 14 directly with the director general in the Ministry of 14 of weeks. 15 Foreign Affairs and my defence attaché did it also with 15 Q. I think in a sense the British took the lead for all the 16 exactly the same message to General Mekri in the 16 countries in the system? 17 Ministry of Defence's foreign governments' liaison 17 A. SO15 played an extremely good role coordinating with the 18 office, who was the main contact for all foreign 18 others, particularly the Norwegians and the Japanese, 19 embassies on the defence attaché side. So those 19 and because of their vast experience in these issues 20 messages were fed into the Algerian authorities. 20 were able to take a lead in ensuring that the 21 Of course the Prime Minister himself spoke six times 21 international coordination with the Algerians worked 22 to the Algerian Prime Minister during the four days of 22 very well. And our own coordination with SO15 was 23 the crisis but Mr Burt, Minister of State, spoke twice 23 extremely good. I myself spent a lot of time trying to 24 to the foreign minister. The foreign secretary when he 24 help them get access, almost hourly speaking to the 25 came back from Australia spoke to the foreign secretary 25 Algerian authorities to help them do what they needed to

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1 do in this terrible situation. 1 A. It isn't usual but we have close protection teams for 2 Q. After the attack are you aware of whether the Algerian 2 ambassadors probably in nine or ten places around the 3 state in any of its forms has done any assessment or 3 world and Algeria is one of them. It is actually the 4 review or enquiry into what happened? 4 longest running close protection team. A close 5 A. They clearly will have done their own internal enquiry 5 protection team went in in the 90s when the situation 6 but whether that internal enquiry is something that 6 was very difficult. So Algeria was a medium sized 7 would be shared again is a difficult question to answer. 7 mission and in a medium sized mission you would find 8 They also have their own enquiry underway, so they would 8 maybe 10 to 20 people. You have -- four people is the 9 not want to prejudice that enquiry. They have three 9 minimum you could have protecting, to provide adequate 10 terrorists that they captured who will go on trial and 10 protection. So it may skew the numbers in that respect 11 that process in Algeria is still underway. 11 but it's a perfectly normal situation, yes. 12 So they would have all that in mind in terms of 12 Q. Does it reflect the fact that there was an extant risk 13 anything that they said. After the crisis we set up 13 that you faced personally doing your job in Algeria? 14 what we called the strategic security partnership with 14 A. Yes, very much so. 15 Algeria to try to lift the level of our contacts with 15 Q. The fact that you, the embassy, had no specific 16 them on political and security issues and of course 16 knowledge of a specific threat wouldn't change, would 17 there were discussions in that forum of what happened. 17 it, the approach you made to terrorist threats, wouldn't 18 The Algerians were robust in that discussion and 18 lead you to have a more relaxed attitude towards the 19 they believed that they dealt with the matter 19 possibility of terrorism? 20 effectively. They believed that 760 people out of 800 20 A. No, no, I wouldn't agree with that. 21 got out of what was a terrible situation. And they were 21 Q. You would not agree with -- 22 relatively robust about how they dealt with this, this 22 A. It wouldn't have an impact. 23 overall operation and this threat to their own national 23 Q. Because it is the nature of terrorist threats that you 24 security. 24 very often don't have specific information about 25 Q. You obviously remained as the ambassador until more 25 a specific threat on a specific target. Is that right?

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1 recently. In respect of that strategic security 1 A. Yes. 2 partnership is it your view that that has made any 2 Q. And as a result you need to be on guard for unspecific 3 difference as to how things would be in the future? 3 threats? 4 A. I think that and the Prime Minister's visit, the 4 A. Yes. I mean as well as -- clearly if you get specific 5 Prime Minister visited at the end of January 2013, has 5 threats you have to respond to those threats. 6 certainly helped to lift the level of our bilateral 6 Q. Yes. 7 relationship with Algeria which was already 7 A. And if there was specific information about a threat to 8 strengthening before the In Amenas incident. So I think 8 British interests or a British national we would need to 9 we have, we have developed enhanced contacts with 9 deal with that and inform the people concerned. But in 10 Algeria and with the Algerian system sitting round 10 terms of threat assessment you are building up a picture 11 a table with people at a higher level than existed 11 from a wider set of issues and factors and then trying 12 before and that can only be helpful if there is 12 to work out what are the greatest threats which we did 13 something like this in the future. 13 regularly, as all embassies overseas do. 14 MS DOLAN: Thank you, Mr Martin, I have no more questions 14 Q. In paragraph 9 of your statement you say that security 15 for you but others will. 15 issues would have been discussed between embassy 16 A. Thank you. 16 officials and BP security staff. Were they? Do you 17 Questions from MR GARNHAM 17 know that they were? 18 MR GARNHAM: Mr Roper, my name is Garnham, I represent the 18 A. There were meetings with BP at which the security 19 families of Messrs Barlow, Bilsland, Morgan and 19 situation in Algeria and the region was discussed, yes, 20 Whiteside. 20 and I -- 21 A. Okay. 21 Q. When you say "would have", you are not qualifying that 22 Q. Is it unusual for 25 per cent of an embassy's UK based 22 in any way? 23 staff to be assigned as personal protection for the 23 A. No. Those meetings did take place and I myself 24 ambassador or is does that reflect the level of risk 24 discussed security with both the previous Algeria 25 that you faced in Algeria? 25 country manager and the current Algeria country manager.

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1 Q. Were those meetings minuted? 1 specifics. You were managing this episode when it 2 A. No, they weren't minuted. They were minuted if there 2 happened? 3 was something very significant emerging connected with 3 A. Yes. 4 BP's interests in the country or if there was something 4 Q. You were in charge of the British government's response 5 particularly important that needed to be sent round but 5 in Algiers. You must have wanted then and there to know 6 this was often a courtesy visit by the head of BP as he 6 how up-to-date the information you had was in relation 7 passed through on his way to Hassi Messaoud. So only if 7 to those who were on that site? 8 there was something very specific would they be minuted. 8 A. We had information immediately which then had to be 9 Q. Are you talking here about your personal contact or the 9 checked that morning with BP's list of who they also 10 contact that you have between officials in your embassy? 10 thought was there. So there was an immediate process to 11 A. I'm talking -- yes, my own personal contact. In terms 11 check the names and find out exactly who was down there. 12 of the meetings that the deputy ambassador had and the 12 But our own lists, the system we put in place before was 13 defence attaché had, as I understand it those meetings 13 pretty accurate in terms of who was there. 14 were exchanges of information and it was agreed there 14 Q. To your knowledge were BP able to provide you with 15 wouldn't be a record of the meetings. People were just 15 a list of contractors on site when they were asked that 16 able to speak freely about what they wanted to say. 16 morning? 17 Q. In paragraph 11 of your statement you discuss the system 17 A. Yes, we were able to establish pretty quickly who was 18 for recording the location of British nationals in 18 and who wasn't there. 19 Algeria? 19 Q. In paragraph 13 you discuss your response to the 20 A. Yes. 20 Algerian media reports. 21 Q. When was that last updated with BP prior 21 A. Mmm. 22 to January 2013? 22 Q. And you explain there and you have explained again this 23 A. Given the crisis around the region, in Libya 23 morning the quality of Algerian journalism meant 24 particularly, we were very focused on making sure that 24 a degree, a considerable degree of scepticism had to be 25 we knew where British nationals were in Algeria. 25 applied before accepting the accuracy of a media report.

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1 Q. When was it last updated? 1 A. Mmm. 2 A. It was updated regularly -- 2 Q. Yes? 3 Q. That doesn't help me much. How often and when? 3 A. Yes. 4 A. It was updated at least every quarter, probably more 4 Q. Was a degree of scepticism also required when 5 than that. The system we put in place was that one of 5 considering the Algerian government's response to such 6 my consular officers in the embassy had a contact with 6 a story? 7 all the foreign -- the British companies in Algeria. 7 A. Clearly as ambassador I have to be mindful of -- former 8 They were supplying him with details of where nationals 8 ambassador -- of our future relationship with Algeria 9 were. So we felt that certainly in the year, 18 months 9 and were this to happen again we would clearly want to 10 running up to In Amenas, we had a pretty good idea of 10 maintain a good relationship, so I have to weigh my 11 where all the British nationals were. When In Amenas 11 comments on questions like that quite carefully. But of 12 happened we had lists of the people that we thought were 12 course we were aware of the Algerian system and how the 13 there instantly because of that system. What we sort of 13 Algerian system functioned. 14 subsequently discovered was there was an issue between 14 Q. It was authoritarian in nature? 15 those staff that worked for BP and contractors and that 15 A. Yes. As the representative of the Algerian government 16 was one of the lessons learned was that the information 16 we had to take a categoric denial as a categoric denial 17 about the contractors wasn't as up-to-date as it needed 17 that a particular article was not correct. 18 to be. 18 Q. Was this stock response you would get though that all 19 Q. You anticipate my next question. In respect of the 19 shall be well and all things shall be well? 20 contractors "employed" by BP what was the most 20 A. No, it was about specific articles and not believing 21 up-to-date information available to you about their 21 what was in specific articles. For example, the one we 22 presence in In Amenas? 22 discussed about the missiles. 23 A. Well, we would look to BP to let us have a list of 23 Q. Did they ever volunteer to you intelligence they had 24 everybody including contractors. 24 about specific threats? 25 Q. You are describing the process. I am interested in the 25 A. I can't comment on intelligence matters. Clearly there

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1 were channels of communication but I can't comment on 1 hold of missiles and being able and having the capacity 2 intelligence matters. 2 to use them to fire at aircraft in Algeria, we took 3 Q. Were you aware through sources other than intelligence 3 a different approach. Our assessment was that there was 4 sources, but from the Algerians, of threats? 4 no imminent threat to aircraft. The US because of their 5 A. Yes. Through political dialogue, there were a number of 5 own system have to forward information they get like 6 political dialogues with Algeria at which they would 6 that immediately to their nationals. So there wasn't 7 give their assessment of the threat and we would give 7 really a huge difference between the US and the UK, it 8 our own assessment of the threat. So there was an 8 was more about their system for the handling of 9 exchange of information about the threat to help both 9 information. 10 governments understand the threat better. 10 Q. Were you more willing to accept assurances from the 11 Q. The oil and gas industry was particularly important to 11 Algerian authorities than the Americans? 12 the Algerian economy? 12 A. No, I don't think that was the case at all. 13 A. Mmm. 13 Q. Can I return to what you said to counsel to the inquest 14 Q. Would it be right for us to understand that in 14 about your observations in paragraph 20 where you say 15 consequence the Algerian authorities were keen to leave 15 that the Algerian authorities response to terrorism was 16 an impression with all relevant embassies that they had 16 "robust". The word "robust" can cover a multitude of 17 everything under control? 17 sins. You mean uncompromising? 18 A. Clearly they would want to give the impression that they 18 A. I think I have covered that in the comments earlier, 19 had everything under control, yes, I think that is true, 19 but, yes, they take a tough, a robust and uncompromising 20 but they were also open to discussion of the situation 20 position. 21 along the borders, for example. So there was a detailed 21 Q. And invariably violent? Invariably the use of force? 22 discussion of the threat of the specific groups that 22 A. Inevitably given the nature of incidents like this then 23 were active and what they were likely to be trying to 23 yes, force is one of the tools that they use. 24 do. 24 Q. SO15 supplied skilled negotiators -- 25 Q. But you did not have the sort of relationship, did you, 25 A. Yes.

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1 with the Algerian authorities that would enable them to 1 Q. -- to the scene. Was there any ever prospect of the 2 say to you: we have these problems, we have these 2 Algerian authorities accepting them? 3 weaknesses? 3 A. No, I don't think there was. I think Algeria, because 4 A. Again, we are getting into areas which in an open forum 4 of its history, 130 years of colonialism with the 5 I don't think I can really comment on but clearly there 5 French, which is a very difficult story, they have had 6 were exchanges where that sort of thing could happen. 6 50 years of independence, they guard their independence 7 I mean if, for example, the Algerians were aware of 7 and sovereignty extremely strongly. So the idea of 8 a specific threat, against British interests and they 8 allowing foreign governments a say in how you conduct 9 had information we would expect them to and we would 9 a military operation in your country would be something 10 hope they would pass that on. 10 that they would just not consider. 11 Q. And did they during your time? 11 THE CORONER: They wouldn't be alone in that. 12 A. I don't think I should be commenting on issues like 12 A. I was going to say we probably wouldn't allow that 13 that. 13 ourselves. 14 Q. I have to ask you the questions. If there is an 14 MR GARNHAM: No, but the combined effect of that likely 15 objection there is counsel representing the Government 15 response to offers for negotiation from outside and 16 who will stand up and indicate. So I am going to ask 16 their immediate inflexible response to threats of 17 you the question were there occasions when you were 17 terrorism meant there was never going to be negotiation 18 given that sort of information? 18 with these terrorists, doesn't it? 19 A. About what, threats? 19 A. We had people there and we offered their services, 20 Q. Threats. 20 but -- yes, the chances of that happening I would have 21 A. Yes. 21 said from the very beginning, in fact I did say from the 22 Q. What was it that led the UK Government to respond in so 22 very beginning in my advice to the Prime Minister that 23 dramatically a different way to the events of 2012 from 23 I didn't think that there would be a negotiated way out 24 the US who changed their travel advice, didn't they? 24 of this. I thought it would be ended as quickly as 25 A. When we looked at the threat from terrorists getting 25 possible.

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1 Q. And that meant by armed force? 1 A. Yes, I knew him very well. 2 A. If that was the only way to stop people fleeing to Mali, 2 Q. How effective an operator was he? 3 then, yes, by armed force. 3 A. Again, I don't think that is something I can comment on. 4 Q. You say in paragraph 27 that you became aware of the 4 Q. Because? 5 terrorists' demand for the release of prisoners and that 5 A. Because I'm conscious of needing to have a relationship 6 you believe, your word, the Algerians were almost 6 with Algeria in the future were there to be something 7 certainly aware of those threats. Do you know whether 7 like this happen. 8 they were aware of them? 8 Q. Was there anything different about his approach to these 9 A. I believe they were and I recall that the first 9 sort of problems to the approach you have described more 10 conversation I had with the director general for Europe 10 generally of the Algerian authorities? 11 on the morning of the 16th, which was fairly early on, 11 A. It was very difficult to get information out of Algiers 12 he said to me that they were aware that foreign hostages 12 because I think the operation in In Amenas was being 13 were being held and they were aware that the terrorists 13 dealt with down in In Amenas by the local commanders on 14 were making demands. I can't say any more than that. 14 the ground and one of the challenges of this whole 15 Q. You don't know what demands they were aware of? 15 crisis was that the exchange of information between what 16 A. I think -- there were a number of demands which were 16 was happening down there and Algiers was challenging, 17 made which was free passage to Mali, getting the -- so 17 which was one of the reasons why I was determined to get 18 I think they would have been aware and I don't think the 18 down to In Amenas as soon as possible, as soon as it was 19 Algerians would have been surprised either of the 19 safe to do so and I did get down there on the 19th but 20 demands that were being made. 20 it wasn't possible to go before that point. And no 21 Q. But you don't know that as a fact. You weren't told 21 other ambassador from any country went down to 22 that? 22 In Amenas. 23 A. I don't know that as I a fact. 23 Q. Did your presence there improve the information supply 24 Q. Did you have any contact with the Canadian embassy 24 flow? 25 during this time given it is said that there were 25 A. I think our presence there was helpful because it

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1 Canadian nationals amongst the terrorists? 1 enabled us to put pressure on the authorities on the 2 A. I can't recall, I'm fairly sure I did have contacts with 2 ground, to get the bodies of the victims of this 3 the Canadian embassy because I was in contact with many 3 terrible tragedy to Algiers as soon as possible. There 4 of the ambassadors of the countries represented there. 4 was some question mark when we arrived as to how long 5 Of course the Canadian factor didn't come out until much 5 that process would take. We were able to say, with SO15 6 later so it wasn't known until much later that there 6 support and guidance, that there needed to be a system 7 were Canadian nationals there. 7 to get all the victims of the tragedy back up to Algiers 8 Q. You have anticipated my next question. Was there any 8 so the identification process could start. 9 indication at time of Canadian national involvement? 9 Q. Who were you talking to when you were down there on the 10 A. No, no. I mean there was concern across the world of 10 Algerian side? 11 this growing tendency for home grown terrorists, people 11 A. I spoke -- the energy minister was there. I spoke to 12 living in the west and then going overseas to support 12 him who I knew very well from our regular dealings and 13 terrorism. 13 I spoke to the local mayor. I also spoke to a senior 14 Q. You referred in your answers earlier to a General Mekri, 14 person in Sonatrach which is the Algerian oil and gas 15 have I got that right? 15 company. 16 A. Mekri, yes, General Mekri, yes. 16 Q. Did you speak to anyone from the military? 17 Q. He was the senior Algerian military officer involved? 17 A. I didn't speak to anybody from the military, no. 18 A. Yes. 18 Q. Or the police? 19 Q. Had you come across him before? 19 A. The police were around but I didn't speak to them, no. 20 A. He wasn't the senior military officer involved. 20 Q. After this terrible incident changes were made in the 21 Q. Responsible. 21 relationship at a security level between the British and 22 A. In Algiers. He was the head of the liaison unit in the 22 the Algerians? 23 Algerian Ministry of Defence which dealt with all 23 A. Mmm. 24 foreign governments. 24 Q. Why was it that this disaster was the prompt for that? 25 Q. Had you come across him before? 25 Why couldn't that have happened before?

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1 A. I wouldn't say it was the prompt. I mean there was, as 1 you just think carefully about it? 2 Algeria remained stable throughout the region and 2 MR RICHIE: That was my only question. 3 throughout -- with the Arab Spring all around its 3 THE CORONER: That was the only question. There we are. 4 borders there was instability and turmoil, there was an 4 Next one. 5 effort from early 2011 to build up a stronger 5 MR RITCHIE: Embassy work. Second topic. You have told the 6 relationship with Algeria across the board. It was 6 coroner that you had face-to-face meetings with Andrew 7 already happening. Clearly the events of In Amenas 7 Collins. 8 allowed -- the Prime Minister came and the relationship 8 A. Mmm. 9 strengthened even more but it wouldn't be right to say 9 Q. And that you discussed from time to time security issues 10 it only happened because of the In Amenas crisis. 10 during those meetings? 11 Q. Was there any reason why that couldn't have happened 11 A. Mmm. 12 before? 12 Q. Did Mr Collins ever ask you to help BP organise the 13 A. It was happening. It was happening. It was building up 13 placement of Gendarmes at the front gates in In Amenas? 14 and we recognised that Algeria as a stable country in 14 A. No, he didn't. And it would have been unusual for him 15 the region was a country with whom we needed to have 15 to do that because there is -- the JV is a JV between 16 a strong and good relationship with. 16 BP, Statoil and the Algerian authorities, Sonatrach and 17 Q. Were there any significant changes after this incident? 17 they have responsibility for security at the site. So 18 A. There were -- one of the key things -- I think the 18 it was that JV's responsibility for securing the site. 19 important things coming out of this is that we were able 19 I think to come to a foreign government asking them to 20 to secure for BP direct access in Algiers to senior 20 intervene in that process would complicate hugely your 21 Algerian contacts, the General Mekri that I mentioned, 21 relationships. 22 which didn't happen before. Because of the nature of 22 Q. It would be unusual, but you say in paragraph 15 of your 23 the Algerian system it was very difficult for foreign 23 witness statement that you had a good relationship with 24 companies to have direct access with government 24 the defence authorities? 25 representatives but we were able to arrange that after 25 A. Yes.

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1 In Amenas and the strategic security partnership that 1 Q. So if he had trouble with the local Gendarmes or the 2 I mentioned did enable us to have a higher level 2 Wali or getting JV partners, if BP and Mr Collins had 3 dialogue with a broader range of Algerian interlocutors. 3 difficulty getting the JV partners to protect expats by 4 Q. It may just be the way things are but none of that could 4 getting Gendarmes to be actually at the front gate 5 not have happened earlier as a matter of practice, could 5 rather than a kilometre away, you would have done your 6 it? It is just that there wasn't the prompt, the drive 6 best to help him if necessary, wouldn't you? 7 caused by this incident? 7 A. Yes, yes, of course. 8 A. The incident certainly led us to lift even further the 8 Q. But you were never asked? 9 level of contact, but I would argue that it was underway 9 A. Not before In Amenas, no. 10 anyway, it was happening anyway, we were building up -- 10 Q. Thank you. The next topic: internal security in Algeria 11 what the incident did was clearly crystallise for people 11 leading up to January 2013. You put your view in your 12 at very senior levels -- 12 witness statement, paragraph 10, as follows, that the 13 Q. It galvanised people on both sides? 13 main threat to Algeria was from insecurity in the south 14 A. Yes, exactly. 14 of the country, and you go on: 15 MR GARNHAM: Thank you very much, thank you, sir. 15 "Around Algeria's eastern and southern borders 16 Questions from MR RITCHIE 16 because of growing insecurity in Libya, Mali, Niger and 17 MR RITCHIE: Mr Roper, I am Andrew Ritchie and I appear for 17 Tunisia." 18 the family of Carlos Estrada. 18 Can I look at the drivers for that assessment. 19 A. Okay. 19 A. Mmm. 20 Q. The first item, the security that you had. Did your 20 Q. It is clear from what you have said to Her Majesty's 21 close protection have guns? 21 Coroner this morning that one of the drivers was the 22 A. Yes. 22 revolution in Libya? 23 THE CORONER: Can I just ask a question. I don't know how 23 A. Yes. 24 much of this we need to go into in terms of numbers and 24 Q. In March of 2011 Gaddafi fell? 25 precisely what measures are available to guard -- can 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. And that led to a high level of lawlessness in that 1 Q. Thank you, and understood and there was the emergence of 2 neighbouring country, didn't it? 2 a group called the MUJAO, during this period, wasn't 3 A. Mmm, mmm. 3 there? 4 Q. That increased the threat of terrorist activity across 4 A. Yes. 5 the border in southern and eastern Algeria, didn't it? 5 Q. And there was the emergence of a group called the MSJII, 6 A. Yes. 6 which I am just going to say, rather than go into any 7 Q. A second driver that you have mentioned is the flow of 7 more detail, had Lamine Boucheneb as part of its 8 weapons from Libya to the area? 8 membership. I think you called it the Sahara group? 9 A. Mmm. 9 A. Whether that is a group or not I think is not known and 10 Q. And these weren't just handguns, these were a wide range 10 that -- that person's name and that group suddenly 11 of weapons, weren't they? 11 appeared very late in the day. I don't think there was 12 A. Well, we don't know exactly what type of weapons they 12 any information about that group which could lead us to 13 were but, yes. 13 believe that this was a group which was capable of 14 Q. He had a bit of an armoury didn't he? 14 mounting terrorist attacks at that time. 15 A. That is the assumption, yes. 15 Q. But these groups emerged and some of them became 16 Q. And the third thing you have mentioned this morning is 16 effective in Northern Mali and the southern Algeria area 17 the morphing of the Algerian terrorist organisations 17 over 2011 and 2012, didn't they? 18 into organisations aligned with Al Qaeda? 18 A. They were operating in that ungoverned space, yes. 19 A. No, I haven't mentioned that. 19 Q. So we have listed some of the drivers for your view that 20 Q. Well, is it true that that changed the threat in Algeria 20 the main threat to Algeria was from insecurity in the 21 somewhat when the terrorist organisations from the 90s 21 south of the country and insecurity across the border in 22 and the early noughties aligned themselves with 22 the east, Libya and in Northern Mali. Was a final 23 Al Qaeda? 23 driver, or part of your view, the number and nature of 24 A. No, that doesn't quite reflect the history of Algeria. 24 the attacks that took place in 2011 and 2012 that came 25 Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb emerged from the groups 25 across your desk as reports?

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1 that were attacking Algeria in the 90s. So they 1 A. No. I think the trend if anything in Algeria itself was 2 re-named themselves Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in 2 still a downward trend. If you looked at the numbers of 3 2007 and then Belmokhtar's group announced he was going 3 attacks on Algerian police and security which had gone 4 on his own and split off from Al Qaeda. So does that 4 on through the early 2000s and into this decade, the 5 answer your question? 5 trend was downward. There were some attacks in the 6 Q. I think I have probably summarised it rather poorly but 6 south which were -- one on Tamanrassat, there was 7 your answer is exactly what I was seeking. There was 7 a suicide bombing but these were all of a pattern which 8 a change from just an internal focus to adopting some 8 we had seen previously of an isolated attack, a suicide 9 Al Qaeda principles if you will? 9 bomber or a bomb in a vehicle left by Algerian Armed 10 A. Well, there was always a regional focus because the way 10 Forces units. So those were -- that was not a trend 11 the groups -- the main threat to Algeria were from three 11 which was increasing in significance but clearly with 12 groups principally. There were two groups of Al Qaeda 12 what was happening in the region it was a great concern. 13 in the Islamic Maghreb in the south and they used to 13 Q. Yes, and there was Ourgla as well? 14 move backwards and forwards between Mali and Niger, 14 A. There was Ourgla, as well. There were two, exactly. 15 operating largely in Mali where there was ungoverned 15 Q. I'll come to others in a minute. Let us turn to the FCO 16 space. There was then a group of terrorists led by 16 advice which was produced. There is a document which 17 someone called Drupdel(?) which was in the east, the 17 has been in Her Majesty's Coroner's bundle dated 18 northeast of Algeria. So it had always been a regional 18 15 August 2012 from the FCO which was advice that was 19 issue, it isn't just Algerian homegrown and these groups 19 given, and it is an orange bundle to your left. You 20 were involved in drugs trafficking, arms smuggling, 20 probably don't need to do anything more than glance at 21 cigarette smuggling and kidnapping hostages which funded 21 it. So you are comfortable you will find it at tab 31. 22 their other activities. So I think it is important to 22 I am sure you are very familiar with this because you in 23 be clear this is a complicated regional picture not just 23 fact appended to your witness statement an amended 24 an Algerian story or a threat developing in Algeria 24 version of this which came out in January 2013. I have 25 separate from what was going on in the region. 25 just identified the document for you.

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1 A. Yes, sure, sure. 1 Algeria". According to-to the internal documents that 2 Q. In that it was clear that the FCO was giving advice on 2 Her Majesty's Coroner has seen from the JV the security 3 travel to various areas of Algeria. My first question 3 threat level that BP and the JV put on this plant was 4 is: were you or your team involved in drafting that 4 low operating as medium. I won't show you the 5 advice? 5 documents. Her Majesty's Coroner has seen them but 6 A. The advice is a combination of work in London and at 6 I will give the reference here, sir, so it is probably 7 post, so it's a joint effort, so, yes, we were involved. 7 justified. It is in liaison weekly minutes from 8 Q. You were involved. And did that advice or was it 8 4 August 2012, Mr Johnson's exhibits, page 199, running 9 intended to apply to BP employees going to Algeria in 9 all the way up to December on 22 December, Mr Johnson's 10 the same way as any other UK citizen going to Algeria? 10 exhibits page 238. There are various other ones but 11 A. It's intended to apply to any citizen who goes to 11 those are the references. 12 Algeria but clearly for companies with nationals 12 This is the question: the BP JV was not operating at 13 employed on oil and gas sites they have their own 13 a threat level which matched the FCO's wording, your 14 arrangements for security, but it applies as general 14 wording being high, their wording being low, operating 15 advice to the general public which includes BP 15 as medium. That is apparent from the wording, isn't it? 16 employees. 16 A. I think I have had a look through some of those 17 Q. Yes. In that the FCO advised against all but essential 17 documents but I can't recall seeing the low, medium 18 travel to areas within 50-kilometres of the Libyan 18 document. 19 border, the wording is there? 19 Q. Take it from me that has been in evidence. It is not 20 A. Yes. 20 challenged. 21 Q. There is a Statoil report on this tragedy and on page 2 21 A. That is clearly a matter for BP and not for us, but we 22 of that report it says that the facility lies 22 for a long time categorised the risk from terrorism in 23 50-kilometres from the border occupying an area of 23 Algeria as high. 24 2750-kilometres squared. So this facility fell four 24 Q. I will move to the next topic. The military view of 25 square within the advice that the FCO gave against 25 increasing threats to hydrocarbon facilities. Again, if

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1 nonessential travel, didn't it? 1 we have a little look at the orange bundle you have just 2 A. Because of the border area we wanted to make sure that 2 on your right hand, could you have a look at page 6 of 3 we were absolutely clear that there was a difference 3 the chronology right at the start, please. There are 4 between being on that border and the 50-kilometres and 4 three events I would draw to your attention. So there 5 further inland, which was safer. 5 is a chronology at the start. Page 6. You will find 6 Q. A band, if you will, following the border? 6 there a reference near the top to -- tab 26, do you see 7 A. Exactly. 7 on the left-hand column? 8 Q. So if the facility is, as described by one of its JV 8 A. Yes. 9 partners, 50-kilometres from the border it falls four 9 Q. What we have done is extract some facts and justified 10 square within the FCO advice not to send people out for 10 them through the tabs. Okay, so the tab is the 11 nonessential tasks, doesn't it? 11 reference behind them? 12 A. That's the advice that we give. But oil and gas 12 A. Okay. 13 companies clearly have their own additional security 13 Q. On 8 July 2012 it was noted in the BP weekly summary of 14 measures and it's up to oil and gas companies to satisfy 14 risks, which is an internal document, that there were 15 themselves that they have the measures in place to 15 reports that 7,000 soldiers had been sent by the 16 protect those nationals in a situation like that. 16 Algerian government to the southern areas to secure 17 Q. Absolutely. So Carlos Estrada was sent out on 17 hydrocarbon facilities. Does that sort of figure ring 18 14 January 2013. If his work was nonessential then 18 any bell with you at the time? 19 sending him out could be regarded as contrary to the FCO 19 A. I think it's entirely plausible that at the time when 20 advice? 20 there was great concern about what was happening in 21 A. Well, that's a matter for BP. 21 Libya that Algeria was doing everything it could to 22 Q. Let me move on to the threat level. In the FCO document 22 protect its borders and they did tell us that they were 23 that I have just referred you to and the subsequent 23 doing a lot to protect their borders and moving troops 24 documents the threat level is described as high threat. 24 around. 25 The wording is "there is a high threat from terrorism in 25 Q. It is not a memory test. I am not seeking for you to

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1 remember all the details but that is consistent with 1 speaking that would be the level of it? 2 your general understanding? 2 A. Yes, that's right, sir. 3 A. Yes. 3 MR RITCHIE: Thank you. Can I turn to a couple of matters 4 Q. Thank you. Tab 27, this is a week later, there were 4 mentioned in evidence about the threat level. This 5 reports that 3,000 soldiers were deployed plus 5 missiles cache, the SAM missiles cache that you mention 6 helicopters along the borders with Libya, Mali and 6 in your witness statement. Can I just try and 7 Niger, security being ramped up in oil and gas regions. 7 understand this. SAM missiles are surface to air 8 Would that be consistent with your understanding of what 8 missiles as we understand it? 9 the military were doing in response to their perception 9 A. That's right. 10 of the threat? 10 Q. So some terrorist has one of these big long tubes, 11 A. Yes. 11 sticks the missile in and fires it and hopes that it 12 Q. Thank you. And then drop to tab 29 where there has been 12 will cause terror and death in the air by bringing down 13 specific evidence for Her Majesty's Coroner of this. 13 an aircraft. We have seen this recently in the Ukraine 14 I believe in fact the wording of the email came before 14 although that apparently had a vehicle underneath that 15 you, sir, in evidence. The military warned the JV, this 15 the -- the machine that shot the missile. 16 JV, of a specific risk of a potential attack at the 16 You said the missiles may or may not have been 17 Hassi R'Mel gas installation. And there was in fact an 17 seized. I imagine you are aware of your words being in 18 attack of sorts that occurred over the page on 11 August 18 your business. They may or may not have been seized 19 where the terrorists attack Hassi R'Mel-Dellys main gas 19 when you gave an answer to my learned friend Mr Garnham. 20 pipeline. I won't go into the detail. Were you aware 20 The Algerian authorities did not deny the seizure, did 21 of that warning given to the BP JV in July? 21 they? 22 A. I can't recall that specific warning. This military 22 A. They objected to the idea that their airports were not 23 warning, do we know where that has come from? This is 23 safe for aircraft and that their security around 24 BP saying that? 24 airports wouldn't be able to prevent something like that 25 Q. A document actually was put in evidence about it by one 25 happening.

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1 of the liaison staff but in relation to tab 29 it is 1 Q. This is the, I suppose it is the joy of diplomacy or the 2 recorded by the BP internal liaison team, and the 2 difficulty of it but when there is a newspaper report 3 wording is at tab 29. "The JV have received a warning 3 that the military or Gendarmes have captured SAM 4 from the military about a planned suicide attack in 4 missiles in the hands of terrorists and General Mekri 5 Hassi R'Mel"? 5 has to discuss with concerned foreign governments 6 A. I can't add any more on that. 6 whether the expats coming into this oil producing region 7 Q. You weren't notified? 7 are going to have to stop flying into Hassi Messaoud, 8 A. No. 8 the centre where they all fly into, because these 9 Q. Can I ask you this though: your FCO advice matched 9 terrorists have got SAM missiles, it's perhaps no great 10 a clear concern which the Algerian military had that 10 surprise that the military would say don't worry, we 11 there was an increased level of threat to hydrocarbon 11 have got the airport very well covered and we won't have 12 facilities in the south and east of Algeria, didn't it? 12 terrorists wandering around with SAM missiles because we 13 A. The Algerians throughout would argue that they were 13 have picked them up. So that wasn't wholly a surprise 14 doing everything to protect oil and gas facilities. 14 to you, was it? 15 Q. Well, this is like Mandy Rice Davies, they would, 15 A. Well, no, but you could also say that the assessment 16 wouldn't they? 16 that there was no imminent threat from missiles to 17 A. But given what happened there was a question mark about 17 aircraft was correct because we now -- we are now two 18 it. 18 years on from that incident and there has been no 19 THE CORONER: If they are saying -- would they give you 19 incident. So we as the British Government accepted 20 a broad indication at least, I don't want to go into all 20 Algeria's assurances that there was no threat and that 21 the details, of what they were doing? 21 assurance will have formed part of our assessment, we 22 A. Not, they wouldn't -- the nature of the system was not 22 come to our own assessment as to the threat to our own 23 to get into that sort of detail. They would speak -- 23 nationals. 24 THE CORONER: Beyond saying we have got it covered or there 24 Q. So if for instance you have taken the information that 25 is a greater risk so we are doing more but broadly 25 your staff may have about the military security around

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1 Hassi Messaoud and they had said there is no army there, 1 a channel of -- there is a procedure and a channel for 2 there's nobody there, I don't see quite how they could 2 going about our business which has to go through the 3 say that, you would have built that into your assessment 3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And I come back to the 4 and you would have taken this more seriously. But 4 point I made about the nature of the state, and from the 5 probably, I am not asking you whether you did, but 5 Soviet legacy, a culture of secrecy makes just getting 6 probably you got information that there were loads of 6 that sort of information extremely difficult in an 7 military around Hassi Messaoud airport and therefore it 7 Algerian context. 8 seems they are doing a pretty good job and therefore 8 Q. You have our sympathy. Our difficulty here is that this 9 even if there was a SAM missile cache which had been 9 sort of bureaucracy, structure, has to be taken into 10 stolen what more could they do? It is those sort of 10 account by those operating within this field, 11 things you would be taking into account, isn't it? 11 particularly commercial organisations, doesn't it? For 12 A. It is and what we know of Algeria's protection all 12 instance, did you ring up the editor of the El Khabbar 13 around its borders in trying to stop any kind of 13 newspaper and say "Hi Fred, you have got an article 14 suspicious vehicles coming in, which clearly failed 14 there by journalist Bob, is it valid?" 15 during the In Amenas incident but that was happening all 15 A. No, because well we discussed that El Khabbar article. 16 around their borders. 16 We are not certain, we can't be 100 per cent certain 17 Q. I understand that. Can I move on then to the El Khabbar 17 that we saw that article at the time but this wider 18 article. I am more concerned about that as is the 18 scepticism about articles, any article, and I lost count 19 family of Carlos Estrada. You can look at the article 19 of the number of times that I was told that 20 again if you want but have told us that you have read 20 such-and-such an article was incorrect. So we were very 21 it? 21 sceptical of anything which appeared in the Algerian 22 A. I have. 22 press because often it was wrong and they were shown to 23 Q. They said there that there were arrests and there were 23 be wrong. 24 court documents that this group in which Lamine 24 Q. I understand that. You have got that point across. You 25 Boucheneb was involved had planned to photograph 25 were sceptical of articles in the Algerian press. But

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1 hydrocarbon facilities preparatory to attacking them. 1 here is an article, it has got directly relevant threats 2 Now, do your staff go and have a chat with the court 2 to the hydrocarbon industry. Does your team, for 3 staff down in the relevant area to find out whether any 3 instance, as a modus operandi get in touch with 4 court documents were issued? 4 newspaper editors to find out whether there is 5 A. Given the nature of the Algerian system and structure of 5 a verifiable source? 6 government it would be extremely difficult to just go 6 A. Yes, we have contacts with journalists across the 7 along and find information like that. 7 Algerian system. In terms of that article as well 8 Q. It is not like going to the court office here and 8 nobody else highlighted that article as adding something 9 saying -- 9 new. It doesn't add anything to the threat. The nature 10 A. No, it is not. The only way you would be able to find 10 of the threat is -- was widely known. If you read that 11 that out or the channel would have to be through the 11 there is nothing in that which would make you think 12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs through what is called 12 there was suddenly a new threat. And I don't think that 13 a note verbal which is a note that we write to another 13 taking what is in one newspaper article is a sensible 14 government and we could ask for information but I would 14 way of forming policy or judgment on the wider risks to 15 be surprised if we were to get a response to any 15 Algeria. 16 questions like that. 16 Q. So a specific threat to hydrocarbon facilities around 17 Q. Even for criminal proceedings? Wasn't there some -- 17 the Hassi Messaoud area and people arrested for it, if 18 what's the need to keep those private? Couldn't you 18 that doesn't trigger a concern what would? 19 find out? 19 A. Again, that particular article wasn't something which 20 A. This is the nature of the environment in which we were 20 was discussed by others at the time because of the fact 21 operating and that is the reality of the environment 21 that it was appearing in the press and there was huge 22 there. 22 scepticism about the press. 23 Q. Is there a Central Criminal Court in Algiers? 23 Q. What would? 24 A. Yes, but foreign diplomats would not be permitted to go 24 A. Well, there would be plenty of other ways in which 25 into it and ask questions about X, Y and Z. There is 25 specific information would come up, if we heard about

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1 something via a contact which would mean we would want 1 like that. 2 to go into the Algerians and find out whether it could 2 Q. Understood. The next point. There are only three more 3 be verified. 3 to go. 4 Q. You mean gossip? 4 A. Okay. 5 A. If you call it gossip. There's -- 5 Q. Algeria, the military's modus operandi. It is a fact, 6 THE CORONER: It depends how reliable what the source was 6 and you set it out, that they take a robust approach and 7 but what you are basically saying is one newspaper 7 you have expounded on that in your answers today. It is 8 article is not something that of itself is likely to 8 a fact that you record in your evidence that they say it 9 have raised the threat level. 9 is a state policy not to negotiate and not to pay 10 A. No, one newspaper article would need to be verified and 10 ransoms? 11 nobody at the time was giving that article any 11 A. Yes. 12 particular importance because it didn't actually add 12 Q. And you have informed Her Majesty's Coroner today that 13 anything to the threat and when you read it as well it 13 these terrorist groups including AQIM groups made a lot 14 is talking about a separatist group and people breaking 14 of money through ransom in the years before this attack? 15 away from Algeria which again doesn't make a lot of 15 A. Mmm. 16 sense in the context of Algeria. So there are other 16 Q. Who was paying? 17 things in that article which don't ring true which cast 17 A. It's widely known that other European governments have 18 further doubt on its reliability. 18 paid ransoms. 19 MR RITCHIE: Her Majesty's Coroner has heard evidence from 19 Q. Italy? 20 others that if they had seen that article and if it had 20 A. Italy, France, Spain. 21 been valid they would have taken it seriously but you 21 Q. And others. It is our policy, UK policy, not to pay 22 have given your view about it. 22 ransom? 23 I am turning to Northern Mali now and the 23 A. Yes. 24 instability. In April 2012 Islamist rebels declared 24 Q. So far as we can and we have heard it is BP policy not 25 Northern Mali an independent state. You would have been 25 to pay ransom but there were other countries who clearly

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1 aware of that? 1 have paid ransom because we know some Italian tourists 2 A. Mmm. 2 were released and some French aid workers were released? 3 Q. And in December 2012 the UN passed a resolution 3 A. Yes. 4 mandating an African led international force to 4 Q. So there was money flowing into the AQIM coffers which 5 intervene. You would have been aware of that too 5 is not only recorded in press articles, but also by 6 I assume, Mr Roper? 6 learned academic commentators? 7 A. Yes. 7 A. Mmm. 8 Q. And on 11 January the French intervened. 8 Q. So it perhaps is not wholly unexpected that in a siege 9 A. Yes. 9 involving French nationals as well as British, American 10 Q. And on the 13 January the FCO tweaked, if I can use the 10 and others that one of the three demands made in this 11 word, the travel advice. Same advice but a further 11 case was for cash, was for ransom. Did Mr Collins pass 12 justification adding the words "the possibility of 12 on to you the information that there was a demand for 13 retaliatory attacks". Were you and your staff partly 13 ransom although unspecified in amount? 14 involved in that tweak? 14 A. During the actual crisis itself? 15 A. Yes. We were aware that was happening in response to 15 Q. Yes. 16 the Mali situation. 16 A. No, I had no direct contact with him during that crisis. 17 Q. Mr Collins in answer to a question I asked him agreed 17 Q. Didn't you sit on the COBRA meetings? 18 that the meeting to which Carlos Estrada was going could 18 A. Yes, I briefed the COBRA meetings when I was in Algiers, 19 have happened anywhere in the world. If that meeting 19 when I went down to In Amenas the deputy ambassador 20 was nonessential sending him out to that meeting could 20 briefed the meetings. It may have been possible that 21 be seen as contrary to the FCO advice that you had just 21 Mr Collins attended some of those but I wouldn't 22 tweaked, couldn't it? 22 necessarily have seen he was there. 23 A. I think that is a matter for BP. We put our advice out 23 Q. So you were aware that one of the demands was safe 24 there as a guide and it's for individuals and companies 24 passage back to Mali? 25 to use that advice to form their own view on policies 25 A. Yes.

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1 Q. You were aware one of the demands was release of some 1 the camp. They took expats, of which I understand there 2 political prisoners? 2 were about 120, 40 of which died. Now the maths is 3 A. Yes. 3 pretty simple. That is not a great success rate, is it? 4 Q. But you weren't aware there was a demand for ransom? 4 A. No, of course it's not. Actually I think my figures 5 THE CORONER: I don't think you have said that yet. What 5 were of 120 foreign nationals managed to escape which 6 you have said is you weren't aware of that direct so far 6 included 22 British nationals. 7 as you understand it from Mr Collins. That is where 7 Q. My apologies if I didn't get the detail right. 8 I am so far. 8 A. But any loss of life is tragic. 9 A. Exactly, that's correct. 9 Q. It is a pretty high percentage of expats killed by 10 THE CORONER: But it may be you say you were you aware of it 10 terrorists in this event. So for expats it was 11 or you weren't about a demand for ransom. 11 unmitigated disaster, wasn't it? 12 A. It is fairly evident that if they are wanting safe 12 A. In that situation, yes. 13 passage from Algeria for hostages that ransom demands 13 Q. Do you think the SSP is going to make any difference 14 will follow. Whether they actually asked a specific 14 whether there is a flow of information or not or that 15 request for ransom at that point I can't say. 15 British companies working in Algeria have to take things 16 MR RITCHIE: It was wholly obvious this was a hostage taking 16 into their own hands and make sure that expats are 17 situation. There may have well be a whole range of 17 protected as well as they can? 18 other horrible things that these terrorists were going 18 A. Since In Amenas there has been a wide ranging dialogue 19 to do but there was likely to be an element of hostage 19 with the Algerians, both government to government and 20 ransom going on here? 20 between the companies and it is for the companies to say 21 A. That is likely. 21 what that involves, but a lot of additional security 22 Q. Now, we know, because it was obvious from the history of 22 measures were put in place immediately after In Amenas 23 the Algerian government, that their published policy is 23 to allow expats to return which I understand has now 24 to be robust, not to negotiate and not to pay ransoms. 24 happened. The SSP strategic security partnership is 25 Therefore, the likelihood is when taken hostage that any 25 a mechanism for having high level dialogue with Algeria

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1 hostage is in extremis at severe risk of death or 1 and it represents an improvement in the bilateral 2 injury, isn't it? 2 relationship. So we are in a better position than we 3 A. In a situation like that then, yes, yes, of course it's 3 were before, but that's not to say if the same thing 4 a highly dangerous situation for everybody. 4 were to happen again the tactics and the methods 5 Q. And everyone knew this before January 2013. This was 5 deployed to deal with that situation would be any 6 the situation in Algeria, wasn't it: don't get taken 6 different based on the nature of the threat. 7 hostage? 7 Q. But now BP and the JV are able to put in place really 8 A. The main threat was seen as westerners being kidnapped 8 really good security insofar as they can and the SSP 9 and taken hostage, particularly around the borders and 9 will help them achieve their aim? 10 the southern areas of Algeria's borders which is why our 10 A. The SSP has been helpful in that process by giving them 11 advice was as strong as it was. 11 this direct contact to Algerian security that 12 Q. Don't go there. So your focus was keeping nonessentials 12 I mentioned earlier so, yes, but ultimately it is 13 out of there and gave advice about that. Companies and 13 a matter for the JV companies to be satisfied that the 14 the FCO were aware of the need not to allow or permit 14 security is adequate for the foreign nationals that they 15 people to be taken hostage. The job here was to prevent 15 employ. 16 expats being taken hostage, wasn't it? That was the 16 MR RITCHIE: Shame that wasn't in place before. Thank you 17 job, that was the focus. There were lots of other jobs 17 very much. 18 on your plate but the job there was to prevent people 18 Questions from MR OWEN-THOMAS 19 being taken hostage? 19 MR OWEN-THOMAS: My name is Owen-Thomas, I represent David 20 A. Yes. 20 Green, the father of Stephen Green. Just a few 21 Q. When we come to what happened afterwards in this body, 21 questions for you if I may. You mentioned 22 the SSP and the Algerians say they did brilliantly 22 General Mekri, am I right in saying that his job title 23 because 760 out of 800 were released. Can we put that 23 was director of external communication or relations? 24 in focus? The terrorists did not hold and strap Semtex 24 A. Yes, external relations in the Ministry of Defence, 25 around Algerian nationals. They let them wander around 25 that's right.

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1 Q. So he was not an operational general, but a press man or 1 detail about the military operation when you were there? 2 a man responsible for getting the message across? 2 A. No, and that was unlikely because I think the details 3 A. He was a member of the Algerian army who was doing this 3 about the military operation would be held very close 4 job. He is a soldier and he has seen active service but 4 and dealt with by those that were actually leading it. 5 that's his current role at the moment. 5 So it was not likely to get information from, say, the 6 Q. You I think reported, you say back to London, and the 6 mayor apart from general information about where matters 7 Foreign Office. Did you report back to a department 7 were and -- not specific details. 8 known generally as the Algerian desk? 8 Q. Were you aware of Stephen Green having been killed in 9 A. No, in a crisis such as this -- 9 the attack? 10 Q. Not in the crisis but generally? 10 A. On the 19th? At that point, no. Not definitely. 11 A. Generally, yes, yes, I did. 11 Q. Were you aware that an English national may have been 12 Q. What did the Algerian desk consist of? The number of 12 mistaken for a terrorist and taken away from In Amenas? 13 people, one man, one woman? 13 A. No. We were -- our concern was to try and ensure that 14 A. The Algerian desk is one desk officer in a larger team 14 the remains of all the victims of this terrible tragedy 15 of people who look after the Maghreb region, so you then 15 were taken to Algiers as soon as possible and we put 16 have a deputy head and a head of department and 16 a lot of pressure on for that to happen quickly. We 17 a director who all have responsibility for Algeria as 17 were told over the period of 21, 22, 23 January that 18 well. 18 that was happening. On the day, the first day we went 19 Q. But with specific day to day responsibility for Algeria 19 down we did, we were taken to see three of the victims, 20 it is one person? 20 but not Mr Green. Mr Green was not one of those. 21 A. Yes, there is one desk officer. 21 Q. At that stage then were you unaware of how many British 22 Q. You have explained in some detail about how you kept 22 nationals were killed? 23 tabs on UK nationals within Algeria? 23 A. We were still -- information was still coming in but we 24 A. Yes. 24 had a pretty clear idea that, yes, seven British 25 Q. Did you draw a distinction between people who were there 25 nationals had been killed but the formal identification

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1 in Algeria working and those, if any, who were there for 1 had not yet taken place, and that was SO15's 2 their own social purposes or backpacking or --- 2 responsibility but by that stage, certainly by the 19th 3 A. We would draw a distinction but clearly there wasn't 3 it was clear who was or who wasn't still involved in 4 a lot of tourism to Algeria because of its history so we 4 this. 5 weren't getting very many people just coming through 5 Q. Were you involved in the subsequent process of 6 Algeria as tourists and it is actually very difficult to 6 identifying Stephen Green, or were you kept aware? 7 get visas so in a way that distinction doesn't arise. 7 A. I was kept very aware and I had to intervene frequently 8 Q. It didn't arise in fact? 8 to assist SO15 in the course of their duties. Apart 9 A. No. 9 from on the 19th when I visited the morgue to ensure 10 Q. You have said that you went to In Amenas on 10 that the bodies were being treated with dignity and 11 19 January -- 11 respect that was -- the next time I was involved 12 A. Mmm. 12 directly was when I visited the morgue in Algiers again 13 Q. -- when you were told it was safe to do so. Is it right 13 to assist SO15, but I didn't go to see the victims at 14 to infer from that that you would have wanted to have 14 that point and I went to the airport at the end when the 15 gone earlier or asked to go earlier and you were told it 15 people were taken back to the UK. So I paid my respects 16 was unsafe to go? 16 at the airport when all of the victims were sent back to 17 A. Yes, I would have liked to have gone down there as soon 17 the UK. 18 as possible but whilst the military operation was going 18 Q. You have been asked a number of questions about the 19 on it was clearly very difficult to get permission to do 19 general political instability in the region. Mr Green 20 that. 20 says he had conversations with his son in December 2012, 21 Q. Had you been to In Amenas before the attack? 21 he was concerned with Mali, Libya and with the general 22 A. No, I hadn't. 22 instability. It was your view, was it, that the 23 Q. You have explained again in a little more detail who you 23 In Amenas area was extremely unsafe for any foreign 24 spoke to and what it is you found out when you arrived 24 national? 25 in In Amenas. But did you find out any more specific 25 A. No, I think the assumption was, as I think I've made

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1 clear earlier, that Algeria had -- of all the countries 1 Clearly there was heightened concern because of the 2 in the region it was perhaps the only one which had not 2 regional situation but ultimately Algeria's 3 gone through an Arab Spring type turmoil. It therefore 3 responsibility is to protect the foreign workers in its 4 had a functioning system of security and effective state 4 country. 5 system and it was extremely well resourced. It was one 5 MR OWEN-THOMAS: Thank you, Mr Roper. 6 of the -- its military was one of the best resourced in 6 Questions from MS GERRY 7 the region. They had a lot of manpower, a lot of 7 MS GERRY: Good afternoon, Mr Roper. I represent the family 8 equipment. The assumption, clearly with hindsight that 8 of Sebastian John. I just want to pick up on a couple 9 assumption has to be questioned, was that the Algerian 9 of points which have been discussed with you already. 10 authorities were capable of protecting the oil and gas 10 Firstly, just to be very clear about the meetings 11 sites because there had been no attack, no major attack 11 you had that you described relating to BP and discussing 12 on oil and gas sites in Algeria throughout the whole of 12 security issues. As I understand it, they were with BP 13 the 90s when there was this terrible terrible civil war. 13 employees only you didn't have any discussions with any 14 And nobody, nobody foresaw an attack on the scale of 14 JV person. It was directly with BP. 15 what we saw at In Amenas. There had been the odd 15 A. Andy Collins is the head of the -- is the BP country 16 suicide bombing, one person blowing themselves up, 16 manager so he is the head of the JV. At In Amenas, 17 attacking Algerian military but there was nothing on the 17 sorry, at Hassi Messaoud, in my visits down to 18 scale of In Amenas which was way beyond anybody 18 Hassi Messaoud I did meet with BP there. They weren't 19 believing that something like that was possible. 19 the In Amenas JV but there may have been some people 20 Q. There is a distinction, isn't there, between being able 20 there who were transiting and on their way down to 21 to stop a terrorist attack and not being at risk of an 21 In Amenas because it was used often as a stopping off 22 attack because the government has not fallen due to the 22 place. 23 Arab Spring -- didn't the fact that Algeria hadn't been 23 Q. But you were specifically meeting with BP, it may be 24 through the Arab Spring, was still working with western 24 that the people you were meeting with were part of the 25 companies, was still making monies out of those sort of 25 JV but you didn't have as it were any direct

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1 commercial collaboration make it more of a target and 1 communication with the JV? 2 not less of a target than perhaps a police station in 2 A. No, no, we didn't. 3 Libya which doesn't have a regime? 3 Q. And is that the same for any private security firm and 4 A. I think Algeria has always been a target. It is still 4 in particular AFMC who were contracted by the JV to 5 now a target for the groups operating in the region. 5 provide internal security, did you have any direct 6 But as Algeria took back control of its own country and 6 contact with them? 7 its own borders it was much harder to attack Algeria. 7 A. We had a lot of direct contact with them and in fact my 8 Although there were still attacks, the Tamanrassat one 8 visits to Hassi Messaoud were organised by that local 9 we have mentioned, the Ourgla one. There was the one in 9 partner and they would bring together all the British 10 Algiers a couple of years ago. 10 nationals in Hassi Messaoud and I would meet them and 11 Q. The nature of the attacks were very different from those 11 talk to them in that way and we kept in close touch with 12 which carried on during the civil war and it may well be 12 that company because they were a very good source of 13 that things, there had been far fewer attacks than there 13 knowledge of who was where and how many people were 14 were during the civil war but of course by the 14 coming in, so they were a key contact in our wider 15 time December 2012 comes along you have this active 15 consular operation. 16 Al Qaeda organisation, the availability of arms from 16 Q. Just to be clear, they were a key contact generally as 17 Libya, the breakdown of the border and you have Algeria 17 opposed to just because they were being contracted by 18 carrying on an almost normal western way of carrying on 18 the JV? 19 with western organisations. Even though you have a huge 19 A. Yes, they were a key contact generally for what was 20 reduction in the sort of civil war type attacks the 20 going on in Algeria and for their knowledge of which 21 chance of this sort of attack were getting higher and 21 British nationals were where at particular times. 22 higher? 22 Q. So in terms of any information that the British 23 A. The sort of attack which was perceived as possible is 23 Government would be able to provide regarding security 24 the sort of attack which took place at Tamanrassat where 24 the JV had two routes to that as it were. So one was 25 a suicide bomber drove a vehicle into the barracks. 25 through your meetings and contact with BP --

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1 A. Yes. 1 responsible, I think that's probably what that is 2 Q. -- and one was through AFMC? 2 hinting at. In other words, it wasn't all our fault, 3 A. Yes, and there were separate contacts below my level, 3 says the Algerian authorities, but as I understand it, 4 the deputy ambassador and the defence attaché and the 4 the Algerian view would be very wary of having armed -- 5 regional security officer did have contacts with BP's 5 having foreign entities with arms in their country 6 Algier's representatives. I think they had security 6 because that is very much against their strong sort of 7 people based in Algiers and there were some contacts 7 nationalist tendency. 8 there, but as part of wider meetings to discuss security 8 Q. Can I then also just draw your attention to a comment 9 in the region. 9 made by Andrew Collins in his written statement which is 10 Q. At the meetings you had either with AFMC or with BP, was 10 at paragraph 42. If you don't mind again I'll read it. 11 there ever any discussion about the policy around arming 11 A. Okay. 12 civilian guards? 12 Q. And of course if you need more time and want to read it 13 A. Yes, I think that did come up and it was clearly 13 to yourself please say so. What Mr Collins said at 14 something which BP themselves were very reluctant to do 14 paragraph 42: 15 because of all the health and safety consequences of 15 "I am also aware that during 2011 to 2012 the issue 16 having armed guards within the base. 16 of using civilian armed guards arose in respect of the 17 Q. Was it something that you perceived was something that 17 In Salah gas sites where as explained above the military 18 the Algerian authorities would have welcomed or would 18 is responsible for guarding the sites. As I understand 19 have preferred for there to be armed civilian guards? 19 it beginning in approximately March 2011 authorities 20 A. That's I think a very difficult question. Certainly for 20 began raising the idea of possibly using armed guards to 21 Algeria the last thing they want to see is what could be 21 support the military. They did this verbally. Although 22 perceived as foreign companies, armed foreign companies 22 the In Salah gas joint venture did not receive a formal 23 on their territory which hits at this point about their 23 request for civilian armed guards to be used it was told 24 sovereignty and being in control. So I think they would 24 about concerns that the demands at time on the region's 25 have had concerns about that from the sovereignty 25 military to send troops to the Libyan border in response

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1 perspective, irrespective of BP's concerns. 1 to the situation in Libya in 2011 might affect the 2 Q. We have been given as part of the exhibits to 2 military's ability to provide sufficient numbers of 3 Mr Bristow's statement notes from some of the meetings 3 military for In Salah particularly in the southern field 4 with Mr Burt. I don't know if you have LB1 to hand? 4 site in In Salah which was planning to open up manned 5 A. I have seen them and I'm very familiar with the -- 5 site locations." 6 Q. In which case I will just read out the relevant part. 6 Mr Collins goes on to explain: 7 THE CORONER: If you need to see it you have only to say but 7 "The JV personnel explained why the use of civilian 8 let's see if we can get on without it. 8 armed guards would not be acceptable to BP and Statoil 9 A. No, I'm very familiar with it. 9 and suggested that there are other solutions to the 10 MS GERRY: It is the visit of the 3or 4 March by Mr Burt. 10 military's resourcing concerns that would not involve 11 It is at paragraph 8 under that. It says: 11 using armed guards. Whilst those discussions occurred 12 "Mr Hill added that when the attack on the bus 12 the military decided to provide the personnel needed to 13 failed they retreated to the plant. The outside of the 13 open up the site." 14 plant was well protected by Algerian forces but they 14 That is the evidence of Mr Collins. Do you recall 15 were not present inside the plant as the companies had 15 the Algerian authorities actually asking BP to provide 16 a policy of not allowing arms inside." 16 civilian armed guards in order to deal with concerns 17 So it seems there that there was a complaint, if 17 about the military becoming stretched? 18 I can put it that way, being made or maybe a concern 18 A. No, I don't and certainly there was no request made via 19 being raised about the ability of protecting the plant 19 the British Government for armed guards within the 20 because of a policy of not allowing arms inside the 20 bases. 21 plant. That seems to be being expressed by the 21 Q. So the circumstances in which discussions were had at 22 Algerians? 22 the meetings you had with BP about arming civilian 23 A. Yes. Again, I would be slightly cautious of that 23 guards, in what circumstances did they arise? 24 comment. I mean, it's -- there is a lot of pride around 24 A. Well, that would just be two way exchange of information 25 the response and in terms of who and who wasn't 25 with Mr Collins or with others from BP. But the

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1 specific arrangements in each JV were a matter for that 1 happened, so after the western military intervention 2 JV and they could differ from site to site. So you 2 which -- and Gaddafi's death, so it was in the period 3 might find there would be a different situation in 3 following that that Algeria and all regional countries 4 In Amenas to the In Salah or at Hassi Messaoud. It was 4 were concerned about the situation in Libya. 5 very much the responsibility of each JV to agree the 5 Q. So at that period of time, so 2011 through to 2013, it 6 security arrangement. 6 was known that there was a real concern over securing 7 Q. Just to be clear, Mr Collins never said to you: we've 7 the border with Libya? 8 had a verbal request by the Algerian authorities to 8 A. Algeria had concerns about all of its borders. It had 9 provide civilian armed guards? 9 always had concerns about Mali and Niger which were, 10 A. I don't recall that. 10 where there was less effective state control. In the 11 Q. Do you think you would recall it if that had been 11 aftermath of what happened in Libya then, yes, there was 12 raised? 12 growing and increased concern about the implications for 13 A. I would hope I would but I can't for definite say that 13 Algeria of what was happening in Libya. 14 I would recall it. 14 Q. I think you already heard reference to the fact that 15 Q. Can I then move on to firstly the border with Libya. We 15 there were more troops being sent to the border area? 16 have had read out the press conference that was given by 16 A. Exactly. 17 the Algerian Prime Minister following the In Amenas 17 Q. Can I just then move on to that and ask you your 18 attack. And again, if you don't mind if I just read an 18 knowledge or views in relation to the capacity and the 19 extract and again if you would like to see it do say or 19 ability of the Algerian military at this time to protect 20 if I am going too fast do say? 20 the gas facilities. One of the other reports that we 21 A. Okay. 21 have been provided in the inquest is the Control Risks 22 Q. It is specifically about the borders. So the 22 report from July 2012 which was commissioned I think by 23 Prime Minister said: 23 Statoil. Is that something you are familiar with now? 24 "We have our capacities and means. Our military 24 A. I've seen the Statoil report. I am not sure I have seen 25 forces have the means to determine the targets at some 25 the Control Risks report.

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1 particular times and when that is done their reaction is 1 Q. Again, I just want to ask your view about whether this 2 immediate." 2 was your knowledge and understanding at the time about 3 So they have the ability to monitor the borders. It 3 certain concerns. If I may just read a couple of 4 then goes on to say: 4 extracts and ask for your views. 5 "Unfortunately the borders are huge. We may need 5 So for those who want the references it is core 6 twice the size of NATO to supervise those borders." 6 bundle 2, tab 1, page 254 first of all where the report 7 And then goes on to say: 7 states: 8 "Algeria has been saying for a long time that the 8 "The threat from cross border militancy has 9 repercussions of what is happening in many border 9 increased in scope and frequency in the past six 10 countries will be serious." 10 months." 11 Was there any views being expressed prior 11 And then goes on at 256, so this is July 2012, at 12 to January 2013 that the Libyan authorities felt that 12 256: 13 they had not got control over their border with Libya or 13 "The security threats from weapons proliferation and 14 that they were unable to effectively secure the border 14 weak state capacity will be difficult for governments 15 given its size and what would be required to secure it? 15 and investors to predict and manage with clear 16 A. Algeria certainly expressed concerns about Libya and the 16 indications that the security forces' capabilities are 17 breakdown of law and order in Libya and the fact that 17 being placed under strain. The ability of the security 18 Libya, the Libyan central authority had no real overall 18 forces to manage threats in the far south resulting from 19 control over the country, so, yes, Algeria expressed to 19 regional dynamics should be monitored closely given the 20 the UK and to all other partners that it had serious 20 limited but credible prospect of spillover into the 21 concerns about it, as did every other government. 21 southern oil producing regions in Algiers. 22 Q. And were those serious concerns being expressed 22 "Regional political and security dynamics give rise 23 immediately before January 2013, what sort of time 23 to a credible threat of a one-off high impact terrorist 24 period are these concerns being expressed? 24 incidence in the oil producing southern provinces 25 A. Gaddafi fell in 2011 and the consequences of what 25 including the areas in which Statoil operates."

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1 Then just finally on page 270: 1 Q. Is there anything being done in terms of in the future 2 "Although Algeria's energy infrastructure does not 2 to ensure that that sort of information is kept and 3 appear to have been a target for QIM's southern or 3 guarded and provided to the British Government? 4 northern branches or for MUJWA its importance to the 4 A. I think -- the key point there is that there is still an 5 Algerian economy is that it should be considered 5 Algerian investigation underway. They have their own 6 a credible target. A one-off attack remains possible 6 process to try the terrorists that they arrested, so 7 but a sustained extremist campaign against oil producing 7 they are reluctant to give out a lot of information, 8 sites in the south is unlikely over the coming years." 8 very specific information, because it could prejudice 9 And it seems from the Control Risks report that what 9 the outcome of that enquiry. 10 their assessment was is that there was a strain being 10 Q. And then just finally, in terms of the primary purpose 11 placed on the Algerian security forces because of the 11 or the way in which you would characterise what happened 12 need to control the borders and other areas and that 12 in In Amenas in January 2013 would it be right to say 13 while obviously the oil infrastructure was important to 13 that it was a hostage taking situation as opposed to 14 the Algerians they may not be able to protect the area 14 more generally a terrorist attack, and by that I mean 15 and there is a concern about one off high impact attack. 15 9/11, 7/7, they are clear attacks in order to inflict 16 Were those sorts of concerns known to you and to the 16 loss of life. Whereas the situation at In Amenas seems 17 British Government about the ability of the Algerian 17 to be that the terrorists deliberately targeted foreign 18 forces to manage the situation? 18 nationals, took them hostages and made demands. So here 19 A. I mean that Control Risks is one company. There are 19 the situation we are really facing is much more of 20 a number of companies who provide assessments like that 20 a hostage taking than terrorist attack. Would you agree 21 and I am sure they'll differ. We do our own assessments 21 with that? 22 as well. We were clearly aware that because of the 22 A. No, I don't think I would. I don't think you can say 23 regional instability that the Algerian security forces 23 that. I don't think any of us can know what's in the 24 were under more pressure than they had been under before 24 heads of the terrorists in terms of what they were 25 the outbreak of the Arab Spring but at no time did the 25 actually seeking to do. But they were seeking to hit

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1 Algerian authorities say to us that we can't handle 1 Algeria. That's very clear. It's very personal between 2 this, that we can't manage, that we need help with X, Y 2 the leaders of these terrorist groups and the Algerian 3 and Z. So yes, there was an increased concern but 3 authorities so they were seeking to strike at Algeria 4 again, the assumption was that Algeria, because of its 4 whose legitimacy they question. And blowing up the site 5 wealth, because of its resources, because of its huge 5 was possibly one of their motives. 6 manpower was able to protect its borders. 6 THE CORONER: They took a whole load of explosives with 7 Q. You say that the assumption was, can I take it from that 7 them. 8 that you didn't specifically ask about whether or not 8 A. They took a lot of explosives so I don't think you can 9 their military was stretched? 9 just say this was a hostage taking situation. We don't 10 A. Those -- we would have had that discussion, discussion 10 know that. 11 with them in the -- before In Amenas there was a working 11 MS GERRY: But in terms of planning going forward, in terms 12 group on counter terrorism which became the strategic 12 of risks, hostage taking, kidnapping is still one of the 13 security partnership and in forums like that we would 13 threats that needs to be guarded against in Algeria. 14 discussing the regional situation in the region so it is 14 A. Absolutely, absolutely. 15 certainly possible that discussions of that nature took 15 MS GERRY: Thank you. 16 place. 16 Questions from MS GOLLOP 17 Q. Just two final short matters. Firstly, in relation to 17 MS GOLLOP: Hello, sir. My name is Katie Gollop and I 18 the identification and recovery of the victims' bodies. 18 represent Belinda Green who is the wife of Stephen 19 Is it right that there was no record kept or you weren't 19 Green. She is not able to be here today but I know how 20 given a record by the Algerian authorities as to where 20 grateful she is to you for your statement and for you to 21 each victim was found and when? 21 come to give evidence. I am sure we all are. 22 A. That's correct. 22 A. Thank you. 23 Q. I assume that that was asked for? 23 Q. I would like to ask you a question about some of the 24 A. Well, of course. And SO15 as part of their work were 24 evidence we have heard and it is a difficult question to 25 seeking to establish that. 25 ask because of the status of the evidence which is

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1 something that Her Majesty's Coroner may or may not dea l 1 prevent people being taken out of the country, they were 2 with in his ruling and it is simply one piece of 2 seeking to prevent the gas site being blown up. I can't 3 evidence, the credibility of which is uncertain. We 3 comment on whether there is a shoot to kill policy. It 4 heard some evidence from an eyewitness to part of the 4 is not a matter for me. 5 attack who was at some distance from the perimeter fence 5 Q. Have US officials -- 6 to the gas plant to which the terrorists were en route. 6 A. Again, that is getting into I think sort of issues which 7 And this gentleman saw a helicopter in the air and he 7 are quite complex to talk about in an open session. 8 told us that he saw or he thinks that he saw a group of 8 Q. I shall take my cue from Mr Garnham, who knows better 9 visibly unarmed men standing and the helicopter, again 9 about these matters than I do, and knowing that you are 10 this is something that he thinks he saw, firing upon 10 well protected I will if I may just ask the question 11 that group of visibly unarmed men. And those men then 11 again, not least because as you well know and I ask it 12 disappearing from site and his explanation for what he 12 partly because of the disclosure that we have had from 13 thinks that he saw was that they had been killed by the 13 the FCO, it is a matter that has been raised by at least 14 bullets fired by Algerian soldiers in the helicopter. 14 two of the families, and the answer that has come 15 According to what he told us he was in no doubt that 15 back -- let me help you out with this, so that you 16 it would have been, from what he thinks he saw, apparent 16 understand where I am coming from -- Jan Barnes, who is 17 to those firing from the helicopter that the men were 17 the sister of Garry Barlow, put it in a meeting with Her 18 unarmed at the time that they were fired upon. As 18 Majesty's minister, Mr Robertson, that her concerns that 19 I have said, the status of that is all uncertain and no 19 there had been media reports that the US had interviewed 20 factual findings have been made and may not be made. If 20 the three terrorist suspects and what she was told was 21 it were to be the case that what he thinks he saw is 21 that we, I take that to be the Government, were 22 credible would that surprise you? 22 coordinating with all other international partners who 23 A. I mean, I have no information about that -- 23 had been affected and it was not unusual for us to 24 Q. No, and that is not my question. 24 coordinate with them including sharing information that 25 A. -- because I wasn't there and I can't verify that either 25 others might gain access to.

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1 way. 1 That is the background to the question which I will 2 Q. No. 2 ask again. Have the three suspects been interviewed by 3 A. All I can say is that the Algerian authorities said to 3 any US officials? 4 me, as the ambassador in country, that they were very 4 A. Well, again, as ambassador in Algeria that is not 5 aware that foreign nationals' lives were at stake and 5 something I was closely involved in and if I may suggest 6 they would do everything they could to protect foreign 6 you are seeing my colleague, Mr Bristow after me and 7 life but that they were dealing with a hugely difficult 7 I think that is something he will be better sighted on 8 and complex situation. So whether it would surprise me 8 than me. 9 or not? Yes, it would surprise me if they were to do 9 Q. Certainly. I will very briefly and without wishing to 10 that. I would hope that that would not happen, but 10 trespass on yours or anybody else's patience go back to 11 these situations are so confused and so complex and so 11 the El Khabbar article. Specifically this. What it 12 difficult it's very hard to be categoric. Another 12 says in the article is: 13 complicating factor was that we knew from early on that 13 "Special counter terrorist security forces have 14 there were western speaking and western looking 14 deposited a substantial dossier with the courts." 15 terrorists, the two Canadians that were mentioned 15 Do you read that as being the DRS depositing this 16 earlier, so again, differentiating between terrorists 16 dossier? 17 and hostages was clearly in the heat of the moment not 17 A. Could you just read the first bit of it again? 18 a straightforward thing. That's all I can say on that. 18 Q. Yes. I don't know if you have a copy of your statement 19 Q. To your knowledge does Algeria have a shoot to kill 19 in front of you? I am not going to spend a lot of time 20 policy in the event of a terrorist attack? 20 on it. 21 A. I can't comment on what their policy is. That's for 21 MS DOLAN: Orange bundle, tab 36. 22 Algeria to say what their policy is but we have 22 A. Yes, okay. 23 certainly had no discussions with them in which we would 23 MS GOLLOP: It is the first full paragraph after the 24 get into that. And these are operational issues about 24 picture. 25 how you deal with the attack and they were seeking to 25 A. Right:

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1 Q. Special counter terrorist security forces. Do you read 1 cases, a number of people have been prosecuted for 2 that as being the DRS? 2 terrorism and clearly evidence will exist somewhere in 3 A. Again, in the context of Algeria it is very difficult to 3 the Algerian system that these people have been tried 4 be certain and to be precise. Clearly the DRS, the 4 and prosecuted. That was the point I was making. 5 intelligence agency, was in the lead in the 90s and was 5 Q. Tell me if this is a cheap point. But in the gist that 6 responsible for bringing Algeria back to some kind of 6 we have it says that: 7 stability. Since then there has been much more of 7 "In the period leading up to the attack at In Amenas 8 a civilian involvement in running the country. But the 8 no information assessed by the government departments 9 DRS are still heavily involved in or assumed to be 9 contained sufficient detail to identify or prevent this 10 heavily involved still in all security operations. 10 specific attack." 11 Whether or not directly but certainly in overall charge. 11 The cheap point is this: if you don't assess the 12 So it is possible, but I can't categorically say yes, 12 information then you don't know? 13 that is the case. 13 A. Well, we do assess the information. We assess 14 Q. Then over the page, right at the bottom of the article 14 information which we believe to be relevant and we were, 15 it says, this is three lines from the bottom that those 15 as all other missions and embassies in Algeria were as 16 arrested were interrogated at the Cheraga Court in the 16 well, very sceptical of taking any information from 17 capital and they were charged with terrorism and the 17 newspapers as being relevant. That information needs to 18 dossiers submitted to the indictment division which 18 be checked, it needs to be clarified. So it wouldn't be 19 issued a decision to refer it to the felonies court." 19 sensible to base policy or judgments on sort of one 20 I don't know what your Algerian jurisprudence is 20 newspaper article when most of the articles are 21 like. It is going to be better than any of ours. But 21 erroneous, inaccurate or done with a specific purpose in 22 are you able to help us with the felonies court. Is it 22 mind by elements within the system. 23 a major court? Is it a minor court, is it -- 23 But we have a process of collecting information and 24 A. I mean, felonies is what it means in English, but again, 24 data and material about what's happening in Algeria to 25 here this -- there's no evidence that what is said here 25 help build our assessment and of course newspapers are

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1 is actually correct and it would be very difficult for 1 part of that but in the specific context of Algeria on 2 a foreign government to try to find out the information 2 security we had to be very wary. 3 in the context of Algeria of these specific cases. 3 Q. Some of the documents disclosed tell us that our consul 4 I think I have covered the points earlier. 4 is in weekly contact with the Algerian judge. That is 5 Q. You have. I don't want to cover old ground. Are you 5 the judge, as I understand it, presiding over the 6 telling us then that had you wished to attempt to verify 6 criminal investigations over the three men who are being 7 the contents of this newspaper article you would have 7 held in connection with the attack. Are you able to 8 been unable to do so? 8 give us any sort of an update as to what if anything is 9 A. If we had attempted to verify the contents I am fairly 9 happening in relation to that process that we are told 10 sure we would have been told that the contents were 10 about but have no information about? 11 inaccurate or incorrect because this was the nature of 11 A. Well, I left Algeria back in May, so again that's 12 this type of article. We had to be very, very sceptical 12 probably something that my colleague later can update 13 and suspicious of articles like this. 13 you on, but from what I know from the time that I was 14 Q. You see, to us here in this country this would appear to 14 there is there is an Algerian process underway. I don't 15 be a little bit more than a nebulous "there were bad 15 think there is any information yet on when that will 16 people out there and they want to do bad things to our 16 conclude. But that process continues. 17 hydrocarbon industry and it is all very worrying", it is 17 Q. Is it your belief that it will conclude? 18 actually talking about a dossier submitted with 18 A. Yes, it is my belief that they will seek to try the 19 a particular court leading to the charging of a specific 19 three terrorists in court and they have said that that 20 number of individuals at a certain other court. But you 20 will be open to the public and people can attend that 21 are telling me that you would have been told that all of 21 process. 22 that was wholly inaccurate? 22 Q. And you think there will be a trial? 23 A. No, I am saying that this -- the thrust of the article 23 A. Yes, I think there will be a trial based on -- there 24 is inaccurate. Clearly Algeria over the years has had 24 have been trials in Algeria of terrorists that have been 25 to fight terrorism and there have been a number of court 25 captured in the past.

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1 Q. I am going to read out to you a small part from one 1 lessened as a result of the loss of life at In Amenas? 2 other document that we have. If necessary I'll put 2 A. I think in terms of what I can say is British government 3 a copy in front of you. 3 after In Amenas is that with the strategic security 4 A. Okay. 4 partnership that we set up there is now more of a means, 5 Q. I think it is probably an email from April 2013 5 a mechanism for BP to have contact with the Algerian 6 recording a telephone call between Mr Burt and Ian Conn 6 military in Algiers than existed before so that has to 7 of BP. It is page 46 of the FCO disclosure. In part it 7 be helpful in terms of going forward. 8 says that: 8 Q. The next sentence following the one that I have just 9 "Bob Dudley, BP's group chief executive had met 9 read out to you is: 10 Yousfi and the relationship was better than it had been 10 "He [and it is not clear from the email whether he 11 at the time of the attack and they would be better 11 is Mr Con or Mr Dudley] did not think however that the 12 placed to work with the authorities in future." 12 Algerians would be forthcoming on how the attackers had 13 Pause there. Mr Yousfi is the then energy minister 13 got past the thousand troops stationed in the desert." 14 in Algeria is that right? 14 Do you think we're ever going to get information 15 A. Yes, he is and I think he is still the energy minister. 15 that helps the families to understand how that could 16 Q. Do you know anything of the relationship and quality 16 possibly have happened? 17 thereof between Mr Dudley and Mr Yousfi at the time of 17 A. It is a very difficult question and again we have to 18 the attack? 18 bear in mind that we need to maintain relationships in 19 A. I mean, I think that is a matter for BP and the 19 the future and we have to bear in mind that the real 20 Algerians, it is not really for me to comment. Clearly 20 pride of Algeria in its country and the sensitivities 21 there was a relationship and BP was a hugely important 21 around nationalism so I think it is -- it is difficult 22 investor in the country and Algeria would ensure that it 22 to say. It is very difficult to say but I would say it 23 was keeping in regular contact but it is not really for 23 is more unlikely than likely. 24 me to comment further on the nature of their 24 Q. I think I understand what you mean when you talk about 25 relationship. 25 national pride and we have been told on more than one

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1 Q. Please rest assured that questions have been asked of 1 occasion that we have to be very sensitive to it and 2 BP. We haven't heard, as it happens, from Mr Dudley 2 I am sure we are all doing our best to be very sensitive 3 which is partly why I am asking you and partly because 3 to the Algerian sense of national pride. Can you 4 of the timing of the disclosure that we get. 4 explain to us what this national pride is that gets in 5 It is clearly indicating that the relationship was 5 the way of being able to provide an explanation of the 6 better after the attack than it was during the attack. 6 colossal intelligence failure that allowed In Amenas to 7 Is there a difficulty with Mr Yousfi and his 7 occur? 8 relationships with the very important investors of many 8 A. I think those are questions for Algeria, not for me, 9 billions of dollars into his country? 9 but -- 10 A. Not that I'm aware of. 10 Q. That may very well but we don't have the luxury of 11 Q. You have mentioned several times in your evidence the 11 having any Algerian witness here so I am afraid you are 12 difficulties that are presented by what you refer to as 12 our closest interpreter of what the culture might be. 13 the Algerian system in getting information perhaps of 13 A. Yes. I think the history of colonialism with the 14 the nature and quality that one might like and certainly 14 French, which at 132 years was a very, very painful 15 in a manner that one might like. You experienced 15 period for Algeria, which leaves its marks today in very 16 difficulties with the system being bureaucratic, is that 16 strong ways. After that they then had a war with the 17 right? 17 French for eight years to gain their independence. They 18 A. Yes, Algeria is -- has heavy bureaucracy and as 18 then in the 90s went through this awful civil war where 19 a foreign mission it is not straightforward to go about 19 between 100,000 to 200,000 people were killed. They 20 the business as it may be in other countries. 20 felt abandoned by the west, nobody was really interested 21 Q. Is somebody like Mr Dudley likely to have experienced 21 in what was happening in Algeria. So this sense that 22 the same difficulties? 22 they are independent and that they are responsible for 23 A. Yes, of course. This is a wider problem. This is not 23 what happens in their own country but they take the 24 just foreign governments. 24 decisions and they'll not allow foreigners to take 25 Q. Are you telling us that some of those difficulties have 25 decisions. Before the French there was 300 years of

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1 Turkish control under the Ottoman Empire so that sense 1 so huge and you have got all the ungoverned space around 2 of sovereignty is very strong and that clearly imposes 2 it, protecting the border is a hugely difficult task. 3 limits on trying to get things done in the way that we 3 But once you have got -- to then get into the site 4 might hope that they could be done. I hope that helps 4 itself I think that still remains the key question: how 5 some way. 5 did that happen? And I'm not able to say how that 6 Q. It does, and I suppose, is it right then to say that it 6 happened. 7 also imposes limits on how comforted one could be about 7 Q. Have you asked? 8 assurances that lives would be kept safe? 8 A. There have been discussions. There is a dialogue. 9 A. Well, the culture and context of a particular country is 9 Q. What answer do you get when you ask? 10 something that has to be taken into account when you are 10 A. Well, it's -- this question about the border, clearly 11 considering your policy or your assessment of the risks 11 the border was extremely difficult. What -- I don't 12 and the threats. Yes, that needs to be taken into 12 think there's anything more useful I can really add to 13 account. 13 that. 14 Q. Can I give you a concrete example. Some of the evidence 14 Q. Because it's a secret or because they don't tell you 15 we have heard was from one of the security liaison 15 anything more than it's a very porous long border which 16 officers actually working at the In Amenas plant. He 16 is very difficult for us to protect? 17 would say that he would go and have a cup of tea with 17 A. The nature of our exchanges and everything I have said 18 the captain of the Gendarmes, run through with him 18 about Algeria and how the system works would make that 19 a list of the terrorist incidents that there had been, 19 type of conversation extremely difficult. We are not 20 none of them generally speaking serious, in the 20 likely to be given, and nobody else is -- 21 underlying and surrounding area, and the captain of the 21 THE CORONER: To be given a line by line account of what 22 Gendarme would say to him that Algeria is a very safe 22 went wrong and how people got through a border -- 23 country and nothing like this ever happens. 23 A. Exactly. 24 I paraphrase. There would simply be a blanket 24 THE CORONER: -- and so on. 25 reassurance that everybody was extremely safe and he 25 A. And whilst there is still an ongoing investigation of

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1 really didn't need to worry about anything. Is that the 1 their own and whilst they still wish to protect the 2 kind of assurance that you would similarly get when you 2 assets that they have that's not the sort of -- it is 3 tried to raise concerns about security? 3 not in the culture to be very open about that. 4 A. Not in those terms because there was more of a dialogue 4 MS GOLLOP: You have read the Statoil report? 5 and we were able to put specific questions and seek 5 A. Yes. 6 specific comments. I wouldn't characterise our 6 Q. And you will recall the passage of analysis that says 7 discussions along the lines of that, no. 7 that it shouldn't have been outwith one's imagination to 8 Q. You said earlier in your evidence that there was no 8 imagine an attack of the scope that actually occurred. 9 suggestion of anything on the scale of In Amenas. Do 9 Do you recall that? 10 you think there was complacency on behalf of the 10 A. I don't recall it quite in those terms. I mean, I think 11 Algerian army and intelligence service? 11 it was -- as I recall it, it was saying that this was 12 A. Again, I think that's a matter for them and it's not 12 clearly an attack along the lines of 9/11 and that it 13 straightforward for me to comment on that. But clearly 13 was actually very difficult to think that an attack like 14 Algeria was responsible for the outer security and this 14 that was going to happen. 15 incident happened, so that's fairly obvious. 15 Q. We have heard some evidence that there was one attempt 16 Q. Do you know what went on? 16 to discuss the Statoil report at a JV committee and the 17 A. No, I don't. I mean, I wasn't -- I wasn't there and 17 Sonatrach representative became very angry and it wasn't 18 I wasn't a witness to what happened, so I can't say. 18 possible to discuss the report any further. Is it your 19 Q. I am not talking about the military dealing with it. 19 impression that the culture is such that it simply will 20 I am talking about how four our five or six or seven 20 not allow any criticism however mild from an outsider? 21 jeeps managed to drive across the desert through what we 21 A. There is a lot of sensitivity about any criticism coming 22 are told was a guarded border through a military zone, 22 from outside. That is certainly the case, yes. 23 through cars that were supposed to circulate and that 23 Q. Our culture is when something goes wrong we try to 24 going wrong. 24 identify what's gone wrong and we try to learn lessons 25 A. I think getting over the -- the border was so long and 25 from it and indeed this whole process is part of that

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1 culture. Should the families have any hope that there 1 other matters -- 2 is an ability to learn lessons on the part of Algerians? 2 A. Yes. 3 A. They've certainly put in place a lot of measures and 3 Q. -- in order to help build up a picture of security and 4 steps since the incident and I know the companies 4 threats within the country and the region? 5 involved have been negotiating with Algeria to make sure 5 A. Yes, they are. I mean, those staff are involved in all 6 that those measures are what they require. But again, 6 aspects of the work of an embassy and clearly there are 7 I don't think it is for me in an open session like this 7 security people, there are people in our management 8 to get into that sort of question. I would hope that, 8 teams helping to run the embassy and provide services, 9 yes, of course they'll learn the lessons. I think it 9 but we also have local staff who are involved on 10 came as a big shock to them. Certainly as it did to 10 political issues, press issues, security issues and it 11 everybody. And they put in place measures since then to 11 is our local staff who monitor the press and produce 12 prevent anything like this ever ever happening again. 12 summaries each day. And our local staff have contacts 13 Q. In the last couple of years we have had a digest of 13 with people across Algeria. So they are a valuable 14 a discussion between the Prime Minister and the Algerian 14 source of information themselves in their own context. 15 Prime Minister that took place in December last year and 15 Q. Able to read articles, whatever the sources are, in 16 that tells us that there is a good dialogue between our 16 different languages and absorb that information? 17 national security teams and there is a hope that that 17 A. Yes. 18 might be extended perhaps by holding a joint exercise. 18 Q. And you say provide summaries on a daily basis? 19 Is that a military -- perhaps you don't know, but would 19 A. Yes, we have a daily press summary. 20 that be a sort of military joint exercise? 20 Q. Can I ask you just a question or two about the security 21 A. No, it would be more crisis management, so how we, the 21 situation within Algeria. You have already answered 22 UK, handle crises, and how Algeria handles crises, so 22 a number of questions on it. Steadily improving since 23 again, sharing experiences and we would obviously hope 23 the 1990s. You have identified the main threat as being 24 that our experience would be of interest and value to 24 insecurity in the south of the country. Can we just 25 the Algerians. 25 understand it because we have heard of a number of

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1 MS GOLLOP: Thank you very much. 1 incidents that occurred within the country but in the 2 THE CORONER: Mr Popat, I am just mindful of the time. If 2 northern part of Algeria? 3 it is possible within a relatively short time to finish 3 A. Yes, yes. 4 so that Mr Roper is not coming back after a lunchtime 4 Q. Was there a distinction between the north and the south 5 but equally I don't know how long you are going to be. 5 in terms of terrorist activity and incidents that had 6 It is not a critical enquiry at all. Just one for 6 occurred over the years? 7 information. 7 A. Yes, you could argue that there was a specific 8 MR POPAT: Sir, I anticipate about ten minutes. I am not 8 situation. It is the east, to the east of Algiers there 9 sure how long. 9 was a low level terrorist insurgency in the east of 10 MR LAIDLAW: I have no questions at present. 10 Algiers and there would be attacks on police, Gendarmes, 11 MR BARR: No questions anticipated, sir. 11 military from time to time and the terrorists were 12 THE CORONER: I don't want you to be under pressure, 12 hiding away up in the mountains in terrain which was 13 Mr Popat, because you mustn't be but shall we see if ten 13 very difficult for the Algerian authorities to get at. 14 minutes or so will finish? 14 Whereas the sort of two southern brigades, as they were 15 Questions from MR POPAT 15 called, were the ones I mentioned which were down in the 16 MR POPAT: Mr Roper I ask questions on behalf of BP. Just 16 south operating between Mali, Niger and that southern 17 a few matters. First, just an understanding of some of 17 border area. 18 the functions of the locally engaged staff employed at 18 Q. And the Algerian military and government response to 19 the embassy in Algeria. 19 terrorist activity and the possibility of terrorist 20 A. Yes. 20 activity has historically been fairly strong? 21 Q. You say in your witness statement that there are 21 A. Mmm. 22 approximately 100 locally engaged staff. Are they 22 Q. Well resourced? 23 involved in the analysis of materials that you have 23 A. Yes, Algeria because of its oil wealth is a well 24 described that goes on within the embassy, examination 24 resourced country. 25 of articles, media sources, social media and all the 25 Q. The competence of the military as far as you are able to

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1 assess it and judge it and others within the 1 in Algeria since the 90s and although the situation had 2 organisation were able to assess and judge it was that 2 stabilised and improved, that threat was still seen to 3 it was a competent, well resourced, well equipped, 3 be there. Our travel advice would have always added 4 strong military presence? 4 any -- if there were any new facts, if there had been an 5 A. I mean, that was our judgment, yes. 5 incident that would be added to the travel advice so 6 Q. And where resources were required to be deployed was it 6 people had an idea of what had happened in recent 7 your experience that on the whole they were deployed? 7 months. There were lots of factual changes made. 8 We have heard for example troops being deployed to the 8 Q. Thank you. And I am sorry to do this with you, 9 border as the border regions became more unstable. Was 9 Mr Roper, but you were asked about the location of the 10 that generally your view of how the Algerians would 10 facility at In Amenas from the border. It was asked of 11 respond? 11 you in connection with the travel advice which said 12 A. Yes, yes. And I think there were concerns about the 12 central travel only in the 50-kilometres with the Libyan 13 quality of some of their conscripts. Although they had 13 border. Can I just ask you to, please, pick up a bundle 14 the manpower and the resources, there were some concerns 14 which should be there. It is called exhibits bundle 4. 15 around that area. 15 I am not sure what colour it is, and turn, please, to 16 Q. Generally, as I think you have said, the trend was, if 16 divider 36. 17 you like, moving downwards in that there were a reduced 17 A. Yes. 18 number of terrorist incidents in the country over the 18 Q. You see a map with a line drawn on it to indicate 19 years up to 2013. Is that correct? 19 a distance. You are aware In Amenas town was closer to 20 A. Yes, there was still a lot of concern and the regional 20 the border with Libya than In Amenas the facility? 21 dimension was adding to that, but if you look from the 21 A. Yes, exactly. 22 90s to now the overall trend was generally downward. 22 Q. In Amenas, the facility, as it is shown on this plan, 23 Q. And the security provided by the Algerians, you have 23 map, is some 78-kilometres from the CPF to the Libyan 24 summarised it in answers just a moment ago, for the 24 border, at the closest point. Is that something you 25 hydrocarbon installations was a layered security. There 25 were aware of before --

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1 was the security provided at the border, with border 1 A. Well, I mean it's roughly 50, I mean it's the size of 2 guards? 2 Luxembourg the site, so it's clearly around sort of -- 3 A. Yes. 3 50-kilometres is a rough number away from the border, 4 Q. And the resources at the border. Away from the border 4 which is where I think that figure comes from. 5 militarised zones with checkpoints heavily staffed by 5 Q. The advice related obviously to all people travelling in 6 military presence and equipment up to the installations 6 Algeria, British people. But you were aware, weren't 7 themselves where there were other security resources? 7 you, that obviously employees of companies such as BP, 8 A. Yes. 8 employees, JV personnel, travelling within the country 9 Q. Was that an understanding you had of the way that the 9 would be travelling in a different way to ordinary 10 military system and the security provision operated? 10 people going about their business? 11 A. Yes, that's correct. 11 A. Yes, yes. 12 Q. Can I ask you a question or two about the FCO advice. 12 Q. And that they would be far, far better protected against 13 First perhaps just to clarify a point that was put to 13 the risks of kidnap, the threat which had been 14 you. The advice was fairly similar from August 2012 14 identified as the principal threat because they would be 15 through to January 2013? 15 protected by armed security travelling in convoys with 16 A. Yes, it was. 16 various other facilities and arrangements being made for 17 Q. The events in Mali led to an addition I think of one 17 their protection? 18 sentence to the January 2013 travel advice which 18 A. Yes. 19 identified specifically the possible risks arising from 19 Q. The arrangements that related to BP employees and others 20 the foreign intervention? 20 in that sort of situation were therefore very different 21 A. Yes, that's right. 21 to other people travelling within the country. At any 22 Q. It was pretty similar, was it, before August 2012, if we 22 stage did the FCO or any other Government organisation 23 looked back over a number of months, it was similar 23 issue any advice or instruction to any foreign companies 24 advice all the way through? 24 that they must evacuate from Algeria and could not 25 A. Yes, because there has been a high threat of terrorism 25 conduct business in Algeria?

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1 A. No. 1 A. Yes, I think -- 2 Q. The US travel advice was changed but I think you said it 2 Q. Thank you. You were asked a number of questions about 3 wasn't fundamentally different to the UK travel advice, 3 the strategic security partnership and whether the 4 but changed in relation specifically to travelling in 4 attack was a prompt for change and you have explained 5 and out of Hassi Messaoud in light of the risk of 5 that was in fact part of an ongoing development of the 6 surface to air missiles that had been identified? 6 relationship? 7 A. Mmm. 7 A. Mmm. 8 Q. Just so we understand this correctly. The review of 8 Q. Would it be fair to say that one thing that has changed 9 that travel advice and the review of the British travel 9 post this horrible attack is that the willingness 10 advice that followed involved you personally, as 10 perhaps of information sharing on the part of the 11 I understood it, having discussions with others within 11 Algerians which was perhaps not as forthcoming before 12 the Algerian system as to how that threat should be 12 the attack? 13 assessed? 13 A. Yes, I think that is fair and our intention in 14 A. We asked them for their -- yes, for their view on the 14 establishing the strategic security partnership was that 15 likelihood of these weapons getting into the hands of 15 it would help increase the flow of information. 16 terrorists and firing on aircraft and then that was one 16 Q. The attack itself was, as you said in your witness 17 element informing our own response to it. 17 statement at paragraph 36, unprecedented in size and 18 Q. And that led to you, and I do mean you personally, 18 scale. The nature of the attack, the sort of attack was 19 issuing a communication to all energy companies and 19 not one that had been identified or predicted in any of 20 British nationals within Algeria which you have 20 the assessments that had been undertaken before? 21 exhibited to your statement -- we have in another place 21 A. Not on that scale, no. 22 in the core bundle -- and you concluded in that 22 Q. You say you are not aware of any major attack on oil and 23 communication: 23 gas facilities and certainly there were, I think we 24 "That whilst people need to continue to be vigilant 24 know, some attacks in the past on pipelines? 25 if the assessment changes or we hear of new threats we 25 A. Pipelines, yes.

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1 will of course be in touch with you immediately." 1 Q. But none on oil and gas facilities -- 2 In other words, I am not reading the rest of it, but 2 A. No. 3 having taken into account all the information you had 3 Q. -- within the region? 4 obtained as at the date of the sending of this 4 A. No. 5 communication the assessment had not changed but if it 5 Q. In that connection, can I again in case it causes you 6 did change in the future it would be communicated? 6 any concern, you were asked some questions about what 7 A. Yes, although I think that particular mention was 7 was put to you as a specific warning received by BP in 8 referring to the missiles. It is about the specific 8 relation to Hassi R'Mel. So you are aware of it, that 9 question of the missiles and whether they can fire at 9 was not a specific warning to BP or the JV alone. It 10 aircraft, but we -- 10 was a general communication about a potential threat in 11 Q. That particular threat certainly hadn't altered your 11 relation to Hassi R'Mel and Hassi R'Mel has the pipe or 12 assessment as at that date? 12 one of the pipelines for the state? 13 A. No. 13 A. Yes, yes. 14 Q. And if that or any other threat had emerged that you had 14 Q. And apart from that sort of attack there hadn't been any 15 taken credibly that would have altered or potentially 15 attack on any oil installations within Algeria? 16 have altered your assessment and that would then have 16 A. No. Apart from, as you say, in the 90s there were one 17 been communicated? 17 or two attacks on pipelines which caused some damage but 18 A. Yes, I think we are obliged that we would pass on any 18 there had been nothing on the scale of what we saw at 19 credible threat to a British interest. 19 In Amenas. 20 Q. Can you just help, do you know when this communication 20 Q. Can I then just turn to the gist that we received and 21 was sent? It is undated. 21 more specifically the form of words that had been 22 A. I can't recall exactly but the article, it is around the 22 communicated by the lead counsel for the government to 23 time of the article, is the summer I think, isn't it, of 23 this court. If in asking any of these questions there 24 that year? It is -- I have got it on. 24 is anything that shouldn't be provided in open forum, 25 Q. The summer of 2012? 25 please obviously just identify it, Mr Roper.

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1 The form of words that has been provided says, as is 1 again, it is clear, that related to In Salah, not 2 made clear by the gist: 2 In Amenas? 3 "The government did receive some information late in 3 A. Not In Amenas, yes, okay. 4 2012 which it was later established was some months old 4 Q. We heard from Mr Collins that there had been liaison 5 but there was a delay in processing that information. 5 between the liaison team, the AFMC people employed by 6 The question arises as to whether this delay made 6 the JV, and the military in relation to that request and 7 a difference. Her Majesty's Government has considered 7 that led ultimately to the military not requiring guards 8 this issue and concluded that it cannot be sure about 8 to be provided in-house but providing military resource. 9 what might have happened. However, but for the delay 9 Is that what you would expect to take place within the 10 there is a possibility that some of the information 10 commercial organisation having that sort of request 11 would have been given to BP before the attack." 11 being made of it that there would be that sort of 12 My question isn't about the information itself, but 12 communication within the organisation and between the 13 how is it that that information is likely to have been 13 organisation and the Algerian military? 14 communicated to BP, in what form and through what 14 A. Yes, if it was connected to the JV the request would 15 channels? 15 come within the JV which has agreed responsibility for 16 A. I mean, again, I can't really comment on anything that 16 security matters. We would only be asked to get 17 is in the gist or go beyond the gist. 17 involved if there was a problem but again, I would be 18 THE CORONER: If you can do it broadly I think that is the 18 sceptical that that would happen because the 19 question. Do you mean, Mr Popat? If anything -- 19 relationships between the JV partners would be important 20 A. If we got specific information of a threat to a British 20 and you could be undermining those. 21 company that would be communicated via the channels tha t 21 Q. So if that communication had led to a problem, then at 22 exist and obviously it would be done at very senior 22 that stage it may be that you would become involved? 23 levels if it was a very serious and imminent threat. So 23 A. Yes. 24 the normal channels that exist, so contacts in London 24 Q. And the second matter which arose from Ms Gerry's 25 between senior Foreign Office people and BP and all the 25 questions that I just wanted to touch upon with you

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1 channels would be how it was done. 1 related to the Control Risks's report. 2 MR POPAT: And if, again I am not asking you, I stress, to 2 A. Mmm. 3 comment on this particular information, but if the 3 Q. And a couple of short passages were read out to you and 4 threat had related to BP employees specifically, then 4 I just want to see what you think about a couple of 5 the communication would be a direct communication 5 other passages which preceded those passages. For 6 presumably to BP -- 6 anyone reading the report it is core bundle 2. If it 7 A. Yes. 7 helps you, Mr Roper, it is -- again, I am not sure what 8 Q. -- to identity that risk to its employees, and 8 colour it is but it is number 2, behind tab 1. The 9 presumably there might be some wider communication to 9 pagination is bottom right. If you could turn, please, 10 others who might be potentially affected by the threat 10 to page 256? 11 as well? 11 A. Okay. 12 A. Yes. 12 Q. Under the heading "Regional political and security 13 Q. And there would be a direct -- 13 trends" the first paragraph refers to the threats from 14 A. And clearly travel advice, if we had specific 14 the changing political and security dynamics in north 15 information about credible threats we have to warn 15 Africa which are expected to have a negative impact on 16 everybody and something would need to be put out in the 16 Algerian security environment. That is entirely 17 travel advice. 17 uncontentious, I assume, from everything you have said. 18 Q. Finally, just two matters which arise from questions you 18 And it concludes, having referred to Northern Mali and 19 were asked by Ms Gerry, who is the advocate at the far 19 Libyan governments, to the sentence at the end that: 20 end on the left. 20 "This is likely to lead to a slow but steady 21 A. Okay. 21 deterioration in the security environment in Algeria's 22 Q. You were asked about some comments in a statement from 22 far south." 23 Mr Collins and they related to the request, if we put it 23 But it then goes on to say this: 24 as generally as we can, from the Algerian military for 24 "However, most of the south, particularly the 25 armed guards to be provided inside or at the camp. So 25 southern oil producing regions, should remain shielded

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1 from such developments in the short term. Given the 1 it correct that they are, as this report states, fully 2 capabilities of Algeria's security forces the trajectory 2 aware of the threat of terrorism in your dealings with 3 of the security environment in the far south is unlikely 3 them and what they assessed? 4 to have a significant impact on the security environment 4 A. I think they have been dealing with this situation in 5 in Algiers and the oil producing regions. Security in 5 their region for so long and it is a lot of the same 6 the capital would be more sensitive." 6 people in the Algerian system who are still there who 7 And then reference is made to the president's 7 were fighting the war in the 90s, so my view is, yes, 8 successor. 8 they are very aware of the threat and very aware of who 9 Does that, again these are very general words and it 9 they are facing. But you have to add to that the whole 10 is one passage in a report that runs to a few pages but 10 dynamic of the region from what happened in Libya and 11 broadly speaking does that accord with your assessment 11 then in Mali does add new elements and Algeria was also, 12 at the time? 12 I think, surprised at just how quickly in Mali, Ansar 13 A. Yes, I mean I would have added the point about the 13 Dine, that the force there was able to get into Bamako 14 borders and clearly with the regional security being in 14 and take effective control of Bamako. They were very -- 15 such flux that clearly makes the challenge of protecting 15 not Bamako, the northern parts, Kidal and the areas 16 the borders harder. But, yes, I mean this picks up on 16 around there. So yes, they were very clear of who the 17 the point that Algeria did have an effective functioning 17 threats were but the change in dynamic did produce new 18 state security system and that it was better able than 18 factors and uncertainties. 19 other states in the region to protect its borders. 19 MR POPAT: Thank you. 20 Q. And a similar point is made before the passage on 20 MR LAIDLAW: No questions, thank you. 21 page 279. The bottom two paragraphs, again, if 21 MR GLASSON: No questions, sir. 22 I summarise it. The likely continuation of the 22 THE CORONER: All right. Thank you very much for coming. 23 instability in Northern Mali will probably allow the 23 I think you like many others have had to re-arrange 24 MUJWA to maintain a significant presence across the 24 schedules to be able to come and help us and also as has 25 region. Its ability to conduct attacks within Algeria's 25 been said thank you for the efforts that you made at the

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1 oil producing south is likely to remain limited. Then 1 time. 2 it goes on to say: 2 A. Okay, thank you. 3 "Significant decrease in the security forces' 3 (The witness withdrew) 4 coercive capabilities would provide the terrorists with 4 THE CORONER: So we will say 2.25. Ms Gollop, if the 5 more ability." 5 question is still in point will you perhaps just discuss 6 But it continues in the final paragraph to say: 6 the issue of the interviews with Ms Dolan and Mr Barr 7 "Even so the reduction in the security forces' 7 and see if you can find a way through that, the question 8 presence is likely to be marginal." 8 you asked, it may be possible to get at it in another 9 And then it says: 9 way. I don't know. Thank you. 10 "Although strained by the fall out from the 2011 10 (1.30 pm) 11 Libyan conflict and the instability in Northern Mali, 11 (Luncheon Adjournment) 12 the Algerian security forces appear fully aware of the 12 (2.25 pm) 13 threat and have attempted to respond accordingly 13 MS DOLAN: Sir, the next witness is Mr Bristow. 14 increasing their presence in the Saharan border regions 14 MR LAURIE BRISTOW (sworn) 15 and around the infrastructure in the south. As such 15 Questions from MS DOLAN 16 a significant deterioration in the security environment 16 MS DOLAN: Mr Bristow, I think you know I am Bridget Dolan, 17 in the southern oil producing areas which would 17 counsel for the inquiry. 18 facilitate a sustained campaign against energy 18 Can you give us your full name and professional 19 infrastructure remains unlikely." 19 affiliation, please? 20 Again, consistent? 20 A. My name is Laurie Bristow. I work for the Foreign 21 A. Yes, I think that's consistent. 21 Office. My job currently and at the time of the 22 Q. And, so it is clear, you were asked a number of 22 In Amenas attack is director of national security. 23 questions about the Algerian military's response and the 23 Q. And I think you have been in that post 24 information that you had received from it as to what its 24 since September 2012 at the time of the events? 25 plans were and what it understood about threats but is 25 A. That's right.

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1 Q. Can I ask you first of all about travel advice that is 1 Q. In your statement you set out at the time of the events 2 given out by the FCO to British citizens. We have heard 2 at In Amenas the travel advice for Algeria had been 3 a little bit from Mr Roper and I think you were here for 3 unchanged since April 2012 apart from a small factual 4 some of it? 4 addition since the French intervention in Mali. 5 A. All of it. 5 If it is unchanged since 4 April 2012 are we taking 6 Q. The inquest has copies of the travel advice shortly 6 from that that from all the sources that the Government 7 before the events at In Amenas and in that there is 7 had available to it there was no significant increase in 8 advice against all but essential travel in certain 8 threat seen from April 2012 through to I think it 9 areas? 9 is December 2012 when the last travel advice was 10 A. Yes. 10 updated? 11 Q. All but essential isn't defined anywhere by the FCO. Is 11 A. Well, with the travel advice for all countries there is 12 there any further indication or further description of 12 a requirement that it should be reviewed periodically 13 what essential travel actually means as far as the FCO 13 and typically that is a one month period for each 14 and Government are concerned or do they just leave the 14 country, you know, the geographical desk taking the lead 15 interpretation of that word to others? 15 will look at the travel advice and ask itself the 16 A. I would refer you to the advice given on the FCO website 16 question: does this still stand? And with the travel 17 both about specific travel advice for specific countries 17 advice I mean the important thing is to read it in its 18 but also about what the generality behind, the intention 18 totality. What is the totality, what is the general 19 behind the travel advice is. We don't specify in terms 19 sense that it is trying to give you about the risks and 20 what advice against all but essential travel means and 20 about the capability of mitigating those risks 21 we don't -- well, advice against all travel means what 21 travelling in country. There is always a balance here 22 it says. But the underlying purpose of that is that 22 between doing that and overloading with detail. You 23 what we seek to do in travel advice, in the travel 23 know, putting in too much ephemeral detail which doesn't 24 advice, is to give the best assessment we can on the 24 necessarily help the reader. The sense that we are 25 information and the assessment available to us for the 25 looking for the reader to get is what is the overall

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1 travelling public about the sorts of risks they would 1 aggregate level of risk is, and and if that is 2 face by travelling to a particular country and to give 2 essentially unchanged then it is right for the travel 3 them essentially the information, the advice on which to 3 advice not to change. 4 make up their minds about how happy they are, what sorts 4 Q. And the advice stood from April 2012 through 5 of measures they need to take to look after their own 5 to January 2012 saying there is a high threat of 6 safety, essentially to take an informed judgment. 6 terrorism in Algeria and attacks could be indiscriminate 7 Q. So in a sense another phrase which appears is exercise 7 and further kidnap attacks are likely. 8 extreme caution and is that then left to the individual 8 A. Yes, that is as far as the elements of the advice go. 9 to decide what extreme caution means? 9 Of course it is important to realise for other travels 10 A. Yes, I think what I would want to say on that is that it 10 other bits of the travel advice are equally or more 11 is -- extreme caution will depend on a number of things. 11 important. 12 It will depend on, you know, the precise circumstances 12 Q. And I think the advice as it now stands is different 13 in the country, the individual's attitude towards risk, 13 again in respect of travel to Algeria. Are you aware of 14 what level of risk they're comfortable with. What sorts 14 the -- 15 of mitigations they can put in place around the risk. 15 A. I am afraid I haven't read the travel advice as it 16 You know, what they can do to keep themselves safe. But 16 stands this morning. 17 ultimately the judgment is for them to take about, you 17 Q. Would it surprise you if the advice as at December 2014 18 know, how to use the advice, what steps to take on the 18 now advised against all travel within 100 kilometres of 19 basis of that. 19 the Libyan border? 20 Q. And as you say, the judgment is for them to take because 20 A. That wouldn't surprise me. 21 only they know what mitigations are in place around 21 Q. Turning to the actual events at In Amenas. One of the 22 their personal circumstances? 22 questions concerning the families is whether there was 23 A. And only they I think can take a fully informed view as 23 specific information available to the Government that 24 to what level of risk they feel they are comfortable 24 specifically identified the attack of the nature that 25 with. 25 happened at In Amenas and whether there was or wasn't

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1 information of that specificity? 1 naturally a state that shares information, particularly 2 A. There wasn't. 2 in this sort of context. Of course we had information 3 Q. The attack itself, can you explain to us what it was 3 coming at us from a wide variety of sources, but in 4 that the FCO and the Government put in place once the 4 terms of the Algerian state, you know, we had to work 5 attack was learned of? We have heard from Mr Roper what 5 quite hard to get a picture out of them as to what they 6 happened at the embassy in Algeria. What was the 6 thought was happening and what their response would be 7 response in the UK? 7 and the key contacts there, apart from through the 8 A. Okay, it might help the questions just to explain a bit 8 embassy and colleagues in Algiers itself, were a series 9 about how the crisis management structures work in 9 of direct top level senior level contacts including 10 Government in the Foreign Office. I mean, the key 10 Prime Minister repeatedly with his opposite number, 11 elements here are first of all the role of COBRA which 11 Foreign Office ministers and others, you know, to their 12 is the -- it is the central government crisis response 12 counterparts in the Algerian system. 13 machinery, which brings together under the chairmanship 13 Q. I think there was communication between the 14 of the Prime Minister in many cases, during the 14 Prime Minister and the Algerian Prime Minister? 15 In Amenas attack, you know, those people across 15 A. There were repeated, repeated conversations between the 16 government, you know, who need to be most involved, 16 Prime Minister and the Algerian Prime Minister during 17 closely involved in the management of the crisis. And 17 the events, sometimes more than once a day. 18 you know, the purpose of that meeting is to get first of 18 Q. Can you assist us with what was learned about the 19 all a single clear picture as to what is going on and to 19 situation in those conversations? 20 use that picture to inform decision making and things 20 A. Yes. In summary, I mean the purpose of those 21 get tasked out of COBRA, you know, go and speak to the 21 conversations was to do two things. One was to get from 22 Prime Minister of Algeria, make an offer to them to give 22 the horse's mouth as it were, the Algerian understanding 23 assistance, that sort of thing. 23 of what they were dealing with and what their intentions 24 The other key element is the crisis management 24 were. But equally important to try to influence those 25 structure in the Foreign Office itself where essentially 25 intentions, you know, to try -- first of all, to offer

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1 what happens is that once a crisis is declared a crisis 1 the Algerians any support and assistance that they 2 leader will be appointed and that person will assemble 2 required or were prepared to accept and to get across to 3 around them a team who will deal with the various 3 the Algerian government, you know, what our priorities 4 elements of the crisis. So in the case of In Amenas and 4 were in the crisis, which were, as always in a crisis of 5 I was appointed crisis leader after the, you know, after 5 this nature, to give the victims, you know, the people 6 the first COBRA and you know, the team included 6 taken hostage the best possible chance of getting out 7 colleagues, including senior colleagues in some cases 7 alive. 8 whose job was to focus on the consular angles, in 8 Q. You have provided with your witness statements the 9 looking after the British national victims and their 9 summary records of calls between the Algerian foreign 10 families, media handling, working through what our 10 minister and Alistair Burt MP who was in the Foreign 11 understanding was of what was actually happening and 11 Office at the time. 12 what our response should be so my counter terrorism team 12 A. Yes. 13 primarily leading on that. 13 Q. One of the calls on 17 January has in it a summary 14 A team leading on working on how we would engage 14 description of the Algerian account of what happened 15 with the Algerians, what was happening inside the 15 with what we have called the vehicle convoy. If you 16 Algerian state and so on and within that team we would 16 look at -- you have your statement there and you will 17 have people embedded from relevant organisations across 17 find it is LB1 and it is on the second page of LB1. 18 Government who would be able to help us do that. 18 A. Sorry, I am struggling to find it. Can you -- 19 Q. And how much information did COBRA, or the 19 Q. LB1 to your second statement. Perhaps I can hand it 20 manifestations of it, the groups coming out of COBRA, 20 over to you? 21 receive from the Algerian government during the event? 21 A. Thanks, that would be simpler. (Handed) 22 A. I think, as has come out of Martyn's evidence this 22 THE CORONER: Just turn through that and you will come to 23 morning, and from a number of other sources in the 23 near the top of the page. It has 17 January. 24 course of this enquiry, I mean, the basic problem in 24 A. Yes, got that. 25 dealing with the Algerian state is that it is not 25 MS DOLAN: Are you there?

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1 A. This is the call to the Algerian ambassador or Meldeci, 1 A. Yes. 2 the foreign minister. 2 Q. And the Algerians therefore intercepted them and three 3 Q. I was going to come to the foreign minister but let's 3 of the vehicles were, the word is neutralised, and two 4 stick to the ambassador one. First of all, there is 4 were recovered? 5 a call on 17 January which is Mr Burt calling the 5 A. Yes. 6 Algerian ambassador in London and he's reiterating the 6 Q. Did you know any more about this call that we find in 7 COBRA requests there? 7 this note or any more of what the explanation from the 8 A. Yes. 8 Algerians was of what had happened and what their 9 Q. Can you tell us what those requests were that he was 9 intentions had been? 10 reiterating? 10 A. I wasn't present during this call taking place and of 11 A. Yes, essentially the, I mean the requests were to urge 11 course this is a summary of a note taken by a note-taker 12 the Algerians to do what the hostage takers had asked 12 of a call with the Algerian foreign minister who of 13 them to do on the first day of the crisis, which was to, 13 course will likely not have been in the sort of 14 or at least some of it, which was to open up mobile 14 innermost command of the operation taking place, so 15 comms as I think, you know, the mobile phone system had 15 there are multiple levels here of sort of relaying 16 gone down or been taken down, I'm not quite sure which, 16 what's happened. 17 and there was a certain amount of firing going on. 17 THE CORONER: You need to be cautious with it. 18 I mean there was another demand as well I think for 18 MS DOLAN: And being fair is this conversation likely to 19 a safe passage to the border which we certainly would 19 have been in French or Arabic? 20 not have supported at that stage. But essentially the 20 A. I think Meldeci would have done it in English but 21 point here was to urge the Algerians, you know, to 21 I don't know, I wasn't present on the call. 22 deescalate the situation, to stop doing things that we 22 Q. But the phrase there is that the terrorists had refused 23 assessed increased the risk to the hostages. 23 to respond to the Algerian measures and the Algerians 24 Q. Which was firing into the compound. I think the call 24 therefore intercepted them and as he thought then three 25 I was going to take you to was the next call that day 25 of the vehicles were neutralised and two were recovered

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1 which is Mr Burt to the Algerian foreign minister. 1 and a statement those in the vehicles were neutralised? 2 A. Okay. 2 A. That's right. 3 Q. And towards the bottom of that call it describes the 3 Q. Do you have any understanding of whether before that 4 foreign minister describing two operations having taken 4 operation to intercept the convoy happened, whether the 5 place on 17 January? 5 British Government had any knowledge that it was about 6 A. Yes. 6 to happen? 7 Q. One completed operation to control the situation with 7 A. No. One of the features throughout this crisis was that 8 regard to terrorists at the base. What was the second, 8 we were not getting advance warning from the Algerians 9 tell us what the second point was that he described as 9 of what they were intending to do and, you know, because 10 happened? 10 of the nature of the crisis, the nature of the site, 11 A. As I think it is set out in the summary, what I think 11 I mean information -- getting a really accurate picture 12 this refers to is the operation where the hostage takers 12 of what was actually happening on the site was 13 put a number of hostages in vehicles and attempted to 13 problematic throughout the crisis. 14 move them and at that point on my understanding the 14 Q. Is that particularly unusual in terrorist situations 15 Algerian military intervened to stop that happening. 15 abroad? Is this something that is a feature of Algeria 16 Q. And although this is just somebody else's summary of 16 or that this is a sovereign state dealing with 17 what they understood the foreign minister to be saying, 17 a difficult situation on their shores and you are 18 is it right that what he says there there had been an 18 a foreign government, one of many foreign governments, 19 operation whereby the terrorists had left with five 19 asking for information? 20 vehicles, he said, containing a mix of hostages and 20 A. I think it is a mixture of two things. There are some 21 terrorists, they understood there were three hostages in 21 circumstances in which we would expect to get a pretty 22 each vehicle and that the Algerians had pursued these 22 good insight into what was going on and to have a pretty 23 vehicles? 23 good dialogue into the management of the crisis. 24 A. That's right. 24 I think this was not one of them. 25 Q. The terrorists had refused to respond? 25 THE CORONER: Probably not made easier if you have a number

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1 of nationalities involved. 1 to deepen the channels and the scope of cooperation. 2 A. In terms of how the Algerians engage with us it 2 Q. And I think Prime Minister Salal was in the UK 3 certainly wouldn't make it easier but I don't think it 3 in December? 4 would be the determining factor. I think what it does 4 A. That's right. 5 do is to ensure that there are more possibly competing 5 Q. Where what is suggested in the note we have seen of that 6 versions of the truth in circulation. 6 meeting with the Prime Minister is there has been 7 MS DOLAN: Since the attack can you tell us about what 7 a transformation of UK and Algerian relations since this 8 structures are in place in addition to what we have 8 incident. Is that too strong a word, transformation? 9 heard from Mr Roper to improve the dialogue between the 9 A. That was the word that was used and it is faithfully 10 two countries? 10 recorded in the note. I would characterise it as "work 11 A. Yes, what I would add to what Martyn said this morning 11 in progress". It is good to have that sort of language 12 is two things. First of all, the intent and impact of 12 being used of a relationship but what we really need 13 the Prime Minister's visit to Algeria shortly after the 13 here is to be confident that we have actually moved 14 crisis, I mean, the purpose of that visit was, amongst 14 forward in substance and that if we were having to deal 15 other things, first of all to demonstrate a degree of 15 with a crisis of this nature again that we would have, 16 solidarity with the Algerian government who, you know, 16 you know, the contacts, habits of cooperation in place 17 had just been through a major national trauma and to do 17 to do so. 18 so in a way that maximised the chances of them engaging 18 MS DOLAN: Mr Bristow, I don't have any more questions for 19 with us in the future on things that matter to our 19 you but others will. 20 national security. 20 Questions from MR SHARGHY 21 So the second thing I would add to what Martyn said 21 MR SHARGHY: Mr Roper, my name is Shahran Sharghy and 22 this morning is specifically around the security 22 I represent the family of Carlos Estrada. I only have 23 partnership with the Algerians. I think it would be 23 two, hopefully brief, areas to ask about and 24 a mistake to expect or for us to expect a sort of 24 I appreciate the limitation similar to your colleague 25 instant pay back on that. I mean Algeria isn't that 25 Mr Roper as to what can be discussed and disclosed. But

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1 sort of state. These aren't the sorts of matters where 1 I hope my questions will not be too controversial. 2 things will change overnight in terms of how we deal 2 Insofar as the level and terminology used in the 3 with each other. What we are seeking to do there is to 3 advice that the Foreign Office gives to the general 4 develop habits of dialogue and of cooperation that over 4 public, UK citizens, am I right in thinking that you 5 time we hope will draw them into a more open 5 have no travel at the top end of your advice followed 6 relationship, one where it is easier and more possible 6 thereafter by nothing but essential travel? 7 to discuss, you know, how we would handle security 7 A. Yes, that's not exactly the way it is put. It is advise 8 incidents of this sort, how we would handle protective 8 against all travel and advise against all but essential 9 security, to deliver specific improvements where we need 9 travel. 10 to, for example, on behalf of the company, but also to 10 Q. That is the highest level that the Foreign Office can 11 establish pre-existing channels of very senior dialogue 11 advise? 12 that we can use if there is a crisis, and one of the 12 A. Yes. 13 evident truths of crisis management is that if you need 13 Q. And that is the level, as Ms Dolan has just indicated, 14 a really good contact into a foreign government in 14 that has been applicable to an increased ambit now of 15 a crisis the time to do -- to start doing that is not 15 100 kilometres, so certainly on Mr Popat's measurements 16 when the crisis is underway. 16 that would include the In Amenas plant, and that would 17 Q. And I think if we look at the note that has been 17 apply. Below that is nothing but essential travel? 18 provided to us of the Prime Minister's visit both with 18 A. That's right. 19 Prime Minister Salal and President Bouteflika, this note 19 Q. And the purpose and the underlying feature of the 20 recalls Prime Minister Salal as saying when our 20 Foreign Office giving this advice is that it is 21 Prime Minister visited that the In Amenas incident had 21 applicable to any UK citizen. In other words, they can 22 been a wake up call to the Algerians for a need for 22 be individual travellers, they can be individual 23 deeper international cooperation? 23 business people or they can be multinational companies 24 A. Yes. That is what Salal said. What we are trying to do 24 such as BP sending out employees to places such as 25 is to, you know, move forward on the logic of that and 25 Algeria. Is that right?

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1 A. Yes. I mean, the advice says what it says and the 1 Q. So in the current state that the advice of the Foreign 2 advice is directed at all people who travel. 2 Office provides to UK citizens of no travel to within 3 Q. What I am really trying to understand is that there is 3 100 kilometres, if a company, such as BP, has begun to 4 no real distinction between whether you are a business 4 place employees within that zone, is your view that 5 intending to travel to Algeria or you are an individual? 5 whether or not that risk is mitigated is totally down to 6 A. It is for the people reading the advice to use it as 6 them? 7 they feel appropriate. If I may make just one other 7 A. I would hope that anybody going to a country or to 8 point though. There is a further factor here which 8 a place where we had advised against all travel would do 9 I think is relevant to this discussion which is net 9 so in the knowledge that we had given that advice and 10 risk. You know, what is the effect of the mitigations 10 would have taken the necessary steps to assure 11 that you can put in place, whether you are an individual 11 themselves that, you know, the risk that implies is 12 or a company, to reduce the risk that is implied in our 12 managed effectively. 13 travel advice down to a level that you, the traveller, 13 MS DOLAN: Sir, I don't want to have any misleading of the 14 consider acceptable. 14 witness, only it could be my fault because when this 15 Q. And your hope, and I choose that word very carefully, is 15 witness wasn't aware of the current travel advice 16 that the advice you provide, especially in a company 16 I didn't go it into any detail. My understanding of the 17 scenario, is filtered down as far as possible to those 17 current travel advice is it is no travel within 18 impacted by the travel to such region. In other words, 18 100 kilometres of the border but there is a tiny point 19 you would hope that an employer would inform their 19 of essential only travel which appears to be on the dot 20 employees that this is what the Foreign Office risk is 20 of the map for In Amenas, so just that. 21 but perhaps don't worry because we put into place 21 MR POPAT: It is actually 100 kilometres of the Libyan 22 mitigating factors to give the net effect? 22 Tunisian borders south of the town and then it is all 23 A. Yes. Well, that -- it's -- I think I agree with the 23 but essential travel to In Amenas. 24 point that you are making. But again with a proviso, 24 THE CORONER: Thank you. 25 which is first of all, it is for companies themselves to 25 MR SHARGHY: Thank you. The final point in relation to your

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1 determine, you know, how they use the information with 1 second witness statement, and this appears at 2 regard to their employees and second, that the 2 paragraph 17. If you have it in front of you turn it up 3 information is available to everyone. It is on the 3 but I'll read the whole paragraph out: 4 internet. You know, any one of us can see it. 4 "I have no knowledge of how the terrorists were able 5 Q. But to take account of people who may not necessarily be 5 to pass through the 'ring of steel' to reach the 6 that savvy to go and have a look at Foreign Office 6 In Amenas plant." 7 advice, in an employment situation the hope is that the 7 You have used speech marks there. Do I take it that 8 employer, being a responsible employer, would provide 8 that is not your phrase? 9 that information to its employees? 9 A. That's not my phrase. I think that is the phrase used 10 A. That would be a reasonable expectation, yes. 10 by the Algerian authorities themselves, but I couldn't 11 Q. And where new information is added to the advice, by 11 be sure of that. 12 that I mean the level of risk isn't raised but new 12 Q. But do I take it that you are not agreeing necessarily 13 incidents, new threats and so on and so forth are added, 13 with the Algerian source, wherever it came from, that in 14 again, the hope that the Foreign Office has by putting 14 fact you have knowledge that the ring of steel in fact 15 that information on the site is that that information 15 existed in or around the In Amenas plant? 16 will again filter down to whomever is affected by the 16 A. I personally don't have enough detailed knowledge of the 17 travel advice? 17 precise Algerian state security arrangements at 18 A. Similar answer as before. I mean, the hope and 18 In Amenas to take a view on that. 19 expectation would be that all who wish to see it and 19 Q. But would you have knowledge about the ungovernable 20 need to see it would see it. And act as they see 20 space we have heard about from Libya across the border 21 appropriate on that basis. 21 and then the wider desert where the plant is based? 22 Q. And the action is, if I can put it in this term, 22 A. Yes, this has been an issue that the counter terrorism 23 twofold: the first is thought process and the second is, 23 community around Whitehall and the allies have been 24 if necessary, action? 24 concerned about for some time both with regard to the 25 A. Yes. 25 specific Sahel region and more generally. One of the

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1 features of recent years across the broader region has 1 necessarily be expected to have detailed knowledge of 2 been, as Martyn described this morning, the development 2 security matters or of how the Whitehall machinery 3 of or the growth of essentially ungoverned space and of 3 dealing with this area of work, you know, carries out 4 scope for terrorist groups to establish themselves and 4 its work. 5 to establish facilitation networks, establish movement 5 Q. Would they be expected to pass upwards security concerns 6 across bases, largely or partly untroubled by state 6 about their area, in this case Algeria, that they became 7 authority. That of course isn't true to a large extent 7 aware of? 8 of Algeria but it certainly has been of Libya and of 8 A. Yes. 9 Mali and frankly one of the reasons why, you know, the 9 Q. Do you know if the Algeria desk officer was aware of the 10 intervention in Mali took place was to respond to the 10 unrest at the In Amenas site, the hunger strike, the 11 emergence of precisely that scenario. 11 concerns of the employees? 12 Q. When a country's own Prime Minister says "we need 12 A. I don't know. My assumption was that relevant material 13 roughly the size of NATO in terms of military times 2 to 13 of that sort would have been part of the routine 14 just protect and guard against infiltration of our 14 political reporting from post which would have gone to, 15 borders", it gives you an indication that perhaps the 15 amongst others, the Algeria desk officer. 16 term "ring of steel" is not accurate or in line with 16 Q. So is it the case that then if he had -- he was more 17 reality? 17 likely to have received that from above than received it 18 A. Well, that presumably is a view expressed by an Algerian 18 himself and passed it on? 19 government official. 19 A. Sorry, I don't really understand the question. 20 Q. The Prime Minister? 20 Q. Well, it would have come to him from the Foreign Office 21 A. The Prime Minister. You know, all I would observe on 21 rather than from a source in Algeria; is that what you 22 that is that Algeria is a very, very big country, you 22 are saying, that if he knew about it that is how he 23 know, with very long borders of a sort that may be very 23 found out about it? 24 difficult to defend effectively. 24 A. I think that would be more likely or relevant material, 25 Q. Therefore, just finally, would it be fair to say that 25 not necessarily this material, would have come from

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1 although you have no knowledge of how these terrorists 1 another source in Government. 2 got through you also have no knowledge about whether or 2 Q. Would that sort of internal employment strife be 3 not a ring of steel exists? 3 something which would feed into the travel advice 4 A. Well, one follows from the other. 4 generally, not for the country itself but for that area? 5 MR SHARGHY: Thank you. 5 A. Not necessarily. I mean, it could. I think the key 6 Questions from MR OWEN-THOMAS 6 test here in really any country would be: what is the 7 MR OWEN-THOMAS: Mr Bristow, my name is Owen-Thomas. 7 likelihood of this impacting in a way that merits 8 I represent David Green, father of Stephen Green. 8 inclusion in the travel advice on British nationals 9 I understand within the FCO there is a desk officer 9 either visiting or in residence in the country. 10 for Algeria. Would his or her remit include considering 10 Q. David Green, Stephen Green's father, contacted the 11 the security situation within Algeria? 11 Foreign Office on 16 January. He was unable to get hold 12 A. Yes, it would -- it may help the inquest if I just say 12 of a single point of contact dealing with this attack. 13 a few words about how the Foreign Office is structured. 13 Is it the case that now, were an attack to happen like 14 I mean, the Algeria desk officer will be -- sits in the 14 this now there would be a single point of contact for 15 Middle East and North Africa Directorate, which is 15 families contacting the Foreign Office? 16 a directorate which has geographical responsibility for 16 A. Yes, I think there are a couple of things bundled up 17 our relations with a wide range of countries. My 17 here. I mean -- depending on how precisely the request 18 directorate is a functional directorate and we take 18 came through, I mean, a request to contact the Algeria 19 a close interest in matters of policy and operations 19 desk would be relatively easy to put in touch with the 20 around, for example, counter terrorism and other issues. 20 relevant desk. As I understand it, and having reviewed 21 For the Algeria desk officer, and bearing in mind this 21 including in some of the wash up exercises how external 22 is a fairly junior officer within the Foreign Office 22 contacts happened during this crisis, I think one of the 23 government system, you know, their job is to be the 23 key points for improvement that we identified 24 first point of contact or the sort of -- the owner of 24 particularly around contacts from families or people who 25 the subject matter, but that individual would not 25 thought they might have family members involved was that

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1 getting through the FCO's switchboard to the relevant 1 First of all, I mean, the background of Mokhtar 2 crisis management officer at a time when we were 2 Belmokhtar and his group, as other witnesses have 3 standing up the crisis unit was not always 3 described I think. This is a group whose previous 4 straightforward. And one of the conclusions that we 4 method of operation had been very much focused on 5 drew from that was that we needed to look again at 5 revenue generation. You know, either through smuggling, 6 having specific numbers with specific people on the end 6 you know, known as Mr Marlboro, drug smuggling, people 7 of them who, as a crisis of this sort unfolded, family 7 trafficking and of course kidnap for ransom with 8 members or people who thought they could be in that 8 hostages. In terms of how a ransom demand might have 9 situation could get through to somebody who was 9 fitted into the overall demands of the hostage takers, 10 specifically dealing with this issue right now. 10 I found it very difficult, we found it very difficult at 11 Q. You see, the first thing that Mr Green was told was, 11 the time to establish a very clear and consistent and 12 well, people are there at their own risk. Now that's 12 stable view of what the hostage takers actually wanted, 13 not something that a crisis management team would have 13 what their objectives were. If you look at the, how it 14 said, I suspect, to a relative of someone's son in that 14 evolved over the course of several days, I mean some of 15 position? 15 the demands, particularly early on, were tactical. Some 16 A. If that is what happened I accept your point. 16 of the demands were not tactical. The idea that 17 Q. What contact did you have with BP employees during the 17 hostages could be taken, for example, through agreed 18 attack itself? 18 passage to Mali, where undoubtedly in my view they would 19 A. Me personally or the Government as a whole? 19 have become a subject of a ransom demand, and some of 20 Q. You personally. 20 the demands -- they were quite difficult to pin down. 21 A. Me personally very, very regular contact with BP as the 21 What exactly were the hostage takers seeking to achieve. 22 crisis unfolded. I mean, many times a day I would say. 22 Q. Was it any part of your role to advise BP as to how to 23 Q. And who were you speaking to? 23 respond to demands? 24 A. I was speaking primarily to a senior BP official called 24 A. There was quite a lot of support across Government to 25 Richard Bridge who deals with Government affairs. 25 advising BP both on the tactical handling and on where

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1 Q. Was he part of the Executive Support Team? 1 we thought the hostage takers' objectives might go. 2 A. I don't recall the precise structure of the BP crisis 2 Specifically on the tactical handling, as I think the 3 management team but he is a senior guy in BP and as 3 inquest knows, the decision was taken early on that BP 4 I understood it, as I understand it, I mean he was part 4 should be -- we should not seek to divert the sort of 5 of the core group dealing with BP's crisis response. 5 primary point of contact with the hostage takers from BP 6 Q. And was it through him that you were learning things 6 to anyone else, least of all us, and, you know, there 7 such as the demands the hostage takers were making? 7 are things that follow from that in terms of how you 8 A. That was reaching us through a number of routes. There 8 would manage that contact and that negotiation where 9 were a number of contacts going on through senior BP 9 particularly a hostage crisis negotiation unit support 10 officials and for example Government ministers, my own 10 would have been able to give expert advice on how to 11 contacts, colleagues of mine who at either operational 11 manage that contact. 12 or policy levels were in contact with BP and of course 12 Q. But on a very practical level was it part of -- did you 13 through the embassy in Algiers as well. 13 see it as part of your personal role to say: yes, you 14 Q. And as far as you are aware did you speak to anyone else 14 should pay, no you shouldn't pay, yes you should pay but 15 on the Executive Support Team? 15 keep it quiet, that practical advice? 16 A. I spoke a number of times I think to Peter Mather. 16 A. No, it never got to that stage in terms of payment of 17 I know that -- I think I spoke to Ian Conn although the 17 ransoms and if it had I don't think it would have been 18 primary point of contact there was at ministerial level. 18 my role to pass that message on. There would have been 19 Q. Were you ever told that one of the hostage takers' 19 a tactical level discussion with HCNU but also frankly a 20 demands was for money, for ransom? 20 ministerial discussion if the thing had come to that 21 A. I don't recall that demand reaching us in that form at 21 point. 22 that time. 22 MR OWEN-THOMAS: Thank you, Mr Bristow. 23 Q. You knew of that demand from the hostage takers 23 Questions from MS GERRY 24 generally -- 24 MS GERRY: Mr Bristow, I just have two questions for you. 25 A. You know there are a couple of things to say there. 25 Firstly, have you read the Statoil report?

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1 A. Yes. 1 A. I would need to go back to the full report and see if 2 Q. Can I then just ask you about one part of that which is 2 that was explicitly spelled out by Messahel. I am 3 dealing with the reports on security in Algeria and the 3 afraid I would be speculating if I answered on that. 4 threats being faced at the time and for those who want 4 MS GERRY: Thank you, I have no other questions. 5 the reference it is core bundle 2, page 398, internal 5 Questions from MS GOLLOP 6 57, where it says: 6 MS GOLLOP: Mr Bristow, my name is Katie Gollop and you have 7 "Statoil recognised that the situation in southern 7 kindly answered some questions on behalf of my client 8 Algeria was becoming more challenging as these reports 8 Belinda Green, for which much thanks. 9 identified. The assessment in the company in late 2012 9 Just turning to the document you have just been 10 was that the military continued to offer adequate 10 taken to which hopefully is still in front of you. That 11 protection for In Amenas. Statoil's main concern about 11 visit of 3/4 March last year; point 3: 12 the border situation was with Libya [and] was a risk 12 "The Prime Minister of Algeria and his colleague 13 that the Algerian military forces would be redeployed 13 were emphasising increased cooperation in capacity 14 from zone protection in the hydrocarbon producing areas 14 building that would be required on security issues in 15 to boost border security." 15 addition to upgrading the legal framework that existed 16 It says here that the concern about whether or not 16 between the UK and Algeria for this work." 17 there would be a diversion of military resources from 17 What does that refer to? 18 protecting the hydrocarbon areas to border security. 18 A. Again, you know, I wouldn't want to -- it would be wrong 19 Two questions really. First, is that a concern the 19 for me to speculate on the basis of a summary without 20 British Government had or and/or was that ever a concern 20 going back to the full record of the detail behind that. 21 that was ever raised with the British Government by 21 But one of the things that we have been seeking to do in 22 anybody? 22 the strategic security partnership with the Algerian 23 A. Well I'm not an expert on Algeria, I have to admit; and 23 state is to get them to engage with us on what they 24 all I can do is answer on the basis of what I know. 24 think they would need to increase their capacity, to 25 I am not aware of any evidence to suggest that that was 25 deal with threats of this sort. And one of the issues

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1 what the Algerian state was actually planning to do. 1 that has come up in that conversation, obviously this is 2 The second question, sorry? 2 a fairly sensitive conversation between governments, but 3 Q. I think you have probably answered it. My first 3 one of those issues, for example, has been border 4 question is whether the British Government itself had 4 security management where I think, you know, we all 5 that concern or whether or not that concern was passed 5 recognise that there is a requirement but a factor here 6 on or raised with the British Government by a third 6 has been the description you had this morning from 7 party, but it is not something you are able to assist 7 Martyn Roper of a country that knows it has 8 with. 8 a requirement but is very conscious of its own 9 And then my other question, going back if I may to 9 sovereignty and status in how it cooperates with others 10 your first exhibit, so LB1, where we have the notes of 10 in meeting that. In terms of the legal framework I'm 11 the calls. And it is Mr Burt's visit, 3 to 4 March 11 not 100 per cent sure what that means but I think there 12 which is -- sorry, it is LB2. Are you able to go to the 12 are two elements here that the inquest would want to 13 beginning of LB2 and go forward until you come to 13 focus on. First of all, my understanding of how the 14 Mr Burt's visit of 3/4 March which is on the second page 14 Algerian state works in common with many other similar 15 and then go over to the next page where you get 15 countries is that it can have a fairly legalistic 16 paragraph 16 at the top. Do you have that? 16 approach to international cooperation. If you want to 17 A. Yes. 17 cooperate with them they want to set out very clearly in 18 Q. It says here: 18 some sort of preferably binding form exactly what each 19 "Messahel's analysis of the In Amenas attack clearly 19 side is bringing to the table and the ways in which that 20 showed they considered the operation a success and 20 is managed. 21 hinted at security gaps being down to the company's own 21 For us I would say there is also an element here 22 policies." 22 that we, I would be interested in, which is how do we 23 Are you able to assist with what the view was of the 23 manage our legal risks around cooperation with the 24 Algerians was as to what those security gaps might have 24 Algerian state, and particularly around compliance with 25 been? 25 our international and domestic legal obligations.

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1 Q. International human rights obligations? 1 in April of last year and we can certainly put a copy in 2 A. Yes. 2 front of you but let me just read out one sentence: 3 Q. Has there been any change in the legal framework in the 3 "He [that is either Mr Conn reporting what Mr Dudley 4 last almost what, nine months? 4 felt or what Mr Con's view was] didn't think that the 5 A. Between us and Algeria? 5 Algerians would be forthcoming on how the attackers had 6 Q. Yes. 6 got past the thousand troops stationed in the desert. 7 A. Again, I am not directly responsible for the 7 The minister said he would try to push them on this." 8 relationship with Algeria, but I don't think that there 8 Has the minister had any success in understanding 9 have been any new treaties signed in this area which 9 any better how the ring of steel failed? 10 is -- if that is what the question means. 10 A. I think the honest answer to that is that as 11 Q. Thank you. Does it follow from what you were saying 11 a government no, we do not have a clear picture of what 12 about capacity in the border that there was a lack of 12 happened, of how the attackers got through. 13 capacity at the time of the In Amenas attack? 13 Q. What is your thought as to whether we might in the 14 A. I think I would go back to what I said earlier and to 14 future have a clearer picture than we do now? 15 what Martyn said this morning which is that, and as the 15 A. I think it's possible that we may get elements of that 16 Algerians have said themselves, this is an immense 16 picture, possibly in part through our engagement with 17 country with very, very long borders and a crucial point 17 the Algerian authorities on security related matters and 18 states with very limited or no capacity on the other 18 possibly as a result of the trial the Algerians have 19 side of those borders to manage them. 19 planned to hold for the three remaining suspected 20 Q. And that was a difficulty that was publicly recognised 20 terrorists. I doubt very much that we will get a full 21 by the Algerians at the time and preceding the attack 21 and comprehensive picture. 22 was it? 22 Q. Shortly after the attack there was a meeting, again, 23 A. It was, I think, a matter of fact for all of us that 23 with Her Majesty's minister, Mr Burt, at which 24 that was the situation with regard to Libya and Mali in 24 I understand you were present with the Statoil 25 particular, whether the Algerians recognised it publicly 25 investigating team. This is I think on 1 May?

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1 I am afraid I don't know. 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. You see, the expression "the ring of steel" is one 2 Q. And then we have a document disclosed about that. One 3 perhaps the Algerians used but it had also been used by 3 of the things that you said there -- this is page 49, 4 some of the British nationals in this case and in fact 4 paragraph 7, the disclosure -- is that you were 5 by an American national as well and what they told us 5 suggesting that there were four ways in which Her 6 was at the time they placed their trust in the ring of 6 Majesty's Government and business should focus and the 7 steel which they were told by the Algerians 7 first of those was stress testing threat information 8 categorically that the Algerians would provide them with 8 through good networks? 9 and that trust was let down with fatal consequences. 9 A. Yes. 10 Part of the ring of steel, in fact the outer ring of the 10 Q. What does that mean? 11 ring of steel, was the border and some of these 11 A. Sorry, that's come across in a rather unfortunate form 12 witnesses were under the impression at the time that the 12 of words. What I had in mind when suggesting that as an 13 Algerians had the border under control. Is it Her 13 area -- these are four areas where I suggested we might 14 Majesty's Government's view that that was not the case? 14 wish to focus, not necessarily the only ones, and again 15 A. Again, you know, I am afraid I am not an expert on 15 this goes to the logic of the strategic security 16 Algeria and I think all I can do is repeat what I just 16 partnership. Being, what I am getting at there is being 17 said, that you know, this is -- Algeria is a country 17 really rigorous at testing our assumption on the 18 that has a powerful security state but a very long 18 evidence, whether as governments or as companies and, 19 border and infrastructure, the sort of infrastructure 19 working at doing that stress testing. As I think Adrian 20 questions that follow from that and it is neighbours 20 Fulcher in his evidence to the inquest described at some 21 with countries like Libya and Mali where effectively 21 length one of the risks that we face in managing our 22 there was no state authority at some periods, you know , 22 understanding of security situations like this is that 23 able to manage the border from that side. 23 you rest on assumptions that are untested and that you 24 Q. (Inaudible) the ambassador at the time earlier recording 24 may miss, not necessarily a big blindingly obvious fact, 25 a conference call between Mr Burt and Mr Conn of BP 25 because that is fairly unlikely but a concatenation of

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1 smaller facts and trends which cause you to revisit your 1 interests in the region" but neither in that update nor 2 assumptions, not necessarily to change them but at least 2 in the preceding iteration of the travel advice is there 3 to question them. And that's essentially the point that 3 a mention of a threat to hydrocarbon installations 4 I was trying to get across there. 4 explicitly. Why not? 5 Q. Without giving away state secrets literally but how do 5 A. Because we would not -- we did not have specific 6 you stress test? 6 information about potential attacks on hydrocarbon 7 A. There are a number of ways you can do it. I mean, in 7 installations. 8 the context of a conversation with companies and/or with 8 Q. But it does indicate in the gist document that the 9 other governments I think there are a couple of elements 9 threat was assessed to include hydrocarbon 10 that are particularly important. One is it is 10 installations? 11 essentially emptying your pockets. What are your 11 A. Yes, the key word there is "assessed", which is 12 assumptions, and, you know, questioning it against each 12 essentially based on the totality of our knowledge and 13 other. So where does that assumption come from, what's 13 of what it means in its context. We assess that, you 14 the evidence for it, what's the evidence that may point 14 know, that there is likely to be a threat, that there is 15 in the other direction? The other element here that 15 a threat to hydrocarbon installations. What it does not 16 I think is quite important, and we have done some work 16 say, what it does not mean is that we know there is 17 on since the attack, is working through how you would 17 a threat that is going to materialise. 18 respond if the worst happens. Again, that's part of 18 Q. Yes, although if you go on to read later parts of the 19 what the logic of the strategic security partnership is 19 advice it goes on the mention examples of shopping 20 about. How would we do this if it happened again? Do 20 malls, hotels and restaurants? 21 we think everything went perfectly last time? How could 21 A. Yes. 22 we improve on that? 22 Q. Now, we know from what Mr Roper said this morning that 23 Part of that in turn is about making sure our 23 Algeria is not and has not been a tourist hub? 24 partners, whether they are other governments or 24 A. Yes. 25 companies, actually understand how we do crisis 25 Q. We also know that the hydrocarbon industry is by far and

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1 management and vice versa, right down to the basics: who 1 away one of its largest industries. Doesn't it stand to 2 does what, who's in the lead, who takes decisions, how 2 reason from that that a threat assessed to include 3 do you contact us? 3 hydrocarbon installations is something which is very 4 Q. You mention Mr Fulcher. Was he a gentleman that you 4 important to put out to the public who will be going 5 have come across before In Amenas? 5 there? 6 A. Yes. 6 A. Yes, but again, you know, it is important not to mislead 7 Q. Again, without wanting to tell us anything that you 7 by implying that we have knowledge that we don't have. 8 shouldn't, can you give us your view of his capability? 8 Q. In what way would indicating that western interests 9 A. My personal view is that he is an extremely capable 9 hydrocarbon installations would be misleading? 10 individual. 10 A. Sorry, I am struggling a bit here with both trying to 11 MS GOLLOP: Thank you very much. 11 stay within the boundaries of a very carefully worded 12 Questions from MR FLINN 12 gist but also I mean going back to the intent of the 13 MR FLINN: Mr Bristow, my name is Matthew Flinn, I ask 13 travel advice that we put out. There is also I think an 14 questions on behalf of the families of Garry Barlow, 14 element here of essentially previous form with the sorts 15 Carson Bilsland, Paul Morgan and Kenneth Whiteside. 15 of individuals or sorts of organisations, individuals 16 The gist document that has been provided to the 16 operating in this area where there is no previous form, 17 inquest indicates that the Government had known "for 17 no previous experience that points towards an attack on 18 more than a year of terrorist activity in Algeria, Libya 18 that sort of target being within the intent of those 19 and Mali which was assessed to pose a threat to, among 19 groups. 20 others, hydrocarbon installations and to foreign 20 Q. If -- the coroner has heard some evidence about the 21 workers." 21 forms of attacks which occurred in recent months and 22 Now I understand that the travel advice for Algeria 22 I won't go over them again. I will move on to another 23 was updated on 13 January of 2013 to include the words 23 topic. 24 "following French military intervention in Mali there is 24 At the time of the attack there were no processes in 25 a possibility of retaliatory attacks targeting western 25 place to ensure the dissemination of travel advisory

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1 updates to UK expat workers, is that right? 1 terrorist or terrorist related risks are some of them 2 A. No, I don't think that's right at all. I mean the 2 but in many jurisdictions, I have first hand experience 3 travel advice you know, can be and was during the crisis 3 of several of them, there are other sorts of risks too, 4 updated on a very rapid cycle, I mean several times 4 for example, political risk or legal risk or whatever it 5 a day if necessary. It goes up on to the Government 5 might be, where companies might wish to engage with 6 websites very quickly and individuals, companies, anyone 6 government, seek our advice, seek to pool information, 7 with an interest can sign up for email alerts if they 7 and, you know, there are ways they can do that going 8 wish. 8 beyond the travel advice. For example, through the 9 Q. Perhaps it is a poorly worded question. The system 9 overseas security risk processes. They can engage with 10 relies on companies accessing it and then disseminating 10 the Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure 11 it to their workers or individuals accessing it 11 which is primarily UK focused but they may have things 12 themselves, is that right? 12 of interest to say or they can speak to us direct. 13 A. It relies on anyone wishing to see it accessing it and 13 I think the experience of those of us who have 14 making appropriate use of it. 14 worked around the world and in London is that we are 15 Q. Indeed. So there is no sort of active way in which it 15 always very happy to see and discuss with 16 is disseminated to those who will be going to Algeria 16 representatives of companies who carry those sorts of 17 itself in the sense of we know you are going to Algeria 17 risks how they propose to do so. It is a two way 18 or you are in Algeria therefore we are sending you this 18 conversation. It is useful for us as well to know about 19 information, for example, via email? 19 how they are dealing with the risks, what are the sorts 20 A. I have just mentioned the option of email alerts. If 20 of things that they are coming up against. 21 people wish to sign up for email alerts then they'll get 21 Q. And again, without wanting you to speculate or to 22 them. 22 comment on matters of policy which you are not able to 23 Q. Now, amongst the documentation which has been disclosed 23 comment on, are you able to say whether or not the 24 by the Government there is a letter from Minister 24 Government has given any thought to legislating in any 25 William Hague to Richard Ottaway dated 22 August 2013 25 way which would require companies to make their

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1 and that he said that companies could not be forced to 1 employees aware of travel advisory updates? 2 ensure that their employees and contractors were aware 2 A. I'm not aware of any such plans. 3 of FCO travel advice. I just wondered why is that the 3 Q. Thank you. 4 position? Why can't they be required to do so? 4 Now, the gist document also indicates that Her 5 A. Well, it's a question I would struggle to answer but 5 Majesty's Government received information 6 I mean, I find it difficult to imagine circumstances 6 in December 2012 alleging that unidentified terrorists 7 under which we could compel companies to do that. 7 in southern Algeria were seeking information about 8 Q. Well, Mr Roper made a reference to an American system, 8 British workers in Algeria potentially with a view to 9 and I am not aware as to whether or not that is a legal 9 kidnapping them. We know that there was an 10 system or a system of practice, but he indicated 10 unintentional delay in processing that information 11 a system which required them to pass on information, and 11 although it was subsequently assessed to be unreliable. 12 he used the example of an air travel threat, to workers 12 And just to be clear would that information have 13 of US companies. Has any similar system been explored 13 triggered any change to the travel advice prior to the 14 as a possibility for the United Kingdom? 14 attack if it had been processed immediately? 15 A. There are two things to say on that. First of all, I am 15 A. I am afraid I can't go beyond the wording of the gist. 16 not quite sure that your representation of the US system 16 Q. More generally, what level of reliability of any 17 is quite right. My understanding there is that 17 information about threats or risks is necessary to be 18 specifically where the Americans have information that 18 crossed before either the travel advisory is updated or 19 could relate to aviation security they have an 19 the Government takes an active step of informing 20 obligation to get it out quickly into their equivalent 20 a company or an individual? 21 of travel advice which I think is not quite the same 21 A. Yes, it's in almost all cases a judgment case. I would 22 thing as you are saying. The second point to make here 22 say that in my experience a situation where you have an 23 is that there are many ways in which companies in 23 absolutely obvious immediate unquestionable knowledge of 24 particular can engage with us as a government to manage 24 a threat is relatively rare. What we are much more 25 the risks that they face. Of course, you know, counter 25 often dealing with is, as I described earlier,

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1 a concatenation of circumstances, of partial 1 of information with companies or updating travel 2 information, of things that point you towards the 2 advisory updates or is it likely just to be held? 3 conclusion that a risk has arisen. And, you know, there 3 A. I think the question is probably too hypothetical to 4 is always a judgment to be made about: are we actually 4 answer. 5 reading this material right? Are there bits of it that 5 Q. Right. Now, I just have a few questions on the topic of 6 are missing or incomplete or just wrong? You test that 6 security arrangements of companies with British workers 7 against what you know, against previous experience. 7 abroad. Did Her Majesty's Government seek or have any 8 There is also I think here a test as to, what would 8 assurances from BP or from the JV prior to the attack 9 be -- what is the change to the travel advice that the 9 that its sites in Algeria whether JV or BP operated were 10 travelling public would actually find useful here? 10 secure? 11 Saying "we have heard essentially hearsay or a rumour 11 A. To the best of my knowledge no, although, as I explained 12 that there might be a fairly indeterminate risk over 12 earlier, you know, my role does not include 13 here" doesn't strike me as a terribly useful thing to 13 responsibility for the sort of day-to-day management of 14 tell the public. What the public want to know is: what 14 our relations with Algeria or of British companies 15 is the considered best analysis of government about 15 operating there. 16 these things? And that's what we seek to achieve. 16 Q. Are you able to say whether or not there was a system 17 Q. If we just explore that very briefly. In the travel 17 whereby those sort of assurances would be sought or 18 advice it talks about under the heading of safety and 18 given prior to the attack? 19 security of terrorism. It says: 19 A. I think there is a problem here which is that we would 20 "In September 2011 the media reported a threat made 20 see it as the role of Government to seek those 21 by terrorists allegedly linked to Al Qaeda in the 21 assurances. I think the issue here is that -- the 22 Islamic Maghreb against airlines used by energy 22 question as to whether BP's security arrangements or 23 companies et cetera." 23 those of any other company operating in a foreign 24 That is included in the travel advice although it is 24 jurisdiction are adequate or not, I mean that's not 25 a reference to media reports. My interpretation of it 25 something on which we would seek assurances from and it

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1 is that the reason it was included is because it goes on 1 is something for them to determine for themselves 2 to say security has been tightened around airports as 2 seeking whatever advice they wish to take from others. 3 a result which implies that in Algeria at least they 3 Q. Yes, I think that essentially answers my question. The 4 took it seriously. Would that be right? 4 view of the Government is that it is not the 5 A. I wouldn't disagree with that. 5 Government's role to do that. It is a matter for the 6 Q. Does the Government draw a distinction between threats 6 companies themselves? 7 and warnings which are assessed as likely to be false 7 A. Yes. 8 and threats and warnings which can't be assessed as 8 Q. Has the Government, again, the sort of policy question, 9 being likely to be true or false either way in terms of 9 has the Government given any consideration to 10 what actions they trigger? 10 implementing or crafting such a system whereby they 11 A. It's certainly a question that we would ask ourselves. 11 would seek assurances of that nature? 12 In the case of threats or warnings that we assess as 12 A. Again, you know, I think the question -- the answer 13 being likely to be false it is a relatively easy 13 would have to come back to what would be the basis for 14 judgment call to make. If you assess that on balance it 14 us seeking assurances from companies? I think it is, in 15 is not true, it is false, it is meaningless, I think 15 a way it is a version of your earlier question on 16 that answers the question for you. The much trickier 16 legislating for this. 17 category is information where it is unlikely that you 17 Q. I mean, the motivation being to ensure that its citizens 18 have had any view on its validity but where there may be 18 working abroad are kept safe. That would be the reason 19 different defensible views as to the validity of the 19 for seeking to do it and has anyone thought, well that's 20 information. 20 a good reason, let's see if we can implement a system 21 Q. And whilst you sort of approach that process of: we want 21 which achieves that? 22 to assess as to come to a view or prior to the point of 22 A. Yes, I see your point but I also see formidable 23 reaching the conclusion that in fact you can't reach any 23 difficulties in asserting the Government's right to do 24 firm view either way, is that sort of information likely 24 that. 25 to trigger a response from the Government by a sharing 25 Q. Now, I would like to move on to the events of 16 to

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1 20 January specifically. In paragraph 17 of your first 1 like some sort of assurance or reassurance that it was 2 statement you say that there was no direct contact 2 a conscious decision that was taken not to call the 3 between the terrorists and Her Majesty's Government. 3 number as opposed to it just falling through the cracks? 4 Now, I hope that you have been made aware of an issue on 4 A. Yes, Neil Stapely covered this in his evidence. The 5 which the coroner has heard some evidence which is of 5 advice that Neil described in his evidence is certainly 6 particular concern to the wife of Garry Barlow, 6 consistent with our practice elsewhere. I have to admit 7 Mrs Lorraine Barlow. Ever since the attacks she has 7 I don't remember the conversation with Neil. It was 8 been haunted by the particular question of what the FCO 8 a very, very fast moving situation but I see absolutely 9 did with a number that Garry provided to her and which 9 no reason to think that that's not the advice he 10 she passed on to the FCO. Can we take it from your 10 wouldn't have given and I or anyone else would have 11 statement that that number was never called by someone 11 needed a very, very strong reason to go against that 12 within the Government? 12 advice, which we didn't have. 13 A. That's correct. 13 Q. ... I think one of the questions the family has is if 14 Q. You did mention earlier in the evidence that you gave to 14 a terrorist says "I want to be contacted on this number" 15 one of my colleagues that one of the concerns of the 15 there are of course the general reasons why one might be 16 Government was not to divert away from a primary point 16 hesitant in making contact but on the other side of the 17 of contact which was viewed as being BP. But are you 17 balance there is the fact that no one actually knows 18 able to expand upon that or give any further 18 what the motivation of that terrorist is at that 19 rationalisation for why no contact was made on that 19 particular moment for wanting to be called. So it could 20 number by the Government? 20 be, for example, that they want to communicate to 21 A. Yes. Sure. I am happy to do so although I should 21 someone that they have a hostage who is taken ill or who 22 preface my remarks by saying that I will speak fairly 22 has been severely injured. What is it that stops a call 23 cautiously because there are some general principles 23 just to sort of get a sense of what is it that they are 24 here about how we deal with terrorist kidnappings where 24 saying as opposed to entering into any dialogue with 25 I don't want to essentially compromise our ability to do 25 them?

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1 so successfully in other cases. 1 A. Again, it is -- part of the answer is highly context 2 Q. Of course. 2 specific and part of it also, I mean, it is quite easy 3 A. The most important things to bear in mind in looking at 3 to start to speculate about things that might have 4 this matter, first of all, that everything we do in 4 happened or what the hostage takers might have intended. 5 a crisis of this sort needs to start from the core 5 What I would say though is that -- first of all, the 6 objective which is to maximise the chances of our 6 hostage takers had no shortage of opportunities to 7 hostages getting out alive and not to do everything we 7 contact people to pass on that sort of message. I mean 8 can to minimise increasing the risks to them, you know, 8 there were messages coming in either from hostages 9 us doing anything which increases the risks to them. ... 9 themselves or on that particular channel, I understand, 10 The second point is critically important, 10 of BP. The point is that the number was one we already 11 particularly could have become important in this 11 knew about on which a dialogue was taking place. So 12 context, which is that it is well known that the UK and 12 there is no shortage of opportunities for them to make 13 US Governments have a particular stance on ransom 13 those points. So in the absence, in those 14 payments. We do not pay ransoms. It is a matter of law 14 circumstances, of a really compelling reason to call 15 and a matter of policy in the UK. It is a matter of law 15 back, ... 16 for most western countries but it is not a matter of 16 Q. Right. I think I understand and that sort of question 17 policy for a number of western countries. ... 17 or potential as to there might be a more benign reason 18 I hope that has done enough to answer the question. 18 for them to be wanting to be contacted has to be weighed 19 But I don't really want to go too far into how we do 19 against all the risks with making contact? 20 these things. 20 A. That's right. 21 Q. Yes, I appreciate that. If I may, I mean I will ask 21 Q. You have already said earlier in your evidence that the 22 a few more questions but I appreciate the boundaries in 22 picture of demands that was made by the terrorists 23 which you are operating and if you can't answer any of 23 changed and was somewhat inconsistent and unclear? 24 them then just say so. But one of the things I did want 24 A. Yes. 25 to confirm is that I understand that Mrs Barlow would 25 Q. Now, one of the questions I know that the families I

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1 represent have is what was the government's 1 any action which would endanger the lives of the 2 understanding of what those demands were. Are you able 2 hostages? 3 to expand in any greater detail on what the Government's 3 A. I think probably the best thing I can do there is to 4 understanding was? 4 refer to the Prime Minister's statement in the House of 5 A. Just to go back on your words just now, unclear, I am 5 Commons I think on the 19th where he made it clear that 6 not sure. The demands themselves at various stages 6 we had been disappointed to learn from the Algerians 7 seemed to me to be quite clear, you know, demands that 7 that the first stage of the military operation had 8 the Algerians should cease firing and should pull back 8 started without informing or consulting us. I forget 9 their troops, you know, should switch the mobile phone 9 the exact words but it is there in the PM's statement. 10 network back on, should give free passage to or safe 10 Q. In terms of contact with various Algerian authorities, 11 passage to Mali with the hostages. What was, I think, 11 we heard this morning from Mr Roper about General Mekri 12 completely unclear, at least to me and my colleagues 12 from the defence ministry. Now, were there any people 13 working on this at the time, was what was the underlying 13 in London in Government who were able to have contact 14 intent, the motivation, the strategy, where did this 14 directly with the Algerian military? 15 end? And that was, you know, throughout the crisis 15 A. To the limited extent that I can answer that question, 16 something that we found particularly hard to read. To 16 the primary channels of communication were as described 17 spell it out a bit, was this essentially an operation to 17 by Martyn this morning. I think -- I can say that one 18 harvest hostages for a subsequent kidnap, a subsequent 18 of the reasons why we wished to engage with the 19 ransom negotiation? Was it a suicide mission? Did they 19 Algerians through the strategic security partnership was 20 intend to blow the plant up? Would they surrender at 20 to improve the degree of both operational and strategic 21 the end of it? You know, at different stages there may 21 contact that we have into the Algerian system. 22 have been elements of a number of those in play. 22 Q. Finally, Mr Bristow, paragraph 6 of your second 23 Q. I think that leads nicely into my next question which 23 statement, you say this: 24 is: was there any understanding on the part of the 24 "In terms of BP's communications with the Algerian 25 Government as to whether or not there were any 25 government we were told by BP that they were in touch

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1 circumstances on which the terrorists would let the 1 with the Algerian energy minister before the storming of 2 hostages go? 2 the site by the Algerians to seek to prevent any 3 A. Again, you know, we are dealing here with assessments 3 precipitous Algerian reaction and afterwards for updates 4 that we had to make under time pressure at the time with 4 on action and repatriation of plans." 5 very, very limited knowledge and, you know, very 5 I just want to clarify the meaning of the words 6 imperfect knowledge. I found it at the time very hard 6 "storming the site". Does that mean the attack on the 7 to imagine circumstances under which that would happen. 7 convoy or does it mean firing on to the BdV or perhaps 8 Our working assumption from the outset was that that was 8 an assault on CPF at a later date? 9 possibly the least likely scenario. 9 A. I'm not sure that I can recall enough of the context of 10 Q. Right. In terms of the specific demand that was 10 what we were told by BP to answer that. I mean, it 11 reiterated through various channels and through various 11 could be one of several stages in the Algerian assault 12 occasions that the Algerian military pull back, what was 12 but -- response, but I am afraid I can't remember the 13 the sort of Government response upon receiving those 13 exact sequence. 14 demands? Was it simply to ensure that they were 14 Q. The reason I ask that question is because I am concerned 15 communicated to the relevant Algerian authorities in 15 that it might indicate that BP had some foreknowledge or 16 a nutshell? 16 forewarning of the assault on the convoy? 17 A. Yes. 17 A. I see. 18 Q. You indicated earlier in your evidence about 18 Q. And had an opportunity to make representations but 19 conversations between the respective Prime Ministers 19 somehow that did not get through to the government? 20 with the objective of both obtaining and sharing 20 A. Well, you would have to ask BP that question but I have 21 information and also seeking to influence. Again, aware 21 no knowledge that BP had that advanced knowledge. We 22 of areas in which you might not be able to tread, are 22 certainly didn't. 23 you able to help the families with any more information 23 MR FLINN: Mr Bristow, thank you very much. 24 about any forms of pressure which were applied to the 24 THE CORONER: Can you just help me please with this and, 25 Algerian government in terms of urging them not to take 25 Mr Flinn, if you want to ask about this in a moment do.

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1 Just about the number, the telephone number, I think 1 number on or else I'll kill him and secondly, you know, 2 when Mr Barlow had passed that on that he explained 2 the hostages were already at, you know, immediate grave 3 I think that he had been told to tell his wife to pass 3 threat. It was not -- it is not clear that handing on 4 that number on to the BBC. I just want to take what you 4 that number would reduce that threat. 5 have said a stage further just so we have your 5 Q. So I suppose this comes back to the issue we explored 6 considered response, please, to the whole question. 6 earlier which is balancing up knowns versus unknowns? 7 A. Yes. 7 A. Yes. 8 THE CORONER: And you have explained reasons why in 8 Q. So this was a situation where you can't be entirely 9 a situation like that a number wouldn't, you say, be 9 certain that it would increase the threat or the risk? 10 called by someone in Government for the reasons you have 10 A. Yes. 11 given. But can you just help about that, that other 11 Q. But in the context of all the risks and considerations 12 aspect to it? 12 that was the judgment that was made? 13 A. The BBC, yes. 13 A. That's correct. Just to say that I have worked 14 THE CORONER: Yes. Are there any conceivable circumstances 14 extensively with HCNU and with Neil Stapely on a number 15 in which in a situation like this somebody in Government 15 of hostage cases and that is the sort of standard 16 received a number that, as it were, they would pass that 16 operating procedure and as I said earlier you would need 17 on to a media organisation? 17 a really strong set of reasons to depart from that. 18 A. Yes. The logic behind the decision not to pass it on to 18 MR FLINN: Thank you very much. Thank you, sir. 19 the BBC is, I think it really has two elements. One is 19 Questions from MR POPAT 20 that we knew because that was the number, the numbers 20 MR POPAT: Mr Bristow, I ask questions on behalf of BP and 21 matched, that that was the primary channel of 21 just a couple of topics if I may. The first relates to 22 communication that was already being used and there's 22 the FCO advice. As I understand a summary of the 23 a sort of basic principle here to try and keep that 23 purpose of that advice from you to be essentially to 24 primary channel both open and clear and not to cross 24 inform the travelling public of the risks or threats. 25 infect other things going on. 25 A. Yes.

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1 The second point is that from the evidence of what 1 Q. And it is then to be taken into account as part of the 2 happened at the time the hostage takers had no real 2 assessment being undertaken by that member of the 3 difficulty contacting media outlets. I think -- 3 travelling public or organisations or whoever it might 4 THE CORONER: We have heard a number of examples of that. 4 be as to whether or not they wish to travel to that 5 A. You have heard a number of examples of that. So to pick 5 location, taking into account for example the mitigation 6 up the other part of your question, are there 6 measures that they may have in place? 7 circumstances under which we would pass that number or 7 A. That's correct. 8 would consider passing that number on? I think the core 8 Q. The mitigation measures that organisations such as the 9 of it is if we were pretty clear that not doing so would 9 hydrocarbon companies that were operating in this region 10 immediately and substantially increase the risk to the 10 could put in place would be potentially quite 11 life of that hostage which clearly wasn't the case in 11 significant and very different to those that could be 12 this instance. 12 put in place for members of the ordinary travelling 13 THE CORONER: All right. Mr Flinn, anything you want to ask 13 public? 14 out of that, but I just wanted to have your considered 14 A. That's correct. 15 view on the whole. 15 Q. The advice is general in that it applies generally to 16 MR FLINN: Yes, thank you, sir, just one question. 16 the country and to all people who might be travelling to 17 Just picking up on the very last point that you 17 that location. The Government can provide specific 18 made. I mean, my understanding is that Mrs Barlow's 18 advice to specific individuals or companies that are 19 very strong fear was that if the number was not passed 19 under particular threat if it chooses to do so; is that 20 on he would come to immediate and significant harm so 20 right? 21 I wondered what the basis was for the opposite view, 21 A. That's right. 22 that that was not the case in this instance? 22 Q. And it could advise companies of course not to carry on 23 A. Again, going back to the principles on which we would 23 business in a particular location, a particular country 24 operate in these circumstances. I mean there was no 24 or part of a country if it thinks that there are grave 25 explicit immediate threat to the hostage, pass this 25 risks which warrant not carrying on business in that

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1 country? 1 it is a reasonable reading of the note here. 2 A. It's conceivable, yes. 2 Q. In addition to the information that was being received 3 Q. The current travel advice, for example, includes whether 3 from BP by the Government and recorded in these various 4 it is all travel in this location or all but essential 4 records and digests, the HCNU officers who were present 5 travel in this location, and extends to the In Amenas 5 in the BP command centre and listening in to the calls 6 facility or location of the In Amenas facility, but the 6 and receiving the information were also communicating 7 Government hasn't advised BP or indeed any other 7 with certainly COBRA and at other levels within the 8 organisation not to carry on business in that location? 8 Government and you? 9 A. That's correct. 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. Indeed, it has gone to some lengths to try to assist 10 Q. And that would include, as we have heard from DCI 11 organisations seeking to carry on business, for example, 11 Stapely, the information that they were receiving 12 by the SSP which has been created and put in place? 12 including the, I put them loosely, ransom demands or 13 A. That's exactly right. 13 demands for money being made by terrorists to BP which 14 Q. The second and final topic relates to communications 14 were then being listened into by the HCNU officers and 15 during the attack and in fact being passed on from BP. 15 then being communicated back. Is that correct? 16 Just one document, please, to look at with you to make 16 A. Yes. 17 sure I have understood it correctly. It is the first 17 MR POPAT: Thank you. 18 page behind LB1. Do you have that? It is the 18 MR LAIDLAW: No questions, thank you. 19 16 January call from Minister Burt to the Algerian 19 MR GLASSON: No questions, sir. 20 foreign minister. 20 THE CORONER: Right. That may or may not be it. There is 21 A. Yes, got it. 21 a matter that I have to check. So what I think we will 22 Q. And the first paragraph records that Mr Burt has spoken 22 do is we will just have a ten-minute break. Do you 23 to the foreign minister and passed on all of the 23 mind? 24 messages in the attached briefing and below the first 24 A. Not at all. 25 two paragraphs there is something which is identified as 25 THE CORONER: That may well be it but we will know at the

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1 referenced above briefing for Meldeci. So can we take 1 end of that. 2 it that that is the briefing that is being referred to 2 (4.06 pm) 3 and it is all the messages in that briefing that have 3 (A short break) 4 been passed on by Mr Burt. Is that a correct reading of 4 (5.00 pm) 5 the document? 5 Housekeeping 6 A. Yes. 6 THE CORONER: Right, there are one or two loose ends. 7 Q. It refers to an attached briefing but it is in fact the 7 Mr Popat, I think this originated with you. It was just 8 material set out below. 8 the question of the status of the inquest material in 9 That would therefore have included what is set out 9 the United States litigation. As I understand it, the 10 in the fourth bullet point which is: 10 position is that that's going to be left for the moment 11 "That there is a need to stop the firing in the 11 because I think the Metropolitan Police, have I got this 12 area. BP have had contact directly with the terrorists 12 right, you will know, just want some more time to 13 and they have indicated that they would be prepared to 13 consider what their stance is on the question. Have 14 release four injured people if the firing stops. Could 14 I got that roughly right? 15 also ask for a body to be released if it is still on 15 MR POPAT: Sir, that wasn't something I had understood. 16 site." 16 THE CORONER: It wasn't. Am I right about that? 17 So that is information received from BP in the 17 MR POPAT: I may have misunderstood a query that was raised 18 course of the communications that the BP were receiving 18 and I thought it related to something else. 19 from the terrorists, passed on to the Government? 19 MS SIMCOCK: Sir, perhaps I can assist. My name is Sarah 20 A. Yes. 20 Simcock. I am standing in for Ms Watson for the 21 Q. And passed on by Mr Burt to the Algerian foreign 21 Metropolitan Police. Yes, the position of the 22 minister? 22 Metropolitan Police formally today is that we just 23 A. That is my understanding. I haven't gone back through 23 require a little bit more time to consider the issue and 24 the sort of detailed records of the conversations and 24 to take formal instructions. 25 how that point came to be in the briefing, but I think 25 THE CORONER: Yes.

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1 MS SIMCOCK: Generally as a matter of principle we can see 1 So if that were to arrive between now and the 26th 2 that there is force in saying that anything which is 2 that will require consideration. 3 completely already in the public domain could of course 3 In addition, we had a message this afternoon that B 4 be disclosed onwards, but in relation to any of that 4 has been located and what I am going to say -- I think 5 material that isn't BP, under BP's ownership and control 5 that has very kindly come from the Metropolitan Police, 6 originating from them and in particular in relation to 6 thank you very much for finding that out -- but what 7 documents such as witness statements that originated by 7 I am going to ask is that the questions that I think 8 the Metropolitan Police having obtained those 8 have been identified to be asked of her that those are 9 statements, we would require more time to consider. 9 asked, please, by 14 January and I am going to ask too 10 THE CORONER: That is all right. Understood. But that's 10 because it does seem to me it is a potentially 11 broadly it. On the basis that I should think that 11 significant matter that people may want to ask questions 12 anything that's remotely relevant I hope we have 12 about that she is invited or asked whether she would be 13 canvassed and is there on the transcript. I mean it may 13 prepared to give oral evidence. That would I think have 14 be by one route or another everything that matters will 14 to be the realities. Probably because of her status it 15 be there. But you were -- so that is that. Sorry, 15 would probably have to be from France over a video link 16 Mr Popat, I come back to you, the other one is the tape 16 but again, Mr Popat, I don't know what -- I am 17 recordings of calls. Subject to anything you want to 17 addressing you because you are kindly standing but 18 say, any provisional view about that is, because 18 I don't know what is going to come of that but it is 19 I understand it those are the original recordings 19 another reason for expressly not saying that the 20 I think I/We haven't got them. We think they are yours 20 evidence is concluded because it is my hope that 21 and that it's a matter for you and, if I can put it this 21 certainly questions will be asked of her and I hope that 22 way, for what I will call any innocent party who is on 22 she will accept an invitation to give evidence so that 23 the recording or their personal representative. 23 in addition to the questions if anybody wants to ask 24 MR POPAT: Thank you, sir. 24 her, if there are any questions that can happen. 25 THE CORONER: At the moment -- I don't have them so I'm not 25 Then the third thing --

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1 sure I can -- I know this is only the CBC but I am 1 MR POPAT: Can I just enquire before we move on to the other 2 saying this in public so far as they are concerned, it 2 topic, in relation to B, do we take it that you are 3 is not for me. So that was that one. 3 extending an invitation to her to give evidence 4 Then what I had been going to say, I will still say 4 irrespective of the questions that are asked and the 5 it but it has -- I now have three caveats in there -- 5 answers that are to be given? 6 but what I was going to say is that the proposal/hope 6 THE CORONER: I think -- only because if I wait -- I am 7 was that on the Monday 26 January at -- it is all right 7 going to ask that the questions are asked and the 8 and convenient to everybody we will have to do it 8 answers are given and that she's asked. If it 9 I think at the Central Criminal Court because this 9 transpires that when all that is to hand everybody says 10 courtroom won't be available, but that is the hope that 10 or nobody says "I want to ask questions" it would be 11 conclusions will be delivered on Monday, 26th at the 11 unlikely that I would insist on it but I just thought we 12 Central Criminal Court. 12 would ask everything at once. 13 Now, I was consciously not saying in that that the 13 Then the third question or third particular reason 14 evidence is all complete. I am not saying that. I will 14 for expressly not saying that's the end of the evidence 15 come on to that. It is not. As I think everybody 15 is I gather that the question has arisen about Mr Shaw's 16 knows, I have made requests of my own simply so that -- 16 evidence and it seems to me that it may be the simplest 17 for my own peace of mind that I know I have asked 17 thing just to explore what his availability is and it 18 regardless of what anybody else has asked of Algeria 18 may be that he will have to be called because I think 19 just to see if anything is forthcoming from them for me 19 you want his evidence, Mr Ritchie, and for all I know 20 that can be used and put into the public domain because 20 others may say well they want to ask him questions. 21 the position was the other material that came to the 21 I appreciate there has been a bit of a history about 22 coroner was -- she had had I think on an undertaking, 22 this and suppose the position was that he was only 23 everybody knows about this, that it wouldn't be put into 23 available on the 27th, just picking that at random, that 24 the public domain. So anyway, I have made requests for 24 might be a reason why the 26th would have to fall by the 25 material myself or for summaries and so on. 25 wayside. So I am not shutting all that out. Can you

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1 just make enquiries as to what his availability would 1 Mr Popat now that there is nothing or five sentences or 2 be? It could be again over a link and I'll try and find 2 four paragraphs. So I will say seven days, but just to 3 a courtroom somewhere. 3 make his life easier if it is possible once I have risen 4 MR POPAT: Thank you, sir. Of course we will do as you ask 4 just to identify anything there is a problem about. 5 and we will make those enquiries. I know you know there 5 MR POPAT: I am grateful. 6 has been a bit of history. 6 THE CORONER: It may be if Mr Popat is content to leave 7 THE CORONER: I do and I appreciate you may have been put i n 7 those bits out then that takes care of one of the three 8 a very difficult position by that and certainly his 8 areas. Would that do? 9 availability I appreciate may not be straightforward. 9 MR RITCHIE: I am very grateful. We have tomorrow set aside 10 So I am not at all unsympathetic. I am not criticising 10 for the hearing in any event. I don't see why we 11 anybody. These things happen but I absolutely know the 11 shouldn't be able to make our minds up about those 12 background. 12 issues we have about by lunchtime tomorrow. So I would 13 MR POPAT: Sir, may I in that vein however through you make 13 hope we could do it much quicker than seven days but 14 an inquiry extended invitation. As I understand it, we 14 there are always bits of paperwork that might need to be 15 had understood it, his evidence was agreed, it wasn't 15 done. 16 disputed and it was to be read. 16 THE CORONER: It is only that I suspect, particularly if 17 THE CORONER: Yes. 17 questions are going to arise -- but if it is left in the 18 MR POPAT: It may be that the items that are now thought to 18 air for seven days and you are then meanwhile having to 19 be contentious are in fact fairly limited. If that is 19 explore his availability -- 20 the case, then it may be possible simply to extract 20 MR POPAT: Sir, it would be. 21 those from the statement, to have the rest of the 21 THE CORONER: Shall I bit a bit more -- if I was to say by 22 statement read into the record. I don't mean fully 22 2 o'clock tomorrow that is doable, isn't it? 23 formally read in but simply just excise those parts. We 23 MR RITCHIE: It is. I am very grateful. 24 are concerned, I make it clear, simply that questions 24 MR OWEN-THOMAS: May I just interrupt to say this: Mr Shaw's 25 have been asked through you of BP to ask Mr Shaw and 25 witness evidence was produced following requests and

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1 those answers have been provided and therefore if those 1 questions made by Mr Green. I would be a little bit 2 questions were deemed to be material in the first place 2 concerned if Mr Ritchie agrees for things to be removed. 3 that the evidence would be necessary to be introduced. 3 THE CORONER: Obviously you all stand round together to do 4 THE CORONER: Yes. 4 it. 5 MR POPAT: But I would have thought, and would hope, it be 5 MR OWEN-THOMAS: He may be happy but -- 6 possible to excise anything that is contentious and the 6 MR POPAT: Rather than doing this in the long way if 7 answers to the questions given in a simple or factual 7 Mr Ritchie were to provide his comments and suggested 8 a way, a neutral way perhaps, as can be put and the 8 excision to all parties and Mr Green's representatives 9 statement can then simply be read. 9 were to provide their comments following on from that we 10 THE CORONER: What I will say, and it looks as though 10 will all work from one draft and -- 11 subject to anything else everybody wants to say, but 11 THE CORONER: Try and get there by 2 tomorrow but just we 12 I think that is everything that's on my list, that we 12 will know if it's an issue and we will know his 13 are not going to need to be here tomorrow but if anybody 13 availability or not. 14 wants -- I am open to anything in writing or orally but 14 All right, good. Nothing else anybody wants to say 15 assuming we are not meeting tomorrow, that that would 15 about anything? No. Good. All right, so unless we 16 give a bit of time as well as this evening just to look 16 meet again for any of those other purposes the aim is 17 at that. When shall I say, Mr Popat? What do you want 17 Monday, 26th. Thank you all very much indeed for all 18 me to say people to let you know? 18 your help. 19 MR POPAT: If that could be done within, say, seven days 19 (5.15 pm) 20 that would still leave enough time. We would of course 20 (The inquest adjourned until Monday, 26 January) 21 still make the enquiries in the meantime in any event. 21 22 THE CORONER: I will say that but the other way of doing it 22 23 is if when I rise, which won't be long, if the building 23 24 isn't shut, whilst everybody is here it may be possible 24 25 for everybody just to look at it together and tell 25

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1 INDEX 2 MR MARTYN ROPER (sworn) ...... 1 3 Questions from MS DOLAN ...... 1 4 Questions from MR GARNHAM ...... 22 5 Questions from MR RITCHIE ...... 38 6 Questions from MR OWEN-THOMAS ...... 64 7 Questions from MS GERRY ...... 71 8 Questions from MS GOLLOP ...... 84 9 Questions from MR POPAT ...... 102 10 MR LAURIE BRISTOW (sworn) ...... 120 11 Questions from MS DOLAN ...... 120 12 Questions from MR SHARGHY ...... 135 13 Questions from MR OWEN-THOMAS ...... 142 14 Questions from MS GERRY ...... 148 15 Questions from MS GOLLOP ...... 151 16 Questions from MR FLINN ...... 158 17 Questions from MR POPAT ...... 180 18 Housekeeping ...... 185 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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- Merrill Corporation www.merrillcorp.com /m ls 8th Floor 165 Fleet Street (+44) 207 404 1400 London EC4A 2DY