IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
REPORT OF
THE AD HOC FACULTY COMMITTEE
ON ACCESS TO AND DISCLOSURE OF
SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
Massachusetts
Institute of Technology COVER PHOTOGRAPH: Kha Le in the Harvard-MIT Biomedical Engineering Center, Professor Elazer Edelman, Director
PHOTOGRAPHER: L. Barry Hetherington IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Report of the Ad Hoc Faculty Committee on Access to and Disclosure of Scientific Information
Appointed by the Provost and the Chair of the Faculty
COMMITTEE
Vincent W. S. Chan Joan and Irwin Jacobs Professor of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science Professor, Aeronautics & Astronautics Director, Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems
Jerome I. Friedman Institute Professor, and Professor of Physics
Stephen C. Graves Abraham J. Siegel Professor of Management Chair of the Faculty
Harvey M. Sapolsky Professor, Political Science Director, MIT Security Studies Program
Sheila E. Widnall, Chair Institute Professor, and Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
COMMITTEE STAFF
Helen W. Samuels Special Assistant, Office of the Provost
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY | JUNE 12, 2002
Executive Summary
Executive Summary
INTRODUCTION
MIT has a long and distinguished record of public service. Our report documents past public service contributions and the policies that underlie them, but primarily it seeks to anticipate the challenges to MIT’s mission that will arise from changing world conditions. The committee was established jointly by the Provost and the Chairman of the Faculty to examine MIT’s policies dealing with restrictions on research, such as those arising from classified or industry-sponsored research. The committee’s work was done at a time of change in laws governing access to materials and information and disclosure of research results that followed the events of September 11, 2001. Restrictions on access to select biological agents, the application of export control provisions to university researchers, and a growing pressure to treat research results as sensitive create a new landscape for faculty, students, and MIT as an institution.
CHARGE FOR THE COMMITTEE
The committee was asked to determine if our current policies provide adequate guidance to consider MIT’s role in classified research in the context of the 21st Century. The committee was asked to address the following issues:
● Does the policy, as stated by Section 14.2 of Policies and Procedures,give the appropriate context for considering classified research on campus?
● While the policy differentiates between classified research at MIT Lincoln Laboratory and on campus, what are the implications for faculty and graduate student participation in research projects being conducted at Lincoln Laboratory when the research has a classified component? Under what conditions is such research acceptable?
● Section 14.2 of Policies and Procedures is specifically silent on the use of classified material on campus, as opposed to carrying out classified research. How should we interpret our policy with respect to the use of classified material on campus?
● As the industrial research base of MIT expands, issues can arise concerning the openness of this research on campus. How do our policies for dealing with this research, as agreed upon in research contracts and as practiced, comply with the values of the academic community?
i ii Executive Summary re ev that therefore, theInstitute, “It isthepolicyof MIT’s current policyonresearch 14.2)states, (Section 1 RECOMMENDATIONSFINDINGS AND to newknowledge throug creation of educational activities, knowledge through unfettered of transmission MITrests uponfourvalues: The fundamentalmissionof STATEMENT OFMIT VALUES AND PRINCIPLES ae pnteepicpe,we andrecommendations arrived atthe findings given below. Based upontheseprinciples, science. mechanism tocrucial insure thecontinued andprogress quality of isa thescientific community, anddebate within opensharing anoutcome of methods andfindings, research Peer of evaluation ideas. discouragepractices thatindiscriminately orlimittheopenexchange of educatio ultimately bedamagedif ournationwill of science andontheeducat andtechnology advancement of what mechanisms shouldbeusedto contribute to such adebate. We these donotconflict MIT policy. with insofaras andresearch orhow managetheirlaboratories they groups, education orpublications, orhow communicate they through theirscientificfindings responsibilities, theirpublicservice fulfill c openness andaccess to research results asembodie Ourcharge wascentered ontheissuesof There are many issuesthatthecommittee didnotconsider. approvals granted. thepolicysince 1975there have beennosuch In theapplicationof theProvost.” approvalprior of onpublicationoraccess otherrestrictions must receive the orimpositionof theresearch results, of Na to Such forfree andopencommunication. opportunities andby information creating the scholarship of are sharing through theunconstrained bestserved We this knowledge to bearonthegreat challenges facingournationandtheworld inthe21stcentury. othersto andto bring working with knowledge, andpreserving disseminating, to generating, education, hanges to these. We did not deal with issues affecting individual faculty, as they consider asthey how bestto We faculty, individual issuesaffecting didnotdealwith hanges to these. quires aclassificationontheresearch process,
r eerhpoetwti h cdmcsrcueo MIT(excluding that Lincoln Laboratory) research of theacademicstructure ery project within h ain n evc ohmnt.TheInstitute iscommitted to quality providing thehighest to humanity. andservice the nation, the mostcurrent knowledge andallows scholars to builduponandto evaluate each other’s work. inlscrt,tehat fornto,adtesrnt foureconomy dependheavily onthe andthestrength of ournation, thehealthof tional security,
i o osdrMTsivleeti ainldbt bu hs sus Nor dowe recommend did notconsider MIT’s involvement inanationaldebate abouttheseissues. eiv htMT oflilismsin uthv noe nelculevrnet Educationand must have anopenintellectual environment. to itsmission, fulfill believe thatMIT, CLASSIFIED RESEARCH ONTHEMITCAMPUS: rmwr adoti u eotHwvr fe xmnn h mlctoso conducting after examining theimplicationsof laidout in ourreport.However, framework membersto serve include facilitatingfaculty Such anexpansion can thatservice. to expanding thescope of asappropriate, and, public service lsiiaina otesuc ffns classification funds, classification asto thesource of d inMIT’s policiesandpractices andonpossible the nation’s the needswithin nationalsecurity ,sine n ehooysfe sarsl fany sufferasaresult andtechnology of science, n, an environment enables studentsto beexposed eerhadohrshlryatvte,service h research andotherscholarly activities, o fftr eeain.Thewell-being future generations. ion of MIT remains committed to astrong role of Executive Summary iii ently, the Faculty rr Cu Because there is no consistent Because there ed to have a security perform to clearance have ed to of select biological agents. present, At very beyond that required by existing legislation. existing by required that beyond The recently enacted USA Patriot Act defines restricted persons and prohibits defines restricted Act USA Patriot enacted The recently as well. some point, At gov- in areas rightfully MIT may decide that on-campus research
CESS TO AND DISCLOSURE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION: OF SCIENTIFIC DISCLOSURE AND CESS TO and disclosure ofand disclosure results, research both industry- for research. or government-sponsored We nsider applying a sunset clause to the acceptance ofnsider applying the acceptance a sunset clause to carried new contracts out for research ntinue its policy ofntinue results that research contractual request sponsor’s any not agreeing to ow
uman Services (H&HS) has been given special powers to expand the list of expand to uman Services special powers (H&HS) has been given select agents and olicy Committee has responsibility to consult with the Provost regarding exceptions to MIT to exceptions regarding with consult the Provost has responsibility to olicy Committee ourse, seminar, on-campus forum. other similar or on-campus designate MIT should not any esponse to these issues,esponse to granted MIT policy for restrictions on access to exceptions as any as well also believe that this committee should monitor any issue of any should monitor that this committee also believe its attention to openness that comes arrangements implicit arising principles from and go made with sponsors that violate MIT’s contractual language. beyond their possessing, shipping or transporting a number few laboratories at MIT are affected by these regulations. by affected few laboratories at MIT are However, the Secretary of and Health H this list if add agents to to is likely enacted. pending bills are personnel, involving The requirements students, faculty, and staff with MIT’s not consistent are principles. climate, that in the current is likely It of the number and agents on the list will grow on personnel,the restrictions placed access, physical and publication of findings may research gr erned by these regulations is no longer in its interest or in line with its principles. is no longer in its interest these regulations erned by should We co restrictions,under such should in the near future, and the standing faculty committee reexamine these regulations. by affected our policies and practices in areas SELECT AGENTS: SENSITIVE AND OTHER RESTRICTIVE DESIGNATIONS: AND OTHER SENSITIVE to STANDING FACULTY COMMITTEE TO MONITOR DEVELOPING RESTRICTIONS ON RESTRICTIONS DEVELOPING MONITOR COMMITTEE TO FACULTY STANDING AC P of the conduct policy regarding research. more requires situation that the current believe We can provide. than that committee attention intensive Therefore, that a new recommend we legislation Federal and MIT’s the evolving monitor be established to standing faculty committee r classified research on campus, research classified with environment research an open that retaining conclude we of flow free to for MIT information and way is the best campus the MIT on results research fulfillservice its public responsibility. Therefore, be carried should out on campus,research that no classified recommend we that no student, graduate or undergraduate, should be requir thesis research, to be carried should requiring access out in areas and that no thesis research classified materials. understanding or definition of information,“sensitive" constitute what would MIT should co generated of during the course of disclosure a program be reviewed inadvertent for the “sensitive” information. this, Beyond documents on its campus that or hold any MIT should not accept “sensitive” nationals,” foreign designated are “no any to access students from or nor restrict any c for access facilities as requiring special conditions 3 4 2 iv Executive Summary 7 8 5 6 EXPORT CONTROLS: RELATIONS WITH OTHER LABORATORIES: LINCOLN LABORATORY: FA should insure that faculty membersunderstandtheiroblig should insure thatfaculty MIT of Theadministration theireffectsuponMITanditsresearch program. careful analysisof Such shouldbeaccepted restrictions onlyafter mental research andpublicdomainexemptions. research results eliminate aproject’s funda- of ontheopensharing or contractual restrictions mu fundamentalresearch andpublicdomainextends to as should insure of thatthedesignation MIT is thebestmeansto insure itsaspects thatresearch results canbefreely communicated. of to Since mostfundamentalresearch enjoys anexemption from theneed andartifacts. information support for faculty requiring access requiring forfaculty to classified material. support andhave Laboratory accessDraper to Draper MITshouldstrengthen itsrelationship with In particular, have applicationsto nationalsecurity. to inresearch strengthen Thesefacilitiesofferopportunities ouractivities that R.I.. in Newport, A r independentdefense-supported a number of I’ icl aoaoy butseveral otherorganizationscould alsoprovide such access. MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory, theseis mostprominent The of theirresearch. of outtheclassifiedportions to carry faculty There exist thatcanprovide several organizations access to classifiedfacilitiesto enableMIT notjustintheannual from report faculty. a project, We believe thatsuch notificationshouldbegiven attheinitiationof cantly affectMITresearch. therelationships thatcansignifi- itislikely beunaware will thatadministrators of notification, Without such thatinvolveactivities MITincomplex otherorganizations. relationships with theProvost about must beinformed Second, memberfromfaculty active contact students. with aresearch thatmay foratimeremove activity the headsnotifiedabouttheextent of department membersneedto keep faculty First, MITpolicy. thecurrent framework of be handledwithin on-campusresearch can membersinoff-campusclassifiedresearch faculty asanextension of of environment implications. to doresearch thatenablesfaculty nationalsecurity with Lincoln provides an andinsofaraspossible, MIT standards forindependence andquality, theresearch meets to insure Lincoln that: Laboratory should continue itsactive management of co rFreRsac aoaoy aikAm aoaoy andtheNaval Undersea Warfare Natick Army Laboratory, Center ir Force Research Laboratory,
pnnso h ulcsrieta I are u o h ain nisoesgtrl,MIT In itsoversight role, outforthenation. thatMITcarries thepublicservice mponents of ekepr iesspirt ismntn nomto ries opencommunication inall to licenses oritems, disseminatinginformation prior seek export CULTY PARTICIPATION INCLASSIFIEDRESEARCH: ch
fisogigrsac ciiya osbe ossetwt h ainlitrs.Any formal consistent thenationalinterest. with itsongoingresearch aspossible, activity of I n t aut r fetdb asgvrigepr fscientific are affectedMIT anditsfaculty by laws governing of export The management and oversight of Lincoln Laboratory are major Lincoln Laboratory The managementandoversight of
as an off-site facility forresearchas anoff-site facility andadministrative esearch Laboratory, such asDraper laboratories MIT and its faculty haveMIT anditsfaculty ongoingrelations with ations under these export controlations undertheseexport laws. Is sues arising fromsues arising theparticipation Executive Summary v xplicit statements e MIT faculty play importantMIT faculty play licies and Procedures Po Our committee has not been able to address all of address has not been able to Our committee the There may be times when rapid near-term access to specialized to access rapid when be times near-term may There MIT should incorporate in MIT should incorporate mmend that MIT hold security them, for faculty clearances who require off- and provide do not recommend that MIT provide facilities for storage and access of and access for storage facilities provide that MIT do not recommend classified materials
CULTY ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED RESEARCH AND MATERIALS: CLASSIFIED RESEARCH TO ACCESS CULTY nsultation with the standing faculty committee we have recommended. have nsultation with we faculty the standing committee mmittee we have suggested review suggested MIT policies in this area, have we mmittee as their specific application as well pe of access. for restricted procedures special require MIT that believe may assistance We quired, the facilities of utilizing or Draper Lincoln Laboratories. co on the MIT campus. material, for faculty use such should be provided to off-campus site An as re about acceptable research behavior and clear standards for the conduct of for the conduct clear standards and behavior research about acceptable insure to research policies on sponsors that violate MIT’s with research not reached that implicit agreements are openness and access. the material that accompanies into guidelines should be incorporated Such report that facultythe annual make, activities and their on- detailing their outside professional relationships. campus research campus facilities to allow access to classified materials needed to engage in research or public service. engage in research classified materials needed to to access allow campus facilities to We issues raised by industry-sponsoredissues raised by research. standing faculty that the recommend therefore We co in practice, as one of its first agenda items. affecting pressures about growing concerned are We the openness of in industry- involvement and their publication that ariseresults from research research.sponsored the fun- undercut that restrictions on openness may also concerned are We regime. in the export control exemption damental research FA RESEARCH CONDUCT: RESEARCH INDUSTRY-SPONSORED RESEARCH: INDUSTRY-SPONSORED EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS: EXTRAORDINARY public service roles in areas requiring access to classified materials. to public service requiring access in areas roles support these activities To we re MIT on-campus facilities and expertise facilities on-campus MIT nation. the by willbe required of Examples would this analysis of for forensic be the need biological materials, materials preparation, the use of and and expertiseother facilities for significant national purpose research. other than this Providing ty expertise for a short-time with such sunset available response time-definite a should make clause. the permission of require emergencies would such to MIT response An in the Provost co 12 10 9 11 Table of Contents T able ofContents 1 6 5 4 3 2 Service To TheNation:AHistoryofResearchandPolicies . OtherRestrictions 3.6 Research Industry-Sponsored 3.5 TheUSAPatriotAct:SelectAgents 3.4 Controls Export 3.3 SensitiveInformation 3.2 ClassifiedResearch 3.1 RestrictionsonResearch MITPoliciesDealingWith 1.7 TheRoleofFundamentalResearchinTechnology Transfer inthe80’s: 1.6 ReconsiderationoftheSpecialLaboratories:The PoundsPanel 1.5 SummerStudiesandtheEstablishmentofLincoln Laboratory 1.4 TheInstrumentationLaboratory 1.3 World War II:TheRadiationLaboratory 1.2 FoundingandEarlyDays 1.1 Implications ofPerformingClassifiedResearchOnCampus Rationale forPerformingClassifiedResearchatMIT Statement ofMITValues andPrinciples Responsibilities andRestrictionsontheHandlingofScientificInformation Developing ConcernsonAccessandControlofScientificInformation NSDD 189 ...... 19 17 15 14 14 13 12 12 11 11 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1 1 Table of Contents 27 31 35 37 43 21 21 21 22 23 25 ...... Current and Past MIT Policies Governing Openness of Research Findings and Recommendations Reference Guide to the Management of Restrticted Scientific Information Campus Research Involving Select Agents Principles, Concerns Industry-Sponsored Research-Challenges, Acknowledgements APPENDICES 7.2 Research Student Involvement in Classified 7.3 The Role of Lincoln Laboratory 7.4 Relationships with Other Institutions MIT’s Involvement in Classified Research: Involvement MIT’s Laboratory and Other Off-Campus Laboratories The Role of Lincoln 7.1 Research Faculty Involvement in Classified C 8 9 7 A B 10
Service To The Nation:
1
Service To The Nation: A History of Research and Research Policies A History of Research and Policies
1.1 FOUNDING AND EARLY DAYS
From the time when William Barton Rogers articulated a vision for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1861, there was a commitment that this new institution should serve the community. “We believe that the great practical value of the results at which we aim…must be recognized with especial heartiness in a community like our own…and we feel assured that the magnitude of the plans [will] secure these great public benefits.” (Objects and Plan of an Institute of Technology, 1861).
1.2 WORLD WAR II: THE RADIATION LABORATORY
During the Institute’s first eighty years, the fulfillment of that public service mission took many forms: consulting, committee memberships, and special research efforts. But it was MIT’s response during the Second World War that contributed so significantly to the nation’s needs, and at the same time transformed the Institute. In May 1940, anticipating that MIT “would be called upon to take part in national preparedness,” Karl T. Compton, then President of MIT, wrote to all department heads asking them to suggest “in which ways the staff and facilities of your department might be most advantageously used in such an emergency.” The magnitude of the Institute’s response is chronicled in John Ely Burchard’s Q.E.D.; MIT in World War II (New York:J.Wiley, 1948).
The largest single effort undertaken by MIT during the war was the Radiation Laboratory. The name was chosen to mask the true purpose of the lab, which was to develop microwave radar systems for aircraft, ships and anti-aircraft guns. Under the leadership of Vannevar Bush and the NDRC (National Defense Research Committee), the decision was made to house the radar laboratory (Rad Lab) at a university in contrast to a defense or industrial site. At the time, this was a novel idea, but the decision to place government-funded laboratories at universities clearly set the pattern for the post-war years.
MIT was chosen as the site for the Rad Lab as research was already underway in these areas and the Institute was willing to make space available for this purpose. MIT originally allocated 10,000 square feet of space and a staff of 50 persons. By the end of the war the laboratory occu- pied 15 acres of office space, had a staff of nearly 4000, an annual budget of $13 million, and
1 had produced over one hundred different radar systems and devices. The Rad Lab was run as a secure facility where all work was classified as secret. Staff members were investigated by the FBI before they were granted a security clearance, and were then required to sign secrecy agreements. Visitors to the facility were carefully controlled.
The Rad Lab not only brought outstanding scientists and engineers into the MIT community, but it also contributed to the education of future generations. The effort made at the end of WW II, to record and disseminate the knowledge gained by the Rad Lab staff reflects the con- tinuing commitment to communicate research results as rapidly and as widely as possible. Service To The Nation: Service To I.I. Rabi, one of the key scientists at the Laboratory, suggested the publication of a series of volumes to capture the advances that had been made by the staff in such areas as crystal theory, antenna development, radio signal propagation work, and general microwave circuitry. The end result was the twenty-eight volumes of the Radiation Laboratory Series.“The series, beginning with the volume Radar Systems Engineering,would debut in 1947 and go on to serve as the occupational bible and textbooks for at least a generation of physicists and engineers studying microwave electronics” (Robert Buderi, The Invention That Changed The World [New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996], p. 251).
James R. Killian Jr., President of MIT from 1948-59, has written that the Radiation Laboratory “bequeathed to their members a realistic sense of the importance of further contributions to our national security after the war…Professor Jerrold Zacharias has made the interesting comment to me that this sense of realistic involvement, which marked the work of the Radiation Laboratory group, led to the initiation of programs…organized in the 1950’s to reform and improve the teaching of science in pre-college schools” (James R. Killian, Jr., The Education of a College President [Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985], p. 27).
At the end of the war, the Rad Lab was quickly dismantled, and the basic research component A History of Research and Policies became MIT’s Research Laboratory for Electronics (RLE). Through the 1950’s the armed services remained the primary source of funding for RLE. At first the research program was predominately unclassified, but over time RLE undertook more classified work though the laboratory remained open to graduate students.
From the end of WWII through the 1960’s, classified research was conducted at several other MIT locations. In addition to RLE, the Instrumentation Laboratory and Lincoln Laboratories, discussed below, some classified work was conducted at the Center for International Studies (CIS). During the 1960’s, the faculty in the CIS decided that classified research in the social sciences had significant negative consequences, and decided to phase out all classified projects. The last room that held classified files in the Center was dismantled in 1972.
1.3 THE INSTRUMENTATION LABORATORY
“The Instrumentation Laboratory of MIT was firmly rooted in the work of one individual, Charles Stark Draper” (Roslyn Romanowski, Peacetime to Wartime [MIT B.A. thesis, Humanities, 1982]). While a graduate student at MIT in the late 1920’s, Draper was invited to teach a course on aircraft instruments, thus beginning his long career in the development of inertial guidance systems.
2 Service To The Nation: When the Instrumentation Laboratory was established in the 1930’s, initial funding came from the Sperry Gyroscope Company. Subsequently, the Laboratory began to investigate gyroscopic guidance for anti-aircraft guns and the primary funding shifted to the government. During World War II the laboratory, known during the war as the Confidential Instruments Laboratory, made significant contributions to defense needs with the Mark-14 gunsight being one of the major developments during the war. (David Mindell, Between Human and Machine: Feedback, Control, and Computing Before Cybernetics [Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002]).
In the post-war years, Draper and the staff of the Instrumentation Laboratory developed guidance A History of Research and Policies systems for strategic ballistic missiles, working on the guidance systems for both the Polaris and Titan projects. Before 1961 almost all research contracts were funded by the military. When the Laboratory was awarded the NASA contract to develop the navigation and guidance systems for Apollo, the mission to the moon, the funding became approximately evenly divided between military and civilian sources. While the military work remained heavily classified, the Apollo project itself was unclassified at the insistence of NASA, although it drew heavily on technologies developed for the military. The Laboratory had a “thesis declassification officer” until the late 1960’s.
1.4 SUMMER STUDIES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LINCOLN LABORATORY
In the 1950’s several federal agencies turned to MIT to explore issues of importance to the nation’s defense. The initial request from the AEC (Atomic Energy Commission) to explore the feasibility of nuclear powered flight (Project Lexington) led MIT to establish the summer studies format as an intense and effective way to rapidly carry out investigative projects. MIT gathered scientists and engineers from around the country and asked them to consider a problem of significant scope and importance. Project Lexington demonstrated the strength of the summer study format, but also the importance of properly framing the question. Professor Jerrold Zacharias, the director of the second study, Project Hartwell, broadened the Navy’s original request to “find new ways of detecting submarines,” to the question of the security of overseas transportation and harbor defense.
After the end of the war, President Killian stated that MIT “was understandably reluctant to undertake the establishment of a large research laboratory devoted to military objectives, having devoted itself so intensively to the conduct of the Radiation Laboratory and other large war projects.” (James R. Killian, Jr., The Education of a College President [Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985], p. 71).
In 1950, however, responding to a request from the Air Force, President Killian recommended a summer study, named Project Charles, to explore the feasibility of establishing a major laboratory focused on air defense. MIT was motivated to take on the study both by national defense needs, and also the understanding that such a laboratory would act as a stimulus for the small electronics industry in the area.
The summer study recommended the establishment of a laboratory, named Project Lincoln, to be operated by MIT for the Army, Navy and Air Force. In agreeing to establish the Laboratory
3 President Killian wrote to Thomas Finletter, then Secretary of the Air Force, “I wish to be very explicit in saying that MIT is anxious to do what is in the public interest in this matter…that in writing to you…I am asking that there be…an effort…to get concurrence that [our continuation] is in the public interest and justifies…the severe problems…it imposes on an educational institution” (James R. Killian, Jr., The Education of a College President [Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985], p. 73).
Continuing funding was assured by the Air Force in 1953, and construction of the new facility near Hanscom Field in Bedford, Massachusetts was completed at that time. A site off-campus Service To The Nation: Service To was sought as there was limited space for classified research on campus, and “President Killian believed that MIT should not be carrying out classified research on the Cambridge campus” (MIT Lincoln Laboratory: Technology in the National Interest [Lexington: Lincoln Laboratory, 1995], p.11). Classified work, previously conducted at the RLE, was transferred to Lincoln Lab.
In the early years, the most important developments to come out of Lincoln Lab were SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment), a nationwide network of radar and anti-aircraft weapons linked to digital computers, and the DEW (Distant Early Warning) Line, a radar surveillance system placed along the polar gateway to the United States. Though operated as a classified facility, Lincoln has supported graduate student work that has resulted in many theses.
1.5 RECONSIDERATION OF THE SPECIAL LABORATORIES: THE POUNDS PANEL
Concerns about the Instrumentation Laboratory and Lincoln Laboratory were always present, as were the implications of the growth of their sponsored research programs. Over the years, MIT’s Visiting Committee on Sponsored Research addressed these issues repeatedly. Their 1965 report stated, “It is in these two areas [of Lincoln Laboratory and the Instrumentation A History of Research and Policies Laboratory] that the most serious problem of controlling the natural tendency to expand resides, and in which interaction with the educational process automatically becomes obscure. We therefore repeat the cautions set forth by previous Committees, warning against unwarranted growth and emphasizing the need for an appropriate balance between meeting obligations to the Government on the one hand, and to the Institute’s educational objectives on the other.”
In 1956, and again in 1963, the Institute discussed altering or severing the relationship between MIT and the two laboratories, but no changes were made. In 1969, in the midst of the war in Vietnam, the reconsideration of the special laboratories took on greater urgency. On March 4, 1969, a group of MIT faculty and students organized a stoppage of research to “provoke a public discussion of problems and dangers related to the present role of science and technology in the life of our nation” (Science [163, January 24, 1969], p. 373 and [163, March 14, 1969], pp. 1175-1178). The protest was devised as a “means for turning research applications away from the present emphasis on military technology toward the solution of pressing environmental and social problems.”
Responding to growing protests at MIT and other college campuses, then President Howard W. Johnson convened a Review Panel on Special Laboratories to reconsider the status of the Instrumentation Laboratory and Lincoln Laboratory. William F. Pounds, then Dean of the Sloan School of Management, chaired the panel. The first report, issued by the Panel in May 1969 and
4 Service To The Nation: 5 A History of Research and Research Policies the Institute weighed the conflicting weighed the conflicting the Institute nstrumentation Laboratory. The Laboratory I that had not previously been restricted. February In 1981, of the presidents research five esearch program. esearch
The laboratories and MIT should explore new projects to provide a more balanced balanced a more provide to new projects The laboratories MIT should explore and r the specialThe educational interaction laboratories between campus should and the be expanded. barriers and clearance classification efforts reduce in the to be intensive should There special laboratories. on the special laboratories should be established. A standing committee mmendations and financial implications ofmmendations and financial implications the special laboratories. or divesting retaining a reaction to the worsening relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union in the and the Soviet Union States the United between relationship the worsening to a reaction rk mmittee’s directive.” Although the recommendation had severe financial consequences for financial consequences directive.” had severe Although the recommendation mmittee’s systems intended for operational as military deployment intended systems weapons.” 20, On May 1970,
nsiderably larger non-military component devoted to the major problems ofnsiderably the major problems to larger non-military devoted component society.” mmunities. the first time, For by restrict access was used to Act Administration the Export esident Johnson announced,esident Johnson Laboratory manage Lincoln to in essentially “MIT can continue otests continued at MIT throughout 1969 while at MIT throughout continued otests affic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), Regulations Arms affic in (EAR).” Regulations Administration and Export
co nstrumentation Laboratory and the MTI (Moving Target Imagery) radar at Lincoln nstrumentation Laboratory Target and the MTI (Moving ● ● ● ● The Panel examined several controversial projects, controversial several examined The Panel missile at the including the Poseidon I Laboratory. was formed with of A standing committee the charge review to the continuing programs of the special laboratories. The Executive Committee of Committee The Executive related that barred new work “directive the Corporation issued a to Pr take to cannot continue we future…[but] in the past and foreseeable the same frame have as we that responsibility for the Draper Laboratory under the restriction of the Corporation Executive Co the Institute, the divest the decision was made to was renamed for its founder,was renamed S. Charles Draper, a part in 1970 and remained of 1973 MIT until when it became an independent, corporation. and development research not-for-profit THE ROLE OF FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN THE 80’S: TRANSFER IN TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN THE ROLE OF FUNDAMENTAL NSDD 189 As Pr re the final report,the final 1969,October issued in histories of very the different recognized the laboratories, a including by service…should public non-academic be diversified “MIT’s that but suggested co (First report, p. 8). report The four recommendations: made universities, including MIT, of the Secretaries to wrote Commerce, and Defense, State indicate to the International universities apply to to attempts about recent concerned “deeply that they were Tr late 1970’s,late American academic scientific and engineering imposed on the new restrictions were co scientific meetings, nationals to foreign and publication of the presentation prohibit and to wo 1.6 In February 1982, a DOD-University Forum, co chaired by Richard DeLauer, then Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, and Stanford President Donald Kennedy, was established to encourage communication between the academic and defense communities. And in March 1982, the Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy (COSEPUP), of the National Academy of Sciences, convened a Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security chaired by Dale R. Corson, physicist and president emeritus of Cornell University. The Corson report concluded that, while there was a significant amount of tech- nology transfer to the Soviet Union, very little of this problem was caused by the academic community. The report stated that “The long-term security of the United States depends in Service To The Nation: Service To large part…on the vigorous research and development effort that openness helps to nurture.”
In 1984, when the DOD proposed contract provisions that would have authorized their reviewers to restrict the publication of some research findings, the presidents of MIT, Caltech, and Stanford notified the White House that if these provisions were enacted, their institutions would refuse to conduct sensitive but unclassified research. Richard DeLauer supported the position taken by the academic community, indicating that “consistent with existing statutes, no controls other than [security] classification may be imposed on fundamental research and its results when performed under a federally supported contract.”
In response to the COSEPUP study and continued efforts to control access to research and dissemination of the findings, the Reagan administration issued National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 189, “National policy on the transfer of scientific, technical and engineering information,” in 1985. NSDD 189 sets forth the definition of fundamental research, and the policy that when restrictions are necessary, security classification should be used.
‘Fundamental research’ means basic and applied research in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the scientific community, A History of Research and Policies as distinguished from proprietary research, and from industrial development, design, produc- tion, and product utilization; the results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security reasons.
It is the policy of this Administration that, to the maximum extent possible, the products of fundamental research remain unrestricted. It is also the policy of this Administration that, where the national security requires control, the mechanism for control of information gen- erated during federally-funded fundamental research in science, technology and engineering at colleges, universities and laboratories is classification…No restriction may be placed upon the conduct or reporting of federally-funded fundamental research that has not received national security classification, except as provided in applicable U.S. Statutes.
1.7 MIT POLICIES DEALING WITH RESTRICTIONS ON RESEARCH
MIT policy development, with respect to classified research and other restrictions on openness in research, tracked the changes described above. These various policies are included in Appendix B, which also contains a statement of current MIT policy.
6 Developing Concerns on Access and Control of Scientific Information 7 their own arsenals of weapons. such The end thus became for many officials the key measure officials the key became for many thus
gy of offers of allies in which of and threats protection
Scientific Information Scientific Information
erica’s success.erica’s military in States was in technologies relevant the United held by The advantage er all other nations in military technologies. relevant of fact The that many most the technologies ith the end ofWar, Cold the worries of about the proliferation of weapons mass destruction and ail-sorting machines can spread the contents ofail-sorting the contents can spread machines letter. an anthrax-contaminated have These events lated delivery systems escalated. systems delivery lated War, During the Cold and, it was in the interest a large extent, to ade and gain economic advantage. ade and gain economic wareness among the nation's political leaders of among the wareness and technology the important science role played in aised concerns about who if gets trained even aised concerns in what techniques or not secret are the techniques eserved only for the military. the power ofthe power limit the diffusion of to and the Soviet Union States both the United of weapons mass destruction. had a network superpower Each W re r The September 11th and subsequent attacks on the United States have taught also that common tech- taught common also that have States attacks on the United 11th and subsequent The September nologies can be used for deadly purpose. a bomb in the hands of becomes A large aircraft terrorists. M r of military strength. relative it came a belief With and hold a lead create must States that the United ov dual use, inherently important our defense are to significant commercial in the sense that they have as militaryas well value, leads. efforts protect to complicates greatly crop can monitor Satellites movements; as troop as well production disease as well for cures produce in biotechnology may work as lethal weapons. The effort build military expand with to to can easily conflict the desire advantage tr possess for others to desires the abandonment contained of theft or sale of has meant not only the possible War the Cold the Soviet stockpile, from weapons but of in the acquisition also heightened interest of weapons mass destruction nations whose security by with the Soviet expired guarantees Union, on their own. American power or who wished challenge to Am The sophistication of military technolo a nation’s The end of national security, to about threats did not end concerns War the Cold the evolution or stop of relations. government-university On the contrary, heightened experience War on the Cold reflections a the military and technology between collaboration in science large part an effective through achieved institutions, sector and private including academic institutions. This significant edge is and growing West with in its ability the compete to confidence undermined the Soviet Union’s have said to often and, grounds on any therefore, the end of hastened have to War. the Cold
Developing Concerns on Access and Control of Concerns on Access Developing 2 From a security point of view, the increasing international visibility and accessibility of America’s universities is a complicating development. On the one hand, the prominence of our universities draws many of the world's best minds to the United States as teachers, researchers, and students. We are richer in all aspects of our lives, including defense, for the knowledge they generate. Many will return home to become leaders in their own countries, carrying with them a good measure of American values and understanding, and building a stronger world. On the other hand, because of their openness, the universities become a gateway through which potential enemies may access advanced technologies, even common ones, that can be used in military systems to our detriment. Research collaborations and educational exchanges that look entirely beneficial from some perspectives may look quite dangerous from others.
Both the Executive Branch and the Congress have expressed concern in recent years about the leakage of vital technologies to hostile regimes or groups. Some lower-level federal research administrators, sensing the changing political climate, have begun to tighten or expand their interpretation of security regulations. One serious result has been the attempt by agencies to claim that restrictions should be placed on access to certain information they label as “sensitive” even though this information has not been classified as secret through established procedures. Thus, universities like MIT, that have policies against doing classified research on their campuses in order to preserve their openness, have found themselves facing pressure from federal research sponsors to control access to and limit dissemination of some research findings.
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) governs the export of technologies and products on the U.S. Munitions List and is administered by the State Department. Although the list of technologies covered by the Munitions List is broad, most university international collaborations and exchanges are excluded from ITAR license requirements under a general exemption for public domain information or fundamental research. ITAR defines fundamental research as research in science and engineering at a U.S. institution of higher learning, the results of which are published without restriction. However,
Developing Concerns on Access and Control of Scientific Information there are some fields like space research where even fundamental research requires the utilization of technologies that may be considered to be defense related. In fact, recent tightening of ITAR’s adminis- tration stemmed from concern about the transfer of space technologies to China in commercial transactions. Finding a way to preserve international collaborations and exchanges in the space sciences has been difficult, and the field is somewhat in turmoil because of this. Recent amendments to ITAR (March 29, 2002), intended to help the universities, have improved the situation somewhat by exempting from the license requirements certain exports to nationals from NATO and a small number of allied countries. The changes are limited in their applications and have not solved the basic diffi- culties. The fundamental research exclusion has not become more flexible and predictable. At the same time, some new problems have been created, such as inadvertently requiring discrimination among students according to country of origin. Moreover, the dual-use nature of science and technology raises the concern that ITAR restrictions will be extended to many other fields.
8 Developing Concerns on Access and Control of Scientific Information 9 tivities, of the employment like graduate students, derstandable desires for securityderstandable desires and the restrictions likely preserve all the academic freedoms that all the academic freedoms preserve likely oublesome to manage for university researchers manage for university to oublesome
tr the universities in that the transfer in of the universities scientific some including the imposition ofincluding the imposition criminal penalties. iot Act,iot signed 2001, October of expansion else including much although involving the government’s or is high. the risk one wishes that additional deadly attacks will increase to occur. No Academic gulations governing access to and the handling and the of to access gulations governing after been strengthened materials have hazardous r most research universities,r most research that research rather than defense-related research it is health-related tr ports” of information are sensitive potentially mained in force and were so productive during the long years of duringthe long years so productive and were mained in force War. the Cold rr iology and bioengineering now join other academic fields such as space and computer sciences in sciences iology and computer and bioengineering as space join other academic fields such now esearch after the Cold War remains financially dependent upon federal research contracts and grants. federal financially dependent upon research remains War the Cold after esearch re now attractsnow most support, in the last half but the vulnerability created federal mandates to century is unchanged. to and universities and a partnership Only dialogue Government the Federal between needs ofidentify the real security, strengthen to government with balanced the public service contri- butions of in all of the universities its aspects, will Fo that it involves for academic life,that it involves be very is going to difficult. support Public the campaign for against te r Opposition, the point of to even questioning the un B the health of test to likely security are which pressures relations. university-government enforce- Law ment and the military worry that the openness of the academic environment, without intention, will do so. gain the materialsinformation and Americans needed to to those who wish harm allow to The and engineeringAmerican academic science so productive that make fear that the processes universities for defense and everything else in society will be sacrificed in the false belief that openness per se is the danger. ability to monitor communications networks and seize electronic records, electronic and seize networks communications ability monitor to the involvement prohibited of possession, individuals deemed restricted persons from shipping, transport, of and receipt covered be used in biologicalselect attacks. agents that could the September 11th attacks and the anthrax 11th attacks and the letters.the September Although most of were controls the pre-existing misuse of as preventing as well safety concerns environmental toward directed biological hazardous for terrorism,materials and toxins in new law. purpose the latter has gained prominence The USA Pa and administrators because the activities are an inherent part an inherent ofand administrators the activities because are process, the academic research yet them in legal jeopardy can place Re the conduct ofthe conduct seminars, and workshops the transmission or of foreign when they papers involve countries, other than NATO from nationals be in violation can of the regulations.“deemed These ex Export controls present particular for present Export problems controls information included in normal domestic research ac information in normal included research domestic
Responsibilities and Restrictions on the Handling of Scientific Information 11 ning laws and regulations.ning laws The obligations of r ve icular substances or particular or icular substances technologies. Recent ly fifteen main campus individuals are required by required main campus individuals are ly fifteen ional obligations, have senior MIT officials must esponsibilities of institutions and individuals. is It r rform classified research at Lincoln Laboratory. at Lincoln rform research classified Others estimate that there might be as many as seventy-five members of as seventy-five might that there be as many estimate the MIT faculty who
mmittee ofmmittee the Corporation. MIT maintains a facility security fulfill its on campus to office
ntractual agreements. employees, Lincoln Beyond senior MIT administrators, and a few esearch and Development Center) specializing in radar and electronics.Governance and over- specializing in radar Center) and electronics.Governance and Development esearch Scientific Information Classified research has a well-defined set of has a well-defined Classified research go understood. well are individuals and the engaged in classified research the Institution Criminal violations from ofpenalties result these laws. Laboratory, at Lincoln classified research undertakes MIT currently an FFRDC Funded (Federally R sight issues require, fulfill its institut that to securityappropriate clearances. Currently, on the government to have security clearance: have to the government President, Provost, and the Executive Presidents Vice Co obligations. agencies and with specific relationships government from flow Classification requirements co with relationships Lincoln, research individual MIT faculty who have no other MIT faculty hold their security their association with MIT or through through Laboratory. clearance Lincoln We hold securitycurrently clearances. specific govern- to be related must clearances as such But agencies, withment contracts relationships and/or specific government these MIT faculty as DOE, other organizations such held by clearances their members have NRO, USAF. and
its role as a major research university,research as a major its role an institution and MIT faculty MIT as as individuals are
3.1 CLASSIFIED RESEARCH In bound by a framework ofbound by pertaining and regulations the handling of to laws information scientific materials.and research Some of that MIT has made to choices the from these obligations derive pe or to perform industry-sponsored research Responsibilities and Restrictions on the Handling of and Restrictions Responsibilities flow from laws controlling access to and dissemination of to access controlling laws from flow materials scientific information and research everyone.that apply to of Many on institutions and faculty special in partic-burdens place these laws fields,ular research of the handling and govern part legislation restrictions has expanded the and the
important and regulations.that MIT faculty understand their obligations laws under these The MIT a primaryadministration play should informedin insuring is well on that the MIT community role these issues. 3 12 Responsibilities and Restrictions on the Handling of Scientific Information . EXPORTCONTROLS 3.3 SENSITIVEINFORMATION 3.2 re re research imposingclassificationonemerging closely oversee theongoingresearch agoalof with has chosen to engageinclassifiedresearch atLinc Ho r actions by thegovernment have access affected faculty to theirresearch aswell asstudentthesis These often removing themfrom member’s thefaculty control orparticipation. after thefact, me ri situations inwhich unclassifiedresearch becomes classifiedby whatcould betermed “march-in classificationflowsAlthough from req contractual provision for isnotpossiblewithout opportunities responding promptly to publicservice obtaining aclearance cantake upto months, eighteen C Fo Fo nvriis Major problems have for research arisen universities involved inthespace sciences,universities. (ITAR) andExport Administration Regulations (EAR)to fundamental research undertaken by An r such Clearly, andaccess to discussingthemisrestricted. such andmeetings materials material, isoften placed on scientificandtechnical Thedesignation “No Foreign Nationals” security. The government may place otherrestrictio onitsresearch restrictions environment. accept arbitrary andshouldnot, but doesnot, We To are aware thatmany universities have hadsimilarexperiences. We dictates from government individual agents—however contracting wellarbitrary intended. situation openstheInstitut This nor bounded. theInstitute involved andtheindividuals have notbeenclarified andthe obligationsof defined, hasnotbeen thisapproach with isthattheterm Thedifficulty “sensitive” access to thismaterial. r Such arequest implies potential onthemannerinwhich restrictions information. “sensitive” of re I cesnl flt,MIThasseentheattempt by government officialsto contracting includea late, of ncreasingly sac n ulctos odt,thesehave events. beenextraordinary To date, esearch and publications. estrictions are theeducationalenvironment notcompatibleestrictions with atMIT. have andmay who thepersonnel alsorestrict esearch results are anddisseminated, handled g ouncil study ontheNuclear Test Since BanTreaty required access to classifiedmaterial. ut.T eacpal,we believe thatany such would actions beextremely rare andwould To beacceptable, sults. ur ra estvt n aet vi aaigtepoeso discovery. andcarequire to great sensitivity avoid theprocess damaging of urmn htrsac eut ervee,p quirement thatresearch results bereviewed,
r example, serving asacommittee foranunclassifiedNational memberorreviewer serving Research r example, theirpublicservice. enablerof theseclearances are animportant r many members, faculty hts.” In such cases, findings obtainedinunclassifiedresearch findings have beendeemedby thegovern- In such cases, hts.”
nt ae I a eue,i l ae,t cetti etito nayo itsgovernment contracts. to accept inany thisrestriction of inallcases, MIThasrefused, date, we
rao rwn ocr steapiaino theInternational Traffic in RegulationsArms growing concern isthe applicationof area of plu hsapoc n eiv hta“rgtln”plc saporaei hsae.MIT isappropriate policy inthisarea. applaud thisapproach andbelieve thata “bright-line” to ve
r, be of such overwhelming importance to national security thattheresults such are overwhelming to importance classified nationalsecurity be of in the current climate, we may see a desire on the part of contract monitors contract to more we may of seeadesire onthepart in thecurrent climate, ns on scientific information that affectsnational ns onscientificinformation n t aut,suet,adsafto potential andstaff students, e anditsfaculty, ri oln Laboratory underwe oln Laboratory the continuity of individual security clearances. security individual the continuity of rt ulcto,forthepotential disclosure or to publication, ieet reyetrdit,there are some uirements freely entered into, ll-defined obligations Responsibilities and Restrictions on the Handling of Scientific Information 13 der the Act,der the certain nationals, foreign in addition to been who have citizens States United these is also included. fact, In document, is a complex ITAR the inconsistent, at times internally llowing the events ofllowing the events 11th, September the posses- passed legislation that controls Congress en when a project might be seen as falling under the fundamental research or public domain mighten when a project be seen as falling under the fundamental research mmercial use with use mmercial some military potential. is important It faculty that understand their clusion, another part of is provision when there is required that a license mandates the ITAR eater impact on MIT,eater particularly that do biological research. on areas security, Additional
quired to conduct background checks and be liable for the results. checks background conduct to quired time, the present At MIT aining,Act. with comply the will facilities to to restrictions required be on access and physical aining, of nationals in the use foreign to articles,” “defense List). on the Munitions (those items undamental research is excluded from the application of from is excluded undamental research and EAR. ITAR definition of The Fo sion, receipt, shipping, transport or of certain select biological agents on the part of “restricted” persons. of As now, will of only affect the work Act the very few laboratories at MIT. However, under some of the bills pending in Congress, the Secretary of Services and Human Health the list of expand to (H&HS) is likely select agents. a much have list could The expanded gr tr applies the obligations and criminal liabilities for violations individ-Act to Patriot The existing uals. the liabilities for violations institutions as well. to extend would bills in Congress Pending Un dishonorably discharged, indicted, for certain crimes, or convicted illegal drug are users, are fugitives, had a mental illness will also be restricted. or who have is not clear who will It be re faculty and staff, with working these select agents, a self-assessment form to being given are ifhelp them determine with work legally these materials, able to they are notify them and to of the implications. and in any case requiring legal interpretation. and in any and concerns have been expressed that these restrictions will soon spread to many other fields. other many restrictions that these will to expressed been spread soon have concerns and itself concerns ITAR with the exportof military-critical on the U.S. listed technologies Munitions services”“defense and related List (USML) instruction. including and scientific Commercial the USML. included on are satellites itself EAR concerns with technology, equipment, software, use,”“dual i.e., as as well for commercial List Control and information on the Commerce co and EAR as violations carry criminal penalties. under ITAR personal responsibilities F at a U.S. research is basic and applied scientific fundamental research university, the results of will which without published and disseminated be restriction, whether restrictions the come or corporate sponsors. government from “sensitive” The designation in contract language, if it implies some restriction on publications, or EAR ITAR to results might research subject the requirements.licensing effect of the not analyzed have We restrictions corporate in industry- application. on ITAR research sponsored However, if limitations on the a contract has any dissemination of or EAR lists, on the ITAR and the technology is listed results research then under EAR. be required and may ITAR under is required licensing Ev ex of services,” “defense a kind of assistance, defined as providing regulation catch-all including tr includes the design,This provision development, engineering, manufacture, testing, operation, demilitarization, destruction, or use of processing defense articles. data”“technical Any relating to 3.4 ACT: USA PATRIOT SELECT AGENTS 14 Responsibilities and Restrictions on the Handling of Scientific Information . INDUSTRY-SPONSORED RESEARCH 3.5 . OTHER RESTRICTIONS 3.6 ing with this legislation will be very similarto bevery thoseforclassifiedresearch. will thislegislation ing with “r hs il,i nce,would also enacted, if These bills, w If We tions onopennessandaccess to research results. toas aforum discussconcerns membersandstudentshave thatfaculty aboutunwritten restric- We suggestthatthisnewcommittee serve MITpoliciesto specificsituations. application of developing issuesandchallenges inthe committeea standingfaculty of to monitor avariety we have fortheestablishmentof called ourrecommendations, of As part sponsors. industry In ex which excludes research results from as eliminatingthefundamentalresearch exemption, such andcanhave unforeseen consequences, opennessand access, undercut MIT’s of principles such agreements can understandthepressures to make onfaculty such handshake agreements, we Although thefaculty. research to findings studentsormembersof on theaccessibility of orrestrictions by asviewed thesponsor, research graduate individual assistants, of the suitability ev to to areimplicit agreements secure usuallyseen asnecessary funding andare often designed Such therequirements andbypass thatappearintheresearch contract. opennessandaccess, of MIT’s thatviolate principles government both andindustry, research with agreements sponsors, We r andthe acceptable information proprietary of MITpoliciesgovern thehandling information. proprietary protect theinadvertent disclosure of re research MIT doesnotaccept from corporate sponsorsonthefree restrictions disseminationof on outsideprofessional activities. thataccompaniesshould beincludedinthematerial faculty theannual forindividual report Information aboutthisissue research discourages such implicit agreements. on theconduct of sac eut.Teeaedsusdi eto fourreport. Theseare discussedinSection9of esearch results. ith the effect that laboratories handlingtheseselectagentswouldith theeffectthatlaboratories have to bephysically restricted. srce esn”fo aigacs oslc gns nsc vn,tepolm fcomply- theproblems of In such event, from having access to agents. select persons” estricted ut,wt h xeto fminordelays to protect thepotential forobtainingapatent orto theexception with of sults,
nulyb ntepbi oan hs rsue a lotk h omo suggestionsabout Thesepressures canalsotake of theform entually beinthepublicdomain.
port controlsport orotherrestrictions. il edn nCnrs r nce,teSceayo H&HScould promulgate regulations of theSecretary inCongress pending bills are enacted, r h rsn lmt,we canexpect such pressures to increase bothfrom government and the present climate,
src cest eerhrsls orto insure orearlyaccess special to research thatwould access toestrict research results, understand that occasionally members of the MIT faculty feelpressured theMITfaculty to make implicit understand thatoccasionally membersof also recommend thatin Po licies andProcedureslicies impose obligationsoninstitutio easfrpbiaino industry-sponsored delays forpublicationof , MIT shouldmake explicit thatthepolicy ns to identifyandprevent Statement of MIT Values and Principles 15 and methodology do not in fact constitute The well-being ofThe well-being our nation will be ultimately ptance or rejection.ptance scientific results Thus fit from the best students,fit from faculty and staff from mpetence in science and technology and has grown in science mpetence cce
fulfill its mission, environment. an open intellectual have MIT must Education and scholarship hnology and on the education of generations. future
eedom to publish is an inherent and necessary of publish is an inherent component eedom to of the progress science. Scientific sults require replication or falsification for their a replication sults require c ith others to bring this knowledge to bear on the great challenges facing our nation and the world the world facing our nation and challenges on the great bear to bringith others to this knowledge re Fr around the world.around This is especially important as co critical is States to the United outside and knowledge research to so that access the world throughout our own progress. of the course Over years, many immigrant visitors as foreign scientists as well and American educational and scientific enterprises. the enormously contributed to students have They and culture, enriched our knowledge have the growth of promoted our economy, essen- become have laboratories, and research American companies in tial contributors the quality of improved and have our lives. leaders with will become an understanding of their home countries to to return Many our nation and our values. should be government States national granted foreign a visa the United by No courses, to denied access on campus. or publications generally available research published without the details of experimental procedure science. restrictions of such suggested on the flow Although some have scientific information, it is damage science. severely a policy would clear that such are best served the unconstrained through sharingare of the opportunities creating information and by and open communication.for free the most to be exposed enables students to an environment Such work. other’s build upon each to scholars and allows knowledge current security, National the health of our nation, of and the strength of on the advancement depend heavily our economy and science te attract,Openness enables MIT to educate, and bene damaged if education, of and technology suffer as a result science practices that indiscriminately any of or limit the open exchange discourage ideas. evaluation of Peer and findings, methods research an ofoutcome open sharing within and debate the scientific community, insure is a crucial to mechanism of quality progress and the continued science. To in the 21st century. The fundamental mission ofThe fundamental values: upon four MIT rests transmission of unfettered knowledge activities, educational through of creation and other scholarly research through new knowledge activities, service the nation, to and service humanity. to the providing to is committed The Institute highest quality education, generating, to disseminating, and preserving knowledge, working and to w
Statement of MIT Values and Principles and Principles of MIT Values Statement 4
Classified Research at MIT 17 carefully developed before we move to a to move we before developed carefully ly excluded by the Provost, by ly excluded cases in in some aordinary research equipment and expertise the aordinary are research ies would be a short-term response to critical be a short-term to national ies would response MIT flows directly from our institutional commitment our from directly MIT flows believe it is appropriate to examine what would be the fundamental rationale con- for what would examine to it is appropriate believe
we
r, ve
we establish additional facilities in which classified research could be conducted to carry to be conducted out research could classified research establish additional facilities in which public service. assist the nation in applying to its expertise the most pressing to stands ready MIT the best technology, individual or patriotic desires, do not justify other means and can be satisfied by nsultation with the standing faculty committee that we recommend.nsultation with that we the standing faculty committee Laboratory Lincoln Since oup of mind. buildings to in Cambridge comes However, facilities MIT has education and research
sults, for example, enhancement, individual career funding, available of the progress science, access The impact of mission of and research on the educational on-campus classified research MIT is mission of the impact on MIT’s distinct from Laboratory at Lincoln conducted classified research in Lexington, elsewhere, or MIT faculty by or Laboratory staff. the future, In see the need MIT may to Ho discussion of that will will and research not be appropriate to the restrictions on openness and access of a definition can give we do not believe “campus.” We for our that will on-campus be valid for all time. speak of we When campus, education and research facilities in which will we physical mean the undergraduate place. and graduate students takes involving assume that all MIT facilities are We included in the definition of campus unless specifical co access, and has controlled performs classified research it is not included in the definition of on-campus. in other scientific areas, as the biological such and health sciences. at other sites. A definition of on-campus, therefore, be must The principal mission of faculty and students. involving MIT is education and research carry out To this mission MIT maintains a variety of facilities.speak of we When campus the contiguous MIT’s gr emergencies, undertaking as opposed to research. accepting restrictions on on-campus research.accepting public service also require to Our commitment may that, under extraordinary circumstances, and available will knowledge specialized the Institute make facilities. specialized to access provide activit Such to The rationale for conducting classified research at research classified The rationale for conducting has done so in the past,national issues—it it now, it is doing and it will in the future. do so believe We that public service otherwise classified or is the only rationale at for conducting restricted research MIT. dissemination of and to restrictions Other rationales on access possible for accepting research re to Classified Research at MIT Classified Research ducting classified research at a university such as MIT. such at a university ducting classified research serve The principal argument is that universities for carrying incubator as an effective out important in emerging work areas. The ability attract to extr to highly qualified personnel and gain access
principal reasons. Examining the history of Laboratory other organizations still Lincoln the many and been spun off that have in existence MIT, by and interviewing Laboratory Lincoln personnel, find we setting. in a university relationships setting up such the nation from value to is considerable that there 5 18 Classified Research at MIT 4 3 2 1 w Among thearguments on MIT’s outatouroff-campusfacilities. campusinadditionto thatcarried outclassifiedresearch Several argumentscould beadvanced carrying to support on theMITcampus. conducting classifiedresearch like isaseparate questionfrom Lincoln theimplicationsof Laboratory to are they notsubjected over inquality canoften Classifiedprograms timeif degrade ment programs. classifiedgovern- make foroversight of andreview capacity MIT’s available inanadvisory expertise isto public service of Onesuch form classifiedresearch oncampus. do notrequire theconduct of There are otherways continue thatMIThascontributed andwill that to contribute to publicservice Ho on-campus research activities? such work were of to beapart MITanditscontinuing to thepublicinterest serve ability if mission of w interests.Andindividual there isnoquestionthatallow co We ould be: udices h novmn ffclyadsuet nteeatvte.But whatisthecost to the andstudentsintheseactivities. faculty ould increase theinvolvement of
ntribution to such research and provide a service to the nation, as well as serve institutionaland aswell asserve to such researchntribution to thenation, andprovide aservice ri we
believe thatMIT’s inclassifiedresearch participation andoversight canmake activities avaluable gorous scrutiny by qualifiedoutsideprofessionals. ve to To in government-sponsored programs. that currently are provided by MITonlythrough Lincoln personnelconducting research To To To emergency. b a r,
U c sa fetv ehooytase ehns odseiaetefut fMITresearch mechanism asaneffective toact transfer disseminate of technology thefruits provide alternative nationalmatters technical onimportant andscientificjudgments pe enable more faculty memberstoenable more engagein faculty our belief in our responsibility to inourresponsibility conduct classifiedresearch inthepublicinterest atfacilities our belief nited States defense andnon-defensecontra and technology. v MIT may beableto contribute to substantially developing nationalpoliciesandstrategies andtechnical capabilitiestoMIT hassubstantialexpertise offerinseekingsolutions. rform a service to the nation on important national security matters where: nationalsecurity to thenationonimportant aservice rform ital to national security by drawing on information onthelatest by oninformation developments drawing inscienceital to nationalsecurity classified research inresponse to any national ing classifiedresearch outon-campus to becarried ct r,thereby improving theircapabilities. ors, The Implications of Performing Classified Research on Campus 19 ould put student careers in jeopardy. ould put student careers w members, staff, students, per- other uncleared and erely reducing the accessibility of the accessibility reducing erely involve- from personnel engaged in classified research equestered laboratories,equestered information systems, and offices, collegial interactions reducing ev naccessibility by foreign visitors, foreign by naccessibility faculty sonnel to classified research.sonnel to classes of separate inevitably two This would create individuals on campus. faculty,between students, and staff. ment with at large, the community including peer interactions, student involvement, departmental and laboratory reviews, considerations. and promotion ere faculty performing classified research.ere are This many cases a pre-publication review is required for papers reporting unclassified research, review is required cases a pre-publication many
en if classified research, students do not conduct of likelihood an increased exist would there
sult in: cS aS bI because a co-author was doing classified research.because a co-author or impede This can significantly delay publication. classifying student thesis research in mid-stream,classifying student thesis research or upon completion, if carried out in an area wh MIT would need to set up another management hierarchy for classified research, set up another management hierarchy need to MIT would in all which in place. currently the hierarchy differ from would likelihood Department need heads would the quality ofsecurity oversee to in order clearances of the work students and faculty. Ev In A partitioning of be required, categories would two into on-campus research would which re
the end, that the restrictions of believe we of flow the free results, research of as control as well
individual access, impact national security of hampering the progress by negatively would science in important of areas health, human growth, economic and in all of that science the other areas our nation. benefits to has brought the obligation of by moved are We service public the nation. to In 3 2 4 1 The classified research regime has well understood laws and regulations, laws understood regime has well The classified research that a require would which be set up on-campus. management system and research dual research MIT is presently engaged in classified research at Lincoln Laboratory to advance important Laboratory at Lincoln national advance to engaged in classified research MIT is presently interests, arrangements. classified programs on additional under appropriate take to ready and stands of Laboratory control Lincoln is an off-campus facility the required provides that and facilities access offor the conduct and development. classified research facilities be established on Should controlled our campus for similar purposes?
The Implications of Performing Classified Research on Campus Research on of Performing Classified The Implications 6 20 The Implications of Performing Classified Research on Campus such arrangements. MITshouldfacilitate agency. thesponsoring theassistance of with perhaps appropriate facilities, make oratother andLincoln otherconvenient Laboratory Laboratory atDraper arrangements whorequire MITfaculty such access can that we donotstore classifieddocumentsonourcampus. re re by partly We were persuaded, forresearch neededby activities. material thefaculty orpublicservice We M United (The States Commission onNational Century, Security/21st imagine” war we might r oursystems of inadequaciesof “The Rudman theHart Commission concluded, national security, current threats to In theirexamination of ways. insignificant to engageinpublicservice for faculty c Ho esearch andeducationposeagreater thanany threat to potential USnationalsecurity conventional uldwt h prto fspe of theoperation oupled with anwtotsc aiiy We forMITto believe beableto thatitisimportant state unequivocally such afacility. main without ce ap forNational Security we
also considered the question of whether MIT whether also considered thequestionof tgvrmn oiydcsosadpatcswt eadt euiy thattheMITcampusshould nt government regard policydecisionsandpractices with to security, ve r, we
believe thatthisisbestmetthrough anopenandshared research environment oncampus Wsigo,DC SN,2001]). USCNS, D.C: [Washington, ilfclte o lsiidrsac n h xaso fopportunities cial facilitiesforclassifiedresearch andtheexpansion of should provide a facility on-campusforclassified should provide afacility Road MIT’s Involvement in Classified Research: The Role of Lincoln Laboratory and Other Off-Campus Laboratories 21 the development ofthe development and/or systems
to
ch clude conducting a classified follow-on a classified follow-on clude conducting take summer or part in time employment take faculty members from active contact with contact active faculty members from occurrences raise several issues that we believe can be dealt with believe raise within issues that we several the current occurrences
anticipate that research programs designed to respond to national needs may occasionally national needs may to programs designed respond to that research anticipate
ch me from a wideme from variety of backgrounds. industry, from Some students come or government lated organizations.lated a transition graduate to student make personnel may Some Lincoln esearch activities that may for a time remove for a time remove activities that may esearch Laboratory and Other Off-Campus Laboratories and Other Off-Campus Laboratory Students at MIT carry ofout an essential component program. the research MIT students co the military with security current clearances. Depending upon their interests, background, and opportunities, Laboratory at Lincoln or other defense- in research involved become they may re status for a time, while some MIT students may organizations that perform classified research. We a classified component.involve Examples might in program to apply the results of apply the results program to fundamental resear hardware, material measure facilities to cleared equipment in use specialized or the need to characteristics.or component at the time the be anticipated needs can research such Often program is established; arise in mid-stream. others may Su students. is informed about activities that the Provost that insure to is the need The second with relationships other organizations. MIT in complex involve notification, such Without of that administrators will be unaware it is likely in that can affect MIT research relationships significant ways. at the initiation of be given notification should that such believe We a project, the faculty. by reports submitted not just in the annual MIT faculty enable carry organizations several that could to exist There out the classified portions of their research. of The most prominent Laboratory, Lincoln these is MIT’s but other classified facilities. to access also provide organizations could However, its status as an given MIT laboratory, is a primary Lincoln activities. focus for such framework offramework MIT policy. department keep heads notified about the The first is the need to r
7.2 RESEARCH IN CLASSIFIED STUDENT INVOLVEMENT 7.1 IN CLASSIFIED RESEARCH INVOLVEMENT FACULTY
MIT’s Involvement in Classified Research: The Role of Lincoln Research: The Involvement in Classified MIT’s 7 22 MIT’s Involvement in Classified Research: The Role of Lincoln Laboratory and Other Off-Campus Laboratories . THEROLEOFLINCOLNLABORATORY 7.3 We should beopento theMITcommunity. All thesisdefenses nor require orhave access to to thesisresearch. classifiedmaterial perform we believe thatno Moreover, classifiedtheses. permit We MIT’s affirm current policythatdoesnot includingthesisresearch. education, of program .,shouldbeespeciallysensitive to theneed 7.1, Fa deemed unsuitableforfuture thesisresearch. thentheresearch area shouldbe itbeingclassified, resultsa review inathesisorany of part re procedure a analogousto thedelay provided to sponsorsforasimilar corporate prompt review, thisbecomes more thana If theses. mayprograms besubjectto pre-publication of review Ho to service hasprovided extraordinary which thisyear iscelebrating itsfiftiethanniversary, Lincoln, during WWII andinthepost-waryears. ourdefenseefforts outof grew Lincoln Laboratory Co Lincoln’s role central isto conduct defense-related research anddevelopment activities. re DOD member’s aLincoln doesnotfund the faculty program work. by even if DOD review prior Co to respect policyshould bereassessed This with appropriate United States government authority. notbereleased for publicdisseminat unclassified, classifiedor Lincoln Laboratory’s itssponsorrequires with thatany contract information, r inLincoln MITfaculty With respect to increased involvement of both oncampusandatLincoln. bothclassifiedandunclassified, involved research inon-goingLincoln Laboratory programs, r In Lincoln’s responsibilities. one canarguetheresearch thesphere could of within beincorporated itwould bebeneficialforthecampus/Lincoln relationship if Lincoln Laboratory, of the part there were nodirect interest on even if But, make thedecisionto locate theresearch at Lincoln. itiseasyto mutual interest to thecampusandto Lincoln Laboratory, the research subjectisof vi Lincoln where classifiedresearch iscurrently theonlyMITfacility andcould isperformed pro- outbothclassified andunclassifiedresearch. carries Laboratory Lincoln inthisresearch. members andstudentscurrently participate Several MITfaculty communications andotherrelated technologies. extraction, information sensors, security: esearch at Lincoln Laboratory, there is also the opportunity for MIT faculty andstudentsto be forMITfaculty there isalsotheopportunity esearch atLincoln Laboratory, esearch there programs exist several issues. etefclte eddb I aut opromtecasfe lmnso hi eerh When theirresearch. tode thefacilitiesneededby theclassifiedelementsof perform MITfaculty vi vi
ut arigotprin fterrsac ntecasfe oan asdiscussedinsection theirresearch intheclassifieddomain, of outportions carrying culty its applicationto membersandLincoln on-campus collaboration between staff. MITfaculty to several technical national fieldsimportant thedevelopment of the nationinfurthering diint h osblt htMTfclycudcryottecasfe oto ftheir of outtheclassifiedportion could carry that MITfaculty addition to thepossibility sqety udmna ee fLincoln’s to doclassifiedwork. istheability operation afundamentaltenet of nsequently, llaboration with Lincoln personnelcould with llaboration also we
are concerned unclassifie thatstudentsperforming w hnteae frsac hudb osdrdoflmt o tdns iial,i such if Similarly, limitsforstudents. research shouldbeconsidered off thenthearea of ew, wpirt ulcto fon-campusresearch isinconsistent ourrecommendations. with to publicationof ew prior ve r, these professional are activities distinctfrom theirinvolvement asstudentsinMIT’s
to
rsreteoens fthesisresearch. preserve theopennessof subject a faculty member’ssubject afaculty publicationsto ion unlessapproved forpublicrelease by student should require a security clearance student shouldrequire asecurity d research inareas related to classified MIT’s Involvement in Classified Research: The Role of Lincoln Laboratory and Other Off-Campus Laboratories 23 ific advisory committees would be a ific advisory would committees ed areas are maintained for classified projects are ed areas y since its divestiture,y since Draper Laboratory has y and MIT-appointed Draper and personnel) y and MIT-appointed rsities for research with MIT. about 85% going to rsities for research cuments required for their research or public for their research cuments required supports (MIT some fifty sixty to Draper Fellows increased involvements that would carry restrictions that would with the MIT them to research involvements increased r, ve urge the faculty committee that is charged with is charged that identifying the facultyurge opportunities committee improvement for have discussed,have and will similar issues of be examining restrictions on scientific research.
we
imagine a future Lincoln Laboratory-like entity classified biologically Lincoln imagine conducting a future related operative programs in the biological sciences.operative will the issues by also be affected Whitehead anagement and oversight ofanagement and oversight Laboratory of Lincoln major components are public service the aduate students co-supervisedaduate MIT Facult by
ould be explored with the sponsor to create a fundamental research fund that would provide provide fund that would a fundamental research with create ould be explored sponsor to the wards about two million dollars a year to unive to million dollars a year about two wards aised during WWII and the Cold War. We believe,War. WWII and the Cold aised during We however, have that the framework we esearch in the Boston area. in the Boston esearch an enterprise in such not clear, is MIT might play what role Just MIT’s statement of statement MIT’s be of them could from values and principles and the policies that flow other institutions wrestling with as to as well these issues. Whitehead value to a The national security implications of growing. the biological are sciences hard is not too It to r that were raise expect the same questions about campus-based research it to would but we r this development. is equally applicable to suggested institutions with separate and MIT are strong Research for Biomedical Institute Whitehead The co we of interaction with these issues. MIT faculty address to Lincoln’s of Use faculty MIT in both and scient summer studies and non-classified classified mechanism to introduce faculty of challenges the to introduce to mechanism program. research Lincoln’s Possibilities c MIT faculty staff between and Lincoln on-campus research for collaborative a mechanism that contract. master did not carry in Lincoln’s inherent restrictions that are the pre-publication Ho Despite its independence as a separate laborator its independence Despite withmaintained a close relationship MIT. near the MIT campus. Draper is located The facility maintains a dual classification structure. secur Small and materials, but most of unclassified. facilities are and physical research the faculty Several classified do access Drapermembers utilize to service activities. The Laboratory generally gr We with our recommendations. inconsistent campus are M that MIT carries for the nation. out role, its oversight In manage- its active MIT should continue ment of Laboratory that: Lincoln insure to for independence meets MIT standards the research and quality, and in so far as possible, that enables faculty to an environment provides Lincoln national service. towards directed do research 7.4 INSTITUTIONS WITH OTHER RELATIONSHIP
On Campus Research Involving Select Agents 25 lect biological agents. present, At very few new contracts for research carriednew contracts out under research for is likely that in the current climate, that in the current is likely of the number agents
discussed in section 3.4,discussed in section persons and prohibits restricted defines Act USA Patriot enacted the recently
nsider applying a sunset clause to the acceptance of nsider applying the acceptance clause to a sunset such restrictions,such in our policies and practices should reexamine and the standing faculty committee in the near future. these regulations by affected areas on the list will grow and the restrictions placed on personnel, and the restrictionson the list will placed grow access, physical and publication of research as well. grow findings may some point, At in rightfully MIT may decide that on-campus research or in line with its principles. is no longer in its interest these regulations by governed areas should We co their possessing, shipping, transporting or of a number se As withand safety the health no concern aspects ofAlthough have we these regulations, the requirements personnel,involving students, faculty, and staff principles. with MIT’s consistent not are are we While fulfilling our obligations under this act,currently in research our involvement should also reassess we restrictions on personnel. such that requires It laboratories at MIT are affected by these regulations. by affected laboratories are at MIT However, the Secretary of H&HS has been given the list of expand to special powers list if this to add agents to select agents and is likely pending bills enacted. are On Campus Research Involving Select Agents Research Involving Select On Campus 8
Industry-Sponsored Research: Challenges, Principles, and Concerns 27 is whether or not the restrictions seriously than one year before the patent application has application the patent before than one year
thesis presentation might have to be closed to to mightthesis presentation have esearch on campus,esearch and specifically, do our how re r ting the openness of industry-sponsored research y often clash with clash y often institutional values, although in
Challenges, Principles, and Concerns Challenges,
ually all forms of prior filing. public disclosure to Thus, and present to although free students are r the most part we are not concerned with here. these issues not concerned r the most part are we ncerned about the continuing pressures affec pressures about the continuing ncerned dustry-sponsored research arrangements often contain some restrictions on the free flow of flow some restrictions arrangements on the free dustry-sponsored contain often research informa- sults and their publication. the undercut that restrictions on openness may also concerned are We rt ith the values of the academic community? ourse journal publication. some cases, In a student’s There are many interests involved in carrying out industry-sponsored involved research. interests many are There The commercially of motivations driven an industry sponsor ma re regime. in the export control exemption fundamental research cases,many aligned because of the values are of incentive the mutual opportunity, financial and significant advance. scientific and technological the arms-length governing MIT has policies in place ofnature and responsibility of that the loyalty insure to the contractual requirements the faculty MIT and its educational mission.is to of Review faculty and restrictions off-campus relationships on the hiring of faculty that both insure have and students companies students in faculty-related ofno conflict its results. and disseminate research conduct their responsibility to regarding interest Fo is the openness ofOur concern industry-sponsored been filed. in most of requirements Patenting of the rest stringent more and preclude are the world vi groups, in their research results discuss their potentially-patentable if is desired, coverage patent foreign outside ofno public presentation prior the filing of to be allowed MIT would a patent. These limitations at scientific meetings,include presentations public seminars at MIT and other universities, and of c MIT has had a long and fruitful involvement in industry-sponsored research, and fruitfulMIT has had a long involvement actually which pre-dates research. in government-sponsored its involvement industry from Funding benefits our faculty and and education. supportingstudents by research the same time, At these activities a service provide to of insuringthe nation by the flow sector. important the private into technologies Nonetheless, are we co The primary of area is patents. conflict potential that no pub- requires States in the United law Patent oflished disclosure material be made mo patentable interfere with the environment of with the environment interfere openness at MIT. Industry-Sponsored Research: Industry-Sponsored tion scientific research. from These form the restrictions of generally take short-term limitations on the time of and/or the content. release is no question that these restrictions There affect the research at MIT. and the educational process environment The issue policies for dealing with this research, and as practiced, contracts upon in research as agreed comply w In 9 28 Industry-Sponsored Research: Challenges, Principles, and Concerns information acceptedinformation investigator by aprincipal to r In order to maintainanopen or confidential thatisreceived information from aresearch sponsor. A the work forpossiblepatents are limited days. to to ninety nolongerthansixty pub In mostcases, student. agraduate development of Theseprohibitions have might effectontheearlycareer asignificant effect ontheeducationalprocess. resulting inanundesirable faculty, theMITcommunity andeven to department thefull members of r educationand Theguidelinesestablishedto ensure thatMIT’s core missionof government sponsor). orconfidential research inproprietary notengage forany companyand thatMITwill industrial (or and thosecompanies have inwhich faculty financialinterests significant consult; orforwhich they re notbeing itsstudentsinjeopardy of notputthethesisresearch thatitwill of other institutions; research at andstudentstheirpeers ideasamongitsfaculty maintainfree exchangeMIT will of that governing The are: principles MIT hasguidelinesforgoverning company-sponsored research. co Un 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 sac niomn,MTsareet ihidsr titylmtteaon fconfidential limittheamountof strictly MIT’s industry with agreements esearch environment, esearch are notcompromised research by industrial performing are as follows. summarized nother area inwhich there issomeeffectontheMITresearch environment proprietary hasto dowith esdfrpbiain htteesol en ofito interest existing between MITresearchers thatthere shouldbenoconflict of leased forpublication; pn-ofdnilifrain inorder tointheresearch participate program. mpany-confidential information, der nocircumstances MITengageinaresearch will thatrequires program astudentto handle the postdoctoral fellow orstudentisworking. work isrelated to theresearch areas inwhich thearea of memberhasafinancial interestfaculty if Fa interest must beevaluated. to acceptingbe disclosedprior the research andtheconflict contract of If day delay An additional thirty may by begranted MIT. daysninety forpatent filing. r Co Co m Theapplicationprocess days canrequest which timethey MITto during filepatent applications. co thecompany’s or foraninadvertent release of appropriate formaterial forpatent filing, theses, Co Co aftergenerally theinvention ismade. royalty-bearing license onterms andconditions to benegotiated, option to acquire anexclusive, r Co Co sac hysosrsbett emnmsana amn.Companies are an alsogranted esearch sponsor—subjectto they ademinimus annual payment. srcin nispbihddseiainbyn h eoitdpro fnolongerthan onits published disseminationbeyond of thenegotiated period estrictions s ecmltdbfr ulctos nldn hss are made available to thepublic. includingtheses, ust becompleted before publications, I aut n tdnscnutfracmayta ssosrn hi eerh thisfactmust andstudentsconsultMIT faculty for acompany theirresearch, thatissponsoring fdnilifrain fdtrie ob aetbe thecompany more to sixty hasthirty determined to bepatentable, If nfidential information. culty mayculty nothire theirstudentsorpostdoctoral fellows to work for companies inwhich the pn pnoshv eido rmtit osxydy oeaiepbiain,including days to sixty to from examine publications, thirty mpany sponsorshave of aperiod pne antatrtersl ftheMITresearch andcannotapplyadditionalrelease mpanies cannotalter theresult of days ninety to complete processes. thesereview mpany sponsorsare given atotal of mpany sponsorscannotclaimreach-back rights the tompany acquire sponsorsare aright aroyalty granted free non-exclusive license of published research results. approval over thecontent of of mpanies cannotrequire aright
what is necessary to conductwhat isnecessary theresearch program. lication delays to allow thesponsorto examine to
pre-existing MITintellectual property. Industry-Sponsored Research: Challenges, Principles, and Concerns 29 e the assignment of property intellectual title to enda items for the standing faculty committee we for the standing facultyenda items committee mpany sponsors are restricted from using promised MIT involvement and possible research and MIT involvement using promised restricted from sponsors are mpany esearch facilities on campus supported with company funds should not carry funds should supported facilities on campus withesearch restrictions company developed by MIT faculty, by developed students, or staff sponsor. the to Co purpose the explicit for ofachievements raising operating funds. R faculty, by access significant or establish preferential other investigators by on access students, staff, sponsors. the company or visitors funded or sent in by MIT will not accept research projects where students must have access to company-confidential to access have must students where projects research willMIT accept not participate. to information in order MIT will signto students individual not permit require or agreements as partnon-disclosure of program. a research programs that requir research not accept MIT does therefore recommend that one of recommend therefore the first ag
9 8 have recommended should be a review of recommended have as their application in as well MIT policies in this area practice. restrictions on openness apparent any should monitor that this committee believe also We implicit arrangements arising its attention from to principles that come that violate MIT’s and access made with sponsors. 10 11 all of address has not been able to Our committee industry-sponsored raised the issues by research. We
Findings and Recommendations 31 ently, Committee the Faculty Policy rr Because there is no consistent under- is no consistent Because there Cu ed to have a security a perform to clearance have ed to beyond that required by existing legislation. existing by that required beyond MIT remains committed to a strong role of role a strong to committed MIT remains e the nation’s national security needs within the e the nation’s e “sensitive”e information, MIT should continue
AND DISCLOSURE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION: AND DISCLOSURE
ll as any exceptions granted to MIT policy for restrictions on access to and disclosure of and disclosure to granted MIT policy for restrictions on access to exceptions ll as any research nduct of than attention research. intensive more requires situation that the current believe We sults, for both industry- research. or government-sponsored that this committee also believe We ourse, on-campus seminar, other similar forum. or on-campus MIT should not designate any standing or definition of constitut what would its policy of generated results that research contractual request sponsor’s any not agreeing to ofduring the course of disclosure a program be reviewed for the inadvertent “sensitive” infor- mation. this, Beyond documents on its campus that are or hold any not accept MIT should “sensitive” nationals,” foreign designated “no any to access students from or nor restrict any c for access facilities as requiring special conditions public service and, as appropriate, of the scope expanding to that service. an expansion Such facultycan include facilitating serv members to framework laid out in our report. However, of the implications examining after conducting on campus,classified research with environment an open research that retaining conclude we of flow free for MIT to and information on the MIT campus is the best way results research fulfill public service its responsibility. Therefore, should be carriedcampus, out on that no classified research recommend we that no student, graduate or undergraduate, should be requir thesis research, to should be carried requiring access out in areas and that no thesis research classified materials. SENSITIVE AND OTHER RESTRICTIVE DESIGNATIONS: AND OTHER SENSITIVE STANDING FACULTY COMMITTEE TO MONITOR DEVELOPING RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS RESTRICTIONS ON DEVELOPING MONITOR COMMITTEE TO FACULTY STANDING TO CLASSIFIED RESEARCH ON THE MIT CAMPUS: CLASSIFIED RESEARCH should monitor any issue of any should monitor implicit arrange- arising its attention from to openness that comes contractual principles language. and go beyond ments made with sponsors that violate MIT’s has responsibility to consult with the Provost regarding exceptions to MIT policy regarding the MIT policy regarding to exceptions regarding with the Provost consult has responsibility to co can provide.that committee Therefore, that a new standing faculty committee recommend we these issues, to response legislation Federal and MIT’s the evolving monitor be established to as we re 0
1 Findings and Recommendations Findings and 2
3 1 32 Findings and Recommendations 5 7 4 6 to Since mostfundamentalresearch enjoys anexemption from theneed andartifacts. information mu fundamentalresearch andpublicdomain extends to as should insure of thatthedesignation MIT isthebestmeansto insure itsaspects thatresearch results canbefreely communicated. of should insure that faculty membersunderstandtheiroblig should insure thatfaculty MIT of Theadministration theireffectsuponMITanditsresearch program. careful analysisof Such shouldbeaccepted restrictions onlyafter mental research and publicdomainexemptions. research results eliminate aproject’s funda- of ontheopensharing or contractual restrictions SELECT AGENTS: LINCOLN LABORATORY: FA EXPORT CONTROLS: gr research may findings andpublicationof physical access, placedthe restrictions onpersonnel, grow agentsonthelistwill and thenumber of It islikely thatinthecurrent climate, principles. st The requirements involving personnel, pendingbillsare enacted. is likely to addagentsto thislistif H Health and of theSecretary However, atMITarefew laboratories affected by theseregulations. anumber shippingortransporting their possessing, our policies and practices inareasour policiesandpractices affected by theseregulations. reexamine committee andthestandingfaculty shouldinthenearfuture, under such restrictions, co We should byerned theseregulations isnolongerinitsinterest itsprinciples. orinlinewith I’ icl aoaoy butseveral otherorganizations could alsoprovide such access. MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory, theseis mostprominent The of theirresearch. of outtheclassifiedportions to carry faculty There exist thatcanprovide several organizations access to classifiedfacilitiesto enableMIT notjustintheannual from report faculty. aproject, the initiationof We believe thatsuch notificationshouldbegiven at affectMITresearch. that cansignificantly W thatinvolve aboutactivities informed MITincomplex otherorganizations. relationships with re ke membersneedto faculty First, MITpolicy. thecurrent framework of can behandledwithin on-campusresearch membersinoff-campusclassifiedresearch faculty asanextension of of environment implications. to do research thatenables faculty national security with Lincoln provides an andinsofaraspossible, MIT standards for independence and quality, theresearch meets to insure Lincoln that: Laboratory should continue itsactive managementof co mnSrie HH)hsbe ie pca oest xadtels fselectagentsand (H&HS)hasbeengiven specialpowersuman Services to expand thelistof oetefclymme rmatv otc ihsuet.Scn,theProvost must be Second, move memberfrom thefaculty active contact students. with
ow pdprmn ed oiidaotteetn faresearch thatmay for a time activity headsnotifiedabouttheextent of ep department totsc oiiain ti ieyta diitaoswl euaaeo therelationships beunaware itislikely will thatadministrators of ithout such notification, nsider applying a sunset clause to the acceptance of new contracts forresearch out newcontracts carried asunsetclauseto theacceptancensider applying of pnnso h ulcsrieta I are u o h ain nisoesgtrl,MIT In itsoversight role, outforthenation. thatMITcarries thepublicservice mponents of ekepr iesspirt ismntn nomto ries opencommunication inall to licenses oritems, disseminatinginformation prior seek export CULTY PARTICIPATION INCLASSIFIEDRESEARCH: ch
as well. At some point, MIT may rightfully decidethaton-campusresearch MITmay rightfully inareas gov- At somepoint, as well. fisogigrsac ciiya osbe ossetwt h ainlitrs.Any formal consistent thenationalinterest. with itsongoingresearch aspossible, activity of The recently enacted USAPatriot Act definesrestricted personsandprohibits I n t aut r fetdb asgvrigepr fscientific are affectedMIT anditsfaculty by laws governing of export The management and oversight of Lincoln Laboratory are major Lincoln Laboratory The managementandoversight of dns aut,adsafare notconsistent MIT’s with andstaff faculty, udents, fslc ilgclaet.A rsn,very At present, agents. biological select of ations under these export controlations undertheseexport laws. Is sues arising fromsues arising theparticipation Findings and Recommendations 33 xplicit statements e MIT faculty play importantMIT faculty play licies and Procedures laboratories as Draper such Laboratory,
Po ch MIT and its faculty have ongoing relations with relations ongoing and its facultyMIT have esponse with sunset clause. a time-definite An r as an off-site facility for research and administrative facilityas an off-site for research
Our committee has not been able to address all of address has not been able to Our committee the There may be times when rapid near-term access to specialized to access be times when rapid near-term may There MIT should incorporate in MIT should incorporate mmend that MIT hold security them, for faculty clearances who require off- and provide do not recommend that MIT provide facilities for storage and access of and access facilities for storage that MIT provide do not recommend classified materials
CULTY ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED RESEARCH AND MATERIALS: CLASSIFIED RESEARCH TO ACCESS CULTY mmittee we have suggested review suggested MIT policies in this area, have we mmittee application as their specific as well quired, the facilities of utilizing or Draper Lincoln Laboratories. co port that faculty make, activities and their on-campus detailing their outside professional pe of access.for restricted special procedures should that MIT require believe may assistance We ith the standing faculty committee we have recommended. have we ith the standing faculty committee ir Force Research Laboratory, Research ir Force Center Laboratory,Army Natick Warfare Undersea and the Naval esearch relationships. esearch on the MIT campus. material, for faculty use such should be provided to off-campus site An as re campus facilities to allow access to classified materials needed to engage in research or public service. engage in research classified materials needed to to access allow campus facilities to We MIT on-campus facilities and expertiseMIT on-campus facilities the nation. by will be required Examples of this would of analysis be the need for forensic biological materials, materials preparation, and the use of expertiseother facilities and for significant national purpose other than research. this Providing ty expertise for a short-time such available make the permission of require emergencies would such to MIT response in consultation the Provost w a number ofa number defense-supported independent resear FA RESEARCH CONDUCT: RESEARCH INDUSTRY-SPONSORED RESEARCH: INDUSTRY-SPONSORED EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS: EXTRAORDINARY RELATIONS WITH OTHER LABORATORIES: WITH OTHER RELATIONS about acceptable research behavior and clear standards for the conduct of for the conduct and clear standards behavior research about acceptable that insure to research policies on openness sponsors that violate MIT’s with research not reached implicit agreements are and access. the annual material the that accompanies into guidelines should be incorporated Such re r support these activities we classified materials.To to requiringpublic service access in areas roles re issues raised by industry-sponsored research.We therefore recommend that the standing faculty recommend therefore industry-sponsoredissues raised by research.We co in practice, as one of items. its first agenda affecting pressures about growing concerned are We the openness of in industry- involvement and their publication that arise results from research research.sponsored the undercut that restrictions on openness may also concerned are We regime. in the export control exemption fundamental research support classified material. to for faculty requiring access A in Newport, R.I.. that our activities offer opportunities These facilities strengthen in research to national security. to applications have particular, In with its relationship strengthen MIT should Draper to Draper access Laboratory and have 12 8 10 11 9
Appendex A Acknowledgements 35 udbury S ersey H ne B. Skolnikoff nest J. Moniz incent Vitto hillip A. Sharp amie Lewis Keith ulie T. Norris Karen J J. David Litster Er J P Euge Roger W. V aley D id L. Briggs ter Blakenship hn M. Deutch hn C. Crowley anielle Guichard-Ashbrook aniel E. Hastings lice P. Gast nthony F.nthony Favaloro Jo A A D D Pe Dav Claude R. Canizares F.Edward Crawley Jo Shawn
ix d
n
e p
OUR THANKS TO OUR THANKS TO The preparation ofThe preparation individualsto the time who took the numerous deal to a great this report owes meet with inform and the Committee, review to and drafts of the report. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
p
A a
Appendix B
pend p ix Current and Past MIT Policies Governing Openness of Research aB
Current and Past MIT Policies Governing Openness of Research
The current MIT policies governing the openness of research are contained in Policies and Procedures 14.2 (included below). These policies have evolved since they were first addressed in the 1945 edition of Policies and Procedures.A brief history of the development of these policies is contained in this Appendix.
CURRENT POLICY
14.2 Open Research and Free Interchange of Information MIT Policies and Procedures, 9/97
The encouragement of research and inquiry into intellectual areas of great promise is one of the most basic obligations MIT has to its faculty, to its students, and to society at large. The profound merits of a policy of open research and free interchange of information among scholars is essential to MIT’s institutional responsibility and to the interests of the nation as a whole. Openness requires that as a general policy MIT not undertake, on the campus, classified research or research whose results may not be published without prior permission—for example, without permission of governmental or industrial research sponsors. Openness also requires that, once they are at MIT, foreign faculty, students, and scholars not be singled out for restriction in their access to MIT’s educational and research activities.
The vast majority of on-campus research projects can be conducted in a manner fully consistent with the principles of freedom of inquiry and open exchange of knowledge. MIT, however, is an institution that plays a unique role in important areas of science and technology that are of great concern to the nation. It recognizes that in a very few cases the pursuit of knowledge may involve critically important but sensitive areas of technology where the immediate distribution of research results would not be in the best interests of society. In such cases, exceptions to these policies regarding publication, classification, and access by foreign students and scholars may be made, but only in those very rare instances where the area of work is crucially important to MIT’s educational mission and the exception is demonstrably necessary for the national good. If these conditions are not met, MIT will decline or discontinue the activity and, if appropriate, propose it for consideration off-campus or elsewhere. Since the implementation of classified or otherwise restricted research on campus would drastically change the academic environment of the Institute, it is essential that each project be reviewed and acted upon in light of its impact on the Institute as a whole.
37 It is the policy of the Institute, therefore, that every research project within the academic structure of MIT (excluding Lincoln Laboratory) that requires a classification on the research process, classification as to the source of funds, classification of the research results, or imposition of other restrictions on publication or access must receive the prior approval of the Provost, who
Appendix B shall seek the advice of the Faculty Policy Committee and will inform the committee of all approvals. When unrestricted research at MIT is important to the national security, appropriate efforts will be made to ensure that relevant government agencies are informed of the results at the same time, as are others in the scholarly community.
Theses, whether undertaken by graduate or undergraduate students, are an integral part of the research program of the Institute and fall within the statement of policy concerning classified or otherwise restricted research on campus as stated above. No thesis requiring that a student have a clearance or requiring a security review upon its completion may be embarked upon without the prior approval of the Provost. When graduate theses are involved, the Provost shall seek the advice of the Committee on Graduate School Policy in cases that involve modification of existing policy and will inform the committee of all approvals.
POLICIES: 1940’S – 1960’S
MIT’s Policies and Procedures was issued for the first time in 1938, and while that first manual affirms the Institute’s responsibility to serve the government and society as a whole, there is no statement about classified research. (Policies and Procedures has not been published each year, but reissued as needed. Relevant policies from all of the known editions are included below.)
During World War II policies on classified research evolved and were published in the 1945 edition of Policies and Procedures:
MIT has always felt a special responsibility to render public service, especially to any branch
Current and Past MIT Policies Governing Openness of Research of local, state or federal government. This policy will continue.
Only under conditions of great emergency will projects be accepted which do not contribute to the advancement of educational objectives or of scientific knowledge or of engineering art.
Imposition of restrictions on publication results, either for secrecy or patent reasons, might be incompatible with the basic concept of an educational institution as a source and distributor of knowledge. Research contracts involving such restrictions, especially long-term or permanent restrictions, should be undertaken only for exceptional and important reasons. In no case should a situation be permitted which could inhibit free and effective work by MIT in any scholarly field.
The 1952 edition of Policies and Procedures reaffirms the Institute’s “special obligation to render service to the Commonwealth, to the cities of Cambridge and Boston, and to the several agencies of the Federal Government.” The policy on classified was restated:
Contracts calling for classified research should be accepted only in time of national emergency and continued only if there are compelling reasons for so doing. During a national emergency of long duration, restrictive contracts of this type will be accepted only if the work is of great
38 Appendix B importance to the national welfare or defense, if it cannot be done more effectively elsewhere, and only if it can be done without undue curtailment of the program of instruction and fundamental research, the carrying out of which is the Institute’s long range responsibility Current and Past MIT Policies Governing Openness of Research to the nation.
The 1961 edition records further changes:
Contracts calling for classified research are contrary to one of the basic objectives of any educational institution—namely the dissemination of knowledge. Nevertheless, for the past several years there has been a great need for classification of research results in some areas, and there are compelling reasons for the Institute to enter into contracts for work in these areas. This need is expected to continue for some time. Restrictive contracts of this type, however, should be accepted only if the work is of great importance to the national welfare and only if it can be done without undue curtailment of the program of instruction and fundamental unclassified research, the carrying out of which is the Institute’s long-range responsibility to the nation.
Finally, the 1966 version stated:
Restrictions on the publication of research results, for the reasons relating either to secrecy or to patents, are contrary to one of the basic objectives of an educational institution, namely the dissemination of knowledge. Accordingly, it is the policy of the Institute, apart from the programs of the Instrumentation and Lincoln Laboratories, to undertake research contracts with security provisions only in the most exceptional circumstances. In all such exceptional cases, moreover, it should be clearly demonstrated that the work is of fundamental importance and that access to restricted information is essential to progress in the field. Exceptions will be approved only after careful consideration and review of all of the pertinent facts, and only if the work is otherwise compatible with the Institute’s general program of unclassified research and teaching.
POLICY CHANGES – 1970 TO THE PRESENT
The Final Report of the Review Panel on Special Laboratories did not address where classified research should be allowed, but did recommend a reduction in classified research and clearance barriers.
The Panel recognizes that classified work may have to be continued at the laboratories, but recommends reducing the present amount of classified research to a minimum, both by selection of projects and by pressing for declassification wherever possible. In particular, classification of project descriptions must be severely limited or removed entirely, since this practice prevents the MIT community as a whole from knowing even the nature of some MIT activities.
Changes are also required in the physical arrangements to make it easy for uncleared students and faculty to participate in the unclassified parts of the laboratories’ program. These steps are essential to achieve the desired increase in campus interaction and must be pursued, even at the cost of administrative inconvenience.
39 These recommendations were reflected in the statement on classified research included in Section 4.11b of the next edition of Policies and Procedures, published in 1975.
MIT affirms that the encouragement of research and inquiry into intellectual areas of great promise is one of the most basic obligations to its faculty, to its students, and to society at large. Appendix B It affirms the profound merits of a policy of open research and free interchange of information among scholars as essential to that responsibility.
In the vast majority of research projects, the encouragement of inquiry wherever the research might lead is not in conflict with the principle of freedom of inquiry and open exchange of knowledge. However, MIT is an institution that plays a unique role in important areas of science and technology that are of great concern to the nation. It recognizes that in a very few cases the pursuit of knowledge may require access to data or literature of a classified nature, or yield results whose immediate distribution would not be in the best interests of society. It affirms, therefore, that such activities are undertaken only when, after weighing the advantages and disadvantages for the academic program and for the nation, they are judged to be highly constructive. Since the implementation of classified research has some aspects that are detrimental to the academic environment of the Institute, it is essential that each project be reviewed and acted upon in the light of its impact on the Institute as a whole.
It is the policy of the Institute, therefore, that every research project within the academic structure of MIT (excluding Lincoln Laboratory) which requires a classification on the research process or on the publication of results receive the prior approval of the Provost, who shall seek the advice of the Committee on Educational Policy in cases that involve modification of the existing policy and will inform the Committee of all approvals.
Theses, whether undertaken by graduate or undergraduate students, are an integral part of the research program of the Institute and fall within the statement of policy concerning classified or otherwise restricted research on campus as stated above. No thesis may be embarked upon
Current and Past MIT Policies Governing Openness of Research which requires security clearance or for which there is a requirement for security review upon its completion without the prior approval of the Provost, who shall seek the advice of the Committee on Graduate School Policy in cases that involve modification of existing policy and will inform the committee of all approvals.
The 1975 version of this policy remains fundamentally in place today. The Faculty Policy Committee is now designated as the group the Provost must consult about exceptions, and this policy is now section 14.2 of Policies and Procedures,entitled, “Open Research and Free Interchange of Information.”
A few substantive changes have been made. From 1985 on, Policies and Procedures reflected the distinction between on-campus and off-campus research, and in 1990 an additional statement was added about the value of openness:
Openness requires that as a general policy MIT not undertake, on the campus, classified research or research whose results may not be published without prior permission—for example, without permission of governmental or industrial research sponsors. Openness also requires that, once they are at MIT, foreign faculty, students, and scholars not be singled out for restriction in their access to MIT’s educational and research activities.
40 Appendix B In 1990 the following statement was also added about exceptions, and when MIT will decline such work:
…exceptions to these policies regarding publication, classification, and access by foreign students Current and Past MIT Policies Governing Openness of Research and scholars may be made, but only in those very rare instances where the area of work is crucially important to MIT’s educational mission and the exception is demonstrably necessary for the national good. If these conditions are not met, MIT will decline or discontinue the activity and, if appropriate, propose it for consideration off-campus or elsewhere. Since the implementation of classified or otherwise restricted research on campus would drastically change the academic environment of the Institute, it is essential that each project be reviewed.
41 of the Bio-safety atriot Act (Oct.,atriot 2001) amending SELECT AGENTS Act (http//:web.mit.edu/ USA Patriot enviroment/programs/patriot.html) prohibits “restricted persons” (defined in Section 817(2)) from shipping, or transfer- transporting ring, possessing and/or receiving “select agents” (listed and not exempted in 42 CFR 72, whether Act registra- or not subject to 1996 tion).Act (Section 817(1)) also The prohibits anyone from possessing “delivery sys- biological agents or tems” in quantities or types not “bona fide reasonably justified by research or peaceful purposes”.The Anti-terrorism and Effective 1996 Death Act Penalty (“1996 Act”) requires institutions (facilities) to register with the CDC prior to listed non- receiving or transferring exempt select agents (42 CFR 72). Section 817 (1) and (2) of the P code, criminal the federal Chapter 10, 18 of the U.S. Title Code. The Anti-terrorism and Effective 1996 Death Act Penalty (“1996 Act”) and its regulations, 42 CFR 72. Covered agents cannot be received from one facility to or transferred another (within or outside MIT) without approval deputy director. program 13.2.5 IT generated or MIT-generated research, or MIT-generated Policies and Procedures Third party owned Third Defined in the document gov- Invention disclosures or infor- F an expectation that invention disclosures and patent applica- tions will be confidential until a patent application is filed. protect Confidentiality practices patentability and not trade secrets. Acquisition and Use of Third-Party Acquisition and Use of Products and Services: BM A to the Institute. erning its transfer Must be (i) proprietary to the owner; identified as proprietary (ii) when transferred; and (iii) not released to the public; not already known to MIT; not received by MIT from others without obligations, not independently developed; and per- not released with the owner’s mission. B mation that may be patentable. research results MIT does not keep confidential. A PROPRIETARY A OFAC Embargo Regulations, OFAC 0; 13 0- are, and information (training, he Export Administration Export Administration he Export EXPORT / EMBARGO CONTROLLED Export control laws (EAR and ITAR) control disclosure in any medium of items (hardware, equipment), soft- w meetings), imposing conditions (including licensing) on providing items, to or information software foreign nationals in the U.S. or abroad, or U.S. citizens abroad. impose pro- Embargoes separately hibitions and restrictions on trans- actions with, exports of items and to,software to embar- and travel goed countries. T Regulations (EAR) Administration administered by the Department of Commerce, 15 CFR 730-774; in Arms International Traffic administered Regulations (ITAR) by the Department of State, 22 CFR 12 administered by the Treasury administered by the Department, 31 CFR 500-598. here is no formal definition. Sensitive but unclassified research results cannot be released without officer. of a contracting approval Sensitive is as defined by the officer. contracting SENSITIVE T he National Industrial Security T Manual (NIS- Operating Program POM) pursuant to Executive Order 12829 is the governing document National security information at Secret,Top the levels of Secret and Confidential. CLASSIFIED Reference Guide to the Management of Restrticted Scientific Information Scientific Restrticted of the Management Guide to Reference
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C a Governing Rules and Responsibilities Definition 42 he regulatory registration require- he regulatory registration SELECT AGENTS SELECT Act prohibitions Currently the Patriot apply to individuals, not institutions. T Act apply to the ments of the 1996 cov- facility receiving or transferring ered agents Prohibitions and criminal penalties apply to indi- Act under the Patriot viduals who are persons”, “restricted whether faculty, students, staff. or Currently, “restricted persons” may continue to work in laboratories having listed non-exempt select agents, but must not work with, handle, or have anything (even paperwork) to do with possessing, receiving, shipping or transporting such agents (whether or not the lab is registered with CDC). Individuals who work with select agents must with receive appropriate training regard to safety and security proto- cols (whether under MIT policy or Act). under the 1996 or confi- here are no confidentiality obli- T Non-disclosure agreements Third party owned party Third MIT generated Obligated under confidentiality hese agreements are superseded dentiality restrictions on faculty. Limitations are placed only on pub- TLO or sponsor lication prior to review for patentability. faculty The are expected to honor contractual obligations of sponsor review prior to publication. obligations Faculty do not extend to non-disclosure. B gations imposed upon the faculty beyond obligations limiting publi- cation to protect patentability. MIT does not impose secrecy PROPRIETARY A A or OSP reviewed by IP Counsel and signed in OSP. Also under standard Attachment B to MIT’s Research Agreement. Also from to MIT. vendors licensing software And some biomaterials under non-disclosure A agreements signed by MIT. Faculty cannot bind the Institute to confi- dentiality. cannot sign per- Faculty sonal NDAs for Institute research programs. Confidential information cannot be released to students, staff or other faculty under personal non- disclosure agreements. Individual faculty members can enter into “pre-proposal” NDAs with industry that bind only the faculty member. T by a standard OSP research agree- ment (with Proprietary Information Attachment) if the company decides to fund research. B he EAR and ITAR regulations con- he EAR and ITAR EXPORT / EMBARGO EXPORT CONTROLLED projects that MIT accepts research licenses for may require export certain technologies. MIT does not accept restrictions on publications or assignment of students to indi- vidual research projects. T trol the dissemination of informa- tion, software, and items to over- seas locations or consignees or, in certain circumstances, to foreign nationals in the U.S. (“deemed export”) or abroad. Further, the regulations restrict/prohibit OFAC (and may require licenses for) travel to or export of certain software and items to embargoed countries. Prohibitions, licensing, and civil and criminal penalties for violations apply to the individual (whether faculty, and the students or staff) institution. SENSITIVE Nothing specific. Institute will The on publica- not accept restrictions tions. Not applicable Cleared individuals are personally responsible for safeguarding classified information CLASSIFIED of Standard Security Manual MIT’s Procedures imple- and Practices NISPOM. mentation of the Faculty MIT olicies and P Practices Related to: 43 SELECT AGENTS SELECT Same as above Not applicable ation of patent hird-party owned confidential MIT imposes no non-disclosure T Publication of research is per- Obligated under agreements Third party owned party Third MIT B PROPRIETARY A A wish access to signed by MIT if they confidential information. Students are not required to sign personal agreements in order to get access. MIT will require only an acknowl- edgement form (used sparingly). Student-signed confidentiality agreements are not binding on the Institute. B obligations upon students with regard to their research. A information that is accepted by an authorized signatory for the Institute cannot be published during the term of confidentiality without permission of its owner. Many non-disclosure agreements have sunset provisions for term of confidentiality. MIT’s preference is 3-5 years but some- times accepts a perpetual term, as i.e. source code. B mitted at any time, subject to fed- regulatory and research sponsor eral requirements to (i) balance publica- tion with preserv funded rights in the case of federally and (ii) to pro- research programs vide the sponsor with a period of publication review (30-60 days) for identification of patentable material of a sponsor’s and for removal inadventently included proprietary information if required under a sponsored research agreement. EXPORT / EMBARGO EXPORT CONTROLLED Same as above Publication restrictions destroy the “fundamental research exclusion” allowed in the regulations (which, in any event, exports applies only to to foreign nationals in the U.S.). MIT does not accept restrictions on publications other than a limited delay for patent protection or to allow a sponsor to remove its pro- prietary information Not applicable SENSITIVE Not applicable Cleared individuals CLASSIFIED Cleared individuals Students olicies and Publications P Practices Related to: 44 patriot.html] which [http://web.mit.edu/ atriot Act prohibitions and asks atriot he 1996 Act requires that MIT he 1996 SELECT AGENTS SELECT an information MIT has developed question- sheet and self-assessment naire environment/ notifies affected individuals of the P them to confirm their understanding. T maintain transfer, receipt, and dis- posal documentation in connection with listed non-exempt select agents. Act Section 817(1) of the Patriot imposes criminal penalties on any- “knowingly”one who possesses or biological agents or toxins “delivery systems” in quantities or “reasonably justified” of types not “bona fide research or other by a peaceful purpose”. Act. Does not apply to the 1996 are consid- terms of external MIT has no policy covering, MIT must use reasonable efforts MIT must use reasonable Invention disclosures are accept MIT does not generally Third party owned party Third MIT and does not impose confidentiality obligations on objects/devices created or developed at the Institute. view or design. It does accept objects or devices that contain proprietary information inside the cover or black box. same prin- The ciples apply as to written propri- etary information. B to avoid duplication and release to avoid duplication outside of the Institute. MIT avoids accepting strict liability for propri- etary information and does not against unauthorized guarantee disclosure. No standards for hand- ling third-party owned confidential information. Responsibility lies with the principal investigator Software documentation and code follows above standard. Confidential infor- be must mation disclosed orally identified as confidential when disclosed and follow-up in writing within 20-30 days. B as confidential.marked Other documents research-generated such as reports should be (but are as copyrighted marked not always) to MIT. A objects or devices that ered proprietary in PROPRIETARY A B A commodity he identity .T the Commerce as rse ove
ped ip Munitions List (USML) of the sh
S. Certain items (e.g., equipment and licenses to may require hardware) be the State Department or control list (CCL) of Department. lists are available The on line at http://pmdtc.org (ITAR) (EAR). or http://www.bxa.doc/gov/ EXPORT / EMBARGO EXPORT CONTROLLED Same as above of such items appears either on the U. Not applicable SENSITIVE Not applicable ere are no classified documents ere are no classified here are no classified objects or T devices on campus CLASSIFIED Th on campus Objects and Devices Documents 45 obtain registration, facilities
atriot Act:atriot Lewis Keith, Jamie must be equipped and capable of handling such agents (including locking laboratories, for boxes lock the agents, refrigerators). and locked MIT applies similar security to other very hazardous biological agents. SELECT AGENTS SELECT P Senior Counsel; 1996 Act: Claudia Mickelson, Deputy Director, Office EHS (Biosafety Program). Act,Under the 1996 facilities must be registered with CDC to receive or agents. listed non-exempt transfer To he principal investigator wish- he principal investigator T MIT responsible officers for Not applicable Not applicable Third party owned party Third MIT B PROPRIETARY A A informa- ing access to proprietary tion or, admin- highest-ranking the officer in the unit desiring istrative access. If needed only by one indi- vidual, person is responsible. that B invention disclosures are both prin- TLO. cipal investigators and the MIT responsible officer(s) for publi- cation review are the principal investigators. A B he responsible official for MIT in he responsible official reasury regulations is Julie T. is Julie reasury regulations EXPORT / EMBARGO EXPORT CONTROLLED T ITAR,administering the EAR and T Norris, Director of Sponsored Programs, who is also responsible for signing license applications for the State,Treasury Commerce and departments. Not applicable Not applicable SENSITIVE clauses, In terms of negotiating the Office of responsibility is with Sponsored Programs. he MIT Facility Security Officer he MIT Facility One (1) Mosler safe capable of storing material to the level of Secret is on campus. CLASSIFIED T is Anthony F. Favaloro, Assistant Director, Office of Sponsored Programs. Physical Facilities Operational Responsibility 46