Zyck, S A and Muggah, R 2015 Preparing Stabilisation for 21st Century stability Security Challenges. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 4(1): 54, pp. 1–9, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.gs

RESEARCH ARTICLE Preparing Stabilisation for 21st Century Security Challenges Steven A. Zyck* and Robert Muggah†

Stabilisation, as a concept and set of practices, has proliferated over the past two decades and is now implicitly integrated into a range of global frameworks. However, this enthusiasm has at times risked turning this increasingly common, albeit contested, idea into a piece of jargon that discounts its unique facets: a focus on all sorts of violence, not just conflict, that create political instability and human harm and a problem-solving approach that draws selectively on various forms of intervention (e.g., statebuilding, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, etc.) without being beholden to any one toolkit. The pragmatism inherent within the concept of stabilisation will grow increasingly important as new security chal- lenges emerge or proliferate. These include the fragmentation and regionalisation of conflict systems, transnational organised crime, large-scale migration and new, disruptive technologies. Novel approaches rooted in big data and technology will increasingly need to be applied. Most importantly, in foreign policy, military and development communities often driven by perceptions about what causes, ends or prevents violence, stabilisation must maintain its agnostic, problem-solving roots and allegiance to evidence over ideology.

Introduction form of ‘development in reverse’ (Collier and Academic and policy-level debate over the Hoeffler 2004). Moreover, the risks of conflict association between security and develop- termination are positively correlated with ment proliferated over the past two decades. income growth in locations where conflicts A consensus emerged: insecurity contrib- had rather decisively come to a close (Collier utes to underdevelopment and that efforts 2004). The relatively limited but convincing to restore stability in war-affected areas can econometric evidence aligns with the wide- establish conditions in which social and spreadperception that ‘peace dividends’ – economic recovery and development can those are the material benefits that typically begin or resume. Research demonstrates that accompany security – will incentivize elites, armed conflict, in particular, constitutes a combatants and ordinary citizens to support stability over warfare.1 The virtuous links between security and * Independent Researcher, Overseas development were further reinforced in Development Institute, GB [email protected] the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), † Research Director, Igarapé Institute, BR agreed in September 2015, though SDG doc- [email protected] uments do not use the term ‘stabilisation’.2 Art. 54, page 2 of 9 Zyck and Muggah: Preparing Stabilisation for 21st Century Security Challenges

The SDGs are unprecedented in the history extremist groups, spreading criminal vio- of the United Nations in that they explic- lence and climate change? This is the ques- itly acknowledge the two-way relationship tion we ask in this special series on ‘The between security and development (Muggah Future of Stabilisation’, supported by the UK 2015). A draft SDG report highlights the asso- government’s Stabilisation Unit. This series ciation between conflict, violence and under- contains a range of articles on a range of development, and SDG 16 in particular aims backward and, in particular, forward-looking to ‘[p]romote peaceful and inclusive societies issues. For instance, separate articles inter- for sustainable development, provide access rogate how governments and the United to justice for all and build effective, account- Nations are using and operationalising stabi- able and inclusive institutions at all levels’ lisation, and other pieces take more theoreti- (United Nations 2015). The SDGs are universal – cal approaches, with one applying complexity and not just directed at low- and middle- theory to instability and stabilisation. While income countries. An implicit assumption is most pieces in the series tackle multiple sec- that all societies are vulnerable to fragility, tors and interventions, two focused pieces conflict and violence. emphasise the importance of civilian pro- The security-development nexus is tection and the disarmament, demobilisa- extraordinarily influential. It is enshrined tion and reintegration (DDR) of combatants in the mandates of governmental and mul- within stabilisation missions. Furthermore, tilateral institutions, from the UK govern- geographical case studies look at contexts ment’s Stabilisation Unit to the US State such as the DR Congo and Iraq and Syria, Department’s Bureau for Conflict and with the latter article asking how a concept Stabilization Operations (CSO). Australia, of stabilisation can or cannot be applied to Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, groups, such as the self-proclaimed Islamic Sweden and other nations have either estab- State, which seek absolutist goals. lished agencies or policies intended to sta- bilise fragile environments. The World Bank The Distinctiveness of Stabilisation too has made fragility reduction one of its Stabilisation continues to face an identity cri- primary areas of focus. The United Nations sis. Is stabilisation an end-state, somewhere also established ‘stabilisation’ missions in on the path between conflict and peace? Or Haiti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is stabilisation a process, a mode of interven- Mali, the Central African Republic, and tion? Relatedly, there are some observers elsewhere (Muggah and Zyck 2015). Even who treat stabilisation as a singular category regional organisations like the African Union of intervention akin to peacekeeping while (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on others describe it as a generic vessel for Development (IGAD) in East Africa increas- all ideas and activities related to restoring ingly use the terms ‘stabilisation’ and ‘stability security and development in so-called ‘frag- operations’ within their discussions and policy ile states’. In some circles, stabilisation is a documents. euphemism for state building, civil-military The stabilisation concept, once criticized cooperation (CIMIC) and counter-insurgency as a passing fad in the wake of US-led mili- (COIN), which is understandably unpopular tary interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, is in some quarters (Barakat, Deely and Zyck showing remarkable staying power. But how 2010). Reinforcing this definitional hurdle, do different actors understand and opera- the High-Level Independent Panel on United tionalise stabilisation? Is this construct, first Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO) called for applied to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina the UN to clarify its understanding of stabili- twenty years ago, still relevant in a world sation after highlighting the fact that several revolutionized by new information technolo- UN organs ‘have used the term “stabilization” gies, cyber-security threats, transnational for a number of missions’ despite the fact Zyck and Muggah: Preparing Stabilisation for 21st Century Security Challenges Art. 54, page 3 of 9 that ‘[t]heterm stabilization has a wide range There is, however, at least one foundational of interpretations’ (HIPPO 2015: 30). dimension of stabilisation that differentiates Given the diversity of meanings attached it from competing concepts, whether peace- to stabilisation, it is hardly surprising that keeping, COIN, CIMIC and state building: the a widely accepted definition has failed to value-free nature of the term. This is not to materialize. Even many academic attempts to suggest that those involved in stabilisation forge a meta definition have also fallen flat. are not guided by clear values and principles. Instead what have emerged are bland and By value-free, what is implied is that stabili- generic formulations that sidestep rather sation is not beholden to any one particular than resolve key conceptual debates. For understanding of insecurity and develop- instance, Zyck, Barakat and Deely (2013: 19) ment, much less one set of tactics. While defined stabilisation as: ‘a process involving state building typically privileges Weberian coercive force in concert with reconstruction state institutions over customary ones, stabi- and development assistance during or in the lisation can include formal or informal insti- immediate aftermath of a violent conflict in tutions or a focus on individuals rather than order to prevent the continuation or recur- institutions. While COIN presumes a military- rence of conflict and destabilizing levels of centric response, as does CIMIC in many non-conflict violence’. While useful in set- instances, stabilisation may fully exclude the ting the conceptual parameters of stabilisa- armed forces and draw on a wider variety of tion and defining what it does and does not actors. Furthermore, in a policy environment entail, it nevertheless fails to present what focused on security-through-livelihood, stabi- makes stabilisation distinctive from compet- lisation does not pre-ordain the means or sec- ing concepts and practices. tors involved. It gives no a priori preference How do we propose to define stabilisa- to security sector governance, justice reform tion? Simply put, we do not – and we believe and national as well as localised ceasefires that the continued debate over the term’s and peace talks. As such, stabilisation at least meaning(s) and usefulness is healthy for in theory, argues for a continued focus on academics, policymakers, practitioners and diplomacy, even if the emphasis continues to others. A single, widely-accepted definition be on defence and development.3 would almost certainly be too broad to be It is important also to emphasize that useful, or it may be so narrow as not to apply stabilisation is not restricted to large-scale to the wide and evolving array of security armed conflict. Stabilisation is agnostic challenges that the world is facing. regarding the forms of organised violence in

Box 1. The UK Approach to to reduce violence, re-establish security Stabilisation and prepare for longer-term recovery by One of the more recent attempts to building an enabling environment for develop a clear definition for stabilisa- structural stability.’ By ‘structural stability’ tion comes from the UK government the UK definition is referring to ‘politi- and its document The UK Approach to cal systems which are representative and Stabilisation (Stabilisation Unit 2014). legitimate, capable of managing conflict That document defines stabilisation as: and change peacefully, and societies in ‘[O]ne of the approaches used in situa- which human rights and rule of law are tions of violent conflict which is designed respected, basic needs are met, security to protect and promote legitimate politi- established and opportunities for social cal authority, using a combination of and economic development are open to integrated civilian and military actions all’ (FCO, MOD and DFID 2011). Art. 54, page 4 of 9 Zyck and Muggah: Preparing Stabilisation for 21st Century Security Challenges question, whether conflict, crime, extrem- increasingly fragmented regional conflict ism or otherwise. That means that stabili- systems, transnational organised crime, sation seeks the prevention reduction and large-scale migration (and the integration reduction of net harm to people and poli- of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees) ties, at least in terms of violence and fear, as and new technologies (both their prolif- the benchmark of success. Stabilisation thus eration and their potential for generating applies to, but also moves beyond, more harms).5 Each of these emerging challenges conventional geographic areas of focus such is discussed below along with sexual and as Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. It encom- gender-based violence, a crucial but some- passes security crises unfolding around the times-neglected security challenge. world, not least Latin America, in western and central Africa and elsewhere. It is worth Fragmentation of traditional conflicts recalling that Honduras, a tiny country of In recent years, armed conflicts grew increas- eight million people, has experienced more ingly protracted and, as they evolve, frag- than 70,000 homicides between 2001 and mented. Fearon (2004) found that the 2014. By comparison, Afghanistan, a coun- average duration of a civil war is roughly try of 30.5 million, reported an estimated 16 years. Rather than two or three warring 92,000 conflict-related deaths (Crawford factions, contemporary wars exhibit a prolif- 2015) over the same period. That is, homi- eration of armed groups with shifting alle- cides in Honduras were 240 per cent more giances. This dynamic is evident in the current prevalent, in per capita terms, than conflict civil conflict in Syria, which was home to, by deaths in one of the 21st Century’s most some US government estimates, upwards of high-profile war zones. In acknowledging 1,500 armed groups (Blanchard, Humud and the multiple forms of insecurity, stabili- Nikitin 2015). Likewise, the ongoing conflict sation is to a certain extent aligned with in Yemen involves regional powers as well as human security (Kaldor 2007), albeit with a tribal, religious and political groups loosely primary focus on minimizing violence and organised into dynamic coalitions with lim- physical insecurity. ited command and control. In Afghanistan, These distinct elements of stabilisation, while the Taliban remains relatively cohesive, far too rarely articulated, are reflected in the other more extreme insurgent groupshave work of the UN, the US and UK governments emerged. Meanwhile in Libya armed groups and others. For instance, as articles in this have proliferated and divided the country Future of Stabilisation series highlight, the among themselves. UN is forming stabilisation missions in areas These increasingly fragmented conflicts will where conflicts intersect with organised prove far more challenging for international crime and weak governance. These include (Bakke et al. 2014). Peace talks are almost missions in eastern DRC, Mali, CAR and Haiti. impossible given the number of stakeholders Likewise, the US government’s non-military involved, who are often sustained by moral stabilisation entity, CSO, actively engages in and material support from regional actors, and war zones such as Syria but focuses on organ- any hard-won peace agreement will face a high ized crime in Central America and elsewhere.4 likelihood of spoiler-related violence by non- signatories. Training and arming ‘moderate’ Stabilisation and Mounting Security elements within these conflicts – presuming Challenges they can be identified – is also exceedingly dif- The comprehensive but also flexible ficult given their limited likelihood of success, approach to stabilisation discussed above high attrition rates and the potential for arms will be important as security risks grow to be seized by more extreme groups as is seen more complicated. These challenges include in many ongoing conflicts around the world. Zyck and Muggah: Preparing Stabilisation for 21st Century Security Challenges Art. 54, page 5 of 9

Transnational organised crime by ‘fluid, opportunistic networks’ that can Many conflict settings – and many seem- adapt to obstacles and maintain operations. ingly stable contexts – have likewise faced the growth of transnational organised crime, Large-scale migration a category that includes everything from the At the time of writing, southern and east- smuggling of drugs, weapons and persons to ern Europe in particular are facing a major online fraud and hacking. These crimes pose migrant crisis as those affected by conflicts several challenges for stabilisation. First, they in the Middle East, North Africa and beyond often serve as enablers of conflict, generating are traversing land and sea to reach the con- revenues for armed groups, states and others. tinent. This ‘crisis’, which involved an esti- Whether one is discussing opium poppies in mated 350,000 migrants during the first Afghanistan, drug and weapons smuggling eight months of 2015, is likely to be a har- in Mali or oil sales by the self-proclaimed binger of things to come. Some migrants, Islamic State in Iraq, many contemporary like those from Syria and Libya, are fleeing conflicts would be dramatically different conflict and instability while several million and, possibly, smaller in scope if criminal more find themselves displaced by food and rent-seeking activities were not involved to water shortages as a result of climate change such a significant degree. Second, the levels (Goff et al. 2012). A similar trend may emerge of violence that accompany these criminal in Australia and elsewhere in the region as enterprises often reach a scale on par with or resource scarcity drives mass population greater than that of many full-fledged con- movements. flicts. For instance, the drug war in Mexico Here the challenge for stabilisation is reportedly contributed to 157,000 homicides two-fold. Firstly, this level of migration will and ‘disappearances’ in that country between require a preventive response, one intended 2007 and 2012 (Molloy 2013). That number to reduce the material pressures that will is more than 50 per cent greater than the drive increased migration to higher-income numbers of civilians killed in the wars in Iraq countries. The second challenge will be for and Afghanistan between 2007 and 2014 the international community as a whole to (Breslow 2015). identify mechanisms to absorb a growing In addition, criminality often coexists with number of migrants without exacerbating a corruption among public officials and secu- humanitarian crisis or leading to destabilis- rity services and is facilitated by it, thereby ing levels of social tension (e.g., the emer- eroding the state’s ability to serve the inter- gence of hard-line groups in Greece and ests of its population. Corruption enables Hungary, in particular). criminality, and vice versa, thus creating a mutually-reinforcing relationship. The New technologies resultant governance deficits contribute to Furthermore, stabilisation needs to engage conflict by generating grievances and reduc- with new technologies. This includes ing cohesion not only among citizens but responding to the ways in which social media also between citizens and their government. is used to spread hatred and violence as well Despite its corrosive effect on stability, trans- as the potential to use social media and national organised crime has proven a major other new technologies to foster peace and challenge for stabilisation. As recent research understanding. Likewise, it is clear that stabi- for the OECD has demonstrated (Miraglia, lisation will increasingly need to prepare for Ochoa and Briscoe 2012), the model of fixed technological crises. These could entail, for criminal networks (e.g., cocaine producers in instance, large-scale technological disrup- Colombia sending drugs to end-user coun- tions that interrupt utilities and undermine tries like the United States) has been replaced global commerce. In addition, cyber-crime, Art. 54, page 6 of 9 Zyck and Muggah: Preparing Stabilisation for 21st Century Security Challenges which often has very tangible impacts on realm of big data and new technologies. For individuals and families, also needs to be instance, data enables policymakers not only considered within the scope of stabilisa- to monitor the types of security challenges tion, particularly as hundreds of millions of they face but also, as in the case of SGBV, people in developing countries come to rely to understand the economic losses that on banks and mobile money. The estimated come with each. Doing so allows improved annual cost of cyber-crime is US$400 billion allocation of scarce resources for domestic per year – likely more – and is rapidly grow- and international stabilisation efforts. For ing (CSIS 2014). A significant proportion of instance, recent years have seen the emer- these losses are feeding into criminal enter- gence of data regarding international and prises and conflicts in war zones such as Syria domestic spending on social infrastructure and eastern Ukraine. in conflict environments, making it possible to quantify the conflict-suppressing poten- Neglected security crises tial of these financial flows (on their own and Lastly, a focus on emerging security chal- in concert with coercive security activities). lenges must not overshadow attention to Data can also enable policymakers and prac- neglected security crises – including those titioners to crack another persistent challenge: affecting women and children. While often the incongruity between objective security viewed as a social or health crisis, sexual conditions and individuals’ and communities’ and gender-based violence (SGBV) and perceived sense of security. That is, reducing child abuse are crucial security challenges. the rate of crime, for instance, may not actu- Globally, 38 per cent of all murders of women ally lead people to feeling substantially more are perpetrated by an intimate partner, a sta- secure if perceived indicators of insecurity, tistic that rises to 55 per cent in South Asia. such as open carrying of weapons or public The 43,000 women killed by intimate part- vandalism, remain intact. Hence, it will be ners in 2012 (UNODC 2014) dramatically sur- increasingly possible to target interventions to pass the total number of people killed in any allow people to feel more secure and to obtain single war zone around the world in recent some of the psychosocial benefits of safety and years except for Syria (PS21 2015). When one stability. considers that recent econometric evidence Such data will be shared through new tech- indicates that intimate partner violence costs nologies. In some cases this may involve real- the world an average of five per cent of GDP time reports of security incidents or human each year (Fearon and Hoeffler, 2014), it is rights abuses by members of the public to clear that the potential returns of tackling ‘hotline’ services, though the CIA, NATO, this security crisis are huge. Yet stabilisation the US military and others in recent years actors have tended to focus less on chronic, have increasingly taken a less structured widespread security challenges and have approach – sifting through billions of Twitter instead focused more on acute, concentrated posts each day in order to attempt to identify challenges. As stabilisation matures in the- and predict security incidents (see Mancini ory and practice, it is important for the short- 2013). Such tools are not only available to term priorities to be replaced by longer-term the largest security services and militaries considerations of cultural change, social but also to municipal police departments cohesion and income disparities. and innovative researchers and civil society groups. Such groups have, for instance, used New Opportunities for Stabilisation social media and other publicly available These new challenges are accompanied by a information to better understand and map wide range of new opportunities – which are the work of Mexican drug cartels (Muggah only periodically utilised – particularly in the and Diniz 2013). Zyck and Muggah: Preparing Stabilisation for 21st Century Security Challenges Art. 54, page 7 of 9

Of course even more high-tech applications Development assistance, while no sub- are constantly being developed. In Ciudad stitute for diplomacy or military engage- Juarez in northern Mexico, a private firm was ment, continues to be a crucial component hired to operate high-altitude drones over of international peace and security. Within the city and document, second by second, the scope of stabilisation it will be integral, the movement of different vehicles. Using particularly now that the SDGs empha- this information, the client, a US government sise peace and security, to focus develop- agency, was able to document crime and ment assistance where it can have the best track assailants back to their criminal organi- violence-reducing impact. This may not sations’ headquarters and facilities. There are entail massive aid programmes in a small also media reports that governments, par- number of war zones but instead greater ticularly in a number of relatively authoritar- investments in countering criminality, pre- ian countries, have hired elite hacking firms venting conflict and reducing pervasive to spy on armed groups – and members of security challenges such as SGBV. This sort the political opposition – in order to bolster of calculation of how best to reduce vio- security. lence and net suffering through targeted All of the tactics noted above are accom- investment is at the core of stabilisation. panied by controversy and legitimate con- In foreign policy, military and development cerns related to privacy and basic freedoms. communities often driven by perceptions They must be accompanied with vigilance about what causes, ends or prevents vio- to ensure that security measures do not lence, stabilisation must maintain its agnos- themselves become tools of oppression. tic, problem-solving roots and allegiance to Nevertheless, these discussions need to hap- data and evidence over ideology. pen, and the pros and cons of new technolo- gies for stabilisation need to be continuously Competing Interests weighed lest new technologies proliferate The authors declare that they have no com- before adequate regulatory frameworks can peting interests. be established. Notes Conclusion: Out with the Old 1 For a discussion of peace dividends and Taking advantage of the full potential of the research supporting and, in particu- stabilisation requires that policymakers, lar, contradicting them can be found in practitioners and researchers do away with Hess and Blomberg (2011). some of the old, outdated notions surround- 2 It is important to acknowledge that the ing the idea. Chief among these outdated SDGs do not call for stabilisation or use notions is the belief that stabilisation can that term. However, their overt linking involve ‘buying’ stability with humanitarian of security and development remains or development assistance in the absence of significant. Other major reports have a meaningful diplomatic or military-security linked security and development over the strategy. Stabilisation cannot take the place course of several decades, but few com- of peace talks or large-scale military engage- prise international strategies and targets ment or robust forms of law enforcement. as significant as the SDGs. Rather, stabilisation requires a combination 3 Elements of this argument can be found of means and approaches and should be in Dennys (2013). understood as the outcome of a combined, 4 See Barton (n.d.). multi-part strategy rather than a stand- 5 These emerging security challenges are alone activity such as counterinsurgency or discussed particularly thoroughly in humanitarian relief. Crocker, et al. (2011). Art. 54, page 8 of 9 Zyck and Muggah: Preparing Stabilisation for 21st Century Security Challenges

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How to cite this article: Zyck, S A and Muggah, R 2015 Preparing Stabilisation for 21st Century Security Challenges. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 4(1): 54, pp. 1–9, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.gs

Published: 19 November 2015

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