Religion and Politics in China

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Religion and Politics in China Universal Rights in a World of Diversity. The Case of Religious Freedom Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, Acta 17, 2012 www.pass.va/content/dam/scienzesociali/pdf/acta17/acta17-kuan.pdf Religion and Politics in China Hsin-chi Kuan Introduction The state of religious freedom in China could be compared to a glass of water. It was completely empty thirty years ago. Now, it is partially filled. The trouble lies in government restrictions rather than social hostilities. In a report by the PEW Forum on Religion & Public Life, China ranked 4th after Saudi Arabia, Iran and Uzbekistan on the list of countries with very high government restrictions on religion, with an index of 7.7. This high index was given ‘primarily because of its restrictions on Buddhism in Tibet, its ban on the Falun Gong movement throughout the country, its strict controls of the practice of religion among Uighur Muslims and its pressure on religious groups that are not registered by the government, including Christians who worship in private homes’.1 Apart from the suppression of religion, however, there are other versions of the story: recognition and tol- erance, containment and guidance. In the reform era, the government has come to recognize that religion will neither fade out as a result of mod- ernization nor can it be eliminated by the state. What remains to be done is to tolerate, contain and guide it. Religious practices are tolerated as long as they are not perceived as posing a threat to the ruling regime and estab- lished institutions such as education system. Therefore, the state’s grip on popular, diffuse religions2 – those categorized as superstitions – has been relatively loose, as compared to its firm control of the five recognized reli- gions. The five recognized religions have organized institutions that could conceivably compete with the ruling party for authority over the people. Thus, the government spares no efforts to invent legislative and adminis- trative means to contain their development within a specified mode and domain of operation.3 Religion is expected to operate largely in the private 1 http://pewforum.org/Government/Global-Restrictions-on-Religion.aspx, ‘Global Restrictions on Religion’, Full report of 7 December 2009, accessed on 10 May 2011. Quoted from page 13 of 72. 2 Falun Gong is a popular religion but very well organized. Therefore, the present statement does not apply to it. 3 Since 1982, the National People’s Congress and the State Council respectively have promulgated close to a hundred laws and regulations on religion. In addition, there are policy documents and guidelines enacted by the People’s Congresses and governments Universal Rights in a World of Diversity – The Case of Religious Freedom 155 HSIN-CHI KUAN sphere. If it is to be drawn into the public realm, religion is required to act under the guidance of the Chinese Communist Party in relation to defined objectives, such as making a contribution to the country’s economic de - velopment, charitable projects and poverty alleviation works. In short, the state of religion-state relations in China today is complex. Its specific manifestations cannot be fully understood without reference to various contexts and levels of analysis. In the following pages, we will look at those contexts, past and present policies, and the responses of selected re - ligious bodies 4 to the changing environment. The contextual framework of analysis Social outcomes are shaped by contexts, actors and actions. Among the contexts relevant to our concern, three are most important: historical, po - litical and social. 5 Taking the historical perspective, 6 today’s state of religion-politics rela - tions can be regarded as repressive of deep-seated traditions, 7 where faiths and beliefs were subjected to patronage, restriction or suppression, depend - ing on the circumstances. In ancient China, the concept of religion as de - fined today – an institutionalized domain of thinking and practice concerned with the sacred or the supernatural – did not exist. Rather, a traditional idea of the cosmos encompassed all kinds of faiths and beliefs. When Buddhism as the first major religion was imported, 8 it brought into China the institution of a celibate priesthood with a system of doctrines, at the sub-national levels. For a general picture and major problems, please consult Zhuo Xinping, ‘Religion and rule of Law in China Today’, Brigham Young University Law Review , Vol. 2009, Issue 3 (2009), pp. 519-527. 4 Uighur Islam and Tibetan Buddhism are excluded from this analysis due to the complexity of issues involved and the limitation of space here to do justice to them. 5 I choose to treat ‘the cultural’ implicitly in these three contexts. 6 Important contributions to this perspective are provided by Anthony C. Yu, ‘On State and Religion in China: A Brief Historical Reflection’, Religion East and West , Vol. 3 (June 2003), pp. 1-20. A response to this article by Henry Rosemount Jr. follows on pp. 21-26; C.K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society: A Study of Contemporary Social Functions of Religion and Some of Their Historical Factors , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. 7 For such an interpretation, see for instance Richard Madsen, ‘The Upsurge of Re - ligion in China’, Journal of Democracy , Vol. 21, No. 4 (October 2010), pp. 64-66. 8 Buddhism was imported two thousand years ago, Islam introduced in the seventh century, Catholic Christianity too but intermittently at first until the Opium War in 1840, and Protestant Christianity in the early nineteenth century. 156 Universal Rights in a World of Diversity – The Case of Religious Freedom RELIGION AND POLITICS IN CHINA something very alien to the tradition of popular beliefs which were diffuse. As more religions were imported or emerged domestically, all religions co- existed peacefully and in general, none of them played any significant role in public life. 9 The state of China was secular and had no consistent policy of religion. Modes of state action ranged from patronage, through control/regulation, to prohibition from time to time, and even within the tenure of the same administration. There were times when an emperor or empress became a believer in or sympathizer with a particular religion. The result was imperial patronage, with a grant of land and/or title. At other times, when a religion was taken as a threat to the state’s interest or to the social/cultural order, it was outlawed. More often, the state controlled or regulated the practice of religions by restricting activities in terms of sites and target audiences. These different modes of action can be evident within the same administration. For instance, the Kangxi emperor of the Qing dy - nasty (1644–1911) was initially tolerant of the spread of Catholicism by the Jesuit missionaries in returns for the latter’s contributions to China in as - tronomy, machinery for gun manufacture, and diplomacy (the Jesuits even ran the Imperial Observatory). However, the policy of tolerance, which was officially anchored in the Edict of 1692, could not survive the Chinese rites controversy within the Church. Pope Clement XI issued the 19 March 1715 Ex illa Die to officially condemn the Chinese rites, which was reiter - ated in 1742 by Benedict’s Ex quo singulari . In 1721, the Kangxi emperor responded with a decree to ban Christian missions in China. With this small example, we can conclude that the main characteristic of imperial policy towards religions was pragmatic with an ideological residue of monarchical tutelage over cultural/spiritual matters in society. Pragmatism was oriented towards functional goals, as defined by the ruler. The ideological residue was based on the idea of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’. The emperor had the responsibility to mediate between Heaven and Earth, the authority to dis - tinguish between ‘true teaching’ and ‘deviant teaching’ and the obligation to keep social activities in a harmonious order. If this historical-cultural legacy matters, it suggests that ‘the state’ today remains the master of all human affairs whereas ‘religion’ can only follow. 9 If we regard Confucianism as a religion, the statement here must be radically changed. Confucianism had become a kind of official ideology of China since the Han dynasty and later institutionalized into the state examination system as a vehicle to recruit the ruling elite. In recent years, the revival of Confucianism and efforts to promote it as a religion were encouraged by the government, perhaps as an indigenous contender to Christianity in the service of the people’s spiritual needs. Universal Rights in a World of Diversity – The Case of Religious Freedom 157 HSIN-CHI KUAN This seems incontestable because the political regime is still authoritarian as in the past. There are however important differences in the political regime between the past and the present. While emperors in old China were absolutists, the reach of imperial power was limited in scope and ex - ercised in a laissez-faire manner. Communist rulers in modern China were once totalitarian reaching deep into the people’s daily life with an anti- theist zeal of social revolution. The Chinese regime today is authoritarian but more interventionist than with its predecessors. All in all, the changing nature of the political regime goes a long way to explain for the different patterns of religion-politics relations since 1949. Today, the vogue of expla - nation knows different but related versions. The first understands the current context as one of pragmatism. Religious policy is no longer shaped by Marxism-Leninism, but by the practical objectives of the ruling Chinese Communist Party. The primary goal is indeed maintenance of political power. Wang Zuo’an, Deputy Director-General of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, was quoted to have said it clearly.
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