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Estonia Political Briefing: Estonian Politics: Forecasting 2019 E-MAP Foundation MTÜ

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Estonia Political Briefing: Estonian Politics: Forecasting 2019 E-MAP Foundation MTÜ ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 14, No. 1 (EE) January 2019 Estonia political briefing: Estonian politics: forecasting 2019 E-MAP Foundation MTÜ 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01 Estonian politics: forecasting 2019 In a turbulent and, to an extent, chaotic political Platzdarm of the EU, Estonia has always been known or, at least, perceived as a place where the concept of good planning is commonly respected. Be it in the fiscal policies or in the process of getting ready for the Presidency in the Council of the EU, the Estonian Republic has been trying to avoid any of those unpleasant surprises, which another country usually ‘receives’ due to its relative (or complete) unpreparedness, let alone lack of proper forecasting. Arguably, such a noble quality of the Baltic country will be seriously tested in 2019, the year of parliamentary elections to both the Riigikogu and the European Parliament. Leaving the latter important body of the EU out of this analysis for now (it needs to be a different briefing, specifically related to the European Parliament), let us make a prognosis on what will be happening in Estonian politics before and after March 2019. The 2019 Riigikogu elections: beginning with and finishing off at Indeed, the elections to the Estonian Parliament will be held on 3 March 2019, but the campaign had informally started a while ago. In a very noticeable way, a comprehensive range of local political parties and movements began seriously eyeing the elections from about July 2018. Without repeating any segments from the previous briefings, while summarising some of their analytical findings, it is possible to argue that the following six Estonian political parties are in strong contention to get their members into the next Riigikogu: the Estonian Centre Party (Eesti Keskerakond; currently enjoying the presence of 25 seats in the outgoing Parliament of 101 MPs), the Estonian Reform Party (Eesti Reformierakond; 30 seats), the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond; 7 seats), the Social Democratic Party (Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond; 14 seats), Pro Patria (Isamaa; 11 seats1), and Estonia 200 (Eesti 200; a new party with no seats in the Riigikogu currently). Thus far, it is highly unlikely for the other political parties to enter the next Estonian Parliament on the party list, which will require passing a nationwide threshold of 5%. This could be of a particular concern for the Estonian Free Party (Eesti Vabaerakond; 6 seats) that, considering its dramatic drop in popularity, is not going to make it this time. Certainly, an MP from any party or without a party’s affiliation can be elected as an individual candidate, but it 1 ‘Riigikogu’. Riigikogu. Available from [https://www.riigikogu.ee/riigikogu/]. 1 is a completely different discussion that will need another framework for analysis – at present, the Riigikogu has 8 MPs who are not associated with any of the parliamentary parties’ faction. In regards of a comprehensive forecast on what percentage each of the six contenders is likely to finish with, an interesting material is offered by PollofPolls.eu,2 an Austria-based non- profit. The graph allows for generating a combined version of many major polls in Estonia, and, on 20 December 2018, according to an aggregation trend line called Kalman Smooth, one could detect only the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia and Pro Patria rising in popularity, at the expense of the two leaders (see Table 1 for more details). Table 1: Aggregated polling data in Estonia (October-December 2018)3 Date of recording/Aggregated % Political party 20 October 2018 20 November 2018 20 December 20184 The Estonian Centre Party 27% 28% 27% The Estonian Reform Party 27% 25% 23% The Conservative People’s 17% 17% 19% Party of Estonia The Social Democratic Party 12% 10% 10% Pro Patria 5% 5% 7% Estonia 200 6% 7% 7% The Estonian Free Party 2% 1% 1% The Estonian Greens 3% 3% 3% Source: Pollof•Polls.eu On the forecasting theme, there are few questions that are remaining, but the main one is undeniably on the most probable configurations of the prospective Estonian Government, which will be formed by the new Riigikogu after the elections. Figuratively as well as ironically 2 ‘All polls for Estonia’. Pollof­Polls.eu. Available from [https://pollofpolls.eu/EE]. 3 ‘All polls for Estonia’. 4 The latest aggregation available to date. 2 speaking, it is a EUR 11.31 billion question (the latter represents the country’s state budget for 2019), but a decent prognosis can still be offered. Should the 20 December 2018-bound aggregative figures get ‘reincarnated’ into the votes received by the parties in March 2019, there will be a high level of probability for the next Estonian Government to be configured out of the Estonian Centre Party, the Social Democratic Party, Pro Patria, and Estonia 200 (see all configurations in Table 2). Table 2: Probable configurations of the prospective Estonian Government Configurations Combined results, according to the latest aggregative poll 1. The Estonian Centre Party The Social Democratic Party 44% Pro Patria 2. The Estonian Centre Party The Social Democratic Party 51% Pro Patria Estonia 200 3. The Estonian Reform Party The Social Democratic Party 47% Estonia 200 Pro Patria 4. The Estonian Centre Party The Social Democratic Party 47% Estonia 200 5. The Estonian Reform Party Estonia 200 37% Pro Patria 6. The Estonian Centre Party The Estonian Reform Party 57% Estonia 200 7. The Estonian Centre Party The Estonian Reform Party 67% The Social Democratic Party Estonia 200 Source: Constructed by E-MAP Foundation MTÜ and based on Pollof•Polls.eu data Evidently, it will be challenging for the current governmental composition (the Estonian Centre Party, the Social Democratic Party, and Pro Patria) to make the ultimate return to the Government, without asking another political party for help (see configuration 1). Back in the 3 memorable November 2016, the Social Democratic Party and Pro Patria (despite significant ideological differences and personal issues existing between them) were instrumental for the ultimate success of the process that toppled the second cabinet of Taavi Rõivas (the Estonian Reform Party) and brought the Estonian Centre Party (with its new leader Jüri Ratas as the Prime Minister) into the Government for the first time since 2003. Even in politics of a democracy such things are usually remembered, and, on this particular case, it could be argued that the factor of institutional memory of being together in the same cabinet will play a major role for the current coalition to aim at staying together for one more time. However, since the numbers may not stack up at a right moment, Estonia 200 may be kindly asked by the current coalitional partners to join in. Should it happen, it will not be a breeze for the trio from the current governmental composition to negotiate with Estonia 200, but there are few factors, which are hinting about a possibility for them to succeed in attracting the new party into the new Government. Moreover, as discussed in a previous briefing, Jüri Ratas has already welcomed the establishment of Estonia 2005, and it is yet another important piece of the ‘puzzle’. The Estonian Reform Party, which was leading the Estonian Government in 5 consecutive cabinets, from April 2005 until November 2016, will also be doing its absolute best in attracting Estonia 200 to join their ‘team’. On all occasions and should they maintain their digits until the day of the elections, both Pro Patria and, especially, Estonia 200 will be holding their ‘golden tickets’, and the bigger parties are well aware of this peculiarity. There will be a significant factor of those prospective MPs who will get elected, having no particular party’s affiliation – these politicians can assist the coalitional ‘locomotives’ (the Estonian Reform Party and the Estonian Centre Party) in the process of ‘converting’ 47% into 50%+1 vote, if either configuration 3 or 4 becomes a reality. Remembering the past, it is necessary to specify that there is a certain degree of probability for the configurations 6 and 7 to appear as grand- coalitions. For example, during the Andrus Ansip’s first cabinet, the Estonian Reform Party and the Estonian Centre Party were in the same Government, therefore it would be unwise to completely rule the return of the grand deals out. At the same, all of the above arithmetic and educated guesses can be treated as relevant only if no party from the configurations presented in Table 2 will be willing to enter a 5 Jüri Ratas in ‘Юри Ратас сделал неожиданное заявление о партии ‘Ээсти 200’’. 4 November 2018. Available from [https://rus.postimees.ee/6445158/yuri-ratas-sdelal-neozhidannoe-zayavlenie-o-partii-eesti-200]. Translated from Russian by E-MAP Foundation MTÜ (non-official translation). 4 coalition with the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia. The latter organisation, while growing in electoral support, objectively represents a populism-driven xenophobic political opportunism, which made some of the major Estonian politicians publically rebuffing even a slight perspective to get into a governmental coalition with the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia6. In 2015, it was supported by 8.1% of the total voters7, entering the Riigikogu on the party list for the first time. This year, having dramatically grown in popular support that can help it to double the number of its MPs after March 2019, the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia, for a number of reasons, will have to remain in the parliamentary opposition after the new elections.
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