WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN AND HOW?

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda

Ilse Zeemeijer

Who gets What, When and How? New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda

By Ilse Zeemeijer Masterthesis

Leiden, December 2011 Student number: 3485064 Supervisor: Prof. Dr. E.B. Zoomers

International Development Studies Department of Human Geography Faculty of Geosciences Utrecht University

[email protected] Copyright Zeemeijer, I.M. 2011 All rights reserved

Who gets What, When and How? 2 ABSTRACT

Is the private sector able to contribute to development? And if yes, what should be their approach and how do they collaborate with the other actors involved? More importantly, how do investors acquire land and what is the impact of these land acquisitions on local livelihoods? This research asked the question: What are the main characteristics of new corporate land acquisitions in Uganda and what is the impact on the local livelihoods? Six recent investments in Uganda were selected and for each of the investments semi-structured and in-depth interviews were conducted with the relevant actors involved. This research will present the findings in terms of compensation, employment, which varies for all the investments, investments in (market/physical) infrastructure and will discuss other positive and negative impacts. The main findings are that: (1) there is a gap between the information that is known in international reports on ‗land grab‘ and the reality; (2) most new corporate land acquisitions that are operational now, are Ugandan companies and not foreign; (3) the selected new corporate land acquisitions are different in their structure and partnerships, from public- private partnership, outgrowers‘ scheme, to independent companies who don‘t have any agreements with other actors; (4) various actors are involved in new corporate land acquisitions, on all levels. In Uganda, the national actors appear to be most dominant; (5) two of the six selected investments have land disputes and are currently being handled in court; (6) corporate social responsibilities are often not specified in binding and transparent contracts, and the concept of benefit-sharing is not yet put in practice; and (7) although opinions differ on the various impacts, this research clearly shows that it is not a black and white story, as is often presented either by the investor or NGOs.

Keywords: ‗land grab‘, agriculture, private sector, investments, public-private partnerships, outgrower scheme, Corporate Social Responsibility, Uganda.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Exactly one year ago, I was preparing myself for the adventure of conducting research in Uganda. I had the same kind of adrenaline that is rushing through my body right now; the adrenaline that tells you that you are about to start a new period and have to say goodbye to another. Last year I realized I would go to an unknown country for five months and, minor detail, all by myself. At this moment, one year later, I realize this thesis will mark the end of my life as a student and is the beginning of my professional career. Last year I started my research with five simple questions. I wanted to find out who, what, when, why and how ‗land grab‘ takes place in Uganda. However, where to start? Although there is a lively international debate on this topic, exact details and information appeared to be lacking. I realized it would take some time to find the answers. These answers were not coming from the official authorities in Uganda, but from the people in the field. From the managing director and district officer to a catholic priest and farmers in a village, I would like to thank all those people that I‘ve met during my fieldwork in Kampala, Mbarara, Bugala Island, Masindi, Mubende, Lira, Gulu and Amuru. Although not everyone was eager to speak to us at once, in the end we managed and gathered a lot of valuable information from a wide range of actors. ‗We‘ is Sam Tumugarukire Musirika, Programme Officer Research, Monitoring and Evaluation at the Uganda Land Alliance and me. The Uganda Land Alliance, especially Esther Obaikol, Sam and other colleguaes, were willing to be my host organization and without their support this research would not have been possible. Although the result of the research and fieldwork is presented in this thesis, I know that the people that have participated in my research not only told their story to me - just a curious student from Utrecht University - but also to Sam and therefore the Uganda Land Alliance. This means that the information we‘ve gathered actually did not leave Uganda and will hopefully contribute to the work of the Uganda Land Alliance and future research. I would also like to thank my supervisor, Annelies Zoomers, for giving me the trust and freedom to conduct this research in my own way. Due to her enthusiastic lectures in the beginning of the master I decided to choose this topic for my research. With my background in Political Sciences and future training in journalism, this research on ‗land grab‘combined the best of three worlds: politics, development issues and sometimes even investigative journalism – which is not always the easiest combination.

Who gets What, When and How? 4 I would also like to thank Joost. While I was in Uganda, Joost was conducting his research in Tanzania. We had to bridge 612 kilometers, but distance appeared to be relative. I had the best possible ‗neighbour‘ I could wish for. I also have to thank my family, especially Ria, Sieger, Joël, and friends for their support. Although I was far away, they always felt close. Furthermore, when I came home everyone understood that writing a thesis is not always the most social activity. Luckily, they were always willing to listen to all my frustrations, breakthroughs, complaints and hopefully soon celebrations as well! Furthermore, I would like to thank Marc and Stefan for their tips and enthusiastic stories about Uganda, and Arne and Juliet, who made me feel at home in Uganda. Last but not least, I would like to thank all fellow IDS students. Not only did we have a great time during the short holiday in Tanzania, we also supported eachother online while we were spread all over the world. Then the world is indeed a global village. It was also a nice experience to follow courses in Utrecht with a group of people that had a shared passtion for issues that matter. Now this thesis is finished, I hope it will give readers a better understanding in the processes that are going on in Uganda. However, although the aim of each research is to find an answer to the research question, I also hope that after reading this thesis even more questions will arise. We can only get a better understanding if we keep on asking questions. Especially in the debate on ‗land grab‘ we have to make sure that we know exactly that our arguments are based on detailed and up-to-date information, no matter how hard it is to get access to this information. The more people will ask questions, start a dialogue with all actors involved - from the farmer to the managing director - and share their information, the better we will truly understand what‘s going on and find our answers.

Ilse Zeemeijer Leiden, December 2011

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 5 CONTENT Abstract ...... 3 Acknowledgements ...... 4 List of Maps ...... 9 List of Tables ...... 11 List of abbreviations ...... 13 Chapter 1. Introduction ...... 15 Structure of thesis ...... 18 Chapter 2. Theoretical Discussion ...... 19 Land as an Asset ...... 19 Context: ‗Land Grab‘ ...... 21 Definition...... 21 Background ...... 25 What‘s new? ...... 29 Consequences ...... 33 How to deal with these developments? ...... 38 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) ...... 41 Public Private Partnerships the new ‗panacea‘ for development? ...... 42 Chapter 3: Methodology ...... 47 Conceptual model ...... 47 Subjects for study ...... 48 Measurement ...... 49 Key variables ...... 49 Data collection methods ...... 52 Analysis ...... 54 Chapter 4 Background of Uganda ...... 56 Geographical context ...... 56 British influence ...... 59 Milton Obote ...... 60 Idi Amin ...... 61 Yoweri Kaguta Museveni ...... 62 Political stability and economic growth ...... 63 Challenges ...... 65 Chapter 5. Role of Policy and Institutions in New Corporate Land Acquisitions ...... 67

Who gets What, When and How? 6 British Influence ...... 67 Land Reform Decree 1975 ...... 70 1995 Constitution ...... 71 1998 Land Act ...... 72 Decentralization ...... 73 Decentralised land management ...... 74 Uganda Land Commission ...... 76 2001 Land Sector Strategic Plan ...... 81 National Land Policy (final draft 2011) ...... 83 2000 Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture ...... 86 Chapter 6. Investments in Uganda - Role of Policies and Institutions ...... 87 Uganda Investment Authority ...... 88 Possibilities for investors ...... 90 Wages ...... 91 Facilitation UIA ...... 92 Challenges ...... 93 Chapter 7. New Land Acquisitions in Uganda: Reports and Reality ...... 97 Reports ...... 97 Hebei Company, China (4) ...... 102 Chinese private investors (23) ...... 103 Lake Victoria Free Trade Zone Authority, China (20) ...... 104 Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (10)/Egyptian Government (11) ...... 104 „Russian Company‟ (9) ...... 106 Agri SA, South Africa (13) ...... 107 „French Investor‟ (19) ...... 107 „Bangladesh Delegation‟ (24) ...... 108 Reality ...... 108 Chapter 8. Characteristics of Selected New Corporate Land Acquisitions ...... 113 Oil Palm Uganda Ltd., Bugala Island ...... 114 Kaweri Coffee Plantation, Mubende ...... 120 Masindi ...... 121 Mukwano Agro Project Ltd., Lira ...... 124 Amuru Sugar Works Ltd., Amuru ...... 126 Actors Involved ...... 127 Chapter 9. How is the Land Acquired? ...... 130

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 7 Chapter 10. Conditions and Corporate Social Responsibility ...... 144 Conditions ...... 144 Benefit-sharing agreements ...... 148 Corporate Social Responsibility policy ...... 148 Chapter 11. What is the Impact of the New Corporate Land Acquisitions? ...... 152 Compensation ...... 153 Employment ...... 155 Investments ...... 168 Other positive and negative impacts ...... 170 Chapter 12. Conclusion ...... 178 Literature ...... 182 Appendix A: Overview Field Visits and Interviews ...... 204 Appendix B: Topics Covered in Interviews ...... 208 Appendix C: Definitions Land Grab ...... 210 Appendix D: Land Deals According to the GLP Report ...... 212 Appendix E: Detailed Maps ...... 213 Appendix F: Case of Mubende district ...... 218 Appendix G: NEMA Environmental Impact Assessment ...... 222 Appendix H: Neumann Kaffee Gruppe (NKG) Sustainability Standards ...... 223 Appendix I: Tables on Income of Farmers ...... 225 Appendix K: Mukwano Outgrower contract ...... 227 Appendix L: Impression Outgrowers Lira ...... 228 Appendix M: FDI and Investors in Africa ...... 229 Appendix N: Uganda in Figures and Tables ...... 230 Appendix O: Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 2010 ...... 235 Appendix P: The 50 Largest taxpayers in Uganda in 2006/7 ...... 237 Appendix Q: Investments Overview UIA ...... 238 Appendix R: Overview Capacity at Land Offices...... 240

Who gets What, When and How? 8 LIST OF MAPS

Map 1. Uganda (2010) and selected areas for fieldwork Map 2. Uganda as land locked country Map 3. Extent of savannas in the 1960s and in 1996. Map 4. Permanent crops and arable land and farming systems Map. 5 Kingdoms in Uganda Map 6. Food security 2008 and 2011 Map 7. Location of New Land Acquisitions in Uganda, 2007 – 2011. Map 8. Kalangala District Map 9. Oil Palm Development Sites at Bugala Island, April 2010 Map 10. Mubende district Map 11. Masindi Map 12. Lira and the outgrowers of Mukwano Agro Project Ltd. Map 13. Gulu and Amuru Map 14. The disputed land in Mubende Map 15. Kalangala District, including Bugala Island Map 16. Mubende (detailed) Map 17. Lira (detailed) Map 18. Gulu (detailed) Map 19. Kafu river Map 20 Ziwa Ranchers Ltd Map 21 Catlle corridor Uganda Map 22. Overview Internally Displaced Persons Uganda

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 9 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. FDI inflows, globally and by groups of economies, 1980 – 2009 (in billions of dollars) Figure 2. Framework to analyze the food security effects on FDI in land on selected vulnerable groups Figure 3. Conceptual model Figure 4. Overview of Relevant Policies 1894 – 2015 Figure 5. Land Sector Institutional Framework as per Land Act Figure 6. FDI inflows in million US$, 1990 - 2009 Figure 7. Drivers of New Land Acquisitions in Uganda (2007-2011) Figure 8. Part of the conceptual model that focuses on the impact on local livelihoods and food security Figure 9. Overview of types of employment for each of the selected investments Figure 10. Major developing economy investors in Africa, 2006-2008 (in millions of dollars) Figure 11. FDI inflows, 2000-2009 Figure 12. Price and production trends in cotton between 1970-71 and 2005-06 Figure 13. Expenditure framework under the NDP 2010/11 – 2014 Figure 14. Poverty headcount by region Figure 15. Official development aid (ODA) in Uganda (2007-2009). Figure 16. Population distribution by age, 2009 Figure 17. Population density, 2002 Figure 18. Distribution of Ugandan Population by Ethnic Group, 1948 – 2002

Who gets What, When and How? 10 LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Overview ‗land grab‘ combining several definitions Table 2. Historical land expansion Table 3. Land resources and land deals Table 4. Land tenure categories Table 5. Total Area and Land Utilisation, 1961 Table 7. Required officers according to the Land Act 1998 Table 8. New Land Acquisitions for Investment, 2007 - 2011 Table 9. Characteristics of Selected New Corporate Land Acquisitions Table 10. Overview of all important actors involved in the selected investments Table 11. Overview of land acquisition for the selected new corporate land acquisitions Table 12. Overview processes of land appropriation and concentration in Uganda Table 13. Overview of selected investments and the conditions attached Table 14. Overview of impact in terms of employment and social services Table 15. Overview of selected cases and the conditions of ‗land grab‘ Table 16. Overview of Definitions of Land Grab Table 17. Overview Land Deals GLP Report Table 18. Overview Income and Exponse Model Sunflower Outgrower farmers Lira Table 19. Effect of New Planting on Annual Net Income from Coffee per Farm in UGX Table 20. Beneficiaries VODP Project 2009 Table 21. Outgrowers Lira, 2011 Table 22. Uganda in numbers Table 23. Status of Ownership of Projects 2010 Table 24. Sector Totals Jan-Dec 2010 Table 25. 2010 sources of investment by country Table 26. France investors from 1991 Table 27. List of Russian investors in Uganda Table 28. Capacity at the land office Mubende Table 29. Capacity at the land office Masindi Table 30. Capacity at the land office Lira Table 31. Capacity in the land office Gulu and Amuru

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 11 CONVERSIONS

Area 1 acre = 4,046. 856 m² = 0.405 hectare 1 hectare = 10,000 m² = 2.47 acre 1 square mile (mi²) = 2,589,988.11 m² = 2.59 km² 1 km² = 247.1 acres = 0.386 square miles (mi²)

Currency 1 euro = 3445 Ugandan shilling (UGX) (exchange rate of 26 November 2011) 1 US dollar = 2601.78 Uganda shilling (exchange rate of 26 November 2011) 1000 UGX = 0.29 euro (exchange rate of 26 November 2011) 1000 UGX = 0.38 US dollar (exchange rate of 26 November 2011)

Who gets What, When and How? 12 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACODE Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment AfDB African Development Bank BFR Budongo Forest Reserve BiD Business in Development Network Foundation CAO Chief Administrative Officer CCSP cross-sector social-oriented partnership CEACR Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (of the ILO) CSR Corporate Social Responsibility DAC Development Assistance Committee DANIDA Danish International Development Assistance DLB District Land Boards FAO Food and Agricultural Organization FDI Foreign Direct Investment FIAN Food First Information and Action Network GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GDP Gross Domestic Product GLP Global Land Project GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH ha hectare ICD Industry Council for Development ICP Industry Cooperative Program IDP Internationally Displaced People IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IFC International Finance Corporation IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute IIED International Institute for Environment and Development ILC International Land Coalition. ILO International Labour Organization IMF International Monetary Fund IPR International Policy Review JLOS Justice, Law and Order Section KADINGO Kalangala District NGO Forum KCFASP Uganda Coffee Farmers Alliance Support Project KIBP Kampala Industrial Business Park KOPGA Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Association KOPGT Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Trust LC Local Council LDCs Least Developed Countries LEAD Livelihoods and Enterprises for Agricultural Development LLDCs Landlocked Developing Countries LLSP Land Sector Strategic Plan LRA Lord Resistance Army LRAN Land Research and Action Network LVFTZ Lake Victoria Free Trade Zone MDGs Millennium Development Goals MoU Memorandum of Understanding

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 13 NAADS National Agricultural Advisory Services agency NCP OECD National Contact Point NEMA National Environmental Management Authority NFA National Forest Authority NFC New Forest Company NGO Non governmental Organization NKG Neumann Kaffee Gruppe NLP New Land Policy NRA National Resistance Army NUPAW National Union of Plantation and Agricultural Workers ODA Official Development Assistance OPUL Oil Palm Uganda Ltd. PEAP Poverty Eradication Action Plan PMA Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture PPDA Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets PPP Public-Private Partnerships RDC Sugar Corporation of Uganda Ltd. SEZs Special Economic Zones SNV SNV Netherlands Development Organisation TNC Transnational Corporations UCFA Uganda Coffee Farmers Alliance (UCFA) UGX Uganda Shillings UIA Uganda Investment Authority ULA Uganda Land Alliance ULC Uganda Land Commission UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Program UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization UNLF Uganda National Liberation Front UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services UPDF The Uganda People‘s Defence Force UPE Universal Primary Education URA Uganda Revenue Authority VAT Value Added Tax VODP Vegetable Oil Development Project WCED World Commission on Environment and Development WIR World Investment Report

Who gets What, When and How? 14 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

‗Land is the most essential pillar of human existence and national development‘ according to the Government of Uganda (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 2011: 2). With 87 percent living in rural areas, of which 34 percent lives in poverty, land in general and access to land in specific is a crucial issue in Uganda (FAO, 2010). According to the government of Uganda, ‗the land sector is the bedrock of all development and is therefore expected to play a crucial role in the development of other sectors and, especially in provision of leverage for efforts in poverty reduction, the promotion of governance and social justice, political accountability and democratic governance, the management of conflict and ecological stress and sustainable transformation of the economy as a whole‘ (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 2009). At the same time land is a highly ‗volatile‘ and ‗political‘ issue. This has often implied that land issues received limited relevance in the policy dialogue, despite their importance, according to Deininger and Castagnini (2006: 321- 322). The Government of Uganda acknowledges that there is no policy in place that ensures ‗sustainable and productive land use and development‘. Not only are land resources ‗chronically under-utilized‘, ‗inefficient managed‘, ‗arbitrary‘ and ‗bedevilled by corruption‘, there is also a ‗lack of transparency‘ (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 2009).

„One of the major concerns in the land sector at present is the allocation of government land, public land, and natural resources held by the State in trust for the citizens, for private investment. Such land allocations have taken place amidst an environment of incoherent and/or nonexistent and /or non-transparent processes and procedures. This in effect, has weakened institutions governing use and management of these lands and natural resources. The allocations have not considered the ecological, environmental, economic and social impacts, and as such have displaced vulnerable land and natural-resource-dependent communities, whose rights of land access, food security and livelihoods are lost. Whereas private sector investment in land and natural resources is necessary and should be promoted, safeguards ought to be put in place to ensure, a transparent process, with due diligence, so that land rights of the vulnerable sections of society and the environment are not compromised‟ (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 2011: 7).

The vision of the National Land Policy (NLP), which is in the process of consultation since 2005, is ‗sustainable and optimal use of land and land-based resources for transformation of

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 15 Ugandan society and the economy‘. The NLP aims at ensuring ‗efficient, equitable and sustainable utilization and management of Uganda‘s land and land-based resources for poverty reduction, wealth creation and overall socio-economic development‘ (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 2011: 2). Furthermore, the Government of Uganda has ‗a duty to attract private investment both domestic and foreign into productive sectors of the economy‘. This duty includes ‗creating an enabling investment climate‘ and ‗facilitating investors to access land‘. However, this document also argues that growth in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) can lead to ‗alienation of land from peasant‘s rights holders (as is already happened in some isolated cases and concentration of land in private hands) and result into tenure insecurity, food insecurity, land conflicts and poverty‘ (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 2011: art. 87). The sentence between brackets was found in the fourth draft, but was removed in the final draft (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 2009: art. 156). According to the NLP, ‗mechanisms to deliver the right balance between improving livelihoods, protecting vulnerable groups, and raising opportunities for investments and development are needed‘.

„Determining the sectors which should be open to foreign direct investments (FDI) and the amount of land to be allocated for such investments based on the use to which the land is to be put is imperative. Government or public land available to issue for carefully-selected private investment, deemed of importance for socio-economic growth is limited. In the past, Government proposed to harness the power of compulsory acquisition to deliver land to investors; this was roundly rejected by the Citizens of Uganda because in some instances it was, not based on any criteria‟ (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 2011: art. 87).

Apparently there is a paradox. On the one hand growth in investments is seen as a development opportunity that is welcomed by the government of Uganda. On the other hand the government of Uganda acknowledges this can have serious and negative consequences for the people who are living on the land that is bought by different actors, since this also means that more land for investment is needed. How to find the right balance? Since 87 percent of Ugandan population is living in rural areas, this subject is relevant not only to the academic debate on land acquisitions for investments, but also for international, national and local organizations involved in these issues, but more importantly for the local population themselves. Furthermore, as is clear from the existing literature, there is hardly any empirical evidence available on the effects of (foreign) direct investment in land. The analysis often

Who gets What, When and How? 16 remains rather hypothetical and theoretical, as the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ, 2010) argues. According to GTZ, ‗much more detailed insights in on- going and past investments are needed in order to improve the empirical evidence of actual successes‘ (GTZ, 2010: 23). Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick (2009: 1) also argue that despite the fact that news reports provide more information on land acquisitions, details about the status of the deals, the size of land purchased or leased, and the amount invested are often still ‗murky‘. ‗Well-documented examples are scarce, and some reports are contradictory.‘ Furthermore, they also argue that ‗little is known so far about domestic ‗land grabbing‘ induced by the price changes of land, which is much less visible‘. The objective of this explorative study is therefore to gain more knowledge and insight in new corporate land acquisitions in Uganda, in order to present a more comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of current practices in Uganda. The main research question for this thesis is therefore: What are the main characteristics of new corporate land acquisitions in Uganda and what is the impact on the local livelihoods? More specifically, the following subtopics will be dealt with, respectively:

1. What is the institutional framework for new corporate land acquisitions in Uganda and what is the role of these policies and institutions in controlling the current developments relating to new corporate land acquisitions? 2. What do we know of new corporate land acquisitions in Uganda and to what extent does this information correspond with the reality? 3. What are the main characteristics of the selected new corporate land acquisitions in Uganda and who are the main actors involved? 4. How was the land acquired? 5. What is the impact of the selected new corporate land acquisitions? a. Are there any conditions attached to the land acquisition, including benefit sharing agreements and prior informed consent? b. Is day-to-day practise guided by internal Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policies? If yes, what are the standards the investor has to meet? c. In the case of an eviction from the land that is acquired by the investor, what is known about the compensation? d. How much employment does the investment bring, what are the wages and is there a labour union involved?

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 17 e. What are other investments that have been initiated by the new corporate land acquisition? f. Are there any other positive and negative impacts?

STRUCTURE OF THESIS This thesis will start by introducing the theoretical discussion on new corporate land acquisitions, often referred to as ‗land grab‘. The livelihood approach, even as the context of ‗land grab‘, the actors and consequences will be discussed, followed by a some of the recent responses of the international community. The third chapter will explain the methodology of this research and also acknowledge the main limitations. Then, a background of Uganda will be given in chapter four, with a focus on the geographical context, and historical, political and economic background, even as the main challenges. Chapter 4 will describe the role of policy and institutions for new corporate land acquisitions in Uganda and will be followed by a chapter that only focuses on the role of policy for investors and the possibilities investors have. With this background in mind, chapter 6 will present one of the main findings; the gap between reports on ‗land deals‘ and reality. The other findings will be presented in the following chapters; which are only focused on the new corporate land acquisitions that were selected for fieldwork. Chapter 7 will elaborate on the main characteristics of the new corporate land acquisitions that were eventually selected and introduce the main actors that are involved. Chapter 8 will concentrate on the way in which this land was acquired, followed by chapter 9, in which the conditions and internal corporate social responsibilities (CSR) will be described, even as the benefit-sharing agreements. The main research question will be dealt with in chapter 11, which will focus on the impacts of the selected new corporate land acquisitions in terms of compensation, employment, investments and will describe other positive and negative impacts that came up during the fieldwork. After the conclusion, several other documents are attached in the appendix.

Who gets What, When and How? 18 CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL DISCUSSION

Today, 1.4 billion people continue to live in extreme poverty, which is less than US$1.25 a day. Of these 1.4 billion people, more than two third lives in rural areas in developing countries. In 2050, the world has to feed 9.1 billion people (IFAD, 2010: 9). According to IFAD (ibid.), in order to feed the world in 2050, global food production has to increase by 70 percent and production in developing countries may well have to almost double. Once you realise the magnitude of these numbers, you become aware that land, including the use of and access to land, becomes one of the most pressing issues for development. As was already mentioned in the introduction, the Government of Uganda argues in the National Land Policy that ‗land is the most essential pillar of human existence and national development‘. This chapter will therefore start by explaining why land can be seen as ‗the most essential pillar of human existence‘ by introducing the livelihood approach. Furthermore, when issues such as agricultural development, food production and investments are discussed in the development debate, ‗land grab‘ is an issue that is often referred to. Therefore, this chapter will continue by introducing the debate on ‗land grab‘. What is ‗land grab‘ and what is the background? Who are the actors and which countries are involved? After this introduction the positive and negative consequences will be discussed. This chapter will conclude by introducing several responses to these developments and the role corporate social responsibility (CSR) policy and public-private partnerships (PPP).

LAND AS AN ASSET According to the Ugandan National Land Policy, land is important for development. Land can be seen as a ‗basic resource in terms of the space it provides‘, land contains and support environmental resources and land represents and generates capital (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 2009: 4). Furthermore, land is a ‗commercial asset that can be used and traded‘ and is therefore a ‗critical factor of production‘. Land is also an ‗essential part of the national patrimony‘ and a ‗key factor in shaping individual and collective identity through its history, the cultural expressions and idioms with which it is associated‘. Last but not least, the Government of Uganda stresses that land ‗influences spirituality and aesthetic values of all human societies‘ (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, ibid.). From these statements, it is clear that land is not only the soil on which you can produce food. The Government of Uganda considers land as an ‗asset‘, that is important for

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 19 the livelihoods of the Ugandan people. This leads us to the livelihood approach. According to Chambers and Conway (1991), a livelihood can be defined as ‗the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living‘. A livelihood is sustainable ‗when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base‘. Bebbington (1999: 2022) shows the importance of assets: ‗a person‘s assets, such as land, are not merely means with which he or she makes a living: they also give meaning to that person‘s world. Assets are not simply resources that people use in building livelihoods; they are assets that give them the capability to be and act. Assets should not be understood only as things that allow survival, adaptation and poverty alleviation; they are also the basis of agent‘s power to act and to reproduce, challenge or change the rules that govern the control, use and transformation of resources‘. De Haan (2000: 344) aims at combining the concept of assets and resources together, by using the term ‗capital‘. According to De Haan (ibid.) people need ‗five vital resources in order to achieve a sustainable livelihood‘. These five vital resources are; human, natural, physical, financial and social capital. The five types of capital are described as follows:

1. human capital can be labour, but also skills, experience, knowledge, creativity and inventiveness; 2. natural capital is resources like land, water, forests and pastures, but also minerals; 3. physical capital can be food stocks, livestock, jewellery, equipment, tools and machinery; 4. financial capital is money in a savings account at the bank or in an old sock, a loan or credit. 5. social capital concerns the quality of relations among people, for example, whether one can count on support by family or mutual assistance among neighbours (De Haan, ibid.).

According to De Haan (ibid.), capital does not necessarily have to be held in private property. Natural capital as land, water and forests can be communally owned. ‗What matters is if one has access to the resource when it is needed and wanted.‘ Claims and resources are seen as ‗non-tangible assets‘; people can call upon moral and practical assistance (claims) and people are having or getting the opportunity to use the resource in practice (access) (Chamber and Conway, 1992 in De Haan, 2000: 344). As De Haan (ibid.) explains, it refers to the ‗real opportunity to gather firewood in the forest or to use the water for irrigation from the village well‘ and ‗to the possibility of women to obtain food from the compound‘s granary or the access by men to information about prices for cattle or the possibilities for temporary wage labour elsewhere in the region‘. However, the livelihood approach does have its structural limitations, as Zoomers (2008: 148) argues. Although Chambers and Conway and De Haan explain that claims and

Who gets What, When and How? 20 access need to be considered in this debate as well, Zoomers argues that the livelihood framework, by focusing on people‘s assets and capabilities, already assumes that people have access to assets. However, even when people have access to assets, it is important to realize that this does not always mean they can build their own livelihood. ‗While people might have access to land, for the majority this means only small plots of eroded land; it will not help people to find a way out of poverty, and many are not capable of using this to accumulate capital. The success of the rural poor may be related less to strategic actions than to structural, often locational, limitations.‘ According to Deininger and Binswanger (1999: 247-248), especially in rural areas in developing countries, ‗land is not only the primary means for generating a livelihood but often the main vehicle for investing, accumulating wealth, and transferring it between generations‘. Deininger and Binswanger (ibid.) also touch upon the issue of structural limitations. They argue that agricultural production can be hampered or stimulated by the way in which access to land is regulated, property rights are defined and ownership conflicts are resolved. This influences ‗the ability of households to produce for their subsistence and for the market but also their social and economic status and often their collective identity, their incentive to work, their willingness to use the land sustainability, and their ability to self-insure or to obtain access to financial markets‘ (Deininger and Binswanger, ibid.).

CONTEXT: ‘LAND GRAB’ In order to understand these structural limitations, we have to discuss land in a broader context. While the academic debate is characterized by shifting paradigms, from the ‗green revolution‘ in the 1950s, to land reforms and agricultural colonization in the 1960s and 1970s, integrated rural development in the 1970s and 1980s, ‗sustainable development‘ from the 1980s onwards and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the 1990s to migration and private sector development in second millennium1, the recent debate that relates to land is often in the context of ‗land grabbing‘.

Definition As with many concepts in science, there are various terms and definitions to capture the recent issues relating to land and development in the literature and international reports. Some prefer to use ‗global land grab‘, ‗large-scale land grab‘, or ‗land rush‘, while others use more neutral terms such as ‗large-scale land acquisition‘, ‗large-scale agricultural investment‘,

1 See Cypher and Dietz, 2009 and Zoomers, 2008 amongst others.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 21 ‗commercial pressures on land‘, ‗cross-border large-scale land deals‘ or ‗large-scale appropriation and concentration of land‘ (see appendix C). Some definitions are very precise, others are more general. Each definition has its own emphasis, for example on the form in which the land acquisition takes place, the actors, scale, purpose or certain characteristics, which is summarized in table (Zoomers, 2010; Daniel and Mittal, 2009; Friis and Reenberg, 2010; FIAN, 2010, Borras and Franco, 2010; Oxfam, 2011; Agter, 2010; Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009; World Bank, 2011a; Anseeuw, e.a. 2011, ILC, 2011). According to Borras and Franco (2010: 2-3), ‗global land grab‘, defined as ‗the explosion of (trans)national commercial land transactions (and land speculation) that has been occurring in recent years around the large-scale production, sale, and export of food and biofuels‘, has become a ‗catch-all phrase‘ that was initially deployed by activists opposed to such transactions from environmental and agrarian justice perspectives. However, as Borras and Franco (ibid.) argue, this phrase now gets ‗absorbed into de-policized mainstream development currents‘. Agter (2010) prefers the term ‗large-scale land appropriation and concentration of land‘ instead of ‗land grab‘ or ‗massive land acquisition‘, because they argue that there is a difference between the appropriation of land rights and the concentration of land rights. Appropriation can either be ‗private appropriation of hitherto common resources over which groups exercised collective rights of use or management‘ or ‗land that had not been appropriated or claimed by anyone‘. The second process, concentration, ‗involves the purchase or rental of large areas of land that were already subject to an individual or collective private land tenure regime‘. According to Agter (ibid) these two process may ‗sometimes – but do not necessarily – coexist‘. The term ‗land acquisition‘ implies that land can be purchased, which is often not the case. ‗Land grab‘ is in their view ‗the wholesale appropriation of resources that excludes other potential beneficiaries‘, and should preferably be used when ‗it applies to the potential of the resources found on the land‘. Although this research will use the term ‗new corporate land acquisition‘, as will be explained in the next chapter on methodology, this chapter will continue by using the term ‗land grab‘, since this is the most widely used term in this debate.

Who gets What, When and How? 22 Table 1. Overview ‗land grab‘ combining several definitions In the form of Purchase; lease; land deal; transaction; buy/lease the rights to use farmland and fresh water; (trans)national commercial land transaction and land speculation; land acquisition; land concession; large-scale agricultural investment; large-scale appropriations and concentrations of land rights; public and private capital investments; deals on land leases, concessions or purchases abroad either directly or through state-owned entities and public-private partnerships. Purpose Produce crops for export; commercial/industrial agricultural production; large- scale production, sale, and export of food and biofuels; cultivation; some agreements do not involve direct land acquisition, but seek to secure food supplies through contract farming and investment in rural and agricultural infrastructure, including irrigation systems and roads. Actors Transnational Corporations (TNCs); foreign governments; wealthier, food- insecure nations (or richer countries with food deficiencies); private investors; private companies; national investors and international investors; foreign entities treated as nationals (result of partnership between national and international investors); international actors in collusion with national governments; national, foreign and international actors; domestic investors; public and private investors (often participating in the same project through direct participation, loans, subsidies, tax exemptions, investment guarantees or diplomatic procedures). Scale Large areas of land; large-scale; a scale that is disproportionate in seize in comparison to the average land holding in the region; amount differs. Characteristics Private appropriation of common resources over which groups exercised collective rights of use or management, land that had not been appropriated or claimed by anyone; land that was already subject to an individual or collective private land tenure regime; cross-border; in other countries; foreign investor is stealing the land from the local poor people; new and in direct competition with local users of land, which previously mainly sustained local livelihoods; in recent years; wholesale appropriation of resrouces that excludes other potential beneficiaries; acquisition that are one or more of the following: (1) in violation of human rights, particularly the equal rights of women, (2) not based on free, prior and informed consent of the affected land-users particularly indigenous peoples, (3) not based on a thorough assessment, or are in disregard of social, economic and environmental impacts, including the way they are gendered, (4) not based on transparent contracts that specify clear and binding commitments about activities, employment and benefits sharing, and (5) not based on effective democratic planning, independent oversight and meaningful participation; impact on the political economy and the local and national populations‘ right to resources for both today and the future. Source: Zoomers, 2010; Daniel and Mittal, 2009; Friis and Reenberg, 2010; FIAN, 2010, Borras and Franco, 2010; Oxfam, 2011; Agter, 2010; World Bank, 2011a; Anseeuw, e.a. 2011, Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009, ILC, 2011.

If we look at the different forms in which ‗land grab‘ can take place, it becomes clear that there are various ways. Some authors speak of an investment, transaction, concession or deal, which can entail a purchase or lease of the land (or the rights to use the land). Friis and Reenberg (2010) added the right to use fresh water as well. Borras and Franco (2010) also add

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 23 land speculation as a form of ‗land grab‘. Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick (2009) also argue that it can be a in the form of deals on land leases, concessions or purchases abroad either directly or through state-owned entities and public-private partnerships. Some definitions already stress the involvement of private actors, by saying ‗(trans)national commercial land transaction‘ (Borras and Franco, 2010) or ‗large-scale agricultural investment‘ (World Bank, 2011a), which will be discussed later on, even as the purposes (or drivers). Many definitions already stress the scale; it should involve ‗large areas of land‘ (Agter, 2010) or be ‗large-scale (Zoomers, 2010; World Bank, 2011a; Borras and Franco, 2010, Oxfam, 2011; Agter, 2010). However, the World Bank (2011a) argues that the ‗amount differs‘, which is also agreed by Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick (2009). FIAN (2010) does not stress the scale itself, but the scale in comparison with the average the average land holding in the region, which is in the case of ‗land grab‘ ‗disproportional‘ – which has to be decided in each context. The purpose of the land acquisition can also differ, according to the definitions in table. For example, Daniel and Mittal (2009) argue that the purpose is producing crops for export. This is also stressed by Friis and Reenberg (2010), and FIAN (2010), who speak of ‗commercial/industrial agricultural production‘. Borras and Franco (2010) argue that ‗land grab‘ happens ‗around the large-scale production, sale, and export of food and bio-fuels‘. Looking at the characteristics, some mention that the ‗land grab‘ is ‗cross-border‘ (Zoomers, 2010; Borras and Franco, 2010) or ‗in other countries‘ then the country of origin of the actor (Friis and Reenberg, 2010). Furthermore, ‗land grab‘ stresses that ‗the foreign investor is stealing the land from the local poor people‘, which is mentioned by Friis and Reenberg (2010). Friis and Reenberg (2010) also stress that it is a ‗new and direct competition with local users of land, which previously mainly sustained local livelihoods‘. Oxfam (2011) and the International Land Coalition (ILC, 2011) are the most detailed and précised. According to the definition of the Tirana Declaration, one can speak about ‗large-scale land grabbing‘, when the acquisitions or concessions are one or more of the following:

1. in violation of human rights, particularly the equal rights of women; 2. not based on free, prior and informed consent of the affected land-users particularly indigenous peoples; 3. not based on a thorough assessment, or are in disregard of social, economic and environmental impacts, including the way they are gendered;

Who gets What, When and How? 24 4. not based on transparent contracts that specify clear and binding commitments about activities, employment and benefits sharing, and; 5. Not based on effective democratic planning, independent oversight and meaningful participation.

This definition of ‗land grab‘ is also preferred by Anseeuw, Alden Wily, Cotula, and Taylor in the most recent study ‗Land Rights and the Rush for Land‘ (Anseeuw e.a., 2011). Since this definition is agreed by over 150 representatives of civil society organisations, social movements, grassroots organisations, international agencies, and governments - including the members and strategic partners of the International Land Coalition (ILC) - from more than 45 countries in Africa, Latin America, North America, Asia and Europe, it is based on strong concensus. The focus of this definition is not on the purpose, scale or actors, but on the process of how the land was acquired or granted concession.

Background Although the definitions already touch upon the drivers behind ‗land grabbing‘, ‗land grab‘ should first be considered in a broader context. As Anseeuw (e.a., 2011: 2) argues: ‗land grab‘ is ‗part of longer-term historical processes of economic and social transformation‘. What then are these ‗longer-term historical processes of economic and social transformation‘? According to Zoomers (2010: 433), ‗land grab‘ is partly the result of a combination of globalization, the liberalization of land markets, which contributed to the commoditization of land, and the worldwide ‗boom‘ in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

Globalization The world in which we live in is a ‗globalising world‘ and is seen as ever more global in character and orientation, as Potter (e.a. 2008: 128) describes. According to governments, globalisation - or ‗the intensification of global interconnectedness‘, a process that Schech and Haggis (2000 in Potter, e.a., 2008: 128) associate with the spread of capitalism as a production and market system - involves ‗enhancing the free movement of goods, services, capital, information and, in some instances, people, across national boundaries‘. As Allen (1995 in Potter, e.a. 2008: 129) argues, ‗distance has become less important to economic activities‘. As a consequence, large companies can more easily operate within a ‗borderless world‘ by subcontracting their activities to branch plants in far distant regions, a process that is also referred to as economic globalisation. Kelly (2007, in Douglas e.a., 2007: 183 - 184) defines economic globalization as ‗the increasing linkages between places across the world

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 25 through various interconnected economic flows, the deepening institutionalization of these linkages, and the process of identifying interdependence that is created as a result‘. Globalisation can also affect the role and powers of the nation state, argues Allen (ibid.): ‗in the arena of political globalisation, internationalisation is regarded as leading to the erosion of the former role and powers of the nation state‘. Potter (e.a., ibid) also argues that the process of globalisation is ‗inescapably plugged into the neo-liberal world order‘, in which a liberal free-market policy is central, even as ‗the rolling back of the state‘ (Potter, e.a., 2008: 128, 94). Globalisation does not automatically have to lead to a negative outcome for development, according to Clare Short, former Secretary of State for International Development in the UK. Short (1998: 458 – 459) argues that globalization is ‗a fundamental and irreversible shift of history, driven by the rapid movement of capital around the globe alongside major technological change. It is increasing wealth-creation and is capable of giving a major boost to poverty eradication‘. In order to reach this positive outcome, Short (ibid.) argues that developing countries must become ‗full participants on the global economic stage – shaping and influencing the global rules – and their interests and needs must be fully taken into account when the rules are being set‘. However, if countries fail ‗to put in place the right arrangements‘, the consequences ‗can be swift and brutal‘. Sanchez (2003: 1980 – 1992) also stresses the role of countries themselves: although there is a ‗swinging of the pendulum toward globalization-minded policies‘ (with Latin America as example) that is diverting attention from domestic policies which are essential for growth and development, countries have to make ‗strategic use of international trade and capital flows‘ as part of a development strategy, instead of seeing globalization as a ‗substitute‘ for development.

Liberalization of land markets Besides globalisation, Zoomers (2010) mentions the liberalization of land markets (or stimulating the free operation of land markets), as an important cause of the current ‗land grab‘ (Zoomers, 2003: 245). As Boucher and Barham (2004) argue, land market liberalizations can range from de-collectivization of agrarian reform cooperatives, provision of private property titles, and the elimination of legal restrictions over rental and sales transactions and are often part of broader programs of liberal reform ‗that have attempted to fortify private markets in ways that enhance efficiency and equity outcomes‘. Furthermore, market-oriented land reforms can promote greater investment, more land transfers, and more efficient use of available land, according to Boucher and Barham (2004). It is also considered

Who gets What, When and How? 26 as a ‗powerful instrument for achieving various policy goals, such as reducing poverty, stimulating agricultural development, increasing public savings through tax generation and safeguarding the environment‘ (Zoomers, 2003: 245 - 246). Often, the World Bank, FAO and other international organisations support national governments in policy measures to make an end to the restrictions of earlier land reforms (Zoomers, ibid.). In 1999, the World Bank argued that the removal of remaining restrictions on the land rental market ‗remains one of the top priorities within land policies‘. However, the World Bank also argues that ‗removing the restrictions on markets for land sales may not be the most urgent requirement for increasing efficiency—and may have a negative impact on equity. Measures thus should be sequenced properly, emphasizing rentals rather than sales, and should be integrated with the development of other rural factor markets‘ (Deininger and Binswanger, 1999: 248-249). In 2001, the World Bank also stressed the importance of access to land and the need to liberalize the land market. According to the World Bank (2001: 67), ‗access to land plays an important part in poverty reduction. Better access to land, accompanied by access to such assets as credit and infrastructure, can improve the productivity of land and labour for poor people. Thus liberalizing land markets has large potential benefits‘. Therefore, the World Bank offered loans for the overhaul of land tenure administration, transforming the nature of traditional, multi-layered, landholding relationships toward simplified individual private property regimes. As Rosset (e.a. in LRAN, 2011: 7) puts it, ‗access to land through market mechanisms was pushed as a form of land reform – more easily palatable to entrenched national powers than the mandatory redistribution through agrarian reform sought by social movements.‘

Foreign Direct Investment Figure also shows that FDI worldwide increased enormously since the 1980s, with a peak in 1999/2000 and 2007. However, there is still a huge gap in foreign direct investment (FDI) between the developing and developed countries. According to the World Investment Report 2010, in the top 20 host economies for FDI in 2008-2009 there is not one African country. Among the top 3 are the United States, China and France.2 As explained by Kelly (2007, in Douglas e.a., 2007: 188 - 189), although political, regulatory and technical advances have removed barriers to economic flows and have allowed the integration of far more places, there

2 Top 20: the United States (130 billion dollar in 2009, in comparison to 316 billion dollar in 2008), China (95 billion dollar in 2009), France, China, United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, Germany, Saudi Arabia, India, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Ireland, Australia, Canada, Singapore and Spain (15 billion dollar in 2009).

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 27 is indeed an uneven geography to the process of incorporation into global flows and unevenness in the nature of that incorporation in different places. ‗Some places are incorporated into the global economy as resource producers, realizing very little of the value that will ultimately be added to their natural riches. Other places, such as business and financial hubs, are nodes for the highest value and most richly rewarded activities in the global economy – for every hundred poorly paid labourers on a plantation, down a mine or in a factory, there is a lawyer, currency/commodity trader, accountant or management consultant who is richly awarded‘.

Figure 1. FDI inflows, globally and by groups of economies, 1980 – 2009 (in billions of dollars)

Source: UNCTAD, 2010: .

Although there is a wide gap between developed and developing countries, until 2008-2009, FDI flows to Africa went through a decade of growth, according to the World Investment Report 2010 (UNCTAD, 2010: 168). FDI flows to Africa declined from a peak of $72 billion in 2008 to $59 billion in 2009, ‗due to the contraction of global demand and the fall in commodity prices‘. As UNCTAD (2010: 33) argues, this has serious consequences since FDI accounts for about a fifth of gross fixed capital formation. ‗FDI could be an important source of job creation and value-added activities‘. As the report notes, firms from developing countries (particularly from Asia) are becoming more and more present in many African countries (although developed-country transnational corporations still account for the lion‘s share of inward FDI stock and flows). ‗TNCs from developing countries are making a rapid entry into Africa‘, due to the high commodity prices and the growing internationalization of emerging TNCs from developing

Who gets What, When and How? 28 economies. Together with fast-growing emerging economies they are in need of natural resources: ‗China, in particular, has become one of the most significant foreign investors in some sub-Saharan African countries, while India and Malaysia are also substantial sources of FDI to the region‘. Most of these investments are ‗resource-seeking‘ and often involve state-owned enterprises from these countries. China and Indian investors mainly are in manufacturing and infrastructure. ‗While labour costs in Africa may not differs significantly from those in the firms‘ home economies, the duty-free, quota-free access of African countries to developed countries through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the European Union‘s Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative have generated some efficiency-seeking investment‘, according to UNCTAD (2010: 34). In comparison with other regions such as Southern Africa or North Africa, the FDI inflows for East Africa are less, although it increased from 2000 to 2008 (see appendix M).

What’s new? As the Land Research Action Network (LRAN, 2011: 6) argues, productive lands, rich in water and natural resources, have always been the most valued assets of communities, societies and nations. Land acquisitions by foreign private investors are therefore not a new development; these kinds of acquisitions have taken place on a small scale for decades. What‘s new is that in recent years land acquisitions by foreign private investors have changed, ‗due to a changed economic and political environment which has accelerated this process‘ (LRAN, 2011: 6). As Borras (e.a., 2011: 14) show, agricultural land expansion grew ‗significantly‘, from 1.36 billion ha in 1961 to 1.55 billion ha in 2007 in the world. If we focus on Sub-Saharan Africa, cultivated land expanded from 134.6 million if hectare to 218.5 million of hectare in 2007, which represents an annual change of 2.63 percent between 1997 and 2007.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 29 Table 2. Historical land expansion

N.B. Cultivated area is land under arable or permanent crops. Source: Deininger, 2011 in Borras e.a., 2011: 18.

According to the Land Research Action Network (LRAN, ibid.), ‗a new global wave of land grabbing is underway‘. Even as LRAN, Daley and Englert (2010: 97) also focus on foreign land acquisitions and argue that the scale of current international ‗land-grabbing‘ is worrying. ‗Recent data from the International Food Policy Research Institute on foreign land acquisitions in developing countries between 2006 and 2009 suggests that at minimum 8.85 million hectares of land were acquired by governments and investors from rich food- importing countries in known land/food production deals, and that in total some 15-20 million hectares of land may have been subject to transactions or talks about possible transactions during this period; over 7 million hectares of the known land deals were located in eastern Africa (Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo).‘3 Data from the Global Land Project shows that there are 177 land deals reported from 2007 till 2010. Among the top recipient countries are Ethiopia, Madagascar and Sudan. Ethiopia represents 26 land deals, with an estimated magnitude between 2,892,000 ha and 3,524,000 ha. Madagascar follows with 24 land deals and an estimated magnitude of 2,745,000 ha. Sudan, Tanzania, Mali and Mozambique follow (see appendix D, Friis and Reenberg, 2010: 11). FAO puts these magnitudes in perspective, as can be seen in table 3. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, reported land deals represent 48.8 percent of the total agricultural area, followed by Mozambique, where land deals represent 21.1 percent of the agricultural area and Uganda, where the land deals represent 14.6 percent of the agricultural area (FAO, 2010 in Friis and Reenberg, 2010).

3 This data relates only to land for food production and does not include land that has been given over to bio- fuels.

Who gets What, When and How? 30 Table 3. Land resources and land deals

Recipient FAO land resource data (1,000ha) Land deal as percentage of: country Land Agricultural Forest Land area Agricultural Agriculture Area area area and forest Ethiopia 100 000 35 077 12 718 2.9 8.2 6.1 Madagascar 58 154 40 843 12 764 4.7 6.7 5.1 Sudan 237 600 136 773 66 368 1.3 2.3 1.6 Tanzania 88 580 34 200 34 433 1.9 5 2.5 Mali 122 019 39 619 12 372 2 6.1 4.6 Mozambique 78 638 48 800 19 162 13.1 21.1 15.2 Uganda 19 710 12 812 3 454 9.5 14.6 11.5 DR Congo 226 705 22 650 132 971 4.9 48.8 7.1 Nigeria 91 077 78 500 10 270 0.9 1 0.9 Zambia 74 339 25 589 41 562 3 8.8 3.3 Ghana 22 754 14 850 5 286 0.4 0.6 0.4 Malawi 9 408 4 970 3 336 3.3 6.2 3.7 Senegal 19 253 8 637 8 583 2.6 5.9 3 Source: FAOstat, Land resource database, 2010 in Friis and Reenberg, 2010: 12. (N.B. The magnitude of the land deals as a percentage of the total land area, the agricultural area and the agricultural area plus the forest covered area in each of the 13 main recipient countries. Areas as of 2007).

The most recent study argues that there are 948 reported land deals, of which 134 million hectares are located in Africa (Anseeuw, e.a., 2011: 23). Land deals in Asia represent 43 million hectares, 19 million hectares in Latin America and 1.6 million hectares in other regions, such as Eastern Europe and Oceania.

Drivers According to Zoomers (2010: 430), the current land deals represent a ‗new type of land grab, one in which not only private investors but also national and local governments are playing an increasingly important role‘. This is generated by the three processes that were discussed above; globalization, liberalization of land markets and an increase in FDI. The pressure on local land markets is driven by seven relatively new processes, according to Zoomers (ibid.): (1) FDI in food production, (2) FDI in non-food agricultural commodities and biofuels, (3) nature conservation and ecotourism, (4) Special Economic Zones, large-scale infrastructure works and urban extensions, (5) large-scale tourist complexes, (6) retirement and residential migration and (7) land purchases by migrants in their countries or origin. Daley and Englert (2010: 92) also define several processes of change that have overlap with the processes and drivers explained by Zoomers, respectively commoditization of land, economic and rural- urban change, conflict (and post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation), the spread of

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 31 HIV/AIDS, and the increasing ‗privatization‘ of land tenure. Land-grabbing for bio-fuels and food production, climate change, and food security are seen as relatively new processes of changes.

Actors Who are the actors that are involved in these land deals? As was already mentioned, Daley and Englert (2010) and Zoomers (2010) argue that the involvement of governments (both domestic and foreign) in ‗land grab‘ makes these developments different from the past. This is also stressed by Borras and Franco (2010) and Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick (2009). According to Daniel and Mittal (2009) and Friis and Reenberg (2010), foreign government are often from ‗wealthier, food-insecure nations‘. Countries that are often named in this context are countries from the Arab-Persian Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar, but also countries such as China, South Korea, Japan, India and Libya (Agter, 2010: 14-15; LRAN, 2011). In many cases, land acquisitions made by these actors ‗have substantial food security motives on the part of the home country‘ (Anseeuw, e.a., 2011: 21). However, as Anseeuw (ibid.) argues, private acquirers ‗motivated by profit‘ are also among the top investors and are from traditional investor countries and emerging economies such as Brazil and South Africa. Private actors, such as TNCs, companies and investors are also mentioned in several definitions and can be both national as international (Zoomers, 2010; Daniel and Mittal, 2009; FIAN, 2010; Borras and Franco, 2010; Agter, 2010; World Bank, 2010). Furthermore, national investors may also involve sovereign wealth funds, public and semi-governmental enterprises, public development banks, governmental agencies and private actors (Agter, 2010: 14 – 15). According to Agter (ibid.), international financial organisations and institutions also have a direct and indirect influence in these investments, by funding projects and enterprises or actively promoting direct foreign investments. Here Agter (ibid.) especially mentions the World Bank, ‗which has created several specialist institutions to make investments, encourage national governments to reform their legislation in order to facilitate and secure foreign investments, and to advise investors‘. Agter (ibid.) also mentions the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), ‗which plays an important role in funding agricultural projects in Eastern Europe‘, the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf and the West African Economic and Monetary Union. However, although you can distinguish public and private actors, the investments that are made are often complex, argues Agter (ibid.). ‗The fact that public and private structures

Who gets What, When and How? 32 are frequently involved in the same project, through direct participation, loans, subsidies, tax exemptions, investment guarantees or diplomatic procedures, makes it difficult to distinguish‘ them. What also became clear from the different definitions is that ‗this phenomenon is really more diverse, of a larger scale, and perhaps less novel that it had first appeared‘. As Anseeuw (e.a., 2011: 2) argues, although some transnational deals were focussed on food and biofuels production, ‗they are hard to separate analytically from wider trends of increasing commercial pressures on land characterised by a more diverse range of actors, scales, and economic drivers‘.

Consequences According to Dietz (2011), there are two narratives on the consequences of new corporate land acquisitions, either optimistic or pessimistic. According to the optimists, foreign large scale land acquisitions for purposes of producing food and biofuels for export will have many positive effects on the economy and society of the areas where they take place. Furthermore, it is argued that Africa is the largest remaining frontier for expanding agriculture. Many countries have suitable land available that is either not cultivated or produces well below its potential. This was a development challenge even before the food price rise of 2008. Seventy- five percent of the world‘s poor are rural, and most are engaged in farming. According to the World Bank (2011a: xiii), ‗the need for more and better investment in agriculture to reduce poverty, increase economic growth, and promote environmental sustainability was already clear when there were only 830 million hungry people before the food price rise. The case is even clearer today when, for the first time in human history, over a billion people go to bed hungry each night‘. These types of acquisitions will expand the land use, expand the labour market and underutilized labour. As the World Bank (2011a: xiii) argues, ‗one of the highest development priorities in the world must be to improve smallholder agricultural productivity, especially in Africa‘.

„Smallholder productivity is essential for reducing poverty and hunger, and more and better investment in agricultural technology, infrastructure, and market access for poor farmers is urgently needed. When done right, larger-scale farming systems can also have a place as one of many tools to promote sustainable agricultural and rural development, and can directly support smallholder productivity, for example, through outgrower programs‟ (World Bank, 2011a: xiii).

The first argument in favour of new corporate land acquisitions is the national budget. As Ton Dietz (2011) explains, land leases will bring foreign exchange and taxes. Before the acquisition these lands as such produced hardly taxes for local and national government. The

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 33 acquisition by a foreign investor will result in export products that will be taxed. It will effect management and foreign labour; they will contribute via indirect taxes. Consumption will increase, there will be room for the expansion of local jobs, labour will get higher paid, indirect and direct taxes will increase, so in the end the national budget can only expand. Second, there will be an impact on economic growth. The investment will increase the economic value production in areas where that was very limited before. It will expand the agricultural land use to areas that had mainly non-agricultural or low-intensity agricultural production before. It will also create a lot of extra direct employment and enable value chain development that creates a lot of indirect employment, for example due to the development of transportation networks and the need for insurances. Third, land acquisitions will have a positive impact on the land market. The acquisitions will increase the value of land in the country as a whole as a result of increasing land pressure, which will improve the commercial land markets. It will also give the land owners more economic security, and banks an incentive to use land as mortgage and hence increase farmers‘ access to credit and banking services. It will also be an incentive for more productive farmers to buy land from less productive farmers. Fourth, it will enable labourers to buy more food with their income than they have ever could buy before. For example, earnings from biofuels could give more money which could give the person more access to food than before. In case of national food and energy shortages the government can decide to ban export of food/biofuels and make that available for support operations within the national territory. In this way, a crisis can be solved with the amount of food and fuels that you would otherwise never had had. The fifth argument according to Dietz (2011) often neglected. Due to the different new backgrounds of foreign investors (Chinese, Indians, etc.) there will be a positive impact on networks and capabilities. The exposure to foreign investors from ‗new backgrounds‘ will create possibilities for new networks of contacts, which can be beneficial for trade, migration and knowledge exchange. Furthermore, the increased exposure to multi-focal global influences will create incentives for increased learning, and higher level of information exchange, with more language and cultural skills.

Pessimist narrative However, there is also a ‗pessimist narrative‘ on new corporate land acquisitions that counters the above mentioned arguments. The pessimists argue that certainly in the long run new corporate land acquisitions will have devastated effects on land and people of the receiving

Who gets What, When and How? 34 areas. They argue that the idea of ‗underutilized land and labour‘ is a false assumption. It‘s an illusion that foreign companies will improve their economic position. First, foreign large-scale land acquisitions for food and biofuels production for export will have a negative impact on the land and the hydro-ecology. Foreign-owned plantations on non-agricultural land are detrimental to biodiversity, and to the natural roles of these areas play for a much larger area, such as water storage and as gene pool. Furthermore, the export of natural resources will not be compensated. Particularly the upstream use of (ground)water will harm water access of downstream areas in a much larger region and this will happen without proper compensation. The Land Research Action Network (LRAN, 2011: 6) argues, due to the use of monocrops in bio diverse rich lands, and the treatment with powerful pesticides and herbicides, poor families have to deal with the negative impacts of these plantations. In many cases, according to LRAN (ibid.) families are forced to make a living by opening up new areas of forest and woodland for cultivation, which can lead to conflicts with previously settled communities over access to limited resources. There is also a negative impact on the environment, since some government authorities view their forests as possible spare land that can be made available for commercial exploitation (LRAN, ibid.). Second, the impact on the local economy will be devastating. Although most of the captured areas were indeed thinly populated before, they provided economic security for many relatively marginal people. Is security provided for marginal players in the national economy, such as pastoralists and inland- fishermen? Land rent and physical access barriers will prevent the local population from using the land, which may endanger arrangements of land acquisition and sharing. Furthermore, the access to common property and lands with unclear property arrangements provided important fallback options to the poorest segments of society, and often provided safe havens for people who wanted to maintain a cultural deviant form of society and live a different lifestyle. Especially for these people there will be no new opportunities. The jobs that are promised by the investor will be for others, and not for them. ‗What is left is starvation, deep poverty and migration to urban slums‘ (Dietz, 2011). Many campaigns and reports of NGOs have this critical view. Recently, Oxfam International launched the ‗GROW‘ campaign and published ‗Land and Power; the growing scandal surrounding the new wave of investments in land‘ (Oxfam, 2011). Other reports from organisations such as GRAIN (2008)

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 35 ‗SEIZED! The 2008 land grab for food and financial security‘, the Oakland Institute (Daniel and Mittal, 2009) ‗The Great Land Grab Rush for World‘s Farmland Threatens Food Security for the Poor‘ is taking a firm stand against these processes. The image which is at the front- page of the GTZ report ‗Access to land; a prerequisite to food security‘ (Görgen e.a., 2009), illustrates the second argument of the pessimists: when land is bought or rented by private actors, the land that first could be used by the community or pastoralists, is no longer accessible due to a fence. Furthermore, according to LRAN (2011: 7) the macro-economic returns from ‗large land concession projects‘ are ‗inadequate, given that accompanying conditions such as tax, rent, social infrastructure, workers‘ wages and welfare tend to favour investors over larger societal interests‘. The third argument deals with the political economy. The pessimists argue that foreign corporate land acquisitions will devastate the political economy; small national elites will capture the awards of the alliances with these foreign investors and invest them abroad or in ways that will not assist the domestic economy. This will feed a political mentality of ‗quick resource capture‘ and ‗primitive accumulation‘ (Dietz, 2011). According to Dahlberg (1979: 110-111), contacts, projects and alliances with multinational corporations tend to become ‗part of the competition between various members of the national elite and between their various bureaucracies and ministries‘. In this competition, the vested interests of the groups involved are central, even as the direction of the economy, the balance between the private and public sectors and the short-term benefits of ‗turnkey‘ projects where production on needed items can begin quickly, versus the longer-term benefits of developing an indigenous engineering and technological capacity (Dahlberg, ibid.). In the end, some pessimists also argue that ‗quick resource capture‘ and ‗primitive accumulation‘ will feed hostility to competing claimants and to adversaries who contest the new developments, including the people who feel themselves victims of the new development. It will also create a breeding ground for conflicts, human rights abuses and dictatorial government. Fourth, the gains that can be expected in the early phase for land and labour productivity will not be sustainable as land will soon deteriorate, and large-scale immigration of numerous job-seekers will depress actual wages and rewards while increasing the price of consumer goods. The most rewarding management positions will be filled with foreigners and local elitists. The local multipliers will be minimal (Dietz, 2011). LRAN (2011: 6) also argues that families and communities can be fractured, because family and community members have to move to urban centres to find a job or to other rural areas as a seasonal agricultural labourer. Furthermore, there have been cases ‗which include the expropriation of land

Who gets What, When and How? 36 belonging to entire villages of people, with little or no monetary compensation and rarely any provision for alternative livelihoods other than to take the penny of the company that threw them, unceremoniously, off their land.‘

„Actual opportunities for employment tend to end up being much smaller than originally promised. Often local people are passed over in favour of a migrant work force who flow in from a precarious circumstance elsewhere. Jobs on large-scale plantations favour the young, relegating older farmers to unemployment, depreciating their knowledge and skills. Where no alternative employment exists, they are forced into long-term dependency on their children. The terms and conditions offered for industrial farm labour are often unclear and unmonitored, leaving many workers with no job security, scant protection against health hazards, irregular wage payments and no legal redress. Wages, after deductions, are barely enough to bring home staple food, except where several workers are hired from one family. Even small price fluctuations have a direct impact on daily hunger. Field studies by the authors and other researchers show that such incomes cannot substitute for a lost productive farm, forest, wetland or rangeland on which a variety of foods and cash resources had been cultivated on a long-term basis‟ (Schott, 2010 in LRAN, 2011: 6).

Fifth, as a consequence of the fourth argument, foreign corporate land acquisitions will have a negative impact on social cohesion. It will result in overall conflict and hidden conflict. There will be politically very unstable environment which will create failed states and undermine the long term stability. Furthermore, it will create nodes and spines of ‗securitized accumulation‘ and ‗elite consumption fortresses‘ amidst vast areas of deep poverty, neglect and security (Dietz, 2011). ‗And that‘s what happening in many parts of the world‘ (Dietz, 2011). Another important argument (6) is that investments in land can have negative effects for the food security and local livelihoods of vulnerable groups, as GTZ (2009: 19-21) argues, which also is in relation to previous arguments. Former land users or owners without formal land concession can lose their livelihood base if they are evicted from the land that is purchased by an investor, as was already mentioned in the second argument. If the country where the investment is occurring is also food-insecure, then the investment (even in food supplies) does not automatically imply that domestic food availability will increase. The products that are produced can be exported to the country which is investing. According to GTZ (ibid.) the local food availability could even further decrease ‗if land and water resources are directed to and used by the investor at the expense of domestic smallholders‘ production‘. In figure (...) the framework to analyse the food security and local development. The boxes in red (expulsion of owners, agricultural labour import, insufficient/inappropriate compensation for owners to allow for new sustainable livelihood strategies‘) will lead to ‗(very) negative immediate or medium to longer term impact on local livelihoods and food security‘. The boxes in blue are representing a more optimistic scenario.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 37 Figure 2. Framework to analyze the food security effects on FDI in land on selected vulnerable groups

Source: Görgen e.a., 2009: 20. Boxes by author.

HOW TO DEAL WITH THESE DEVELOPMENTS? According to Daniel and Mittal (2009: 9-12) land grabs are being ‗legitimized and perpetuated‘ by actors as donor governments, a number of research institutions, and international governance agencies such as the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and other UN agencies, who claim that land deals can be a ‗win-win situation‘ both for the investor and the receiving ‗host‘ countries. As Daniel and Mittal (ibid.) illustrate, Jacques Diouf, Director-General of the FAO, supports the proposed Gulf land deals as a means of economic development for poor countries. If the deals are properly constructed, they have the potential to transform developing economies by providing jobs both in agriculture and other supporting industries like transportation and warehousing. IFAD, with his president Kanayo Nwanze argued in 2010 that foreign land deals could be a ‗win-win‘ solution for those involved. He highlighted the need for more community-investor partnerships which ‗don‘t require large-scale transfer of land rights. What is important is that they should be long-term. That they should balance profit with social responsibility. And they should be supported by governments, civil society organizations, and the private sector, to ensure that they are mutually beneficial‘ (Nierenberg and Pollack, 2010).

Who gets What, When and How? 38 The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI ) argues that ‗if there is transparency in negotiations, respect for existing land rights, and sharing of benefits between local communities and foreign investors, foreign investment can provide key resources for agriculture, including development of needed infrastructure and expansion of livelihood options for local people‘ (Daniel and Mittal, ibid.). IFAD also supports the development of partnerships or joint-venture agreements between the countries that have the financial resources and others which possess land, water, and human resources.

„Massive foreign investments in rural areas can be an opportunity for development. At the same time, it might well be that direct acquisition of land by outsiders is not necessary for the products – food and feed – that this demand aims to secure. If the price for these products is remunerative, then the supply can be organized by the current owners or users of the land, the majority of whom are smallholder farmers. Public investments in infrastructure and other public goods, private investment in processing industries and financial services and organization of producers and local communities can result in win-win situations. Such situations can maximize opportunities in terms of, inter alia, increased agricultural income, new employment opportunities and overall rural development while minimizing risks related to the alienation of land rights and the marginalization of poor rural people. In this connection, public policy choices and, in particular, the systematic and inclusive consultation of local communities and farmers‟ organizations have a critical role to play and could make the difference‟ (IFAD, 2009: 1).

However, in order to be a ‗win-win‘ situation, it should be an investment within a ‗conducive policy framework, can contribute to poverty reduction, agriculture-led development and economic growth. Provided they are developed with a pro-poor, sustainable and ‗win-win‘ approach that takes into consideration the needs, capabilities and constraints of smallholder farmers, these partnerships can create valuable synergies through knowledge and risk sharing, economies of scale, and resource pooling. Contract farming/out-grower schemes are the most common models to date of such partnerships‘ (IFAD, 2009: 8). Daniel and Mittal (2009: 9- 10) also argue that the growing support for an investment code of conduct from donor countries and the technical financial support from international financing institutions are legitimizing large-scale land investments. For example, Joachim von Braun, director general at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), called for a code of conduct for the investing companies and countries.

„The combination of an international code of conduct4, on the one hand, and improved domestic agricultural policies, on the other hand, would make a virtue of the investments that investors consider

4 A code of conduct with ‗teeth‘ should have the following key elements: (1) transparency in negotiations (free, prior and informed consent is the standard); (2) respect for existing land rights, including customary and common property rights (including compensation and rehabilitation) (3); sharing of benefits (also for the local community, contract farming or outgrower schemes are preferred); (4) environmental sustainability (environmental impact assessment and monitoring); (5) adherence to national trade policies (in case of national food security risk, domestic supplies should have priority) (Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009: 3-4).

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 39 a necessity and facilitate win-win outcomes. Well-designed foreign direct investment could embed transfers of knowledge and institutional strengthening into the investment and related trade flows, thereby improving productivity in the target countries of these investments. In the longer run, a healthy trade relationship could grow out of such investment islands, building trust in trade, at least on a bilateral basis and potentially more broadly, in an increasingly volatile world food system‟(Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009: 3).

However, Daniel and Mittal (2009: 9-10) do not agree; ‗focusing on potential benefits helps mask numerous risks and likely consequences of land grabbing. With increasing talk of win- win situations, the dissenting voices often go unheard. The lack of transparency of the private- sector led land deals to date have suggested that the livelihoods of the poor and most vulnerable rarely factor into whether or not these situations will, in fact, be win-win.‘ The World Bank argues, in its most recent report ‗Rising Global Interest in Farmland, can it yield sustainable and equitable benefits?‘ that ‗when done right, large-scale farming systems can also have a place as one of many tools to promote sustainable agricultural and rural development, and can directly support smallholder productivity, for example, through outgrower programs. Critical reports are ‗worrying‘, but ‗the lack of reliable information has made it difficult to understand what has been actually happening‘ (World Bank, 2011a: xiv). This report, in which 389 deals in 80 countries are researched, has been delayed for several times. According to GRAIN this delay is ‗due to unfavourable findings‘ (Pollack and Nierenberg, 2010). As Scones (2011) argues, the main argument of the report is that ‗external investment in land is good thing in some places, especially those where there are large tracts of suitable land, but also large proportion of smallholders with very low productivity, but that governance measures, based on a set of high-sounding principles, are required to make this happen equitably and sustainably‘. This ‗code of conduct‘, as was already suggested by IFPRI (Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009), is according to Scones (2011) ‗hailed as the administrative-managerial solution to the troublesome governance problems of large-scale land investment‘, but the more explicit way in which this should work in reality is missing. ‗The actual practice is a world away‘ from ideals such as ‗evidence-based multi-stakeholder approach‘ and ‗open and impartial‘ and ‗accountable and representative mechanisms‘, think only of the lack of capacity, failures of institutional authority, corrupt practices and so on (Scones, 2011). Scones (ibid.) conclusion is therefore:

„The overall message is deeply confusing. The confusion arises from several fronts: methodological, presentational and conceptual. (...) As the report admits, data on land acquisitions is shaky at best, and the Bank relied on government surveys, which in most settings are less than

Who gets What, When and How? 40 reliable. (...). A political economy analysis of agrarian change and the role of large scale investments in historical perspective is essentially absent from the report. (...) Without an understanding of what drives investments, what politics surrounds the deals, and the socio-political dynamics shaping livelihood outcomes, it is very difficult to make sense of recent events‟ (Scones, 2011).

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) As was already mentioned, the president of IFAD argues: ‗What is important is that they [foreign land deals] should be long-term. That they should balance profit with social responsibility‘. According to Newell and Frynas (2007: 669), Corporate Social Responsibility has been adopted as an approach to international development. The European Commission defines CSR as ‗a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interactions with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis‘ (Newell and Frynas, 2007: 673). Although Newell and Frynas (ibid.) argue that CSR can also be acts of philanthropy, contributions to community development, codes of conduct and/or compliance with international standards of best practices, this research will use the definition of Jenkins (2005: 525), respectively: ‗voluntary corporate initiatives aimed at improving the social and environmental impacts of a company's business activities, but excludes philanthropy which arises after profits are made‘. According to Barkemeyer (2009: 285 – 286), the CSR agenda is still predominantly shaped by Northern priorities. Therefore, government intervention is still needed; when development issues in the South are taken up by voluntary and business-led CSR instruments, this will have significant limitations. According to Barkemeyer (ibid.), the state has to be brought back into the debate in order to create a better fit between the agenda of Northern and Southern countries. ‗A laissez-faire approach is unlikely to produce meaningful contributions towards a more sustainable and inclusive development in the South‘. However, there is also a view that it is not the CSR policy that is determining whether the investment of a private actor has an impact on development, but instead they argue that it is the practice of doing ‗business as usual‘. By doing ‗business-as-usual‘, e.g. increasing employment among the poor, providing new market opportunities for smallholders, increasing the access of the poor to essential services or contribute to government taxes, firms help to tackle poverty in their role as investors, employers and tax-paters, and not through acts of philanthropy, adherence to global social standards or the negotiation of codes of conduct (Newell and Frynas, 2007: 674). Therefore, Newell and Frynas (ibid.) argue that CSR as well as non-CSR activities of firms have both a bearing on poverty. Building a school, a clinic or a water treatment plant can bring enormous short- and long-term benefits to a community.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 41 However, ‗such contributions are likely to be overshadowed by the economic and social effects, positive and negative, that are created by investment and employment‘. In the end ‗it is in the day-to-day management of the firm and through the taking of key investment decisions that development gains come to be realized or denied, rather than in the well intended, but isolated and discrete activities of firms in developing areas‘ (Newell and Frynas, ibid.).

Public Private Partnerships the new ‘panacea’ for development? As became clear in discussing the definitions of ‗land grab‘, a wide range of actors are already involved. According to Agter (2010: 14-15) national investors for example may also involve national investors may also involve sovereign wealth funds, public and semi-governmental enterprises, public development banks, governmental agencies and private actors. International financial organisations and institutions can also influence these investments (Agter, ibid.). In this context, it is interesting to discuss public private partnerships, which have increased since the 1980s in number and scope around the world (Loftus, 2008 in Desai and Potter, 2008: 543). Also in Southern countries, due to adopting ‗the credo of market supremacy and government inadequacy‘, as Miraftab (2004: 91) argues. Regarding agriculture, agricultural multinationals have been successful in working out ‗comfortable cooperative arrangements‘ with international agencies in the 1960s, such as the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) (Dahlberg, 1979: 115).5 There is no consensus on the definition of public-private partnerships (PPP). According to Hodge and Greve (2009: 33) PPPs can be defined as ‗cooperative institutional arrangements between public and private sector actors‘. Linder (1999, in Hodge and Greeve, 2009: 34) views PPP as a set of ‗language games‘ as there are ‗multiple grammars‘ to the meaning of PPPs. Some governments prefer the term ‗partnership‘ instead of ‗privatisation‘ or ‗contracting out‘ while in reality it is the same policy, but put under a different and ‗catchier‘ name. Partnerships can also vary in size, scope and purpose. As Selsky and Parker (2005: 850-851, 853) argue, they can range from dyads to multiparty arrangements, local to global levels, short- to long term time frames, and totally voluntary to fully mandated.

5 For example, the Industry Cooperative Program (ICP) that was founded in 1966 to provide industry expertise on agriculture to developing countries. According to Turner (1972 in Dahlberg, 1979: 115), most ‗seem to have joined in the long-term hope of gradually convincing the United Nations aid establishment that private investment can play a real part in the development ‗mix‘. ICP was ejected from its rank by FAO in 1978 based on claims that ‗corporations reaped substantial financial benefits‘. Member companies used information provided by FAO to make profitable investments that often displaced and impoverished smallholding farmers‘. Another initiative is the Industry Council for Development (ICD), a non-profit organization funded by 32 multinationals, with support from UNDP (also Bolton, 1977).

Who gets What, When and How? 42 ‘Organizations in every sector face changing pressures and evolving public expectations that encourage them to partner across sectors. Demands for corporate social responsibility encourage businesses to partner, nonprofits are motivated by demands for improved efficiency and accountability, and governments are encouraged to provide more benefits and services while being both less intrusive and more transparent’ (Selsky and Parker, ibid.).

According to Te Velde (2001: 4) there are several reasons why a company might prefer a partnership model, rather than delivering local social investment programmes on its own. ‗First, the existence of high transaction costs associated with investments could favour a partnership. Such transaction costs may relate to the need to obtain construction and other permits and finding workers with suitable skills and local knowledge to implement the investment. Second, a business is usually not specialised in making social investments (constructing roads, health centres, etc.) and hence building on each other‘s specialisation can lead to more efficient use of resources. Third, long-term co-ordination of supply and demand for social investment programmes at the local level between government and business and civil society can ensure a more effective use of resources to bring social development. Finally, the partnership model – particularly a ‗tri-sector‘ model - can also reduce volatility in the relations between parties, leading to improved risk management.‘ As in each debate, the discourse on PPPs is also filled with different interest groups: advocates include groups such as consultants, merchant bankers, legal firms, construction companies (mainly in the US and Europe), governments through ministers and their compliant treasury and finance departments and international development agencies as well, as was mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph. According to Miraftab (2004: 89), these agencies celebrate PPPs as a ‗key strategy for delivering services in the third world‘. Proponents argue that the ‗marriage‘ between the government and the private sector, mediated by the public sector, can overcome certain shortcomings of each and is therefore a win-win situation: private firms can help reduce poverty, and make profits at the same time, by investing new business models for providing products and services to the world‘s poor (Newell and Frynas, 2007: 670). PPPs are seen as a ‗market-enabling‘ strategy by which the private sector‘s role is supported by the resources of the communities, the private sector, and the public sector. Partnerships with NGOs, development agencies and local communities can help private firms to develop new markets, while providing the poor with access to markets and services (Newell and Frynas, ibid.). Furthermore, PPPs would avoid presumed inefficiencies of the public sector. The (unexamined) assumption is that as partnerships create wealth, they also distribute it equitably (Miraftab, 2004: 89 – 91).

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 43 Critics have appeared across disciplines and traditional ideological borders (Hodge and Greve, 2009: 34). In a review of the current state of PPPs, Rosenau (1999, 2000b in Selsky and Parker, 2005: 860) concluded they have substantial problems; they may decrease costs in the short term, but only if cost and efficiency are defined narrowly and externalities are discounted. They do not necessarily exhibit superior performance in terms of equity, access, or democracy. Moreover, they do not necessarily reduce regulation because government still must fulfil its roles as protector of the public good. Regarding accountability, public partners are the providers of last resort, but this could change if private partners gain more experience and partnering moves into more fully developed policy partnerships (Selsky and Parker, 2005: 860). Furthermore, according to Miraftab (2004: 89) there are serious discrepancies between the theory propounding partnerships as a third world panacea and their consequences in reality.

„In the context of the third world‟s wide socioeconomic gaps and decentralizing states, where central governments often have neither the will nor the ability to intervene effectively, PPPs are free to operate as „Trojan Horses‟ of development. Private sector firms approach local governments and their impoverished communities with the message of power sharing, but once the process is in motion the interests of the community are often overwhelmed by those of the most powerful member of the partnership – the private sector firms‟ (Miraftab, 2004: 89).

As the quote already shows, Miraftab (2004: 94 - 98) is concerned about the public-private partnerships in the South, especially when the local government in these countries are among the partners in the PPPs. Even as Barkemeyer (2009) in the debate on corporate social responsibility, Miraftab (ibid.) also argues for a stronger role of the state. ‗Successful partnerships require strong mediation by the state to develop detailed regulations that level the playing field amongst unequal partners and to protect the interest of the disadvantaged partner(s)‘. For that, the state has to be willing as well as able to use its financial, legislative/regulatory, and institutional resources. However, according to Miraftab (ibid.), due to the decentralization in many Third World countries, lower tiers of government are giving more responsibilities, but not always the matching capacity that is needed to make sure that this level playing field is guaranteed. They often cannot fulfil this mediating role: ‗their financial dependence, combined with their limited technical and financial capacity to handle their new responsibilities, leaves local governments little power of independent decision making and hence little influence on partnerships they enter into‘. As a result, the process is often dominated by the private sector firms that are at the steering wheel, while the other

Who gets What, When and How? 44 actors ‗row‘.6 Furthermore, Miraftab (2004: 92-93) also puts a question mark at the intention to let the community‘s poor benefit from the PPP. This is dependent on the nature of the associated action: how the partnership is conceived, why it is initiated and carried out, and whether the power imbalances amongst participants can be dealt with to secure equitable, horizontal power relations.

„Is the community filling a gap for the public or private sector by performing tasks that organizations in those sectors prefer not to perform – perhaps by providing cheap labour? Or are local governments and private sector organizations filling the gaps in community action by carrying out the tasks that community people and organizations cannot do‟ (Miraftab, ibid.).

Regarding the position of communities, Newell (2005: 543) stresses that we have to be aware of their position. ‗There is clearly an important difference between a well-resourced and globally networked NGO engaging a company in a discussion about its social and environmental responsibilities and a poorer community without significant resources or access to global networks, confronting investors from a position of weakness.‘ According to Newell (ibid.) power inequities have important implications for the types of accountability mechanism that can realistically be constructed between companies and communities. ‗The nature of the community, as well as the sector in which the company is based, the extent to which it has a global presence and the form of corporate culture that predominates, will all have a bearing on the type of accountability.‘ Despite the critique, institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank and national development agencies such as the Department for International Development (DfID) in the United Kingdom still believe that the ‗market is a critical vehicle for tackling poverty‘, as long as they follow ‗socially responsible practices‘ (Newell and Frynas, 2007: 670). According to the World Investment Report, public-private partnerships can provide a lot of opportunities in ‗a close association between FDI and Official Development Assistance, as well as interaction with domestic investment‘ (UNCTAD, 2010: 63). These partnerships can foster local development. However, ‗successful partnerships, however, require coherent PPP policies providing clear directions to investors and donor countries, a coherent legal and regulatory framework, transparent public decisions and selection of partners, and a commitment to sustainable development. Investors‘ legal rights and the rights of the public in case of investment disputes also need to be protected‘ (UNCTAD, ibid.).

6 Appendix R gives an overview of the capacity of the land offices in the districts that were selected and illustrates this statement.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 45 Especially in the least developed countries there is a ‗significant latency in opportunities for the private sector‘. Not only because there is a lot of current potential in resources, labour or market-based, but ‗more so in participating in the developmental dynamics which move a country along a development trajectory‘. For this the private sector can act as a ‗proactive agent‘, independently seeking potential business opportunities in development processes, or work with the public sector in delivering goods and services in ‗government-led PPP frameworks‘ (UNCTAD, ibid.).

Who gets What, When and How? 46 CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

„Exploratory studies are quite valuable in social scientific research. They‟re essential whenever a researcher is breaking new ground, and they almost always yield new insights into a topic of research‟ (Babbie, 2007: 89).

Since little is known about new corporate land acquisitions and the impact on local livelihoods in Uganda, this is an exploratory study. As Babbie (2007: 88) explains, exploratory studies are most typically done for three purposes: ‗(1) to satisfy the researcher‘s curiosity and desire for better understanding, (2) to test the feasibility of undertaking a more extensive study and (3) to develop the methods to be employed in any subsequent study‘. Although an exploratory study is valuable and essential in ‗breaking new ground‘, it also has some shortcomings. As Babbie (2007: 89) argues, ‗they seldom provide satisfactory answers to research questions, though they can hint at the answers and can suggest which research methods could provide definite ones‘. Therefore, this chapter will explain the methodology, including the conceptual model, subjects for study, measurement, key variables, data collection methods, analysis and will conclude with the limitations.

Conceptual model A conceptual model was designed based on the theoretical discussion in the previous chapter. In order to answer the main research question; what are the main characteristics of new corporate land acquisitions in Uganda and what is the impact on the local livelihoods? We have to find a way to get a better understanding on the impact. GTZ (2009) developed a conceptual model to analyze the impact of FDI on food security and local livelihoods, which is discussed in the previous chapter. Although this chapter will not only focus on FDI, but in new corporate land acquisition in general, it provides a framework that enables us to understand what‘s going on. This model also include the background of new land acquisitions, respectively globalization, the liberalization of land markets and a worldwide increase in FDI and two of the seven distinguished drivers by Zoomers (2010), namely FDI in food (orange) and non-food agricultural commodities (blue), since that is the focus of this research. The theoretical debate also showed that a wide range of actors, on an international, national and local level, are involved and are expected to participate in Uganda as well.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 47 Figure 3. Conceptual model

Based on Zoomers, 2010 and Görgen e.a., 2009.

Subjects for study

„Across the continent, local people do engage in land deals whether by sale or not; and frequently these fail to show up in survey results because the researchers are not asking the questions in the right way or in enough different ways‟ (Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006: 364).

The objective of this study is to gain more knowledge and insight in new corporate land acquisitions in Uganda, in order to present a more comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of current practices in Uganda. This study focuses on the different actors involved in land acquisitions, on all levels, as is shown in the conceptual model. Global actors can be foreign governments, foreign private actors or international organizations or institutions. National

Who gets What, When and How? 48 actors can be the national government of Uganda, national private actors, and national institutions, organizations and NGOs. On the local level, the local governments are expected to play a role as well, even as the local elite, local communities, local NGOs and interest groups.

Measurement In order to answer the main research question, several sub questions are formulated, which were already introduced in the introduction. In order to answer the first sub question, ‗what is the institutional framework for new corporate land acquisitions‘, several policies will be discussed, even as important institutions. Together with the in-depth interviews of key informants, this research will answer this question. In order to give an answer to the second sub question, ‗what do we know of new corporate land acquisitions in Uganda and to what extent does this information correspond with the reality‘, this research will give an overview of new corporate land acquisitions from 2007 onwards and present the sources on which they are based, even as the information that was gathered during the verification. This research will continue by selecting six investments in food or non-agricultural commodities. The fourth sub question, how was the land acquired, will be answered for each of these investments. In order to answer the fifth sub question, information is gathered on the conditions attached to the land acquisition, including benefit sharing agreements the question whether there process of land acquisition respected the principle of prior informed consent (sub question 5a); internal corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies (sub question 5b); whether the land acquisition by the investor caused an eviction and if yes, the compensation of previous tenants (sub question 5c); employment, wages and the involvement of a labour union (sub question 5d); other investments that were the result of the new corporate land acquisition (sub question 5e); and other positive and negative impacts (sub question 5f). The answers to these sub questions will lead us to the answer on the main research question.

Key variables The first key variable of this study is a new land acquisition, which means a land acquisition from 2007 onwards. However, some of the new land acquisitions that are presented where acquired earlier, but were reported in the media from 2007 onwards and are therefore also included. In the selection for the fieldwork, these new land acquisitions have to be acquired by private actors, such as multinational corporations (MNCs) or national corporations or investors. Although seize is not a requirement, the (foreign direct) investment should have the

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 49 purpose of investing in food production or non-agricultural commodities, which can be divided base metals and metal minerals, precious metals and stones, energy commodities (oil, natural gas and coal), non metal minerals, fish and shellfish, rubber and timber (South Centre Analytical Note, 2005: 4). Another key variable is foreign direct investment (FDI), for which the definition of GTZ is used (Görgen e.a., 2009: 64-65). FDI involves ‗a lasting interest in effective management control over an enterprise. Foreign direct investment can include buying shares of an enterprise in another country, reinvesting earnings of a foreign owned enterprise in the country where it is located, and parent firms extending loans to their foreign affiliates. International Monetary Fund (IMF) guidelines consider an investment to be a foreign direct investment if it accounts for at least 10% of the foreign firm‘s voting stock of shares. However, many countries set a higher threshold because 10% is often not enough to establish effective management control of a company or demonstrate an investor‘s lasting interest‘ (Görgen e.a., ibid.). In order to analyze the impact, as far as possible, the definition of contract farming is important, for which the definition of GTZ is also used. ‗Contract farming is based on a contractual partnership between small farmers and a processing and/or marketing firm for the purpose of commercial production, frequently at predetermined prices. Depending on the terms of contract, small farmers may receive technical assistance, seeds, agro-chemicals and some credit from their contract-partners, and are ensured of guaranteed markets, secure income and employment‘ (Görgen e.a., ibid.). Land ownership is also an important variable. Land ownership in Uganda has many different forms and has changed over the years, as will be discussed in the fifth chapter. The current tenure system can be summarized in table 4. Land tenure regime refers to the combination of different types of land rights held by individual and/or collective rights holders who coexist on a given territory, and the regulatory systems associated with them (Agter, 2010: 20).

Who gets What, When and How? 50 Table 4. Land tenure categories Tenure Key features Geographical incidence Customary The holding of land by an individual or Country wide community on former public land in accordance with the customs and traditions of a given community. This tenure is varying in different areas. More individualised in south and west, more communal in north and east Leasehold 49 or 99 year leases, with development conditions. Country wide, Ground rent and premium payable. Leasehold title especially in urban issued areas Freehold Registered ownership in perpetuity. Freehold title Predominantly in south issued and west. Mailo Limited form of freehold which recognises Central region tenants‘ rights. Mailo title issued. Occupancy Rights to occupy land under specific conditions Country wide on any based on occupation prior to 1983 registered land Renting Use rights to land for a defined period subject to Varies country wide payment of rent Borrowing Use rights to land for a defined period subject to Various country wide payment of part of harvest LSSP, 2001: 12; UNCTAD, 2004: 61.

Employment, which will be discussed in chapter 11 on the impacts, can be defined as the provision of jobs. How many people are actually benefitting from the new land acquisition? What do they earn? In discussing CSR policies, the definition of Jenkins (2005: 525) is used: ‗voluntary corporate initiatives aimed at improving the social and environmental impacts of a company's business activities, but excludes philanthropy which arises after profits are made‘. Although food security will be mentioned in this research, this research did not have this as a key variable in that it will operationalize it and make a final statement whether there is a negative impact on food security or not. If this is stated, this is an opinion from some of the actors involved. However, it is useful to mention the definition, adopted from GTZ (2010: 12). ‗Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Household food security is the application of this concept to the family level, with individuals within households as the focus of concern.‘ The dimensions of food security are ‗availability of food in the country, access of households and individual Household members to available food, and (use and) utilisation of food at

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 51 Household level and individual household members, and stability of availability, access and use and utilisation‘ (GTZ, ibid.)

Data collection methods In order to get an answer on the research question, fieldwork was conducted in collaboration with the Uganda Land Alliance, a consortium of NGOs working on land or land related issues in Uganda. It specifically lobbies policy makers to guarantee the rights of poor people on land and land derived livelihoods. Due to their network and their information regarding land issues in Uganda, they acted as an important starting point and made it easier to conduct the fieldwork and reach the local communities. In collecting data, several sources were used. In order to make an overview of all new (corporate) land acquisitions in Uganda from 2007 onwards, an extensive literature review was conducted. Several international organizations, such as GRAIN, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) and the World Bank amongst others have published reports on land acquisitions or ‗land grabbing‘, which acted as a starting point for further research on land acquisitions in Uganda. Articles in the newspaper and on the internet also provided a lot of information. Other secondary data included government policies, reports on land issues and agriculture and other economic indicators from relevant government institutions and agencies. The first weeks of the research in Uganda was used to visit relevant authorities in Kampala, the capital city of Uganda in order to verify the information that was gathered from the sources mentioned above. For example the Uganda Investment Authority and several embassies and high commissions of the country of origin of the investor, in order to check the information that was gathered. It appeared that it was impossible to compile a list that is complete for 100 percent (see limitations), but when a list of almost 21 investments was ready, six areas were selected for further research: Bugala Island, Mubende, Masindi (including Kiryandongo), Lira, Gulu and Amuru, as can be shown in figure 1. These research sites were selected because there was relatively little information available about the land acquisitions that were taking place in that area, which made them interesting for further research. During the fieldwork in appeared that not all land acquisitions that were on this list, could be found in reality. Although the initial focus was on the foreign direct investments, only two out of the six selected investments have foreign parent company, namely Kaweri Coffee Plantation (German Neumann Kaffee Gruppe) in Mubende and Oil

Who gets What, When and How? 52 Palm Uganda Ltd (Kenyan BIDCO) on Bugala Island. The other four represent different types of investment, which made them interesting to compare. The progress and operation of each of the six selected investments also differs. Amuru Sugar Works Ltd, a sugar cane plantation in Amuru, is still only a proposal and there is uncertainty about the land ownership. Ziwa Ranchers Ltd in Masindi is recently bought by Mukwano Group of Companies but has two possibilities in the future, either continue as cattle ranch or start growing sugarcane. Mukwano Outgrowers Project Ltd does not own land, but works with thousands of outgrowers in the region, and gets support from a NGO. Oil Palm Uganda Ltd is part of the Vegetable Oil Development Project of IFAD, which is the first largest public-private partnership in Uganda. Kiryandongo Farm in Kiryandongo operates even as Ziwa Ranchers on its own.

Map 1. of Uganda (2010) and selected areas for fieldwork

Amuru Sugar Works Ltd Location: Amuru Commodity: planned investment sugarcane Mukwano Agro Project Ltd. Location: Lira Commodity: Sunflower

Kiryandongo Farm Location: Kiryandongo Commodity: maize, soya and jatropha

Ziwa Ranchers Ltd Location: Masindi Cattle ranch/ sugarcane

Kaweri Coffee Plantation Location: Mubende Commodity: Coffee

Palm Oil Uganda Ltd. Location: Bugala Island Commodity: Oil Palm

N.B. Districts in white were visited during the fieldwork. Red dots represent the selected investments but do not necessarily correspond with the exact location.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 53 In appendix A a list of all interviewees is included (a total of 108), even as the topics that were covered for each group of actors. Field visits in each place (Bugala Island, Mubende, Masindi, Kiryandongo, Lira, Gulu and Amuru) took approximately 4-5 days in which a wide range of actors was interviewed. Interviews were based on a list of topics, and therefore semi- structured and in-depth, although did also depended on the time available of the informants. In the case of Bugala Island, Masindi, Lira and Kiryandongo, managers took the time to show us the area and their day-to-day work. The manager at Kaweri Coffee Plantation in Mubende was too busy and only had 30 minutes for the whole interview. Other actors that were interviewed included the district land board, (senior) land officers, local communities and representatives, involved NGOs, District Authorities, and other relevant national authorities such the Uganda Land Commission, the Uganda Investment Authority and the Registrar of Companies.

Analysis As Babbie (2007: 378) argues, ‗qualitative research methods involve a continuing interplay between data collection and theory‘. Data collection, analysis, and theory are more ‗intimately intertwined‘. However, since this is an exploratory research, most emphasis lies on the gathering of data and presenting this data in a clear and hopefully logical way. Since relatively little is known about this issue in Uganda, it is interesting to see whether the issues that are described in the academic debate on ‗land grab‘ are indeed also happening in Uganda. This research will also compare and analyse the case studies, since most of the interviews covered the same topics (see appendix B). This information will hopefully give an insight in overlapping or conflicting opinions and gaps.

Limitations This research has several limitations. First, it was not possible to get access to information from the Uganda Revenue Authority and Uganda Investment Authority, although the latter did answered some of my questions. Both could not give any information on individual companies. The reports which both organisations publish regularly only represent planned investments and are therefore not reliable. A fully up-to-date list of new corporate land acquisitions is therefore not 100 percent comprehensive and is only an indication, based on the resources that were available. Second, the people that were interviewed will not always be representative and will express the views that suit them most or are in their interest. Sometimes, we organized a

Who gets What, When and How? 54 group meeting, or this happened spontaneously. This group meeting, for example with only outgrowers at Bugala Island, will not be a representative for all outgrowers at Bugala Island. This has to be considered for all actors. Furthermore, opinions differ even within district authorities, land offices etcetera. Third, although working with a host organization (a requirement from Utrecht University), did have certain benefits (e.g. information, transport, translation), sometimes it also resulted in hesitation. I had no budget for this research and therefore relied on the transport that was arranged by the Uganda Land Alliance, which was highly appreciated. However, the field visit to Bugala Island was made in a car from the Ministry of Lands, which was arranged by ULA. This might have had effects on the way people talked about our presence on the island and how they responded to us, although this was not my experience. The field visit in Lira, to several outgrowers that work in the Mukwano Agro Project Ltd was made in a car from Mukwano, since an extension manager showed me the several demonstration plots and introduced me to some outgrowers. Although the extension manager was not always around during the interviews itself, this could have had impact on the responses of the outgrowers as well. Furthermore, although I have always presented myself as an independent researcher and made it clear that I‘m not a representative from ULA, of course the boundary is not always that clear. For the Uganda Investment Authority there is no boundary at all. ‗We still do not share our list of investors especially since you work with NGOs that are often against investment.‘ Fourth, although this research put a lot of efforts in finding the answer to the main question, it was not possible to measure the environmental impacts for example or an increase of income, since this will require the right measurements, baseline study and sample survey. However, we did hear a lot of opinions on certain issues. If one person argued there were environmental concerns, a brutal eviction and human right violations, someone else would argue that this is not true. Not every opinion will be mentioned in this thesis, since a selection is made. Although a lot of efforts have been put in trying to get a comprehensive and balanced view as possible, this has to be taken into account. Lastly, it has to be acknowledged that this is an exploratory study and that almost no information was available at the beginning of this research (except for Bugala Island). Therefore, this thesis has to be considered as a first effort to get a better insight in the issues that are at stake in Uganda and will hopefully mark the beginning of further research.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 55 CHAPTER 4 BACKGROUND OF UGANDA

Uganda is one of the 33 African countries on the list of the United Nations of ‗least developed countries‘ (LDCs), which was established in 1971 by the UN General Assembly. This means that Uganda is among the ‗poorest and weakest segment of the international community‘ and is characterized by ‗weak human and institutional capacities, low and unequally distributed income and scarcity of domestic financial resources‘. Furthermore, ‗their largely agrarian economies are affected by a vicious cycle of low productivity and low investment‘ (UN OHROLLS, 2011). These 33 African countries have according to the UN (ibid.) ‗insufficient domestic resource mobilization, low economic management capacity, weaknesses in programme design and implementation, chronic external deficits, high debt burdens and heavy dependence on external financing‘. These factors have ‗kept LDCs in a poverty trap‘. However, Uganda is also known as the ‗pearl of Africa‘ and often praised by donors for its internal policies. This chapter will give a background of Uganda and elaborate on the geographical, historical, socio-economic and political context in Uganda. This chapter will be followed by two chapters that will answer the first sub question on this research regarding the institutional framework and the influence of policies on new corporate land acquisitions.

Geographical context Uganda is a ‗landlocked developing country‘ (LLDC). Given the fact that they are landlocked (Uganda is surrounded by Tanzania, Kenya, South-Sudan, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, see map), this is reflected in their economic performance, which reflects the direct and indirect impact on geographical situation7 on key-economic variables, which will be discussed later on. According to the UN (OHRLLS, 2011) ‗lack of territorial access to the sea, remoteness and isolation from world markets and high transit costs continue to impose serious constraints on the overall socio-economic development‘. Their sea borne trade unavoidably depends on transit through other countries, which is in the case of Uganda Kenya. Additional border crossings and long distance from the market substantially increase the total expenses for the transport services.

7 Geographical location: 4°7′ N to 1°30′ S ; 29°33′ to 35°20′ E. Boundary lengths: South-Sudan, 435 kilometres; Kenya, 933 kilometres; Tanzania, 396 kilometres; Rwanda, 169 kilometres; Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC), 765 kilometres (Encyclopedia of Nations, 2011).

Who gets What, When and How? 56 Map 2. Uganda as land locked country

Source: Oxford Cartographers

Uganda is quite diverse, as FAO (2005: 584) describes it evocative:

„In the south the characteristic scenery consists of flat-topped mesa-like hills and broad intervening valleys frequently containing swamps, while in the north the landscape is more subdued, consisting of gently rolling open plains interrupted by occasional hills, mountains and inselbergs. In the south-west, broken hill country, encircling lowland embayments, forms the transition to the deeply incised plateau that reaches its greatest elevations of over 2 000 m above sea level in the Kabale district. The country is underlain by some of the world‟s oldest rocks, which have been modified by deep-seated mountain-building activity. These rocks are overlain by predominantly ferrallitic, and to a lesser extent ferruginous, soils as the most widely distributed soil type, occurring in both forest and savannah ecosystems in the country. The profile of these soils consists of a thin (20-30 cm) topsoil and a deep (5-10 m) subsoil. Organic matter and nutrients are strongly concentrated in the topsoil. These soils range in texture from clay loams to sandy loams, although red clay loams tend to predominate in the wetter regions.‟

The total area of Uganda is 241,040 km2 and about 18 percent of the total area is open water, and large areas are covered by swamps. In 2008, 66 percent of the land area was agricultural lands. Map highlights the land cover of 1996, as compared to the 1960s and illustrates big differences.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 57 Map 3. Extent of savannas in the 1960s and in 1996.

Source: GoU, 1996 and Langdale-Brown e.a. 1964 in NEMA, 2008: 144.

Uganda is characterised by an equatorial climate with small regional variations in annual temperature and humidity. The country can be subdivided into four major agro-ecological zones (FAO, ibid.): (1) high altitude zone in Kigezi, Sebel, parts of Ankole, west Nile, Toro, Mbale; temperate-zone crops; (2) pastoral dry to semi-arid range lands in east Ankole, west Masaka, Karamoja; pastoral systems; (3) northern and eastern short grasslands zone; short grasslands and cotton-finger millet mixed farming systems; (4) southern and western tall grasslands zone; tall-grass areas, perennial and annual crops in mixed farming systems (see maps).

Who gets What, When and How? 58 Map 4. Permanent crops and arable land and farming systems

Source: FAO, 2011

British influence The first Christian and Catholic missionaries from Britain and France arrived between 1877 and 1879 in Buganda, one of the original four kingdoms that have existed since the fourteenth century. In 1890, Captain Frederick Lugard on behalf of the Imperial British East Africa Company entered Buganda and extended the company‘s control to southern Uganda. Buganda became a British protectorate in 1894, which was extended in 1896 to cover Bunyoro and most of what is now Uganda8. In 1899 Sir Harry Johnston was appointed to Uganda as Special Commissioner. He negotiated a treaty with the Regents and Principal Chiefs of Buganda, of which land settlement was a fundamental part. In 1900 the Uganda Agreement was signed which gave Buganda autonomy and turned it into a constitutional monarchy which was controlled mainly by Protestant chiefs. The colonial administrators were confronted with an indigenous administrative structure of the four kingdoms and various ethno-political groupings within the area that became Uganda. As Watt (e.a., 1999: 37-41) argues, Lugard‘s system was characterized by a system of indirect rule under which native chiefs were used as mediators between the resident authorities and the indigenous population. Furthermore, this system also reinforced the separation of the various ethnic groups in Uganda and exacerbated the inequalities between them. As Watt (ibid.) argues, the British tended to favour the southern Baganda (in Buganda) who were disproportionately recruited into the civil service.

8 ‗The Protectorate is administered under the Colonial Office by the Governor, who is assisted by Executive and Legislative Councils. Policies are formed in the Executive Council which is advisory to the Governor. The enactments of the Legislative Council, including financial measures, require the Governor's assent and can be (but so far have not been) disallowed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the United Kingdom. The British Parliament also legislates for Uganda without reference to the Legislative Council‘ (World Bank, 1961: 2).

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 59 Their chiefs benefited from lucrative land grants. Other ethnic groups, such as the Northern Lango and Achole (see map 5) tended to gravitate towards the army, due to the absence of alternatives. According to Watt (ibid.) this created stark regional disparities, which laid the foundation for the serious division between north and south which ‗continues to threaten stability of Uganda today‘.

Map. 5 Kingdoms in Uganda

Source: Berrang-Ford, e.a., 2006: 228. N.B. this map is used to illustrate the sleeping sickness during the period 1905 – 1920, but illustrates here the different kingdoms and ethnic groups.

Milton Obote In 1921 Uganda was given a legislative council. However, its first African member was only admitted in 1945. That the Ugandan economy is affected by political developments is illustrated in figure. Uganda was given internal self-government in 1958 and became independent in 1962, with Milton Obote as prime-minister and the Kabaka (King) of Buganda as president. According to Watt (e.a., 1999: 37-41), the economic situation at independence was reasonably strong. ‗The future outlook was promising.‘ As Watt (ibid.) argues, this was helped by the existence of legislative and parliamentary institutions and sound electoral procedures: ‗Uganda displayed a relatively high level of accountability at the centre, which was aided in part by a lively and free press and an efficient civil service. This facilitated a relatively painless transition in 1962‘ (Watt, ibid.). Up to 1966 Obote pursued economic development policies that focused on agriculture. Cotton was promoted as a cash crop and strong marketing arrangements were in place. From 1962 up to 1971, GDP grew by an average of 5.2 percent per annum. However, soon after

Who gets What, When and How? 60 independence Uganda started to experience difficulties caused primarily by ethnic tensions. 1966 was an important year, since Obote abolished Buganda and the other kingdoms and forced the Kabaka into exile (Watt, ibid.). Obote proceeded to lead the country under unitary presidential rule, but he had a fragile coalition and a weak support base. He had undermined the authority of the chiefs and abolished the local government system that was inherited at independence. He did create an alternative centralised system which limited pluralist activities. As Watt (ibid.) argues, with this Obote failed to take into account the various ethnic and regional reality in Uganda.

Idi Amin In 1971 Milton Obote was toppled in a coup led by Idi Amin, a senior army officer from the north. Although his take-over was initially celebrated by the population and the international community, it meant the beginning of a period of political instability and economic decline. Amin proved himself to be even more brutal and repressive than the previous regime, according to Watt (ibid.):

„Idi Amin relied heavily on force in order to secure compliance and proceeded to suspend all political activity and most civil rights. The National Assembly was effectively dissolved and Amin ruled Uganda by capricious decree. In addition to the political turmoil created by Amin's actions, he also succeeded in bringing the economy to a situation of almost total collapse‟ (Watt, ibid.).

In 1972 Amin ordered Asians who were not Ugandan citizens (around 60,000 people) to leave the country. According to Amin, an ‗economic war‘ was needed to ‗Africanise‘ the private sector. There was increased insecurity and skilled manpower was replaced by unskilled manpower in order to manage the economy in the name of ‗nationalisation‘. However, due to this ‗africanisation‘ Amin undermined the economic base of the country; the Asians provided the mainstay of Uganda‘s industry and business. It therefore also meant a loss of technical skills and enterprise (Watt, ibid.). Poverty and widespread corruption increased. Uganda became engaged in border clashes with Tanzania during 1972-1973. In 1976 Amin declared himself president for life and claimed parts of Kenya. In 1978 Uganda invaded Tanzania with a view to annexing Kagera region. As Watt (ibid.) argues, the government became increasingly arbitrary in its use of force, with widespread killings becoming the norm. As is shown in figure (...), GDP declined during this period by 25 percent. The 1980s were characterized by political instability, but economic recovery as well. In 1979 Uganda is invaded by Tanzania, together with 26 anti-Amin forces that were united

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 61 under the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF). Amin is forced to flee out of the country. Yusufu Lule is installed as president, but is quickly replaced by Godfrey Binaisa, who is overthrown by the army one year later. After elections in 1980, which were widely believed to have been rigged, Milton Obote became in power for the second time, this time as president.

Yoweri Kaguta Museveni At the same time former Minister of Defense and ‗seasoned guerrilla fighter‘ Yoweri Kaguta Museveni decided to form the National Resistance Army with 27 supporters in the bush. ‗Obote inherited a shattered economy that had shrunk by 20 percent since independence onto which was clamped a bloated and corrupt administration‘, according to Watt (ibid.). Although Western donors in the beginning ignored the human rights abuses by ‗out of-control northern soldiers‘, because they thought that ‗anything had to be better than Amin‘, it is now generally accepted that Obote‘s regime exceeded those slaughtered under Amin. It is estimated that during the 1970s and 1980s, probably one and a half million people were murdered. A similar number was imprisoned, tortured or forced into exile (Watt, ibid.). In 1985 Obote is deposed in a military coup and is replaced by Tito Okello. When looking at the GDP growth rates, we can see that from 1981 to 1983, Uganda experienced GDP growth rate of 5.5 per cent but recorded negative growth rates in 1984 and 1986. In the same year, the National Resistance Army (NRA) rebels took Kampala and installed Museveni as president. The National Resistance Council, an administration made up of civilian and military representatives, started economic recovery programmes. The NRA faced several challenges. How to bring back a legitimate political system and increase the commitment to the common good? People were used to political power that gave the opportunity to ‗plunder the state‘ and acquire wealth very quickly. The main challenges were to get the control over the whole country, including the north and north-east. Furthermore, people had to go brought back into the formal economy (Watt, ibid.). Agriculture became a priority. As can be seen in figure (…), it is clear that what used to be savannas is now used as farmland (pink) or woodland (green) (NEMA, 2008: 144). However, the cotton sector did not recover. Farmers started exploring alternative income crops like rice.

Who gets What, When and How? 62

World Bank, 1961: ii.

Political stability and economic growth The period between 1990 and 2000 is characterized by political stability and economic growth. Museveni proposed a Ten Point Programme which should bring development to Uganda. As Watt (ibid.) shows, this manifesto proposed several solutions, based upon ‗the creation of a complete democratic infrastructure from village level upwards; the restoration of individual and community security via these local democratic structures, supported by an army and police under political control and maintained by uncorrupted political leaders and public servants; the removal of ethnic factionalism and the consolidation of national identity; the provision of basic social services; and, most importantly, the building of an independent and sustainable national economy.‘ In order to increase actual tax and customs revenue, corruption had to be eliminated, the losses associated with procurement had to be reduced, constraints on business development had to be removed in order to provide public services and social inequality and poverty had the be alleviated (Watt, e.a., 1999: 37-41). Furthermore, poverty eradication became a key objective in development thinking, even as creating a better environment to enhance business and the economy. Public services had to be reorganized, even as the privatization of state enterprises, decentralization of power and putting in place institutions to combat corruption (Watt, ibid.). Between 1987 and 1996, GDP grew at an average of 6.5 per cent translating into 3.4 per cent growth in per capita terms. The decline in monetary growth, together with growth in agriculture, especially food crop production, contributed to a reduction in inflation, from 200 per cent in 1987 to about 7.1 per cent in 1996. In 1997 the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) was introduced, which was mainly inspired on the Millennium Development Goals. The percentage of the population living below the poverty line declined from 56 percent in 1992/93 to 44 percent in 1997/98 and to 31 percent in 2005/06. The Poverty Eradication

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 63 Action Plan9 is still the main strategic framework for ‗arresting poverty‘ by 2017 (PRSP, 2010). According to Kapwepwe (2007 in AFRODAD, 2007: 11), ‗this was partly the genesis of what made Uganda a darling of the western world and such institutions as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), The World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB). The love translated into massive donor and debt relief resources for Uganda's drive out of poverty, genuinely or otherwise‘. As Mallaby (2004 in Green, 2010) argues, ‗this happy marriage of ―Washington Consensus‖ policies and real growth and poverty results has thus been seen by many as one of the high points for the Wolfensohn-led World Bank in the 1990s.‘ According to Ellis and Bahiigwa (2003: 998), Uganda is nowadays generally regarded as ‗quite a success story of donors and the government working together to provide a macro environment conducive to economic growth and poverty reduction‘. Official development assistance10 in Uganda is in 2009 11.6 percent of the gross national income (see appendix N). Most of the bilateral official development assistance goes to ‗health and population‘. The United States, International Development Association (part of the World Bank) and European Union institutions are among the top 3 donors of gross official development assistance. However, Uganda is also placing heavy emphasis on improving domestic revenue (UNDP, 2010) in order to mobilize resources for financing the development process. In 2004/05 the domestic revenue accounted for 12.7 percent of GDP, comparing with the Sub-Saharan average of 18 percent very low. In 2007/08 there was a slight improvement to 13.5 percent of GDP (UNDP, 2010; BBC, 2011). When looking at the Millennium Development Goals, UNDP (2011) concludes that Uganda ‗has made substantial progress towards achieving the MDGs, although more needs to be done if all are to be attained‘. It is likely that Uganda achieves Goals 1 (eradicate extreme poverty and hunger), 3 (promote gender equality and empower women), 6 (combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases), 7 (ensure environmental sustainability) and 8 (develop a global partnership for development) due to ‗continued good policies‘. According to UNDP (ibid.) Uganda may also be able to achieve the second goal, achieve universal primary education. The progress of the fourth and fifth goal, reduce child mortality and improve maternal health, is uncertain (see appendix O).

10 ODA consists of flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following two criteria: (1) it is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective, and (2) it is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent) (Führer, 1994 in Riddell, 2007: 19).

Who gets What, When and How? 64 Although President Museveni has been celebrated by foreign donors, diplomats, media reporters and academics as a ‗new-style‘ of African leaders, his critics have grown more numerous and vocal over the last years, as Child (2009: 245-246) argues. Especially after the elections of 2001, 2006 and 2011, his main opponent and former physician (during the bush war), Kizza Besigye, complained of an unfair election process. Before the 2006 elections, Parliament voted with a majority to lift presidential term-limits, which made it possible for Museveni to run for a third time. There has also been critique that the press, judiciary and are ‗victim of Museveni‘s less then democratic caprice‘ (Child, ibid.). Furthermore, the political landscape does still rely on clientelism and patronage, according to Child (ibid.). Academics speak of Uganda as ‗sliding backward toward a system of one-man rule‘, ‗a semi- authoritarian regime‘ or ‗elitists and anti-poor‘ (Tripp; Mwenda; Hickey, 2004 in Child, ibid.). According to Child (ibid.), ‗if there is a sense of uncertainty about Museveni‘s commitment to democracy much of the blame must be laid on the shoulders of international donors and their diplomatic communities who have been impressed with Museveni‘s willingness to champion their favourite causes, including the fight against HIV/AIDS, terrorism and a demonstrated willingness to make pro-market economic reforms‘ (Child, ibid.). In 2011, Amnesty International published a report which highlights ‗Amnesty International‘s concerns about official repression of the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly and the failure to hold perpetrators of human rights violations committed against political activists, journalists and civil society activists to account‘. According to Amnesty International, there is a ‗general clampdown on the right to freedom of expression, in particular press freedom, between 2007 and 2011, and official intolerance of peaceful protests in the wake of public protests regarding rising costs of living in April and May 2011‘ (Amnesty, 2011).

Challenges Uganda faces a lot of challenges. It has one of the highest annual population rates of 3.2 percent and a population of 31.66 million inhabitants, which shows the need on cultivatable land and resources to sustain livelihoods (Hartter and Ryan, 2010: 815). According to Green (2007: 218), this high growth rate and the ‗extreme ethnic diversity‘ makes the Ugandan population ‗unusual‘; Uganda is the fourth-most ethnically diverse country in the world, with the largest ethnic group, the Baganda, comprising only seventeen per cent of the population according to the 2002 census (see appendix). Of the total population, 87 percent lives in rural

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 65 areas population, of which 34 percent in poverty. Agriculture is still the most important sector in terms of employment: 68.9 percent of the population works in agriculture. More than 80 percent of the land (180,000 km2) is now used for small-scale farming (Hartter and Ryan, 2010: 815). According to FAO (2011: 51), Uganda is an ‗agriculture-dependent‘ country with a ‗high level of hunger and slow progress in improving it‘.

Map 6. Food security 2008 and 2011

Source: USAID, 2011a

Who gets What, When and How? 66 CHAPTER 5. ROLE OF POLICY AND INSTITUTIONS IN NEW CORPORATE LAND ACQUISITIONS

„Although under exceptional circumstances law per se can bring about social change, it is a truism that in so far as law is a superstructure rising out of the particular mode of production as a base, it cannot as a general rule bring about social change, let alone social development, on its own‟ (Musisi, 1986: 73).

With the background of Uganda in mind, we will now turn to the role of policy and institutions for new corporate land acquisitions. This chapter will describe the main policies and institutions, the next chapter will only focus on policy and institutions for investment, with a specific focus on the Uganda Investment Authority.

British Influence As Deininger and Castagnini (2006: 324) notice, in many African countries less than 10 percent of the area is covered by a formal tenure. Even before Uganda became a British protectorate in 1894, there was no single land tenure system for the whole of Uganda; customary practice varied from place to place. However, none of the communities in Uganda recognized individual ownership of land. Furthermore, there was recognition of various individual rights to possess and use land subject to sanction by his family, clan, or community (Rugadya, 1999).

„The individual had the right to utilise his land as he thought best, to rent out his piece of land, pledge crops on the land but not the land itself, sell land subject to the approval of the family, dispose of the land according to the customary laws of inheritance, dispose of trees growing on his land, prohibit grazing near his homestead and fence his homestead. The clan or family had the power and right to settle land disputes, exercise the right or option to buy any land offered by its members, prohibit the sale of clan land to an undesirable person and declare void any land transaction which had not received its approval. The general community had the right to graze communally but damage to crops had to be made good. The community also had access to salt licks, watering of cattle and access to water from springs and other common rights. It can therefore be note that customary tenure in pre- colonial Uganda recognised both individual and communal holding of land‟ (Rugadya, 1999).

According to Rugadya (1999), with the effective control through legislation and the establishment of political and legal structures in the early 1900s, ‗Uganda‘s land tenure was to drastically change in favour of the white man‘s interest and purposes‘. The British needed land for political administrative units, for infrastructural development, for plantation farming,

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 67 mining, settlement and other purposes. For the colonial administration it was considered strategic to control land ownership and land use. The British introduced three new types of land tenure: freehold, leasehold and mailo land:

- Mailo land The mailo tenure system was the result of the 1900 Buganda Agreement11 in which the total land area of Buganda, with 50,764 km² the largest kingdom in Uganda, was divided between the Kabaka, the king, and other notables in the protectorate. In this agreement it was stated that the boundaries of Buganda were fixed; Buganda could no longer conquer more land from neighbouring kingdoms. The Kabaka became subject to the colonial government; the British divided land issued certificates of title to the Kabaka and the chiefs. As Rugadya illustrates, until 1927 the local peasants or cultivators previously settled on land were not recognised. In 1927 their rights were specified (Rugadya, 1999; West, 1972). Furthermore, the land granted to the Kabaka and the chiefs was not vacant land; peasants occupied it. Relations between the peasant occupiers and the chiefs were up to the time of the Uganda Agreement governed by an intricate system of law and custom. The land granted to the chiefs became known as mailo land, referring to the square miles of land, and was granted as English freehold tenure (McAuslan, 2003: 2). As Place and Otsuka (2000: 11) explain, owners of mailoland, lacking labour to till such large land areas, and wishing to attain esteem in the community, received fees, rents, or other payments (e.g., sharing of output) by settling tenants (‗kibanja‘) on their land1213. According to the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2005: 39), there is a stalemate where the owner has no inducement to invest and the tenant has no power to grow anything other than annual crops.

- Freehold Tenure This is the holding of registered land in perpetuity subject to statutory and common-law qualifications (UNCTAD, 2004: 61). This tenure was peculiar to the then Kingdoms of Toro

11 For more see for example Mugambwa, J.T (1987). 12 Landlords powers to evict tenants were restricted by a 1928 law that required full compensation for any investments. Later, in the 1975 land reform, all rents were abolished. As Place and Otsuka (2011: 11) argue, although only mailo owners may acquire titles to the land, many tenants have very strong rights over land they occupy, including the right to bequeath. Today, some mailo owners occupy and farm their land; however, in many areas, occupation of land is overwhelmingly by ‗kibanja‘tenants (Place and Otsuka, ibid.). 13 In the 1998 Land Act, mailo is defined as: the holding of registered land in perpetuity; permits the separation of ownership of land from the ownership of developments on land made by a lawful or bona fide occupant and enables the holder, subject to the customary and statutory rights of those persons lawful or bona fide in occupation of the land at the time that the tenure was created and their successors in title, to exercise all the powers of ownership of the owner of land held of a freehold title (Land Act, 1998: II, part 3).

Who gets What, When and How? 68 and Ankole in Western Uganda. The terms of tenancy between the tenants on this land and the titleholders were fixed by law in 1937. The British also issued adjudicated freehold to a small number of people and churches and religious institutions.

- Leasehold Leasehold is an interest in land as a result of an agreement between a lessor and lessee that the lessee will enjoy exclusive possession of the land of the lessor for a specific and certain duration in consideration of a payment called a premium and an annual rent which is normally 10 percent of the premium. It can be either private or statutory (UNCTAD, 2004: 61; Rugadya, 1999).

In 1903, the Crown Land Ordinance stated that persons occupying land under customary tenure were never regarded as owning the land; they were no more than tenants at will of the crown, as McAuslan (2003: 2) argues. The colonial government could and often did grant both freehold and leasehold titles to persons who applied for such land, with the customary occupiers thereafter being required to move off the land or remaining specifically as tenants at will of the new owner (McAuslan, ibid.). According to West (1986: 2), the British have considerably influenced the land tenure system in Uganda. ‗Johnston‘s settlement (the Uganda Agreement in 1900, see previous paragraph) was made without any consideration on his part of the customary attitudes and relationships to land in Buganda. As a result a system of land tenure grew up which was an ‗ill-adapted mixture‘ of English and Ganda (Buganda) ideas of property.‘ It was a complex system and the process of survey and demarcation (in Buganda) took nearly forty years to complete. ‗The holdings of original landowners of Johnston‘s day have become heavily subdivided and tenant‘s rights of various kinds have grown up‘ (West, ibid.). Furthermore, as West (1986: 7-8) illustrates, cultural conflicts inherent in the intermingling of tenurial concepts became more apparent, with occasional social unrest. During the 1920s, there was an ‗increase in administrative reluctance to become involved and a laissez-faire policy of non-intervention in respect of customary tenures developed‘. Land found to be unoccupied and deemed to be unclaimed was designated Crown land (vested in the Queen of England). Exceptionally, where environmental conditions were found to be suitable for white settlement, land was alienated for European use. In some countries, governmental departments of land were established, but their responsibilities were frequently confined to the administration of Crown land, and this led to segmented thinking and dualism (West, 1986:

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 69 8). Table 5 illustrates the total land in square miles; land allotted to individual Africans, Government Forest Reserves and Land outside the ‗townships‘ alienated to Non-Africans‘ in 1961. Figure represents an overview of all relevant policies between 1894 and 2015.

Table 5. Total Area and Land Utilisation, 1961

Source: World Bank, 1961.

Figure 4. Overview of Relevant Policies 1894 – 2015

Land Reform Decree 1975 As Mutibwa (1992 in Harrter and Ryan, 2010: 816) argues, historically, chieftains had reign over land allocation, local law and natural resource allocation. The introduction of the ‗co- existence of a number of tenure systems created considerable scope for overlapping rights to the same plot that could lead to land conflict‘, as Deininger and Castagnini (2006: 326) argue.

Who gets What, When and How? 70 When Idi Amin seized power in 1971, he stripped traditional leaders of their powers (Mutibwa, ibid.). It became even more complex when Amin imposed the Land Reform Decree in 1975 in which all land in Uganda would be vested in the state ‗in trust for the people to facilitate its use for economic and social development‘. Mailo ownership was converted into leasehold. No person was to occupy public land by customary tenure, except with written permission of the prescribed authority (Rugadya, 1999). In 1987 the Economic Recovery Programme was launched, and was followed by a policy statement on Public Enterprise Reform and Divestiture in 1991. This outlined the privatization strategy, as was already mentioned in the previous chapter. One third of the enterprises were privatized through the sale of assets and another one third through the sale of government shares. According to Saprin (2002: 93-100), the results of privatization are an increase in capacity utilization, sales revenue, tax contributions to government, profitability, and product quality and diversification have all increased when compared with the period prior to the privatization process. According to Saprin (ibid.) the surveyed firms showed a positive trend in sales revenue over the period 1997-1999, when capacity utilization increased from 47 to 57 percent. Saprin (ibid) continues, the principal beneficiaries of the privatization program have been foreigners, who obtained 75 percent of the total divestiture proceeds, while the local population gained only a 16-percent share (Saprin, ibid.).

1995 Constitution The nationalization of land was overturned by the 1995 Constitution. Prior to the 1995 constitution, Uganda had three other Constitutions, which were abrogated, ignored or suspended with impunity by Uganda‘s leaders (Moehler, 2006: 281). Not only were four of the five traditional kingdoms restored as cultural institution, Museveni also instituted a system of quotas across all levels of government for women, persons with disabilities and the youth (Green, 2010: 6). The Constitution of 1995 brought fundamental reforms in ownership, tenure management and control of land in Uganda. From now on ‗Land in Uganda belongs to the citizens of Uganda and shall vest in them in accordance with the land tenure systems provided for in this Constitution‘ and that ‗land in Uganda shall be owned‘ in accordance with four land tenure systems; customary, freehold, mailo and leasehold, which meant recognition for customary tenure as a legal tenure. From now on, the government or local government may acquire land in the public interest (which will be discussed later). The Uganda Land Commission was introduced to manage Government land, even as the announcement that district land boards and district land tribunals are to be established (LSSP, 2001: 2).

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 71 Furthermore, it was stated that ‗noncitizens may acquire leases in land in accordance with the law prescribed by Parliament‘, which will be discussed later on. It took three more years before this new law came into being (Land Act, 1998). However, in 2002 a civil society initiative produced a Framework for Policy. Although this was not followed up by the state, the land sector plans were integral to the modernization of agriculture policy development (Alden Wily, 2003: 7). As becomes clear, the Constitution laid the ground for other land reforms. Although the Constitution ‗totally reversed‘ the old system, there were still some key legal issues that were not included in the Constitution, such as the nature of tenants‘ and women‘s land rights (Deininger and Castagnini, 2006: 324; Rugadya, 1999).

1998 Land Act The remaining land issues of the Constitution were to be resolved by the 1998 Land Act. However, as Rugadya (1999) argues, this Act was ‗from day one received with suspicion, apathy, fear and outright rejection from some quarters, the wounds may not have healed‘. The Land Act was based on three leading principles: (1) a good land tenure system should support agricultural development through the function of land market which permits those who have rights in land to voluntarily sell their land and for progressive framers to gain access to land; (2) a good land tenure system should not force people off the land, particularly those who have no other way to earn a reasonable living or to survive. Land tenure system should protect people‘s rights in land so they are not forced off the land before there are jobs available in the non-agricultural sector of the economy; and (3) a good land tenure system should be uniform throughout the country (Rugadya, 1999). These principles would also guide Uganda through its land reform process. The Land Act also meant the beginning of the decentralization of the land administration system and it provided for government and local government to acquire land compulsorily in the public interest and for other public purposes. Furthermore it defined the four land tenure systems, even as in the Constitution, and it was stated that customary land owners may acquire a certificate of customary ownership for their land as conclusive evidence of their rights. Other important provisions are:

 A person may apply for a freehold, or may convert their customary ownership to freehold  Communities may form Communal Land Associations and manage common land under a Common Property Management Scheme

Who gets What, When and How? 72  Tenants on registered land have security of occupation and can apply for a certificate of occupancy for the land they occupy.  Spouses and children must consent to transactions in land where they usually live. For orphans, the Land Committee must give consent.  A Land Fund is to be established to assist people to acquire registrable interests in land, and to facilitate Government to resettle landless people.  Operationalises Uganda Land Commission, District Land Boards, and District Land Tribunals  Requires establishment of District Land Offices, Sub-county Land Tribunals, and Parish Land Committees (LSSP, 2001: 2).

Decentralization As was already mentioned, decentralisation was one of the main themes within the reform programme of the NRM administration. Figure (...) shows the key features of the decentralized local government structure. As Hartter and Ryan (2010: 816) argue, the local council (LC) system was implemented to serve as institutions for local self-governance. ‗It would enable Ugandans to participate in decision making at a more equal level regardless of gender, age, ethnicity or political affiliations, while giving local governments autonomy, meaning they have the legislative and executive authority within their listed areas of jurisdiction.‘ As Watt (e.a., 1999: 46) argues, this process typically involves a transfer of responsibility for planning, management and the raising of revenue and resources to lower levels of government. Furthermore, decentralisation in decision making and public service delivery is regarded as an important element of combating corruption in countering the potential lack of transparency and accountability in centralized systems of government (Watt e.a., ibid.). The LC system has five levels of local government: village, parish, sub-county, county, and district. Not only were politicians locally elected by regular and direct elections and the local level, further reforms also meant the decentralization of both financial decision- making and power over local public land to district governments (see following paragraph) (Green, 2010: 6). Green (ibid.) states that ‗by the late 1990s, district leadership positions had become quite powerful within their jurisdictions‘. The LC system ‗has drawn large amount of praise from the outside world, inasmuch as it offered lessons to other African states on how to detribalize rural administration and how to combat HIV/AIDS (Mamdani, 1996 in Green, 2010: 6; Allen & Heald, 2004 in Green, 2010: 6).

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 73 Table 6. Key features of Ugandas decentralized local government structure Local Council (LC) Status of LC Political head and Administrative head level/area selection of representatives District council Local District Chairperson, elected by Chief Administrative Government (LC5) universal adult suffrage Officer (CAO) (UAS), Councillors from sub-counties, women (1/3), youth, disabled Municipality (urban) Local government Municipal Mayor; Council Town Clerk (Urban made up of all LC3 areas), Assistant CAO executives, who then elect (rural areas) LC4 executive and Chair County (Rural area) Administrative councils Unit (LC4) City Division/Town Local government Mayor (in urban areas) and Town clerk (Urban Council (urban area) (LC3) Chairperson (in rural areas) Sub-county Council areas), elected by UAS. Sub-county chief (Rural area Councillors are elected (rural) from parish and women (1/3), youth delegates Parish Council Administrative Chairperson selected by all Parish Chief unit (LC2) LC1 executive members who make up the council Village Council Administrative Chair elected by UAS, Unit (LC1) and all adults (18 years) are council members Source: Kakumba 2010: 21.

Decentralised land management With the decentralization of land several new land management institutions and dispute settlement mechanisms were created in order to shift the focus of land management to the local level and to provide for effective community involvement in land management decisions.14 The new institutions were the Uganda Land Commission, the District Land Boards, the Land Committees, Recorders, District Land Offices, District Land tribunals and sub-county land tribunals, which is shown in figure 5 (Rugadya, 1999). On top of the land management hierarchy is the Uganda Land Commission, which is responsible for any government land and related issues. The chairperson of the Commission is even as the (at least) four other members appointed by the President with the approval of Parliament (Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995: art. 238(2)). The District land boards (45 in

14 See appendix R for an overview of the current capacity at the land offices

Who gets What, When and How? 74 total) are independent from the Uganda Land Commission and ‗from any other government organ or person‘. They do take into account the national and district council policy on land.

Figure 5. Land Sector Institutional Framework as per Land Act

Source: LSSP, 2001: 40.

The District Land Boards hold and allocate the land in the district which is not owned by any person or authority and have the task to facilitate the registration and transfer of interest in land and to deal with all other matters connected with land in the district (Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995: art 241). They have the power to: (1) acquire by purchase or otherwise rights or interests in land and easements; (2) erect, alter, enlarge, improve or demolish any building or other erection on any land held by it; (3) sell, lease or otherwise deal with the land held by it (Land Act, 1998, art. 60). The land committees, that are set up in each parish gazetted urban area or a division in the case of Kampala) have an advisory role to the District Land Board, on matters relating to land, including ascertaining rights in land (Rugadya, 1999; Land Act 1998: art. 64). The members of the land committees are paid a remuneration that is determined by the district council. Their expenses are charged on the district administration funds (Land Act, 1998: art. 66). The recorder is responsible for keeping records relating to certificates of customary ownership and certificates of occupancy. In a rural area, the sub county chief shall be the recorder, in a gazetted urban area it is the town clerk, even as in a division of a city. Furthermore, according to the Land Act (1998: art 59), each district council shall have a district land office comprising the offices of the district physical planner, the district land

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 75 officer, the district valuer, the district surveyor and the district registrar of titles. This is later changed by ‗each district shall have a District Land Office, which shall provide technical services through its own staff, or arrange for external consultants to the Board‘. The task of the land tribunals, consisting of a chairperson and two other members, is the determination of disputes relating to the grant, lease, repossession, transfer or acquisition of land by individuals, the Uganda Land Commission or other authorities with responsibilities relating to land. They also deal with disputes relating to the amount of compensation to be paid for land acquired (Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995, art. 243). For this, they take into account the open market value of land (in case of a customary owner), the value of the buildings of the land, and the value of standing crops, excluding the annual crops which could be harvested during the period of notice given to the tenant (Land Act, 1998: art. 77). Furthermore, the Land Act (1998: 80) also states that each sub county and each division in a city (the urban land tribunals) should have a land tribunal, which also consists of 3 persons. According to Rugadya (ibid.) the following numbers of officers and amount of manpower should be needed in order to make the Act operational:

Table 7. Required officers according to the Land Act 1998 Institution No of offices Officials Total District Land Board 45 5 225 Land Committees 7000 4 28000 Recorders 917 1 917 District land offices 45 5 225 District land tribunals 45 3 135 Sub-county land 917 3 2751 tribunals Source: Rugadya, 1999: 7.

Uganda Land Commission The Uganda Land Commission needs some further elaboration. The Commission ‗comes in on behalf of the government, either to acquire land to resettle people for any land which government wants to acquire land for the purpose of developing it, or when the government wants to acquire land to give out to the investor for development‘. ‗We also manage land which already exists on that land. If anybody is interested in that land to lease it out, or to use it for development, then the ULC gives or leases it out to individuals.‘ The Uganda Land Commission also manages the Land Fund. ‗From that fund, government is systematically resettling people or buying land from problematic areas where land lords have big chunks of land. If they want to give it to government, then the Government compensates them. We also

Who gets What, When and How? 76 assure that all government land is titled and that there is an inventory of it‘ (ULC, 2011). However, until now the ULC cannot give an indication of government land in Uganda. ‗The information is there, but it is scattered.‘ The information has to be found within different departments, ministries, authorities and is not yet on the computer. Within the Uganda Land Commission, there are many challenges. The first challenge is related to the Constitution of Uganda, in which it was stated that land should belong to the people of Uganda instead of the government. ‗There was no need for the government to have a title for its land. If you wanted to own land, you came to the government and they would offer you a lease. But now the government should held land in trust of its people. Even if you are the Government, you should have a title.‘ This leads to the second problem; conflict of interests with the District Land Boards. ‗There are conflicts with the District Land Boards, because they are also mandated by the Constitution to manage land which belongs to nobody. Now, land which belongs to nobody is very difficult to find. But what belongs to government, is sometimes not been clearly earmarked.‘ Due to changes and different users within the Government, sometimes it appeared that the land indeed belongs to nobody. ‗But in most cases land belongs to the ULC.‘ Then the ULC will lease it out, because they have the title. However, at the same time, the District Land Board will claim that the land belongs to them, and they also give it out to developers. ‗Those things we are trying to sort out now. We are in the process of proposing rules and regulations which will guide our operations. That‘s going to be an act of Parliament. The Land Act (1998) provides the ULC, even as the Constitution, but currently there is no law called the ULC Act where all the rules and regulations are specified that will govern the day to day management of the ULC. Currently, an issue paper is discussed with stakeholders and after the Cabinet will take position, the Parliament will make a Bill and pass it. This act will eliminate all internal contradictions.‘ Third, the Uganda Land Commission faces pressure. ‗Land does not increase, the population is increasing, projects and programs are increasing, so we continuously face pressure here of people who want to gain access to different pieces of land. But they cannot, because of what is already on the land, because of others who are already applying for the land and that‘s a bit of a challenge. How do you deal with these different programs and different interests? You have a public who thinks that land should specifically held in trust for them, but sometimes Government wants it for development. Someone will ask you why do you give away land where there are 100 people living on it? Someone else will ask you: why do you allow 100 people to live in an estate area where we should put a factory? Find land for them. Then the people will say they are there rightfully.‘

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 77 In case of land for investment, there is also overlap with the work of UIA, which has a land database for investors, a fourth problem. ‗There is a problem that some of the land in their database is already having problems. UIA has to link with the Ministry of Lands and also with the ULC if they are dealing with land that is government land. Where they are doing this, you will find problems. The UIA is a legal authority; the Ministry of Lands, the Ministry of Urban Planning, the ULC... they are all involved and trying to manage the land. Nobody is doing the wrong thing, but there is a conflict of authorities all trying to do a good thing.‘ ‗The UIA has moved faster than us, they already have a database on the computer. We need to check that database. We should have an inventory of all government land in this country. We must be sure we don‘t have the title of the land that is in the UIA database. Many people will say we have the land, but when we check it, it‘s already gone. That‘s a high priority.‘

„Even though Article 239 of the 1995 Constitution and the Land Act, Cap 227, section 49 outline the functions of ULC to include the management of Government land, this mandate has been split and has rendered ULC weak and seem to be a non performer. The split of the mandate has caused duplication in government land service delivery. Some of the institutions Managing Government lands include; the Uganda Property Holdings co. Limited, Uganda Investment Authority (UIA), Ministries of Defense, Internal Affairs, etc. This is all due to lack of a specific law to prescribe how ULC should hold and manage Government land‟ (ULC Issue Paper, 2011).

Fifth, there is the problem of funding. Policies are there, but several actors complain about the lack of funding to actually implement the policies. ‗You are right, many of the things that are happening or not happening. The government tries, but the money they have is not enough. This sector is very poorly funded. For example, only to create an inventory of all government lands will costs huge amounts of money. I have to attract funds for that.‘ Due to the lack of funds to implement and the lack of clarity on responsibilities and enforcement of policies, this will have consequences for the way in which investments are being handled in reality. ‗Investments, especially now due to the finding oil, is coming up with an explosion. We‘re sitting on some time bomb.‘ The ULC hopes that the NLP will address some of the challenges, but ‗not much will change‘. ‗When it becomes a policy, we are supposed to come up with workable rules of procedure. If you have no policy on who does what, who is responsible for what and where the demarcations are, you are scattering your efforts. But investors found their way. Although we always find our way, we also face challenges along the way. Everybody is asking the question: how far will we go in giving out land? How much of it is remaining, how much should be targeted for development projects, housing, forests, wetlands? Should we allow all the wetlands to go in the name of development? They are also

Who gets What, When and How? 78 part of the challenge. Do we maintain forests in the city? The policy tries to address these issues. Once it is in place and we get funds - that are always the additional issue - we shall be in the right direction.‘

Strengths and weaknesses Land Act According to Alden Wily (2003: 76) the main strengths are that (1) the Land Act recognises all existing tenure regimes and in current forms and as having equal legal weight and status; (2) it provides fully for registration of all tenure forms; (3) it devolves land administration fully out of Government and to the local, district level; (4) it provides a rigorous spousal and family consent clause for all land transfers; (5) it provides for a local Register at sub county level for customary rights; (6) by not making registration compulsory, the Land Act has enabled a more incremental approach to registration possible; and (7) law was clearly donor- driven and lack of Government enthusiasm for implementation is clear (see following paragraph). Despite the strengths of the Land Act, there are also weaknesses. According to Alden Wily (ibid.), one of the weaknesses is that the Land Act ‗open doors to continued lower status of majority customary rights by allowing registered customary rights to be converted to freehold‘. Another weakness is localised institutional development was made a statutory obligation which implied Government funding. This however proved to be too costly to be workable. This critique has been made for the decentralization programme in general. Bazaara (2003: 32-33), argues that although the decentralization in Uganda may be ‗well intentioned‘, in practice there are some powers that local governments are supposed to wield, but they lack the financial and human resources necessary to do so. ‗Having no resources is tantamount to having no powers at all.‘ According to Bazaara (ibid.) local governments have to find a way of increasing local revenue and running their activities with ‗home-grown‘ resources.

„At present, there is a tendency for local governments to look to donors for grants or to try to cede their powers to civil society organizations. This is a dangerous erosion of their powers and can lead to serious social conflict. A few reforms in local government practices could generate more funds. Such reforms include fighting corruption through transparency, ensuring that local governments get value for money spent on any project, paying their civil servants reasonable wages so that they are not tempted to be corrupt, and expanding their sources of taxation‟ (Bazaara, 2003: 32-33).

This problem becomes even more prominent, since the number of districts has increased. While the number of districts was 33 in 1980, it increased to 56 in 2000, 78 in 2005 and 111 districts in 2011 (Ministry of Local Government, 2011; The Independent, 2009). According to

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 79 Green (2010), the rapid increase in such a relatively short period, is mainly motivated by political reasons: ‗President Museveni‘s government has created new districts as a means to compensate for other patronage resources lost through reforms‘. By creating new districts, ‗a raft of new jobs, each one a patronage opportunity‘ is created (Mwenda, 2007 in Green, 2010: 13). Five years after the passage of the law, Alden Wily (2003: 17) also concluded that although most local land institutions such as the District Land Board are in place, they are not operating in half of the districts. Furthermore, not all recorders or committees are in place and none are operating. The 4,500 community level Parish Land Committees have not been put in place. An amendment to the law (Land Act Amendment Bill, 2002) proposed that these institutions should be removed to the higher sub-county level. In 2004, when the Land Amendment Act was approved, it stated that ‗a District Council, on the advice of the Sub- county or Division Council, may, in accordance with this section, appoint a land committee at sub-county or division level‘. In determining whether to appoint a Committee, the District Council have to take into account ‗any request from any of the areas for which a Committee may be appointed‘ and the ‗extent of the demand‘ and the people within the areas‘. The areas then have to be prepared to assist in the funding of the Committee. The state of finances of the District Council also has to be taken into account, even as the advice of the Ministry of Lands (Land Amendment Bill, 2002, art. 27). But as Alden Wily (2003: 76) argues, the Parish level land committees are crucial in favour of more remote decision-making. Although costs are reduced by approving the amendment, and thus making the parish land committees at matter of choice, voluntary and self funding, it works as a weakness, since it would have appeased certain groups‘ demands for different forms of decision-making, according to Alden Wily (ibid.). As JLOS (2011) explains, at the district level there are no land tribunals operational for the last five years. Cases are transferred to the Magistrate, which causes an overload of work. The Magistrate is lagging behind with all the cases. ‗At the LC level they also need a lot of training, because it‘s very technical. People need to be educated on the land tenure system. The land tribunals should be re-established as well. But it‘s a resource issue. The budget remained with the Ministry of Lands, but the Land Tribunals are under the responsibility of JLOS. So the budget was too small and with the expansion of the districts, the costs also rise. Although we‘re making a strategic plan for the next coming five years, we also wait for the National Land Policy to be signed.‘

Who gets What, When and How? 80 Within the land bodies were people are appointed that are operating, there is no downward accountability well developed, according to Alden Wily (2003: 20). Despite their operation as service agencies, no legal mechanisms are prescribed in Uganda to require land administration bodies to formally report problems and progress to land holders. ‗Most are accountable upwards to their appointees, Governments or Ministers.‘ In Uganda, administrators are not directly accountable to landholders. There are no routes for reporting to people but they are neither accountable to Government or Local Government. However, in practice, the administrators report to the Local Government through appointments (Alden Wily, 2003: 24). The fact that the Land Board members are not elected and that their accountability is unclear, is also a weakness of this Land Act (Alden Wily, 2003: 76). Regarding the multi-functional land offices that can assist the District Land Boards, there are budgetary constraints.15 Some land offices are serving several Land Boards at once, ‗thereby likely diluting their influence along with their service‘. Furthermore, the administrative Secretary to the Land Board also had to be provided by the District Service Commission for Local Government, according to the Land Act. But after five years, not all have been provided, nor are all Government paid Recorders in place in more than 2,000 sub- county offices, ‗severely constraining the ability of local people to take up registration opportunities as promised by the law‘ (Alden Wily, 2003: 27).

2001 Land Sector Strategic Plan In 2001 the Land Sector Strategic Plan ‗Utilising Uganda‘s Land Resources for Sustainable Development‘ was introduced, to which was referred earlier. This plan has to provide ‗the operational, institutional and financial framework for the implementation of sector wide reforms and land management including the implementation of the Land Act‘. Furthermore, it ‗is intended to guide government, the private sector and civil society in the management and use of Uganda‘s land resources.‘ This policy is influenced by four other national policies and will also be complementary to these policies: (1) the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (the plan will enhance rapid economic growth and help increasing the ability of the poor to raise their incomes); (2) the Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture (increasing incomes of the rural poor); (3) the decentralisation policy (the plan will facilitate the decentralisation of land services, the devolution of land management, and empower communities and districts to make better use of their land resources) and (4) the liberalisation and Medium Term

15 See appendix R.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 81 Competitiveness Strategy (by examining the opportunities for privatisation of some land services and for supporting the development of the private sector in relation to land sector activities) (LLSP, 2001: I).

[Box 1. Registering a customary right in Uganda: procedures and principles] 1. Any individual, family or community holding land under customary tenure may obtain an application form from the Sub-County LAND COMMITTEE and fill it in. 2. The Land Committee will publish a notice and post this in a prominent place in the area, specifying the land and requiring all persons who claim any interest in the land or adjacent land which may be affected, to attend a meeting at the time indicated, at a date not less than two weeks from the time of putting the notice up. 3. The Land Committee may request an officer from the District Land Office or any other person/s to conduct further investigations. 4. The Land Committee will visit the land and – a. investigate and confirm the boundaries, demarcate these; b. hold meetings or other discussions to identify all interests in the land as above; c. decide on any question of customary law relating to the ownership of the land; d. if any person/s have rights, record these and indicate the share of each person in the land and the nature of that right; e. ensure that any interests that do not amount to ownership are recorded as third party rights and the names of the persons holding these interests; f. ensure that any known interest which has, for any reason, not been claimed is taken account of; g. ensure that the interests and rights in land held by women, absent persons, minors and persons with disability are safeguarded. 5. To achieve the above, the Land Committee may – a. Call, hear and use evidence in its assessment, including evidence that would otherwise not be admissible in a court of law; b. Refer any matter to any customary institution habitually accepted in the area as an institution with functions over land; c. Determine its own procedure. 6. The Committee will prepare a report on the application, recording all claims to interests in the land, and give its opinion of whether these claims have been proved to exist, setting out its findings and recommendations; 7. It will give a copy of the Report to the applicant, make another copy available in the Parish for inspection by all persons who submitted claims, and submit the Report to the District Land Board; 8. The BOARD will consider the application and may confirm the recommendations of the Committee, issue the Certificate with conditions, return the Report for more investigations, or reject the application; 9. If the Board agrees to issue a certificate then it will inform the Sub-County Recorder of its decision in writing and the Recorder will issue the Certificate of Customary Ownership accordingly (with or without conditions, as specified by the Board); 10. Any person may appeal to the Land Tribunal against a decision and the Land Tribunal may confirm, vary, reverse or modify the decision of the Board. Source: Alden Wily, 2003: 36. Extracted from Uganda Land Act 1998; sections 5-8.

As the LLSP (ibid.) argues, ‗before the recent legal reforms, the land sector in Uganda tended to be perceived within a narrow focus on the provision of technical and land service

Who gets What, When and How? 82 predominantly serving an elite of citizens‘. Now the focus has changed to an ‗integrated approach to the land sector, encompassing all land sector actors and services, and enabling actions and resource use to be prioritised across the sector‘. The LLSP (2001: ii) acts according to four guiding principles: (1) management of land resources must comply with broader social and economic objectives; (2) management of land resources must guarantee environmental sustainability; (3) land management institutions must be relevant, cost- effective, efficient, and sustainable; (4) planning and implementation, decision making and monitoring must be democratic and participatory, transparent and accountable. According to the Government of Uganda, the majority of Uganda‘s land is still underutilised. It is estimated that only one third of Uganda‘s cultivable land is under ‗productive use‘ (LLSP, 2001: ii). The current state of the land sector has an impact on poverty as well; through the unequal land distribution, land tenure insecurity and through inequitable systems and processes. ‗Creating an enabling environment for the private sector‘ is an important theme in the LSSP (2001: 43). As the LSSP (ibid.) argues, ‗the implementation of the LSSP will positively contribute to the empowerment of the private sector in a wider context. The quality of land services delivery is crucial for the Private Sector, especially for businesses in agriculture‘. By modernising the Land Registry, the LSSP wants to contribute to private sector development. According to LSSP (2001: 44), the Land Registry does not serve the private sector needs ‗satisfactorily‘; complaints include files lost, inefficiency, and widespread corruption, with the result that important transactions are disrupted. The LSSP influenced four other policies (2001: I)

National Land Policy (final draft 2011) When the Land Act came into being, there was no Land Policy to guide the land reform process. It did provide some leading principles, such as ‗a good land tenure system should not force people off the land, particularly those who have no other way to earn a reasonable living or to survive‘ and ‗land tenure system should protect people‘s rights in land so they are not forced off the land before there are jobs available in the non-agricultural sector of the economy‘ (Rugadya, 1999). Unfortunately, as Deininger and Castagnini (2006: 324) argue: ‗the adoption of an ambitious institutional design together with a lack of funding implied that little if any of the infrastructure needed to implement this Act was established‘. According to Ahene (2009), the first major initiative to implement the LSSP is ‗a pragmatic revision of the existing land policy environment and the drafting of a new National Land Policy‘. This process started in 2004. As Ahene (ibid.) argues, ‗the exercise has not only

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 83 provided a forum for discussing issues pertaining to land rights, but is attempting to shift policy emphasis towards land access and development‘. However, although a first draft formed the base for several consultations in 2005, the final version (2011) of the New Land Policy (NLP) is still not yet approved by Cabinet (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 2011). With regard to investments, NLP will bring some significant changes, as can be seen in box 2. According to the New Land Policy, a strategy regarding the management of natural resources in Uganda should be the ‗joint management and sharing of benefits from these natural resources between the trustee and beneficiaries‘ (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 2011: art. 22). Furthermore, ‗to stem abuse, in management and use of resources held under the public doctrine trust in Uganda‘, measures have to be put in place to ‗define the rights of access and/or use guaranteed to the communities living in such areas‘, ‗institutionalize mechanisms for the joint and participatory management of these natural resources with communities owing land adjacent to, in or over which these resources are allocated‘ and ‗develop criteria for equalization and compensation for foregone opportunities as part of a benefits sharing scheme for districts or populations where such resources are located‘. In the case of land of ethnic minorities, the government wants to ‗deliberate and specify benefit-sharing measures to ensure that minority groups benefit from resources on their ancestral lands rendered to extractive or other industry‘. Regarding land for investment, it is stated that long-term benefit-sharing arrangements, rather than one-off compensation for loss of land rights, such as contract farming schemes for smallholder farmers, outgrowers schemes, equity-sharing schemes, use of leaseholds and joint-ventures have to be put in place by the Government (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 2011: art. 89). However this policy is still not yet approved and therefore not implemented. Both the Land Act (1998) and the Investment Code Act do not mention anything with ‗benefit-sharing‘ or ‗informed consent‘. The New Land Policy states regarding the mineral and petroleum in Uganda, that the Government has to ‗adopt an open policy on information to the public and seek consent of communities and local governments concerning prospecting and mining of these resources‘ (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 2011).

Who gets What, When and How? 84 [Box 2. The New Land Policy and Investments]  Growth in FDI can lead to alienation of land from peasant‘s rights holders and result into tenure insecurity, food insecurity, land conflicts and poverty (art. 87).  Government or public land available to issue for carefully-selected private investment, deemed of importance for socio-economic growth is limited. In the past, Government proposed to harness the power of compulsory acquisition to deliver land to investors (art. 87).  Uganda‘s natural resources have depleted or degraded through indiscriminate excisions, unregulated harvesting, and encroachment for promotions of politically-motivated investments (…) (art. 135)  The Government of Uganda has a duty to attract private investment both domestic and foreign, into productive sectors of the economy. This duty includes creating an enabling investment climate, as well as facilitating investors to access land.  Integrate land ownership with land use regulation, more emphasis on urbanization, attaining food security using land and orientation to commercial agriculture for an estimated of 31 percent of peasants (art. 118).  Enhance access to land for large-scale commercial investment without prejudicing security of tenure for the Citizens of Uganda  Ensure that poor communities are protected from activities which deny them access to land resources and the infrastructure necessary for productive use (art. 120).  Government shall put in place measures to mitigate the negative impacts of investment so as to deliver equitable and sustainable development (art. 88).  Government will formulate a strategy to guide the State and its agencies in the provision of land for investment (regulate the amount of land investors can access, determine sectors, carry out cost-benefit analysis on public facilities before allocating the land to private investors, assemble land and allocate it through a land bank)  Land tribunals will be reinstated, properly resourced and facilitated to enable them carry out their constitutional mandate (art. 112).  Reform the land ownership rights and interests as the starting point before proceeding to land development aspects  Government will put in place measures to promote long-term benefit-sharing arrangements rather than one-off compensation for loss of land rights, such as contract farming schemes for small holder farmers, out growers‘ schemes, equity-sharing schemes, use of leaseholds and joint-ventures (NLP, art. 89).  Protect the land rights, including the rights of citizens in the face of investments, with measures for clear procedures and standards for local consultation, mechanisms for appeal and arbitration, facilitate access to land by vulnerable groups, smaller-scale land owners and land users in the face of large scale farming interests, protect and avoid degradation of natural resources (art. 90).  Non-citizens shall not be granted interest in land greater than leasehold for 49 years in respect of any land in Uganda (art. 94) (with the option to renew, art. 95).  To support land rights, measures will be put in place to (iii) ensure land delivery services are further decentralized to the local authority level, (v) ensure civil society participation in the protection of land rights and tenure security of communities and vulnerable groups (art. 95).

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 85 2000 Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture In 2000 the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture was introduced, which was part of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan that was launched in 1997. Main goals included rapid and sustainable economic growth and structural transformation, and (3): increased ability of the poor to raise their incomes. According to the vision of the PMA, poverty should be eradicated through a ‗profitable, competitive, sustainable and dynamic agricultural and agro-industrial sector‘. The mission can be briefly defined as transforming subsistence agriculture to commercial agriculture. The PMA is not in itself an investment plan. Rather it defines the visions, and the principles and strategies which Central Government, Local Councils and farmers/rural households may apply to develop policies and investment plans that are relevant for improving agriculture-based livelihoods. The specific objectives of the PMA are to: (i) increase the income and quality of life of rural households; (ii) improve household food security through the market; (iii) generate gainful employment; and (iv) promote sustainable use and management of natural resources (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005: 3). When the PMA was evaluated, it was stressed that ‗there is a need to inject a sense of urgency into the whole of the land reform agenda, particularly to address women‘s poor access to land. (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005: 15). More in general, it can be argued that agricultural reforms in Uganda emphasized (1) liberalization of the exchange rate (to eliminate currency overvaluation); (ii) control of inflation; (iii) liberalization of trade in agricultural inputs and outputs; (iv) provision of export incentives to the private sector (removal of export tax); and (v) removal of government subsidies in the agricultural sector (Saprin, 2002: 111-112). However, research has concluded that agricultural reform and liberalization had not improved the real incomes of farmers, particularly the small-scale ones. Although producer prices for some crops rose, there was also a general rise in the cost of production, and only those farmers who already had the resources were able to benefit (Saprin, 2002: 117). Furthermore, Saprin (ibid.) also argue that ‗while the liberalization of agricultural markets resulted in higher prices for agricultural produce, only the better-off farmers were able to respond and increase their production.‘ The situation of poor households was further worsened by the pressing need to meet the higher cost of social services, such as health care and education, under the adjustment program.

Who gets What, When and How? 86 CHAPTER 6. INVESTMENTS IN UGANDA - ROLE OF POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS

With the broader background of Uganda and the institutional framework in mind, this chapter will only focus on investments in Uganda, and particularly the role of the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA). In Uganda, the FDI inflows increased from 733 million dollars in 2007 to 799 million dollars in 2009. The increase is especially noticeable when comparing with 2000, when FDI was only 82 million US$, as can be seen in figure 6 (UIA, 2011b: 4). According to UNCTAD (2004: 31), Uganda has much ‗untapped potential and a range of investment opportunities‘.

Figure 6. FDI inflows in million US$, 1990 - 2009

Source: UIA, 2011b: .4

The country has a comparative advantage in agricultural production, forestry, mineral resources and their primary and secondary processing. Tourism is also among the sectors where there is a lot of potential, according to UNCTAD (2004: 31). Investment in agricultural production and processing is encouraged by the Ugandan Government. In 2009, agriculture added 25 percent value to GDP, in comparison to 26 percent for industry and 50 percent for services (World Bank, 2010). Furthermore, only one third of the food crop products are marketed compared to two thirds of the livestock. In 2004, about 42 percent of agricultural GDP consisted of subsistence crops for domestic consumption and is non-monetized. The

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 87 agricultural products include many types of food and cash crops, such as coffee, cotton, tea and tobacco, oil seeds, livestock and fish. Bananas account for the largest percentage of total cropped area, namely 28 percent. Cereals account for 25 percent, root crops for 16.7 percent, pulses for 14 percent and oil seeds for 8 percent. Export crops account for 8 percent of the total cropped area. New products such as cut flowers, fruits, vegetables and spices also gained more importance in recent years. Those products are increasingly being produced for export markets (UNCTAD, 2004: 31).

„Uganda‟s mild climate, regular rainfall and stable political environment make it an ideal location to invest in agriculture, on both a large and a small scale. In addition, the logistics of doing business in Uganda have never been better, with more efficient and cost-effective export corridors by air, rail and road. Investors opting for the agricultural sector and thinking of export markets will not be disappointed, whether their interest is in established export items like tea, coffee, cocoa, pulses, flowers, tobacco and vanilla – or in new ones with potential, like palm oil.‟ David Barry, Managing Director, Kyagalanyi Coffee Ltd. (Volcafe Group) (UNCTAD, 2004: 50).

According to UNCTAD (ibid.), investment in agricultural production and processing can be ‗very rewarding‘. ‗With its natural endowments, Uganda is a low-cost producer of most agricultural products and, with improved efficiency, can become a major producer and exporter‘. As was already mentioned for Africa as a region, is also true for Uganda; most of Uganda‘s agricultural products can be exported to the European Union with a tariff-free entry.

UGANDA INVESTMENT AUTHORITY Contributing to the economic development of the country by enhancing foreign direct investment as well as domestic investment, is one of the tasks of the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA), which was established by the Investment Code in 1991. As a semi- autonomous government agency, it promotes Uganda as an investment location, eases constraints on investment and encourages inward investment by offering incentives. The main priorities are now policy advocacy, project facilitation, image building and investment promotion (UNCTAD, 2004: 51). In 2000 the International Policy Review (IPR) advised the UIA to restructure the organization; instead of focusing on administration and regulation it would be better to focus ‗firmly‘ on promotion (United Nations, 2007). In 2007 the IPR stated that ‗a less intrusive approach with investors‘ was adopted, ‗including by stopping field visits when granting licenses‘ (United Nations, 2007: 18). Furthermore, the UIA has not been converted into a one- stop shop, which was the main idea in 1991 and means having all services such as immigration, customs, land, utilities, etc, under one roof. This was not adopted because the

Who gets What, When and How? 88 UIA rather encourages all public administrations to engage as ‗efficient team members, working towards a common goal‘. The UIA plays the role of a ‗team leader‘ (United Nations, ibid). Under the new concept, the UIA created a network with all the relevant government agencies to provide services to investors (UNCTAD, 2004: 52). However, in 2011 the UIA argues that it in fact is a ‗one-stop shop to promote and facilitate investors‘ (UIA, 2011). Every year, the UIA launches a report and press brief with the planned projects and planned employment. According to the Minister of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Ephraim Kamuntu, in 2010 ‗the general investment climate was very good‘. That year the UIA licensed a total of 323 projects, with a planned investment of approximately 1.7 billion US$ and with almost 150,000 planned jobs. This would mean a rise in investments of three percent and 36% more jobs than in 2009. Manufacturing (119 projects), financial services (63 projects) and agriculture (50) projects, were the main sectors of planned investments (UIA, 2011). Furthermore, the UIA argues that there is an increasing investment in the mining sector, petroleum and agricultural industries. ‗The Government is projecting higher Foreign Direct Investment in 2011, and the proceeding years‘ (UIA, ibid; UIA, 2011b). However, although FDI is expecting to increase the next coming years, out of the 323 project licensed in 2010, 143 projects are from Ugandan owned companies, accounting for 59 percent of the total investments registered in 2010. India (47 projects) and China (33 projects) followed after that. However, that same report also mentions that out of the 323 projects, 169 are foreign-owned, 122 local owned and 32 projects from a joint-venture. According to the UIA, of the 323 projects in 2010, 119 were in manufacturing, 63 in the financial sector and 50 in the agricultural sector (including forestry and fishery) (see appendix N). All these numbers however have to be taken with one remark in mind. As UNCTAD (2004: 15) argues: ‗typically for a developing country, there has been a marked disparity between planned and actual investments in Uganda‘. In 2004 Investor Survey Reports of the UIA stated that the conversion rate of projects from planned to actual investment has risen from 39 percent in 1996 to around 50 percent in 2000. As the UIA (2011) argues, ‗you have to understand the dynamics of investment. If somebody comes to license an investment, we‘re talking about million dollar investments. As UIA we license a company on basis of a business proposal. When it comes to the implementation, it may happen that the investor may not able implement the project due to one reason or another.‘

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 89 POSSIBILITIES FOR INVESTORS An investor is required to apply to the UIA for an investment license to start a business in Uganda. The license is normally valid for a period of not less than five years after the implementation of the project (UNCTAD, 2004: 51). According to the Investment Code Act (art. 12), a license is granted when the proposed business enterprise contributes to the (1) ‗generation of new earnings or savings of foreign exchange through exports. resource-based import substitution or service activities; (2) the utilisation of local materials, supplies and services; (3) the creation of employment opportunities in Uganda; (4) the introduction of advanced technology or upgrading of indigenous technology; (5) the contribution to locally or regionally balanced socioeconomic development; (6) any other objectives that the authority may consider relevant for achieving the objects of this Code. As the UIA (2011) argues, ‗the Investment Code is under revision and before Cabinet as we speak. It is our role if someone presented a business proposal, we will look through it, and actually even have interviews with them where they specify what they are planning. Some already have existing businesses, so we have something we can see. Others are new, they have to show proof that the amount of technology is going to change the way things are done and that the skills are going to impart to the local Ugandans‘. According to the Investment Code and the 1998 Land Act, foreign investment is allowed in any industrial sector except those touching on national security or requiring the ownership of land. Although foreign companies and individuals may not own land, they may hold it under long-term lease. Foreigners must seek Cabinet approval through the UIA to lease land over 50 acres to be used for agricultural or animal production purposes. Foreigner may own land in a joint venture with a majority local shareholder (US Department of State, 2011; World Bank, 2011b). There are no restrictions on the equity share that foreign nationals may hold in a locally incorporated company. Similarly, there are no rules or regulations restricting joint ventures between Ugandan and foreign investors. These issues are subject to mutual agreement between the partners. However, all such agreements must be registered with the Registrar General at a nominal fee (Business in Development Network, ibid.). A minimum investment of US$ 100,000 for foreign investors is also required, in order to protect small local companies from foreign competition. As Business in Development Network (BiD Network) (2008) argues, in practice this amount includes everything right from protect pre- investment activities, land, equipment, plant and machinery and building and construction. Foreign investors may also invest smaller amounts (minimum of USD 50,000) if they are participating in a joint venture with a majority shareholding-local investor. According to BiD

Who gets What, When and How? 90 Network (ibid,) it is important to note that while these requirements must be met by foreign investors in obtaining licenses, the Investment Code itself does not contain any mandatory performance requirements (BiD Network, 2008)

Wages With regard to the wages in Uganda, according to the UIA ‗there should be a minimum wage, but if it‘s there it must be very old, because the Ministry of Labour is not very proactive in enforcing the law. So currently there is no minimum wage. Everyone pays what they want to pay. Of course, as UIA, we don‘t try to do everybody else‘s work. Our job and mandate is clear: promote investment. However, we do still hear of investors, especially Indians and Chinese that are mistreating their workers. But, that is usually a case that goes straight to the Ministry of Labour and to the Courts of Law. Unless there is something they are doing in terms of their products or services that go against the grain of UIA, then the investment license might be revoked. UIA simply ensures that all in line ministries and Government Agencies and Departments do their respective jobs with regards to investor facilitation‘ (UIA, 2011). The national minimum wage in Uganda has not been adjusted since 1984 and currently stands at 6,000 Uganda Shillings (UGX) per month. According to the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations of the International Labour Organization (CEACR, ILO), in 1997 the Minimum Wages Board through tripartite consultations recommended a national minimum wage. This was submitted to Cabinet, ‗but no substantive action appears to have taken place‘ (CEACR Individual Observation, 2007). This is against the ‗fundamental objective‘ of the International Labour Convection, ‗which is to ensure to workers a minimum wage that guarantees a decent standard of living for them and their families‘. According to the Committee (CEACR, 2007), ‗when minimum rates of pay are left to lose most of their value so that they ultimately bear no relationship with the real needs of the workers, minimum wage fixing is reduced to a mere formality void of any substance‘. In 2011, the Committee still did not receive a report from the government ‗concerning changes in minimum wage and the rate of inflation and the average wage by branch of activity and occupation‘ (CEACR, 2011). With regard to working hours, the Employment Act (2006) states that an employee can work at maximum 48 hours a week. However, the employer and the employee may agree that the normal working hours can more than 48 hours, but it may not exceed 56 hours a week. A working day may not exceed ten hours. A working day above eight hours a day requires a pause of half an hour.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 91 Facilitation UIA One of the way in which the UIA facilitates investors is by accessing land, for industrial or agricultural purposes. As UIA (2011) explains, they facilitate investors to acquire land in a number of ways. If an investor is interested in acquiring some land for a particular investment, the Government can lease or freely give a parcel of land to an investor, be they local or foreign, to establish an investment that is deemed economically viable to Uganda. In order for such an investor to qualify land, the UIA uses the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets (PPDA) guidelines.16 The investor ‗should provide the information on the levels of job creation; capital investment to be made; export orientation and destination country and turnover (sales). The application should also fully elaborate to what extent the project will affect the environment and what mitigations it will put in place to ensure environmental sustainability. ICT, agro-processing and mineral beneficiations receive priority over other sectors for free land‘ (UIA, 2011). For this free land, investors have to meet two out of the three extra criteria: (1) total investment/acre must exceed US$ 1 million per acre; (2) the percentage of export of value-added products would be equal to a minimum of 80 percent of total product value; (3) local employment/acre for semi-skilled workers would be a minimum of 30, while skilled workers would be a minimum of 15. The lease of the plot will be kept at 30 years with an option for an extension of a further 30 year period.17 ‗Failure to comply will mean that the land automatically reverts back to the UIA‘ (UIA, 2011c). In order for UIA to acquire land suitable for industrial development, it has to advertise nationally for those individuals, communities or cooperatives that have land for sale. The conditions are that this land should be ‗unencumbered (free of squatters)‘, properly titled and conflict-free. ‗Of course, we have cases were land has had squatters claiming that they are bonafide occupants and we have had to compensate them. But generally, we try to avoid such scenarios. Therefore, if an investor come to us, whether local or foreign, looking for land for a particular activity, we are able to provide the suitable land for whatever investment they hope to put up‘ (UIA , 2011). The second way in which the UIA facilitates is ‗through partnerships with the owners of land‘. ‗By this, individual owners approach the UIA with information on the land they own

16 ‗Under the auspices of the joint World Bank and OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Procurement Round Table initiative, developing countries and bilateral and multilateral donors worked together to develop a set of tools and standards that provide guidance for improvements in procurement systems and the results they produce‘ (OECD, 2007). 17 The lease periods for commercial, recreational and institutional plots will be 60 years while residential plots will be leased for 90 years (UIA, 2011c).

Who gets What, When and How? 92 and their asking price per acre. The UIA ensures that a proper valuation of the land is carried out before the land is then included on the land database kept at the UIA. Investors are then provided with the land bank, and put in touch with the prospective seller. The transaction is between the two, without UIA‘s involvement. In this case, UIA only facilitates the owner to find an investor to utilize the land or any other real estate that somebody might have‘. ‗The third way is that the Government established Industrial Parks in various parts of the country.‘ There are 8 parks being set up. Kampala Industrial Business Park (KIBP) in Namanve (869 ha) is an example, even as Luzira Industrial Business Park, Mbarara SME Park, the Soroti Fruit Processing Park and some others as well. Namanve has demarcations for manufacturing, export processing zones, ICT Park, residential areas and freight and cargo ports. ‗Some 272 investors have already been allocated land in Namanve which has been subsidized to a rate of US$ 80,000 per acre‘. Originally, the idea was to establish 22 Industrial Parks, but land is the main problem. ‗In the places where we are establishing the Industrial Parks, there is land, but for the other Parks we are still acquiring land‘ (UIA, 2011). Although the UIA did not hear about Lake Victoria Free Trade Zone, which will be discussed in the next chapter, special economic zones will be established in Uganda as well, ‗to promote the value addition component in exports, to generate employment as well as mobilize foreign exchange. The companies that will be targeted for the establishment of the SEZs have to ensure that they are labour intensive manufacturing centres that involve value addition to raw materials export of factory products – the rationale being that the zones will attract employers and thus reduce poverty and unemployment and stimulate the area‘s economy‘ (UIA, 2011). Foreign investors are also required to pay taxes on their investment in Uganda. Dividend and capital payments are allowed subject to the tax laws of Uganda. With the approval of the Bank of Uganda, dividends can be remitted to non-resident shareholders. Capital gains on business assets are subject to a tax rate of 30 percent (BiD Network, 2008: 48).

Challenges As was already mentioned, the figures UIA presents every year on foreign and local investments and the impact on employment have to be taken with the thought in mind that the actual investments will differ. This is one of the things that can be improved. ‗There are so many things to be done; I don‘t know where to start. For UIA there is a lot of funding needed to do investment promotion, to facilitate investors, to monitor and evaluate companies that are

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 93 settled in Uganda and see how they are running, etc.‘ ‗Due to shortage of funding, we have not been able to go back and monitor whether the projects that are licensed are actually on the ground‘. However, the UIA does argue that they are following all the requirements that are stated in the New Land Policy (which is still not signed by the Cabinet and therefore not yet implemented) [We will look at the investment license they‘ve filled in, the jobs they have promised to create, the number of Ugandans they‘re going to employ, materials they use, the export/import, the wage. This might even help with the minimum wage.18] Recently, the UIA has acquired funds from the European Union and from UNIDO [United Nations Industrial Development Organization19] to carry out investor surveys and we now comfortably establish which projects are actually on the ground of the 5000 or so that we have licensed since 1991 (UIA, 2011). According to the International Finance Corporation‘s 2010 Doing Business Survey, businesses generally deem acquisition of land with a ‗clean title‘ as one of their ‗biggest challenges‘. Uganda‘s property registration process ranked 150 out of 183 countries surveyed. It is estimated that there are more than 8,000 fake land titles in Uganda (US Department of State, 2011; World Bank, 2011). In 2005, a news report stated that ‗land title forgeries have become so rampant in Uganda that almost every two to three hours, a land title is forged‘ in Kampala. ‗The Land Registry is general viewed as a hindrance to investment and development.‘ According to a former Chief Registrar of the Uganda Land Registry, the title forgeries are happening besides the persistent hiding of records in the Land Registry Office in the ministry of Lands and Environment (Oketch, 2005). According to an official from the Justice Law and Order Section at the Ministry of Justice, ‗the law is clear on fraud. You can sue the Registrar of Titles or the individual. But legally it‘s not a simple area. People assume things and then they see it‘s not working in that way and they say the Registrar of Titles is fraudulent. Sometimes it is the clerks within the registry. They do not always understand what they are ought to do‘. Since 2009 there is a special Land Fraud Unit within the police unit. ‗But they‘re still working on it‘ (JLOS, 201120). BiD Network (2008: 47) also wrote in 2008: ‗land ownership is not a clear-cut issue in Uganda. Caution needs to be taken when acquiring land due to the possibility of overlapping claims on the same piece of land‘ and advised future investors to ‗watch out for fraudulent titles and titles issued in error, for example two or more certificates of titles issues in respect

18 Deleted in ‗corrected version‘ 19 UNIDO is the specialized agency of the United Nations that promotes industrial development for poverty reduction, inclusive globalization and environmental sustainability http://www.unido.org/index.php?id=7852 20 Interview with Rachel Odoi, JLOS, Kampala. 18-03-2011.

Who gets What, When and How? 94 of the same piece of land‘. Furthermore, caution is needed when surveying the land. ‗Be on the lookout for poor survey and title deed plans. The use of competent and licensed surveyor to inspect the land and confirm survey coordinates and other boundary markings is highly recommended‘ (BiD, ibid.). As the UIA (2011) argues, ‗the responsible Government Ministries, Agencies and Departments have to be facilitated to do their work. A lot of steps required to set up a business in Uganda have to be minimized in order to improve our rankings in the Doing Business Reports, among others. In response to some of these issues, however, the Government of Uganda set up the Presidential Investors‘ Roundtable [which started in 2004]. This is a high level forum chaired by the President and brings together a select group of about 22 local and international investors to advise the government on how to improve the country‘s investment climate so as to make it a competitive investment destination. Over the years, a lot has changed‘. For example, the Uganda Registration Services Bureau was granted autonomy from the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs in July 2010 and will launch an online search engine for companies.21 Furthermore, a public private partnership policy will be enacted. President Museveni especially stressed the need for PPPs for infrastructural works. According to the World Bank, ‗for the policy to work legislation, a Public Private Partnership centre and an Authority to guide the program are some of the needs that have to be put in place‘ (Nakaweesi, 2010; UIA, 2011). For the UIA, the main challenge is the land tenure system. ‗There are various issues around the system of freehold and mailo land. The whole structure since the colonial times and the monarchies have created a lot of problems; people claim land because they have lived there for a long time, while others claim the same land, because they have the title. In addition to this, the land administration is inadequately resourced, and it is performing very poorly in service delivery. Until this issue is addressed, Uganda will remain at a comparative disadvantage compared with other locations in East Africa‘ (UIA, 2011). However, ‗a lot of agencies and government organizations are trying to discuss ways to make the land tenure systems slightly more favourable.‘22 As a Consultant argues, ‗investors have access to free mailo land. It is surveyed and titled. But mailo land that is occupied is not available, because you cannot evict people. It freezes the land. There are big structural issues with multiple mailo rights‘. 23 The Justice Law

21 In October 2011, the search engine is still not online. http://www.ursb.go.ug/ [15-10-2011] 22 This sentenced was removed when the UIA wanted to check the interview by email, 05-07-2011, UIA. 23 Eddy Nsamba-Gayiiya, Consultant, 16-03-2011.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 95 and Order Section at the Ministry of Justice agrees; ‗mailo land has a lot of problems. The management structures for the customary tenure are not in place. Due to the overlapping rights, there are evictions. But you cannot evict people legally. There is a problem with bonafide occupants, which goes back to the feudal system. Peasants on the land cannot buy the land, even if they are given the first option to buy the land. They cannot afford. The second person that buys the land has to take care of the peasants, but this is often not the case‘ (JLOS, 2011). According to the Consultant (2011), ‗the 1998 Land Act enhanced registration that could facilitate the market. There are 1500 sub county chiefs. Each sub county should have a register. But it didn‘t happen, mainly due to financial means. They need equipment and human resources. But the legal provisions are there. The hope is on implementation of the Land Act. The Government is trying to find the resources. You cannot transform the economy without the reform of the land tenure system and its issues. Only a serious government has to find the money. We need to tackle the land tenure system, reform it, to achieve industrialization.‘24

24 Eddy Nsamba-Gayiiya, Consultant, 16-03-2011.

Who gets What, When and How? 96 CHAPTER 7. NEW LAND ACQUISITIONS IN UGANDA: REPORTS AND REALITY

With the background of the institutional framework of Uganda in mind, the following chapters will focus on the main findings of this research. This chapter will discuss what is known about new land acquisitions in Uganda and present the findings of the verification during the fieldwork, from February till July 2011. The chapters that follows, chapter 8, will discuss more in detail the characteristics of the new corporate land acquisitions that were selected as case studies and the actors involved. Chapter 9 and 10 will focus on the way in which land was acquired, the conditions attached, and the role of Corporate Social Responsibility. This will be followed by chapter 11, in which the impact of the selected land acquisitions will be discussed, concluded by the different perceptions on the consequences of the stakeholders in chapter 13.

REPORTS „Land grabbing is rapidly growing like a cancer and if it‟s not immediately treated it‟s likely to spread and affect many people in Uganda‟ (Mabikke, 2011: 12).

As was already presented in chapter 2, according to the Global Land Project (GLP) report, there have been 7 deals in Uganda as of 2007 until April 15, 2010, which concerns minimum 1,874,000 ha and maximum 1,904,000 ha (Friis and Reenberg, 2010: 1125). According to data from FAO (FAOstat, 2010 in Friss and Reenberg, ibid.), in Uganda the land deals represent a very large part of the country's agricultural area, namely 14.6 percent. However, although GLP concludes that the consequences of the land deals can be expected to be very large for the local population and environment, with impacts such as agricultural intensification, forest degradation, displacement of local populations, increasing local food insecurity and increasing poverty, actually very little is known about the details of these ‗land deals‘ (Friis and Reenberg, 2010: 18). This is not only a problem in analyzing land deals in Uganda, but for all reported ‗land deals‘ in general. As Cotula and Vermeulen (2011: 11) argue, it is necessary to be ‗cautious‘. Friis and Reenberg (2010: 13) also acknowledge

25 Based on the screening and triangulation of GRAIN (2008), Von Braun & Meinzen-Dick (2009) and Görgen et al. (2009)).

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 97 that ‗consistent information about the purpose of investment in the different recipient countries is lacking‘.26 When looking in more detail to the seven investments from the GLP report and the information on other investments in Uganda that is available from media reports and other international reports, table 8 can be drawn (GLP Report, 2010: 34, Görgen e.a., 2009; GRAIN, AfDB, 2009, IFPRI, 2009). This list represents a comprehensive overview of land acquisitions from 2007 onwards, as far as possible.27 When analyzing the compiled list of 21 land acquisitions, it becomes clear that there is a huge diversity in actors, country of origin, seize and purpose. If we look to the actors, the investors are foreign as well as domestic. Foreign investors include investors from China, Russia, Germany, Kenya, Egypt, United Kingdom, South Africa, India and Bangladesh. Seize varies between 200 and 809,377 ha. The purposes of the investments are also diverse: it ranges from the cultivation of maize, fruits, rice, wheat, coffee, sunflower, sugarcane, commercial timber and jatropha, among others. Although this list is compiled with the information available and is therefore not 100 percent comprehensive, it is possible to distinguish several drivers (see colours); FDI in food, FDI in non-food agricultural commodities, direct investment in food and non-food agricultural commodities by Ugandan investors, land acquisitions for animal production, land acquisitions for nature and eco-tourism and a land acquisition for a Special Economic Zone, as can be seen in figure 7. Map 7 gives an overview of the locations. The land acquisitions are scattered all over Uganda, although there is a ‗gap‘ in the north-east and south-west. An explanation might be the former presence of the Lord Resistance Army in the northern region28 and tensions in Karamoja region.29 Climatological and geographical conditions might also influence the locations, since Uganda is characterised by four agro-ecological zones (see chapter 4) and therefore makes certain parts more favourable for investment than others. The land tenure and availability of land might also play a role.

26 Much information is based on media reports, but they are not always reliable. These figures must be treated with extreme caution. Conflicting data sources may also result in discrepancies among datasets. For example, while land ministries tend to have figures for lands actually transferred, investment promotion agencies under pressure to show success in attracting investment may refer to the usually larger land areas featured in the MoU or business plan (Cotula and Vermeulen, 2011: 11). According to Cotula and Vermeulen (2011: 12) with a few exceptions, research based figures are much lower than those suggested by media reports (as aggregated and analysed by Friis and Reenberg, 2010). In the case of Ethiopia and Mali for example, Cotula and Vermeulen found that although the size of single land acquisitions can be very large (e.g. a 100,000 hectares project in Mali), the average sizes of projects above 1,000 hectares are much smaller than what is suggested by media reports. 27 See chapter 3 on methodology to read on the limitations of this research. 28 The northern region is now much more safe, since the LRA is now in North-East Congo, Garamba National Parc and the Central African Republic (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). 29 Especially in Abim, Kaabong, Moroto, Kotido, Nakapiripirit and the eastern part of Katakwi District.

Who gets What, When and How? 98 Table 8. New Land Acquisitions for Investment, 2007 - 2011

Actor Country of Seize Location Details Year ᴥ ► origin (converted reported in ha) 1. Oil Palm Uganda, 10,000 ha, Bugala Island, Aim: ‘largest oil 2009 V V Uganda Ltd., Kenya planning for Kalangala palm plantation in part of BIDCO 40,000 ha District Africa’ 2. Kaweri Coffee Uganda, 2,512 ha Mubende Coffee 2009 V V Plantation Ltd. Germany (Neumann Kaffee Gruppe) 3. New Forest UK 9,300 ha, Mubende, Commercial timber 2010 X - Company planning for Kiboga and 26,000 ha Bugiri district

4. Hebei Company China 40,500 ha Kigumba, Manufacturing 2009 V X in 8-10 Masindi plant; Maize, rice, years district wheat; fruits and vegetables; commercial trees 5. Kiryandongo Uganda 2,833 ha Masindi Commercial farm; *** V *** Farm (Mukwano District maize Group of Companies) 6. Ziwa Ranchers Uganda 15,378 ha Masindi Ranch *** V *** Ltd. (Mukwano District Group of Companies) 7. Nexus Biodiesel Uganda > 400 ha Isimba, Jatropha 2010 X - Ltd. Masindi District 8. ‘Russian Russia * Lira District Biofuel production: 2009 V X company’ jatropha 9. Mukwano Agro Uganda 17,000 ha Lira District Sunflower, maize, 2006, V V Project Ltd. soybeans, simsim, 2010, (Mukwano and outgrower 2011 Group of scheme Companies 10. Ministry of Egypt** 200 ha Labora, Koro Model farms; wheat 2009, V X Agriculture and sub-county, for home 2010 Land Gulu District; consumption and Reclamation Yumbe District export Egypt 11. Government of Egypt 809,377 ha * Lease 2008, V X Egypt 2009 12. Amuru Sugar Uganda 30,000 ha Amuru District Sugarcane 2011 V V Works Ltd. plantation, (Madhvani Still in court Group) 13. Agri SA South Africa 170,000 ha Near Kampala * 2009, V X 2011 14. National Uganda, 20,000 ha Busoga ‘Residents have 2006, X - Forest foreign Forest without success 2010 Authority; Reserve, petitioned the foreign and Mayuge government to domestic District have part of the investors reserve degazeted for the landless.’

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 99 Actor Country of Seize Location Details Year ᴥ ► origin (converted reported in ha) 15. Sugar Uganda 10,000 ha Lugazi, Mabira Sugarcane 2007 X - Corporation of forest, Buikwe production Uganda Ltd. District SCOUL (Mehta Group) 16. Tilda India 14,000 ha Bugiri District Rice processing 2009 X - plant and outgrowers 17. Uganda Wildlife Uganda * Mt. Elgon ULA: ‘communities 2008 X - Authority National Park, are indigenous Mbale District inhabitants’ 18. FACE The Nether- * Namatyale, Plant trees in 2010 X - Foundation and lands, Uganda Namaguli in Mount Elgon Uganda Wildlife Sironko and National Park, Authority some parts of reforestation Bududa, Mt Elgon region, Mbale District 19. French investors France 8,289 ha Sirimula, Eviction of 16,000 2009 V X Kibaale, people Kiboga district 20. Lake Victoria China, Uganda 51,800 ha Rakai district Sseesamirembe 2009 X - Free Trade Zone Eco-City, free trade Authority zone. Multi-use (LVFTZ) in land, green belts partnership and ecological with China and reserves. GoU 21. Speculators and Kampala, 700 ha Bunyoro in Pastoralists, 2010 X - Balaalo cattle Uganda Hoima District, discovery of oil keepers Buliisa District 22. African Power ‘owned by 810 ha Namalu, Caster oil and * X - Initiative Ltd. Americans’ Karamoja jatropha region (Nakapiripirit District) 23. Private China 4,047 ha * ‘Baoding villages’, 2008 V X investors corn 24. Bangladesh Bangladesh 10,000 ha * Rice; 80 percent for 2011 X - delegation export, 20 percent for domestic use

FDI in food Nature/eco-tourism FDI in non-food agricultural commodities SEZ, infrastructural works and urban extensions Direct Investment in food (by Ugandan) Direct Investment in non-food agricultural commodities (by Ugandan) Animal Production Not categorized * No information available ** In the case of Egypt, the ministry of Agriculture in Uganda did confirm a test farm in Yumbe, but due to time limits, we could not visit the farm ourselves. *** These cases were not reported in the media, but ‘found’ during the fieldwork ᴥ Investment checked with relevant authorities and/or fieldwork; V = check, X= no check ► Result of checking the information: V= investment does exist , X = investment is not existing Source: authors own compilation and Friis and Reenberg, 2010: 34, Görgen e.a., 2009; GRAIN, 2008; Castel, V. and Kamara, A. (2009), Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009.

Who gets What, When and How? 100 Map 7. Location of New Land Acquisitions in Uganda, 2007 – 2011.

(10) Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (12) Amuru Sugar Works Ltd..

(10) Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (8) Mukwano Agro Project Ltd.. (9) ‗Russian company‘

(4) Hebei Company (5) Kiryandongo Farm (6) Ziwa RanchersLtd.. (7) Nexus Biodiesel Ltd.. (22) African (21) Speculators and cattle keepers Power Initiative Ltd.. (19) ‗French Investors‘

(2) Kaweri Coffee Plantation (3) New Forest Company (17) Uganda Wildlife Authority (18) Face Foundation and UWA

(16) Tilda

(14) NFA, foreign and domestic investors

(15) SCOUL (13) Agri SA

(20) Lake Victoria Free Trade (1) Oil Palm Zone Authority (China/GoU) Uganda Ltd.

N.B. Red dots do not necessarily correspond with the exact location. Districts in white are the selected field sites.

As was already mentioned in the methodology, this research started with verifying the available information on these new land acquisitions. Fieldwork was conducted in Kampala, Masindi, Lira, Masindi (including a visit to Kiryandongo, the neighbouring district),

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 101 Mubende, Gulu and Amuru and Kalangala district (the white districts on the map). The investments that were located in these districts were checked during the fieldwork with the relevant authorities and informants in those areas. In Kampala, relevant authorities were asked to verify the information as well (see methodology). Since international (media) reports often stress the involvement of foreign investors and/or governments, this was also the focus of this research at the beginning of the fieldwork. Therefore, these land acquisitions will be discussed first, which are respectively land acquisitions by China, Egypt, South Africa, France, Russia and Bangladesh. First, we will look into the sources on which those claims are based, then the ‗realities‘ will be presented.

Figure 7. Drivers of New Land Acquisitions in Uganda (2007-2011)

Hebei Company, China (4) Regarding the Chinese investment of Hebei Company (4) (Kigumba, Masindi district), which was in the news in October 2009, it concerns a manufacturing plant to process animal feeds, canned food and agricultural implements and for which agricultural machinery will be imported. The investment started with 4.05 square kilometre of land for the production of maize, rice and wheat; 1,21 square kilometre of land for the production of fruits and vegetables for export and the local market and 25,9 square kilometre of land for commercial trees. Poultry farming and sheep rearing are also part of the investment. The investment would supply the local, Chinese and European markets, according to the information available. Furthermore, it would employ 1,000 people. In the future, the company would expand to 40,500 ha of land, in 8 to 10 years. The initial investment is $10 million. According to the news report, this investment was discussed during a meeting with the King of Bunyoro Kitara, Solomon Iguru. The General Manager of Hebei Company, Ligium Qui asked for ‗favorable tax regime and relaxed immigration rules to enable the company bring in about 200

Who gets What, When and How? 102 experienced technical manpower from China to kick-start the project‘. He also stated that ‗our enterprise has many years of experience in agricultural industrialization and fund strength. We regard this as an opportunity to develop the national agriculture of Uganda and the relevant industries in a more cost effective manner‘ (Ssekika, 2009).

Chinese private investors (23) The other supposed Chinese investment , the ‗Baoding villages‘ of private Chinese investors, was announced in a news article in July 2008 where it was stated that Chinese farmers ‗have already been successful in Uganda which has leased an area of about 10,000 acres to around 300-400 Chinese.30 They grow corn and other crops and employ hundreds of local workers‘ (Patton, 2008). According to Liu Jianjun, chairman of ‗China-Africa Baoding Business Council‘,31 an organization that sets up negotiations with African government for Chinese investments, Chinese farms in Africa will create jobs and it will bring know-how and modern machinery. Mr Liu Jianjun told that there are so-called ‗Baoding villages‘ set up in Africa, which range in size from 400 to 2,000 Chinese, which he started when he was the head of Hebei province‘s foreign trade bureaus in 1998 (Coonan, 2009). There is also a Baoding village in Uganda, according to the news report. Another Chinese investor, Li Zhu, chairman of Dafei International Investment, argued that ‗The local government [in Uganda] is very eager to develop the country, but they don‘t know how to do that. So they want to learn from us. We provide ideas like development zones. I also hear that there are some good mines, gold mines and quarries, in Uganda‘. Li Zhu owns a piece of land of 8.09 square kilometres in Mbale. Regarding the land, Liu Zhu said: ‗Initially we asked the Africans how much they wanted in rent. They said it‘s free; just share the food with us. We made a deal that we only pay $1 per year per acre in rent. At the start we didn't promote the idea because we didn't want people to say we were grabbing land‘ (The Irish Times, 2008; Patton, 2008). In another news report in 2009, it was stated that China has leased 40.47 square kilometres (10,000 acre) (Smith and Talbot, 2009).

30 http://en.baodingcun.org/ A website does exist, but is almost empty. 31 On the internet nothing could be found on this council. There is however a China Africa Business Council, which was established in 2004 by the UNDP, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the China Society of Promotion of the Guangcai Programme, which counts over 16,500 Chinese private companies (http://actors.growinginclusivemarkets.org/cabc) It paid also visits to Uganda (http://www.undp.org.cn/monitordocs/43576.pdf) Mr Liu Jianjun however does have a website ‗Baoding villages‘.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 103 Lake Victoria Free Trade Zone Authority, China (20) China should also be the partner of the Government of Uganda for the ‗Lake Victoria Free Trade Zone Authority‘ (LVFTZ).32 Although this planned investment was not included in the fieldwork, it is worthy to mention the internet that is available online, since it is currently followed by a group of Australian and Dutch researchers.33 According to their website, in 2006 and 2008 a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed by the Government of Uganda and Kagera Eco-Cities Ltd. (Uganda) and Paradise International Investment Ltd. (China) in Kampala, ‗witnessed by several Ambassadors and Government dignitaries‘. The planned investment (‗the single largest Chinese private investment in East Africa‘) will create ‗Africa‘s largest tax-free economic zone municipality in Rakai District called Sseesamirembe Eco-City – Lake Victoria Free Trade Zone‘. Paradise International Investment Ltd. will invest US$ 1.5 billion in this project, which should start in December 2008 on an area of approximately 50,800 ha. The signed MoU34 offers fiscal and administrative incentives. The companies that are operating in Sseesamirembe Eco-City are exempted from Income Tax, Customs Duties, Corporate Income Tax and Value Added Tax (VAT), according to the website. It is mainly aimed at East Africa, as the website argues ‗it will offer the most viable trans-shipment corridor for the land-locked countries in the region‘ (see map, Ssesamirembe, 2011).

Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (10)/Egyptian Government (11) Egypt is also one of the foreign investors in Uganda. In 2008, Reuters reported that Egyptian media said that Uganda had allocated about 800,000 hectares of land to Egypt to cultivate wheat and corn. The minister of agriculture would together with a delegation of government officials and businessmen travel to Uganda in order ‗to negotiate final details and prepare to

32 http://www.sseesamirembe.com/index.php 33 MqVU is a team of anthropologists based at Macquarie University (Sydney, Australia) and the Free University (VU, Amsterdam, the Netherlands) who research China‘s development projects around the world. This site is intended as an aggregator of news and a platform for discussion on these projects, as well as China‘s domestic development issues http://mqvu.wordpress.com/about/ 34 http://www.sseesamirembe.com/article.php?title=The Signing of a Memorandum of Understanding &content_page=article_08_14_2008_1

Who gets What, When and How? 104 start work on the first 200,000 acres‘ (Reuters, 2008). According to GRAIN (2008), ‗a huge public outcry erupted in Uganda when Reuters reported on the government‘s talks with Egypt‘s ministry of agriculture‘. ‗While government officials denied the deal, Uganda‘s parliament called an emergency session to investigate the matter.‘ According to a news report in 2009, the Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation is ‗planning to set up model farms in Uganda‘. ‗So far, one site of 200 hectares suitable for wheat growing has already been identified at Labora, Koro sub-county in Gulu district.‘ This site was identified in 2008, when a technical team from Egypt and Uganda carried out a feasibility study on large-scale wheat production in Uganda. According to the Ugandan newspaper New Vision, the joint farm between Uganda and Egypt will be used for research and production to demonstrate and train extension workers and farmers in wheat growing (Basalirwa and Kagolo, 2009). The study that was conducted one year earlier assessed ‗the suitability of wheat production and export‘. Labora, in Pader District, the north of Uganda (see map, nr. 10), was found most suitable, according to the news report. Another ‗model farm for crop cultivation and animal production‘ will be set up in Yumbe district, in the north of Uganda (see map, nr. 10). The Egyptians will provide technical and financial assistance, send experts and provide seeds to the farm. Uganda will provide the required infrastructure, irrigation equipment, local staff and labourers. According to a commissioner for crop production and marketing in the Ministry of Agriculture, in the same news report, several nucleus farms of 10 to 30 hectares will be set up in various areas once the partnership between the two governments is formalized, ‗to popularize the growing of the crop‘. Local farmers will be employed on the nucleus farms as outgrowers, ‗where they will also receive training in better wheat farming practices‘. These nucleus farms will produce wheat for home consumption and export. For the test farm in Yumbe, the director of Africa Cooperation sent a proposed agreement to the Ugandan Government. Work on the farm would start by the end of 2009, when the agreement was signed.35 In 2009, The Independent argued that ‗Egypt has leased 2 million acres [8093.71 km2] of land from Uganda to grow corn and what‘ (Howden, 2009; Pagano, 2009). Furthermore, in an interview with managing director Karim Sadek from Citadel Company, an investment company, Sadek said that the current focus of the company lied in sourcing raw commodities. For that they are also looking at Uganda and Kenya. According to the news report, Citadel is

35 http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200905200283.html [this page is no longer available, but author has a copy of the article]

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 105 already ‗pursuing agribusiness investments in Ethiopia through its platform company Gozour‘.36 As the journalist argues:

„This could drag Citadel into a few more sticky areas: Acquiring large plots of land for farming anywhere in East Africa will be difficult given the region‟s dysfunctional land legislation and volatile feelings on the topic. Attempting to ship any food off to far-flung destinations may also rouse trouble. Recent attempts by a number of foreign investors to farm for export in Africa have triggered strident allegations of neo-colonial land grabbing. Sadek dismisses this as an “academic concern”, saying “there should definitely be a priority for that produce to be sold on the local market, if there is a paying market for it”, and that ultimately these are decisions for the government to make‟ (Ratio Magazine, 2010).

Another news report stated that the managing director of institutional fundraising at Citadel ‗had eyed agriculture and infrastructure investments in Uganda‘ (Dziadosz, 2009). In 2010 the Egyptian government announced again that it would send a committee ‗to assess farmland in Uganda to grow wheat to then import back into Egypt‘. According to the news report ‗this has brought up ethical questions of exploitation, another concern is how this arrangement will impact earth changes and food security in the future‘. Another news report stated that the Egyptian agricultural ministry was looking at three options; ‗whether Egyptian investors would own and cultivate farmland, whether land would be owned in partnership with Egypt and Uganda, or whether land would be owned as a concession right‘. According to this news report, the Ugandan farms is part of 14 African farms (others are found in Tanzania, Zambia and Niger), in order to supply Egypt (El Madany, 2010).

„Russian Company‟ (9) With regard to the planned investment in Lira, the New Vision reported in 2009 that there is a Russian company among the agricultural projects of the annual report of planned investments of UIA. According to the executive director of UIA, ‗a Russian company is bidding to start a jatropha project for the production of bio-diesel in Lira district‘. The project will employ 2,087 Ugandans. The director also said that the Russian investor had acquired land in Lira, but would mainly rely on outgrowers to cultivate the jatropha plants (Baguma, 2009).

36 Gozour is a Platform Company for an integrated regional agriculture and multi-category consumer foods platform. The group includes three primary lines of business: agri-foods and dairy, fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) and intermediate industries such as wet-corn milling and sugar processing. Gozour Portfolio Companies include Dina Farms, Rashidi El- Mizan, El-Misriyeen, El-Aguizy International, Mom‘s Foods and a 31.5% stake in the National Company for Maize Products (NCMP) (Citadel Capital, 2011, http://citadelcapital.com/portfolio/current-investments/).

Who gets What, When and How? 106 Agri SA, South Africa (13) Several news reports covered the South African investments in Uganda (Goodspeed, 2009; Sherry, 2009). According to these reports, ‗South Africa‘s beleaguered white farmers are jumping at the opportunity to expand deep into the continent‘. Their union, Agri SA37, which ‗promotes, on behalf of its members, the development, profitability, stability and sustainability of commercial agriculture in South Africa by means of its involvement and input on national and international policy level‘, has ‗fielded offers of land leases for agriculture from 17 African countries and opened negotiations with Angola, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia and Sudan‘ (Agri SA, 2011). South African farmers are looking for other opportunities, because they ‗do not have enough land or water and land reform is putting a lot of pressure on these natural resources‘. According to the news report, Uganda has offered 170,000 hectares near the capital Kampala (Sherry, 2009; Goodspeed, 2009). In February 2011, a Ugandan delegation led by President Museveni visited to South Africa in which he presented ‗an opportunity where South African farmers and businesses can access agro-processing opportunities‘ in Uganda. The South African Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Tina Joemat-Petterson, said that her office will be ‗facilitating a trip to Uganda where we will take a delegation of South African farmers and business people in the near future to explore the opportunities‘. The Minister invited Agri SA to join her (South African Government Information, 2011). Earlier in 2009, the Minister said: ‗In Angola and Uganda, we have been promised immediately 48 square miles [12,432 ha] … but we‘re not going to go there unless we have security of tenure‘ (Reuters, 2009).

„French Investor‟ (19) According to a news report in the Monitor (Muziransa, 2009), ‗about 16,000 people on a 36 square miles piece of land in Kiboga District have been evicted‘. It stated that ‗the area covers 14 villages and two parishes of Sirimula and Kibaale. By Wednesday, most of the land had been cleared and the occupants where desperately running up and down for help. The area cleared partly comprises two sub counties of Ntweetwe and Kibinga. According to the villagers, the government sold the land they have occupied for more than 35 years to two foreigners. The French investors were only identified as Juliana and Pierre.‘

37 Established in 1904 as The South African Agricultural Union http://www.agrisa.co.za/agrorgE.htm

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 107 „Bangladesh Delegation‟ (24) In May 2011, the BBC reported that ‗Bangladeshi companies say they have leased thousands of hectares of farmland in Africa as part of their efforts to avoid future food shortages. Two Bangladeshi companies have already signed deals to lease unused cultivable land in Uganda, Tanzania and Gambia. Another agreement to lease around 30,000 hectares for 99 years will be signed with the Tanzanian government later this week‘ (Ethirajan, 2011). Reuters followed and reported that ‗Uganda is ready to lease 60,000 hectares of farmland to Bangladeshi firms looking to grow food in Africa as part of government efforts to ensure food security for its growing population‘. This was announced by Abul Hossain, the consul to Uganda in a news conference. According to the news report, Nitol Group38 has already signed a memorandum with Uganda to lease 10,000 hectares of land to grow rice. 77,000 tonnes of rice will be produced, of which 80 percent will be exported to Bangladesh, according to Abdul Matlub Ahmed, founder of Nitol Motors Ltd. in 1983 and now chairman of the Nitol Niloy Group. Furthermore, ‗some 25,000 farmers are needed for farming, of which 10 percent will be Bangladeshi‘.

REALITY

Chinese investments Now we know on which sources these reports and claims about new land acquisitions in Uganda are based and what exactly is known, the findings on the verification will be presented. Although most of this information described above, is all available online, the verification was done during the fieldwork, through interviews, telephone calls, e-mails to relevant authorities such as the Registrar of Companies (Kampala, the capital city of Uganda), Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) and the representative embassies or High Commissions in Kampala. Regarding the new land acquisitions made by Chinese investors it appears that no one actually knows ‗Hebei Company‘. The Economic and Commercial Counsellor‘s Office Embassy of the People‘s Republic of China in Kampala cannot confirm the investment of Hebei Company, even as the existence of ‗Baoding villages‘. They do say that there are six Chinese companies working in the agricultural sector (wheat flower, mushrooms, etc.), but they couldn‘t tell the names of these companies, as they have this information from the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA). The Uganda Investment Authority itself states that

38 Nitol-Niloy Group of companies, http://www.nitolniloy.com.bd/about_nitol.html

Who gets What, When and How? 108 Hebei Company is not licensed by UIA.39 According to the Commercial office, Chinese companies rent the land from local farmers. Furthermore, local farmers want to work with the Chinese, ‗as they have cheaper machinery then the European and Americans‘. ‗We have the skills and China is famous for its agriculture.‘ Chinese businesses are, according to the Commercial office, working with local employees. ‗The wages in China are relatively higher. Labour here in Uganda is less expensive than in China.‘ The Commercial office is not aware of Chinese ‗Baoding villages‘ in Uganda. The only link they can make is that Baoding is a place in Hebei Province in China. According to the Commercial office, China is mainly interested in animal skins and Blackwood. ‗A win-win relationship between Uganda and China is very important.‘ According to the senior lands management officer in Masindi, where Hebei Company should operate, there is only a Chinese company that is buying maize. ‗I don‘t believe that there is a Hebei company that is growing fruits, commercial trees and other crops‘.40 The Chinese grain millers are Esther Nakitto and Peter Semenso. According to Esther, Yong Xin Grain Millers is operating in Masindi since August 2010. Furthermore, there are no other Chinese companies operating in Masindi. ‗But there is a Hebei Machines in Kampala. We are here in Uganda because the land is very fertile. It would be good to have land in the future. Contracts with farmers are for us the next level. We now produce maize flower and have 15 local workers of which 10 in Masindi and 5 in Kampala. But we now only have a mill, where we sell the maize flower to the local market.‘41 However, another informant told us that Hebei Company is mainly operating in other districts, respectively in Mubende district and Mityana. ‗I understand ‗informally‘ that many actors behind Hebei (not only Chinese – but the Ugandan section) have changed the company name and registered a different company operating in a more of Public Private Partnership process.‘ Furthermore, ‗the current chairman Li Zhu is operating under Dafei International Investments‘. Li Zhu and Dafei International Investment were earlier mentioned in the article about ‗Baoding villages‘.42 Furthermore, the informant argues: ‗Since the government is very cautious about FDIs, its becoming more difficult to clearly get one investors holding over 1000 ha of land and the UIA is extremely careful about releasing such info.‘43 However, I did

39 Email 15-04-2011 from an Investment Executive, Prosie H.N. Kikabi. 40 Mugoya James, Senior Land Management Officer Masindi, 28-04-2011. 41 29-04-2011. Esther Nakitto and Peter Semenso, Masindi. 42 MqVU, 2010. http://mqvu.wordpress.com/category/free-trade-zones/ 43 Source known by the author, person wants to stay anonomous.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 109 receive an email from the former director of UIA, Maggi Kigozi, in which she argues: ‗Uganda does not offer large tracts of land to foreign (Chinese?) investors‘.44 Regarding the Special Economic Zone, the Lake Victoria Free Trade Zone Authority, Uganda Radio Network in June 2011 stated that ‗after a failure by Ssesamirembe to establish a planned Free Trade Zone in Rakai district, a group of farmers there are demanding to take over the gazetted land for their agricultural productivity. About 8000 farmers in Kabira, and Kakeeto Sub Counties in Rakai district, are planning to occupy the land‘45. The website of Sseesamirembe Eco-City itself doesn‘t report on anything new since 2009. It remains unclear whether this planned investment will really take place (MqVU, 201146).

Investments by Egypt and Russian and South-African investors It appeared hard to check the Egyptian investments (nr. 10 and 11 in table 8). The UIA referred us to the Ministry of Agriculture, ‗since this is an issue related to agriculture‘. The Ministry of Agriculture could only confirm the test farm in Yumbe (Baumgartner, 2011). At the Egyptian Embassy it was not possible to speak to any of the diplomats. They could tell however, that Egypt ‗has no investments in Uganda‘. It has not been in the news since the news reports that were mentioned. Although a field visit to Yumbe was planned initially, it had to be cancelled due to time limits. In the case of Citadel Company, this company is indeed investing in Uganda, but the ‗agribusinesses‘ are not mentioned in their annual reports. Regarding the investment by the ‗Russian company‘ which should be in Lira, the UIA explained that ‗the company we know growing Jatropha is ‗The African Power Initiative‘ located in Karamoja, not Lira, owned by Americans and not Russians‘.47 During the fieldwork in Lira, the district production and marketing officer48 said there was no Russian company that is growing jatropha. ‗Jatropha is growing wild and is used to demarcate some boundaries. Now we have to turn it into economical production. It‘s not a very difficult crop. If someone comes in with the right techniques, it can become something within five years.‘ One of the investors we interviewed told us that the Russian investment is ‗an old Chinese spinning mill which has put up in early 1960s. Few years ago it was taken over by a Chinese company

44 Maggi Kigozi, 03-03-2011 45 http://ugandaradionetwork.com/a/story.php?s=33445#ixzz1cgNx48Dr 46 http://mqvu.wordpress.com/2011/09/14/lake-victoria-east-africa-free-trade-zone-vanishes/ 47 Email of UIA, 15-04-2011. Prossy Kikabi, investment executive. 48 05-05-2011, Lira. District Marketing and Production Officer, Ajungo Peter.

Who gets What, When and How? 110 named JITCO International. But the company collapsed and the investment went in receivership.‘49 In the case of South African Agri SA, the UIA argued it was not licensed with them. The Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) had no information available as well, even as the South African High Commission, which in their turn asked the UIA for further information, which they did not have. Furthermore, the South African High Commission also didn‘t say anything on the talks of the Minister. However, in a phone call with Agri SA, they confirmed that there have been two visits with the South African Minister of Agriculture, on an invitation of the Ugandan government. Uganda offered Agri SA two pieces of land, each of 2 square miles, which is almost 1,036 hectare together (and not the 170,000 hectares that was reported in 2009). However, Agri SA hasn‘t started in Uganda yet, because they first have to conduct a feasibility study on these two pieces of land. Therefore, Agri SA is waiting for another invitation from the South-African minister. 50

French investment and Banglades delegation When we tried to check the ‗French investment‘, the French Embassy did not know anything about this case and did not know ‗Pierre and Juliana‘. According to the Trade Officer at the French Embassy, there are no French investors working in this district, since ‗most of our companies have their office in Kampala or plan to work in the Lake Albert Region‘. You would expect that the diplomats at the French embassy should have known this case if it concerned French people. The UIA only gave a list a list of French investors since 1991, but all have a physical address is in Kampala (see appendix Q). However, it could be possible that the eviction to which is referred to is the same case that is in the news at the moment due to the report ‗Land and Power‘ of Oxfam International (2011). According to Oxfam International (ibid.), almost 20,000 local people, also from Kiboga District, were evicted due to an investment (establishment of plantations) made by the New Forest Company. Regarding the visit of the ‗Bangladesh delegation‘ and the reports about a land acquisition of 10,000 ha, this information was denied in June 2011 by the Ugandan government itself. Uganda denied that if ‗has ever offered land in thousands of hectares to two Bangladesh companies to grow food for export‘ (The Independent, 2011). The commissioner for crop resources in the Ministry of Agriculture said that although Uganda hosted officials from Bangladesh ‗on a mission to acquire land for agriculture‘; the Ugandan

49 Email from source known by the author, 09-05-2011. 50 Telephone call with representative from Agri SA, 19-12-2011.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 111 government has never allocated any area of land to Bangladesh investors. No deals were made. ‗We frankly told them, we had no land. They insisted we sign a Memorandum of Understating with them, a request we also refused. We only accepted to sign minutes of the meeting we held‘, Mr Okasai said. He said maybe the Bangladeshis approached the private sector for the said land. But even if the arrangement was done, the ministry would know.‘

Gap between reports and reality? This information clearly raises some issues. The verification shows that the sources on which some ‗land deals‘ in international reports, such as the Global Land Project, are highly questionable and sometimes even rely on one sentence, as the ‗French case‘ shows. Furthermore, the findings of earlier research on ‗land deals‘ by Cotula and Vermeulen (2011: 11), in which it was argued that media reports are not always reliable and that investment promotion agencies are often under pressure to show success in attracting investment may refer to usually larger land areas featured in the business plan – is indeed also true in Uganda. The UIA, which is also an ‗investment promotion agency‘, announced for example the investment made by a Russian company, while this investment appeared to be non-existing, which was even confirmed by the UIA itself. Furthermore, when announcements are made in public, for example in the case of the Bangladesh delegation, this is presented as a ‗land deal‘ already, while nothing is settled yet. In the case of Agri SA, the magnitude of the suggested land acquisition is clearly overestimated. However, it also has to be acknowledged there is still a lot of unclearity in all these cases, since it is hard verify these land deals for 100 percent. If the UIA or URA does not have any information, this can either mean there is indeed nothing happening, or they are not willing to make it public. Also, a lot will happen ‗behind closed doors‘, as the informant in the case of the Chinese ‗Hebei Company‘ suggested.

Who gets What, When and How? 112 CHAPTER 8. CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED NEW CORPORATE LAND ACQUISITIONS

Although the foreign investments were hard to trace in reality, as was showed in the previous chapter, fieldwork was conducted in five districts: Kalangala district, where Oil Palm Uganda Ltd (originally from Kenya, nr. 1 in table 8.) established a palm oil plantation and represents the first large public-private partnership in Uganda, and Mubende district, where Kaweri Coffee Plantation (originally from Germany, nr. 2 in table 8) cultivates coffee. The New Forest Company (nr. 3) is also operating in Mubende, but since I decided to focus on agricultural commodities, this was no further case study. The next district was Masindi, where it appeared there were two other investments by Ugandan owned Mukwano Group of Companies; Kiryandongo Farm (nr. 5) and Ziwa RanchersLtd (nr. 6). As became clear from the previous chapter, any operations in Masindi by Hebei Company could not be found. Then fieldwork was conducted in Lira district, where Mukwano Group of Companies was also working with thousands of farmers in the region in an outgrowers‘ scheme (Mukwano Agro Project Ltd, nr. 9). This represents an alternative form of investment, and is interesting to compare with the other investments, since an outgrowers‘ scheme does not require the acquisition of land by the company itself. Furthermore, Mukwano worked together with a NGO in establishing extension services. As was the case with Hebei Company, the Russian company in Lira district did not exist. The final destination was Gulu and Amuru district, even as Lira in the north of Uganda. In Amuru, Amuru Sugar Works Ltd. (of the Ugandan owned Madhvani Group) wants to establish a sugar plantation, but since the ownership of the land is not clear, it is currently a case in court. Although Amuru Sugar Works Ltd. is not yet operating in Amuru, fieldwork was conducted to see how the process of the acquisition of land is going and how people react on their plans. Since Amuru is one of the newest districts in Uganda, most of the authorities are based in Gulu. In Gulu further information was gathered on the land acquisitions made by the Egyptian government as well, but could also not be confirmed. Therefore, this chapter will introduce the main characteristics of the six selected new corporate land acquisitions: Oil Palm Uganda Ltd. on Bugala Island, Kaweri Coffee Plantation in Mubende, Ziwa Ranchers Ltd. and Kiryandongo farm in Masindi, Mukwano Agro Project Ltd. in Lira and Amuru Sugar Works Ltd. in Amuru. An overview is shown in

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 113 table 9. This chapter will first discuss the characteristics and then briefly give an overview of the actors involved, which will mostly be discussed in the chapters that follow.

Table 9. Characteristics of Selected New Corporate Land Acquisitions

* other partners in this project: farmers in Mubende and Mitiyana district, the Ministries of Agricultures and Finance in Uganda, the Uganda Coffee Development Authority, the Secretariat of the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture, the Secretariat of the Medium Term Competitiveness Strategy, the European Commission, the Agricultural Productivity Enhancement Program, the Agricultural Sector Program Support Project, the LEAD program funded by USAID, the Africa Project Development Facility, IBERO (Ug) Ltd. and Neumann Kaffee Gruppe.

Oil Palm Uganda Ltd., Bugala Island Oil Palm Uganda Ltd. is partner in the Vegetable Oil Development Project (VODP), which represents one of the first large public-private partnership in agribusiness in Uganda (IFAD, 2011: vii). This project is aimed at increasing ‗household cash income of smallholders by revitalizing and increasing domestic vegetable oil production, in partnership with the private sector‘. Furthermore, increasing the food security and economic activities in Uganda is also among the general objective (IFADd). The project is divided in three subprojects, of which the introduction of commercial oil palm production on Bugala Island in Lake Victoria is one (see map).51 Bugala Island52 is the largest of 84 islands that make up Kalangala District. The

51 The second subproject is the development of traditional oilseeds in northern, eastern and mid-western districts of Uganda; and the third subproject is research and development (R&D) of essential oil crops piloted in a variety of districts (IFAD, 2011: vii).

Who gets What, When and How? 114 Island is 68 km long and 10 km wide at its widest point and has a total area land area of 29,650 ha and 17,355 inhabitants. Most of the people on the island earn their income from fishing, but there are an estimated 1,300 smallholder farms scattered across the island that grow cassava, bananas, sweet potatoes, maize, vegetables and coffee (IFAD, 2011: 8).

Map 8. Kalangala District

Bundibugyo, initially another potential area for oil palm

New project 2012, Buvuma Island

Oil Palm Uganda Ltd. Seize: 10,000 ha Commodity: Oil Palm

(N.B. see for detailed map of Kalangala appendix E)

The partners in this project are IFAD, the Government of Uganda, the private sector – Kenyan BIDCO with subsidiary Oil Palm Uganda Ltd on Bugala Island - and non-governmental implementing partners, which vary in the three subprojects. For IFAD53 this project also represents the first public-private partnership (IFAD, 2011: xvii). For the Ugandan Government this project was interesting because it aimed at developing the vegetable oil subsector, and especially oil palm. Uganda did not grow or process oil palm in the country itself and therefore large amounts of palm oil were imported. Developing palm oil production in Uganda was a means of promoting import substitution and export diversification. In the 1960s, 1972-1973 and 1993-1994, various trials to grow oil palm had been developed (IFAD,

52 IFAD (2010: 10): ‗The choice of Bugala Island as the main project area for oil palm production was primarily made on grounds of agro-climatic suitability, although the fact that it was an area of subsistence agriculture and fishing helped to justify the choice.‘ 53 As a specialized agency of the United Nations established to finance agricultural development projects, IFAD is operating in Uganda for more than 25 years now and has contributed US$ 279.9 million to finance 13 programs and projects, which all aim at empowering poor people in rural areas (IFAD, 2010c; Meijer and Zeemeijer, 2010).

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 115 2011: 6-7), but it in 1998 it was still not commercially produced. IFAD on the other hand wanted to focus on the opportunity to increase smallholder incomes in ‗innovative ways‘. IFAD (2011: 7) also argued that palm oil promised high economic returns because of the 10- 15 percent increase in price owing to the costs of transportation for imports. But this project would require partnership with a private sector, since they would have the money and expertise to set up this industry. ‗IFAD could bring a pro-poor focus by financing the participation of small farmers‘. Therefore, the total project aimed at developing a palm oil industry, ‗which is well integrated into the subsector, to the benefit of smallholder growers and private sector processors‘ (IFAD, 2010b: 2). IFAD wanted to target 3,000 farmers (800 households), including relocated landless farmers from the mainland and spontaneous farmers who would grow oil palm with their own resources (IFAD, 2011: 8). In doing that, they could support the smallholders to ‗contribute their land and labour to the partnership‘ (IFAD, 2010: 141). BIDCO on the other hand was ‗drawn to the initiative by the profitable market opportunities in this sector, as well as by the advantages that partnering with the Government and with smallholders could offer in terms of enabling access to a large consolidated area of land to establish production at a sufficient scale to be profitable‘ (IFAD, 2011 rpr: 141). For the total project IFAD would contribute $20 million (loan), the Government of Uganda US$ 3.8 million, beneficiaries US$ 3.1 million (both contribution) and the private- sector partner US$33.1 million (co-financing) (IFAD, 2011: vii). The project was identified in 199454 and approved by the Executive Board of IFAD in April 1997 and the loan became partially effective in 1998. In order to select the private sector partner in the oil palm subproject a bidding process was initiated in that same month. The Government of Uganda received 6 bids, of which 2 withdrawn.55 Negotiations with the top ranked bidder, Kakira Sugar Works Ltd., were started. However, these negotiations were ‗desultory and eventually cancelled‘, according to IFAD (2011: 11). In 2000 another private partner was found; BIDCO Oil Refineries Ltd., from Kenya. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in which the project design was described and agreements were made. BIDCO became the main project partner. However, negotiations were concluded in 2003, due to discussions over the pioneer tax concessions requested by BIDCO, land purchases for the subproject and a reassessment of

54 Based on a study of the FAO on the agro-ecological zones of Uganda 55 BIDCO was not selected in the first round of bidding. The Government of Uganda preferred a local company. IFAD: ‗you want to develop your local companies in your own economy, so it‘s a transparent way of favoring local companies‘. The first company that was interested was Mukwano, a Ugandan company. But the deal was not closed. According to IFAD (2011d) it has been a fair bidding process; ‗Mukwano‘s model and corporate culture was not ready to work with farmers. The BIDCO proposal was without doubt the best proposal.‘

Who gets What, When and How? 116 feasibility and impact arising from the expanded scale (IFAD, 2011: 11). After the MoU was signed, Oil Palm Uganda Ltd. (OPUL) was created, as a subsidiary of BIDCO. OPUL would implement the plantation in association with Wilmar Plantation Services, which is a branch of Wilmar International Ltd., a palm oil trading company based in Singapore. Its operations are located in more than 20 countries across four continents, with a primary focus on Indonesia, Malaysia, the People‘s Republic of China, India and Europe (IFAD, 2011: 12). Wilmar International Ltd. is member of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO, 2011). According to Wilmar (2011), the primary obligation of a ‗successful business‘ is to make profit and bring this value to the stakeholders. However, ‗while fulfilling these obligations, businesses are often caught in a trade-off between the desire for economic growth and the imperative to protect the natural environment and safeguard the interests of the population; from climate change and environmental degradation, to the imbalance between rising population and depleting resources, as well as the widening rich-poor divide‘. ‗We have learned from others as well as from our own experience that sustainable development is the way forward. Whit this appreciation, striving for the right balance between growth and sustainability becomes our principal goal‘ (Wilmar, 2011).

„Bidco Uganda is creating a fully integrated edible oil business in Uganda. With an investment of over $130 million spread over a period of five years, Bidco will realize its vision of „from the soil to the frying pan‟. From the soil of Kalangala Island, Bidco is creating the largest oil palm plantation in Africa which will eventually cover over 40,000 ha of plantation. (...) Already more than 1000 people are employed on the project making sure the money making plant of East Asia is returned to its original homeland where it was taken away in the early 20th century‟(BIDCO, 2010).

The project design also changed with BIDCO as partner. Initially there were two sites for oil palm development; in Bundibugyo, a place in the west of Uganda, close to the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Bugala Island in Lake Victoria. Bundibugyo was dropped because of ‗security problems on the border‘. The nucleus estate on Bugala Island was expanded from 1,000 ha to 6,500 ha on the request of BIDCO. On the advice of Wilmar International Ltd., ‗it claimed that it was simply not profitable to run a nucleus estate on the basis of 1,000 ha and operate palm oil milling of fresh fruit bunch from 4,500 ha‘. Together with the 3,500 ha intended for smallholders (who will plant 2,700 ha) and outgrowers (who will plant 800 ha) this would give 10,000 ha of oil palm on the island instead of the initially planned 4,500 ha (IFAD, 2011: xiii). The difference between an outgrower and a smallholder is that the land of the outgrower is managed in consolidated blocks by OPUL, while smallholders grown the oil palm plots on their own land, hence their plots are smaller and

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 117 more scattered (see photo56). The agreement on the land acquisition also changed, which will be discussed in the next chapter. Other changes were that an industrial refinery would be established in Jinja and the doubling of the milling capacity on the island. Credit to farmers would be administered by a trust (KOPGT) instead of a commercial bank. So in total, the ‗outputs‘ should be: (1) outgrower/smallholder scheme (3,500 ha); (2) establishment of nucleus plantation (6,500 ha); (3) Farmers Trust providing services to members; (4) oil processing mill and refinery established; (5) environmental monitoring system in place; (6) increased Research and Design of oil palm by research institute (IFAD, 2010: 22). The expansion of the total area for palm oil required a new environmental impact assessment and eventually led to the withdrawal of the World Bank as cooperating institution, ‗because it feared that the expanded oil palm project would not comply with its internal forestry safeguards policies‘ (IFAD, 2011: xvii). The vegetable oil development project has been extended with five years and will be completed in December 2011. However, a second phase will continue and extend the partnership with OPUL through the replication of the nucleus estate and smallholder oil palm model on Buvuma Island, and continued consolidation and expansion in Kalangala District to some outlying islands (IFAD, 2011: xxii). The Government of Uganda, IFAD and OPUL will also continue in efforts to identify new areas for future oil palm production through oil palm research trials (IFAD, ibid.). Until now, a new area is found on Buvuma Island, near Jinja and Mukono (see map). In 2012 an oil palm plantation will be established of 10,000 ha (VODP, OPUL, 2011). ‗For this second phase, again a full social and environmental impact assessment will be carried out, even as a new environmental management plan ‗with emphasis on communications, and activities to promote livelihood enhancement in the oil palm communities‘ (IFAD, ibid.).

56 April 2010. Red: township, greyI: nucleus estate, greyII: smallholder farmers, green: farmers, yellow: potential areas.

Who gets What, When and How? 118 Map 9. Oil Palm Development Sites at Bugala Island, April 2010

Source: photograph at VODP office, Bugala Island. Map is made by VODP, 2010

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 119 Kaweri Coffee Plantation, Mubende Mubende district (Central Uganda) covers with 6,196 km2 2.6 percent of the national land area. It has 579,200 inhabitants (estimation 2010), of which approximately 84 percent is engaged in peasant farming (District Mubende, 2004). Matooke, maize and coffee are the main crops that are produced. Approximately 23 percent of the total land area in Mubende is forest (1,239 km2).57 In 2005 it was split in two and Mityana district was created.58 In 2010 the IMF stated that Mubende is among the most affected districts in terms of forest cover loss; forest cover decreased with 79 percent, Mityana with 59.6 percent.

Map 10. Mubende district

In 2001 German-based Neumann Kaffee Gruppe began developing Uganda‘s ‗largest and most modern coffee farm‘ in Kitemba, Mubende District. Between 2001 and 2004, 1800 ha Robusta coffee was planted. The total amount is now 2,512 ha. 1802 ha have been planted with Uganda Robusta coffee and 552 ha remain as ‗natural, indigenous tropical rainforest‘. The other 152 ha consists of roads, housing, processing and natural papyrus swamps. The farm is divided into 5 sections: Nonve, Luwenga, Kitagweta, Kitemba, Kyamutuma (see map, Kaweri, 2011). The nursery produces 120,000 coffee seedlings per annum, for internal use and

57 There are natural high forests in Busujji county and some parts of Mityana County, woodlands cover the largest part of the district especially in the counties of Buwekala, Kassanda and the Western part of Mityana. Gazette forest reserves cover 32,404 hectares, private forests 87,137 hectares and public forestland 36,000 hectares (Mubende district, 2004: 44). 58 http://www.kcfuganda.org/map%20of%20mubende.png

Who gets What, When and How? 120 distribution to smallholder, through the coffee alliance (see other actors). Kaweri also produces 40,000 indigenous tree seedlings for shade and future hard wood timber production (Kaweri, 2011). In 2005, Kaweri Coffee Plantation became a partner in the Uganda Coffee Farmers Support Project, which will be discuses in Chapter 11. Other partners involved in this project are farmers in Mubende and Mitiyana district, the Ministries of Agricultures and Finance in Uganda, the Uganda Coffee Development Authority, the Secretariat of the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture, the Secretariat of the Medium Term Competitiveness Strategy, the European Commission, the Agricultural Productivity Enhancement Program, the Agricultural Sector Program Support Project, the LEAD program funded by USAID, the Africa Project Development Facility, IBERO (Ug) Ltd. and Neumann Kaffee Gruppe.

Masindi Our fieldwork in Masindi focused on two investments, Ziwa Ranchers Ltd and Kiryandongo Farm, both by Mukwano Group of Companies. Masindi district is 8,087 km2 and has an estimated population of 479,000. Nine percent of the area is protected area, which includes Murchison Falls National Park (1,930 km2), Bugungu Wildlife Reserve (747 km2), Karuma Wildlife Reserve (713 km2), and Karuma Communal Wildlife Area (241 km2). In addition, Masindi District has 15 central forest reserves, one local forest reserve and three kingdom forest reserves, which were given to the Bunyoro-Kitara kingdom when the central government restored the kingdoms in 1993 (Bazaara, 2003: 27). Masindi is also amongst the districts which are most affected in terms of forest cover loss; this is in Masindi 12.2 percent (PRSP, 2010: 102). Masindi is also surrounded by Lake Albert and Lake Kyoga and boasts many rivers and wetlands (Bazaara, ibid.). Analysis of land-use and cover changes around Budongo Forest Reserve show three major land-use and cover categories; forest/woodland, sugarcane plantations and grassland/shifting- cultivations/settlements (Mwavu and Witkowski, 2008: 609-610). Sugarcane cultivation increased from 690 ha in 1988 to 12,729 ha in 2002. Forest/woodland decreased that same period with 4680 ha. According to Mwavu and Witkowski (2008, ibid.), these changes were the result of agricultural expansion, increasing human population (exacerbated by large influxes of refugees), conflicts of interest and political interference in the management of Budongo Forest Reserve and unclear land tenure. Local people earn their income mainly with agriculture, by using commercial sugarcane and tobacco as primary cash crops. As Mwavu and Witkowski (2008, ibid.) argue, ‗there is an ever-increasing need for more land for agricultural expansion, resulting in continued loss of forest/woodland on private/communal

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 121 lands and encroachment into BFR‘. In 2006, IFAD (2011: 45) estimated that the average farm garden is 2-6 acre.

Map 11. Masindi

Kiryandongo Farm, Mukwano Group of Companies Seize: 2,833 ha Commodity: maize

Ziwa RanchersLtd., Mukwano Group of Companies Seize: 15,378 ha Cattle/milk or sugarcane (plan)

Mukwano Group of Companies is not a new actor in Uganda. In 1986 Mukwano started with the production of single laundry soap and cottonseed, now they are a conglomerate of several businesses, of which Mukwano Industries Ltd. is one.59 Mukwano Industries is a privately owned enterprise registered in Uganda and ‗value chain leader and key actor‘ in the production, post harvest handling, processing and marketing of sunflower oil (Mwesige, 2009: 2). They have 36 processing mills with different milling capacity, of which the majority is a small miller.60 Furthermore, they are the largest buyer of cottonseed, soya beans, sesame seeds and green tea from outgrowers. Until 2009, Mukwano enjoyed 70 percent market share among processors, while the small millers operate under the Northern Uganda Oilseed Millers Association. However, in 2009 Mt. Meru millers, a family owned business that is established in 1978 in Tanzania (Mt Meru, 2011). It is estimated that the company now accounts for about 50 per cent of vegetable oil production in Uganda (IFAD, 2011: 19). Mukwano now works with outgrowers in Lira, Apac, Dokolo, Oyam, Kaberamaido, Masindi, Kitgum and

59 The other businesses are: A.K. Oils and Fats Ltd., Mukwano Peronal Care Products Ltd., A.K. Plastics (U) Ltd., Mukwano Sweets & Confectionaries and A.K. Transporters Ltd.. They have 7,000 employees in total. http://directory.africa-business.com/product_desc.php?id=4532 60 The number of oil mills in Lira alone increased from three in 1998 to the current 26 (with more to come), and 12 mills are now operating in Apac, Pallisa, Soroti and Sironko where there were none previously (IFAD, 2011: 36).

Who gets What, When and How? 122 Amolotar, all in northern Uganda. Mukwano is the only company that is importing improved hybrid sunflower seeds in Uganda from South Africa (Mwesige, ibid; Mukwano, 2011).

Ziwa Ranchers Ltd. Initially, we wanted to focus on a plantation in Masindi port61 (2500 acre), but it appeared that this plantation was recently sold to Kinyara Sugar Works Ltd. (owned by RAI Group of Companies62). Ziwa Ranchers Ltd. is one of the biggest Ranchers in Uganda, with the size of approximately 15,378 ha. It has three borders; the Kafu river, Royal Ranchers and Masindi Kafu main road. It‘s now operating as a ranch, but there are two scenarios in the future: (1) it either stays ranch and it expands the cattle from 2500 to 40,000 cattle for a dairy ranch, a dairy farm, dairy factory, abattoir and some commercial crops, or (2) the ranch is transformed to a sugarcane plantation (‗a US$ 120 million project‘). As the manager argues: ‗We are still in debate. If we go for sugar, we think that 16.000 ha are enough to support the project, so we may not need outgrowers in the area. That will not work in a good way. But if we decide to do this, then we have to double the capacity or they [Mukwano] have to put their own sugar mill.‘ All our neighbours have big pieces of land. The UIA also has three farms of 20 square miles each; Critical Mass Growth, Ugandan Livestock Industry and a Ugandan/American farm that is now fencing and growing pine forest. We will then shift the ranch to Zombo district (near the DRC border), where Mukwano also has 3,200 acre of land.‘

Kiryandongo farm Kiryandongo farm exists since 2009 and produces sunflower, maize and soya. There are also tests with jatropha and palm oil. The total area is 2,833 ha and now fenced off, ‗2 meter before the official border‘. However, there are some problems with cattle keepers (Masindi is part of the cattle corridor, see appendix E), which will be discussed in chapter 12.

61 Cultivation blocks for crops such as maize, soya and sunflower have been created in a total area exceeding 17,000 acres (Mukwano, 2011). 62 In 1964, the Government of India and Uganda reached an agreement to start a sugar factory, which was established in 1976 and closed in 1987 during the war. In 1995, the factory recommissioned and in 2006 the privatization process was completed (Booker Tate, 2011). However, in July 2006, RAI Group, a Kenyan and Mauritius-based agro-forestry company, offered the highest bid for the 51 percent government shares in Kinyara Sugar Works Limited (KSWL). RAI Group's actual price bid was $33.5 million (about Shs62 billion), while TSB/Booker Tate - a consortium, which includes Industrial Promotion Services Ltd. (Kenya) and Transvaal Sugar Ltd. (South Africa), posted a bid price of $27,446,840 (about Shs50 billion) (All Africa, 2011).

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 123

Kiryandongo farm

Mukwano Agro Project Ltd., Lira Lira is a district with 660,445 inhabitants, situated in Lango region in the northern part of Uganda (IFAD, 2011: 8). Lira is one of the districts that have suffered from the Lord Resistance Army (LRA). Gulu, Kitgum and Pader were particularly affected. During 2002 – 2003, the LRA moved further into Apac, Lira, Soroti, Kabermaido and parts of Katakwi. In Lira, 15 sub counties were affected directly or indirectly. Some 328,700 people were internally displaced and other communities had to host displaced people (IFAD, 2011: 18). The return from Internationally Displaced People (IDPs) is not a serious problem in Lango and also in Acholi the return is still low (2008) (Rugadya, ibid.). Lira is one of the districts where IFAD implemented the first subproject from the Vegetable Oil Development Project, the ‗traditional oilseeds‘ project, mainly sunflower63. In 2011, over 200,000 families were reached and the cultivation of sunflower expanded from 2,000 to 81,500 ha, as well as increasing grain milling and processing (IFAD, 2011: vii). Agricultural extension services were also restructured in all districts during the mid-1990s. In 1998 the system was decentralized and a new, semi-autonomous National Agricultural Advisory Services agency (NAADS) was set up in 2001 as part of the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture (PMA), which was discussed in chapter 6. Although the extension service for the farmers remained relatively the same, there was less budget and staff available. Due to the

63 It is interesting to realize that in 1992 Turiho-Habwe argued: ‗Sunflower is a relatively new crop to Uganda farmers and its marketing system is very poorly developed. Growing and marketing of sunflower is still a trial and error exercise. Unlike other food crops which can be consumed domestically, sold directly to other consumers, or through traders for processing or export, sunflower has a much more limited range of potential customers. Oil mills are essentially the only market for the crop‘ (Turiho-Habwe, 1992).

Who gets What, When and How? 124 program of NAADS, technical and financial resources provided to support sunflower growing through the district agricultural office (DAO), declined and there were no alternatives (IFAD, 2011: 19).

Map 12. Lira and the outgrowers of Mukwano Agro Project Ltd.

Mukwano Agro Project Ltd. Seize: app. 17,000 ha through outgrowers‘ scheme (in Lango region, red dots) Commodity: sunflower

Mukwano has contracted farmers in Northern, Western and Eastern Uganda since 1991, by supplying them with seed and buying the harvested from them at a pre-agreed price (Turiho- Habwe, 1992). In 2004 however, Mukwano Group of Companies (under the name Mukwano Agriculture Project Ltd.) established an alternative sunflower production and milling system. It started contracting farmers to grow an imported sunflower hybrid seed, which was first milled in Kampala and later at a large mill in Lira. Mukwano also supplied extension services to its contract farmers, with the support of USAID.64

Northern Uganda is perceived to be the best source for the raw materials and they won‟t let the opportunity go. At the moment, the Mukwano Oil Mill in Lira extracts crude oil which is transported

64 ‗LEAD signed a grant agreement with Mukwano to enable the continued increase of sunflower seed production while also developing commercial maize production. Mukwano, with LEAD support, will increase sunflower seed production by another 10,000 metric tons over 12 months through the farmer field school methodology‘ (USAID, 2011b).

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 125 to Kampala for refining. Mr Gadhoke however disclosed that there is a plan to put up an oil refinery right in Lira‟ (Mukwano, 2011).

„Mukwano has embarked on developing strategic partnerships with the farming communities. These activities which include extension services and a guaranteed market for farmers‟ produce, will positively impact poverty alleviation‟ (Mukwano, 2011).

The seeds of Mukwano appeared to be more profitable for the farmer than the seeds that were used by VODP. ‗The [IFAD] mission heard that competition among the main stakeholders associated with the two sunflower products became vitriolic at one time, although relations between them have now improved‘ (IFAD, 2011: 20). After USAID, they also worked together with Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) and SNV. According to the Business Unit Manager in Lira, there are now 70,000 outgrowers in Bunyoro and 22,000 in Lango region in 2011. ‗Traditionally they already grew some sunflower. That made us come here.‘

Amuru Sugar Works Ltd., Amuru Amuru was first part of Gulu District, but became an independent district in 2006. Most of the Amuru district officials are therefore still located in Gulu. It is estimated that there are 234,100 inhabitants in Amuru District. Gulu (town, in Gulu district) is the largest city in Acholi sub-region, in the northern part of Uganda (PRSP, 2010: 185). Gulu district has approximately 298,500 inhabitants. Amuru is a 90-minutes drive away from Gulu. Madhvani Group already has a long history in Uganda, as a family and company. The Madhvani family is among those Indians that returned after the overthrow of Amin‘s regime. ‗President Museveni actively wooed Asians abroad, declaring them the backbone of the economy and enticing many more than his predecessor.‘ About 5,000 Asians returned to stay and built new lives, ‗with substantial assets‘. According to UNCTAD (2004: 19), once again they are making a ‗substantial contribution to the revitalized Ugandan economy‘. As UNCTAD (2004, ibid.) argues, it is an accomplishment for the Ugandan Government that they returned. ‗It‘s business as usual‘ again (UNCTAD, ibid.). Madhvani is one of the three main players in the sugar industry in Uganda and owns Kakira Sugar Works and Nile Breweries. There are a lot of controversies around this planned investment, as it is currently a case in court (see next chapter). According to the technical committee report of Ker Kwalo Acholi (2008), the cultural institution in Acholi sub-region, on the Madhvani Land Proposal, Madhvani has set up a company, Amuru Sugar Works Ltd. They have requested an amount of

Who gets What, When and How? 126 30,000 ha of land, of which 20,000 will be for the nucleus estate, processing factor (to mill the sugar into granulated sugar for sale), a power plant (using bagasse to create energy for the plant) and associated infrastructure (roads, housing of the staff, roads, etc.), all managed by Madhvani Group. The remaining 10,000 ha will be for smallholder outgrower farmers. Farmers will grow sugar on 80 percent of their land so that 20 percent is remaining for subsistence farming. The total project costs will be US$80 million, of which US$ 18 million is contributed by Madhvani Group, US$ 12 million by the Government of Uganda and US$ 50 million by loans from financial institutions, such as the African Development Bank.

Map 13. Gulu and Amuru

ACTORS INVOLVED We now know that the selected new corporate land acquisitions all are Ugandan companies, although they do have different parent companies which can be foreign, as is the case in Bugala Island with the Kenyan BIDCO and in Mubende with Neumann Kaffee Gruppe from Germany. Are there any other actors involved, such as NGOs and interest groups? Table 10 shows an overview of the actors in each of the selected investments. It is possible to make a distinction between several categories; first you can distinguish international, national and local actors, second you can make a distinction between private actors, public actors, NGOs, institutions, organizations and interest groups. Their involvement may differ. For example, they can be advocating for certain issues relating to the investment or be an official partner of

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 127 the company that is responsible for the investment. In all cases, the local district authorities are involved, either through their local leaders (from LC1 to LC5) or through the land office, District Land Board and the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), the highest position within the district.

Table 10. Overview of all important actors involved in the selected investments

There are only three international institution involved, namely IFAD, the World Bank and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). The World Bank was cooperating institution from the start of Vegetable Oil Development Project at Bugala Island (Oil Palm Uganda Ltd) in 1998 until August 2004. It facilitated the negotiations between the Government and the private sector and supervised the project in Kalangala. However, in 2004 it withdrew from the project ‗because it feared that the expanded oil palm project would not comply with its internal forestry safeguards policies‘. UNOPS took over and supervised the project in Kalangala until 2008. Since 2009 IFAD is supervising the project.

Who gets What, When and How? 128 Also important are two local associations Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Trust (KOPGT) and Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Association (KOPGA), categorized under interest groups since they are representing respectively the interests of farmers, national and local government, local NGOs and VODP (KOPGT) and the palm growers (KOPGA). Interesting to see is that especially in Amuru, there are a lot of different local interest groups involved, respectively Acholi Parliamentary Group, Acholi Land Protection Committee Lakang Amuru District, Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, Cultural Institution Ker Kwalo and the Acholi Land Protection Forum. Even though the project of Madhvani Group of Companies is only a proposal, apparently there are a lot of issues that are worth lobbying for, as will be explained in the following chapters. Action Aid, and FIAN are NGOs that work internationally, and are involved in Mubende (Kaweri Coffee Plantation) and Masindi (Kiryandongo Farm). USAID, the government agency providing U.S. economic and humanitarian assistance, and Danish International Development Assistance, DANIDA, an independent unit that part is of ‗a single-string service‘ in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark are both active in Lira (Mukwano Agro Project Ltd.) (Danida, 2011). The role of these actors will be discussed in the following chapters.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 129 CHAPTER 9. HOW IS THE LAND ACQUIRED?

With the background of the selected new corporate land acquisitions in mind, it‘s time to raise other questions. First, how exactly was the land acquired? Was this land previously owned? This chapter will conclude with some remarks on prior informed consent and the information that was available during the process of land acquisition. The next chapters will continue by looking at the Corporate Social Responsibility policies and impact of the new corporate land acquisitions. If we look at the overview in table 11 it is clear that there are various ways in which the companies acquired the land that was needed for their investment; through the Uganda Investment Authority, the Uganda Land Commission and a special ‗Land Acquisition Taskforce‘, a takeover of the shares, or through the District Land Board with approval from the Government of Uganda. It is possible to distinguish the new corporate land acquisitions in three categories that are either characterised by (1) strong involvement of the Government of Uganda, (2) privatization or takeover or (3) through an outgrower‘s scheme.

Table 11. Overview of land acquisition for the selected new corporate land acquisitions Company Origin Location Seize How was the land acquired? (in ha) Oil Palm BIDCO Ltd., Bugala 10,000 Through public-private partnership (agreed Uganda Ltd. Kenya Island, with the Government of Uganda); Land Kalangala Acquisition Taskforce (including UIA and district GoU), acquired land on behalf of the Uganda Land Commission through purchase from private owners. Kaweri Coffee Neumann Kitemba, 2,512 Lease through UIA Plantation Kaffee Gruppe, Mubende Germany district Ziwa Ranchers Mukwano Masindi 15,378 Mukwano Group of Companies bought the Ltd. Group of shares of Ziwa Ranchers Ltd. from Captain Companies, Joseph Charles Roy and Daisy Asaba Roy in Uganda 2009 and 2010. Kiryandongo A.K. Oils & Fats Masindi 2,833 Privatization. Farm belonged to the farm (U) Ltd., Government of Uganda and was used by the Mukwano Group UPDF. of Companies, Uganda Mukwano Mukwano Lira 17,000 Mukwano does not own the land, but signs Agro Project Group of contracts with app 20,000 outgrowers in the Ltd. Companies, Lango region. Uganda Amuru Sugar Madhvani Amuru 30,000 With approval of the Government of Uganda, Works Ltd. Group of Madhvani requested for a lease of 10,000 ha through Companies, the Amuru District Land Board. However, other Uganda actors argue it is public land and therefore the DLB is not the right authority to lease out the land. This is yet to be decided in court.

Who gets What, When and How? 130 (1) Involvement of the Government of Uganda

Regarding the first category, it became clear that the Government of Uganda is especially important in the case of Oil Palm Uganda Ltd, Kaweri Coffee Plantation and Amuru Sugar Works Ltd. For example, under the agreement signed with BIDCO (that included the changes, 2003), the Government - through the Uganda Land Commission - committed itself to handing over 6,500 ha of plantable land, ‗free of encumbrance and suitable for agricultural use‘, for the nucleus estate under a 99-year lease. Some 3,000 ha were formerly public land and the additional 3,500 ha were expected to be acquired through private land purchases and the degazetting of public secondary forests. Private land purchases had to be on a willing- buyer/willing-seller basis, because it is not possible under the Constitution to compulsory acquire land for private investment and economic growth (only in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health) (Focus on Africa Brief, 2010). That same agreement also foresees the development of an additional 30,000 ha of oil palm in other areas, with 20,000 ha and 10,000 ha developed by BIDCO Oil Refineries Ltd and the Government. These areas are not part of the VODP project (IFAD, 2011: 7).65 Due to the expansion, there were difficulties in acquiring the additional land for the nucleus estate, for which a Land Acquisition Taskforce was set up.66 Their main task was to identify land for purchase and ensure there were ‗no encumbrances or environmental sensitivity‘, inspect and value the land, recommend for purchase, negotiate with the landowners, facilitate agreement signing and ensure that land was protected from future encroachment. IFAD also supported the district land committees with extra ‗resources‘, but it still appeared to be insufficient. In 2001 it became clear that it was not allowed to degazette public forests and that a protected shoreline strip was proscribed by NEMA, the National Environmental Management Authority. Others parts of land could not be planted because the land consisted burial grounds and or cultural stones. In other cases the land was too rocky or sandy for oil palm planting. Therefore, a balance of 1,400 ha had to be purchased over and above the 6,519 ha that was handed over on signature.

65 According to IFAD (ibid.), BIDCO has not yet received the 20,000 ha of land for the estate on the mainland. However, it has not exercised its right to terminate the agreement with the Government if the land was not delivered within 12 months of the agreement. 66 This taskforce was established to acquire the additional land for the project. It represents all relevant stakeholders: Ministry of Lands, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA), the Uganda Investment Authority and Kalangala District Local Government. The land for the VODP project was bought on behalf of the Uganda Land Commission, according to the project coordinator of VODP.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 131 The process of acquiring the land was also slowed due to the land surveys and price authorization from the Government. The speed of registration by smallholders and outgrowers was also not as fast as was hoped for. The land tenure made the situation also difficult. Much of the land on the island is mailo land and is occupied by kibanja tenants. Their rights are recognized under the 1998 Land Act. Some of the landowners on the island could not be located by the Taskforce or were deceased. In order to participate in the project, people needed a right of tenure, such as a land title or letters from local chiefs assuring that they had lived on the land for more than 12 years. Some of them did not know where their land was or had lost their titles. In other cases there were family wrangles over ownership, ‗once it was realized there was a market‘. Prices of land rose from UGX 150,000-/acre in 2002 to UGX 800,000 in 2008 (IFAD, 2011: 11-12). According to VODP (2011), there were many instances where a 200 ha piece of land had roughly 3 ha of disputed land that was part of it. Those 3ha would prevent all of the 200 being handed over. In Bumanji, the government did not know that many people were living on that land and after finding out, they decided to purchase land somewhere else. ‗Many of the people were recent squatters. There is an old lady who is now still there in the middle of the nucleus estate and she argued that she had been there since birth.‘ They found an aerial picture that proved that this lady was telling the truth. ‗Based on the laws of the country she was allowed to stay. But there were some people who heard that the project was coming and thought that they might get money by settling there and the government hasn‘t paid them‘ (VODP, 2011). Due to several disputes, 1100 ha was not available for the nucleus estate to develop. Even when the land owners were know, it appeared that there were only few absentee landlords that were willing to grow their land over in order for OPUL to cultivate the land. The land of outgrowers had to be close to the plantation and at least 50 ha, otherwise it could not be cultivated in the way OPUL did (IFAD, 2011: 11-12). As VODP (2011) explains, there was social resistance from farmers that had tracts of land and who decided that they did not want to give the land away when they saw that signs of boundaries and identifying features such as stones and plants had to be removed. The proposed grants of land (total 750 ha) to returning islanders from the mainland could not proceed because of lack of public land (IFAD, 2011: 12). Another example where the Government of Uganda is involved is Kaweri Coffee Plantation. Kaweri was looking for a ‗solid block of land‘, as the manager of the plantation

Who gets What, When and How? 132 explains.67 ‗Uganda was looking for investment and land was available.‘ Kaweri got the lease for the 2,512 ha through the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA). However, the way in which the UIA acquired the lease, and how Kaweri Coffee Plantation dealt with this, is questioned by human right activist Peter Kayiira and NGO FoodFirst Information Action Network, FIAN. The land that now belongs to Kaweri has already a long history. The former owner of the land, Kayiwa, wanted to sell the land to the Ugandan Army, UPDF, but eventually sold it to the UIA. However, this piece of land includes a plot of land (around 538 ha) where people have lived for decades and that originally belongs to another owner, Ssebbowa (see appendix F). In 2001, a team of lawyers of the owner of the land ‗gave order to the people to quit the land‘, despite the arrangement with the UPDF and the LC3 Chairman that they would remain in control of those parts of land on which they had settled (the 538 ha). According to Kayiira (2001: 5), the peasants also hired a lawyer and the addressed the Attorney General of Uganda and wrote to several authorities, including the Presidents‘ Office. However, the owner already had employed surveyors to re-open the boundaries of the land and stated that the area on which the people were settled (the 2 square miles 49 acre) was part of his land. The total piece of land (9 square miles, 448 acres and 7 acres) from Kayiwa was sold to the Uganda Investment Authority. Kayiira (2001: 5) claims that the land that was handed to Kaweri Coffee Plantation was 11.77 square miles.

Map 14. The disputed land in Mubende

Source: Falk and Sterk, 2004: 8.

67 13-05-2011, interview with managing director of Kaweri Coffee Plantation, Mubende.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 133 According to the report made by Kayiira, the residents went to the Resident District Commissioner, who represents the President and Government in the District, to ask why the surveyors brought the land of Ssebbowa (on which they were settled) under the land of Kayiwa. The RDC stated that the people that were on that specific piece of land had to quit by 15-08-2001 (while the letter of the lawyers stated 31-08-2001). ‗He was going to send bulldozers to demolish all property both private and public‘ and said ‗he was to send his men to work on whoever put up resistance‘. This meant that Kitemba primary school and other businesses had to be closed per 15-08-2001. Later, the RDC asked the residents to come with documents that would prove that their land belonged to Ssebbowa. At the Mityana land office the documents were taken to Kampala by the employees of the land office. At the departments of land and surveys in Entebbe they could however provide the headmaster of Kitemba primary school, Peter Kayiira, the map that would prove that the residents were right. Kayiira advised the tenants to ‗seek a lawfull redress to their plight‘. On 16-08-2001 Kayiira was arrested by the police, which was eventually not enforced after a talk with Kayiira himself. A meeting with some of the villagers and Kayiira was arranged at the police office, where it was decided that if the RDC and the landlord Kayiwa did not come with a solution, they had to go to court. According to the report of Kayiira, that afternoon the RDC deployed the army and ‗repulsed the people from their rightful settlement‘. ‗The RDC was present to inaugurate the armed raid, plunder, physical torture and looting of people‘s property. Kayiira was arrested. On the 22nd and 23rd of August, property of Kitemba primary school was looted, Kitemba sub-parish church building was pushed down, and several other buildings in the area were involved. Houses along the roadside were pushed down as well, even as the business community, shops, etc. On August 24th, President Museveni ‗went to break the ground for Kaweri Coffee Plantation Ltd. In his words he praised the effort and commitment of the district officials they had shown in the process of acquiring land‘. Museveni argued that the peasants were ‗adequately compensated‘. Kayiira asks the Government to re-establish the homes that were demolished, and that people are adequately compensated, even as providing new materials for Kitemba Primary School, the reconstruction of worship places, amongst others. In total, Kayiira claims that there are 392 families affected, with a population of 2041 people (Kayiira, 2001). The third example, in which the Government plays an important role, is the proposed investment by Amuru Sugar Works Ltd. in Amuru. First, however, it is important to realize that the tenure in the northern part of Uganda is different from other parts (for example in comparison with mailo tenure in central Uganda). The main land tenure in northern Uganda is

Who gets What, When and How? 134 customary tenure, covering over 90 percent. According to Rugadya (2008: 21-22), the reality of the customary tenure in Lango (Lira) and Acholi region (Gulu, Amuru) can be characterized by ‗secure tenure, because it is known and understood‘. The values of customary tenure are ‗appreciated by the owners and users‘. However, there is a fear that given land titles are with the ‗ulterior motive‘ of ‗grabbing land by the government‘. Although it is perceived that clans do not allow customary tenure to be titled and have the authority and power to control and make accountable household heads on their actions such as sales, in reality there is an increasing individualization in Lango region. In Acholi sub-region there is still a lot of land communally owned. However, individual household heads would not mind titling their customary tenure. Furthermore, in Lango region the clan control is not as strong as in Acholi region. According to Rugadya, ‗Acholi regard their land collectively as ‗Acholi land‘. Common property resources are still open to community access, but are under ‗greatest threat of individualization and appropriation‘. According to the representative of the cultural institution Ker Kwalo Acholi in Gulu and former Human Rights Officer at the Uganda Human Rights Commission, there were already talks about Madhvani in 2004.68 ‗They are not a new person in Uganda. It‘s like a scramble for Africa; it is like colonialism is back. People are illiterate and not knowledgeable. (…) The people in Amuru are very poor. There are a few elites that are well informed. They want everything and make use of the illiterates. It becomes a survival of the fittest.‘ According to the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, based in Gulu, ‗Madhvani approached the president; the president appointed opinion leaders and the cultural institution [Ker Kwalo Acholi] got involved. They were to take the lead and published a feasibility study. That report argued that the project is viable and that there are a number of positive consequences, such as electricity etcetera. Madhvani should start negotiating with the people about the land. But Madhvani is busy with meeting the top officials. They are using the big shots in government.‘ According to information that is now in court, the managing director of Kakira in Jinja, part of Madhvani Group, received a letter in February 2008 in which it was stated that ‗cabinet ministers approved your investment proposal in sugar complex at Amuru on the following‘: (1) ‗you will be allocated 20,000 ha for nucleus estate by relevant authority‘; (2) ‗Government of Uganda will hold and pay for 40 percent shares‘ and (3) ‗both Government of Uganda and you will jointly solicit financing from international agencies for the project‘. Furthermore, ‗the local population will be allocated to become outgrowers for sugar factory.

68 Ker Kwalo Acholi, 20-05-2011, Gulu.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 135 The Ministry of finance and land are requested to finalize their arrangements‘69. In March 2008, the director of Corporate Affairs of Madhvani wrote in a letter to the Secretary District Land Board, ‗we have identified a site at Amuru which has been indicated to you and would now formally request you to allocate us 20,000 ha. The site is already indicated to you as adjacent to the Nile as adequate water is required. We already have incorporated a new company under the name of Amuru Sugar Works Ltd that will implement the above project. Request to give us approval.‘ In the application it is stated that the land will be used for ‗sugarcane grow, a factory and infrastructure like housing, school etc.‘ The owner of the ‗adjacent land‘ according to the application is Amuru District Land Board. However, this is questioned by several other actors, such as the Acholi Parliamentary Group, 70 a group of parliamentarians representing the Acholi region, who argue that the land for grant of freehold is currently held under unregistered customary tenure and privately owned by the Lamogi clans. Another interest group, Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, argues in a report of 2011 that people in Amuru district are not against sugar cane growing, but ‗want Madhvani to dialogue with them, and then they will give Madhvani land to put his factory and piloting while they remain outgrowers and sale to Madhvani‘ (ARLPI, 2011). According to the community (271 people attended this meeting), ‗the contested land is customary land. The idea of Madhvani coming is a game by high government officials to grab their land and sell it to investors.‘ ‗Why should the authority by pass them [the community‘ and transact the giving of the land for development without the owner‘s consent and what will be the fate of the persons displaced from Lakang?‘ Furthermore, ‗there is recruitment of youth from Lakang Village to carry clandestine operation against their own people‘. The community is ‗denied essential services like school, medical, road to mention a few unless they sign the giveaway document before they can get such services‘. The community members that are attending this meeting also argue that ‗the traditional leaders who are supposed to be custodians of the community and their properties are being lured to support the purported government development program. According to the Director of Corporate Affairs of Madhvani, ‗almost four years ago we decided at our board meeting that there was a need in agroprocessing sugar industry and that the best way is to put a new factory in the North, because it was our originally idea before

69 This letter in the file is signed by Hon Janat B. Mulaway, a representative from a ministry that was obliterated. This person could also not be traced online. 70 Hon Ocula Michael (Forum for Democratic Change, FDC, Amuru District), Ociro Concy (Independent, Amuru District), Penytoo David (FDC, Gulu District), Uma Zakeo and Obalim Jack Weleya. The last two MPs could not be found in the search system of the Ugandan Government (Parliament of Uganda, 2011). Together they are part the Acholi Parliamentary Group (APG).

Who gets What, When and How? 136 the Indians were expelled. So we did an extensive survey, we send a team to take soil samples, study the rainfall patterns, everything, to see how feasible it is and where it is most feasible to put up a sugar factory. We zoomed in at Amuru District. All the ingredients for setting up a good sugar factory were availble there. The land was there, it was not occupied, there was no settlement in that area. From the British time on, this area we have defined has never been settled, it was a forest area. Amin degazetted it. Because of the Ssese flies, people were not settling there. The land belongs to nobody. Is someone‘s is coming ad take advantage from the investors, then it‘s for different reasons, that‘s what the politicians are trying to do.‘ ‗We applied to the District Chairman [LC5]. The told us that he agreed in principal: We welcome you, but we would like to visit you with all our councillors and have a discussion. 25 of them visited Kakira Sugar Works, so that they could see the benefits with their own eyes. They were happy. They said: you have our support, but we also want you to invite parliamentarians, the Acholi Parliamentary Group, led by Livingstone Okello-Okello at that time. He also said: ‗it‘s fine, we have nothing against you, we are glad you are coming to invest there.‘ ‗We proceed as to the laws, we applied for the land through the district land board. After a long struggle we got 10,000 ha as lease. We accepted. But by the time the other formalities could be completed, like the payment of fees, we were taken to court by five politicians. Now we have not got the land. We already have done a survey on that land, we cannot take other land because of the rainfall pattern etc. People know, the District Authorities know, the District Land Board officially knows. In 2008 they had a meeting and gave us the lease of 10,000 ha. The said 10,000 ha at a time. The next meeting they will again approve 10,000 ha. Within that time, the court case was filed.‘ 71

71Director of Corporate Affairs of Madhvani Group of Companies, 14-07-2011, Kampala.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 137 [Box 3. Disputed land in Amuru] Based on documents from the High Court in Gulu1, this case will be explained. There are five applicants: Hon Ocula Michael (Forum for Democratic Change, FDC, Amuru District), Ociro Concy (Independent, Amuru District), Penytoo David (FDC, Gulu District), Uma Zakeo and Obalim Jack Weleya1. Together they are part the Acholi Parliamentary Group (APG). The respondents in this case are Amuru District Land Board, Maj. Gen. Oketta Julius, Christine Atimango Odongo (a former candidate for the Gulu Woman MP Seat and Secretary of the District Land Board), Opio Michael (brother of Christine Atimango and chairman District Land Board) and Amuru Sugar Works Ltd (part of Madhvani). The land that is contested is 10,000 ha and can be found at Omee Lujaro, Lwak Obito, Pailyec Parish in Amuru Sub County in Amuru District. In February 2008, the managing director of Kakira in Jinja (Madhvani) received a letter from the Government in which it was stated that their proposal was approved (as can be read in the above paragraph). The owner of the ‗adjacent land‘ according to the application of Madhvani is Amuru District Land Board. In August 2008, the Amuru sub county area Land Committee received an application for grant of freehold/leasehold during a meeting. There were five applicants: Ocheng Charles (1000 ha), Opiyo Michael (1000 ha), Okot Martine (1000 ha), Komakeck Walter (1000 ha) and Christine Atimango (2000 ha). Ocula, Ociro and Penytoo, the applicants of the case, received complaints from customary owners in Amuru district that their pieces of land had been grabbed from them and allocated to Amuru District Land Board. Uma and Obalim (APG) discovered as well that their pieces for land and that of other people of Lamogi clan had been grabbed from them and reallocated to the Amuru District Land Board. In November 2008 Amuru District Land Board scheduled a meeting ‗to further allocate part of the remaining land‘. In this meeting, the Maj. Gen. Julius Oketta and Opio Michael were allocated land by the District Land Board. Atimengo received 500 ha, Opio Michael 500 ha and Oketta 1,000 ha. The applicants argue that the customary land owners were not given a hearing at the time of ‗taking away their said land and giving it to Maj. Gen. Oketta Julius, Chrstine Atimango Odongo, Opio Michael and Amuru Sugar Works Ltd‘. No provisions were made for compensation. According to the applicants, the chairman of the District Land Board did not allow the public for land inspection and UPDF personnel ‗were menacing the public‘. The Chairman of the sub county land committee of Amuru announced that he only received one objection from a LC3 Chairman. But the applicants argue that the land for grant of freehold is currently held under unregistered customary tenure and privately owned by the Lamogi clans. Oketta has already constructed houses and is engaged in farming activities. Oketta applied for 10,000 ha with the District Land Board and was allocated 1,800 ha and is now processing a title. According to one of the applicants, Obalim Jack Weleya, ‘land is a serious issue. It is a matter of life and death. Our fathers lived on this land, we are living on this land and our children and future generations will live on this land. Freehold is not only a new phenomenon, but is indirect conflict with the Acholi land tenure system.‘ According to Okello, in the 1990s and 2000s he organized several meetings and consultations with the clan community and the individual clan chiefs. Okello argues that 418 people signed and agreed that he could use the land at Lwak Obito for private purposes. However, the applicants argue that this list is false and that the vast majority of Lamogi clans are still in IDP camps. In April 2011, the judge orders that the hearings of the case will proceed. As the registrar at the High Court in Gulu argues, the respondents want court of appeal in Kampala against this ruling. In June 2011 it will be decided if this will continue or that they have to wait for the appeal. The appeal will take five to seven months and will block the case, according to the registrar. In November 2011, the director of corporate affairs of Madhvani informed the author that ‗there is some progress in that the case has commenced hearing and in our opinion, the Court is likely to pronounce its ruling later this month‘ (Madhvani, 2011).

(2) Privatization or takeover In the case of Ziwa Ranchers Ltd. and Kiryandongo Farm, both owned by Mukwano Group and both located in Masindi district, the Government of Uganda is not prominent involved. However, before Mukwano acquired the farm in 2009, it belonged to the government and was used by the UPDF. According to the manager of the farm, before Amin it was a Palestinian farm, but they left with Amin. It is not clear whether the farm is acquired by a lease of purchase. When Mukwano acquired the farm, there was no fence that surrounded the farm. According to the manager, ‗there are problems with approximately 100 ‗squatters‘; land

Who gets What, When and How? 138 hasn‘t been designated, no one has a title‘. In the past, there were around 500 families on this land. ‗But they knew it wasn‘t their land, people knew it belonged to the government. They were compensated at government rates. Mukwano is so good!‘ For the acquisition of Ziwa Ranchers Ltd, Mukwano Group bought the shares of the original owners; Captain Joseph Charles Roy and Daisy Asaba Roy in 2009 and 2010. Captain Roy, who worked at the airport, bought the ranch in 2002 when it got privatized. According to the general manager of Ziwa Ranchers Ltd, due to his work at the airport, he ‗abandoned‘ the ranch. ‗There are very few pieces of land that have this size, so that‘s why Mukwano became interested.‘ Captain Roy already had the title of the land that was on the name of the company, Ziwa Ranchers Ltd., Mukwano bought the company and thus the title. However, as the general manager of Ziwa Ranchers Ltd argues, ‗when we bought the land, we did not know the realities on the ground and the problems we were facing there. After the purchase we found that there are so many encroachers that have entered the land with their local breed cattle, Ankole cattle, which are bringing in ticks, which is causing fever to our cattle. With the help of the district security committee, we managed to evict all those people and today we are fully operational.‘ 72 ‗Luckily enough we found there was nobody who was inside the ranch as a squatter or a bonafide occupant. There were only encroachers, just to graze their cattle or take water from Kafu River.‘ If Ziwa Ranchers Ltd decides to grow sugarcane, there will be other requirements. As the manager explains: ‗For the sugarcane, there are legal requirements we have to meet from the Government, Parliament and the Constitution. If we get approval then we apply for a license from the UIA. They will grant us, they only take serious investors with a business plan. We have built up a name in Uganda.‘ According to the land office in Masindi, initially the local communities wanted to lease Ziwa Ranchers Ltd. ‗When Mukwano came, local communities wanted to lease the land, but they failed.‘ The former LC5 chairman also confirms this and explains: ‗The Government offered Masindi district to buy this land. So we organized a meeting with business from Masindi and political leaders. Community came together and we discussed. According to the Council, the land of Ziwa Ranchers should be bought by the district on behalf of the people. We agreed on 3 to 5 billion Ugandan Shillings. The business community agreed. They asked six months to arrange the payment. But then we got no reply. Ziwa ranch is bought for less than 1 billion UGX. Now it‘s passed to Mukwano. But people live there. They are chased away. There are graves, people have cattle. People came to us, where do we have to go? We

72 General Manager of Ziwa Ranchers Ltd. 12-07-2011, Kampala.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 139 have parliament came here. Government went ahead without informing us. They sold it to another person.‘

(3) Outgrowers‟ scheme In comparison with the other selected investments, Mukwano Agro Project Ltd. in Lira is quite different. Mukwano does not ‗own‘ the land to grow sunflower, but choose to work with around 22,000 outgrowers in Lango region (Lira). The outgrower‘s sign a contract with Mukwano (see appendix K and outgrowers‘ impression appendix L). Mukwano provides hybrid seed to farmers at cost, offers a forward contract which is paid in cash on delivery, offers transport for the product and has its own extension agents. Other than seed, the required inputs are not unusual and are widely available from local stockists. The producers themselves have been trained in sunflower production. The cycle for production and marketing is a short 4 months and eliminates the need for temporal arbitrage by the producers because the crop is sold forward‘ (USAID Uganda, 2005: 10). According to the manager of Mukwano in Lira, ‗acquiring land is a problem; the system in Uganda is quite complicated. We work together with prison farms, but there are no other farms that are using commercial farming, it is still young. Only 40 to 50 percent in Lira and Apach [another district near Lira] is cultivated. There is still potential. We want more outgrowers or farmers that are expanding. Now most of them have 3 to 5 acre.‘

Prior informed consent As became clear in chapter 6, prior informed consent is not a concept that is used in the land policies that guide the land acquisitions. The fieldwork confirmed that this is a concept that is respected by any of the investors. Sometimes the term ‗consultations‘ or ‗sensitization meetings‘ are mentioned or ‗sensitization meetings‘, the latter often explained as meetings in which the firm or organization the communities have to inform, although the word ‗sensitizing‘ implies more than to inform. Even in the case of an international institution, IFAD (Oil Palm Uganda Ltd.) nothing is mentioned on ‗prior informed consent‘. They do mention ‗consultations‘ that were undertaken during the appraisal process between 1990 and 1996. Farmers, the central government, district officials, donors and some private investors were consulted. However, there is no specific report of the outcomes of the consultation and no stakeholder analysis was included, as IFAD (2011: 31) argues. ‗It has to be said that these were not common procedures at the time.‘ But, according to IFAD (ibid), the smallholders on Bugala Island

Who gets What, When and How? 140 were enthusiastic for the project. ‗Similar expressions of support from farmers were noted by the first supervision mission during VODP‘s early sensitization meetings‘, in which the project objectives were explained and farmers were invited to participate in groups. During the fieldwork, some outgrowers, community members and KADINGO were often not pleased in how the project was introduced. Complaints differed from ‗we were misinformed‘ (regarding the intercropping), ‗they exaggerated the project‘ and ‗they promised a lot‘ to the complaint from KADINGO that ‗they don‘t want us to tell the community in order that they don‘t understand what‘s happening‘. But in fact, these arguments all relate to the information prior and in the course of the implementation of the project. It is not clear to what extent people really could choose for this project, since the agreement was between the Government of Uganda, BIDCO and IFAD. It took years to find a suitable business partner (BIDCO), but nothing is mentioned on negotiations with the communities. IFAD does mention ‗sensitization meetings‘. These meetings were held by VODP and district extension staff with smallholders. VODP encouraged that also women and youth attended these meetings. IFAD (2011d) also observes ‗miscommunication‘ with the farmers on the island, for example regarding the loan procedure, the fertilizers, and the amount of money the smallholders and outgrowers have to pay back, among others. ‗The smallholders have not understood that palm oil takes time. The nucleus estate plans everything; in 2000 they were planning the start in 2004. With monoculture you need to know 2.5 years in advance if you are going to plant 200 ha. But the farmers still have the attitude they had with an annual crop like cassava. They have extraordinarily, unreasonable, uneducated ideas about oil palm. (…) Farmers are always ready to accuse IFAD, for example with their payment of the money. Many accusations don‘t hold water. But there is a certain bureaucratic inertia in this system. But no one is stealing the money.‘ According to IFAD (2011d), this also has to do with the level of trust in institutions, which is quite low in Africa. ‗So there are social and cultural issues involved.‘ In Masindi, where Mukwano owns Kiryandongo Farm and Ziwa Ranches Ltd., the LC5 Chairman argues that the surrounding communities were and still are not informed on the investments. The people at the opposite of the Kiryandongo farm also complain. ‗They don‘t consult the people.‘ The communities on their turn don‘t go to the managers of Ziwa Ranch (who is based in Kampala) or Kiryandongo and think this not possible. The manager from Ziwa Ranch argues the communication goes through the local district government.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 141 The farmers support program of Mukwano started in 2003 and in 2004 USAID became involved. According to USAID Uganda (2005), Mukwano‘s promotion strategy to attract farmers to become a hybrid sunflower grower consisted of a weekly radio program, demonstration plots, word of mouth, and technical training from the site coordinators, who are, according to USAID, ‗well trusted by the community members‘. This strategy is still working in 2011. The weekly radio program every Wednesday informs the farmers also on the price. However, according to the Lira Farmers Association, Mukwano did not tell the farmers that their sunflower, which is an improved variety that have to be imported from South Africa, is ‗exhausting and depleting‘ the land of the farmers. According to Mukwano, they provide the farmers with a lot of information on crop rotation. ‗The farmers can decide if they want to grow sunflower the next season or change to another crop.‘ The situation in Mubende with Kaweri Coffee Plantation and in Amuru with Amuru Sugar Works will be explained in the next chapters.

Conclusions As was already discussed in chapter 2, Agter (2010: 19) argued that two processes can be distinguished, ‗appropriations and concentrations of land rights‘.73 For these six selected new corporate land acquisitions, we can conclude that most of the processes are a concentration of land rights, since it concerned the purchase or rental of (large) areas of land that were already subject to an individual or collective private land tenure regime, as was the case with Ziwa RanchersLtd. and Kiryandongo Farm. Kaweri Coffee Plantation can also be considered as a concentration of land rights, although you can also argue that although the owners of which the UIA purchased the land were known, it also consisted of a piece of land over which groups exercised collective rights of use or management, since they live there for decades and were granted rights to live on the land by the previous owner (although not formalized). In the case of Oil Palm Uganda Ltd., the concentration appeared to be complex, since ownership was not always clear on Bugala Island and it was sometimes hard to trace land owners. But it did not concern the appropriation of land that had not been appropriated or claimed by anyone before, as is the case of Amuru Sugar Works Ltd. according to Madhvani and Amuru District

73 Private appropriation of hitherto common resources over which groups exercised collective rights of use or management, or land that had not been appropriated or claimed by anyone. This can happen through concessions and leases for example. Concentration involves the purchase or rental of large areas of land that were already subject to an individual or collective private land tenure regime. These processes may sometimes coexist (Agter, 2010: 19).

Who gets What, When and How? 142 Land Board. However, opponents argued that the Lamogi clans have collective rights of use over the land. Whether this is indeed the case, has to be decided in court.

Table 12. Overview processes of land appropriation and concentration in Uganda Company Origin Location Seize (in Process (based on Agter, ha) 2010) Oil Palm BIDCO Ltd., Kenya Bugala Island, 10,000 Concentration Uganda Ltd. Kalangala district Kaweri Coffee Neumann Kaffee Kitemba, Mubende 2,512 Concentration / private Plantation Gruppe, Germany district appropriation of hitherto common resources over which groups exercised collective rights of use or management Ziwa Ranchers Mukwano Group of Masindi 15,378 Concentration Ltd. Companies, Uganda Kiryandongo A.K. Oils & Fats (U) Masindi 2,833 Concentration farm Ltd., Mukwano Group of Companies, Uganda Mukwano Mukwano Group of Lira 17,000 - Agro Project Companies, Uganda Ltd. Amuru Sugar Madhvani Group of Amuru 30,000 Appropriation of land that had Works Ltd. Companies, Uganda not been appropriated or claimed by anyone or private appropriation of hitherto common resources over which groups exercised collective rights of use or management

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 143 CHAPTER 10. CONDITIONS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Although it was sometimes difficult to find out the exact conditions and contracts of the land acquisitions, this research will give a first insight in the conditions regarding the selected investments. Benefit-sharing agreements can be one of those conditions and is especially mentioned in the National Land Policy which has to be accepted by the Cabinet and Parliament in the next coming year(s), as was explained in chapter 6. Benefit-sharing is also explicitly mentioned in the declaration of the International Land Coalition (2011). Is benefit- sharing already a concept that is incorporated in the acquisitions of land in Uganda? Furthermore, this chapter will look into more detail into the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policies of the investors themselves. Although Ugandan authorities can set certain conditions, it is also expected that companies have their own internal policies, which give them guidelines in how to operate in Uganda. Is CSR already a concept that is widely used among investors and incorporated in official policies or is it an issue that stays in the ‗do good niche‘ that is practiced only at moments that are most convenient for the investors themselves?

Conditions Table 13 gives an overview of the selected investments and the conditions attached. Regarding the conditions, we can see that the conditions for the investment of Kaweri Coffee Plantation provides the most details and are quite broad, since they also include labour conditions, health and safety, and make a reference to the guidelines of the World Bank Group. There is also a reference to the Standards of NKG itself (see appendix H). The conditions are part of the loan agreement between Kaweri Coffee Plantation and Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH, the German Investment Corporation. This information is public at the office of the Registrar of Companies. However, when the manager of Kaweri Coffee Plantation to explain the conditions attached to this investment, the manager answers: ‗There are no conditions attached to this investment. We grow coffee around the forest, that‘s our ethos.‘ In the case of Oil Palm Uganda Ltd., the involvement of IFAD ensures that there are regular reports and evaluations, which are made public. Because oil palm is a new crop on the island, the project has to comply with NEMA environmental risk-mitigation conditions (see

Who gets What, When and How? 144 appendix G). According to IFAD (2010: 59), ‗OPUL seems to be doing its utmost to meet the requirements‘, although despite that OPUL is doing ‗its utmost‘ it does not become clear if OPUL indeed meets all requirements. Environment and social issues are nevertheless an issue in this project. When the project started in 1998, IFAD didn‘t have ‗environmental and social safeguards in place‘, unlike other international financial institutions. However, IFAD ‗exercised its responsibilities in this respect in a pragmatic fashion‘. According to IFAD (2011: 57), ‗it‘s a moot point whether the existence of such safeguards would have helped or hindered the redesign of the oil palm subproject.‘ ‗On the one hand, a more thorough analysis of socioeconomic aspects might have led to greater awareness of potential difficulties in securing land and smallholder/outgrower uptake. On the other hand, however, the reduced flexibility usually accompanying safeguards policies might have made it difficult to continue with the project under the conditions requested by BIDCO‘ (IFAD, ibid.). For the second phase of the project at Bugala Island however, IFAD advises to conduct a ‗full social and environmental impact assessment, a new environmental management plan with emphasis on communications, and activities to promote livelihood enhancement in the oil palm communities‘ (IFAD, 2011: xix). Also interesting is that the World Bank, who was the cooperating institution at the beginning of the project in 1998, withdrew from the project in 2004, ‗because it feared that the expanded oil palm project would not comply with its internal forestry safeguards policies‘. Their own policy74 aims ‗to reduce deforestation, enhance the environmental contribution of forested areas, promote afforestation, reduce poverty, and encourage economic development‘ (World Bank, 2011c).75 Regarding other conditions, outgrowers have to sign an agreement with Oil Palm Uganda Ltd. and pledge their land for 25 years. In return, they receive a full range of establishment and management services from OPUL for the first 3 years. BIDCO also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Uganda, but the exact details are, apart from the information in the IFAD reports, not known. If Ziwa Ranchers Ltd decides to grow sugarcane, then this will also require an environmental impact assessment from NEMA (see appendix G). The manager of Ziwa Ranchers Ltd. is also the only investor that aims at signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the district authorities in Masindi and the local communities, in which agreements are captured, which will be discussed in the next part of this chapter on CSR.

74 Operational Policy/Bank Procedure 4.36 (World Bank, 2011c). 75 The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) took over and supervised the project in Kalangala until 2008. Since 2009 IFAD is supervising the project.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 145 Table 13. Overview of selected investments and the conditions attached

* The exact requirements from the UIA for Kiryandongo Farm are not known.

Although Amuru Sugar Works Ltd is the only investment in this list that is not yet put into practice, some of the conditions, both from the Government as from Amuru Sugar Works Ltd itself are already known (but can probably change in the future). The Ugandan Cabinet approved the investment by Madhvani on the condition that the Government of Uganda will hold and pay for 40 percent shares. Madhvani will be allocated 20,000 ha for the nucleus estate and both the Government and Madhvani will jointly solicit financing from international agencies for the project. Once the land is allocated, NEMA will have to conduct an

Who gets What, When and How? 146 Environmental Impact Assessment. In their investment proposal, Madhvani has several requests for the Government of Uganda: (1) allow imports of all machinery for this project free of any type of tax levies (including VAT exemption), (2) provide required security, (3) clear the entire area to be given to us of land-mines, (4) liaise with Umeme76/ Uganda Electricity Transmission Company Limited to provide a power connection to the site, (5) assist in securing loan financing for the project on soft terms. The local government is requested to (1) construct at least one wide road leading to the side, (2), re-instate that broken culverts leading to the site, (3) give necessary clearances within a reasonable time frame, (4) ensure that there is security in the project site area in support of the efforts to the Central Government and (5) provide required assistance and cooperation from time to time (Ker Kwalo Acholi, 2008: 71). Mukwano Agro Project Ltd. is different, since it only has an agreement with the outgrowers and the NGOs that collaborate with Mukwano to improve the situation for the outgrower farmers (such as Danida, USAID and currently SNV). In 2005, when Mukwano worked together in the Rural Speed program of USAID, it was argued that the conditions for the outgrower farmers include a guaranteed market, reliable input supply, skilled production management and short production and marketing cycle. ‗Mukwano provides hybrid seed to farmers at cost, offers a forward contract which is paid in cash on delivery, offers transport for the product and has its own extension agents. Other than seed, the required inputs are not unusual and are widely available from local stockists. The producers themselves have been trained in sunflower production. The cycle for production and marketing is a short 4 months and eliminates the need for temporal arbitrage by the producers because the crop is sold forward‘ (USAID Uganda, 2005: 10). However, at the end of 2008, when Mukwano signed the partnership agreement with SNV, Mukwano committed itself to strengthen the position of farmers through ‗dropping contracts with individual farmers, providing market to any farmer at prevailing prices, putting warehouses in different locations near farmers, importing and supplying high quality planting seed, other inputs and extension services, and providing high quality maize planting seed as a furrow crop in between the sunflower seasons to help secure food within the farming community as part of their corporate social responsibility‘ (Mwesige, 2009: 1-2). In 2011, the business unit manager of Mukwano in Lira informed us that the

76 Umeme Umeme Ltd is a major investment of Actis' Infrastructure 2 fund. Actis is a leading investor in emerging markets, investing exclusively in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Actis has specialist teams dedicated to private equity, infrastructure and real estate and has a track record built on growth capital and leadership in control investing across its markets (Umeme, 2011).

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 147 contract system was only suspended for a short period of time. ‗But the outcome was discouraging, the farmers started losing interest in sunflower and the production declined one third in 2009. Therefore, we had to restart the contract system.‘77 Now the farmers sign a contract again, before the seeds are distributed. ‗They sign a contract on the terms and agreements; we buy back the grain, they supply us with good quality. We guarantee them a minimum price. There are several centres in the region, they get instant payment, and Lorries are coming to pick up the yield. The market is very competitive.‘

Benefit-sharing agreements Regarding the benefit-sharing agreements, which could be part of the conditions of the land acquisitions; it appeared that none of the investors has benefit-sharing agreements with the local communities or their representatives at a district or local level. An exception is Mukwano Agro Project Ltd where clear agreements regarding the sunflower harvest are mentioned and the outgrower contracts between Oil Palm Uganda Ltd on Bugala Island, but this is inherent in an outgrowers‘ scheme. The Government of Uganda however did mention a condition for benefit-sharing in Amuru Sugar Works Ltd, but this only relates to the benefits for the Government of Uganda itself and does not include shares for the local communities.

Corporate Social Responsibility policy As is the case with benefit-sharing agreements, none of the investments has an official Corporate Social Responsibility policy that is guiding their day-to-day management and strategic decisions in doing business. However, although there is no official CSR policy paper that is named that way, if you consider CSR as ‗voluntary corporate initiatives aimed at improving the social and environmental impacts of a company‘s business activities, but which excludes philanthropy which arises after profits are made‘, then the picture is more positive. Most of the investments have to comply with the environmental standards of NEMA, and the other conditions that Kaweri fit into the broader CSR agenda as well, as they focus on health and safety guidelines, labour conditions, and other standards relating to ‗sustainable coffee production‘. However, when the manager of Kaweri is asked to elaborate on their CSR, the answer is: ‗I have not seen a corporate social responsibility paper.‘ ‗Our biggest aim is to develop the surrounding communities. We‘ve build schools, helped two schools, build 5/6 water dwells, maintained roads, and provide access to coffee seedlings. We do take it

77 Email Business Unit Manager Mukwano, 20-11-2011.

Who gets What, When and How? 148 seriously and do whatever we can. But we have to get help from local leaders; it has to come from two ways. Therefore, we have a quarterly local community leaders meeting.‘ BIDCO, the parent company of Oil Palm Uganda Ltd. on the other side, argues: ‗our investment in Uganda shows our commitment to working with the agricultural populations to help alleviate poverty by providing an economic activity with extended benefits to the community. We believe this project will demonstrate to the world that by supporting agro industrial industries in Africa, we will be able to turn around the economic problems facing the continent‘ (Vimal Shah, Group CEO Bidco) (Bidco, 2011). However, as in the case of Kaweri Coffee Plantation, despite these big statements of the higher management, the plantation manager at Bugala Island himself argues it is not yet time for CSR. ‗In Malaysia [where Wilmar has two plantations] there is a CSR policy and a labour union, but here on the Kalangala Islands we are in an early stage.‘ However, he did appreciate the fact that they were supporting a football match. The manager at Ziwa Ranches Ltd is more committed. However, ‗the responsibility of the investor lies in the creation of jobs‘, according to the manager of Ziwa Ranches Ltd. ‗That is the first priority. In a poor environment as Uganda, you may find 5 people behind the one who is earning. If we are going to create 4,000 jobs [sugarcane], then that means at least 20,000 people are going to benefit.‘ ‗Secondly, we will provide shelter for the people that are going to get the jobs. We will build houses and quarters for the staff. On the health side, we should have a dispensary or a clinic, maybe a small hospital, which will not only accommodate all the workers, but the neighbouring community as well. Then we shall be having a school which will not only accommodate the children of the workers, but the neighbouring communities also. There will be a clean water source, a borehole or pumped water from the river, whatever NEMA will advise us. Apart from that, we shall be having a club, a playground, and all those things. The safety and health is also important. We are committed once the project is launched.‘ Although there is no document in which responsibilities of Mukwano Group are captured, the manager aims at creating a Memorandum of Understanding with the district authority in Masindi and the local communities. ‗Whatever is needed, we shall do it and we normally do. I don‘t know if there is an official document on the CSR policy. But there must be some official document. I know these things are done by Mukwano. For Kiryandongo there is a document.‘78 ‗In Masindi we might come up with a Memorandum of Understanding

78 According to the manager in Lira, ‗there is no such Memorandum of Understanding, I think that is a wrong info. Kiriyandongo farm is just a commercial farm producing crops which we see feasible‘ (13-07-2011).

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 149 on social responsibility, but the problem is education. At the sub county level the educated people are not there, no leaders on whom we can trust. We may get it soon. We asked the Resident District Commissioner again. We will sign a Memorandum of Understanding and we shall do it. We need the district come in, so that tomorrow there is no dispute anymore. It should be documented. The Memorandum should be signed by the district, the local communities and by us. Then we put the dam there, so that by tomorrow, it is agreed that the water can be accessed by anyone, and that nobody stops other people from getting water because it is on their land.‘ The manager of Kiryandongo farm in Masindi refers mainly to philanthropy. ‗Do we have a Corporate Social Responsibility policy? Not as far as I know. But we help them everywhere we can. Mukwano has a hospital in Kampala, there is an eye clinic in Lira but they don‘t want any publicity.‘ The business unit manager of Mukwano Agro Project Ltd in Lira is clearer, but can also not explain their CSR immediately: ‗For the policy on Corporate Social Responsibility you have to go the headquarters in Kampala. We do it through marketing. In 2008, our unit had a focus on the outgrowers. We supported an eye clinic in remote areas. This was a program of a month. We also support some clinics in the main hospitals. Then we make an announcement that it‘s for everyone.‘ However, the contribution of Mukwano reaches far, according to the manager. ‗Our policy is to develop raw material, that‘s clear. We want to help the sector to develop. Our money went to 7 to 8 districts and supported 3 to 4 million people. This can reduce poverty levels. But that‘s not our main aim. But we are supporting. Our goal is taking the money to the people. For this unit, we work with outgrowers; we provide them with services and money. That‘s a great score. We see benefits; we see progress among the people. You can change families, there are trading centres that are expanding, etcetera.‘ The same arguments are coming from the director at Madhvani, regarding Amuru Sugar Works Ltd in Amuru. At first, reference is made to philanthropy, which is followed by a ‗contribution to reducing poverty‘. As the manager of Madhvani argues, ‗there is no CSR policy on paper. We really give a lot of money to orphanages, we maintain different hospitals, we give scholarships every year from the Madhvani Trust, so we give a lot of money to CSR each year.‘ But there are no agreements on their commitment on paper. ‗If we want to sign a Memorandum of Understanding for the investment in Amuru, that‘s our decision, it‘s no requirement from any authority. The Madhvani pilosophy is that we want to give education, and affordable medical facilities to our workers, so that their productivity will increase. They can only concentrate on their job if they know that their children are in a good school and that

Who gets What, When and How? 150 there is medical attention for their family.‘ According to the manager, the main responsibility of a company as Madhvani is ‗providing jobs to the unemployed. That is what we can do. We can employ 9,000 people. The indirect spinoffs are much greater. The whole economy will start booming.‘ What becomes clear is that CSR as a guiding concept is not yet incorporated in day-to- day business in the selected investments, at least not in the field itself. Managers that are managing the plantations are often referring to the head office in Kampala and do not immediately refer to the policies and guidelines that appear to be on paper (such as in the case of Kaweri). It seems most managers support the view that is mentioned by Newell and Frynas (2007: 674); ‗firms help to tackle poverty primarily in their roles as investors, employers and tax-payers and not through acts of philanthropy, adherence to global social standards or the negotiation of codes of conduct.‘ However, they also mention their activities which can be labelled as philanthropy, such as supporting schools and hospitals.‘ The impacts of both CSR and non-CSR activities will be discussed in the following chapter.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 151 CHAPTER 11. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF THE NEW CORPORATE LAND ACQUISITIONS?

Although this research is an explorative study and did not conduct a specific impact assessment based on a sample survey, the fieldwork did provide a lot of information and opinions on the impact of the selected investments. This will hopefully give a first insight in the complex issues that are at stake. According to Newell and Frynas (2007: 674), both CSR - as was discussed in the previous chapter – and non-CSR activities of firms have a bearing on poverty, even if the latter are far more significant in overall social and economic terms. As Newell and Frynass (ibid.) continue:

„One-off philanthropic projects such as building a school, a clinic or a water treatment plant can bring enormous short- and long-term benefits to a community. Even if such gestures may be aimed at placating more far-reaching and contentious community demands for a greater share of revenues earned from extracting resources, or if such projects do not always reflect the communities‟ own priorities, they do nevertheless bring direct developmental gains. But such contributions are likely to be overshadowed in their importance by the economic and social effects, positive and negative, that are created by investment and employment. Whether it is altering the sustainability of local livelihoods or bringing cleaner production processes and improved technologies, displacing local industry or boosting it, fuelling war through investment in conflict zones or providing much needed resources to resolve such conflict, it is in the day-to-day management of the firm and through the taking of key investment decisions that development gains come to be realised or denied, rather than in the well intended, but isolated and discrete activities of firms in developing areas.‟

As most of the managers of the firms argued in the previous chapter, firms do spend money on social initiatives or philanthropy, but all agree that their biggest contribution as a firm is doing business and providing employment. Oxfam International (2004: 21) makes an interesting note based on a study on the impact of the sugar industry, which can be applicable for all agricultural sectors in Uganda. ‗There is not always a direct relation between poverty reduction and employment. Poor-quality, low-paid jobs do not automatically provide a way out of poverty, and the record of working conditions in the sugar industry is generally poor.‘ However, people with few alternative sources of income do value the work highly. ‗The challenge lies in the creation of higher-quality, better-paid jobs and improved labour conditions. In the context of national policies to ensure compliance with international labour standards and better environmental practices, there is great potential for the sugar sector to improve standards of living.‘

Who gets What, When and How? 152 Although this chapter cannot go in detail on each aspects, based on the conceptual model we will discuss the following issues; first, the compensation of the previous landowners – if applicable to the investment – as can be seen in the red box and circles. Second, it is important to know whether the labourers that will work at the plantation, are local or from other neighbouring districts or countries (green box). A third issue is the wage people receive, which can lead to increased income, as is shown in the model (purple circle). Although it is not possible to assess whether their income has increased, information on the wages will be useful and a starting point. Lastly, the investments that are done in productivity, the local level and transport and market infrastructure are important to consider (yellow box). The conditions of the purchase or lease and specific conditions (orange circle) were already discussed in chapter 7.

Figure 8. Part of the conceptual model that focuses on the impact on local livelihoods and food security

(Foreign) Direct Investment

Compensation It is not possible to answer the question whether the compensation of the so-called ‗squatters‘, ‗encroachers‘ (as the company often calls them), ‗bonafide occupants‘ or other tenants that are involved in the selected new corporate land acquisitions was appropriate and allowed them opportunities to build a sustainable livelihood (see red circle/box), also because the people that were evicted or had to move, often moved to other places and are therefore hard to

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 153 trace. However, the fieldwork did provide more information on this matter, which at least gives an insight in how this works in reality. At Kyabwima Landing Site on Bugala Island (Oil Palm Uganda Ltd), we speak to the LC1 chairman and six other people from the village. According to them, some of the villagers lost their gardens in 2006/2007. ‗In the beginning the investor didn‘t want to compensate for the land, we lost our gardens. They used force, some of them were compensated, others not. Reason was that after escalation they got money. After destroyment of property, it is difficult to compensate.‘ According to their information, two people were compensated in 2009, after a long process. ‗It would have been better if they did this earlier.‘ During this process, Kalangala District NGO Forum (KADINGO) had helped them. However, there are still concerns among the villagers. ‗Now we are worried that the owner of nearby land (mailo land owner, from Mukono79) gave his title to BIDCO. Now it‘s easier for them to get this landing site. But it‘s a rumour.‘ In the case of Mubende, the interest group ‗Wake up and fight for your rights‘ argues there was no proper compensation, the manager of Kaweri Coffee Plantation disagrees and argues that half of the evictees accepted. Kayiira, the spokesperson of the group, undertook several actions to address his case. In 2002 the Minister for Presidency came ‗to meet the evicted people to sweet talk them to stop them from suing the Government‘ (Action Aid, 2008: 45). In August 2002 the evictees went to court, suing the Attorney General and Kaweri Coffee Plantation.80 In 2004, they received an invitation from FoodFirst Information and Action Network (FIAN) Germany to launch a campaign and write a report. Representatives were sent to Germany ‗to lobby for allies‘. The Government of Germany was asked to request the give up of the land by Neumann Kaffee Gruppe. That same year, the German ambassador in Uganda received a letter from the Ugandan Minister of State for Investment ‗to cleanse the image of Neumann Kaffee Gruppe and Kaweri Coffee Plantation in the German media and the German government‘. FIAN assisted the group of Peter Kayiira in filing a formal complaint on the grounds that ‗Neumann Kaffee Gruppe breached the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, arguing that the company was informed of, and benefitted from, human rights violations such as the forced eviction and the related destruction of evictees‘ property without compensation; in addition, the company had constantly rejected dialogue with representatives of the evictees‘ (Pieper, 2011).

79 Mukono is a city on the mainland of Uganda, near the capital city Kampala 80 In November 2006 the first hearings in the court case took place – more than four years after the evictees had filed the suit (Action Aid, 2008). In 2011, the court has not decided.

Who gets What, When and How? 154 „The remaining evictees continue to suffer the loss of their land. Many now subsist on the border of the plantation in makeshift homes. Some have found shelter on neighbouring land where they engage in temporary small-scale farming in order to sustain a livelihood. Their plots of land for farming are small, however, and are insufficient to provide their families with adequate food. The educational needs of young people have become secondary to survival. Due to reduced incomes the number of secondary school students has decreased‟ (Pieper, 2011)

In 2011, the National Contact Point (NCP) for OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises stated that the complaints procedure against Neumann Kaffee Gruppe was closed.81 According to the NCP, both parties should continue to settle out of court. However, FIAN is determined to continue in court. ‗We will continue until this case has been solved.‘82 In Masindi, Kiryandongo Farm had to compensate around 500 families ‗at government rates‘, as was mentioned in chapter 7. According to Action Aid in Masindi, ‗the communities were told to leave the village and move. Locally there is no protest. They [Mukwano] give some compensation, but I doubt if tribunals are involved. It is out of the investors‘ own will if they are willing to compensate or not. Besides, the district might not have the power. With a big investor [as Mukwano], it‘s handled at a higher level. They say we cannot intervene in this.‘ According to the manager of Kiryandongo farm, there are still ‗problems‘ with ‗approximately 100 squatters‘. According to the manager, ‗land hasn‘t been designated, no one has a title‘. Ziwa Ranchers Ltd did not have to compensate anyone, according to the managers. However, according to the former LC5 chairman in Masindi, ‗people lived there. They are chased away. There are graves, people have cattle. People came to us, where do we have to go?‘ in the past, cattle keepers could always let their cattle graze, but this is since Mukwano no longer allowed, because it can infect their own cattle. However, the fencing is still not completed yet. Therefore, some cattle keepers continued to let their cattle graze. Mukwano responded by ‗grabbing their cattle‘, according to the manager of Kiryandongo Farm. ‗We have some problems with cattle keepers. They cut the fence. We grabbed their cattle; they were compensated; now they‘ve gone north, to Arua. Everyone was photographed and compensated. That‘s why we put a 7 ft electric fence.‘

Employment A second issue for elaboration is the labourers. Is there agricultural labour import or is the local population recruited as labourers? Furthermore, what are the wages? Table 14 provides

81 MR. J. Steffens, Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft und Technologie, 30-03-2011 (Steffens, 2011). 82 Next hearings will take place on January 23rd, 2012 in Uganda (email Falk, 21-11-2011).

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 155 an overview for the selected investments. In the case of Ziwa Ranchers Ltd and Amuru Works Ltd it represents the numbers according to the proposal. Most of the companies work with a proportion of permanent staff and but mainly rely on casual labourers. Figure 9 shows the proportion of each type of employment (categorized in permanent and contract workers, casual labourers and outgrowers/smallholders) for each of the selected investments.

Figure 9. Overview of types of employment for each of the selected investments

N.B. independent outgrowers are grey, because this group officially not part of the Kaweri investment.

Who gets What, When and How? 156 Table 14. Overview of impact in terms of employment and social services

N.B. * is no information available, - is not applicable. Earnings of outgrowers of Mukwano Agro Project Ltd are based on figures from USAID, 2006 (see appendix). Earnings of outgrowers in Mubende, near Kaweri Coffee Plantation are available from Cognigni (2010: 52) (see appendix). An impression of the outgrowers in Lira can also be found in the appendix. Exact figures for Oil Palm Uganda Ltd are not yet available.

The work of casual labourers is often based on tasks and productivity, as is the case at Oil Palm Uganda Ltd. and Kaweri Coffee Plantation. According to the manager of Oil Palm Uganda Ltd, ‗it‘s hard to find loyal staff. All our graduates have cheated us. You have to build in incentives. Everything is on a productivity basis. You have to be a good manager. We pay 2,200 a day and give 500 UGX food subsidies. We already increased the salary a couple of times. It‘s casual labour. We tried to work with contracts, but that didn‘t work, people were

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 157 not showing up. But we give full employment. We are working 7 days a week, based on casual labour.‘ IFAD (2011: 42) is positive on the work of the nucleus estate workers and their salary – which is ‗slightly below the going rate of UGX 3,000 on Bugala Island for unskilled labour, but above the rate of UGX 2,000 on the sugar plantations and some mainland factories‘ and ‗is easier‘. IFAD (ibid.) also argues, ‗plantation workers revealed that employment on the estate compares very favourably with similar types of work elsewhere (e.g. sugar plantations) and many are able to remit savings to their families of origin‘.83 The income of a casual labourer at Kaweri Coffee Plantation is not clear. Estimations differ from UGX 2,000 to 3,500 a day.84 A casual labourer at Kiryandongo farm, for example for weeding, gets UGX 2,500 a day. If we convert these numbers to US dollars, then we can say that the wages are except for the highest estimation at Kaweri Coffee Plantation, below the poverty line of US$ 1.25 a day (World Bank, 2011d). The manager at Kaweri however refers during our interview to the minimum wage of UGX 6,000 a month (US$ 2.28) and argues: ‗If you do two tasks a day, you can double your wage. It is our intention to look at the welfare of our workers.‘

Women working at Kiryandongo Farm, Masindi

83 See also appendix I 84 When the author tried to verify these numbers, the author did not get any response from Kaweri Coffee Plantation.

Who gets What, When and How? 158 Although the investment of Amuru Sugar Works Ltd is still a proposal, the details of the proposal are known. Oxfam (2004) published a study on the sugar sector and argues that it can provide an important source of income. ‗It is through job creation that the sugar industry has the most direct impact on poverty reduction.‘ However, salaries in the sugar sector are low. ‗This is particularly true for farm labourers and even more so for labourers employed by smallholder farmers. The latter are generally employed on far worse terms than workers on the sugar estates. As most workers in the sugar sector cannot survive on their monthly wages, they continue to draw on alternative sources of income. Many cultivate subsistence crops on their own plots in order to reduce the costs of living. Seasonal work in the sugar sector falls mostly in the dry season, making it relatively complementary to the farm work at home. Nevertheless, the combination of workloads can be problematic, especially for single-parent families, which are most often headed by women.‘ Madhvani can already say something on the employment, since they run another sugarcane plantation, Kakira Sugar Works. According to the manager of Madhvani, ‗our workers in Kakira are happy. We had no labour issues in Kakira. Okay, recently we had some unrest due to the inflation on fuel and commodities. They wanted more payment. We discussed with them and that was settled. Otherwise we have no labour issues. Our relationship with the trade union is good.‘ Another similarity between the selected investments, is that there is no labour union in which workers are united, except for 50 percent of the permanent workers (110 people) at Kaweri Coffee Plantation that are a member of a labour union since January 2010. According to the manager at Kaweri Coffee Plantation, there is a ‗good relationship‘ with this labour union and a Memorandum of Understanding. Membership of this union is voluntary and ‗up to the union‘. In 2004 however, FoodFirst Information Action Network argued that there was a strike at Kaweri Coffee Plantation in 2004, due to ‗bad labour conditions‘. ‗Up till today [2007], the management has also prevented the National Union of Plantation and Agricultural Workers (NUPAW)85 from unionizing the workers‘ (Falk and Sterk, 2007: 1). Another strike occurred at the 2nd of May, 2011. According to the informants, the army was brought in.

85 The NUPAW Uganda is the largest trade union organization in Uganda. It has a Total membership of 47,000 including 15,000 women, with a potential of 150,000 members. NUPAW (U) is affiliated to the National Organization of Trade Unions (NOTU) (with 75,000 members) and to the International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurants, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers‘ Association (IUF) (2.6 million members from 118 trade unions in 334 countries). NUPAW represents workers in the tea and sugar plantations and general agriculture, e.g. rice farmers, flower farms and other agriculture related industries (Fashoyin e.a., 2003: 47).

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 159 According to the managing director this was not organized by a union, because they did not announced it 21 days in advance. According to the LC1 Chairman, the union is operating outside the plantation and still in an infant stadium. The result of the strike was an increase of 250 UGX (US$ 0.10) a day. From the fieldwork, it became clear that most of the employees, whether permanent/contract workers or casual labourers, are from Uganda. However, especially managerial positions are filled by international employees. Sometimes, casual labourers also come from other districts and not from the surrounding local communities. A complaint that is often heard is that the payment is considered too little, even as that there are no favourable working conditions. As a former worker of Oil Palm Uganda Ltd argues: ‗The conditions on the plantation are too hard. It‘s a long walk to the plantation. Out of the 380 people in our village, nobody works there. They pay too little and working days are too long. The alternative is fishing.‘ In Mubende, a villager near the plantation argues: ‗People earn 2500 UGX a day, but the costs of living are high. A person that owns his own farm has free accommodation, food, fruits and animals. So in most cases the casual labourers are worse off.‘ In Masindi, at the opposite of Kiryandongo farm, people are also not satisfied about the payment and prefer other jobs that pay more than 2,500 UGX, such as being a porter, loading cassava or growing their own crops. At Oil Palm Uganda Ltd, only 10 percent of those recruited as casual labourers are from the island (IFAD, 2010: 42). The other 90 percent are mainly from ‗poor families on the mainland‘ (IFAD, 2010: 32). At Kaweri Coffee Plantation, most of the 18 managers are from Kenya, the managing director (already the 3rd manager) is originally from Zimbabwe. At Oil Palm Uganda Ltd there are three international employees among the staff members (including the manager himself). During our visit to Kaweri Coffee Plantation in May 2011, there worked 1,100 casual labourers, of which 200 are coming from other districts. For those workers transport is arranged; ‗they are trucked in daily‘, as the manager explains. During the peak of the season (which is from October till February and May till August), 3000 workers are needed (Uganda Coffee Development Authority, 2011). Ziwa Ranchers Ltd already knows as well they will need labourers from other districts. ‗Within the immediate neighbourhood we may get a few workers. But if we go for the expansion [sugarcane instead of ranch], we might be looking for employees from Bunyoro Kingdom. We have a really good relationship with the Bunyoro Kingdom. The other workers may come from other parts of Uganda. If there is a need, we may get few from abroad as well, which is not going to be a very big number. But if we decide to grow sugarcane, this will be a big number. For the sugarcane plantation we may

Who gets What, When and How? 160 need 60 people from outside who are having experience in sugar; we can probably not find them in Uganda. We also need 400 to 500 people from Bunyoro and 3,500 people from the local communities. If we are starting today, then within four years we will reach maximum capacity.‘

Outgrowers The investments also provided opportunities for outgrowers in the district. In the case of Oil Palm Uganda Ltd, the project aimed at engaging 3,000 subsistence or landless farmers in the project. This number included relocated farmers from the mainland and ‗spontaneous farmers‘ who would grow oil palm with their own resources. However, as IFAD (2010: 3) states: ‗at present there are no farmers in either of these two categories. The 3,000 figure was clearly an overestimate given data on the total population‘. The beneficiaries of the project are ‗those who have sold land to the Government for the nucleus estate, outgrowers, smallholders and nucleus estate workers‘ (IFAD, 2011: 32). Because it was hard to acquire the land on the island, anyone who was interested and willing could participate, even if they were not part of the initial ‗target group‘ (such as absentee landlords that would sell their land). IFAD concludes that some poorer island farmers such as widows have not been able to participate in the project, because they didn‘t have enough spare land or labour to allocate to cash crops. The outgrowers in Lira – who are participating in Mukwano Agro Project Ltd – are supported by USAID and DANIDA in the past and SNV since 2008. The partnership agreement between Mukwano Group of Companies and SNV aims at implementing an ‗all inclusive business model for enhanced growth, equity and competitiveness within the oilseed value chain‘. Initially, the company used to import seed for only farmers it had contracted to work with, but currently imports sunflower planting seeds for all the farmers interested in growing sunflower country wide (Mwesigye, 2009: 1). In 2008, Mukwano supported an oilseed outgrower‘s scheme of approximately 45,000 individual smallholders in the mid-north region. According to Mwesigye (ibid.), a large number of farmers in that area have been involved in sunflower production for two seasons and had no access to other chain services like inputs, financing and information ‗which put them in a very vulnerable position‘. ‗Mukwano being the largest player in the chain had the monopoly and control over resources which put the individual farmers at an even more disadvantaged position‘ (Mwesigye, ibid.). SNV wanted to (1) improve the effectiveness of producer organizations in accessing and utilizing extension services and other products that boast production and marketing; (2) improve planning and coordination of activities within members of the formed producer

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 161 organization; (3) empower producers‘ to participate in the development and management of the chain but also negotiate for better prices, and other chain services at better terms; (4) increase producer‘s competitiveness and freedom to choose its partners with the oilseed value chain and (5) improved access to inputs, technology, knowledge and know-how (Mwesigye, 2009: 2-3). According to SNV, the results are among others:

- There are now 55 outgrower scheme lead farmers (site coordinators) out of which 20 percent is women, who have acquired group formation and enterprise formation skills - Formation of 231 producer organizations of 25 producers each. Each group is composed of 40 percent women and youth - 480 producer organizations are expected to be legally formed - Producer groups have clear governance and leadership structures in place. - The formed producer organizations are able to procure inputs collectively exploiting the economies of scale associated with bulk purchase - More women within the groups have now been empowered to be part of the decisions on how to spend the family incomes from oilseed sales in future investments like purchase of inputs and other services. - It is anticipated that margins with increase by at least 10% per house hold for the entire number of farmers under the formed producer organizations. This will impact 5,775 households and 34,650 beneficiaries in season one and 12,000 households and 72,000 beneficiaries in season two by the end of 2009. Women account for 40 percent of the beneficiaries. - Producer groups with „clear leadership‟ and „objective oriented action plans‟ can have access a 50 percent agricultural loan guarantee offered by DANIDA through Stanbic bank, as part of the Agricultural Sector Programme (ASPSII, 2004-2009). - The extension services units at Mukwano (extension coordinators) have taken on key roles in co- facilitating the national oilseed multi stakeholder processors (Mwesige, 2009: 3-4).

Outgrowers that were visited during the fieldwork - 11 different outgrowers in Apala village, Obaro-Ngwen and Agwenge, all in Dokolo district, near Lira – were mainly positive, although there were some complaints about the provision of seeds and maintenance. Food security was also discussed as a possible (negative) impact. This issue was mentioned by Action Aid in Lira. As the Land Rights officer of Action Aid argues: ‗Our relation regarding the food security in this district is that it is true. Most people started with sunflower as a cash crop and they grew less food crops. The sunflower has an adverse effect on land and the nutrients so that it cannot yield food crops. When the soil is exhausted, you have to leave it for 2 to 3 years. In most areas it is contributing to the issue that the cash crops are at the expense of food crops. People go for the money. But this problem was there only in the beginning.‘ 86

86 Land Rights Officer of Action Aid, 08-05-2011, Lira.

Who gets What, When and How? 162 What is the experience of outgrowers themselves? The outgrowers that were visited own a piece of land that varies between between 2 and 26 acre. One of the farmers87 grows sunflower since 2004. He grows maize, groundnuts, cotton as well. He uses crop rotation and grows sunflower on 2 acre (out of 4). ‗I use my 4 acre wisely. Sunflower is the most attractive crop, and you earn better. Mukwano‘s policy is good, we get a guaranteed market and they have a good policy. Before I grew sunflower, I had domestic problems to maintain my family [9 people], now we have it financially better. We have money to send the children to school. Due to the drought, of lot of my land is affected. The seedlings are also late this season. So the money will be late, so we will be late for the harvest. I fear that I cannot send my children to school. Mukwano could provide a loan scheme. There is more competition now Mt Meru88 has come in. But they don‘t provide seeds. Mukwano is better, provides training etcetera. But it does bring temptation to the farmer. Mukwano has to give a better price. Under favourable conditions I earn 700,000 to 1 million UGX every season. If the conditions are less favourable, then I earn 400,000 UGX in one season. With the producer group we gather on a weekly base, for the demonstration of the garden. We work as a group in the garden. It speeds up work and it reduces the costs of labour.‘ Another outgrower89, which has 12 acre of which 4 are used for cash crops and 8 for own use (soya beans, sunflower, maize, groundnuts, cassava), joined the farmers group in 2007. ‗I saw they are doing good things. People that joined could buy cows and machines. Before 2007 I only grew maize and groundnuts. Now I can also build houses and buy cows. I‘m planning to buy a motorcycle. The sunflower gives a better yield than soya. So then we have money to pay the school fees. We get training in planting and keeping seeds, we now know better.‘

87 Outgrower farmer, 07-05-2011. 88 According to SNV, the entry of a new and big processor into this sector, Mt Meru Millers Ltd., ‗pushed Mukwano to join hands with SNV to facilitate producer group formation and strengthening, in a way building its relationship with farmers in order to have a secure and sustainable source of raw materials for its processing plant‘ (Mwesige, 2009: 4). 89 Chairperson of the farmers group ‗Kong-Otem‘ in Obaro-Ngwen village, 07-05-2011.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 163 Most of the farmers join Mukwano when they hear good stories from other people in the village. ‗First I was not interested, but now I see that others are benefitting as well I want to join‘, tells another farmer (3 acre of maize and cassava).90 ‗The main reason for not joining the project was that when they introduced the project, I was told that sunflower would spoil the soil and that the price of seeds was very high. There is a negative attitude. But it is not true. So through experience, I got a lot of interest.‘ Later, the extension coordinator argues that people need to have more than 1 acre of land, otherwise they have to keep using the land for food crops. Issues with food appeared to be caused by a shortage of beans in the whole area. The beans have problems with growing. ‗That‘s why there is hunger‘, according to another farmer.91 ‗But with maize and cassava there is no problem. Where there is crop rotation, there land is not exhausted. The problem with using maize as a cash crop is the fluctuation in price. Mukwano has a guaranteed price. Through seeing the experiences and the benefits of other farmers, it drew my interest. I thought, let me try. We own 16 acre, of which 6 to 8 acre is for sunflowers.‘ The other land is used for maize, soya, and for their own consumption simsim, millet, cassava. ‗Mukwano has field days. They have a heart, a responsibility. They balance between profit making and their social responsibility. When the seeds did not germinate, they compensated us. Farmer benefits, even as Mukwano.‘ Furthermore the outgrower argues: ‗I would advise them to bring in more seeds. And they should not allow that competitors beat them in the price. They have to be more competitive. If the prices of seeds go down, then other people can also benefit and more people can buy the seeds. Not all people can afford to buy seeds from Mukwano.‘ Another outgrower92, who owns 26 acre of which 6 acre is for the production of food and 10 acre for selling of sunflower, maize, soya beans, millet, simsim and cassava, also argues that the balance of Mukwano between profit making and their social responsibility is ok. ‗Many people now built permanent houses. Now there are businesses, trading centres, people can buy a plot of land. Only the provision of seeds can be improved.‘

90 Martin, 52 years old, Bung village, 07-05-2011. 91 Margareth and husband, Bung village, 07-05-2011. 92 Tim, Agwenge village, Abuyenek parish, Bata subcounty, 07-05-2011

Who gets What, When and How? 164 Coffee outgrowers in Masindi district are different than outgrowers who work with Oil Palm Uganda Ltd on Bugala Island or participate in the Mukwano Agro Project Ltd in Lira. What became clear during the fieldwork is that despite the serious human right violations which happened during the acquisition of the land in Masindi, the investment of Kaweri Coffee Plantation also gave an impulse to the coffee sector in Uganda. Although these impacts do not redeem the accusations, and the issues that are still as important and worrying, this should be mentioned as well. As an outgrower in Masindi puts it: ‗when the investor came, people were displaced. That‘s a bad thing for the people. They are complaining and not happy. Any investor of that kind who displaces people, that‘s not good. He‘s developing himself. He might develop the country, but not the people.‘ However, the outgrower (who owns 50 acre of land of which 8 acre is used to grow coffee) also argues: ‗Kaweri is an example for the community. We are copying the way in which they are growing coffee. I‘m a traditional coffee grower and was not displaced. Some years ago the coffee yield was low. Traditionally, a man that grew coffee was a rich man. By joining the Coffee Alliance that would become the same again. Now I get a good price for my coffee. We now also start selling coffee to Kaweri; they have the best price for coffee. The market has revived.‘ As the outgrower explains, the Coffee Alliance gives advice and they sell the coffee as a company together.‘ The alliance is free to sell coffee to the highest bidder. Due to the high standards of Kaweri, the quality and quantity of coffee in this area has increased. This alliance is the result of a project that was started in 2005, known as the Uganda Coffee Farmers Alliance Support Project (KCFASP), with a grant from the National Authorizing Officer and the European Union. Together with the farmers in Mubende and Mitiyana district, the Ministries of Agricultures and Finance in Uganda, the Uganda Coffee Development Authority93, the Secretariat of the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture, the Secretariat of the Medium Term Competitiveness Strategy, the European Commission, the

93 The UCDA carried out a supervisory role on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture. They promoted the project by organizing a number of field visits for Government Officials and provided a large number of seedlings to project farmers.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 165 Agricultural Productivity Enhancement Program94, the Agricultural Sector Program Support Project95, the LEAD program funded by USAID96, the Africa Project Development Facility, IBERO (Ug) Ltd97 and Neumann Kaffee Gruppe (of which Kaweri Coffee Plantation is part of)98, this project was started to design a model in which small holder coffee farmers could organize and collaborate with the international coffee business. It started with a 3 year pilot phase in 2005 and a 2 year consolidation phase in 2008 (Cognini, 2010: 8, 15). Initially, this project aimed at establishing a partnership between well organized farmer groups and the Kaweri Coffee Plantation. In this partnership high quality production and processing of Robusta coffee was promoted and the farmers could profit from the direct links to the international market of the Plantation. However, the project partners agreed in the beginning of the project that in order to be sustainable in the long run, it was important for the farmer groups not to rely on the plantation for marketing their coffee, but rather remain independent so that they could develop their own processing and marketing skills. To make this happen, all project partners agreed that small holder farmers needed to be organized in ‗viable production and processing units capable of effectively accessing coffee extension services, handling and marketing large quantities of improved quality coffee, implementing internal control systems to ensure transparency in operations and effectively negotiating with market players for adequate prices and other services‘ (Cognini, 2010: 9). The Trust acts under the umbrella of Hanss R. Neumann Stifftung.99 The smallholder farmers that should benefit had plots varying between the 0.5 and 5 acres. Most of the times, coffee occupied only a portion of the land and was intercropped with Matooke and a few other crops. As Cognini (2010: 14) argues, the average farmer had between 250 and 300 ‗poorly managed coffee trees and in many cases totally neglected‘. The effects of the Coffee Wilt Disease (wiping out 40 percent of the coffee tree population), ‗unattractive market opportunities‘ and low yields caused that there was little incentive for

94 APEP, funded by USAID. APEP provided Producer Organization Trainers and facilitated farmer groups with tools and equipment. They have contributed to demonstration plots and funded a number of consultants and experts. 95 APEP, funded by DANIDA. They contributed to the establishment of nurseries and other gardens in supporting the capacity building process of farmer organizations and in funding a number of consultants, experts and trainers. 96 LEAD (Livelihoods and Enterprises for Agricultural Development) started in 2010, but they supported the establishment of Farmer Field Schools. LEAD will become a more prominent partner in the rolling out process 97 IBERO had provided market information to farmer groups and a market for their coffee. They have signed a Memorandum of Understanding with microfinance institutions and depot committee companies in order for loans to be granted. 98 Kaweri Coffee Plantation provided technical expertise in trainings and they made available high quality planting materials. 99 The overall project budget is € 4 million, of which the EU contributed € 2,309,840. Contributions from other partners were both in kind and in cash (Cognini, 2010: 15-16).

Who gets What, When and How? 166 farmers to focus on coffee production. Furthermore, ‗with a lack of organizational structures, farmers were also not empowered to move further down the value chain‘; they sold their coffee at the lowest possible price (Cognini, 2010: 14). By the end of 2010, when the project was ended, 14,574 farmers were participating. They have organized themselves in 447 producer organizations (primary level) and 24 depot committees companies (secondary level). The producer organizations as well as the depot committees are fully owned by farmers. Furthermore, 447 farmer field schools were established. The Uganda Coffee Farmers Alliance Support Project changed its name into the Uganda Coffee Farmers Alliance and was registered in 2010. According to the Executive Manager of the Alliance, membership throughout Uganda has increased as well from 5000 households to 35,000 households. According to the executive manager, when Kaweri came, they offered the communities to assist the farmers. ‗People woke up. They already knew the coffee business, but the question was how the farmers could also benefit of this investment of Kaweri.‘ As the executive manager argues, the establishment of Kaweri Coffee Plantation provided an opportunity for the coffee farmers. The situation was analyzed and the solution was to establish a trust. ‗The initial plan was to become outgrowers of Kaweri. But Kaweri uses a different processing of coffee.100 To switch from sun drying to wet processing of coffee you need a lot of investment, machines, water etc, which was not possible to set up in a short period of time. Now the farmers are selling their coffee beans to exporters instead of the middlemen, which is increasing the profit. This is really a bottom-up approach. We have an advantage in business and we are independent. We can sell our coffee to the highest bidder. If we would have been outgrowers of Kaweri, we would only concentrate on producing coffee. Now we built our own capacity beyond the production as well. We also built our own internal resources, so we will have our own money to run our operations. We benefit from the

100 Small scale farmer often use sun-drying of unpulped cherries. Another possibility is wet coffee processing, which produces a superior coffee brew and attracts a higher market value. Research from Ethiopia shows that farmers with a higher education level and a large area under coffee prefer wet processing. Relatively less educated, old and farmers located far away from the coffee washing stations use sun-dried processing. ‗The key constraints to coffee processing are lack of coffee processing facilities, high costs of materials for constructing the raising drying beds, limited technical know-how and long distance to the few processing facilities‘ (Musebe, 2007: 1418).

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 167 interaction with a wide range of players in the coffee business. Our goal is to participate in a higher level of the value chain. In the future we hope we can export our coffee directly. At the moment it is not yet possible to register as an export company.‘ In 2011, the Coffee Alliance is negotiating with Kaweri to deliver to them and therefore to change the processing from sun drying to wet processing. ‗The disadvantage we have now is that we failed to tap in the Robusta coffee market. If we would have washed the coffee, we could have got a higher price. We are now negotiating with Kaweri on the prices, because we now have reached the volume of coffee which is needed. But we cannot always change, so if we choose to work with them, we have to sell to Kaweri forever.‘ Producing coffee is a win-win situation according to the executive manager of the Coffee Alliance. ‗In contrast to tea or tobacco, coffee is an intercrop farming system, so it is naturally to intercrop. We teach the farmers what other crops will match, in order to get the maximum from the same field. Bananas and beans work for example, eucalyptus is disastrous. Therefore, the issue with food security is minimized.‘ ‗Furthermore, the future of coffee is good. There is no risk of overproduction because the current demand is higher than the supply. There will be more demand in South America. New emerging markets are China and India and they will have to import coffee. We are looking to these markets.‘

Investments The fourth issue that will be considered are investments in productivity (irrigation, outputs), investments at the local level, and in transport and market infrastructure. The fieldwork made it clear that especially the extension services in the outgrower scheme are an investment in the productivity and local level, as Oil Palm Uganda and Mukwano Agro Project Ltd provide training to the farmers, seeds, fertilizers, marketing, harvesting, and etcetera. Both companies receive support from organisations with experience, which improves the market infrastructure as well; IFAD in the case of Oil Palm Uganda Ltd and SNV in the case of Mukwano Agro Project Ltd. Due to the focus of SNV the value chain for sunflower is improved, even as is the case in the Coffee Farmers Alliance Support Project (KCFASP) (IFAD, 2011; Cognini, 2010; Mwesige, 2009). According to Cognini (2010: 14) due to a ‗lack of organizational structures, farmers were not empowered to move further down the value chain and therefore released control of their coffee at farm gate earning the lowest possible price‘. Cognini concludes: ‗with the Depot Committees (DC) registered as Companies, a significantly bigger step was taken and DC Companies began delivering Fair Average Quality (FAQ) coffee directly to the exporter‘s premises in Kampala, bypassing all the middlemen and traders. This move further

Who gets What, When and How? 168 down the value chain was prompted by an increased feeling of ownership and by a significant improvement in capacity with regards to coffee marketing and logistics.‘ Whether farmers are better off as independent outgrower, as is the case in Mubende (Kaweri Coffee Plantation) or as outgrower with a binding contract with a company (Oil Palm Uganda Ltd and Mukwano Agro Project Ltd, and probably Amuru Sugar Works Ltd) would be an interesting question for further research. It appeared that farmers are especially dependent from the companies if the company has an exclusive contract with an exporter of (hybrid) seedlings, which will influence the possibilities of farmers to be independent or not. Non-governmental organizations, as in the case of SNV, can act as a ‗gatekeeper‘, although Mukwano shows that they are still in control and will make their own decisions (by reinforcing the contracts). Investments in the plantation itself and day-to-day management also relate to the investments in physical infrastructure (e.g. roads, electricity, and provision of water). As the proposal of Amuru Sugar Works Ltd shows, the companies themselves demand for investments from the (local) government as well. The manager at Kaweri Coffee Plantation for example complains about the irregular power supply. However, Madhvani (Amuru Sugar Works Ltd) therefore makes sure it can generate electricity independently (as already happens at Kakira Sugar Works Ltd, which is connected to the national grid). The sugarcane plantation will generate bagasse, a residue left after the crushing of sugarcane and some filter mud. This can be burnt as fuel in the boilers to produce steam, which will generate electrical power. This can also be beneficial to the surrounding communities, although this is not agreed on paper. The investment of Oil Palm Uganda Ltd changed a lot in infrastructure on Bugala Island, by IFAD described as ‗remote areas‘. The Government of Uganda procured a new 120-ton ferry, rehabilitated a second ferry and constructed ferry landings, ‗which greatly increased commercial traffic to the island‘. The government upgraded the 68 km of spinal road on the island and built additional feeder roads, ‗which reduce transportation costs and facilitate the delivery of inputs and technical services to smallholders‘ (IFAD, 2010: 7). The district authority in Masindi, where Ziwa Ranchers Ltd and Kiryandongo Farm are located, there are no specific agreements on paper relating to infrastructure. As the principal planner in Masindi argues; ‗Yes, they make investments in infrastructure, but this is within their estate and not for other traffic.‘ In Mubende, the principal head teacher of Madudu primary school argues that Kaweri Coffee Plantation is making investments in infrastructure. There is infrastructural development, although minor. But some roads are maintained by the farm.‘

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 169 Other positive and negative impacts Lastly, the fieldwork also revealed some other impacts, positive as well as negative. The provision of social services, most of them already explained in the chapter on CSR policies, can be considered as positive. Although the investments differ from each other, the social services appeared to be quite similar, although there is a distinction between the services of the permanent workers and the services for the casual labourers. Also, for example in the case at Oil Palm Uganda, you can discuss whether you can truly speak of ‗free services‘ as the casual labourers are not paid while they are seeing a doctor and therefore have to miss a day of income. You can also argue about the free housing OPUL provides, considering that one family has to live on 4 x 4 meter. OPUL does not provide food for their workers. ‗We tried, but then we got that the problem that if we didn‘t give them food, they didn‘t want to work. People have to be independent. Our driver had the idea to buy in food, but we are not going to give people food for free. We do buy maize flower and Matooke; they can buy that from us.‘ According to IFAD (2011: xv) there are also negative indirect effects of the project on Bugala Island, such as increase pressure on education and health services (due to the increase of people on the island), reduced access to forest resources, increased road hazards, and anti- social behaviour associated with the nucleus estate workers. However, although there is pressure on the health services and education, IFAD (ibid.) considers the growth in population as a positive impact, which is surprising. However, this can be related to the other impacts that are mentioned, such as improved utilities, increased business, tourism and trade, better access to financial and government services, and increased investment in housing. However, the field visit to Masindi brought some negative issues. First, the access to water is an issue, both at Ziwa Ranchers Ltd and Kiryandongo farm. As was already explained, Mukwano is fencing the borders of Ziwa Ranchers Ltd (see map) and already fenced Kiryandongo farm. Ziwa Ranchers borders Kafu River (see map). As the manager of Ziwa Ranchers Ltd argues; ‗Kafu River has dried up a little bit over time, and the land which is in between our ranch and the Kafu River became a settler point for cattle keepers. They‘ve started grazing within our land. The management of the previous owners was poor, so it gave them enough room to enter and start making facilities for their cattle. They are only encroachers, just to graze their cattle or take water from Kafu River.‘ However, according to the manager, there is no problem. ‗As far as my information is correct, there is no problem with access to water. But once we fence it off, there will be some problems of course. We will be blocking off the road to Kafu River. If I say the ranch is my home, I do resolve the right for anybody to enter. For this purpose we have offered to put a dam for the people that will not

Who gets What, When and How? 170 having water from river Kafu anymore. We also want to give them a corridor. We have already put a corridor, so they can have access to water. We have made promises to build four dams. We are waiting for these people to know where the dams should be located. So then there will be no problem.‘ However, the district land officer at Masindi confirms the problems with access of water of the Kafu River. ‗The government has to ensure that that they can still access the water. However, they see the government as a second citizen. The investor comes from up. But the district and political leaders are negotiating with Mukwano, and the negotiation is in the last stage.‘ If we organize a meeting with the LC1 sub chief and 10 other men and women from Kikube Parish101, opposite of Kiryandongo Farm, we hear there are also complaints about access to water and the access and compensation of a primary school, that used to be located within the borders of the farm. ‗There is a water problem. There is not enough water. But Mukwano does not allow us to enter. Before Mukwano was on this land, and it was still an Army farm, we were allowed to come in. The borehole is inside the farm. There is a borehole at the side of the road, but that is not enough for all the people that live here.‘ According to the LC1 sub chief there are approximately 480 households in this area. ‗We complained with the LC5 Chairman, and they told us that some Member of Parliament will come, but that is already years ago.‘ According to the villagers, ‗when a company comes in and take land from the people, they have to make sure that people are happy and assist them. If they serve the people, they will understand. But they don‘t consult the people.‘ They didn‘t go to Mukwano, the Kiryandongo farm, to complain. ‗There is no way. We once sat together over the water problem. But there was no meeting.‘ They also tell that a school was destroyed when Mukwano took over Kiryandongo farm. Another LC1 Chairman, in Kitalabo shows us the problem with the school. ‗The former school was on the land of Mukwano, for Primary 1 up to Primary 4. 400 children were going to this school. When Mukwano bought the land, we had to transfer the school. But the other school for the children is 2 miles away. Because it‘s so far, we build a school here. We received 1 million UGX from Mukwano, for the school. They gave the money to LC2 and LC3. We bought 1 acre of land for 1 million UGX. There is no money for the school. The Government doesn‘t recognize the school, so there is no salary. Now there are some voluntary teachers from Action Aid. Mukwano said they will come and

101 Kitareba district, Kiryandongo, 29-04-2011.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 171 help, but this is three years ago. There is nothing on paper, no written document. We don‘t know for sure if they will help. Mukwano also said they will help with the borehole.‘ According to Action Aid in Masindi, who supported the school, there is definitely an ‗issue‘ with the Kiryandongo farm.102 ‗Schools, social responsibility, social institutions were given away to develop land.‘

Impression Masindi

Alternative solution for the school that is destroyed at Kiryandongo Farm, Masindi

Borehole that is surrounded by the fences of Kiryandongo Farm, Masindi

Former school, now within a fenced Kiryandongo Farm, Masindi

102 Action Aid Masindi, 26-04-11.

Who gets What, When and How? 172 There are also a lot of complaints about negative impacts in Amuru, where Amuru Sugar Works Ltd proposed its investment. According to the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, the process so far resulted in a ‗traumatized community‘. ‗The community has become so traumatized, violent and not fried deaths. There is need for a special prayer and mass sensitization means of resolving the land conflict.‘ ‗Madhvani must come to clear terms with the community now that they have done the feasibility study of the project. They should stop pursuing free takeover of land with allegations of bribery‘ (ARLPI, 2011: 1-4). In 2008, Ker Kwalo Acholi launched a report, written by a technical committee on the Madhvani Land Proposal for Sugar Works in Amuru. Their main findings are represented in box 4. According to this report, the sugar industry in Uganda is not beneficial to farmers and that it is the Government and Madhvani that will benefit most. Furthermore, ‗people are not in the position to engage in the projects that require large pieces of land in the rural areas. Any deal would likely not favor local people as much as it would when people have returned from their original homes‘. The report also argues that the development may not be suitable for poor farmers who initially are vulnerable and unable to engage in the level of investment that is required for sugar. The Committee proposes several measures to make sure that ‗broader Acholi interests‘ are part of this investment and that an international ‗panel of experts‘ should guide the process in order to ensure ‗accountability‘ and ‗transparency‘ (Ker Kwalo Acholi, 2008). In 2010, a professor from Gulu University was asked by Mr. Esau Okema, the Minister of Lands under the Acholi Paramount Chief to talk to the people in Lamogi and Amuru in May 2010, ‗to consider availing land for commercial sugarcane production‘. In May 2011, the professor argues: ‗I am aware negative reports are being written about me by some young people in Amuru and sent to the President.‘ However, according to the professor, ‗this is a major investment and we know it will benefit the people of not only Amuru/Lamogi, but Acholi and Ugandans in general. We all support it. The way forward is: (1) We shall continue talking to the people of Lamogi and Amuru to generate a general consensus on the how to give land to investors; (2) we plan to form a registered body (Amuru/Lamogi Development Trust; (3) the trust will, on behalf of the people, negotiate with Madhvani or any other developers on terms and conditions of giving land for big projects, (4) we appeal to Your Highness to advice Madhvani, Government and the RDC of Amuru to give us time to consult our people about this project. We have confidence; the people will agree to avail land‘.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 173

[Box 4. Conclusions of the Technical Committee on the proposal of Madhvani, June 2008]

1. Irrespective of any outcome from the discussions, the land in question needs to be immediately protected to prevent grabbing. The area should be mapped and clan rights over the area clarified and documented. This should happen as soon as possible. 2. A well managed and well negotiated sugar development will bring considerable economic development to the region, providing jobs and reasonable livelihoods opportunities. The development will put approximately 1 billion shillings per month in the local economy. 3. Outgrowers would gain more from the development than non skilled workers (cane cutters). (...) Small outgrowers would likely number 3000-4000 people. Larger outgrowers (typically 100-150 people) farming 20- 50 hectares can earn a very good living. 4. The government would benefit greatly from any development through increased tax revenues (estimated by Madhvani Group to be 30 billion UGX a year) and a reduction in foreign exchange savings due to the fewer sugar imports. 5. This development differs from others in Uganda in that the proposed outgrower area is currently unoccupied. No mention is made of how this will be allocated and on what tenure. This has the potential for great conflict and/or corruption. This challenge could be encountered by having no outgrowers on unoccupied land. Perhaps by increasing the nucleus estate and pushing the outgrower area into previously occupied areas. (...) Another alternative view discussed by the committee would be to have the previously unoccupied outgrower area set up as block farms representing broader Acholi interest. This would be very efficient and profits put into educational funds. 6. The sugar industry in Uganda is not equitable to farmers. This is recognised by the African Development Bank in official documents. As a result, outgrower farmers do not benefit as much as they could from the sugar industry. This could be addressed by revision of the sugar cane pricing formula and sharing of by-product revenues. 7. The biggest beneficiaries of the proposed developments are the sugar company and the government. The terms of trade could be negotiated for greater benefit and impact on poverty reduction. Increasing the ratio of outgrower area to nucleus estate would be one way to address this. 8. (...) Any leases should be drafted to explicitly exclude mineral rights. The issue of petroleum rights is, under current legislation, purely a matter between the Honourable Minister and the oil company concerned and there is no express provision for local sharing of revenues. Local stakeholders should engage in discussions to clarify this matter. 9. Discussions on developments need to be based on fact rather than fear. A greater understanding of the sugar growing compared to other crops would help local people make a decision on whether they are interested in a sugar development. 10. At present there is great confusion as to who is responsible for inward investment into Acholiland. Broader Acholi interest would be better served if there was one common point of contact especially with regard to land. 11. The unanimous view of the Committee is that the preferred approach to selecting an investor would be through an open international tender process. This would be a very long and expensive process and it is debatable whether this would remove all possibilities of corruption. Therefore, the most pragmatic approach and the one best serving broader Acholi interest (...) is simply to engage with the Madhvani Group as they are available and willing to invest. This approach should only be considered if a genuine, transparent, and inclusive negotiation process is undertaken to maximise local benefit from the project. 12. (...) In order to enhance and ensure accountability and transparency, the committee recommends that an international independent panel of experts are recruited to undertake this work. (...)

Source: Ker Kwalo Acholi, 2008: 38-39.

Who gets What, When and How? 174 There are also various environmental concerns for Amuru Sugar Works Ltd as well as for Oil Palm Uganda Ltd. According to Kalangala District NGO Forum (KADINGO) and the Collaborative Action for Land Issues Project (CALI), there is an increased pressure on central forest reserves for forest products, a loss of biodiversity, increased soil erosion, chemical pollution, reduced wind breaks and a negative impact on the micro-climate (e.g. rainfall, temperature). In the report of Ker Kwalo Acholi, a sugar cane plantation will cause a loss of habitat, water scarcity, water pollution, degraded soils and can cause air pollution. The area in question has riverine forest areas and areas of woodland, which also provides as a source of firewood for local communities (Ker Kwalo Acholi, 2008). However, on the other side Ker Kwalo Acholi also acknowledges that cane growing has a positive impact on the atmospheric carbon balance. Lastly, what are the financial impacts? At full scale, the project at Bugala Island will produce about 140,000 tons of crude palm oil and 14,000 tons of palm kernel oil annually, which will save about US$60 million in foreign exchange what would be used for importation (IFAD, 2011). However, KADINGO argues there is a loss of revenue for Kalangala District Local Government. According to the senior lands management officer in Masindi, district authorities receive every year land rent from Mukwano of UGX 15 million/ year. In the case of Amuru Sugar Works Ltd, the proposal argues that taxes such as VAT, Customs Duty, Excise Duty, pay-as-you-earn tax (P.A.Y.E.) and Corporation Tax will be paid every year, with an estimation amount of UGX 30 billion a year. Information for Mukwano Agro Project Ltd, Kiryandongo Farm, Ziwa Ranchers and Kaweri Coffee Plantation is not available. Therefore, it would be interesting for future research to find out detailed information regarding the tax regulations and the exemptions companies will have and the impact on the economy in general.

Conclusion With all this information in mind, it is interesting to go back to the definition of land grab from the International Land Coalition (ILC). According to their declaration, (1) a proper land acquisition should not involve the violation of human rights, (2) should be based on free, prior and informed consent of the affected land-users, (3) should be based on a thorough assessment and should not disregard the social, economic and environmental impacts. Furthermore, (4) the land acquisition should be based on transparent contracts that specify clear and binding commitments about activities, employment and benefit sharing and, lastly, (5) should be based on effective democratic planning, independent oversight and meaningful

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 175 participation (ILC, 2011). If a land acquisition is not in line with at least one of these conditions, then the land acquisition is a ‗land grab‘, according to the ILC. If we take this definition as a standard, and we look to the previous chapters, we can already give an indication regarding the first, second, third and fourth requirement. Indication here means that it these practices were mentioned by the informants during the fieldwork.

Table 15. Overview of selected cases and the conditions of ‗land grab‘ Company Location Seize (in ha) ‘Land grab’ (based on conditions International Land Coalition*) 1 2 3 4 5 Oil Palm Uganda Bugala Island, 10,000 V X X X - Ltd. Kalangala district Kaweri Coffee Kitemba, 2,512 V V X X/V - Plantation Mubende district Ziwa Ranchers Masindi 15,378 V V - - - Ltd.*** Kiryandongo farm Masindi 2,833 V V X V -

Mukwano Agro Lira 17,000 - - - X - Project Ltd. Amuru Sugar Amuru 30,000 - - - - - Works Ltd.***

N.B. Explanation: V = mentioned by informants (human rights violation includes here also an eviction), X = not mentioned by informants, - not applicable, or no information available *** these investments are only proposals. * (1) in violation of human rights, particularly the equal rights of women; (2) not based on free, prior and informed consent of the affected land-users particularly indigenous peoples; (3) not based on a thorough assessment, or are in disregard of social, economic and environmental impacts, including the way they are gendered; (4) not based on transparent contracts that specify clear and binding commitments about activities, employment and benefits sharing, and; (5) not based on effective democratic planning, independent oversight and meaningful participation.

The first requirement is not met in Mubende, where the people on the disputed land were evicted when the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) acquired the land to lease it to Kaweri Coffee Plantation. It is expected that the High Court in Uganda will decide in the first months of 2012 whether human rights are violated. According to the managing director of Kaweri Coffee Plantation, ‗the community leaders know we were not the one but the government. 230 or 130 people were evicted, of which 102 accepted [compensation]. It‘s about plot 99/100. One individual decided not to move. That small group recruited family. One stirred it up, it was a political promise, he [Kayiira] wanted to become a Member of Parliament.‘ The second requirement is also not met in Mubende, since the report of Kayiira showed that official date on which the people should be gone was not respected. However, this as well has to be decided definitely in court. The third requirement is met, since the

Who gets What, When and How? 176 conditions were well described. However, as is the case for each of the investments as well, there are no clear contracts in which binding commitments are made regarding the activities, employment and benefit sharing. Benefit sharing is even as prior informed consent not a concept that is known and/or used by the companies themselves. In the case of Oil Palm Uganda Ltd there were accusations of an eviction in 2006/2007, whereby the evictees received compensation in 2009. This also happened in at Kiryandongo Farm and Ziwa Ranchers Ltd. in Masindi. A thorough assessment is often required by NEMA, as is the case on Bugala Island, Ziwa Ranchers Ltd (if sugarcane) and also Amuru Sugar Works Ltd. The report by the technical committee on the proposal of Madhvani indicates possible positive and negative impacts, and although it is not clear whether everyone has access to this reports (according to the manager of Madhvani, there are several reports on the impacts); this is at least a starting point. Although it is also not clear to what extent the recommendations are followed and complaints are taken seriously. But since the case is in court, and not may happen on the land until the court has reached a final decision, other actors can and hopefully will follow the developments closely. The fourth condition, not based on transparent contracts that specify clear and binding commitments is true in almost each case, although Kaweri Coffee Plantation has several conditions which can be found at the Registrar of Titles (therefore X), even as Oil Palm Uganda Ltd, which as due to the involvement, clear agreements on their responsibilities, as for all partners. However, the fieldwork also showed that in the day-to-day management, these arrangements (which are not always known among the actors) are not leading principles, even as that the managers of the plantation itself often cannot confirm that there are certain contracts. Arrangements between the investors and the UIA are not public and can therefore not be checked, although the UIA argues they are following the principles which are laid down in the New Land Policy. However, this is not transparent and benefit-sharing often appeared to be concept that was unknown for the investors themselves. An exception is Mukwano Agro Project Ltd, which has a partnership agreement with SNV.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 177 CHAPTER 12. CONCLUSION

This research started with a paradox; the New Land Policy showed that on the one hand growth in investments is seen as a development opportunity that is welcomed by the Government of Uganda, while on the other hand the same Government acknowledged this can have serious negative consequences for the people who are living on the land that is bought by different actors. This paradox is also a lively debate on the international level, as is shown in several international reports that compile all ‗land deals‘. This research aimed at getting a better understanding in new corporate land acquisitions in Uganda, in order to understand what this paradox means in practice. After gathering the information from the fieldwork in Uganda we are able to give an answer to the main research question, what are the main characteristics of new corporate land acquisitions in Uganda and what is the impact on the local livelihoods? We‘ve seen that there is a broad institutional framework, in which several institutions are important. First, this research shows there is a gap between reports and reality. Although this study acknowledges that it cannot give a 100 percent guarantee - since getting access to reliable information turned out to be difficult and one of the obstacles of this research - these land deals often represent proposed investments. Either the investor changed his mind, or the land deals are continued to proceed but behind closed doors. Both conclusions imply that research on this topic is needed; it shows the need for thorough analysis of the information that is available, before making claims about a widespread ‗land rush‘. Second, it appeared that the Uganda Investment Authority acknowledged they are not in the position to control all investments, but will hopefully start monitoring in 2012. Their interests may sometimes conflict with another institution that is important; the Uganda Land Commission, which lacks a clear law that guides their operations. Then the District Land Boards appeared to play an important role and sometimes also competes with the ULC, as is the case in Amuru. The National Land Policy, which will provide guidelines to the implementation of the Land Act that was adopted in 1998, clearly gives some guidelines on how to deal with land issues for investment. Access to land for large-scale commercial investment will be promoted, poor communities will be protected, land tribunals will be reinstated, and long-term benefit-sharing arrangements will be put in place. The Government of Uganda argues that contract farming, equity-sharing schemes, and the use of leaseholds and

Who gets What, When and How? 178 joint-ventures are good examples. However, this policy is still not approved by Cabinet and Parliament and is therefore not leading for current new corporate land acquisitions. Third, the new corporate land acquisitions that were found in reality are mostly from Ugandan companies and have different structures. Some companies prefer to work with NGOs, such as Oil Palm Uganda Ltd and Mukwano Agro Project Ltd, while other companies operate on their own (Ziwa Ranchers Ltd and Kiryandongo Farm). All investments show a wide range of actors involved, often also on the local level, as is the case in Amuru relating to Amuru Sugar Works, where a lot of interest groups claim they represent the ‗community‘. Ziwa Ranchers Ltd stated that it is important for them that the communities are organized. This shows that investors are willing to discuss their corporate social responsibility, but need some kind of organization in order to start the dialogue. In Lira (outgrowers‘ scheme) and Mubende (Coffee Alliance Trust), projects were launched to provide these governance structures, which are appreciated by the farmers. Fourth, the process of land acquisition appeared to be characterized by serious issues, often negative for the local communities. For these six selected new corporate land acquisitions, we can conclude that most of the processes are a concentration of land rights, since it concerned the purchase or rental of (large) areas of land that were already subject to an individual or collective private land tenure regime, as was the case with Ziwa Ranchers Ltd. and Kiryandongo Farm. Both on Bugala Island, Mubende and Amuru are accusations of evictions. Kaweri Coffee Plantation and Amuru Sugar Works are both involved in a court case. Informed consent often was not respected as well, although Oil Palm Uganda did organize several consultation meetings with IFAD, even as Amuru Sugar Works. Fifth, regarding the impact of the selected new corporate land acquisitions, we can conclude that various types of employment are generated. The amount of casual labourers varies from 1,100 casual labourers at Kaweri Coffee Plantation, 1,600 at Oil Palm Uganda Ltd, to a proposed 4,000 at Ziwa Ranchers Ltd (sugar cane scenario) and 6,000 at Amuru Sugar Works. Wages that are known vary from US$ 0.9 to US$ 1.39 a day (OPUL, Kaweri Coffee Plantation and Kiryandongo Farm). Due to the high food prices, at OPUL a food ‗subsidy‘ of US$ 0.19 was given to the workers. Most of these wages are however below the poverty line of US$ 1.25 a day. Labour unions are not involved, only at Kaweri Coffee Plantation, where it only represents permanent workers. Although the ILO puts pressure on Uganda concerning the minimum wage, which is outdated, nothing is yet decided. The rights of the casual labourers and their representation within companies is therefore a key issue for the future, even as the monitoring of labour conditions, especially since most of the

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 179 investments will work with thousands of casual labourers. The outgrower scheme provides another important type of employment, and differs from the other investments as well. While coffee farmers in Mubende are independent and can choose to which bidder they sell their coffee, farmers in Lira are bounded to Mukwano. Who has access to (hybrid) seedlings appeared to be important in the choices farmers have. Permanent workers and staff members are another type of employment, although especially managers appeared to be from other countries, as is the case at Kaweri Coffee Plantation and in the proposal of Ziwa Ranchers and Amuru Sugar Works. The exact conditions for social responsibility of the investor is often not described in a contract, although Kaweri Coffee Plantation has clear regulations that are public, due to their loan from German financial institution DEG. Due to the involvement of IFAD, at Bugala Island regular evaluations are done, even as the monitoring of the environment. Most of this information is public as well. The social initiatives which companies support, from building a school to providing free housing for employees, are often similar, and clearly an initiative that is initiated by the company itself, sometimes also based on meetings with local communities. However, this research also showed that there are serious complaints about the access to the land, water and boreholes for example, as is the case in Masindi. Furthermore, some even argue that people are denied access to services if they do not agree with giving away their land rights, as is the case in Amuru. Often, the Government of Uganda and/or local district authorities use their influence and processes in court are delayed for years, which is not beneficial for anyone. Especially in Amuru, there is a lot of concern about what will happen to the people that are living there. It is unclear who will take the responsibility to ensure that this investment will happen in a proper way that respect all rights of people involved. Therefore, we can conclude that the selected new corporate land acquisitions have several impacts on the local livelihoods op the people involved, which can be both negative and positive. Future research has to be done in order to find out the exact impacts, contracts and agreements, and monitor the developments in order to truly understand what is going on. It appeared that there is a lot of information available, but it only takes time and effort to find out exactly and this will remain one of the challenges of this topic. However, although this research discussed most of the issues relating to new corporate land acquisitions in Uganda, the pace of investments will probably not slow down. All actors will continue to lobby for their own interests. Therefore, the paradox will probably still be valid in the next coming years. Research on this topic will hopefully continue and stimulate

Who gets What, When and How? 180 us, researchers, policy makers, NGOs, and all other actors involved, to go faster, and beyond the surface. Within this debate, the people that represent 87 percent of the population in Uganda should be central. Their stories should be heard more often, but should also be placed in a broader perspective in order to get a balanced view. Here lies a task for all actors involved: actors should not only look at their own interests, needs and strategies, but also think through the future consequences as well. It‘s never black or white.

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New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 203 APPENDIX A: OVERVIEW FIELD VISITS AND INTERVIEWS

Research in Uganda: 07/02/2011 – 17/07/2011 Host organization: Uganda Land Alliance Block 29, Plot 1521 Mawanda Road, Kamwokya. P. O. Box 26990 Kampala.

Kampala 1. Desk research at Uganda Land Alliance, February 2011 2. Angwech, A.B. Microjustice Uganda, 16-02-2011.

Mbarara (Field visit with Microjustice Uganda) 3. Karumhomga, J. Registrar of Titles Mbarara District, 25-02-2011. 4. District Staff Surveyor Mbarara District Local Government, 25-02-2011. 5. Surveyor Mbarara District Local Government, 26-02-2011. 6. Regional Manager SACCO Mbarara, 26-02-2011.

Kampala 7. Schrier, J. Managing director at Fiduga Ltd, 08-03-2011 (Mpigi). 8. Kigula, J. Makarere University, 10-03-2011. 9. Visit to Indian High Commission and Embassy of Egypt, 11-03-2011. 10. Ren, Y. Second Secretary at the Economic and Commercial Counselor‘s Office Embassy of the People‘s Republic of China in the Republic of Uganda, 15-03-2011. 11. Nsamba-Gayiiya, E. Consultant, 16-03-2011. 12. Bwiragura, Mr, Former Chief Government Valuer, Land Economist, served in government from 1975 – 2010, 16-03-2011. 13. Odoi, R. Technical Advisor, Land and Commercial Justice, JLOS Secretariat, 18-03-2011. 14. Tumuhimbise, I. Senior Advisor Agriculture at SNV Uganda, 24-03-2011. 15. Van Lankveld, B. Royal van Zanten, 04-04-2011 (Mukono). 16. Baumgartner, P. Junior Researcher at German-based ZEF, Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung - Center for Development, 18-04-2011.

Who gets What, When and How? 204 Fieldwork Bugala Island, Kalangala District 17. Ssemugenyi, M.E. Coördinator of Kalangala District NGO Forum, 19-04-2011. 18. Ssendi, J. District Land Surveyor Kalangala, 20-04-2011. 19. Secretary of the District Land Board, 20-04-2011. 20. Group discussion held at Kyabwima Landing Site, six people attended, including the LC1 Chairman , 20-04-2011. 21. Group discussion held Kasekulo Landing site, including the LC1 Chairman and an opinion leader, 20-04-2011. 22. Nelson Basaalidde, Manager Kalangala Oil Palm Growers Trust (KOPGT), 20-04-2011. 23. Focus group discussion at Bugala Island with 12 outgrowers of VODP, 21-04-2011. 24. Lim Choon Meng, General Manager of Oil Palm Uganda Ltd, 21-04-2011.

Masindi 25. Wandera, F. Action Aid Mubende, 26-04-2011 and 28-04-2011. 26. Kiiza, R. Assistant Chief Administrative Officer at District Head Office, 27-04-2011 and 29-04-2011. 27. Field visit to the Catholic Mission, 27-04-2011. 28. Magezi, G. Principal district planner, Masindi District Local Government, 27-04-2011 and 28-04-2011. 29. Mubuuke Baptist, J. Field officer Mt. Elgon Seeds in Masindi, 28-04-2011. 30. Mugoya, J. Senior Land Officer Masindi District Local Government, 28-04-2011. 31. Nakitto, E. and Semenso, P. Yong Xin Grain Millers, Masindi, 29-04-2011. 32. Kisagye, R. Secretary Masindi District Land Board, 29-04-2011. 33. Wallington, M. Manager Kiryandongo Farm, 29-04-2011. 34. Meeting with 10 people from Kikube parish, Kitareba, Kiryandongo subcounty, Kiryandongo District (opposite of Kiryandongo farm), 30-04-2011. 35. Byakagaba, W. former LC5 Chairman, 30-04-2011. 36. Field visit to affected school, and interview with LC1 Chairman Kiryandongo, 30-04- 2011. 37. Field visit Ziwa Ranchers Ltd, talk with cattle keepers opposite of Ziwa Ranchers Ltd, 30- 04-2011. 38. Field visit to Masindi Port, 30-04-2011.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 205 Lira 39. Adonga, P. Senior Land Officer Lira District Local Government, 04-05-2011. 40. Mayega, S. and Mugurwa, L. VEDCO, 04-05-2011. 41. Rwanguha, B. Chief Administrative Officer Lira District Local Government, 05-05-2011. 42. Okwir, M. Lira Farmers Association (LIDFA), 05-05-2011. 43. Narayanan, R.V. Business Unit Manager at A.K. Oils and Fat Ltd (Mukwano Group of Companies), 05-05-2011. 44. Luseesa, D. Extension services manager at A.K. Oils and Fat Ltd (Mukwano Group of Companies), 05-05-2011. 45. Ajungo, P. District production and marketing officer, Lira District Local Government, 05- 05-2011. 46. Mwanbu, G. Extension coordinator Dokolo district at A.K. Oils and Fat Ltd (Mukwano Group of Companies), 07-05-2011. 47. Field visit to 12 outgrowers in Dokolo district, 07-05-2011. 48. Omonya, R. Land Rights officer at Action Aid Lira, 08-05-2011.

Mubende 49. Shemeri, C.T. Legal officer at Action Aid Mubende, 11-05-2011. 50. Kamya, S. District physical planner at Mubende District Local Government, 11-05-2011. 51. Director of the Natural Resources Department Mubende District, 11-05-2011. 52. Namiiro, S. Senior land officer at Mubende District Local Government, 11-05-2011. 53. Kayiira, P. Representative of Wake up and fight for your rights, Madudu Group, 11-05- 2011 at Madudu and 07-12-2011 at FIAN, Amsterdam. 54. Ruys, E. Managing Director at Kaweri Coffee Plantation, together with Ssali, E. HR/Administration manager, 13-05-2011 at Kaweri Coffee Plantation. 55. LC2 Chairman, near Kaweri Coffee Plantation, Maluwondwa Parish, and former worker at Kaweri Coffee Plantation (now a driver), 13-05-2011. 56. Outgrower at the Uganda Farmers Alliance, in Mubende, 13-05-2011. 57. Headmaster Kitemba Primary School, Madudu subcounty, 14-05-2011.

Kampala 58. Mugoya, T. Executive manager of Uganda Coffee Farmers Alliance, 17-05-2011.

Who gets What, When and How? 206 Gulu 59. Aber, S.M. Senior Land Management Officer, Amuru District, 17-05-2011.

Amuru 60. Uganda Land Alliance field office, 18-05-2011. 61. Norwegian Refugee Council field office, 18-05-2011.

Gulu 62. Visit to High Court, to make inquiries to the case regarding Amuru Sugar Works Ltd, 19- 05-2011. 63. Visit to Norwegian Refugee Council, 19-05-2011. 64. Loum, P. Program Coordinator of Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, 20-05-2011. 65. Lazech, S. Ker Kwalo Acholi, Cultural Institution, 20-05-2011. 66. Lakony, M. Mobilizer Acholi Land Forum, 22-05-2011.

Kampala 67. Mitti, D. Deputy Director, Communications & PR, Uganda Investment Authority, 05-07- 2011. 68. Otoa, T. Researcher &Coordinator TAI Africa & Civil Society Coalition on Oil (CSCO), Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment, 12-07-2011. 69. Iqbal, M. general manager of Ziwa Ranchers Ltd, 12-07-2011. 70. Visit to the Registrar of Companies to inquire on the contracts, 13-07-2011. 71. Isakawesa, Mr. Secretary at the Uganda Land Commision, 14-07-2011. 72. K. Eswar, Director of Corporate Affairs Madhvani Group of Companies, 14-07-2011.

N.B. Contact information is kept private. Furthermore, not everyone would or could be mentioned by name. Unsuccessful visits, for example to the Uganda Revenue Authority and the Ministry of Lands in Kampala are not included. In case of any questions, please contact the author.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 207 APPENDIX B: TOPICS COVERED IN INTERVIEWS

Investors  Formal status in terms of ownership (foreign/Ugandan)  Size of land, since when?  How did you find the land?  What happened on the land before?  Previous owner  How do you hold this land?  Main challenges in acquiring the land  Facilitation UIA  Conditions for buying/leasing the land  Benfit sharing agreements  Positive and negative consequences of your investment  Employment, region of origin  Main employees, salary  Trades Union?  CSR policy  How would you describe your contribution to development in Uganda?  How would you describe the relation with (1) local communities, (2) local authorities, (3) district land board

District Land Board/ land office  Function  Fulltime staffmembers  Financial and human resources  Capacity/performance of local institutions - District land board - Land committee - Recorder - District land offices - District land tribunal - Sub county land tribunal  New Land Policy, importancy, main relevant points?  Recent land surveyed  Recent investments  Benefit sharing agreements  Conditions to the investment  Main positive consequences investment  Main negative consequences investment  How are local communities informed?

Who gets What, When and How? 208  Response of local communities  Relationship with the investor and the local government  What about evictions in this district?  Most common problems related to land  Most urgent issue

District Local Government  Function  Fulltime staffmembers  Main task in relation to land  Financial and human resources  New Land Policy  Recent land surveyed  Recent investments  Benefit sharing agreements  Conditions to the investment  Main benefits investment  Main negative consequences  How are local communities informed?  Response local communities  Relationship investor/local communities/district land board  Most common problems  Most urgent issue

Local communities

 Ownership and seize of land  (outgrower/smallholder) What crops do you grow? How much for each crop?  (outgrower/smallholder) How much do you earn from the harvest?  Issues relating to land (ownership, access, food security)  Investments in the area  Are you involved? How were you informed?  What do you know of the investor?  Working conditions, salary at the plantation  What is the role of the district authorities/ Government of Uganda?  Are you aware of any benefit-sharing agreements?  What should be the responsibility of the investor?  Is there a CSR policy or are there CSR initiatives that you are aware of?  Are there any agreements on CSR initiatives?  Were promises made by the investors/district authorities and if so, is this documented?  Did the investment meet your expectations?  Main positive consequences  Main negative consequences  What can be improved?

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 209 APPENDIX C: DEFINITIONS LAND GRAB

Table 16. Overview of Definitions of Land Grab

Author/ Term Definition institution Zoomers Land grab ‗large-scale, cross-border land deals or transactions that are carried (2010) out by transnational corporations or initiated by foreign governments‘ Daniel and Land grab ‗the purchase or lease of vast tracts of land by wealthier, food- Mittal insecure nations and private investors from mostly poor, developing (2009) countries in order to produce crops for export‘

Friis and Land grab When richer countries with food deficiencies or private companies Reenberg buy or lease the rights to use farmland and fresh water in other (2010: 2) countries. The term ‗land grab‘ stresses that this is a ‗new and direct competition with local users of land, which previously mainly sustained local livelihoods‘ and ‗that the foreign investors are stealing the land from the local poor people‘. Fian (2010) Land grab ‗taking possession of and/or controlling a scale of land for commercial/industrial agricultural production which is disproportionate – which needs to be discussed in each particular context - in seize in comparison to the average land holding in the region‘. ‗distributional aspects of the phenomenon and its impact on the polical economcy and the local and national populations‘ right to resources for both today and the future‘. Both national as international investors can be involved in ‗land grabs‘, according to FIAN. An important characteristic is therefore that there is often a blurring boundary between ‗national‘ and ‗foreign‘: ‗the varying degrees of arrangements between foreign and national investors creates a situation where the boundaries are blurred because the partnerships between the two result in foreign entities being treated as nationals‘ (FIAN, ibid.). Borras and Global land grab/ ‗cross- ‗the explosion of (trans)national commercial land transactions (and franco border large-scale land land speculation) that has been occurring in recent years around the (2010) deals‘ large-scale production, sale, and export of food and biofuels‘. ‗cross-border large-scale land deals‘ are often driven by transnational corporations (TNCs) and in some cases foreign- governments driven, ‗but almost always in close partnership (or collusion) with national governments‘. Oxfam ‗large-scale land Acquisitions or concessions that are one or more of the following: (2011)/ grabbing‘  in violation of human rights, particularly the equal rights of Tirana women; Declaration  not based on free, prior and informed consent of the affected (ILC, 2011) land-users particularly indigenous peoples;  not based on a thorough assessment, or are in disregard of social, economic and environmental impacts, including the way they are gendered;  not based on transparent contracts that specify clear and binding commitments about activities, employment and benefits sharing, and;  not based on effective democratic planning, independent oversight and meaningful participation.

Who gets What, When and How? 210 Author/ Term Definition institution Agter (2010) Agricultural investments Which are two distinct phenomena, in which two different in the form of large-scale processes can be distinguished: appropriations and  The first involves the private appropriation of hitherto common concentrations of land resources over which groups exercised collective rights of use rights or management; or, much more rarely, land that had not been appropriated or claimed by anyone. This private appropriation may be the work of national, foreign or international actors purchasing or renting land (through concessions, leases, etc.).  The second process involves the purchase or rental of large areas of land that were already subject to an individual or collective private land tenure regime. It is always useful to distinguish between the private appropriation and concentration of land. The two may sometimes – but do not necessarily – coexist ‗land grab‘ The wholesale appropriation of resources that excludes other potential beneficiaries, is used advisedly when it applies to the potential of the resources found on the land

World bank large-scale agricultural investment large-scale land Incidence and Characteristics of Large-Scale Land Acquisitions acquisition While weak administrative processes may be cause for concern, the outcomes in terms of productivity and distribution of benefits are even more important. Available data point to several observations:  Amounts of land transferred differ widely across countries as a function of policy.  Domestic investors appear to be more prevalent than foreign ones in most contexts.  Land policies are key determinants of the size and nature of land transactions.  Most projects are smaller than those reported in the media, though the distribution is skewed.  Amounts of new employment and physical investment are often well below Expectations (WB, 2011: 61). ‗land rush‘ The expansion of cultivated areas through markets continues to be important in many regions. The jump in investment following the 2008 food price hike also affected countries not traditionally considered viable targets. ILC, 2011 commercial pressures on Sources of demand for land and the conditions globally, nationally, land and locally that shape its impacts. Focus on land deals involving the large-scale purchase, lease, or concession of land, and their causes and impacts. Von Braun According to Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick (2009: 1) many and governments, either directly or through state-owned entities and Meinzen- public-private partnerships, are in negotiations for or have already Dick (2009) closed deals on arable land leases, concessions, or purchases abroad. ‗The size and terms of contracts differ widely. Some agreements do not involve direct land acquisition, but seek to secure food supplies through contract farming and investment in rural and agricultural infrastructure, including irrigation systems and roads.‘

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 211 APPENDIX D: LAND DEALS ACCORDING TO THE GLP REPORT

Table 17. Overview Land Deals

Recipient country Number of deals Magnitude (1000 ha) Min Max Ethiopia 26 2,892 3,524 Madagascar 24 2,745 Sudan 20 3,171 1,899 Tanzania 15 1,717 11,000 Mali 13 2,417 2,419 Mozambique 10 10,305 Uganda 7 1,874 1,904 DR Congo 6 11,048 Nigeria 6 821 Zambia 6 2,245 Ghana 5 89 Malawi 5 307 Senegal 5 510 Total (all 27 countries) 177 51,415 63,111 Source: Friis and Reenberg, 2010: 11 (NB. The 13 main recipient countries listed by number of land deals and showing two estimates for the magnitude of all the land deals in each country. Based on the screening and triangulation of GRAIN (2008), Von Braun & Meinzen-Dick (2009) and Görgen et al. (2009)).

Who gets What, When and How? 212 APPENDIX E: DETAILED MAPS

Map 15. Kalangala District, including Bugala Island

Source: International Travel Maps, Vancouver.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 213 Map 16. Mubende (detailed)

Source: fieldwork Uganda

Who gets What, When and How? 214 Map 17. Lira (detailed)

Source: fieldwork Uganda

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 215 Map 18. Gulu (detailed)

Source: fieldwork Uganda.

Map 19. Kafu river and Map 20. Ziwa Ranchers Ltd

Source: worldatlas.net (2011) and fieldwork.

Who gets What, When and How? 216 Map 21. Catlle corridor Uganda

Source: Mugisha, 2002.

Map 21. Overview Internally Displaced Persons Uganda

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 217 APPENDIX F: CASE OF MUBENDE DISTRICT

Mubende district is characterized by two important cases: New Forest Company, in which Oxfam International is involved and Neumann Kaffee Gruppe, in which FIAN and Action Aid are involved. The UK-based New Forest Company is operational in Uganda since 2005. It is Uganda‘s biggest tree planter with more than 20,000 hectares of forestry land in plantations in Mubende, Kiboga and Bugiri districts. It aims at ‗protecting the remaining natural forests that occur along the streams and restoring and regenerating those forests that have been destroyed by encroachers; providing employment and development to rural communities where unemployment levels are very high; and meeting Uganda‘s national development priorities for investment in agro-industry, poverty alleviation and rural development‘ (NFC, 2011). In October 2011 Oxfam International accused NFC of not following international standards (Oxfam, 2011: 16). Although NFC claims that in Mubende and Kiboga locals left the land voluntarily, 20,000 villagers claim that they have been evicted in Kiboga district and nearby Mubende district to make way for the plantations of NFC. NFC is supported by the International Finance Corporation (IFC, private sector lending arm of the World Bank), the European Investment Bank and HSBC bank. NFC argues they are ‗illegal encroachers‘ and ‗tresspassers‘. The case is now at the Ugandan High Court. After the launch of the report of Oxfam, NFC stated: ‗NFC continues to maintain that the vast majority of Oxfam‘s claims are inaccurate, misleading and uncorroborated and that the company has acted lawfully and maintained the highest standards of social responsibility‘103. According to the CAO, this issue, which even went up to the President became political and the Government used force. The people that originally lived there were compensated, but the ‗encroachers‘, ‗shouldn‘t been compensated‘. In In 2010, General Manager Tonderai Kachale said that NFC‘s plans to have 26,000 hectares of sustainable commercial timber planted in Uganda by 2014. According to Kachale, ‗land acquisition is also still a challenge. We need about 15,000 hectares of plantable land in Uganda in areas of at least 5,000 hectares which are hard to find (Nakaweesi, 2010).

Peter Kayiira / Wake Up and Fight for your Rigths, Madudu Group

Peter Kayiira is a human rights activist who represents the Ugandan association ‗Wake Up and Fight for your Rights, Madudu Group‘, which is supported by the German and Dutch

103 http://www.newforests.net/index.php/hmd_article/nfc-to-launch-investigation-into-land-issues-in-uganda

Who gets What, When and How? 218 section of Food First Information and Action Network (FIAN). In 2001, Kayiira sent a letter to the Speaker of Parliament with the subject ‗brutal armed raid, plunder, torture and looting‘. In his report ‗Break the Silence and Rederess the Catastrophe‘, it becomes clear that the land that is part of the investment by Kaweri already has a long history. Central is block 99 Buwekula in Madudu sub-county. In 1968 this land was part of the Kirawula Farm, owned by Michael Kawalya Kaggwa. Before he could start with his farm, ‗people were brutally evicted‘ (Kayiira, 2001).

However, block 99 is owned by Daudi Ssebbowa, a former chief in the Kabaka‘s government of Buganda. The people that are evicted by Kawalya, were resettled on the land of Ssebbowa104. Kawalya pledged the land title in one of the banks in Uganda and got the money to run the farm. He was murdered in 1972 and therefore the land title was left with the bank. In 1978 the land title is sold to Mr. Emmanuel Kayiwa Bukko. When he came to the farm, he found a farm under the name of ‗Green Nile Farmers‘. The Uganda Army came and wanted to engage the same land as Mr Kayiwa. However, Kayiwa could not cope with sharing the land with the army and disappeared from the land. However, in 1999, Kayiwa wanted to sell the land to the Ministry of Defence. A meeting was arranged with the UPDF, the LC3 Chairman, and the residents in the area. The residents agreed to hand over some of this land but asked to remain in control of those parts of land on which they had settled (2 square miles 49 acres). Furthermore, they agreed that ‗their friends who were scattered settlements on the land would be resettled among them to occupy vacant pieces of land among them‘. The government was asked to help them in their transfer. However, there are no minutes of this meeting. A letter was send to the lawyers of Kayiwa, but there was no reply to the letter from Kayiwa. In 2001 however, a new team of lawyers in name of Kayiwa ‗gave orders to the people to quit the land‘. The letter was also sent to several district officials. The peasants also hired a lawyer and the addressed the Attorney General of Uganda and wrote to several authorities, including the Presidents‘ Office. However, Kayiwa had employed surveyors to re-open the boundaries of the land and stated that the area on which the people were settled (the 2 square miles 49 acre) was part of his land. The total piece of land (9 square miles, 448 acres and 7 acres) from Kayiwa was sold to the Uganda Investment Authority. Kayiira (2001: 5) claims that the land that was handed to Kaweri Coffee Plantation was 11.77 square miles.

104 Which includes the villages Katabalanga, Kigolooba, Kyota, Nakaseeta, Kireku, Kitemba, Kissebugga, part of Kagunguli and part of Luwunga. Also Kitemba Trading Centre, Kitemba Catholic Church, Kitemba Primary School, Kitemba Pentecostal Church, Kitemba S.D.A. Church, Kifumbira Trading Centre and Kagunguli Trading Centre.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 219 The residents went to the RDC to ask why the surveyors brought the land of Ssebbowa (on which they were settled) under the land of Kayiwa. However, the RDC stated that the people that were on that specific piece of land had to quit by 15-08-2001 (while the lawyers letter said 31-08-2001). ‗He was going to send bulldozers to demolish all property both private and public‘ and said ‗he was to send his men to work on whoever put up resistance‘. This meant that Kitemba primary school and other businesses had to be closed per 15-08- 2001. Later, the RDC asked the residents to come with documents that would prove that their land belonged to Ssebbowa. At the Mityana land office the documents were taken to Kampala by the employees of the land office. At the departments of land and surveys in Entebbe they could however provide the headmaster of Kitemba primary school, Peter Kayiira, the map that would prove that the residents were right. Kayiira advised the tenants to ‗seek a lawfull redress to their pligth‘. On 16-08-2001 Kayiira was arrested by the police, which was eventually not enforced after a talk with Kayiira himself. A meeting with some of the villagers and Kayiira was arranged at the police office, where it was decided that if the RDC and the landlord Kayiwa did not come with a solution, they had to go to court. According to the report of Kayiira, that afternoon the RDC deployed the army and ‗repulsed the people from their rightful settlement‘. ‗The RDC was present to inaugurate the armed raid, plunder, physical torture and looting of people‘s property. Kayiira was arrested. On the 22nd and 23rd of August, property of Kitemba primary school was looted, Kitemba sub-parish church building was pushed down, and several other buildings in the area were involved. Houses along the roadside were pushed down as well, even as the business community, shops, etc. On August 24th, President Museveni ‗went to break the ground for Kaweri Coffee Plantation Ltd. In his words he praised the effort and commitment of the district officials they had shown in the process of acquiring land‘. Museveni argued that the peasants were ‗adequately compensated‘. In his report, Kayiira (2001: 12) pleas for the investor to let the peasants stay on their land and use other land that is not occupied. ‗Then the investor will build the factories he intends to and establish demonstration coffee farms. People will be taken to these demonstration farms to learn how to produce the quality of coffee the investor wants. Then the Government and the investor would help the peasants to start growing coffee as a compulsory crop.‘ Kayiira asks the Government to reestablish the homes that were demolished, and that people are adequately compensated, even as providing new materials for Kitemba Primary School, the reconstruction of worship places, amongst others. In total,

Who gets What, When and How? 220 Kayiira claims that there are 392 families affected, with a population of 2041 people (Kayiira, 2001). In 2011, Kayiira is still fighting for his case. In 2005 he had to spend six months in prison because he was accused of ‗having embezzled funds he had received for his school‘. After the six months, the court decided to acquit him of all charges. He was posted to a new school which is ‗very far away from the evictees‘ settlement‘ (Falk and Sterk, 2007: 2). Kayiira argues that the Coffee Plantation only brought negative consequences. ‗Due to the influx of people there is environmental degradation. Poverty is growing more; in the past people could feed themselves with land. Without land they are forced to work with cash. Life is more difficult than in used to be.‘ Furthermore, Kayiira argues that ‗the foreigners got the better jobs, people from this land couldn‘t get access. They are casual laborers. The whole issue is political. How can it be that the case is already going on for 10 years now? We have had six different judges. The politicians control the army.‘

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 221 APPENDIX G: NEMA ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT

The various impacts that the project may have on the environment are evaluated by the team and ranked according to two criteria; i) quantitative or measurable change, where the impact can be measured and ii) qualitative change where the impact cannot be measured but depends on the environmental acceptability of the project.

Quantitative changes provide a numerical representation of a measure and include the following;

 Water quality and hydrology: whether the proposed project will contaminate a public water supply, alter the course or flow of flood water, or deplete ground water supply;  population and housing: whether the proposed project will displace large numbers of people, induce substantial growth or concentration of people  geology; whether the proposed project will expose structures and human to major hazards such as earth quakes, landslides or result in changes in deposition of soils;  Biological resources: whether it will eliminate plant and animal communities, cause fish or wildlife population to drop below self-sustaining levels;  Air quality: whether the intended project will result in substantial air emissions or decrease in ambient air quality.

Qualitative changes on the other hand refer to measures that are more descriptive and represent the presence of something reported and not necessarily measurable. These changes would subsequently lead to the degradation of the visual quality and sense of beauty of the natural environment. This considers such issues as, whether:

 the proposed project will significantly alter the existing natural view sheds including changes in natural terrain;  it will greatly reduce sunlight or introduce shadows in areas used extensively by the communities;  it will comply with local guidelines or goals related to visual quality;  it will significantly increase light and glare on the project vicinity.

Source: Kakuru e.a., 2001: 21

Who gets What, When and How? 222 APPENDIX H: NEUMANN KAFFEE GRUPPE (NKG) SUSTAINABILITY STANDARDS

The NKG Standards for Sustainable Coffee Production were developed in collaboration with GTZ (German Agency for Technical Development Cooperation) and CERTIMEX, an independent and accredited Mexican certification agency. The standards are based on a two- pronged integrated management approach that conserves natural resources and creates a respectful and supportive environment for the workers of the coffee industry. The standards are supplemented by the NKG Sustainability Index, which was designed as a monitoring tool for the implementation of standards. The index creates an incentive based scoring system whereby improvements made against the standards‘ criteria are rewarded with points which elevate a farm‘s relative market position. While the standards were developed on a NKG farm in Mexico, they were designed to be feasibly implemented by all NKG coffee farms around the globe.

Standard Purpose: Promotes economic, social, and environmental sustainability and serves as a tool for sourcing sustainable coffee for the mainstream coffee industry.

NKG Sustainability Standards  Health: Employees and families shall be members of national health insurance in accordance with national law. Farm shall take actions to prevent work related accidents, promote health campaigns, and guarantee access to health services. Farm shall provide hygienic bathrooms and potable water for all workers.  Labor Conditions and Working Hours: A safe and respectful work environment will be promoted that does not discriminate, use forced labor, allow physical or verbal abuses, or restrict social practices of its workers. Work hours, days of rest, overtime, and paid leave shall follow national and international standards.  Women in the Workplace: Women shall have equal rights in the workplace.  Training: All farm workers shall receive basic job training, training on health and hygiene, training on the proper use and application of agrochemicals, and training in environmental protection.  Freedom of Association: Workers may freely join organizations.  Education: School-age children shall be guaranteed access to basic education.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 223  Wages: Monetary remuneration in accordance with tasks and skills and that meet or exceed minimum local and national standards is guaranteed. No deductions in wages are permitted for disciplinary purposes.  Child Labor: Children living on the farm under the age of 14 shall be carefully monitored to ensure access to schooling and protection from forced or long work hours or dangerous working conditions. No one under the age of 18 shall be exposed to hazardous, unsafe, or unhealthy situations on or off the farm.  Day Laborers and Seasonal Workers: Day or seasonal laborers shall benefit from access to medical treatment, nutrition, accommodations, sanitary facilities, potable water, education for children, basic training, transportation, and wages that meet local and national law.  Integrated Handling and Use of Agricultural Inputs: Agrochemicals shall only be used in a precise manner, utilizing chemicals of lowest toxicity, and prohibiting use of agrochemicals that are nationally or internationally banned. Measures shall be taken to reduce health and safety risks to workers who apply agrochemicals and they shall be given proper equipment and training on proper application.  Soil Conservation: Improve soil fertility, prevent erosion, and use agrochemicals responsibly to protect soil health.  Integrated Waste and Crop Byproduct Management: Measures shall be taken to reduce overall waste on farm and minimize environmental impacts of coffee byproducts through reduction, reuse, and recycling. Appropriate facilities for the treatment of human wastes shall be constructed. Inorganic, non-recyclable wastes shall be disposed of properly without burning.  Accreditation Body: None.  Auditing System: Regular internal audits conducted by independent auditors that measure progress against the farm management system and standard criteria.  Labeling: None.  Premium: Market-based price premiums proportionate to progress in standard implementation (Source: Cague e.a. (year unknown), Beyond the Bean: Redefining Coffee Quality).105

105 Quick Reference Guide to Standards for Sustainable Production Systems Second Edition. Washington: Environment and Natural Resource Management and Agribusiness Practice Networks

Who gets What, When and How? 224 APPENDIX I: TABLES ON INCOME OF FARMERS

Table 18. Overview Income and Exponse Model Sunflower Outgrower farmers Lira

Source: USAID, 2006: 42.

Table 19. Effect of New Planting on Annual Net Income from Coffee per Farm in UGX

Source: Cognigni, 2010: 52.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 225 APPENDIX J: BENEFICIARIES VODP PROJECT IN 2009

Table 20. Beneficiaries VODP Project 2009

smallholders % Outgrowers % Total % Target Target Target Total land 1,887 84 407 33 2,294 66 registered Land 930 41 220 18 1,150 33 planted (ha) Target (ha) 2,250 100 1,250 100 3,500 100 Total 579 72 651 beneficiaries Men 396 53 449 Women 183 19 202 Source: IFAD, 2011: 16.

Who gets What, When and How? 226 APPENDIX K: MUKWANO OUTGROWER CONTRACT

Source: USAID, 2006.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 227 APPENDIX L: IMPRESSION OUTGROWERS LIRA

Table 21. Outgrowers Lira, 2011

Hudson Patrick Margaret Tom Robinson Joined group 2007 2007 * 2003/04 2004 in Sunflower 4 acre 4 acre 6-8 acre 10 acre 4 acre (cash crop) Other crops Maize, Soya beans, Maize, soya, Maize, soya, Sim sim, groundnuts, sunflower, sim sim, millet, sim millet, maize, cotton maize, millet, sim, cassava (6 cassava (2 acre groundnuts, cassava (8 acre for food for food cassava (8 acre) production) production) acre) Earnings/ 700,000 – 1 * * * 700,000 (most season in million (most favourable UGX favourable conditions) or conditions) 400,000. or 400,000 In US$ 277.90– 397 * * * 277.90 or or 158.80 158.80 Improvements Seed Seed Transportatio Seed Price of seeds distribution, distribution, n and distribution, and seed loan there are not storage, money for distribution maintenance, enough seeds availability weeding give a better of seeds, (before the price price of harvest can be seeds are too sold) high Extra Wants to rent Plan to buy a Is living in a Now I have 20 Sunflower more land, motor cycle house made cattle. Many grows faster; I since and graining of rocks people now get a lot of earnings are machine can build money. My not enough permanent children are for family of houses now in a 9 people private school. N.B. * is no information available

Who gets What, When and How? 228 APPENDIX M: FDI AND INVESTORS IN AFRICA

Figure 10. Major developing economy investors in Africa, 2006-2008 (in millions of dollars)

Source: UNCTAD, 2009.

Figure 11. FDI inflows, 2000-2009

Source, UNCTAD, 2010: 32.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 229 APPENDIX N: UGANDA IN FIGURES AND TABLES

Table 22. Uganda in numbers

Uganda Population (in millions, 2008; Uganda, 2010) 33,4 Growth total population (percentage, 1988 – 2008) 84 Average annual population growth rate (percentage, 2006) 3.2 Rural population (in millions, 2008) 27.55 Rural population (percentage, 2010) 87 Growth rural population (percentage, 1988 – 2008) 78 Economy GDP per capita in $ (2008) 348 GDP annual growth (percentage, 2009) 7.1 Average growth GDP per capita (percentage per annum) 1.1 (2000s) Inflation, GDP deflator (annual percentage, 2010)106 9.1 Exports of goods and services (percentage of GDP, 2009) 23 Imports of goods and services (percentage of GDP, 2009 35 Revenue, excluding grants (percentage of GDP, 2009) 12.4 GNI per capita (in US$, Atlas method, 2010107) 500 Received workers‘ remittances and compensation of 750 employees (in million US$, 2009) Foreign direct investment, net inflows (in million US$, 380 BoP, 2005108) Foreign direct investment, net inflows (in million US$, 604 BoP, 2009) Net ODA received (percentage of GNI, 2009) 11.5 Society Poverty incidence (US$1.25/day, as percentage of total 51.5 population) (2008) Percentage of people living under US$2/day 75.6 Rural poverty (poverty headcount, as percentage of the 34.2 population, 2006) Urban poverty (poverty headcount, as percentage of the 13.7 population, 2006) Gini Index109 (2005/06) 0.41

106 Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole. The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency (World Bank, 2011 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG?display=default 107 In calculating gross national income (GNI—formerly referred to as GNP) and GNI per capita in U.S. dollars for certain operational purposes, the World Bank uses the Atlas conversion factor. The purpose of the Atlas conversion factor is to reduce the impact of exchange rate fluctuations in the cross-country comparison of national incomes World Bank, 2011 http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/world-bank-atlas- method 108 The series "Workers' remittances and compensation of employees, received" is a composite of three indicators from IMF's Balance of Payments (BoP) database: compensation of employees, workers‘ remittances, and migrants transfers (World Bank, 2011 http://data.worldbank.org/about/faq/specific-data-series).

Who gets What, When and How? 230 Percentage of people with access to safe, clean water 65 (2009) Adult literacy (percentage adults, 2008) 74 Enrolment primary school (gross, percentage relevant age 116 group, 2008) Change in enrolment primary school 1988 – 2008 49 (percentage) Primary completion rate (percentage of relevant age group, 72 2009) Maternal mortality (deaths per 100 000 births, 2008) 500 Infant mortality (deaths per 1000 births, 2008) 82 Life expectancy (years) 52.4 Fertility rate (average births per woman from 15 to 49 6.4 years) Percentage of people aged 15-49 living with HIV/AIDS 6.4 2004/2005 (percentage) Agriculture Agriculture, value added (percentage of GDP, 2009) 25 Agricultural employment (percentage) (2007) 68.9 Growth in agricultural employment 1998 – 2008 49.1 (percentage) Growth in agricultural labour productivity (percentage) 19.9 (1988-2008) Index of food production per capita against 1999-2001 base 107 (2004-2006) Major food commodities consumed (percentage, 2005-07, Plantains (15.6), cassava (12.7), flour of share in DES110) maize (9.4), sweet potatoes (8.8), flour of millet (5.3) Major items in agricultural production Plantains, cassava, sweet potatoes, indigenous cattle meat, whole (fresh) cow milk) Share of food in total expenditure (percentage, 2005-07) 44 Major exports (percentage, share in agriculture, 1990-92) Green coffee (74.6), tea (3.8), tobacco leaves (2.5) Major exports (percentage, share in agriculture, 2005-07) Green coffee (38.1), tea (8.6), crude organic materials NES (8.5), tobacco leaves (8.0), cotton (carded or combed, 4.4) Major imports (percentage, share in agriculture, 1990-92) Wheat (6.9), oil of palm (12.2), refined sugar (18.9) Major imports (percentage, share in agriculture, 2005-07) Wheat (27.8), oil of palm (16.9), refined sugar (6.9), sorghum (5.1), dry peas (4.4) Fertilizer use/ Arable land (kg. Nutr/ha, 2005-07) 0.9 Tractors/ Arable land (no/1000 ha, 2005-07) 0.6 Land Agricultural land (thousands of hectares, 2007) 12 712 Agricultural land (percentage of land area, 2008) 66 Arable lands (thousands of hectares, 2007) 5500 Arable land per head of agricultural population 0.2 (hectare/cap, 2007)

109 The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of zero represents perfect equality and 100, perfect inequality OECD, 2011 http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=4842. 110 dietary energy supply (DES)

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 231 Irrigated land (percentage of arable, 2008) 0.1 Political stability/absence of violence111 -0.88 Government effectiveness112 -0.51 Voice and accountability113 -0.47 Regulatory quality114 -0.08 Rule of law115 -0.51 Control of corruption116 -0.79 Overall governance (average of all governance indicators) -0.54 Source: FAO, Rural poverty report 2011; DFID, 2011 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Africa-Eastern-- Southern/Uganda/Key-facts/; PRSP, 2010, World Bank, 2011 http://data.worldbank.org/country/uganda; FAO (2010) http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/ess/documents/food_security_statistics/country_profiles/eng/Uganda_E. pdf

Figure 12. Price and production trends in cotton between 1970-71 and 2005-06

Source: Masiga and Ruhweza, 2007: 9.

111 capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically‐ motivated violence and terrorism. 112 capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 113 capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 114 capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 115 capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 116 capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests (Kaufman e.a., 2010: 4-5).

Who gets What, When and How? 232

Figure 13. Expenditure framework under the NDP 2010/11 – 2014

Source: UNDP, 2010: 10

Figure 14. Poverty headcount by region

Source: UNDP, 2010: 15

Figure 15. Official development aid (ODA) in Uganda (2007-2009)

Source: OECD 2011 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/32/1883200.gif N.B. IDA stands for the International Development Association, and is the part of the World Bank that helps the world‟s poorest countries; GNI stands for gross national income; AfDF, the African Development Fund is the arm of the African Development Bank (AfDB) that provides highly concessional loans and grants to 38 least developed and other low income African countries

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 233

Figure 16. Population distribution by age, 2009

Source: UBOS Statistical Abstract, 2009, PRSP, 21

Figure 17. Population density, 2002

Source: Pandey e.a., 2007: 119.

Figure 18. Distribution of Ugandan Population by Ethnic Group, 1948 – 2002

Source: UBOS, 2002.

Who gets What, When and How? 234 APPENDIX O: ACHIEVEMENT OF THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDGS), 2010

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 235

Source: UNDP, 2010: 64-65.

Who gets What, When and How? 236 APPENDIX P: THE 50 LARGEST TAXPAYERS IN UGANDA IN 2006/7

Source: Kalema, 2008: 8-9.

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 237 APPENDIX Q: INVESTMENTS OVERVIEW UIA

Table 23. Status of Ownership of Projects 2010

Ownership Planned Employment Planned Investment Projects Local 115,253 989,713,461 122 Foreign 27,362 584,822,644 169 Joint venture 7,044 98,496,490 32 Total 149,659 1,673,032,595 323

Table 24. Sector Totals Jan-Dec 2010 Sector Planned Employment Planned Projects Investment Agric, Hunt, Forest & Fish 95225 664548992 50 Manufacturing 18471 327198698 119 Fin, Ins, Real Estate & Biz Sys 23459 307198698 63 Construction 6663 125695000 26 Mining and Quarrying 701 103307590 10 Wh & Ret, Cat & Accom Sys 2087 62847098 29 Transport, Storage and Comm 2777 49334188 21 Community and Social Services 276 32566841 5 149659 1673032595 323

Table 25. 2010 sources of investment by country Country Planned employment Planned investment Projects Uganda 130,004 1,112,464,621 143 India 6,499 173,417,800 47 United Kingdom 970 76,560,694 13 Netherlands 552 66,945,983 6 China 4,279 65,210,500 33 Kenya 1,803 62805,567 14 Canada 545 19,399,000 4 Belgium 135 12,086,400 2 Tanzania 396 9,600,00 5 United Arab Emirates 46 7,000,000 1 Lebanon 316 6,030,000 3 Ethiopia 363 5,660,000 3 Sweden 27 4,951,457 1 Turkey 777 4,664,000 3 Virgin Islands 36 4,580,000 1 Luxembourg 33 3,894,000 1 Italy 133 3,580,271 3 Austria 59 3,118,841 2 Rwanda 40 3,000,000 1 Denmark 276 2,811,923 3 Hong Kong 38 2,550,000 1 South Africa 62 2,535,465 2 United States 924 2,228,070 6 Sudan 56 1,904,000 1 Cyprus 105 1,900,000 1 Botswana 5 1,323,852 1 Poland 44 1,312,275 2

Who gets What, When and How? 238 Mauritius 150 1,277,000 1 Brazil 12 1,263,000 1 Russia 17 1,144,000 2 Bangladesh 98 1,000,000 1 Lithuania 22 1,000,000 1 Somalia 78 1,000,000 1 Iran 250 996,376 1 France 43 701,000 1 Zimbabwe 89 696,500 1 Pakistan 98 605,000 3 Australia 23 500,000 1 Israel 9 405,000 1 New Zealand 40 341,000 2 Korea North 162 300,000 1 Eritrea 45 269,000 2 Total 149,659 1,673,032,595 323 Source: UIA, 2011 http://www.ugandainvest.com/admin/docs/Countries.pdf

Table 26. France investors from 1991

Source: UIA, 2011

Table 27. List of Russian investors in Uganda

Source: UIA, 2011

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 239 APPENDIX R: OVERVIEW CAPACITY AT LAND OFFICES

Table 28. Capacity at the land office Mubende District professional positions Filled Vacant District registrar of titles X District land officer X District land valuer X District surveyor X District physical planner X

District support staff positions Cartographer X Office assistant/secretary X Drivers etc X117 District land management structures District Land Board X Secretary to land board X Area land committee X (also within subcounties)

Table 29. Capacity at the land office Masindi District professional positions Filled Vacant District registrar of titles District land officer X District land valuer X District surveyor District physical planner X Recorder X District support staff positions Cartographer X Office assistant/secretary Drivers etc District land management structures

District Land Board X Secretary to land board X Area land committee X118

117 ‗but no car‘ 118 ‗With the area land committee, the problem is there is no money. We cannot pay for them. We should get 8 million a year, but this money doesn‘t come. For this year we only received 3 million UGX.‘

Who gets What, When and How? 240

Table 30. Capacity at the land office Lira

District professional positions Filled Vacant District registrar of titles X District land officer X District land valuer X District surveyor X District physical planner X

District support staff positions Cartographer X Office assistant/secretary X Drivers etc X119 District land management structures District Land Board X Secretary to land board X Area land committee X

Table 31. Capacity in the land office Gulu and Amuru Vacant Filled District professional positions Amuru Gulu Amuru Gulu District registrar of titles X X District land officer X120 X District land valuer X121 District surveyor X122 X District physical planner X

District support staff positions Cartographer X X Office assistant/secretary X123 Drivers etc X124 District land management structures District Land Board X Secretary to land board X Area land committee X Source: fieldwork

119 ‗we don‘t even have a car‘ 120 since 07-2010 121 ‗We go to the chief government valuer Kampala‘ 122 ‗We use one of Gulu‘ 123 ‗We borrow services from the natural department, but we are hoping that we can recruit someone, even as record‘ 124 ‗We do not even have a motor or car‘

New Corporate Land Acquisitions and the Impact on Local Livelihoods in Uganda 241