Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs Studies of Classical India

Editors

Bimal K. Matilal Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions & Ethics, Oxford University, England

J. Moussaieff Masson Professor of Sanskrit, University of Cali/ornia, Berkeley, U.S.A.

Editorial Board: R. P. Goldman, Daniel H. H. Ingalls, and A. K. Ramanujan

The aim of this series is to publish fundamental studies concerning classi• cal Indian civilization. It will include editions of texts, translations, specialized studies, and scholarly works of more general interest related to various fields of classical Indian culture such as philosophy, grammar, literature, religion, art, and history. In this context, the term 'Classical India', covers a vast area both historically and geographically, and embraces various religions and philosophical traditions, such as Buddhism, Jainism, and Hinduism, and many languages from Vedic and Epic Sanskrit to Pali, Prakrit, and Apabhrarpsa. We believe that in a profoundly traditional society like In• dia, the study of classical culture is always relevant and important. Classical India presents an interesting record of deep human ex• perience, thoughts, beliefs, and myths, which have been a source of in• spiration for countless generations. We are pe'rsu~ded of its lasting value and relevance to modern man. By using extensive and for the most part unexplored material with scientific rigor and modern methodology, the authors and editors of this series hope to stimulate and promote interest and research in a field that needs to be placed in its proper perspective.

Volume 9 Dignagaon the Interpretation of Signs

Richard P. Hayes Faculty ofReligious Studies, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada

KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS

DORDRECHT / BOSTON / LONDON Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Hayes, Richard P. (Richard Philip), 1945- Dignaga on the interpretation of signs.

(Studies of classical India; v. 9) Composite revision of three earlier works, one of which was the author's thesis (Ph. D.-University of Toronto). Includes translation of Ch. 2 & Ch. 5 of Pramanasamuccaya. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Dignaga, 5th cent. 2. Languages-Philosophy. 3. Languages-Religious aspects-Buddhism. I. Digniiga, 5th cent. Pramanasamuccaya. Ch. 2. English. 1987. II. Dignaga, 5th cent. Pramanasamuccaya. Ch. 5. English. 1987. III. Title. IV. Series. B133.D654H39 1987 181' .043 87-35620

ISBN-13 :978-94-0 10-7806-1 e-ISBN-13:978-94-009-2899-2 DOl: 10.1007/978-94-009-2899-2

Published by Kluwer Academic Publishers, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, Holland.

Kluwer Academic Publishers incorporates the publishing programmes of D. Reidel, Martinus Nijhoff, Dr W. Junk and MTP Press.

Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada by Kluwer Academic Publishers, 101 Philip Drive, Norwell, MA 02061, U.S.A.

In all other countries, sold and distributed by Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, Holland.

No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner To Philip T. and Helen Schooley Hayes, who by lifelong example have taught the author t~ treasure critical thinking, to shun dogmatism, and to sustain good humour in a world that often disappoints. CONTENTS

Preface ...... ix Acknowleagements . . . xv Chapter 1: Preliminaries 1 1.1 The central issues ••••••••• 1 1.2 The contributions of previous scholars 9 1.2.1 Satis Chandra Vidyabhii~l)a . . . . 9 1.2.2 Th. Stcherbatsky ...... 11 1.2.3 Satkari Mookerjee ...... 16 1.2.4 Erich Frauwallner ...... 21 1.2.5 Kitagawa Hidenori, Hattori Masaaki and Katsura Shoryu .24 1.2.6 Radhika Herzberger ...... 30 1.3 The argument of this book • . . • • • • . . . • . .32 Notes ...... 36 Chapter 2: Rational Skepticism in Pre-Ditmagan Buddhism .41 2.1 The foundation of skepticism in the Nikiiyas • • .42 2.1.1 The Sutta Nipata ...... 43 2.1.2 DIgha Nikaya: The Brahmajtila sutta ...... 45 2.1.3 Ali.guttara Nikaya: The Kesaputtas ...... 48 2.1.4 Summary of how opinions are regarded in the Nikayas .50 2.2 The influence of Niigiirjuna .52 2.2.1 Millamadhyamakakiirikii ...... 53 2.2.2 Vigrahavyiivartani ...... 59 Notes ...... 63

Chapter 3: Nominalism in Pre-Diiiniigan Buddhism .72 3.1 The Agama literature and Milindapaiiha • • • • .78 3.1.1 Natural class in the Nikayas .79 3.1.2 Personal identity in the Pali Canon . . .81 3.1.3 Personal identity in the MilindapaTiha .86 3.2 Nominalism in Nagarjuna • • • .88 3.3 Nominalism in Vasubandhu . . .93 3.3.1 Vasubandhu's theory of two truths .93 3.3.2 Vasubandhu's phenomenalism . .96 Notes ...... 104 Chapter 4; Diiinaga's Theory of Knowledge 111 4.1 Hetucakranimaya ••••••• 111 4.2 The PramiiQasamuccaya • • • • • 131 4.2.1 Sensation in the PramaIJasamuccaya 133 4.2.1.1 Awareness's awareness of itself . 140 4.2.2 Inference in the Pramiif}asamuccaya 142 4.2.2.1 The subject matter of inference .... 143 4.2.2.2 Three characteristics of legitimate evidence 145 4.2.2.3 On errancy and pervasion ...... 154 4.3 The skepticism implicit in Diiinaga's epistemology 158 Notes ...... 168 Vlll Contents

Chapter 5: Diimaga's nominalism ...... •.....• 173 5.1 The Alambanaparrlqii • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . •• 173 5.2 The context of the discussion of nominalism in the PramiiTJasamuccaya 1'78 5.2.1 Scripture as a form of inferential sign . 178 5.2.2 Fallibility in inference and scripture . . . . . 179 5.2.3 The question of universals ...... 183 5.2.4 Anyiipoha as a substitute for universals . . . . 185 5.2.5 The nature of information conveyed by language 188 5.2.6 The meaning of individual words ...... 193 5.2.7 Particulars as instantiations of universals . . . . 196 5.2.8 Absurdities in the view that universals exist outside thought 204 5.2.9 The contrariety of expressions ...... 205 5.2.10 The meaning of a sentence ...... 212 5.2.11 The sentence as the primary linguistic symbol 215 Notes...... 216 TRANSLATIONS Introduction to translation ...... 223 The history of the PramalJasamuccaya in Tibet . . 226 Chapter 6: Pramiil}asamuccaya II "On reasoning" 231 6.1 Inference differentiated from sensation • 231 6.2 The three characteristics of legitimate evidence 239 6.3 Property-bearer as the subject of inference 242 6.4 On restricted and errant properties • • . • . 244 6.5 Non-symmetry of restriction and pervasion • • 247 Notes...... 249 Chapter 7: PramiiIJasamuccaya V: On the nature of signs in language 252 7.1 On the question of what verbal symbols make known 252 7.2 On the relationships between symbols that express preclusion 278 7.3 On the unreality of universals outside thought 282 7.4 On the question of what linguistic symbols preclude 287 Notes...... 300 Chapter 8: Conclusions . . • • • • • 309 Appendix A: Glossary of Sanskrit Terms 313 Appendix B: Tibetan-Sanskrit Lexicon ...... 322 Appendix C: Text key to translations of PramalJasamuccaya 332 Selected Bibliography ...... 335 Subject and Author Index ...... 353 Preface

Buddhist philosophy in India in the early sixth century C.E. took an important tum away from the traditional methods of explaining and systematizing the teachings in Siitra literature that were attributed to the Buddha. The new direction in which several Indian Buddhist philosophers began to move was that of following reasoning to its natural conclusions, regardless whether the conclusions conflicted with traditional teachings. The central figure in this new movement was DiIinaga, a native of South India who found his way to the centre of Buddhist education at Nalanda, studied the treatises that were learned by the Buddhist intellectuals of his day, and eventually wrote works of his own that formed the core of a distinctly new school of Buddhist thought. Inasmuch as virtually every Indian philosopher after the sixth century had either to reject Dirinaga's methods or build upon the foundations provided by his investigations into logic, epistemology and language, his influence on the evolution of Indian philosophy was considerable, and indeed some familiarity with Dirinaga's arguments and conclusions is indispensable for anyone who wishes to understand the historical development of Indian thought. Moreover, since the approach to Buddhism that grew out of Dirinaga's meditations on language and the limits of knowledge dominated the minds of many of the scholars who took Buddhism to Tibet, some familiarity with Dirinaga is also essential to those who wish to understand the intellectual infrastructure of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy and practice. Despite Dirinaga's importance in the evolution of Indian and Tibetan philosophy, however, it has not been easy for modem scholars to gain access to his ideas. All his key works have perished in their original Sanskrit versions and can be read only in rather awkward Tibetan and Chinese translations. But because so many of Dirinaga's observations, especially of language, were deeply influenced by the Sanskrit grammatical tradition of PiiI)ini, Patafijali and Bhartrhari, his philosophical writings were extremely difficult to translate into comprehensible Tibetan or Chinese, so even these translations can hardly be read. Rather, they must be painstakingly deciphered by a very slow and complex procedure that involves piecing together clues that have been gathered not only from the Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophical traditions but also from India's rich grammatical tradition. At times the work feels more like the task of an archaeologist fitting together the scattered fragments of an unearthed pot than like the task of an historian of philosophy, for a great

ix x Preface

deal of effort at the outset must be expended on discovering even what Diimaga had said, not to think of what significance might have been attached to saying it. But gradually the pieces begin to fit together, and the result of the labours of piecing them together has been the present book, which focuses on Diimaga's theories on the interpretations of natural signs in ordinary inference and of conventionally contrived signs in human discourse. My initial intention, when I began working on this general topic in 1974, was to gain some understanding of the theory of language that featured so prominently in the works of such Indian Buddhist writers as DharmakIrti, Dharmottara, Santaraksita, Kamalarua, RatnakIrti and JfianasrImitra. The decision to do research for a doctoral dissertation in this area had come about as a result of feeling torn between three loves: Buddhist philosophy, formal logic and Sanskrit grammar. Studying the linguistic theory of the Buddhist epistemologists seemed an ideal way to continue research in all three of these areas, and I shall always be grateful to Professors Katsura Shoryu and B.K. Matilal for pointing me towards a study of the linguistic philosophy of Santaraksita for my dissertation research. The more I worked on Santarak~ita, however, the more apparent it became that I must first gain a clear understanding of the antecedents to his thinking about language, and so began the study of numerous thinkers whose criticisms of the Buddhist philosophy of language Santaraksita had tried to answer. Ultimately, of course, it was necessary to come to terms with the principal source of most of the ideas developed by Buddhist epistemologists and linguists, and so I came to the study of Diimaga's Pramtil]asamuccaya. As I began to work through the section of the Pramtil'J.asamuccaya that deals especially with philosophy of language, I expected to find there a series of arguments and conclusions essentially like those that are to be found in the work of Diimaga's most celebrated interpreter, DharmakIrti. What was in fact to be found in reading Diimaga at first hand, however, was rather different from accounts found in virtually all the secondary literature that treats Buddhist linguistic philosophy, and I came to form the unexpected conclusion that nearly every modern scholar of classical Buddhist thought has proceeded on the false assumption that DiIinaga and DharmakIrti had advanced essentially the same arguments towards essentially the same conclusions. It was with great delight that I discovered in DiIinaga not merely an inchoate and simpler version of DharmakIrti, but a strikingly distinct thinker whose agenda was different from Dharma• kIrti's in a number of important ways. The ways in which DiIinaga differed from his later interpreters are spelled out in the introduction and Preface xi

conclusion of this book. Stated simply, the difference is this: whereas Dharmakirti was the architect of a complex edifice of apologetics in which every received dogma of Indian Buddhism was justified by a multiplicity of arguments and every cherished Brahmanical belief was subjected to a barrage of feisty polemics, Diimaga emerged as a figure much more in line with the skeptical spirit of archaic Buddhism and early Madhyamaka philosophy. For Diimliga the central task was not to construct and defend a rationalized system of thought but to examine the fundamental assumptions on which all our claims to understanding rest.

Dinnliga's principal philosophical work was called the Pramiir:za• samuccaya, for it was a collection (samuccaya) of shorter writings that he had done on various aspects of the study of what constitutes knowledge (pramiir:za). The present work is also a samuccaya of sorts in that it comprises a number of works that were originally independent studies of aspects of Dinnaga's thought. An observation that stands at the heart of Diimaga's investigation is that language conveys information of essentially the same type that inference conveys. That is, upon hearing a spoken sentence the hearer forms an hypothesis about the idea that was in the mind of the speaker. A sentence is the sign of an idea in about the same way that a body of smoke is a sign of fire. Interpreting the sign of a thought expressed by a sentence in a conventional human language is governed by the same constraints and carries with it the same risks of error as does drawing an inference from any sign in nature. Understanding what the risks of error are in understanding a sign that takes the form of a sentence requires first understanding what the risks are of drawing conclusions from observed signs in general. Given the intimate connection between the theory of inference and the theory of language in Dinnaga' s philosophy, it makes sense to treat these two branches of DiIinaga's inquiry together in a single volume. For this reason I have merged together, with a considerable amount of editing and rewriting, three of my earlier studies of DiIinliga's philosophy. Two of these earlier studies were in the form of articles (Hayes 1980 and 1984), and the third was my Ph.D. dissertation at University of Toronto. The 1980 article contained a translation of the main part of Pramiir:zasamuccaya chapter two, which deals with inference, and the dissertation contained a study and translation of Pramiir:zasamuccaya chapter five, which deals with linguistic signs. The 1984 article dealt with aspects of Dinnaga's theory of inference and tied his theory of inference to his theory of language. In the present work I have tied together somewhat modified and updated forms of these three earlier works. xii Preface

But during the time that I was working on Diimaga's thought, it happened that I was also teaching courses in Indian philosophy, in Buddhist philosophy and in Buddhist religious practice at the University of Toronto, and my thought turned more and more to seeing how Dirinaga's philosophical writings fit into the overall development of not only Buddhist theory but also Buddhist practice. The more I reflected on Buddhism in general and Dirinaga in particular, the more it struck me that a careful study of the nature of language was not merely an interesting intellectual hobby to a man who happened to be a Buddhist monk but rather that exploring the limits of communication and the limits of human understanding were central to the task of achieving nirwi'l)a as traditionally understood in mainstream Buddhism. Therefore, while the focus of my dissertation was on Dirinaga's philosophy of language as such, the present book deals much more fully with the question of why a Buddhist qua Buddhist would bother to have a philosophy of language at all. It is my contention that Dirinaga's theory of inference is essentially skeptical and that his theory of language is also skeptical. It is also my contention that skepticism, empiricism and nominalism go very comfortably together as philosophical views and that it is therefore no surprise that Dirinaga the skeptic should also be an empiricist and a nominalist. Finally, it is my contention that skeptical and nominalistic tendencies are present in Buddhism from the very outset and so there is no great surprise in finding that a Buddhist should be a nominalist, a skeptic and an empiricist. But I have discovered in talking to other scholars that while I find it perfectly natural that a Buddhist would easily be a skeptic, a nominalist and an empiricist, not everyone sees the natural congruence of these different positions. Therefore I have thought it best to spell out my reasoning on this matter in some detail in chapters two and three of this study, which deal respectively with the skeptical trend and the tendency towards nominalism in canonical Buddhism, in Buddhist abhidharma and in early Madhyamaka thought as set down by Niigarjuna. At the risk of oversimplifying the argument of my book, one might say that my conclusion is that Dirinaga, rather than being the founder of a radically new school of Buddhism, was more a natural continuation of a line of a very gradual evolution, an evolution characterized not by dramatic changes of perspective but by a natural process of discovering ever more fully the complex implications of a perspective that had at first seemed much more simple. Thus, while I doubt that the Buddha could ever have anticipated that a philosophy of language like Dirinaga's would evolve out of something as simple as the Four Noble Truths, I am also inclined to feel that a philosophy of language like Dirinaga's grows quite naturally out of the basic suppositions in the Buddha's teachings. Given both the teachings of mainstream Buddhism and the general Indian obsession with questions Preface xiii

of language, it is almost inevitable that a Buddhist would come along with views on language like Diriniiga's.

It has been my intention in putting together this book to provide material that would be of interest to several types of reader. Thus I have ventured into areas, such as a comparison of the Hellenistic Skeptics with some trends of early Buddhism, that I hope will be of interest to historians of philosophy who are interested in comparing the evolution of thought in Europe with the evolution of thought in India. I have also dealt with topics that are intended to be of interest to historians of Buddhism and scholars engaged in the comparative studies of religion. In addition, some discussions have been included of points that scholars of the Sanskrit and Tibetan languages should find interesting. Finally, it is my hope that members of the Buddhist community, especially those in the West where Buddhism has yet to reach its mature form, will find something of value in the reflections offered here of the intellectual achievements made during one of the most creative and vital periods in the history of the religion.

Very few academic books represent the work and ideas of only one scholar, although it is customary for one or occasionally two authors to take responsibility for the final form of the work. The present book would quite simply never have existed had it not been for the kind influences of a number of mentors and colleagues. As mentioned earlier, the initial suggestion that I do some work in the area of the linguistic philosophy of the Buddhist epistemologists came from Prof. Katsura Shoryu, who gave me my first instruction in 1973 at University of Toronto both in the classical Tibetan language and in the Buddhist epistemologists. My interest in the thought of DharmakIrti and his school was kept alive by Professors A.K. Warder and B.K. MatilaI. As my decision to work on the Buddhist theory of language grew more firm and it became apparent that it would be necessary to become familiar with the Brahmanical theories of language in opposition to which the Buddhist theories were formed, Prof. Matilal provided able and amiable guidance through relevant passages in Uddyotakara's Nyiiyaviirttika, Kumiirila Bhatta's Mfmiirhsiis!okaviirttika, and Mallavadin's Dviidasiirarh Nayacakram. The study of these texts with Prof. MatHal provided a most valuable introduction to the issues involved in philosophy of language between the time of Dirinaga and his earliest apologist, DharmakIrti, and without this background many passages in Dirinaga's work would have been far less intelligible to me than they in fact were. At the same time Prof. T. Venkataciirya provided instruction in the fundamentals ofPfu)ini's grammatical system, which repeatedly proved invaluable in reaching an understanding of the philosophies of Bhartrhari and Diriniiga. The study of the Tibetan translations of Diriniiga's PramiilJa- xiv Preface

samuccaya and Iinendrabuddhi's Visalamalavatf PramafJaSamuccayatfkti was carried out in the Department of Indian Philosophy at Hiroshima University, where Prof. Katsura read through the texts with me and offered many valuable criticisms of my interpretations and English translations. His impressive command of the subject matter combined with his constantly warm-hearted encouragement made working with him among the most valued experiences of my life. Upon my return to Toronto after sixteen months in Japan, Prof. Matilal provided careful supervision of my Ph.D. dissertation and immediately after that task was completed he began to urge me to expand that work into a more comprehensive study of Diil• naga's philosophy. Thanks to comments from him and from Prof. D. Seyfort Ruegg, a number of improvements over the dissertation have been incorporated into the present work. It is with a feeling of deep gratitude to all the aforementioned professors that I put this book into the public eye, urging whoever may read it to be mindful of the fact that credit for everything of value in this book is due to these excellent teachers, who cannot, however, be held responsible for any carelessness or faulty thinking on my part. My good fortune has not been limited to having fine teachers, for I have also benefited from excellent companions. My valued friend and colleague Brendan Gillon has shaped my thinking in numerous ways through the past dozen years of collaboration, conversation and correspondence, and many parts of this book bear the stamp of his influence. My wife Beth has not only provided moral support through the hectic and often discouraging pace of the past several years, but as a skilled Sanskritist, cultural historian and philosopher in her own right she has always been an intelligent and well-informed audience on whom to try out my ideas before committing them to the unforgiving medium of print. And when the time did come to deal with the problems specific to getting manuscript into print, Jason Weiss generously gave countless hours of valuable advice and computer programming expertise towards helping find elegant ways to make software and printers deal with Sanskrit diacritical marks. I am much indebted to him not only for his technical help but for his warm and cheerful friendship. Finally, Ven. Sarnu Sunim, Zen master at Zen Buddhist Temple Toronto, has put his keen intellect and sense of humour to the good use of showing me repeatedly that there is much more richness in Buddhism than just the philosophical musings that so rouse my curiosity. Acknowledgements

The research out of which this book grew would not have been possible without generous grants from the Japanese Ministry of Education (Monbush5), which financed my period of research at Hiroshima Daigaku, and the National Endowment for the Humanities, an agency of the United States Federal Government, which financed two further years of research into Ditinaga' s Pramiil')asamuccaya. The expenses of hardware and software used in producing the final manuscript were defrayed by a gift from Elinor G. Hayes. Prof. Milton Israel, director of the Centre of South Asian Studies at University of Toronto, kindly arranged for me to use the University of Toronto research library and other facilities during the 1986-87 academic year. The printing of the final manuscript was done on a laser printer put at my disposal by the Zen Buddhist Temple Toronto.