Building a Feminist Philosophy of Cognitive Neuroscience A dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Cincinnati in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy of the College of Arts and Sciences by Vanessa A. Bentley M.A. University of Cincinnati September 2015 Committee Chair: Robert A. Skipper, Jr., Ph.D. i Dissertation Abstract Feminist philosophers of science identify sexist and androcentric science and develop alternate practices to address science’s empirical limitations and its contributions to social oppression. However, some scholars have questioned the impact of feminist epistemology on scientific practice. In my dissertation, I advance the project of feminist philosophy of science by articulating a method to connect it to scientific practice. I develop a feminist philosophy of cognitive neuroscience using feminist standpoint empiricism that is informed by the specifics of practice. In chapter one, I establish the gap between feminist theory and feminist practice of science. I claim that feminist philosophy of science has the tools to effect change in scientific practice, but it must be articulated in a way that engages scientists. In order to make it relevant to scientists, feminist philosophy of science must be tailored to the specifics of a particular discipline of science. I defend feminist standpoint empiricism (Intemann 2010) for its potential to connect to scientific practice, and I identify the considerations for translating feminist standpoint empiricism to a specific science. In chapter two, I introduce the theory of sex/gender differences in the brain, the two neuroimaging case studies, and my critical approach: assessing the research on empirical grounds as well as through the feminist standpoint. The next two chapters are case studies on the neuroimaging of human sex or gender differences. Chapter three investigates structural differences in the corpus callosum, the white matter tract connecting the two hemispheres of the brain. The corpus callosum is thought to be larger and more bulbous in women. Chapter four investigates functional differences in a visuospatial task, mental rotation, a task in which men supposedly excel. Although many studies find sex or gender differences in the corpus callosum or in mental rotation activation, there are no consistent findings across studies. I conclude for both questions that there is no evidence for sex or gender differences. In analyzing the ii methods and the assumptions, I uncover sex essentialism throughout the research process. Sex essentialism is the view that men and women are essentially different due to their sex. In chapter five, I use the findings from the two case studies to demonstrate the limitations of cognitive neuroscience grounded in traditional epistemology. I propose a new framework based on feminist standpoint empiricism and integrated with the specifics of practice in cognitive neuroimaging. For the question of sex or gender differences in cognitive neuroscience, the framework involves initiating inquiry from the perspective of women’s lives, reflecting on the differences between men’s lives and women’s lives, and incorporating the interests of women in the research, which involves understanding the difference between sex and gender. Since this approach was built through close consideration of scientific practice, it is in the form of tangible changes practicing scientists can incorporate into their research. A philosophy of cognitive neuroscience from the feminist standpoint yields a practice of science that is better grounded epistemologically and that is more socially and morally responsible. iii © Copyright by Vanessa A. Bentley 2015 iv Acknowledgements I acknowledge the following funding sources through the University of Cincinnati: the Philosophy Department, the Taft Center, the Graduate Student Governance Association, and the University Research Council. I thank: my advisor, Rob Skipper, who gave me the idea for this project; my committee members, especially Angela Potochnik for her valuable feedback; Ayҫa Mazman, my good friend and supporter from the first year; audiences at conferences where I presented portions of this work for their helpful comments; the graduate students who gave helpful feedback at practice talks and Dissertation Dish, especially Nina Atanasova; Josh Haddock, who was taken from us too soon; and my parents, Bob and Carol Gorley. Finally, I thank my partner, Brian Bentley, for sticking around when it seemed this project would never end. Brian, thank you for believing in me. v Table of contents Dissertation abstract……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. ii Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… v Table of contents…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. vi List of tables…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. xi List of figures……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. xii Chapter 1: Establishing the case for discipline-specific feminist philosophy of science……………….1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1 The gap between theory and practice………………………………………………………………………………………….. 5 Bridging the gap…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 10 Parallel case: History of philosophy of science……………………………………………………………………………… 17 Feminist philosophy of science…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 20 Feminist empiricism………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 22 Philosophical feminist empiricism……………………………………………………………………………………. 23 Feminist standpoint theory……………………………………………………………………………………………… 25 A hybrid theory: feminist standpoint empiricism…………………………………………………………….. 28 Feminist science…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 31 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 38 Chapter 2: Background and methodology…………………………………………………………………………………… 39 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 39 Cognitive neuroscience and cognitive neuroimaging……………………………………………………………………. 40 Introduction to sex or gender differences in the brain…………………………………………………………………. 44 Introduction to the two case studies……………………………………………………………………………………………. 48 Case studies, the gendered lateralization hypothesis, and ethical considerations………………………… 52 vi Case study methodology………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 55 Overall argument preview……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 56 Chapter 3: Corpus callosum case study……………………………………………………………………………………….. 58 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 58 History…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 62 Case study……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 71 Method……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 71 Results…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 75 1. Empirical…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 75 2. Feminist and methodological critiques……………………………………………………………. 81 A. Persistence of the question………………………………………………………………… 81 B. Language……………………………………………………………………………………………. 82 C. Creating groups………………………………………………………………………………….. 83 D. Blind measurement and analysis procedures and expectation effects.. 84 E. Assumption that the results generalize universally…………………………….. 87 F. Assumption that social and environmental factors do not affect CC development……………………………………………………………………………… 88 G. Handedness……………………………………………………………………………………….. 90 H. Correcting for multiple comparisons………………………………………………….. 91 I. General methodological critique: Dorion et al. (2001)…………………………. 92 J. New tools: diffusion tensor imaging (DTI)……………………………………………. 94 1. Problems with standard parcellation schemes………………………. 94 2. Sex or gender differences using DTI……………………………………….. 98 K. A different approach……………………………………………………………………………105 vii Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 108 Chapter 4: Mental rotation case study………………………………………………………………………………………… 112 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 112 History…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 116 Case study……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 124 Method……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 124 Results…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 127 1. Outliers: Tagaris et al. (1996) and Dietrich et al. (2001)…………………………………… 127 2. Empirical…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 130 A. Behavioral………………………………………………………………………………………….. 131 B. Activation…………………………………………………………………………………………… 134 3. Feminist and methodological critiques……………………………………………………………. 137 A. Persistence of the question………………………………………………………………… 137 B. Language……………………………………………………………………………………………. 139 C. Creating groups………………………………………………………………………………….. 141 D. Blind measurement and analysis procedures and expectation effects.. 141 E. Assumption that the results generalize universally…………………………….. 145 F. Assumption that social and environmental factors do not affect mental rotation ability…………………………………………………………………………… 152 i. Wooden models, three-dimensional stimulus presentation, and virtual reality………………………………………………………………… 152 ii. Sports and hobbies………………………………………………………………… 154 iii. Video game play……………………………………………………………………. 157 iv. Science and math courses taken…………………………………………….160 viii v. Practice and training………………………………………………………………. 160 vi. Distance traveled from home for play or work in children…….. 161 vii. Confidence level…………………………………………………………………… 163 viii. Stereotype threat……………………………………………………. ……....... 164 ix. Group composition……………………………………………………………….