This is the penultimate draft of a paper published in Analytic and Continental Philosophy (ed. By Rinofner-Kreidl), Berlin Boston, Walter de Gruyter, 29-46. Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Relativism Martin Kusch Introduction One important strand in the contemporary debate over epistemological relativism focuses on the question whether, and to what extent, Wittgenstein in On Certainty (1969) leaned towards this position. This paper is a contribution to this strand. My discussion has four parts. I shall begin by outlining my interpretation of Wittgensteinian certainties. Subsequently I shall briefly introduce some central arguments for and against attributing epistemic relativism to On Certainty. This will be followed by a sketch of the cluster of ideas that – on my analysis – define important versions of the doctrine in question. And finally I shall give my own interpretation of On Certainty in relation to epistemic relativism. On Certainty – A Brief Reminder On Certainty describes as its central interest “cases in which I rightly say I cannot be making a mistake …” And the passage continues: “I can enumerate various typical cases, but not give any common characteristic.” (§674) In this section I shall offer a classification of these “various typical cases”. On my count these cases fall into five epistemic categories. These categories differ in how certainties relate to evidence, justification and knowledge. Category I consists of beliefs for which we have evidence that is both overwhelming and (at least in good part) dialectically mute. There are eight types of such cases: (I.1) Perceptual/proprioceptive beliefs about one’s own body (e.g. “… here is a hand.” §1) (I.2) Perceptual beliefs about close familiar medium-size objects (e.g. “I believe there is an armchair over there.” §193) (I.3) Introspective beliefs (e.g. “I am in pain.” §178) (I.4) Memory beliefs of salient features of one's autobiography (e.g. “I have lived in this room for weeks past.” §416) (I.5) Beliefs based on simple deductive reasoning; e.g. calculations (e.g. “12x12=144” §43) (I.6) Simple inductive beliefs, e.g. about familiar simple objects (“After putting a book in a drawer, I assume it is there ...” §134) (I.7) Testimonial beliefs based on parents’ or textbook testimony (“... textbooks of experimental physics ... I trust them.” §600) (I.8) Semantic beliefs (e.g. “My name is L.W.” §425) The epistemic status of category I cases – (I.1) to (I.8) – can be summed up as follows. The confidence with which we hold these beliefs is “empirically based” (Wright 2004, p. 36). I have, for instance, a lifelong experience of being called “Martin Kusch”. I also have a lengthy experience of the flat I live in. And I have a protracted experience of me being regarded as calculating reliably and reasoning competently both deductively and inductively. And yet, even though our evidence is overwhelming in these cases, much of it is not accessible. Most of it lies outside our present point of view; most of it is forgotten. And thus it cannot be disclosed and shared. This is the reason why I call it “dialectically mute”: we cannot marshal it against someone who denies our certainties of this category. Category II is the class of mathematical propositions that have “officially been given the stamp of incontestability” (§655). As Wittgenstein explains at greater length in the Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, mathematical propositions are based on the overwhelming empirical evidence of experiments: for example, the experiment showing that two balls and two balls balances four balls. We turn such initially empirical propositions into mathematical propositions by immunizing them against empirical refutation (Wittgenstein 1976, p. 98). Category III cases are fundamental empirical-scientific beliefs (e.g. “The earth is round.” §291; “Water boils at 100°C.” §293). Here too we have very strong and tractable evidence for the beliefs. And again we take the strength of the evidence as a reason to go further and immunize the beliefs. Other than in the case of mathematical propositions however, we do so not “once and for all” but only “for the time being”. In other words, our readiness to give up one of these beliefs is greater than with respect to Category II. Note that Wittgenstein is willing to say that certainties in Category III can be known: 291. We know that the earth is round. We have definitively ascertained that it is round. We shall stick to this opinion, unless our whole way of seeing nature changes. Category IV embodies beliefs that constitute what we might call “domains of knowledge”. I mean certainties like “... the earth has existed for many years past” (§411), or “... the earth exists” (§209). These beliefs do not fit the model of “beliefs supported by strong empirical evidence transformed into certainties via immunization”. Category IV beliefs are beyond empirical confirmation. Or, put differently, only by presupposing them can we show them to be true. Finally, Category V consists of fundamental religious beliefs, like “Jesus only had a human mother.” (§239) As Wittgenstein emphasises in the Lectures on Religious Belief of 1939: “Reasons [for religious beliefs] look entirely different from normal reasons. They are, in a way, quite inconclusive.” (Wittgenstein 1966, p. 56, cf. Kusch 1911) There are reasons and evidence in this realm too, but they are of a different kind from the evidence in the other categories. For and Against Epistemic Relativism in On Certainty The debate over the question whether On Certainty leans towards epistemic relativism is not new. And thus there already exist a number of arguments pro and contra. I now shall try to give a brief summary of these arguments. I begin with the “pro” case and shall focus on three authors, Paul Boghossian, Anthony Grayling and Rudolf Haller. All three base their argument on specific passages. Grayling and Haller cite the following paragraphs in evidence: 65. When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with the concepts the meanings of words change. 95. The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. 99. And the bank of the river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited. 166. The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing. 256. On the other hand a language game does change with time. 336. But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable changes. §§65, 99, 256, and 336 all emphasize the occurrence of fundamental change: in language-games, concepts, word meaning, and rationality. This for Grayling is “classically strong relativism” since it “constitutes a claim that the framework within which claims to knowledge and challenges of doubt equally make sense is such that its change can reverse what counted as either” (2001, p. 308). §§94, 95, and 166 in turn raise the question “what if the background—e.g. your picture of the world— [were] different?” (Haller 1995, p. 229) Does not Wittgenstein imply that there is nothing that can be said about such a scenario? At least nothing evaluative? It appears that “we remain without any ground for the decision between conflicting judgements based on different world pictures.” (Haller 1995, p. 230) Boghossian suggests that it is first and foremost paragraphs §§609-612 that express a commitment to epistemic relativism (2006, p. 107): 609. Suppose we met people who … instead of the physicist … consult an oracle. … —If we call this ‘wrong’ aren’t we using our language-game as a base from which to combat theirs? 610. Are we right or wrong to combat it? Of course there are all sorts of slogans which will be used to support our proceedings. 611. Where two principles clash that cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic. 612. I said I would ‘combat’ the other man,—but wouldn’t I give him reasons? Certainly; but … at the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Think what happens when missionaries convert natives.) Boghossian’s take can be supported by the following considerations. §609 suggests that our criticism of the tribe’s use of an oracle is based on the biased background of our own language-game. §609 also hints that our negative response invariably has an unduly aggressive character: we are not just stating our view, we are “fighting” (bekämpfen) their central beliefs. §610 leaves it open whether our fight is justified or not. Indeed, the “of course” (freilich) even raises the prospect that our attack may be supported by nothing else than “all sorts of slogans”. §611 might be taken to say that there are no worldview- or system-independent considerations in virtue of which one knowledge system – our or the tribe’s – can be said to be more correct than any other, and that name-calling is the only option. And §612 seems to capitalize on the limits of reasoning across cultural boundaries. The members of the tribe cannot be rationally convinced, they can only be persuaded or converted. Authors opting for “contra” also often invoke specific passages in On Certainty to make their case. First, Michael Williams argues that Wittgenstein opposes relativism in §286 of On Certainty (Williams 2007: 1008): 286. We all believe that it isn’t possible to get to the moon; but there might be people who believe that that is possible and that it sometimes happens. We say: these people do not know a lot that we know. And, let them be never so sure of their belief – they are wrong and we know it.