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Personal Submission to the Commission on the Defence Forces

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Personal Submission to the Commission on the Defence Forces Personal Submission to the Commission on the Defence Forces 14 March 2021 1. Introduction In this submission I will outline some of my thoughts on different issues and I will make a number of recommendations for the future of the DF under the headings of ‘Capabilities’, ‘Structures’, ‘Staffing’, and ‘Other’. 2. Capabilities Army Assets The Army of the future should be firmly in line with Government’s policy that “it is now necessary for the DF to be trained and equipped to NATO standards”1. The Army of the future should be a “conventional all arms army”2 with adequately equipped Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry, and Combat Service Support Corps’ with full equipment scales for all units in line with NATO standards. It should be noted that we are currently not at NATO standards. For example, it required a DF wide effort to provide one single Cavalry Squadron for assessment by NATO for the Operational Capability Concept Evaluation and Feedback Programme in 2018. The Infantry corps should be fully equipped with enough vehicles and equipment to provide for total mobility of the Army’s battalions. The Artillery corps should be equipped with self-propelled field guns capable of mobile fire support at home and for future force protection on overseas peace support operations. The Cavalry corps should be re-equipped with light tanks, or at the least be equipped with wheeled armoured vehicles with at least 105mm direct fire weapon systems, also to boost force protection capabilities. Personal level equipment in all parts of the Army needs to be modernised. Tactical level communications, body armour, and load carrying equipment should be upgraded. The Combat Service Support Corps’ of the Army also require significant investment and development. The Army should once again have dedicated Logistics and Supply Battalions who provide for transport, logistics support, and catering etc. The CIS Corps should be expanded to contain a Cyber Defence unit. A dedicated Military Intelligence Corps or unit should be established also. The Medical Corps of the Army requires significant modernisation. Combat medicine is virtually non-existent in Army units. The Medical Corps is understaffed, especially in areas such as doctors. Its two hospitals are below 1 White Paper on Defence 2015, p. 65 2 Ibid. 1 the most basic of standard. Soldiers’ external medical qualifications are often not recognised. Field Hospital capabilities should be once again purchased and retained. Special Operations capabilities should be significantly enhanced by the establishment of a ‘Tier Two’ unit, similar to the Special Operations Support Group in the UK to enhance SF capabilities for the DF as a whole. This would also bridge the skillset gap that exists between line Army units and our only Special Forces unit, the Army Ranger Wing. Along with the ARW it could constitute a self-sustaining SOF Group. Navy Assets The Naval Service should be reclassified as the Irish Navy. The Navy should be enlarged and given subsurface detection capabilities, as well as anti-submarine and anti-ship capabilities. Recent evidence has shown that foreign submarines and vessels are behaving suspiciously in Irish waters, and Ireland must possess a deterrent. It must also be noted that improvised submarines are used around the world by drugs and weapon smugglers, and that significant amounts of international data cables pass through Irish waters. Possessing a sub-surface capability would highly increase the Navy’s capability to maintain surveillance and interception of smugglers, while also providing a deterrence to foreign forces. The Navy should also replace the LÉ Eithne with a multi- role vessel capable of supporting helicopter operations. Air Assets The Air Corps should be reclassified as the Air Force (as it is no longer a corps of the Army) and it should be the lead in defence of Irish air space. The British RAF should no longer be required to provide air intercept for Irish air space and Irish controlled air space. The Air Force should be equipped with primary radar and again be equipped with a squadron of light jet intercept aircraft with a basic air-to-air and air-to-ground offensive capability. Some of these aircraft could be volunteered for overseas service with the UN in ground support or reconnaissance roles in order to generate funding to pay for them. The Air Force should operate a larger helicopter fleet in support to the Army and in support of national search and rescue operations. Some of these helicopters should be equipped for light ground attack roles in support of the Army. These also could be volunteered for overseas service with the UN in order to help fund them. The Air Force should be equipped with a strategic airlift capability. The lack of such a capability was highlighted during the Covid-19 pandemic when Ireland was incapable of repatriating citizens/troops without significant assistance or ‘hitching a ride’ from other countries. The Army is always operating 1 to 2 large overseas deployments as well as numerous smaller deployments as laid out in the following estimates. 2 It must be noted that any strategic airlift capability should be able to provide for other military roles such as parachuting, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Ireland provides for its strategic flight requirements by extensive and expensive chartering of civilian aircraft, ‘hitching a ride’ with other troop contributors, forcing soldiers to pay for their own leave rotations, and by sometimes using the Air Corps’ limited capability to fly material. A strategic airlift capability would clearly pay for itself over time, and would end the unfair practice of making soldiers pay for their mandatory leave flights. Procurement Ireland’s military procurement model should be changed, with decision making on choices of equipment being given entirely to the military. The Department of Defence (DoD) currently possess significant decision making power on what equipment and material is purchased. This should be in the hands of the experts and users of that military equipment only. The Minister for Defence should remain a decision maker in the procurement process in order to maintain civilian control, but this power should be exercised directly through the military chain of command, not through civilian officials. Funding and Budget Management Funding for the DF should be increased significantly. The Defence budget as a whole should be restructured. Operations, Training, Infrastructure, and Capital Expenditure should be a separate vote, with the Chief of Staff of the DF (or more appropriately, a Chief of Defence or ‘CHOD’) being the Accounting Officer. All other Defence spending should remain under civilian management. Defence spending in recent years has increased slightly every year in comparison to the previous year’s budget, but it must be firmly noted, this does not constitute an increase in Defence spending. Irish Defence 3 spending as a portion of GDP has been consistently decreasing. The below table containing data from previous budgets and approximated GDP in Euro clearly shows this. Irish Defence Spending and Approx GDP 400 Defence Spending (Vote 36) in €Tens of Millions GDP in €Billions 356 350 300 263 250 200 185 168 150 108 100 82.0 (0.75% of GDP) 73.3 (0.40% of GDP) 74.4 (0.44% of GDP) 78.1 (0.21% of GDP) 67.1 (0.26% of GDP) 50 0 2000 2005 2010 2015 2019 The Defence budget should be ring fenced as an ambitious and firm minimum percentage of public spending every year. All funds paid to Ireland by the United Nations for services rendered by the DF should be retained in the Defence budget. As can be seen in the following figures from EUROSTAT, Irish Defence spending is extremely low in comparison to other EU states and was the lowest in the EU in 2019. 4 3. Structures Governance, Command, and Control The structure of the ‘Defence Organisation’ should be changed. The DF should emulate the changes made with governance and control in An Garda Síochána. There should be a ‘separation of powers’ between the DoD and the DF. The General Staff should no longer be something to be controlled by the Minister’s officials. They should be the Minister’s officials. The Ministers and Secretaries Act states that the role of the DoD is the “administration and business of the raising, training, organisation, maintenance, equipment, management, discipline, regulation, and control according to law of the Military Defence Forces […] and all powers, duties and functions connected with the same […]”3. I believe the Ministers of Secretaries Act should be amended to allow for Defence Forces Headquarters to be established as a government department under the control of the Minister for Defence. This department should have control of Defence Forces Operations, Training, Discipline, Finance, Procurement, Internal Management, and Human Resources. This department should be headed by the Minister as Commander in Chief, with a Chief of Defence, or ‘CHOD’ under them running the department as the military equivalent of a Secretary General. I believe that the CHOD should be given the legal 3 Ministers and Secretaries Act, 1924. Section 1. 5 status of Secretary General ensuring that they remain entirely under the control of the civilian Minister, and that democratic principles such as the Carltona Principle remain applicable. The CHOD should effectively replace the position of Chief of Staff. They should be a Commissioned Officer of the DF with significant previous military service. DFHQ as a new government department should have significant civilian and military cross staffing. The DoD should remain in existence and retain control of state defence policy, auditing and oversight (but not direct governance) of the Defence Forces, pay and pensions management, the Civil Defence, and all other such non-military related roles.
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