Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs Studies of Classical India Editors Bimal K. Matilal Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions & Ethics, Oxford University, England J. Moussaieff Masson Professor of Sanskrit, University of Cali/ornia, Berkeley, U.S.A. Editorial Board: R. P. Goldman, Daniel H. H. Ingalls, and A. K. Ramanujan The aim of this series is to publish fundamental studies concerning classi­ cal Indian civilization. It will include editions of texts, translations, specialized studies, and scholarly works of more general interest related to various fields of classical Indian culture such as philosophy, grammar, literature, religion, art, and history. In this context, the term 'Classical India', covers a vast area both historically and geographically, and embraces various religions and philosophical traditions, such as Buddhism, Jainism, and Hinduism, and many languages from Vedic and Epic Sanskrit to Pali, Prakrit, and Apabhrarpsa. We believe that in a profoundly traditional society like In­ dia, the study of classical culture is always relevant and important. Classical India presents an interesting record of deep human ex­ perience, thoughts, beliefs, and myths, which have been a source of in­ spiration for countless generations. We are pe'rsu~ded of its lasting value and relevance to modern man. By using extensive and for the most part unexplored material with scientific rigor and modern methodology, the authors and editors of this series hope to stimulate and promote interest and research in a field that needs to be placed in its proper perspective. Volume 9 Dignagaon the Interpretation of Signs by Richard P. Hayes Faculty ofReligious Studies, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS DORDRECHT / BOSTON / LONDON Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Hayes, Richard P. (Richard Philip), 1945- Dignaga on the interpretation of signs. (Studies of classical India; v. 9) Composite revision of three earlier works, one of which was the author's thesis (Ph. D.-University of Toronto). Includes translation of Ch. 2 & Ch. 5 of Pramanasamuccaya. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Dignaga, 5th cent. 2. Languages-Philosophy. 3. Languages-Religious aspects-Buddhism. I. Digniiga, 5th cent. Pramanasamuccaya. Ch. 2. English. 1987. II. Dignaga, 5th cent. Pramanasamuccaya. Ch. 5. English. 1987. III. Title. IV. Series. B133.D654H39 1987 181' .043 87-35620 ISBN-13 :978-94-0 10-7806-1 e-ISBN-13:978-94-009-2899-2 DOl: 10.1007/978-94-009-2899-2 Published by Kluwer Academic Publishers, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, Holland. Kluwer Academic Publishers incorporates the publishing programmes of D. Reidel, Martinus Nijhoff, Dr W. Junk and MTP Press. Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada by Kluwer Academic Publishers, 101 Philip Drive, Norwell, MA 02061, U.S.A. In all other countries, sold and distributed by Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, Holland. All Rights Reserved © 1988 by Kluwer Academic Publishers Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1988 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner To Philip T. and Helen Schooley Hayes, who by lifelong example have taught the author t~ treasure critical thinking, to shun dogmatism, and to sustain good humour in a world that often disappoints. CONTENTS Preface . ix Acknowleagements . xv Chapter 1: Preliminaries 1 1.1 The central issues ••••••••• 1 1.2 The contributions of previous scholars 9 1.2.1 Satis Chandra Vidyabhii~l)a . 9 1.2.2 Th. Stcherbatsky . .11 1.2.3 Satkari Mookerjee . .16 1.2.4 Erich Frauwallner .............. .21 1.2.5 Kitagawa Hidenori, Hattori Masaaki and Katsura Shoryu .24 1.2.6 Radhika Herzberger . .30 1.3 The argument of this book • . • • • • . • . .32 Notes ...................... .36 Chapter 2: Rational Skepticism in Pre-Ditmagan Buddhism .41 2.1 The foundation of skepticism in the Nikiiyas • • .42 2.1.1 The Sutta Nipata . .43 2.1.2 DIgha Nikaya: The Brahmajtila sutta . .45 2.1.3 Ali.guttara Nikaya: The Kesaputtas . .48 2.1.4 Summary of how opinions are regarded in the Nikayas .50 2.2 The influence of Niigiirjuna .52 2.2.1 Millamadhyamakakiirikii . .53 2.2.2 Vigrahavyiivartani . .59 Notes .................. .63 Chapter 3: Nominalism in Pre-Diiiniigan Buddhism .72 3.1 The Agama literature and Milindapaiiha • • • • .78 3.1.1 Natural class in the Nikayas .79 3.1.2 Personal identity in the Pali Canon . .81 3.1.3 Personal identity in the MilindapaTiha .86 3.2 Nominalism in Nagarjuna • • • .88 3.3 Nominalism in Vasubandhu . .93 3.3.1 Vasubandhu's theory of two truths .93 3.3.2 Vasubandhu's phenomenalism . .96 Notes ............. 104 Chapter 4; Diiinaga's Theory of Knowledge 111 4.1 Hetucakranimaya ••••••• 111 4.2 The PramiiQasamuccaya • • • • • 131 4.2.1 Sensation in the PramaIJasamuccaya 133 4.2.1.1 Awareness's awareness of itself . 140 4.2.2 Inference in the Pramiif}asamuccaya 142 4.2.2.1 The subject matter of inference .... 143 4.2.2.2 Three characteristics of legitimate evidence 145 4.2.2.3 On errancy and pervasion ........ 154 4.3 The skepticism implicit in Diiinaga's epistemology 158 Notes .................... 168 Vlll Contents Chapter 5: Diimaga's nominalism ...........•.....• 173 5.1 The Alambanaparrlqii • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . •• 173 5.2 The context of the discussion of nominalism in the PramiiTJasamuccaya 1'78 5.2.1 Scripture as a form of inferential sign . 178 5.2.2 Fallibility in inference and scripture . 179 5.2.3 The question of universals . 183 5.2.4 Anyiipoha as a substitute for universals . 185 5.2.5 The nature of information conveyed by language 188 5.2.6 The meaning of individual words . 193 5.2.7 Particulars as instantiations of universals . 196 5.2.8 Absurdities in the view that universals exist outside thought 204 5.2.9 The contrariety of expressions ...... 205 5.2.10 The meaning of a sentence ....... 212 5.2.11 The sentence as the primary linguistic symbol 215 Notes. 216 TRANSLATIONS Introduction to translation .......... 223 The history of the PramalJasamuccaya in Tibet . 226 Chapter 6: Pramiil}asamuccaya II "On reasoning" 231 6.1 Inference differentiated from sensation • 231 6.2 The three characteristics of legitimate evidence 239 6.3 Property-bearer as the subject of inference 242 6.4 On restricted and errant properties • • . • . 244 6.5 Non-symmetry of restriction and pervasion • • 247 Notes. 249 Chapter 7: PramiiIJasamuccaya V: On the nature of signs in language 252 7.1 On the question of what verbal symbols make known 252 7.2 On the relationships between symbols that express preclusion 278 7.3 On the unreality of universals outside thought 282 7.4 On the question of what linguistic symbols preclude 287 Notes. 300 Chapter 8: Conclusions . • • • • • 309 Appendix A: Glossary of Sanskrit Terms 313 Appendix B: Tibetan-Sanskrit Lexicon . 322 Appendix C: Text key to translations of PramalJasamuccaya 332 Selected Bibliography . 335 Subject and Author Index . 353 Preface Buddhist philosophy in India in the early sixth century C.E. took an important tum away from the traditional methods of explaining and systematizing the teachings in Siitra literature that were attributed to the Buddha. The new direction in which several Indian Buddhist philosophers began to move was that of following reasoning to its natural conclusions, regardless whether the conclusions conflicted with traditional teachings. The central figure in this new movement was DiIinaga, a native of South India who found his way to the centre of Buddhist education at Nalanda, studied the treatises that were learned by the Buddhist intellectuals of his day, and eventually wrote works of his own that formed the core of a distinctly new school of Buddhist thought. Inasmuch as virtually every Indian philosopher after the sixth century had either to reject Dirinaga's methods or build upon the foundations provided by his investigations into logic, epistemology and language, his influence on the evolution of Indian philosophy was considerable, and indeed some familiarity with Dirinaga's arguments and conclusions is indispensable for anyone who wishes to understand the historical development of Indian thought. Moreover, since the approach to Buddhism that grew out of Dirinaga's meditations on language and the limits of knowledge dominated the minds of many of the scholars who took Buddhism to Tibet, some familiarity with Dirinaga is also essential to those who wish to understand the intellectual infrastructure of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy and practice. Despite Dirinaga's importance in the evolution of Indian and Tibetan philosophy, however, it has not been easy for modem scholars to gain access to his ideas. All his key works have perished in their original Sanskrit versions and can be read only in rather awkward Tibetan and Chinese translations. But because so many of Dirinaga's observations, especially of language, were deeply influenced by the Sanskrit grammatical tradition of PiiI)ini, Patafijali and Bhartrhari, his philosophical writings were extremely difficult to translate into comprehensible Tibetan or Chinese, so even these translations can hardly be read. Rather, they must be painstakingly deciphered by a very slow and complex procedure that involves piecing together clues that have been gathered not only from the Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophical traditions but also from India's rich grammatical tradition. At times the work feels more like the task of an archaeologist fitting together the scattered fragments of an unearthed pot than like the task of an historian of philosophy, for a great ix x Preface deal of effort at the outset must be expended on discovering even what Diimaga had said, not to think of what significance might have been attached to saying it.