Personal Submission to the Commission on the

14 March 2021

1. Introduction

In this submission I will outline some of my thoughts on different issues and I will make a number of recommendations for the future of the DF under the headings of ‘Capabilities’, ‘Structures’, ‘Staffing’, and ‘Other’.

2. Capabilities

Army Assets The Army of the future should be firmly in line with Government’s policy that “it is now necessary for the DF to be trained and equipped to NATO standards”1. The Army of the future should be a “conventional all arms army”2 with adequately equipped Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry, and Combat Service Support Corps’ with full equipment scales for all units in line with NATO standards. It should be noted that we are currently not at NATO standards. For example, it required a DF wide effort to provide one single Cavalry Squadron for assessment by NATO for the Operational Capability Concept Evaluation and Feedback Programme in 2018.

The should be fully equipped with enough vehicles and equipment to provide for total mobility of the Army’s battalions. The Artillery corps should be equipped with self-propelled field guns capable of mobile fire support at home and for future force protection on overseas peace support operations. The should be re-equipped with light tanks, or at the least be equipped with wheeled armoured vehicles with at least 105mm direct fire weapon systems, also to boost force protection capabilities. Personal level equipment in all parts of the Army needs to be modernised. Tactical level communications, body armour, and load carrying equipment should be upgraded. The Combat Service Support Corps’ of the Army also require significant investment and development. The Army should once again have dedicated Logistics and Supply Battalions who provide for transport, logistics support, and catering etc. The CIS Corps should be expanded to contain a Cyber Defence unit. A dedicated Military Intelligence Corps or unit should be established also. The of the Army requires significant modernisation. Combat medicine is virtually non-existent in Army units. The Medical Corps is understaffed, especially in areas such as doctors. Its two hospitals are below

1 White Paper on Defence 2015, p. 65 2 Ibid.

1 the most basic of standard. Soldiers’ external medical qualifications are often not recognised. Field Hospital capabilities should be once again purchased and retained.

Special Operations capabilities should be significantly enhanced by the establishment of a ‘Tier Two’ unit, similar to the Special Operations Support Group in the UK to enhance SF capabilities for the DF as a whole. This would also bridge the skillset gap that exists between line Army units and our only unit, the . Along with the ARW it could constitute a self-sustaining SOF Group.

Navy Assets The Naval Service should be reclassified as the Irish Navy. The Navy should be enlarged and given subsurface detection capabilities, as well as anti-submarine and anti-ship capabilities. Recent evidence has shown that foreign submarines and vessels are behaving suspiciously in Irish waters, and must possess a deterrent. It must also be noted that improvised submarines are used around the world by drugs and weapon smugglers, and that significant amounts of international data cables pass through Irish waters. Possessing a sub-surface capability would highly increase the Navy’s capability to maintain surveillance and interception of smugglers, while also providing a deterrence to foreign forces. The Navy should also replace the LÉ Eithne with a multi- role vessel capable of supporting helicopter operations.

Air Assets The Air Corps should be reclassified as the Air Force (as it is no longer a corps of the Army) and it should be the lead in defence of Irish air space. The British RAF should no longer be required to provide air intercept for Irish air space and Irish controlled air space. The Air Force should be equipped with primary radar and again be equipped with a squadron of light jet intercept aircraft with a basic air-to-air and air-to-ground offensive capability. Some of these aircraft could be volunteered for overseas service with the UN in ground support or reconnaissance roles in order to generate funding to pay for them. The Air Force should operate a larger helicopter fleet in support to the Army and in support of national operations. Some of these helicopters should be equipped for light ground attack roles in support of the Army. These also could be volunteered for overseas service with the UN in order to help fund them.

The Air Force should be equipped with a strategic airlift capability. The lack of such a capability was highlighted during the Covid-19 pandemic when Ireland was incapable of repatriating citizens/troops without significant assistance or ‘hitching a ride’ from other countries. The Army is always operating 1 to 2 large overseas deployments as well as numerous smaller deployments as laid out in the following estimates.

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It must be noted that any strategic airlift capability should be able to provide for other military roles such as parachuting, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Ireland provides for its strategic flight requirements by extensive and expensive chartering of civilian aircraft, ‘hitching a ride’ with other troop contributors, forcing soldiers to pay for their own leave rotations, and by sometimes using the Air Corps’ limited capability to fly material. A strategic airlift capability would clearly pay for itself over time, and would end the unfair practice of making soldiers pay for their mandatory leave flights.

Procurement Ireland’s military procurement model should be changed, with decision making on choices of equipment being given entirely to the military. The Department of Defence (DoD) currently possess significant decision making power on what equipment and material is purchased. This should be in the hands of the experts and users of that military equipment only. The Minister for Defence should remain a decision maker in the procurement process in order to maintain civilian control, but this power should be exercised directly through the military chain of command, not through civilian officials.

Funding and Budget Management Funding for the DF should be increased significantly. The Defence budget as a whole should be restructured. Operations, Training, Infrastructure, and Capital Expenditure should be a separate vote, with the Chief of Staff of the DF (or more appropriately, a Chief of Defence or ‘CHOD’) being the Accounting Officer. All other Defence spending should remain under civilian management.

Defence spending in recent years has increased slightly every year in comparison to the previous year’s budget, but it must be firmly noted, this does not constitute an increase in Defence spending. Irish Defence

3 spending as a portion of GDP has been consistently decreasing. The below table containing data from previous budgets and approximated GDP in Euro clearly shows this.

Irish Defence Spending and Approx GDP 400 Defence Spending (Vote 36) in €Tens of Millions GDP in €Billions 356 350

300

263

250

200 185 168

150

108

100 82.0 (0.75% of GDP) 73.3 (0.40% of GDP) 74.4 (0.44% of GDP) 78.1 (0.21% of GDP) 67.1 (0.26% of GDP)

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0 2000 2005 2010 2015 2019

The Defence budget should be ring fenced as an ambitious and firm minimum percentage of public spending every year. All funds paid to Ireland by the United Nations for services rendered by the DF should be retained in the Defence budget. As can be seen in the following figures from EUROSTAT, Irish Defence spending is extremely low in comparison to other EU states and was the lowest in the EU in 2019.

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3. Structures

Governance, Command, and Control The structure of the ‘Defence Organisation’ should be changed. The DF should emulate the changes made with governance and control in An Garda Síochána. There should be a ‘separation of powers’ between the DoD and the DF. The General Staff should no longer be something to be controlled by the Minister’s officials. They should be the Minister’s officials. The Ministers and Secretaries Act states that the role of the DoD is the “administration and business of the raising, training, organisation, maintenance, equipment, management, discipline, regulation, and control according to law of the Military Defence Forces […] and all powers, duties and functions connected with the same […]”3. I believe the Ministers of Secretaries Act should be amended to allow for Defence Forces Headquarters to be established as a government department under the control of the Minister for Defence. This department should have control of Defence Forces Operations, Training, Discipline, Finance, Procurement, Internal Management, and Human Resources. This department should be headed by the Minister as Commander in Chief, with a Chief of Defence, or ‘CHOD’ under them running the department as the military equivalent of a Secretary General. I believe that the CHOD should be given the legal

3 Ministers and Secretaries Act, 1924. Section 1.

5 status of Secretary General ensuring that they remain entirely under the control of the civilian Minister, and that democratic principles such as the Carltona Principle remain applicable. The CHOD should effectively replace the position of Chief of Staff. They should be a Commissioned Officer of the DF with significant previous military service. DFHQ as a new government department should have significant civilian and military cross staffing. The DoD should remain in existence and retain control of state defence policy, auditing and oversight (but not direct governance) of the Defence Forces, pay and pensions management, the Civil Defence, and all other such non-military related roles. The DoD should also have military members working on secondment within it to maintain a strong link between the two organisations.

An Army Headquarters with command of the Army’s formations should be established to work alongside Air Corps (or Air Force) Headquarters, and Navy Headquarters, all of which should be under the direct command of DFHQ. This would remove Ireland’s dated command structure and brings us into line with international norms. Direct command of the DF would be in the hands of the Minister for Defence, and would flow through the layers of military command without external filtration. Amendment of the Defence Act, the Ministers and Secretaries Act, and possibly the Comptroller and Auditor Generals Act would be required to make all of these changes.

Enhanced Civilian Involvement Outside of governance, command, and control civilian involvement in Defence increase significantly. There should be a large increase in civilian employees within the DF working in administrative, maintenance, research, and financial roles all under the control of DF Officers. Significant administration functions in military units and HQ’s should be civilianised to free up military personnel for operations and training. An Garda Síochána has successfully embraced such an approach and it is common internationally. I believe that some hiring would be required, but I believe that the DoD’s current staff would provide a skilled and professional pool of potential employees for DF civilian staff.

Training Support Platoons Training Resource Requirements (TRRs) are a significant burden on line units in the DF. Every Brigade Training Centre and the Military College should have a platoon each of exercise support troops so that these institutions can be self-sustaining in exercises for OPFOR and security.

Geographical Disposition and Retention While the whole Public Service and the Civil Service were engaged in an active policy of geographical de- centralisation around the state, the DF engaged in the opposite. Significant barrack closures and

6 reorganisations have created a geographically stretched DF that is incapable of retaining personnel. I believe that the current geographical disposition of the DF is one of the most significant contributors to the retention crisis that it faces and a huge contributor to low morale within the DF.

Geographical Disposition - Army Army does three things: overseas operations, security operations in Ireland, and conventional military training. The Army is strongly sacrificing the latter in order to meet our operational commitments. The ‘rule of thirds’ is an age old military planning concept that had worked for decades in Ireland until the Army’s 4th Western Brigade was disbanded. An immediate programme of reorganisation should occur to bring the Army back to a structure of three operational formations and a DF Training Centre. There should be operational formations based in the West, South, and East of the country, similar to the Army’s previous three brigade structure. Closed barracks such as Mullingar and others should be reacquired or purchased back from the Land Development Agency and reopened. Ministerial and Taoiseach involvement may be required to achieve this, but it should be achieved. These three formations do not necessarily need to take the form of three brigade’s again, but they should take the form of some type of higher-than-unit-level command either as brigade’s, commands, command groups, regiments, or battlegroups each under the command of a Brigadier General or a Colonel. Their headquarters should be in , Cork, and . Their recruitment should be localised. This would alleviate the intense travel requirements that soldiers and units now face, and it would allow the Army to return to a sustainable operational rhythm such as the following:

• Western Brigade – Preparation for overseas and conducting conventional military training (as per White Paper requirements of the Army). • Eastern Brigade – Leading on deployment overseas. • Southern Brigade – Taking the lead on home based security operations/offering more flexible leave to troops to recuperate.

Rotation between these operational postures could occur every six months allowing the Army to credibly achieve its White Paper goal of maintaining capabilities as a conventional all arms army. This structure would significantly aid in retention as it would once again make the DF a viable career for NCOs and Officers who could achieve Headquarters experience closer to home without being limited to Dublin, Kildare and Cork.

Geographical Disposition – Navy The Navy should have more of a geographical spread than its one base in Cork. I believe its lack of geographical locations compromises its ability to retain personnel. The Navy should have small bases in Dublin and ,

7 and should have a presence in Donegal also if possible. This would enhance the Navy’s reaction times, especially in the context of Brexit challenges, and it would significantly improve their ability to retain personnel.

Geographical Disposition - Air Corps/Air Force The Air Corps or Air Force should once again have bases in Donegal and Gormanston. Both Finner and Gormanston Camps are under DF control and possess runways. There should be significant infrastructure investment to make both of these airfields operational again, and elements of the Air Corps/Air Force should be based there. Much like the Navy, this would significantly improve reaction times, and would offer the Air Corps/Air Force as a credible career for people other than those who would choose to live in Dublin only.

Ceremonial Unit Ceremonial events are a significant drain on line unit resources and personnel. A new all arms battalion sized unit should be established and based in McKee Barracks to cater for all state ceremonial events in the Dublin area for Áras an Uachtaráin to relieve pressure on other units. This unit should contain an Infantry element, a Military Police element, a ceremonial Artillery Troop, and a Cavalry motorcycle escort squadron. The DF’s ceremonial Artillery guns currently in McKee should be incorporated into the Artillery Troop. This unit should also be an operational unit and take the lead on security duties in Government buildings in Dublin. A unit name with historical or presidential connotations would be appropriate such as the ‘Áras Guards Battalion’, ‘President’s Guards’ or an Irish translation of either. This unit should also be equipped with new unique uniforms with more historical relevance, such as modernised versions of the uniform of the , the Irish Citizen Army, the ‘Blue Hussars’, or other such historical Irish military entities. This would add to the prestige of state events and would add to Esprit de Corps within the unit.

4. Staffing

Establishment Strength The DF’s establishment strength is not fit for purpose. The military’s structure including all assigned jobs, appointments and roles in every unit is based on a full establishment of 9,500 in the PDF. However, it is stated government policy that the figure of 9,500 is only a “ceiling”4 figure, not a minimum standard. Therefore the

4 White Paper on Defence 2015, p. 62

8 way the DF is currently structured ensures that members will always have to hold multiple jobs at once. This is incredibly stressful for members and leads to intense levels of burn out, fatigue, and early retirements.

For the past two decades Ireland has engaged in a process of demilitarisation while expecting the DF to maintain its operational tempo and commitments and to somehow maintain the same standards in its own training and operational output. This demilitarisation is not practical for a country who engages in a policy of active neutrality. Neutrality requires a state to adequately provide for its own defence and not rely on others. This process of demilitarisation is also not appropriate for Ireland given its organic terror threat and increases in threats to international security. The below data taken from Oireachtas records displays the severity of this demilitarisation. These trends should be reversed. We have reached and surpassed the limit of how far we can push this demilitarisation without reducing what the state expects the DF to do and be able to do.

Military Strength - Ireland 30000 27493

25000 24227 22476

20000

15892 14748 15000 13471 12745 11890 11441 10756 10586 9809 9998 10000 9112 8734

6083

5000 2329 1624

0 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020

Permanent Defence Forces Reservists Total Military Strength

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We should aim to return to 2005 military strength levels of at least 11,000 personnel in the PDF, and up to 10,000 reservists. The reserve should be split between a volunteer RDF in its current guise and a smaller ‘integrated’ or ‘active’ reserve of contracted part time fully trained soldiers within PDF units. They should have legal protection for their civilian jobs to allow them to train to PDF standards and to serve on home and overseas operations with the PDF.

DF Pay As the data shows, Ireland has significant challenges in maintaining personnel figures. A significant contributor to this problem is pay. Ireland’s public service pay determination model is a collective bargaining model. This civilianised model brought great peace and stability to the public sector industrial relations environment decades ago and has since been lauded as a success. However, the model is entirely focused on trade unionism and has not been adapted to account for the military. The military’s representative associations are responsible for engaging with this process as if they were trade unions despite possessing none of the legal rights or capabilities to influence anything that a trade union possesses. In recent years clear data has been presented to the Oireachtas on the military’s retention crisis and its link to pay and conditions. The government is currently incapable of acting on that data to alter pay due to their wider commitments to the collective bargaining policy.

Regardless of all good will and effort, this model will never be capable of producing pay levels and structures capable of matching what the Irish DF requires to adequately staff itself.

Public Service pay determination policy should be amended to allow an element of DF pay to be determined outside of this structure. The DF Representative Associations should retain the right to negotiate salaries and some allowances for their members in line with Public Service pay determination policy. Separately then, a DF Pay Review Body should be established to determine yearly DF allowance rates and retention bonuses for all areas of the DF based on retention data and their own independent research. This Pay Review Body’s recommendations should be binding and it should be independent of Military Management, DPER, and the DoD.

The DF should immediately reintroduce an attractive Extension of Service Bonus Scheme to aid in retention, and it should introduce a bonus for members who return to service.

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Pensions Public Service pensions in Ireland have been streamlined into the Single Pension Scheme. The Single Pension Scheme is civilian focused and it provides a liveable pension for state workers when they retire at the state retirement age in their sixties. Members of the DF are rightly required to retire significantly earlier than this. This is important as it enables the DF to maintain an appropriate age profile in line with observations made by the Gleeson Commission in 1990. The Singe Pension Scheme provides for fast accrual pensions for DF personnel, but still limits full payment of pension entitlements to the civilian state retirement age, so it is not appropriate for the DF.

The Public Service Pensions (Single Scheme and Other Provisions) Act 2012 should be amended to remove the DF from the scheme. The DF should once again have a military specific pension model to recognise and reward the unique nature of military service, and to be used as a retention tool. Attractive pension models have always been a cost effective retention tool for militaries around the world. They are significantly cheaper than large scale salary increases and more palatable politically. A return of the older 12 and 21 year pension model for the military would have a profound effect on retention. Failing this, a 12 and 21 year pension scheme offering less generous payment values than the original scheme would be still be highly effective. At the very minimum, the ‘Supplementary Pension’ for post-2013 members of the DF should be reintroduced if the DF is to remain in the unsuitable Single Pension Scheme.

Personnel Management Structures The DF should have within its personnel structure (CS4) a large general list separate to its unit establishments. All personnel on overseas service, long term sick leave, long term courses, and leaves of absence should be posted to this list. Unit staffing figures should only match personnel actually present and working in those units. Not including the size of the DF, CS4 should be amendable by the CHOD as he or she sees fit with the permission of the Minister. A significant reduction in bureaucracy should also occur in the DF in terms of personnel management. Various appraisal, administrative, and filing processes should be made electronic and streamlined.

Career Management (Officers) All Officers overseas service selection should be transparent and on an application by application basis similar to how other ranks are selected for overseas. If the Army’s structure is to remain in two formations Officers and NCOs should not be penalised for working in operational units in terms of promotion prospects. Headquarters experience is currently valued. However, this only suits a small cohort of Officers and NCOs who are geographically close to headquarters locations. Removing the value placed on Headquarters experience,

11 or more preferably, reintroducing a third formation to the Army’s structure would alleviate this issue and aid retention.

Career Management (Other Ranks) The current NCO Promotion System is not fit for purpose. It is not capable of keeping up with demand for the level of promotions that are required. It requires significant movement by NCOs around the country and has created a ‘box ticking’ culture which rewards quantity of experiences rather than the quality of the individual. This has eroded continuity of leadership and Esprit de Corps in units. Promotion competitions for NCO’s should be ran at unit level. Competitions for promotions into vacancies in Headquarters and specialist appointments should be open to all who meet eligibility regardless of unit.

Junior Leadership Ireland does not have an rank between OR-2 (fully trained Pte or equivalent) and OR-4 (Cpl or equivalent). We should introduce a rank of Lance OR-3 to provide more advancement opportunities. This rank could be awarded at unit level after completion of a short course. It would provide more NCOs to supervise training and activities, and it would mean that the DF would be able to significantly shorten its Potential NCO Courses. They are currently approximately 6 months long, and they are a significant commitment for soldiers with families who are looking to progress. The DF should also consider introducing Warrant Officer type ranks for the Army and a significantly shortened Potential Officers Course for Sergeants Major/Battalion Quarter Master Sergeants (and equivalents).

Esprit de Corps The DF should formalise its unit and corps traditions and invest in projects to increase Esprit de Corps. Significant prizes for military skills, sports, and shooting competitions would help, as would further investment in messes and mess culture. Officers should again be able to dine in their own mess facilities. I also believe that the DF should introduce more Corps and unit specific items of uniform such as different colour berets, different cap badges etc. The lack of these things may seem innocuous, but such practices are normal in almost all other militaries. Soldiers buy into this culture and these symbols become similar to a jersey for a sports team in meaning.

The DF should embrace the awarding of medals and honours for bravery, distinguished service, actions in combat, and service in all extreme circumstances. Medals for distinguished service are routinely awarded to some individuals while there are other soldiers currently serving who have been under fire and had to use their weapons in action overseas that have no formal recognition. This aversion to acknowledgement of

12 distinguished and commendable service results in a force where troops feel less valued, and where the general public doubts the seriousness of the DF’s service.

A committee should be established to examine all historic actions and incidents recorded in overseas unit histories that Irish troops were involved in to retrospectively award appropriate medals. This committee should be separate to the current Jadotville committee. A medal or badge similar to the ‘Combat Infantryman’s Badge’ in the should also be awarded to all personnel who come under fire on duty at home or overseas.

Working Time Directive The Minister for Defence should immediately establish a Committee for the Implementation of the Working Time Directive in the DF. This committee should have the Chief of Staff/CHOD, General Staff, RACO, PDFORRA, and RDFRA all within its membership.

Induction Training The DF should establish a Recruit Training Depot to train all recruits. Operational units should not have this burden. Recruits should also have an element of influence on what unit or corps they will get to serve in prior to beginning training. If ‘integrated’ or ‘active’ reserve inductees were combined with the PDF’s inductees it would have a continuous stream of students. Navy and Air recruits could complete the first part of their training here before continuing their specific training with their own branches.

5. Other

Defence and Security Knowledge There is a poor understanding of defence and security related issues in public and political discourse in Ireland. This lack of expertise is also present within the Public and Civil Services. Discourse on military matters in Ireland has historically been dominated by actors with ideological and partisan agendas. I believe that the government should seek funding for an independent Defence and Security think tank. This could be similar in function to the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), but for the Defence Sector. Such an institution would be able to fairly critique and comment on Defence policy and activity in Ireland without being compromised by ideological and political agendas or being tied to the DoD or the DF. In the UK a similar institution, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), is quite successful and respected.

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Accommodation and Infrastructure A significant programme of infrastructure improvements should be made across all DF buildings, barracks, and properties. In particular, the Camp should be entirely renovated. The DF should re-engage with providing accommodation to its members on or close to bases and barracks. The British Army has engaged in a large development programme to accommodate large numbers of soldiers moving back from overseas postings in in recent years. I believe we should emulate this process and build apartments/housing on military lands. This would be a significant retention measure and would also alleviate the pressure on the already burdened national housing system.

Appraisal System The DF appraisal system should be immediately reviewed. The competencies that personnel are marked under by their reporting officer do not match the competencies used in promotion competitions and the system is still entirely paper based. It leaves scope for subjective interpretation of ratings and competencies by reporting officers, and it has no provisions for women who are away from work on maternity leave. I also believe that the system can be punitive to Officers and NCOs for taking risks, which could sometimes encourage risk aversion in leadership.

Day-care Facilities The DF should establish and fund day-care facilities in all of its major institutions in order to make a career in the DF more viable for personnel who wish to pursue a family life. This would also have positive impacts on making the DF a more viable career for female members.

Medical Cover The level of medical cover offered to DF Officers should be extended to all personnel, and their immediate families. Such a provision for working in the DF would make it a significantly more attractive career and it would aid in retention.

6. Conclusion

Significant investment and change is required in the Defence establishment in Ireland. All positive changes must be permanent and delivered in a way that will prevent a future reversion in standards with supportive legislative changes. Appropriate Defence spending in Ireland should be recognised as a necessity for a sovereign state openly pursuing a policy of active neutrality and not something to be feared or avoided for

14 political expedience. A country’s armed forces is its insurance policy. We must not plan for what is likely, but for what would be devastating regardless of its likelihood. The requirement for robust national defence and a deterrent to aggression and interference transcends what we may consider possible in the near future. Political and security related realities can and do change overnight. We should be ready for the next big change when it inevitably comes our way. It is finally time for Ireland to come to terms with and meet its Defence responsibilities by providing a NATO standard all arms Defence Forces, capable of independently defending Ireland’s skies, seas, land, and cyber domains. To quote the Minister for Defence Mr TD, we must indeed be “ambitious and radical”.

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