ISSN: 2560-1601

Vol. 25, No. 1 (RS)

Jan 2020

Serbia political briefing: in 2020 – nothing new on the horizon? IIPE

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+36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin

Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01

Serbia in 2020 – nothing new on the horizon?

An estimation of internal political trends The main political event in the Republic of Serbia in 2020 should be regular parliamentary elections. The Republic of Serbia is a single electoral unit and MPs are elected on the basis of the lists of political parties, coalitions of parties, other political organizations and the lists submitted by groups of citizens, and since 1992, the proportional system with the threshold of 5% and D’Hondt formula has been in force. The president of the Republic, Aleksandar Vucic, announced several months ago (at the beginning of November 2019) that the parliamentary elections should be held at the end of March 2020. Furthermore, president Vucic, who is simultaneously the leader of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS – Srpska napredna stranka), disclosed that the aim of SNS is gaining an absolute majority in the parliament, hence 126 deputy seats.1 The seats in question represent minimal majority in the Serbian parliament, which consists of 250 seats in total, which would, however, along with several deputies representing electoral lists of national minorities, enable absolute power at the republic level for Serbian Progressive Party. Another option for SNS is to form a post-electoral coalition with the present partner – the Socialist Party of Serbia – which will almost surely surpass the electoral threshold of 5%, and whose rating goes up to 10% in the last years. In any case, Serbian Progressive Party enjoys the biggest trust among citizens (estimates range from 44% to 54%)234 and it is not impossible for it alone to receive more than 126 mandates (within the framework of its coalition with dwarf parties and movements).

Far more significant is a dilemma represented by a participation or boycott coming from (a part of) in the next elections. According to the attitude of the opposition parties and movements, the reasons for the boycott being announced by them include unfavorable general political, juridical and, above all, media conditions. In this way, the opposition will attempt to get authority’s consent to change electoral conditions or to, if the authorities disobey their requests, decrease its legitimacy after conducted elections. So far, Party of Freedom and Justice founded by Dragan Djilas, People’s Party, founded by Vuk Jeremic, and The Serbian Movement Dveri, founded by Bosko Obradovic, have publicly opted for election boycott.5 It

1 https://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/ex-yu/Vucic-Parlamentarni-izbori-krajem-marta/567028 2http://www.nspm.rs/istrazivanja-javnog-mnjenja/srbija-jesen-2019.-igre-prestola-i-bojkota.html 3https://mondo.rs/Info/Srbija/a1228743/Rejting-stranaka-istrazivanje.html 4https://moravainfo.rs/2019/08/objavljeno-najnovije-istrazivanje-rejtinga-politickih-stranaka/ 5https://www.bbc.com/serbian/lat/balkan-49525689

1 seems that Democratic Party is close to the idea of boycott, as well as a number of smaller parties that sprung from it. Individuals from the opposition consider the boycott as an additional step to keep the government under a constant tension, for it will make more mistakes. 6 Simultaneously, boycott does not only imply abstention, but also a constant campaign, protesting meetings, concerts, performances and similar manifestations. If such idea would be carried out, its outcome could lead to potential physical confrontations between government supporters and their opponents. The fact is that a significant number of current or former high officials of the opposition, which still have an influence among legislative body, still do not have a clear idea about the boycott’s purpose, nor a final stand regarding it.7

There are several scenarios regarding parliamentary elections that Serbian progressive party has before it. The least possible option is that it will accept all or, at least, a majority of the opposition demands and radically change electoral conditions. This particularly applies to demands regarding media, and giving the opportunity to an equal appearance to all the political parties on national TV stations. Also, SNS will certainly launch new (if possible) young people that were not engaged in disreputable affairs.8 Another, much more realistic, option includes a slight (façade-like) change of electoral conditions followed by attracting the opposition fragments (by bribing, promising or extortion) to participate in the elections in order for them to gain a partial legitimacy at least, as well as proving a will for compromise and respect towards European values in the dialogues with the EU officials. The third option implies an absence of any change of electoral conditions, as well as an electoral involvement by parties who truly support the government, or rather participate in it, with minimal engagement by smaller opposition parties. In any case, no matter what the post-events of the electoral process would be, expectances for nothing significant to change in the internal policy of the Republic of Serbia are realistic. Serbian Progressive Party will still, with or without its coalition partners, exercise their power and it will not be majorly challenged by the opposition which is fractious and has different ideas regarding some key questions, such are Serbia’s EU path or solving the issue.

6 https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/30300662.html 7 https://www.istinomer.rs/analize/sutanovac-brine-me-sta-ce-biti-sa-ds-posle-bojkota/

8 https://studiob.rs/sastanak-predsednistva-sns-o-kim/

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Other internal policy aspects Excluding the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, wherein the government of Serbia does not have the effective power, in the rest of the Republic of Serbia an appearance of more significant social, ethnic or religious tensions, disturbances or conflicts should not be expected. The population of Serbia is aging, and younger population that is oriented towards social activism and dynamism is less and less present among total population. In certain Serbian regions, the national minorities’ parties made requests at some time past or are still making requests today for the formation of special administrative autonomous units based on the ethnic belongingness of the majority of the inhabitants of those regions. In the extreme north of the Republic of Serbia, i.e. in the north of its Province of , during the period of a few years (2008-2013), the parties and social organizations of the Hungarian minority started the initiative for the creation of Hungarian territorial autonomy in the nine municipalities in which the Hungarians are dominant in number (in fact, in eight, either absolutely or relatively). Without a more significant support in Serbia and from abroad, that request has never been seriously discussed, either, and the Hungarian minority enjoy a broad educational and cultural autonomy. Certain political organizations of in Serbia (primarily SDA Sandžaka – Party of Democratic Action of Sanjak) are still advocating the creation of the autonomous region of Sanjak as the European cross-border region whose maximum borders would encompass six municipalities in Serbia and six (in some versions eight) municipalities in the north of , invoking the experience of South Tyrol. The probable purpose of that project, inter alia, is contained in the aspiration to unite into one the Bosniaks of Serbia and Montenegro in some institutional way. Yet, the Bosniaks in Serbia, as well as the Hungarians, enjoy very broad rights and autonomy in culture and education, and they have their representatives in the Serbian Parliament. The Albanian population (except in Kosovo and Metohija) is also concentrated on the territory of the three municipalities in the south of Central Serbia (i.e. in Bujanovac, Preševo, and Medvedja), by the administrative border with the Province of Kosovo and Metohija. The territory of the two municipalities bordering on each other – namely Preševo and Bujanovac – in which the Albanian population is the majority is called Preševo Valley by the , and the name Eastern Kosovo is sometimes also used. That is the part of the Republic of Serbia which the parties of the local Albanians are still demanding a special status for, and requests for its secession and annexation to Kosovo, where the Albanians have declared independence, are not rare, either. Even though there are undisputed separatist ambitions of the Albanians in these municipalities, the Republic of Serbia guarantees and enables them to enjoy a broad cultural and educational autonomy, and they also have political representation in the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. It is not real to expect

3 that the Serbian Government will fulfill demands for creating territorial autonomies for national minorities in any of these cases for foreseeable future.

Not including the Kosovo Albanians, others, more numerous national minorities, as Hungarians or Bosniaks do not have a demographic potential, serious external support or real reasons for causing tension or conflicts with the majority or with the Serbian authorities. Serbian electoral system enables national minorities to acquire their representatives in the Serbian Parliament irrespective of the small number of their members. So, lesser provocations might be possible, but nothing further. There is no real basis for an appearance of interreligious animosity as well, since, amongst other things, there is a stable dialogue and communication between different religious representatives (highest clergymen). Also, according to the current Constitution, the Republic of Serbia is a secular state, and churches and religious communities are separated from the state. The freedom of thought, conscience, beliefs and religion is guaranteed.

Altogether, when it comes to the Republic of Serbia, politically speaking, the year of 2020 will most likely, and in a large amount, resemble the year 2019. Therefore, nothing new on the horizon.

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