Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty Also by Danièle Moyal-Sharrock

THE THIRD WITTGENSTEIN THE POST-INVESTIGATIONS WORKS Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty

Danièle Moyal-Sharrock Department of Philosophy University of East Anglia, UK © Danièle Moyal-Sharrock 2004 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2004 978-1-4039-2175-8 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2004 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 978-0-230-53553-4 ISBN 978-0-230-50446-2 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9780230504462 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Moyal-Sharrock, Danièle Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty/Danièle Moyal-Sharrock. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889–1951. Uèber Gewissheit. 2. Certainty. I. Title.

B3376. W563U365 2004 121Ј.63—dc22 2003064661

10987654321 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 In memory of my father, Michael Moyal, whose laughter gave my world its depth This page intentionally left blank Contents

List of Charts viii Abbreviations of Works by Wittgenstein ix Acknowledgements xi

Introduction 1

1 Objective Certainty versus Knowledge 13

2 The Nonpropositionality of Some ‘Propositions’ 33

3 Objective Certainty and Objective Certainties 52

4 The Features of Hinges 72

5 Types and Origins of Hinges 100

6 Linguistic and Personal Hinges 117

7 Local and Universal Hinges 136

8 Objective Certainty versus Scepticism 157

9 Certainty as Trust: Belief as a Nonpropositional Attitude 181

Conclusion: No Gap to Mind 202

Notes 207 References 235 Index 243

vii List of Charts

2.1 Saying versus speaking 46 3.1 Objective certainty and objective certainties 59 3.2 Formulation versus occurrence 69 5.1 Origin and tenacity of hinges 106 5.2 Origins of hinges 107 8.1 The third Wittgenstein 165 9.1 Belief-in 198

viii Abbreviations of Works by Wittgenstein

AWL Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge, 1932–1935, from the notes of A. Ambrose and M. MacDonald. A. Ambrose (ed.). Oxford: Blackwell, 1979. BB The Blue and Brown Books. 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell, 1969. CE ‘Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness’ (1937); ‘Appendix A: Immediately Aware of the Cause’ (1937–38); ‘Appendix B: Can We Know Anything but Data?’ (1938). In PO, 371–426. CL Cambridge Letters: Correspondence with Russell, Keynes, Moore, Ramsey and Sraffa. Brian McGuinness and G.H. von Wright (eds). Oxford: Blackwell, 1985. CV Culture and Value, G.H. von Wright (ed) in collaboration with H. Nyman. Trans. P. Winch. Amended 2nd edn. Oxford, Blackwell, 1980. LC Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, from the notes of Y. Smithies, R. Rhees, J. Taylor and C. Barrett (ed.). Oxford: Blackwell, 1966. LFM Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge 1939, from the notes of R.G. Bosanquet, N. Malcolm, R. Rhees and Y. Smythies. C. Diamond (ed.). Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1976. LPE ‘Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sense Data” ’, in PO, 202–367. LO Letters to C.K. Ogden. G.H. von Wright (ed.), with an appendix con- taining letters by F.P. Ramsey, 1923–24. Oxford: Blackwell, 1973. LPP Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Philosophical Psychology 1946–47, notes by P.T. Geach, K.J. Shah and A.C. Jackson. P.T. Geach (ed.). Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1988. LW I Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology. Volume I. G.H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman (eds). Trans. C.G. Luckhardt and Maximilian A.E. Aue. Oxford: Blackwell, 1982. LW II Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology. Volume II. G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman (eds). Trans. C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue. Oxford, Blackwell, 1992. MWL Moore’s Wittgenstein Lectures in 1930–1933, in PO, 46–114. NB Notebooks 1914–16. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (eds). Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell, 1979.

ix x Abbreviations of Works by Wittgenstein

OC On Certainty. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (eds). Trans. D. Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe. Amended 1st edn. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. P ‘Philosophy’ (sections 86–93 of the Big Typescript), in PO, 160–99. PG Philosophical Grammar. R. Rhees (ed.). Trans. A. Kenny. Oxford: Blackwell, 1974. PI Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. PLP The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy, by F. Waismann. R. Harré, (ed.). 2nd edn. London: Macmillan, 1997. Preface by Gordon Baker. PO Philosophical Occasions: 1912–1951. J.C. Klagge and A. Nordman (eds). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1993. PR Philosophical Remarks. R. Rhees (ed.). Trans. R. Hargreaves and R. White. Oxford: Blackwell, 1975. RC Remarks on Colour. G.E.M. Anscombe (ed.). Trans. L.L. McAlister and Margarete Schättle. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980; 1st edn. 1977. RFM Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees and G.E.M. Anscombe (eds). Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. 3rd revised edn. Oxford: Blackwell, 1978. RPP I Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Vol. I. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (eds.). Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980. TLP Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961. Z Zettel. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (eds). Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970. Acknowledgements

There are works without whose insights I could not have begun to under- stand On Certainty. One work comes before all others: Avrum Stroll’s Moore and Wittgenstein On Certainty. Stroll’s masterly elucidation of Wittgenstein’s third masterpiece has, for the last decade, provided all students and schol- ars of On Certainty with light, map and compass in their exploration of that work. Any commentary of On Certainty owes Avrum Stroll its bearings. Mine owes him more. It is indebted to his enthusiastic encouragement, the rich- ness of his comments, and the privilege of his friendship. Avrum Stroll’s nat- ural and robust grasp of Wittgenstein is for me an ongoing inspiration. Other works were essential in illuminating the conceptual way: Gertrude Conway’s Wittgenstein on Foundations, Marie McGinn’s Sense and Certainty: A Dissolution of Scepticism, Thomas Morawetz’s Wittgenstein and Knowledge: The Importance of On Certainty, and Crispin Wright’s ‘Facts and Certainties’. I am also indebted to works whose more general scope shed a nonetheless acute and indispensable light on my reading of On Certainty. These are John V. Canfield’s seminal publications on concept formation, Lars Hertzberg’s defining writings on trust and primitivity, Frank Cioffi’s perspicuous ‘place- ment’ of the empirical, and Jacques Bouveresse’s book-length study of Wittgenstein’s conception of necessity. I am immensely grateful to Kevin Mulligan, whose reading of the manu- script has provided with me with invaluable suggestions and objections. My gratitude extends also to Brian McGuinness, Frank Cioffi, Anat Matar, Anat Biletzki, Dan Hutto and Duncan Pritchard for their insightful comments. But the conception, the labour and the fruit of this book would not have been possible without the man who shares my life, Peter Sharrock. I am also grateful for the support of the University of Geneva.

xi And what we expect with certainty is essential to our whole life. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics