0/';,3/ Urtcussifffio

Home , Strategic bomber

A46 rffi I TPPIOYEB TON . l\ 1 PUOLII NELEASE 0icLAssrFltu 8Y IA|i t,8, i3[?6 0 AT t , Ttrtb o$zu

Bol'tsER TI{E QI.'EST FOR AN ADVAI{CED MANI$ED STRATEGIC

USAF PI,ANS AI{D POLICIES t95r-L966

Bernard C. NaltY

i\il USAF Historical Divislon Llaison Office August 1!56 ,,:'?*t \t1,

fl5 nrrnr QQ?SQ tor; 0/';,3/ urtcussifffio

When this Study is no longer needed, please return it to the USAF Historical. Division Liaison Office.

UI{CTASSIFIED

l*.' "" U1{CLASSIFIED

FOREI'TORD

The eupet lqr qn Ad.rrancetl Mgrned S-tra?eslc Pggg ry. pf""S-@@fSE WLs an account of the USAtr'effort to find aEplacemeit for the B-J2 and, thougb wltb lesser urgency, the B-!8. Although three successi.ve Chlefe of Sta,ffr Oenerals Thomas D. Whlte, curtis E. Ie|rlay ancl Jobn P. McConnell, banre glven top prlority to this effort, the Air Foree bas not yet ob- ialned p}lrission to develop an advanced manned bomber. Instead, it has recelved approval for a bmber version of the F-}Il to replace the old'er nod.el B-52ts. Thls stucly exanlnes the principal manned. bonber programs ln progress between 195I and. L%6. One eectlon, tberefore, is devoted to eacb of tbree undertakings: tbe B-7O, a supersonlc, blgb- altitud.e bomber that was conpleted. as an experimental type; the ad.vanced. nanned. strateglc alreraft, Jutlged technologically less aubitious than the B-7O but better abl-e to penetrate enemy defenses; and, the FB-111, nbicb the Alr Force conslders an interim bmber, adequate to replace tbe B-5ec througb B-rzF. Tbe last sectlon also treats the planned phase out oI the olcler B'rz's and tbe 8-58'6 and recounts Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNanarats vlews on the role of tbe manned bomber. Those interested. in tbe B-JQ progran vill fincl information on its origin, as well 8s on the hlgb bopes once entertained for this type of aircraft, ln The Searcb for New USAF WeaponF' +28- 1959 (S-RD), by.Artbur K. Marmor of tbe Air Force Eistorlcal Divlsion Liaison Office.

l,IN( ROSEIIBERO Chief USAF lllstorieal Divieion Liaison Offiee

uilcrAssiFno UNCLASSITIED

COI{TENTS

TONE][,'IORD I. THEB-?OPROGRAM...... ' ' ' ' ' " ' ' ' t ' ' ' 1 ANewsgtback ...... t t t " "'' " tt t 4 FronB-TOtoRS-7O...... ''"''"''' 6 .'''''''''''' I The Beiection of the RS-7O' . . I B-TO Technical Probleuns . . . . . "' " " " "' TheProgramContiJlugd ...... ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 'L3 A FinaL Cutback . . . . t . . .'''''''''''' t 15 What Wgnt Wrong ...... '''''''''' t' 16 20 II. TI{E ADVANCED I.4ANNED STNAItnIC A]RCRAFT ...... Newl,Ianffed BOfrbef ...... 2L ' The ReqUegt fof a Thel€l'iayhoposal ...... t " " " " " "23 The Program Begjrs ...... '' t'''' t''' 25 ProgresJ Benajlls Slow ...... ' o''''''' 27 ThgTaskAhead...... o . . "'' t' t''''''29 III. TI{E FB-ILJ . .' . . . . o . . . . o t " t t " " t " 3h Getting Off the Ground ...... ''''''''' 35 The FB-rll Program ...... o r . .''''''''' 19 Early Problems ...... '''' t''''''' t' lS tl+9 llOtES ...... '. t" t t t t "" t t t t t t t59 GLOSSARY...... "' " " t t

ullcLASSltlED I. THE B-7O PROGRAI'{

(A After Ig35, accolding to an official Air Force history of World War II, the Arrny airnan ttwas, above a1I else, an advocate of the big bonber, and around the potentialities of that t}rye of plane he built hj's most cherished hopes.rr 1 T?rree decades 1ater, the world scene had changed dras- tically and the coning of intercontinental nissiles and nuclear ueapons had revol-utionized warfare, but many USAF leaders stj-ll insisted on the vital importance of the manned bornber, although now as part of a bomber-ntissile rrtrfl:s.rr In January 1965, on the eve of his retirement as Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Curtis E. Lel,Iay was asked how serious a gamble the nation ras ) talcing if it did not develop a nelr bonber, and he replied:- . .. if r|e donrt have a.war, it lronrt matter. If we do, and we donrt have a new bornber, Le are apt to lose. For a considerable firture, ,ue need .a manned system. there are certajn things a maln6O systen can do better; other things an unmanned systeur can do betier. the next rrrar will be different than t'he llst, and the side rrith the nost flexibility rri].l have tfe ad- varrtig.. ftre ,side that has the uixed force and can react u:ith missiles and bonbers is apt to beat the side that has on\r mis' siles. so we must have a manned system for tkre foreseeable future to exercise judgnent and to react to sr:rlprises. 0 The new bomber upon l*rieh the Air Force originally set its'hopes for the 196ors uas the B-?0.* Afber more than t'hree years of study, it signed contracts early in 1958 for development of ttris aircraft' Norttr

xlyre Air Foree also hoped that j-ts nuclear-powered aircraft'progran would eventUally culninate iir a nilitary useful bbmber, but the.Itl"..9y adninistration terrninated the program in March 1951. For a detailed history of this progrann, ,see Roberi Ol littte, Nuc,lpa!-glpp4tiot for Manned Air,eraft: Itre &rd or ttr" Prosran, D52-LW (arCitO, L953). 2

American Aviation, winner of the design competition, undertook to develop, as a replacement for the B-52t a high-altitude bomber capable of flying three times the speed of sound. The craft was to be powered by six C'eneral Electric jet engines buried side by side in a wide-mouthed nacelle Located para).lel to the fuselage and beneath the bomberfs delta wing. Plans also called for trin rudders, one on either side of the row of engine exhausts, foldirg wingtips to insure stability at all speeds, and a longitudinal control surface on each side of the fuselage just to the rear of the crew ? compartment.-

e) The B-7O progran was bare\r under way r*ren the Air Force proposed accelerating development, but it was slowed instead. Developnent of high- ener$r fuel- suitable for the B-7O was cancelled in the sunner of 1959, as was the F-1O8 interceptor progran n?rich had financed the development of escape capsules and other equipment that could be adapt€d to the B-7O. FinalJy, on 1 December 1959 the Departrnent of Defense (DOD) drastical-ly curtailed the bomber progran, cancelling contracts for essential military subsystems. AlL that remained rras a cormitrnent to manufaeture two proto- t1rye B-7Ots that were mere shells of the complex weapon systen souglrt by the aI Aj.r Force. fr (U) Thomas S. Gates, Secretary of Defense during the last two years of the adninistration of President Drright D. Eisenhower, told Congress irr Janyry 195O that technical as rell as tactical considerations had persr:aded hin to cut back the B-7O progr€rn. I?re technical problems stemed fnm ttre ruse of metals and cornponents . . . still in the researeh stagertt but the tactical objections focused on the basic question of the need for a manned UilCLASSIFIED bonber in the missile age. the progran, Secretary Gates e:cplained, was geared to produce in 1955 a manned system ltdesigned for nassive retaliation as part of our strategic deLerrent.rt Ert Minutemanr Titan, and Atlas--three highly regarded missiles--rrould be fully operational at about the sane time, a'nd he questioned w|ether the B-70rs, at a cost of $5.5 biflion, could do more than add trdiversificationtr to the retaliatory force. Since the Eisenhower admin-

istration was not convi-r:ced that the B-70 ttwould rea11y be as effective ' ' ' as missile systems are antieipated to bertt it had elected to build tro 5 demonstration aircraft rather than plmge atread rith systerr development' (u) Dr:ring the Presidential campaign of 1950, w?rich saw considerable debate over American nilitary policy, the B-7O wre:Pectedty asstned new

irnportance. A week before election day, Secretary Crates released sone $155 nj.ll-ion appropri.ated by Congress but previously rithheld by the executive

branch, bringing to $265 mil-lion the amount that could be spent on the B-7O during fiscal year 1961. In releasing this rnoney, the adninistration changed the program objective from the fabrication of prototlrye aircraft to demon- 6 stration of a full-fledged B-7O weapon system. (U) Ttris decision, according to the Wa1l Street Journal, had obvious political inplications, for it served to cowtter Democratic charges that the Eisenhower adninistration--and by association the Republican candidate, Vice President Richard M. Nixon--had placed balancing the federal budget before providing an adequate national defense. Besides helping refirte Democratic arggtents, the decision heralded additional ernployment for aircraft workers promised to be in California, where the vote "1o'"'7 (U) Ca,npaigning at the time in California, Senator John F. Kennedyt the Dmocratic candidate, took note of the Republican administrationrs

ul{ctAsstFtED U1{CLASSIFIED l+

sudden change of heart, inquiring of a San Di.ego audidnce nwhy they did it this r*eek.tt The senator then hailed efforts by menbers of his own party who had increased the amor:nt appropriated for the B-7O beyond wtrat Pregident

Eisenhower had asked. tfl ntrol-eheartedly endorse the B-7O manned aircraftrrt l,[:n. Kennedy deelared.S

{ New Setback (U) Prospects for the B-70 seemed excellent as l96L began. Senator Kennedy, wtro had declared in favor of the B-7O during his unsuccesefirl bid for Californiars el-ectoral votes, defeated Vice President Nixon in the Novernber election. In his last budget which was subject to change by the incoming adninistration, President Eisenhower accepted a W.T billion B-ZO program that would produce as manJr as a dozen e:gerimental craft and, if the system demonstrated its worth, perrrit the deployrnent of an operational force in 1968. To begin this great\y e:panded undertaking, he specifically requested $358 nillion for fiscal year 1962.9 (U) Errgene M. Zuckert, president Kennedyrs choice as Secretary of the

Air Force, recormended that the new administration retain the $359 nillion in its budget request. Shortly after his appointment as Chief of Staff, usAF in July 1951, General curtis E. LeMay presented argunents in support of this recommendation before a Senate subconm:ittee. He paid tribute to the

B-?Ors flexibility, *rich he broadly deffued as the ability to l-ocate and attack targets not preciseJy identified, to report the results of attacks by other weapons, to attack from any direction, to carry out shows of force imFossible with nissiles, and to respond to recall after being launched.

General LeMay declared that the rorst stumbling blocks to development were

ul{ctAsstFtED past. ItA1l the inventing has been donerrt he said. ttlhere are no maJor 10 technical problems facing us in the B-70 progran.tl (U) Despite President Kennedyrs earlier endorsernent' his administration exercised caution in pursuing B-70 development. Instead of the $358 nillion sought by the Ai-r Force, Secretary of Defense Robert S. Mcl{amara and his asked Congress for only $22O million. President Kennedy "d?i"."" desired to lirnit e:penditures to $1.3 biJ-lion ntrich would restrict development to only the airfra,me, engines, and bmb-navigation system and cancel work on other components vital to an integrated weapon system' the program woul-d be reduced to about vrfrat it uas before the 196O eLection camp"ign.1l (U) Itre reasons for this cauti-ous approach were similar to those given by Secretary Gates during the 1959 cutback. The Kennedy adninistration objected to beginning developnent of an integrated B-7O weapon system in 1961 because it either night not be needed or prove to be only a marginal weapon, the neu bonber, Secretary McNamara argued, could riot become operational until well after L965. At that time a large nunber of reliable intercontinental nissiles uould already have been deployed. Housed-in under- gror:nd lar.nchers, these new ueapons would be far less vullerable to surprise attack ttran B-?Ots based at airfields. Sovi-et progress in antiaircraft rnissifesr moreover, nould make it increasing\y difficult for the B-70 to penetrate at the altitqdes for rtrich it had been designed. To operate at lower altittrdes, wtrere Russian missiles would be less effective, it would have to fly at subsonie speed. Nor was the B-70 designed to carry*grissiles that rrculd enable it to renain outside the range of defensive weapons and still destroy the targets these ueapons protected. Secretary McNatnara

( tHraelca rs .lScLASsrFrED) therefore opposed an erpanded B-7O effort but he assured Congress that the adrrinistrationrs program would preserve the option to deveJ.op and deploy an integrated weapon system by the end of 1!69, should this be necessary for national security.u

9) Although the adminj.stration desired only S220 million, Congress appropriated $4OO million. Secretary McNarnara, as his predecessor had done in slmilar circumstances, released only the amount he had requested. Congres- sional opinion therefore had no direct effect on the fiscal 1962 prog."*.f3 (U) Facing a $f.3 billion ceiling, the Air Force set about deter:ni-ning just wtrat could be done for that amount. On 20 Aprit 196I Secretary Zuckert advised Secretary McNamara that three aircraft could be conpleted. T?re first e:perimental eraft would be followed in nine months by the second; the third, completed nine months after the second, rrculd contain a prototype bonbing- navigation systenr. Target date for the first B-Zo flight ras December Lg62y

Fron B-7O to RS-7O O This financial limitation, together rith the adm:lnj.strationrs lack of enthusiasm for the B-7O, conpe].led a reassessment of the w?role subject of manned bombers. At secretary McNanarars request of 2 June 1961, the

Air Force scrutinized possible alternatives to the F-TO, among then the

B-58r an improved version of the F*58t a long-endurance aircraft designed to larurch rdssiles, and a nucrear-powered aircraft.l5

Of More irnportant, the Air Force revised the B-7O coneept to meet the obJections raieed by two successive Secretaries of Defense. Drring the sunmer and faII of 1961, it shifted emphasis from bombardment to

.,r,.f ffh {ffir

aircraft in- reconnaissance-strike. The B-?O sired the RS-?O' a proposed reconnaissance; (z) tended to provide (1) timely, accurate, and sel-ective be subject to positi've control, in that after taking to the air it r.lorrld in ttre direc- recap or diversion to an alternate target; (:) ffexibility the nanner of tion and, since it carried missiles as wefl as bombs, in of targets' iagluding attack; and finally the ability to destroy all sorts I6 missile sites. Jarruary 1962 (c) In order to begin development of the R^S-7o, on f2 of the iryowded the Air Force requested the jmnediate release of $80 nillion of sensors and other fiscal year 1962 fi:nds for development and procurement prototype B-70 to aceomodat'e components and for modification of the third at least $32O this equipment. The Air Force estimated that it would need nirl-ion to continue development through fiscal year r963-L7 O'tl 19 Jariuary Secretary O) The RS-?g proposal met a prompt rebuff' was required to deterrnine t*rether McNamara said that a great deal more study cost of development and a reconnaissance-strike system was worth the high year L963 to $171 milliont production. He limited the B-7O pro8ram in fiscal appropriated the previous to be drar.rn from the balance of the $4oo million 'lQ Research year.*- short\y after this announcernent, the Director of Defense informed the Air Force that its and &rgineering (onnaa), Dr. Harold Brown, that rrdevelopment of request for RS-70 ftrnds had been denied. He observed aircraft is congidered a reconnaissance-strike systen for manned strategic ttthe state of the art is suffi- desi.rablett but questioned wtrether present 19 In March Dr' Bror' cient to support system development at this time." obtainedSecretaryMcNarnarargapprovalfortheAirForcetosutmita

* €t0*Irr development plan for the sort of radars requ5"red by a reconnaissance-strike system. One such radar, a prototlrye side-looking set, could be tested in the thid B-70 or in another suitable aircraft. No such plan nras subrnitted, however, because of an une:pected renenar of interest in the Rs-zo.2o

The Re.iectiog of the RS-70

0, 0n 8 March 1962, after hearing usAF and OsD views on the RS-ZO, Representative CarI Vinson, Chairman of the House Armed Senrices Cormittee, cha'llenged both Secretary McNamarars opinion of the RS-70 weapon syatem and the tactic, enployed by Secretaries Gates and McNamara, of irnporrnding money appropriated by Congress for the B-lO progran. rI for onern said Repr.esenta- tive ViJtson, ftdo not believe that aIL the e:perts are in the Departrnent of

Defensertt and he warned that his comittee r.ras ttgoing to use uqr knowledge and not act as a rubber stamp to programs furnished ready-nade by the Departnent of Defense.tf lhe cornnittee thereupon produced a report.lhat directed Secretary McNamara to spend $lgf niffion on RS-ZO developnrent durj.ng fiscal year L963. T?ris anount uas ilre ninimr.un ttrat the Air Force believed necessary and took into account delays caused by secretary McNamarars earLier rejection of the less ambitious proposal. ttlf this language constitutes a test as to wtrether Congress has the power to so rnn- daterr said Mr. Vinson referriag to the directive to !tr. McNamara, trlet this test be mad.e, and let this important t{eapon system be the field of trial.rr2I

{|) Wary of a clash with Representative Vinson, President Kennedy succeeded in working out a comproni-se that avoided debate on the constitutional authority of Congress to conrpel the executive branch to spend appropri-ated fwrds. In return for Secretary McNanarars pronuise to begin

r #3ffih 9

vinson agreed to at once a new study of the lis-?o proposal, Representative the Secretary rrithd.raw his constitutional cha"l:lenge. lnstead of directing appropriation biIL of Defense to spend at least $491 nillion, the House then r{uced the merely authorized hin to do so. A Senate-House conference .22 amowtt Lo $362.6 million, drich Congress finally appropraateo' a)Asthiscornpromiserra3beingreached,anadhoccom:itteeofthe C'en' scientific Advisory Boatd subnitted its views on the proposed R'5-7O' General lrMay thatt Jameg H. Doolittle, Retired, corraittee chairnanr told minority felt that although the menbers favored the developnent effort, a as the Air technical obstacles nould prevent the system from performing to go ahead and Force desired. General Lel'lay accepted the reconrnendation about eve4r success- pointed out that some persons had entertained nisgivings fuJ' development oto*t*.'3 .a^ under'-'5ecretary q? secr.etary McNanara directed Dr. Joseph charyk, supenrised of the Air Force, to undertake the pronised study. Dr' Charyk justified both the the preparation of docwnents that, to the Air Force, Zuckert technical feasibiLi-ty and strategic value of the R'S-?o' secretary wing in therefore proposed a prograrn intended to produce an operational

:|96g.2ln review of thanrogran 3) Ttre Jojnt chiefs of staff, after a lengthy agreed on 28 Septem- change proposal that embo ied the basic nS-7O request, berLg62toamemorandumfortheSecretaryofDefensethatrecongnended rrdemonstrate the of granting the Air Force sufficient funds to feasibility tnalln€f.rt on the follow- the aircraft and associated subsystems in a timely term ended ing day, the Ckrairman, Gen. Iyman L. Lemunitzer, rtrhose ;#F 10

september, l0 signed the memorandun. As this recsrunendation ras being dis- patched, the Jcs received fron the secretary of Defense a menorandum, dated 28 Septenber, that indicated a tentative decision against the Rs-7o.25 or 1 October e) secretary McNamara conferred rith the Jcs, now headed by Gen' Maxrell D. Taylorr and suggested that they reconsider their earrier endorgement of the Rs-7o and, if their position renrained the sarnel provJ.de more detailed reasong for their views. on 2 Novenber, after the Cuban missile crisis, the JcS recornnended constmction of at least five e:perimental craft to determine the feasibility of the R.s-Zo. when General Taylor fortrarded thj's rec@mendation'on 6 Novenber he erpressed personal agreeurent rith Secretary McNamara that the program shouid not be undertaken but did recornrnend ttdirecting nrd,ximun efforb torrard the development of an advanced reconnaissaice aircraft . . . of high reliability and great ra^ge.tt 26 Later jn G November the adrninistration added $5O nif1t.,db ttre B-7o program for the development of sensors suitable for a reconnaissance- strike system' secretary Zuckert interpreted this action as reaffinnation of secretary McNamarars opposition to the Rs-70 proposar and a deci.sion to restrj'ct development to work on sensors beginning rrith the completion of ttre third B-?O.27 Ttris e) interpretation was justified. the secretary of Detense did not retreat frsn the posi-tion he had set forth to the Jcs and which GeneraL Taylor had supported. Instead of the $491 milli.on sought for fiscal year 1963 ot the $362'5 niuion actually appropriated, the Air Force noul-d be al-lowed to spend about $2o7 million on the three e:perimental B-/ors rather than on the proposed Rs-20.28 I t't'"il 11.

B-?0 Technical ProUiqq. rejectedt (u) while the RS-70 proposal was being studied and final-Iy the date the B-7o rras encountering severe technical problems that caused for the first flight, set for December L962, to recede well into L9&' These difficulties involved the aj-r induction control systeur, secondary power of generating subsystem, corrosion of honeycomb netal panels' a mismatch w'ing stub and wing, and leaks jn the fuel tanks'29 air (u) Developing a fulIy automatic system for regulating the flow of and liorth to ttre jet engines proved too much for the original subcontractor' ldorth American had to take over the uork. To avoid losing more time, induction control American installed in the first B-7O a type of manual air automatic deviee' system that hacl originally been planned ag backup for the version for the i{hi}e this rrnas being done, work went a}read on an autonati'c second ana iniro aircraft.3o current (u) The secondary power generating subsystem, ntrich provided proved rrnsatisfactory' to ttre plxmps that naintained hydraulic pressuret also boxes' and the Excessive vibration caused failures jn the generator gear steadied the gear hydraulic pleps frequently broke doun. Additional braces withstand the boxes, but the pleps had to be rebuilt using metals able to pressure intense heat of supersonic operati-ons as well as the e:

I (tgTS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED) T2 JFffiF*

steel" honeycomb placed hetween two thin sheets of stailless steeL. When corr''osion appeareci, the affected area had to be cleaned, examined for structural damage, and replaced if n""""".O.3'

(O North American had anticipated that wing and ring stub nould not match exactly but r.ras confident that the error could be held to rithin one- tenth of an inch and compensated for quite easily. When the time cane to the trvo ioin sections, however, the misrnatch turned out to be as much as three-quarters of an inch. As a result, the conpany had to use jacks to get the parts into closer jrutaposition, jnsert an H-beam betrveen rcing stub and 'the r+-jng, and smooth and strengthen joint by adding panels and internal bra""".33 (U) the most difficult problern was finding a suitable sealant for the fuel tanks. As C,eneraJ- LeMay described the task for a House subconnritt""z34 we have not been abre to rnanufacture these things to keep then fron having rittle pinholes in the welds. some of the pintroles . . . rrculd hold f'el arl rigfit, but this air- p}3le is going to operate at Maeh 3 wtrich-means the stmcture wiIL heat up to 5@o or 6000. Ihil neans the fuel is goiog to get hot. Having hot fuel, the r\mes above it, if ii nixes with air you have .an e:plosive mi:rbure. rn order to reduce the hazarrc of the e:plosive nix- tur", you do not alrow air in the-taqfs. Nitrbgen is added nnder ten pounds pressure thanfuel.,.. . , . L&d is much harder to hold (U) To solve the problen, North American engineers tried grinding the welds and brazing the se€trm. ltris failed, and because none of the available sealants could n'ithstand tenperatures of lQOo or above, new synthetics had to be developed for the job. This, more than aqy other techni.caL di-fficulty, delayed the first flight untit tg6U.35

t L3

Ttre Prograrn 9onttued (U) Correctjng the various technical fail.ings disrupted schedules and cost money. In Febrrrary 1963 John L. Atwood, president of North American Aviation, after pointing out that nno action of the Air Force durilg the past 22 months has impaired completion of the XB-?O airplanerrt adsdtted that his firrn was trwtable to progran the corryletion of the three airplanes within the funds allocated.tt He suggested that Secretary Zuckert obtain the begin release of an additional $25 million so that North American could fabrj-cating the second and third aircraft. In this way the firm coul-d avoid falr ing farther behind schedule and incurring greater deficits trying to catch up. Additional amor:nts, howeverr would have to be released during fiscal year I95l if the three-plane program rrnas to be completed'36 (a) At the recommendation of the Air Force, secretary McNamara efec- ted to keep the three-aircraft program alive but at the e:gense of sensor the development, rdrich had been approved only three months earlier' Of reassj-gned $35'8 $50 nil$.on earmarked for the developnent of sensors, he nillion to sustain the B-7O effort and stated that disposition of the remainder year 1953' wouLd arait a decision on the fiscal 1964 program' Drrjng fiscal he had ttre B-?0 progran thus exceeded by $35.g mi]jlion the $171 million that released origina}ly. The total of $206.8 nillion feIL far short, howevert

of the &362.6 nj.Ilion appropriated for that year by Congre"".37 (u) For fiscal year 1964 trre Air Force requested $156 miltion to con- this tinue wor* on three prototype aircraft, and Secretary McNamara accepted estimate. He told congress that he intended to provide this amolrnt by year 1963 tut releasing $81 nriltion or1ginally appropriated for fiscal jffi 14

deferred for later use, adding $51 nilrion of fiscar year 1963 funds that had been kept in reserve for emergencies, and turning over the g1r+.2 million remaijling from the original sensor fund of $5o niuion. For fiscal year 1965 trre Secretary of Defense anticipated a $9e niUion progr€lm , $55 nillion to come fron Lhe cancelled Qyna-soar and the remainder fr.qn the fiscal year 1963 appropriatiop. The e:penditure of another $25 nillion during fiscal year lt966 would conrplete the program. Predicted B-Zo development costs were now $1.5 billlon, $200 nillion above the original ceiling inposed by the Kennedy administration in 1961.38 (U) Despite the difficulties in assembling the first B-ZO and the rj'sing costs of development, General LeMay continued to advocate reviving

the defunct RS-ZO proposal. In April 1963 he told a Senate subcolrunittee that ttthe Rs-7o is the one we should go fu1]. bl"ast on now to replac" tht B-52': If not the RS-7o, he continued, tts@e other system has to be brouglrt for*rarrlrrt such as one of those current\r under study by the Aj"r Force. These possibilities tta included long-ranger n:issile larrnching airplane, an airplane designed specifically for low altitrrde penetration, and . e r 01€ using the advanced state of the art for a high altitude airplans.n 39 O) 'Ihe Air Force rras primarily concerned at this time, however, wiur keeping the .B-7O progrim r*ithin the gI.5 billion li-uritation than rrriti breath_ ing new life into the RS-zo proposal. To keep work going on the three prototl4pes, it decided upon a cost-p1us-incentive-fee contract for the remainder of the progran that would reward North American for savi.ng money. rn May 1963 lhe company signed the agreement and it went into effect in The July' new contract estabrished a target cost of $576.7 milrion, rtre L5 companyuou].dreceive'besidesabasicfee,2opercentofthefirstt}rree savings in excess of percent trinned fron this anount and 10 percent of all beyond three percent three percent. this scale was adopted because savings fee nould be reduced if seerned aIL but impossible. sirnilarly, the basic North American exceeded the target amol nt'40

iCI| ! final gutback 3)Despitetheclosewatchkeptontheprcgran,B-Tocostscontinued task of finding to rise during Lg63, largely because of the tinne-consrning team appojnted by the B-70 an adequate sealant for the fuel tanks. A study continuing the progra,n director, Brig. Gen. !!ed J. Ascanir recomnended reIL rithin the three-plane effort v*rich, it claimed, could be finished cunent lirlitation of $1.5 billion'E of a B-7O F) But Secretary zuckert held that siJrce the development neaponsystemwasoutofthequestion,theprograncouldbestsenrethe proving the nation by denonstrating the feasibility of Mach 3 flightt thus construction' technical jnnovations incorporated in the planers design and Secretary maintajned that Seconded by the Chief of Staff, on 2O February the were the prcgrarr would make a greater contribution if the third aircilft conpletion rvere abandoned and some of the $60 niltion required for its bound to arise'rt In reser:ved rrto accoronodate thOse contingencies that are Isignificant ntmber of fligltt this way, two B-7Ors could be subjected to a In March 1954 test hourstr without exceeding the ljrn:it of $1'5 billion' plane'E Secretary McNamara approved ending flork on the third called for the A flne B-?O progran, as a result of this cutback, hours of fligfit fabri-cation of two aircraft fo].loued by a total of I8O ..{ *,tlffifih;."-d Lo

testing rith the final test flight before 30 llovember L965. Both aircraft were buj.Lt: the first flew in september tg64 the second in July of the

following year. lhe goal of corpleting 18O hours of flight testing by the end of Novernber 1955 proved r:nattainable, however, and on that date the Air Force was planning to finish in March or April Lg66.B O As the B-?o program neared its concLusion, the Air Force, with concunence in Novqnber L965, negotiated an agreernent rrith National Aero- nautj-cs and Space Adninistration (f,nSA), rlhereby the latte" rrould "g.r,"i share in the costs of flight testing beyond the current ter:ninal date of April 1955. NASA nould recej-ve i-nfonnation applicable to its supersonic transport prcgran wtrile the Air Force would obtain general data on supersonic flight. Ttre Air Foree and NASA wouLd each pay half the eost of a flight test program of 162 hours that was schedul-ed over 18 months and involved the use of both B-/Ors. Ttre esti-rnated cost to the Air Flrce rras ffi7.2 nillion, r*rich would raise the total prograrn cost to $1.489 bi11ion, just under the $1.5 billion cei1ins.44

What Went Wrong Q) Ttre XB-7O was now wtrolly an e:iperiirenLal aircraft. Built of steel and titanir.un and por*ered by six IJ-93 General- Electric engines, it was designed to have an operating range of 4r0OO nautical nniles, a ceiling of

77 rw feet, and a marcimrm speed or J r?2o knots above 6jrooo feet. rts pri- nary purpose was to |tdemonstrate airworthiness in a sustained Mach 3 test environmeslJ l+5 (U) Whatever its contributions to future supersonic aircraft, niili.tary or conmercialr the B-70 progran faiLed to provi-de a replacernent for the F-52. uilctAsslFlED 17

part in Secretary Zuckert held that techriological risks had pleyed a major here"t he the failure of the 8S-?O and B-70' ttl think v*rat was atteryted rfwas of told a House subcoilurittee in the sprin g of 196l+. a conbination togethert you changes, of advances in the art . . . €Uld nhen you put these product of the do not get just the sum of the uncertainties, you get the uncertainties." L6 (U) After his retirenrent in Septernber L965t Mr. Zuckert wrote that tfbetter by the lrdialoguerf concerning the B-70 disclosed a need for honerork present infor- ttre Air staff before we c€une in with a position.tt It had to of mation more precisely than waE custmary and exanine the consequences houever' possj.ble courses of action rnore close\r. He absolved the Air Staff' ttquestion from gu:ilt in the death of the B-TO.- attributing it to 3 of ' ' ' the rnrlnerabilityn gr", ttcould not be satisfactorily €trllslrr€t€d.tt Because of the B-70 capabilities of Br.rssj.an antiaircraft missiles, he doubted that to replace could ever have fi}led a genuine requirement for a manned bmber

],jlre t-l52ts.L7 Air (u) cen. Thomas s. Power, Comnander in chief of the strategic that had plagued Conmand (CIUCSAC), was thorougfr)y faniliar with the troubles he wrotet the program. tfWtrat really rkilledr this airplane' in ny opinion'tt r&ich r\ras the fact that it rras designed for fliglrt at very high altitudes becane a seri'ous was very desj.rable at the tirne it was conceived. Bgt this altitude deficiency r*ren the sovi.ets developed their octensive systanr of hi!!r antiaircraft missiles.r 48 took (u) secretarT McNanara, testifling before a HouEe subcomittee, eristing the position that failure uas the inevitable result of pressing

ullcLASSlFlElI 18 u1{ctAsstFtED technolory to ttre linit in an effort to produce s@ething for r*rich there was no real need. rfl think, with hindsigtrtrr he said, ?|rrrc can say very clearly that the requirement is slil'l not proven. I?re technologr is stlll to be fuuy proven out.rt He added that, to ttre best of his knowledge, ttthere igntt a single senior giyitian or military official in the Departnent of Defense r*ro, today, lrould recmnend the B-zo . , . .r, lng

(U) this staternent ras nade after the departrre of General Lelt{ay, r,*ro retained an abiding enthusiagn for the RS-70. He placed the blane for faj-Iure on the enatic fashion in r*rich the Departrnent of Defense-presrnab\r under Mr. Gates as weIL as Mr. McNanara-had srpported the developnent effort. the program, ceneral Lel.tay contended, had.suffered frm a sqgqession of go- aheads, reappraisals, reversals, and budgetaty ceilings that nade 11re B-?O ttdead a end programtr rithout possibility of e:qpansion. Ttrus, ,rdren . . . you run into a technical problem . . . you go out to industrlr al't over the country to try to get soneone to help you solve j.trn but because of the linited fi:nds available, ttno one is interested and you donrt get the prpper ta-lent.tt this rack of interest, he naintained, ras the faqlt of the Departnent of Defense and ras the ieason that technical problems had dragged on for so manJr nonths before being so1ved.5O

(U) T?re kind of crash development progran desired by General Lel.{ay had, 5rr fact, been rured out shortry after rlork began. As ear\y as L959, the Department of Defense had doubted that the F-TO' already beset b;r technical problerns, eras a necessarTr addition to the strategic force. political considerations during the 1960 Presidential car,rFaign caused both parties to show an interest in the bonber, but once the ba'llots rpre counted, the new

u1{crAsstFtED L9 adrn-i.nistration, Iike the old, began doubting its operational va1ue. $or did these doubts diminish wtren the Air Force proposed talcing a B-70 airframet with wtrich the manufacturer uas having serious difflculties, loading it with elebtronic sensors that the Secretary of Defense considered erqperirnenfal, and calling the result an R'5-70. (U) The ultjmate cause of the failure ras the disbelief, shared by trrro adninj.strations, that the B-?O could do a useful iob. Ttre Air Force could find no argtrrent to ref\rte objections based on the probable effectiveness of Soviet antiaircraft nissiles against high flying bombers. If a new manned strategic aircraft was to be developed, the administration nould have to be convjnced that the plane could penetrate Soviet defenses and perfotm some essential mission better than it could be done by ballistic mj-ssiles.

(rnrs P&E rs uwtAssrFrnD) 20

II. TI{E ADVANCED MANI{ED STMIEGIC AIRCRATT

(t) W 1963 the RS-7O proposal was dead and the B-Zo had become exct-u- sively a research vehicle. Neither wouJ.d replace Lhe bJ2, the last of wtrich came off the assembly line the year before. The Air Force now undertook various studies to devise a manned bomber that yould weather the sort of criticiirn that had been directed against the B-70 and its reconnaissance- strike variant. At the end of June, a l,Ianned Aircraft Studj.es Steering Group

(UassC;' headed by the office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Develop- ment, was exarrining three likely possibiJ-ities: a low-altitude nanned penetrator, a long-endurance aircraft, and a supersonic reconnaissance craft. II{ASSG eventually agreed that the ]ow-al-titude manned penetrator wil,s most promising. In the meantirne, Froject Forecast, a major Air Force effort to calculate its future needs, also reconnnended development of an advanced manned system. Ihe reconrnendations of the two groups served as the basis for an advanced manned strategie aircraft (aUsa) "on"upt.1 (C) The planners sought high perforrrance at every altitude wtrile ertphasizing operations at extrene\r Low altitudes to fmstrate radardirected antiaircraft missiles. The new Al"lSA craft was e:qpected to attain bursts of speed uP to l[ach 2.5 at high al.titudes, Mach 1.2 when 20O feet above flat terrain, and about Mach .9 at low altitudes over rolling tenain. T6is versatility would stern fron its variable wing and its radar. The wing would rotate into aLmost a delta shape for supersonic flight or e:ctend at nearly right angles to the fuselage for takeoffs and subsonic operations. The radar would guide the plane over natural obstacles. AMSA was to possess an unrefueled :t ffiEF r {;lffP 2L range of 5'OOO miles, of which 2,OOO was to be floun at l'iach .85 at sea levelt be abl-e to take off fron a 5rOoo-foot runway, &d carry both bonbs and mis- 2 s].J.es.

(t) The missile envisioned for the proposed aircraft ruas the shor{- range attack missile (SRAM). The Air Force had begrm preliminary nork on it in January Ig()3, following cancelJation of the Skybolt air-Iaunched ballistic missile. Preliminary studies indicated that SRAM rvould enhance the striking power of the B-52 and also be adaptable to the F-Itl tactical fighter. Project Forecast concluded that this missile was the weapon best suited to a manned penetrator. When the AMSA concept energedr SRAM rrras arnong the weapons the plane would """ry.3 (U) Gen. Berna1rl A. Schriever, Conmander sf Air Force Systams Cotmand

(lfSC) and director of Project Forecast also urged a far more ambitious AI'XSA w?rich would perrnit trypersonic flight by incorporating wrtested advances in aerodynamics, propulsion, and metallurry. Its engines nould be hydrogen tthitting fueled, its wings woul-d retract rather than fold, and it uould carry i missifestt that would be launched from the bomb-bay. The Air Foree, however, continued to advocate a less revolutionary design based on characteristics

derived from I,IASSG and Forecast.4

The Request for a New Manned Bomber

(U) Before MASSG had reached a concl-usion whether to reconrnend develop-

ing a manned penetrator, a long-endurance type capable of lar:nching missilest or a supersonic reconnaissance plane, the f.ir Force on 3 Ju\r 1963 made a routine request for the inclusion of $25 nriLlion in the fiscal year 1955 *o budget in order to begin development of whichever weapon system night be selected. For this arnount, the Air Force could undertake project definition, 22

that is, produce data on probable costs, tirne needed for developnent, and technical risks' rf the results were satisfactory, it rrculd be in a position to contract for further work.5 (a 0n 3 septernber * the 0ffice of the secretary of Defens" (oso) announced a tentative decision to nake $15 nillion available for project definition of a tlenetrating strategic aircraft capable of operating fron zr bases'rr the plane would rtcomplement the ballistic n:issile force in a post attack environrnent.r, 5

6 rnfLuenced by these instnrctions, rrAssc set aside the reconnaissance and long-endurance aircraft projects to concentrate on an advanced manned penetrator capable of supersonic speedb at high or low aLtitude. studies showed that such an aircraft r,vouLd be preferable to improved versions of the &.47, B-j2, and B-5g. rt would arso be preferabre to both bomber desipgrs of the F-111A, one rrrith the original shape and the other uith an elongated fuserage to provide more room for fuel and electronic equiprnent.Z a) Iate in 0ctober, the Deputy chiefs of staff, plans and operations, Programs and Requirernents, and Research and Development--Lt. Gens. william H. Bj'anchard, David A. Burchinal, and James Ferguson, respectiveJ;r--conferred. rith General schriever at Forecastrs west coast headquarters. They compared IvIASsGts penetrator with the advanced precision strike system recomnended by Forecast and discovergd that the proposals were easily reconci.ed. r?re Air Force thus established the characteristics desired for its advanced marrned bomber.S

Aq rn the meantime, secretary McNamara had changed his mind about beginning project definition for the advanced strategic aircraft. The 23

year L965 buciget for research and development provided only tentative fiscal r*\ $5 n:;i1lion for the r:ndertaking, too little to finance more than prelirninary studies,9 tpt The Air Force tri.ed to persuade Secretary McNanara to restore enough money to pern:it beginning the definition phase as quickly as possible'

General LeMay was especially eager because he doubted that the B-ltts dnd B-58rs would last into the nid-l97Ots as Secretary McNamara maintained. The Chief of Staff advocated an irurediate authorization to reprogran, $5 m:illion of fiscal year 1964 firnds jn order to begin immediate\y on project definitj-on. To continue development through fisca] year 1965, he urged the appropriation of $78 million for engi-nes, aVionics, and the airframe itself. Secretaly ;tf Zuckert supported C,eneral LeMay and on 4- November L963 made essentially the same recormendation to the Secretary of Defense.l0 gf In his reply on 19 November, Secretary Mclrlamara stated that l4inute- nan was more 1ikely to survive enery attack than was a manned bomber. He nade it clear that he would not cqutrit the Departarent of Defense to so e>pensive a progran unless he received more valid justification for developing a manned system and a clearer picture of wtrat the proposed aircraft was

sr.pposed to do.1l

Ttre LeMav Proposal A Despite this initial setback, Ceneral LeMay listed the proposed manned strategic aircraft as the Air Forcets most important project. 'Qping

a JCS meeting in late December 1963 al the Texas ranch of President L;rndon B. Johnson, the Chief of Staff advocated pushing atread with the penetrator, nhich he called the inproved manned strategic aircraft.U ffirhr ?.tt ,-:{ l 2L tt!illr

A In descri.bing the aircraft, General Lel'{ay stressed its capability for foiling enemy radar and antiaircraft rni"ssiles by hugging the earthrs surface, its flexibility in corparison with bal-listlc nissiles, its super-

sonic speed, and its capacity to strike rrith either bombs or SMMts. The plane, he noted, would be large enough to accomnodate sizeable firel tanks as werl as elaborate radar, infrared, and photographic gear. During his

conversation with the Pregident, General LeMay indicated he rrcu1d again ask for authority to reprogram $5 miUion in fiscal year 1954 funas in order to begin pro;ect definition. He r.rould arso seek a fiscal year 1965 b'dget of about $5O miltion, nain\y for the development of engines and "riorri"".l3 A Forlowi-ng this neeting the Jcs revier+ed General LeMayrs proposal and on 20 January 1954 reconmended proceeding rrith both project definition rdesign and uork . . . on long-lead-time items.tt But the Chair:nan, Gerreral 't Taylor, stated that he wanted further ilformation on wtrat the aircraft was e:pected to do, how rnany r.rould be produced, and t*ry the service chiefs favored a comnitnent beyond project definition. He supported beginning project definition but wanted to have the results of this phase before pro-

ceeding w"ith the development of engines or other corqronents. Ttre data pr"ovided by the service chiefs in answer to these questions did not cause

General Taylor to change hj.s m:ind. In March the JCS, less the Chairman, reconrnended that Secretary McNarnara endorse the LeMay p.opo""I.U "** 9) The Air Force, neanr,rhile, had drar.rn up a financial request for

$52 rdllion in fiscal year 1965: $15 nillion for project definiti.on; $26 ur:if- lion for advanced development of engines; and $IL nillion for advanced development of an avionics systern. Over the objections of Secretary McNanara, 25

requested firnds' Congress accepted this estimate in ful'l and appropriated the bill.I5 On 21 August 1964 President Johnson signed the appropriation

The Progran Eeeirts td Although the Air Force had persuaded Congress to appropriate wtrether the enough money for project definition, it remalned to be seen executive branch uould release the fr:nds or impound them, as it frequently USAF request for had done with the B-70. Throughout the discussion of the go atread with the AI4SA funds, Secretary McNamara had been reluctant to definition phase. In his opinion the Air Force had not yet produced a pre- Ii:ninary study that justified embarking-on 30 elpensive an undertaking' Nor because the did he accept the USAII argtmrent that work had to start at once r4 .{' fleet of B-52rs and B-5grs would wear out in the earry ltlots.*' a prograln change proposal G, ArL Zg August Secretary Zuckert subrnitted that set forth the fiscal year 1965 A}fijA effort and outlined what was con- OSD to sidered necessary for the following fiscal year. He called for purpose approve the beginning of project definition, release for that $15 in million from the fiscal year 1965 appropriation, and provide $'77 nillion proved fiscal year 1966 to continue development if the definition phase propuLsion successfirl. He requested reLease of $26 ndll-ion for work on a systen and assurance that $30 million would be available the followingftear' he desired Besides the release of $11 rdltion to begin avionics development, developme"t'f7 $14 nri1lion in the 1966 budget request to continue this skeptical O) Secretary McNamarar s reaction showed that he remained for toward AMSA. On 21 October 1954 DDRse approved refease of $3 million 1s1 S'ini lar analysi.s and defj-nition of a propulsion system and {12 mi}lion frffip'.4 26

work on an avionics systern. Late the following month, however, the Secretary

of Defense limited the fiscal year 1965 eftorb to $ZB miffion, includipg the

$5 nlttion already released. 0f the yearrs total, $5 nillion was ealuarked for what he called ttweapon system studiesrtt $7 nilllon for avionics, anajf6

millj-on for engines. Ihe Secretary deferred the $21. nillion balance of the

$52 niltion appropriation until fiscal year L966, and jndicated he would ask

Congress for an additional $15 rnillion for that year to bring its total to

$39 million. His request for fiscal year 1967 nas tentatively set at $IL mill-jon. Ttre Air Force acquiesced, with the understanding that project defi-

nition coul-d be started if the vreapon system studies justified such an undertaking.lS

g) Once established, the program inched fonrard, with Urnited work done in engine development, avionics, and weapon system studies. In Febmar:f

1965 DDRS& released the rernaining $13 nil-l-ion of propulsion funds, but avionics development was slower in getting started. Vilork statenrents coverirrg the $2 n:illion released in October l96l+ were not approved until the folLowing l,Iay, and not until June nas the remaining $5 million released to the Air Force.

The $5 million set aside for weapon system studi.es becarne available in l,fay L965, wtren DDR&E approved the approach proposed by the Air Fo""e.19

O) In the meanti.ure, development had started on SRAM, tentatively planned for use rrith the F-111A and B-52 as well as with AIr{,SA. Sone confusj.on arose in February 1965 rrtren DDR&E reversed his earlier decision to incorporate a radar homing device in the missile, but the delay proved slight, and the follorrlng month Secretary McNamara appr.oved a development progran. foilo*- ing conpletion of the project definition phase, he rould decide wtrether to let contracts for full-scale developm"rrt.2o ji$riuil €[Qitt?,n 27

Progress Remajns Plcw (U) In pJ,anning for fiscal year 19(>6, Secretary McNamara concentrated his attention on avionics and propulsion, and postponed a decision on IIMSA as a weapon systern. His program for fj.scal year f965 renained wtrat he had outlj-:lred in the faIl of 1964: $39 million, of utrich $3 million was for con-

tjnuation of system studies; $12 nillion for avioni.cs; and $24 nniffion for propulsion. Avionics and propulsion developnent could produce systems applicable to several iacticaf or strategic aircraft whereas systen studies had

but one pw?ose--to fix AMSA characteristics and specifications. Elplaini-ng his emphasis on eLectronics and engines rather than the i:rtegrated systernt the Secretary said that he was primarily jnterested in retaining the option

to build AMSA rather than in rushing the plane into service. He favored nissiles over bombers for assured destnrcti-on but recognized that some unfore-

seen. change night restore the manned bomber to strategic prorninence and wanted ftto retaia the option to naintain indefinitely bonber units in our strategic offensive forces." 2! fi;) As far as the Air Force was concerned, AI'ISA was essential. Gen. John P. McConnell, who succeeded General LeMay as Chief of Staff on }-February

Lg65rshared the view of his predecessor that AItfSA enjoyed first priority within the service. Nevertheless, reductions in the previous yearrs pr!-

gram and Secretary McNanara? s skeptieism as to the value of Alt{SA were indications of further trouble to "o*"'22 (U) Although Congress once again seemed willing to appropriate more

money for AIiISA than Secretary McNamara requested, thi-s placed the Air Force

i-n an avrkwarri position, for the added funds mig,ht prove to be rnore than it could spend to good advantage. General McConnell pointed out that the Air ffi l, .$ ' t 28 dlilF

Force had soug,ht #52 million in fiscal year 1965 and $121 nillion in fiscal year 1966, but Secretary McNamara had cut the first sum by almost one-half and had waited r:ntil l-ate in the year before releasing the l-ast of this reduced amount. As a result, the Chief of Staff stated that ttwe could not spend all of the $l:t mlll"ion if it is given to us in the 1956 budget.rr

C,eneral Ferguson, Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and DeveLopment, added that,

because of the previous year?s cutbacks and delays, the g39 million-only $15 mill-ion of it new obligating authority--in the Presidentrs budget uould suffice.23

(U) I?re OSD progran would not perrrit beginning project definition during fiscal year 1966. General McConnell uas w"illing to accept a yearrs delay in order to develop an engine that rould improve the craftrs perform- €lnc€r Sufficient ftrnds, he said, rvere included in the budget to support propulsion.development through fiscal year 1!56. The Chief of Staff warned,

however, that a decj-sion on project definition could not be delayed beyond July 1965 if AMSA was to be available in time to replace the most modern of the B-52rs.24 *

(J, Despite usAF wilringness to accept osD funding plans, the senate

Armed Senrices Cqmittee advocated an authorization of $82 million for fiscal year 1955. Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrls R, Vance advised both the Senate and House Armed senrices corunittees that an additional $Z milIlon night prove useful but $82 m:illion was too much for the program to absorb. A conference conrr:ittee accepted the OsD recorunendation and added only $? nillion to the $15 ni'l'l,ion requested. This sran, plus the $el rniffion carried over from the prevlous year, made $46 million availab1e for further studies of the overall system and contjnued development of its engines and avioni"".25 29

3) Ttre entire $4.6 nillion was released to the Air Force by the end of

Jarrnary 1966. First to be made available was the $1O million allotted for aircraft systeur studies. Both the $at nif:-ion for advanced developrnent of engines a.nd the $12 miltion for avionics renained te'nForarily in reserve. h Decernber, however, DDR&E honored the USAF r.equest for $7 million ln avionics firnds, and it released the rernainder in January 1966. Also in 26 January, DDR&3 made avail,able the $24 nillion for propulsion.

(t) In the meantime, Secretary Zuckert had been trying to persr{e OSD to erpand the fiscal year 1967 program in order to permit contract deflnition, that part of the acquisition cycle that follor*ed concept fomula- tion.* In I'{ay he requested the addition of $L1.8 million--$8.J million for the aircraft and $2.3 mill"ion for propulsi-on--to the $lL nilLion effort outlined by the Secretary of Defense. the JCS, though they did not endorse the view of the Air Force Chief of Staff that ful-l-scale development ought to begin, also recormended adding this noney. Ihrt Secretary McNamara did not approve the request, taking the position that contract definition amounted to a cormitment to production. He remained unwilling to burden hinself w'ith a program about utrich he had serious doubts.27 d!{

The Task Ahead

3) Secretary Zuckertrs successor, Dr. Harold Brown, former\y DDR88, took office on I October 1965. Although the new secretary considered that funds for contract defiaition were inappropriate rithout a trdecisj.on to xAt this time Secretary McNamarars new terms for the acquisition cycle were concept formulation, contract definition, and production. Since the Air Force, and segnents of OSD as we1l, continued to substitute project definition for concept formul-ation and engineering development for contract defjnition, descriptions of AMSA and other programs uere sonenhat confirsed. n {I*FF 3O proceed with full-scale developmentrtr on 10 October he reconrnended ano jrcrease in AlvlSA funds for the con-ing fiscal year. Secretary Brown betr.ieved that ftadditional funds can most profitably be used for engine developnenttt sjnce this could be applicable to other aircraft as wel-I as AMSA, and he recommended that ttsome $,I0.0 million be added . . . for this purposs.rt Secretary McNamara did not accept this proposal, r*rich would have increased the fiscal year 1967 program to $21 million.28 O Secretary Bronn nexb revier+ed the way in wtrich the Air ForBo had tried to justify AMSA, and he concluded that the job had not been Aone wett39

No one jn OSD would support acquisition of a vreapon systern costing perhaps

$1.5 billion to develop and $1O billion over the first decade of its operational life unless he was absolutely convinced that tta1l other weapon systems have been measured against it ln terms of versatility and cost, as well as capability, ed found ranting.tt A reasoned e:position of this sort nould have to be made quickJy, Secretary Brown continued, if OSD was to reach a favorable decision in time to pernr-it development of a successor to the newest ?o of the P--J2re.t"

A As civilian head of the Departurent of the Air Force, DF. Brorrm, like his predecessor, became an advocate of a manned strategic aj.rcraft, though not necessarily of AIvfSA. He told the Chief of Staff that, wtrile the tradvent of long range ballistic missiles has clearly changed-and reduced-- the role of the strategic bomber jn thermonuclear warrrt he neverbheless believed that ttthe strategic bomber is needed as part of a balanced nissile/ bomber force for the foreseeabLe future.n 31 What sort of bomber routd fui- fill this need he nas not yet sure. Iater, i-rr the spring of L966, he suggested *lffir 3T

that two distinct types might be necessary, one for nuclear and the other for conventional *^r.32

€t Secretary McNamara saw no urgent need for AI,ISA. He noted the JCS recqmrendation for jncreasing the fiscal year 1957 prcgran but insisted

that the serrrice chiefs, save for the USAF Chief of Staff, shared his view that tteorunitment to full-scale development of the advanced manned strategic aircrafttt should not be made at this tjme. Instead of doubling the amount

requested, as Secretary Zuckert and the JCS had recorunended, or adding the

$10 million sought by Secretary Broure ltr. McNamara asked CongreSs for no more than the $It nillion in his original p*gr*.33 (U) Adopting a course of action that he judged ttrnore sensiblett than

spending large sums on AMSA, the Secretary of Defense appnoved procurernent of a bonber versi-on of the F-111A tactical fighter. The Air Force had requested this craft, dubbed the FB-111, as a replacernent for the B-J2Cts

through B-52Fts, the older nodels in the Stratofortress series. But it saw

AIUSA' not the FB-III, as the eventual replac.ement for the newer B-52Gt s and B-52Hts and the modi-fied fighter as an interim solution to tl:e probleur of finding a new manned strategic aircraft.34

(U) Secretary McNamara insisted that the FB-ILI was as I\rlL-fledged a strategic system as the B-52 or the proposed Al"tSA. Although the converted tactical fighter uouJ-d re\r to a greater entent than AIfSA on aeriaL tankers, he maintained that the FB-11-1 could fly far enough and carry enough reapons to threaten tta very large share of an aggressorts urban/industrj-al corplex.tt The Secretary appeared to believe ttrat modification of a plane already in producti.on rsould provide an adeciuate manned bomber without spending the far larger stms required for AI.{SA.35

"3. )1

(U) Therefore the task of convincing Secretary Mctlamara that Al'fSA was a necessary addition to the strategic force promised to be even far more difficult. During House hearings held in the spri.n g, of 1956 the Secret5ry obsenred that the design for the advanced strategic aircraft had not yet been decided upon and again raised the possibllity of a long-endurance aircraft, possib3y a version of the marunoth C-5 transport that was under development, arrned w:ith long-range missiles. The Secretary showed no enthusiasm for [}4SA and very litt1e interest in the manned bomber, w?rich he considered supplementary to the ballistic missile.35 (U) As in earlier years, the Air Force found support for AMSA within Congress. A subcoudttee of the House Armed Senrices Corrnittee, headed by

Representative F. Edward Hebert, reconmend.ed adding $11.8 nill-ion--the amount that Secretary Zuckert had requested to permit contract defjnition--to the

$11 nillion fi-scal" year i967 progran. The subconmittee also admonished the Department of Defense to pursue Al,lSA development with ttinterest and vigor.'J7

The parent comrittee accepted this recdmrendatj.on and voted to incorporate the additional finds in the House version of the annual authorization bi11.38 (U) Ttris subcormrittee also rel-eased testimony by General Mc0onnell indicatiag that the JCS had r:nani.mously recomnended fuJ'l-scale development

of AMSA, something that Secretary McNamara had previousl.v denied. The Secretary then poi-nted out that the JCS had made this reconnendation in con- nection u.ith the joint strategic objectives plan being prepared for fiscal year 1968, not the fiscal year 1,957 budget, i-rr order to preserve the option

of developing AI1SA r.rith an initial operational capability in fiscal year l97l+.

He declared that they enoneously believed that they had to choose at the tjme

between all-out development and no further development, and they had chosen IE (tgls PAGE IS I.JNCLASSIFIED) 33 the former in order to have a desi5gr available j.n case a manned bcrnber should be needed. the Secretary maj.ntained, however, that a decision to pursue development could wait urntil September L966 without jeopardizing this target date, or even later if a postponement was acceptable. He stated that the emoneous belief of the JCS was attributable to a poorly written OSD dj-rec- ti.re.39 (U) After this e>planation Representative Hebert told the press that the Secretary had shown not only a ttw"illingness to adnit he rrras rrrongtt but also ttart open mind on the manned bomber.tt Mr. Hebert e:gressed confidence that Secretary Mcllamara would permit work on AMSA to proceed and that lgSress t*ould approve for fi,scal year l957 Lhe $22.8 rnillion progran recosmnended by the Air Force, the JCS, and his own subcomm;ittee.4o

(U) Itr. McNamarars e>planation was not a conrnitrnent to develop AllSA.

His final decision would probably accompany presentation of the fiscal year

1968 budeet request. Proponents of AMSA had roug,hly r:ntil the faII of L966 to persuade Secretary Brown that this particular desigr suited IISAF needs and Secretary McNamara that Al,lSA was the best replacement for the B-52 and eventually for the FB-111.

(rHrs PAcE r$'{JNcLASSIFTED) 3t+ frffi[rr:r

IIT. T}TE FB-111

(U) Ttre sluggish course of the AMSA progran, together with a possibility that the older B-52rs would give rray to structural strain earlier than e)Pec- ted, started the Air Force looking for an interjrn manned bonber. As early as the spring of 1963, DDR&X showed an interest in the F-ILIA for this rolet but the Air Force debated for afmost a year before recomnending its use to fill the gap that otherw"ise wou.Id occur between phase out of the older B-52t s and procurement of AMSA. I The F-111- (lfX--tactical Fighter @eriinental: the narte used during the design corrpetition) was an atterrpt to neet the tactical fighter require- ments of both the Air Force and the Navy with a single aircraft. In June

196J, Secretary McNanara directed the Air Force to proceed with an air superi- ority fighter for both the Air Force and the lJavy. He hoped to save over $1 Ulttion by standardizing on one plane. More than a ye€lr later the Secre- tary decided that the USAF version, the F-111A, would have an air-to-ground mission as well, the Naqy F-1118 would be used as a long-range fleet air superiori-ty weapon.] tf ) Ttre most advanced feature of the p-t 11A was the vari.able geometry wing, wtrich could be held forward for takeoff and landing at low speeds and swept back for higlr speeds i-n flight. This aeronautical development, plus

improved engines, rnade possible the developnent of a fighter that could operate effectively at high or low speeds from carriers as well as frort shorter and cnrder r:unways. Ttris two-engine, two-pilot plane would have a 35

cmbat operating g0o radius of nauticar rniles, a combat ceiling of 62;ffi feet' a marcimrrn speed of LrlSl+ knots, and be able to dash 165 nauti.cal mires to a target at a speed l,Iach of r.2. I?re F-ltlA nade its first flight on 2] December 1964 and fi-rst moved its wings in flight on 5 Janrrarxr tg6|,.2

C,etting Off the Ground (u) Anong the first to consider using the F-111A as a strategic L*' was Dr. Brorrn, then DDR6E. In laay 1963 he suggested to a House subcqmlttee that' r'rith aerial refueling, the plane could provide rra umited bonbing capability particul'ar\r because the airplane can g9 in fast and 1ow, r*rlch would make it relatively invulnerable to surface to alr missiles.rr He was careful" to poj-rnt out ,SAC that people and General Lel,Iay rcul-d not consider this a genuine strategic bombing capability, iuld r am not offering it as a fulI-scal-e replaceu,ent for any of our present strategic bombers.rr3 rn 1963 General Power, crNcsAcr requested an interim bomber that could serye until some advanced aircraft joiaed sA0rs bomber force. At this time he favored resuning B-58 production, r*?rich had ended late in 1962, and procur ing 2JO of these supersonic bornbers. T?ris suggestion led to USAF consideration" along with the B-58 and several other craft, of trrp possible bonbers based on the F-lrtA design. one of these retained the size and shape of the F-111A; the other had an elongated fi.rselage to accsunodate additionaL fuel tanks as werl as electronic equipurent not normally fowrd in a fighter. According to the Manned Alrcraft studies steering Groupr* which used data : provided by General Dynanies, neither nodification of the F-lrM__nor, for that matterr €ul irnproved B-58--rras as well suited to strategic operations as a low-altitude penetrator especialry: designed for the purpose.4 *See p 2O. ffi* tF0lFlr* 36

9) Meanwtrile, General. Ilynanics was at work on a strategic version of the F-111A. In Novenber 1953 the corporation offered for USAF consideration two models that rlere basically those studied by MASSG. Ej.ther could carry L}rl*g5 pounds of ordnance but one had two sections totaling 101 inches inserted in the fuselage to increase fuel capacity and thus e.:rtend t*g".5 (l) After exarnining the proposal, Dr. Alexander H. Flax, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Research and DeveLopnent) concluded that, although the technical assrmptions geemed reasonable if sonewtrat optimistlc, ttthe nature of the effort to convert the F-111A to a . . . SAC airplane is underplayed and the estimates of costs are undoubtedly too low.tt He recdn- mended, however, a geries of rjnd tunnel tests, r*rich the Air Force undertookt frrnding it separately fron F-Il,LA development.6 (U) 0pinion varied w"idely on the likely value of an F-111A bstber. General LeMay, wtrile still Chief of Staff, felt that the plane rrould prove i-nadequate for strategic missions. rn the spring of L96l+ he told a senate subcomnittee that its main trouble was trthat it is a srnalI airplane and rrill not carry the things you need to penetrate modern defenses and still have enough tdrtg€ r o . .,,7

(U) Dr. Brown, as DDR&I, xras more hopeful. On the strength of studies then in progress, he fel-t that the plane could be modified to carry out satisfactorily those strategic tasks that did not require an enonnous payload. ttlf you are tafking about a low-leveI reconnaissance jobrtt he e4lained, nor

a mop up job, you may be able to do it with a lengthened TFX.tt He conceded that a tactica] fighter Itwas not perhaps of intercontinental rangertt but he held that a lengthened F-111A could nevertheLess be used as a strategic bomber'-irsince r,r-ith one refueling it gets in the intercontinental class.t'B 37

2) As time passed, the Air Force tended to iccept Dr. EFormre_lvieu. Early in 1954r I'Iaj. Gen. Jack Catton, Air Staff Director of Operational

Requirernents, urged General Power to direct a study of the F-111A as a

strategic aircraft. In time, SAC planners concluded that a nrodified fighter

tsoul-d be superior to the B-58. General Power, concerned because the AI,ISA

prograln was moving so slowly, caJne to advocate F-lllrs for SAC ix order to

keep a trained organization intact as a nucleus of a bonber force that could

be expanded as necessary to meet any frrtur" .*""g"rr"y.9 He sought @trreral

LellaJrts approval for procurement of a modified F-1,11A as an jnterim strategic bomber. The Chief of Staff rejected the recommendation, probably because of

his concern lest an F-1Ll bomber progran divert interest from AMSA--an undertaking he considered vital-.Io

(U) Although the Air Force did not request development of a bqnber

version of the F-111A, it continued--along with OSD and General Qynamics--to exarnine the feasibility of such a step. Roger Lewis, president of General Dynamics, tried unsuccessfully to interest the Alr.Force in taking an F-II]A that was currently being assembled, stretching the fuselage, adding a fuel tank that would j.ncrease capacity by 69 percent, and strengthening the land-

ing gear to support the added weight. He clajmed that this modified F-l-11-A vtould fly 2r0OO niles without refueling at a sustained speed of Mach .9 at se. 1".r"I.fl ,,4,

O The Office of Secretary of Defense finished its study early in

January 1965 tut made no recommendation whether to build the plane. TLle study merely offered additional data on the comparative costs and performance of the F-111A, F58, and B-52 and on the cost and effectiveness of a force of 2OO F-111A bombers.U 38

?t In the meantine, an ad hoc group, headed by General Catton 51fr made up of representatives of the Air Staff and SAC, had investigated whether a nrodj-fied F-U-IA coul-d replace t}r,e B-'52. Ttre group concluded that the F-111A could provide the basis for a plane that could take the place of the r-52Cts through B-l2Frs. The aircraft that they reconrnended would have a stretched fuselage to accorrnodate additional, fuel tanks, more complex avionics, and a crew of three o" for".13

Q| In March 1955 General Schriever, AFSC Conunander, called for caution in eharting the course of F-111-A modification. He warned that [it is highly unliJcely that, we can obtain authority to pursue both a 8-111 development and an AI{SA development at the same ti-nertt although the Air Force couLd probably buy an F-IIIA rrith minjmun modification rithout endangering AMSA. He concl,uded that, despite the peril to AMSA, tfwe might do besttt to seek a ttfull grovrth version . . . of the B-111 utrich would incorporate the AI1SA engine technolo6gr and avionicstr and wouLd serve as a ttvalld aircraft for the strategic fleettt from 1972 until the developnent of a ttnanned hypersonic vehicl,e in the $Qls.n What General Schriever feared was that the Air Force might try to "go for a 8-111 with an IOC Linitial Operational Capabilitg/ of 197O" and saddle itself rrith ttthe worst possible compronisertt an aircraft that was 14 rtneither . . . a tactical fighter nor a satisfactory bonber." 9) But the procurenent of a m:inimr:m modification version also had attractive advantages. According to the judgment of the corunand that4ould be using it, the F-111A ttcould perform the SAC nj.ssion in its present configuration.ff With ninimr:n nodifications, this Hould ttprovide the earl-iest available aircraft system.tt Some alterations, however, were ltstrongly desiredrtt such as an improved bonbing-navigation system, a trquick reaction ifffi f;ffiF,*t 39

Launch capabilityrtt and a honing beacon to help the bonber and its tanker rendezvous for refue1ing.15

(U) Time and money also Here key considerations in deciding wtrich version of the F-lItA would best senre SACrs requirement for an interim bdnber. AFSC reveal-ed that an enlarged model yith three or four crel{nen nould require costly and time-constmi.ng revisions in the basic design. Stretching the firselage would set in motion a chai-n reaction of nodifications that nould jnelude, anong other things, a new crew escape module, a new engine and fuel systern, and extensive changes to the ttglovett into wtrich the variable wing 1/ rotated.ro

C These factors influenced the deliberations of an Air Staff strategic study SrouPr upon which both AFSC and SAC were represented. Ttris group recorrnended that the Air Force replace the B-52Crs through B-52F?s with a ninimtm modification F-111A, and C,eneral Mc0onnel-l, now Chief of Staff, approved the preparation of plans to ttris effect. Ttre deputy chiefs of staff involved in this planning counseled against rnaking a foraal request to replace the ol-der b52ts with F-l-llAts until B-5Z Life erpectancy had been reassessed. For the time beingr no formar request ,." rd".17

A The results of this reassessment of B-52 stmctural soundness were far from heartening. t?re Air Force logistS.cs Corrnand (Afi,C) advised SAC that studies, based on data provided by the manufacturer of the B-52, indicated that life eryectancy of the C through F models could be as much as three-and-one-ha1f years shorter than previously beli-eved. This disclosure gave added urgency to the acqulsition of an interim bomber, for the cost of shorilg up the structural members of these older planes appeared prohi.bitive. .ff3|f*r 4O

The Designated Systems Management Group (OSf'lC) of the Air Force

recornmended an energency progr€m costing $117 ndllion for major nodification of the wing and firselage of these older y'-.J2rs.

Secretary McNamara subsequently placed the cost of keeping the entj're

current bomber fleet--al} types of B-52rs and the B-58ts--in the

operational inventory throu gh ].|975 at approximately $17 billiot'tt

The FB-111 Prosram

(U) the FB-11"1 prograrn began taking shape in April 1965 dren

General McConne]I informally suggested to Secretary }IcNanara the

replacemenL of 3l+5 VSZCrs througlr [*15z|ts w'ith 210 Fts-ltlrs. Subg sequently, the Chief of Staff testified before a House subcolluttittee that the proposal to substitute FB-]Ilrs at a two-for-three ratj-o was his own, not Secretary McNamarats, and had resulted from consul- tations with the Air Staff. He had never considered substituting FB-IIlfs on a one-for-one basis, even thougfr General John D. Ryant

General Powerrs successor as CINCSACT had desired a far larger nun-

ber of FB-IILIs than lhe 3I+5 t-;52rs he was giving up.f9 (U) Ceneral l,tcConnell e:plained that the progran was trbased €t cost to start with.tt He apparently based the size of the proposed

force on his belief that OSD would insist that the cost of FB-]I]

developurent and procurenent be offset as far as possible by money

made available because of the retirernent of the aged B-J2rs. The

Chief of Staff estimated that $510 million could in this fashion be applied to the FB-Ill effort. Aside from cost, other factors were lil the greater flexibility of the FB-111, its ability to carry 50 ffi-pound bombs ancl its tthigher performance characteristicsrtt as uel1 as a need to ttget some people out of the B-52 force, to put them into the rest of the forces that were being e>panded.tr These men could, for examplet serve in the Tactical Air Conrnand (TAC) or in the Military Airlift Cmnand /rr^ \ 20 \ i"uru^ ,/ o O) The Air Force fornally presented its FB-I11 program on 2 June 1955. The objective according to Secretary Zuckert, was to devj-se tra satisfactory hecige against catastrophic strlctural failure of tQe V52.tl For this purpose the Air Force had selected a ninjmum modification version of the F-LLlA, rrprincipally because of its early avail-ability.tt

The first of the 21O new bombers would beeome operational during fiscal l-.959. .Secretary Zuckert aeknowledgeci that the Air Force preferred the ttincreased capabilitytt of an enlarged aircraft but not at the higher cost in time and money. the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Research and Development) estimated that each stretched model uould cost at least $5.4 n,i]}ion, some 15 percent more than one with nini- mum modi-flcations.2l. ' 9) The Air Force proposed to obtain FB-Il.l"rs by increasing the number of aircraft produced each rnonth and at the same time reducing the number destined for TAC. Instead of l-8 tactical aircraft per month,

General Snamics would turn out 21 aircraft of r^rtrich 9 trcu1d be bombers. TAC roould sunender 3 wings so that SAC cou.Ld receive a total" of 263t including spares and other aircraft.22 -f #r I fffi lr2

?) The FR-]-II prograrn al-so had to mesh with plans for retiring Lhe W52. The Air Force selected fiscal year 1969 for introducing the first of the new bombers into the operational inventory. It planned to begin phasing out the older planes in fiscal year 1968 by elininating 3 of the 2J squadrons that year, and to finish the job in fiscal year J9?L by scrapping the last 4 so-uadrons. In contrast, secretary l'IcNanara favored beginning the phase out in fiscal year 1966, a course o$action that the Aj-r Force opposed.23 ': fi!) The Secretary of Defense soon jnclined somer+trat towani the

USAF view. lle devised a tjmetable that delayed the beginni-ng of the v phase out untj-I fiscal year L9\7, when eight squadrons would be dis- rlr carcled. Ttre Air Force counseled against retiring any F--52r s during that ,,, t. period because of the fighting in Vietnam, but the Secretary of Defense persisted jn his plan. In Novernbet 1965, houever, he decided for technical- reasons to delay the FB-111 program by some six months. I?re Air Foree as a result reconmended postponing the maxjmum impact of t'he F-52 phase out, and the secretary agreed to adjust the schedol".24 (U) Wtrile the program of B-52 retirecnents was being norked out,

Secretary McNarnara decided to retire the entire B-58 fbrce of 8$ bombers by the end of fiscal year 1971. The Air Force had not reconrnended this reduction, but General McQonnell lndicated he was not particularly troubled by it. He maintained, and the JCS agreed, that time enough remained before the planned retirement date to review the decision and either accept it or argue agalnst iL.25 IEfffts ' L3

' (Q As a resuit of these exchanges of views among his office, the Air

Force, and the Jcs, secretary McNamara in December 1965 deciaed upon the following ptog"*r26

Unit Equipnent It'Ieapon Erd of Fiscal Year

B*52C-f ...... 345....3OO. ....255...... 18O...... 75...... O { q58... o...... 8O. r, ..78...... 76...... 71+...... 12...... O

FB-111... .. o ...... e.I5.....1O5...... 21o(P1armed nraxi- mm. ) Kc-135...... '.... .6zo ([trchanged through Lg73-r97t+.) :ar Honnd Dog...... 51+Or...54O.....J2O...... J2O.....52O...... JJO

SRA],I & B-52 (None planned. ) SRAM & FB-111...... 15O...... 45O (ptanneA maxi- mun of 525 at end of fiscal year 1972.)

Compared rith the most recent USAF proposal, this progr€rm reflected a reduc-

tion in the nurnber of SRAMts--the Air Force had r"ranted 900 for the ne{er B-521s and a naxirnun of 988 for the pg-]]l--and a sizeable cutback in the nrmrber of

FB-lllts from the 60 reconunended by the Air Force for fiscal year f959 and the 150 sought for the following year.

C trihile the Air Force was estimating detailed prograrn costs, it asked

on 28 September L965 tor the release of ta5.Z million of fiscal year 1966 fi.mds for FB-111 research, development, test, ed engineering (RDTse). Of this amount, $11.5 rnillion would be used for items--airframe engineering, tooling, and others-that required long lead time. Dr. John S. Foster, Jr.e JI3ffi "* l+l+

becar4e DDR&E October, repljed that the yearrs energency firnds could who on I .:* provide $8.2 million for what was ttnost urgently needed within the $11.5 rnillion requested.tr He said that the Air Force wouid have to reprogram from its onn resources to locate the renaining $15.5 million of its estjrnated

RDT&X needs for the fiscal year. ltre Air Force then sutrnitted to Dr. Foster jn an analysis of rtfiere the money would come from, ed he approved it late 27 November. |l) The proposed system package for fiscal year L967 t subndtted by the Air Force Late in October l965, called for the erpenditure of $l+4.6 nillion for FB-II1 development and #3g.7 nillion for SRAM, or a total of S84.36 nd1- lion. Dr. Foster uanted to cut the FB-111 request to $PI.6 niJ-lion so that the aircraft and raissi1e would become operational at nearer the same tine. Still another delay was unacceptable to the Air Force. Secretary Brown argued that the squadron or so of FB-l1ils that would enter service before r*ten SFTAM could serve a useful pu?ose without the attack nissile. Moreover,

SRAM did appear, the planes would require only a minor modificationt the installation of a computer, to accornmodate the weapon. Secretaqf Brpun t'here-

fore recommended keeping the progran on schedule. Secretary McNarrara accepted

the USAF argrmrent and increased Dr. Fosterts sttrn to $?I.? n:illion, $4O.9 million for the FB-111 and the rest for SRAM. Ttre total request by Mr. McNamara for FB-IIL development and procurenent during fiscal year 1967 r*as $2O2 nilliont

excluding SRAIt{ RDTS&.28 ''r

Egg.lf, Problems (U) Scarcely had the FB-111, prograrn started r.rtren the first problerns appeared. Some r*ere purely technical and centered upon substitution of nore *,'m!lt f;ilFhc 45 advanced avionic eqripment for that specified originall;r. 0thers stenmed frorn conflicting IJSAF and OSD views concerning the capabilities of the new craft.

A the principal technical question that had to be resolved wa.q, lftether it was worthwhile to retard ihe rate of FB-lll production in order to incorporate the versatil-e and highly at$,omatea Mark II avionics systen. the system was equally suited to aerial warfare, close air support, or interdiction. ft featured such capabilities as all-weather navigation, automatic temain following, automatic vi-sual or all-weather weapons. de1i.very, and electromic countermeasures. OSD favored dela;7; the Aj-r Force opposed iL39 9 In tlovember L965 Dr. Foster maintained that the delay, wtrich uould be about six nonths, was r,aorthr*rile sjlce it would result in a more effective weapon system at slight technological risk. the Air Force, howeverr $posed any delay unless the scheduled retirsnent of the B-52 fleet was adjusted to compensate for it. Secretary l4cNamara aceepted the USAF objection, slowed the pace of B-52 retirements, and approved a reduction of frorn 33 to 1O in the nuaber of FB-lllts to be procured during fiscal- year 1967. the schedule continued, however, to call for the attajrqnent of an initial operational capability--one FB-J-Ll squadron--duri-ng fj-scal-'year Ig59.3O 3, CINCSACIs objection to delay could not be satisfied so easily, for it invoLved the basic purpose of the prograrn. On 16 January 1956 General ffyan challenged the recent decision by pointing out that holdjlg up production to acconmnodate improved avionics was out of harmon;, with the intent wderlying the progran, v*rich was to provide an interim bomber as quickly

ffiF ,t* tttt;F' r l+(, and with as little nodifj.cation as possible. He reconrnended going ahead on schedule; wtren l,lark If was readl', it could be jncorporated in aircraft that were being assembl-ed and retrofitted in those already in se"vi"e.3l F) The Secretary of Defense did not rescind his decision to desr the prograrn. In llecennber he had charged the Air Force ttto coordinate and direct the FB-111A, I'lark II, and SRAM prograns so ttrat the FB-IIIA w"ill be produced with a nodified !'{ark II avionics system . . . , the maxinrnn conunonality /*iff exis/ between the Mark II for the F-111A and the Mark II for the FB-11}A, L*rfI the SRAM progran Lrat{ be eompatible with the new FB-lI1A avionics system.tt In Februarf 1966 the Air Force contracted for definition and cost ldentification of a singl.e avionics package, Mark II, for bot't the tactical and strategic versions of the F-L11A.32 3) Another possible nodification r:nder discussi.on during the spring of 1965 was the use of an englrie-afterburner combination being developed by the Naqy for possi.ble use in an improved F-1118. Ttris power plant could provide improved takeoff characteristics, faster acceleration to Mach 2r and other features of benefit to a strategic bomber. It r.ras not as far along ilt its tests, however, as the engile that pouered the F-111A and was slated to power the bomber version. At this time, a change seemed unlike1y.33 (U) Far more serious than these technical questions lras the confl,ict between Secretary Mcllamara and the Air Force concerning the eapabilities of the FB-ILL. In outlining the plane?s characteristics, Secretary i"lci.lamara said that the rrrange of the FB-IIIA, on a typical nuclear missi.onrtr would exceed that of the &-J8, SACrs only operational supersonic bomber, as well ullcLASSlFlElI It7 as that of the early nodel B-J2rs. ttf believe from this comparison alonerrt ttthat he concluded, the FB-111 is :not a stop-gap aircraft but is, i:ndeed, a

truly effective strategic bomber.tt 3l+

(U) The USAF position on the FB-111 contradicted this view. General McConneIL acknowledged that the plane ttcould serve usefully j-n the Strategic

Air Coinmand for a period of time to replace the C through F series B-52rs.r

But he declared that the plane uas too ttrange hrnitedrt and therefore too dependent on oversea bases. And it r"ras unable to carry enough ordnance to ttdo the job we have in mind for the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraftrtt wttich would be a tttotal replacementtt for the entire B-52 fleet. Secretary honn stated in February 1966 that the FB-111, although superior in speed and avionics to the ol-der B-52ts, was tttoo small to replace the Grs and [{le.tl To General Ferguson, Air Staff chief of research and development, the FB-III was a ttstopgap airplanett that could ttdo some of . . . the manned strategic aj.rcraft iob.rr 35

(U) Secretary McNarnara also differed with USAF leaders over the value of manned bonbers and the nr:rnber of then that should be assigned to the nationrs strategic retaliatory force. On 14 February 1966 tre told a House subconmittee that, according to OSD calculations, bonbers had a poorer cost- effectiveness ratio than intercontinental missiles wtren employed for the assured destntction of priority targets. This statistical judgment, the Secretary maintajled, would hold true unless mj-ssile reliability skldded to half wtrat DOD analysts e:qpected it to be. Should Soviet bomber defenses improve, he estirnated that missile reliability uould have to decline to 30 percent of the assigned figure before manned aircraft could contribute enough to the strategic force to justif) using then against targets formerly covered

U]ICLASSIFIED UIIGLASSIFIED 48 by missiles. Since estimates of nissile reliability seoned unlikely to go so far astray, he did not consider manned bombers as good a form of strategic

'insurance as additional missiles rrould be.36

(U) Secretary McNamara therefore j-ntended to retain only a few hundred bombers, enough to supplernent the intercontinental ballistic missiles. In this supplementary rolerhe noted, bombers ttean force the eneqy to provide defense against aircraft as well as missilesrtr an r:ndertaking Itparticularly costly in the case of terminal defenses.tt Since missile defenses were unabLe to cope rith aircraft and antiaircraft weapons were useless against ballistic missiles, l,Ir. McNamara believed that the tfiited States, by postponing until

the moment of the retaliatory strike the decision whether to destroy a par-

ticular target with bombs or missile warheads, could force the enerly ttto twastef a large part of his resourcesrt on defenses that he could ,rot .t"..37

(U) Ttre Air Foree, in contrast, looked upon manned aircraft as €ul integral and important part of the retaliatory force. As the Chief of Staff stated in the spring of 1966, ttbalanced mix of ballistic missiles and bombersrt

tlras necessary to ttrnaintain high confidence in our nuclear deterrent posture and provide a source of long range, all weather capabilities useful at any l-evel of conflict to support our national mil-i-tary objectives.tt Whether this view could be reconciled with those held by l,lr. McNamara rernained to be

"""rr.38

ultctAsstFtED ulrctAsstFtED 49 lbtes to pages 1 - 5.

NOIES

Chapter I

1. W.F. Craven ancL J.L. Cate, ed.s., Thg Arty Alr Forees Ln Wor1d. llar If (ctrlcago, r-948) (u), T, p 5'1.

2. Intervl.ews (S), AFCIIO rrlth Gen. Curtls E. LeMay, 12, 26, and, 27 Jart 65 tn Atr'CHO flLes.

3. filst (S), ARDC, Jan-Jun J), voL 2r pp 30-35. 4. &19., pp 2I-2J. 5. Stnt (U) by SECDEF in House llearlngs before Appropriations Subcmte, t) Jan 60, reproduced. in Research and Analysis Dlv, OSAF, !*gs! Quotations...on the B-Jo, pt 2t p 2h, ln Al'C80. 6. DOD News Release (U), 3I Oct 50, reproduced ln Seleeted. Quotations... on the B-70, pt 1r p 58.

7. WetI Street Journal (U),. f Nov 60, reproduced. in Selectecl Quotations... gg-l}g @r_ffi 59; Theoaore C . soten"un, KeinrcT-1T)l-(ffit, L965)r p 206.

B. ftreech (U) Uy Senator Jobn F. Kennedy, 2 Nov 60, at San Diego, quoted in Sel.ected- Quotations...on tbe B-7Or pt 2t p h5.

9. Stmt (U) by SECDEF in Senate Hearings before Subcmte on Appropriations, BTIU Cong, 19t SessLon, DOD Appropriations, W., p 18; {ew York Times (U), 17 Jan 6I, reproduced. ln OSAF Current N"w} 1l Jan 61, in Atr'CEO.

10. Sbnt (U) by SAF in Senate Hearlngs before Subcmrte on ApproprLatS-ons, B]ttr Cong, lst Sesslon, DOD Approprlattons, 1962, pp 27L-272; Stnt (U) by CSAF Ln Senate Heari.ngs before Appropriations Submte, reprodueed ln Selected Quotatlons...on tbe fo?Q, pt 4 pp 52-53.

11. Stut (U) by SECDEF 1n Senate Hearlngs before Subcrnte on Approprlatlons, BTIU Cong, lst Sesslon, DOD Approprlations, W, pp {-18. L2. ry.; Exeerpt (U) frcm Prestd.ent Kennedyrs Bud.get Msg, ln SeIected. Quotations.c.orl tbe B-70, pt 2r p [4. 13. Ofc of Leglslatlve l,latson, Resrme (S) of the Leglslatlve Illst of tbe B-70r n.d., 1n OSAF 213-63.

UilCTASSIFIED uilcLASSltlED Notes to Pages 5 - 10 5O Program' 14. lteno (u), sAF for sEqDFF, 20 Apr 61, subj:..Reorientation--B-fo gSAF ;y asA'F in Senati Hearings before Appropria- in 62;i;-;L;iui the B-70t 2' tions Subcmte, reproducea ii-3lf""t"a Quotations"' 9! Pt p 59. 4o of 92 Proiects in L5. Merno (S), SAF for sEcDEF, 2 Jun 61, suUj: Project osAF 800-61. systen (S), for s.EcDEF, 1 Nov 61, subj: Weapon 16. ttemo rith incls, .SAF -rl-71 t4ar 62' no Approval, ;-6sAF-6a:4lt 1a"[; 6;-l3ar for comdr AFsc' 2o subj, in OSAF 193-62- Jan 62, subj: Alternative BS-7O ::7.' Meno (S), Asst SAF (n&D) for DDR&E, 12 (Reconnaissan"e StriJ

uilcLAsslilElI u1{ctAsstflED Notes to pages 10 - 16 5t

27. Memos (c), snconr for sAF, 23 Nov 62, no subj; SAF for CSAtr', 2l+ Nov 62, in oSAF L93-62.

28. Stut (U) by Asst SECDEF' (Compt) in Senate Hearlngs before Subcnte on Appropriations, SBtn Cong, Ist Session, DOD Appropriations, L*I+, p 22r.

29. t,tsg (OUO), ND to AFSC, 9 Nov 6A, atch to ltr, Comdr AX'SC to CSAX., IJ Nov 62, subj: XB-JO, in OS,AF L93-6?. 30. Sunrnary (U) qf m-?O Development Experience through Jan 63, n.d.., in OSAF 253-q. 31. Ibid.

32. Ibid..; Strnt (U) Uy CSAF in Eouse Hearings before Subcnte on Appropri- ationsr.SBth Cong, 2d Sesslon, P Appropriations, Ifi5, pt 4, pp 4TT-478.

33. ilj.st (TS-RD-Nor0RN), sAC, .lul 62-Jun 63, voJ- 2, p 316. 3h. !!mt (U) by CSAF in l{ouse lleari-ngs before Subcmte on Appropriations, 88th Cong, 2d Session, DOD Appropriations, L965, pt h, pp t+77-ll78. 35. Ibid. 36. Ltr (U), President, North American Aviation to SAF, 5 Feb 63, no subj, in OSAF 213-63.

37. I'temo (C), SECDEF for SAF, 22Feb 53, subj: lC-]O Reoriented program, in oSAF 2fi-53.

38. Stmt (U) by SECDffi in House Hearings before Subcnte on Appropriations, BSttr Cong, 2d. Session, DOD Appropriations, L965., pt h, p 247. 39. Stmt (U) by CSAF in Senate llerarings before $ubcnte on Appropriati.onst 88th Cong, lst Session, DOD Appropriations, Lg1+, p 3rr. kO. Memos (C), Asst SAF for SAF, 20 Feb 61, subj: XB-JO; SAF for SECDEF, 2 Jul 63, no subj, in OSAF 253-63. 4I. Hlst (S), Dir/Production, JuI-Dee 53, n.d.; Meno (S), Unaer SAtr for Asst SAFs (Flnancial Met) ana (nAO), Il+ Jan 6l+, no subj; ttteno (S) SAF for SECDEF, 2O Feb 54, no subj, in OSAF 151-64. 42. Memos (S) SAF for SECDEF, 20 Feb 64, no subj; SECDtr for SAF, 2I Feb 64, no subj; Meno (C) SECDEF foT SA3, JMat 5)+, subj: XB-?O Program, in osAF 151-64.

43. )iB-7O Flight Test Progran Options (C), I Dec 5l+, in OSAF \59-6+; Ltr (C), dth atchs, Exec Secy DSMG to DDR&E, I! Sep 5!, subJ: XB-7O; SAF Program Revlew (U), Xn-7O: Laboratory for progress, 1! Sep 65, in ospF 566-6j.

ut{ctAssrFtED ut{ctAsstFrED 52 Notes to pages 16 - 23 l+4. Menos (C), Sm'for SECDEF, 14 ocb 6J, subj: XB-70 hogram; SECDtr for SAF, 19 Nov 6!, same subj, in OSAF 56645.

45. USAF Aircraft Characteristics Sr.rrurary rtBlack Bookr (C) Xg-?0. l+6. Strnt (U) by SAF in House Hearings before Subcmte on Appropriations, 88th Cong, 2d Session, DOD Appropriatj.ons , L965, p6 h, p l+77, l+7. Eugene M. Zuckert, ttThe Senrice Secretary: Has He a Usefirl Rolerrr Foreisr Affairs, vol, 44r no 3, Apr 56, pp l+7O-l+73.

48, Gen Thomas S. Poner, Desisn for Sunrival (U) (New York, 1965), p L74. lsg. Sfunt (U) Uy SECDEF in House Hearings before Subcrnte on Appropriations, 89th Cong, 1st Session, DOD Appropriations t 1966, Pt 3, p L33. 50. Stnnt (U) by CSAF in Senate Hearings before Subcmte on Appropri-ati-ons, 88th Cong, 2d Sessj,on, DOQ Approprj-ations t 196\, Pt f, p 736-

Chapter II ].. Hist (S-nn), oir/Op Rqnts, Jul-Dec 63, pp 25-28. 2, Sunrnary &rt (S) Analys of ]'fission and Perfornance Characteristics for arr AMSA, Apr 65, in Pians nf(65)4; Systern I"Igt Directive (S), 2 Feb 66, jl Acft Br, Strat Div, Dir/Op Rqnts and Dev Plans. 3. Hist (S), Dj.r/op Rqnts, Jr:l--Dec 64, pp 67-68.

l+. ttschriever Urges BoId Approach to hrturertt (U), Arrned For-ces Managenent. vol IL, no 8, ttay 1965 t p 39. q Stet (U), by CSAF in House Hearings before Subcurte on Appropriationst 88th Cong, 2d Session, DOD Appropriations. L965, PL b, p 535.

/, OSD Format B (S), issued.3 Sep 63, h Acft tsr, Strat Div, Dir/@ Rqlts and Dev Plans,

f,(. rtrrt (s), lto. 1, Ir,IASSG, 15 Oct 63, h OSAI 337-63. 8. Hist (S), rlu/op Rgrts, Jul-Dec 63, p 28.

9. Subj/Issue (S) AtlSL Aircraft, Atch to Uerao (S), Asst SAF (Financial I'{gt) for Asst SECDS (Compt), 4 Dec 6J, subj: Tentative Decision on fl l:g6S Budget Estimate, in lcft Br, Slrat Div, Dir/gp Rqnts and Dev Plans.

UNCLASSIFITD Notes to pages 23 - 26 u1{cLASStflED 53

10. Ltr, rrrith atchs (S), CSlf to SAF, 7l,lov 61, subj: lianned Strategic Weapon System; Atch- to Meuro (S), Acting SAF for SECDEF, 13 llcv 63, sanre subj, in Acft Br, Strat DLv, Dir/@ Rqnts and Dev Plans; Memo (s), sar ior sECDEF, i Nov 6J, sarne subJ, in OSAF 337"'63. 11. l{emo for the Record (S), Uraer SAF, 19 ltlov 63, subj: Proposed New Strategic Aircraft, in OSAF 337-63. L2. Hist (S-RD), oi"/op Rgts, Jan-Jun 6b, p 39; Janes Atwater, ttlhe Last Stand of the Big Bdnberrtt !g!gI9.AT, EVening Post, 27 Jruan 54' pp 11+-)-5. !3. uenro (S), CSAF for JCS, csAru-5-54, 4 Je 54, subi: Irnproved l{anned Strategic Aircraft, atch to JCS U78/104, in Plans RL(64)4.

14. St&t (U), by CSAF in House Hearings before Appropriations Subcmtet 88th Cong, 2d Session, DOD Appropriations t L96\, Pt l+, pp 536-537;

15. Memro (S), less atch B, csAF for JCS, cSAI[{-14344r.15 Feb 6{r-subj:. hrproved Manned Strategic Aircraft, in Plans ru,(54)4; Hist (S), Dir/ 0p Rqnts, Jul-Dec 64, pp 3l+-35.

16. Iferno (S), SECDEF for CJCS, 6 f'eu 64, subj: Ingqo-ved l,lanned Strategic Aircraft, atch to Jcs U7b/104-4r in P1ans nL(64)4. L7. AF PcP (s) 6l+-72, 29 ArE 6t+; 6tr-92, 29 AuB 64; AF PcP (c) 6t+-93, 29 Aug 6tr, in Acft Br, Strat Djv, Dj.r/@ Rryrts and Dev Plans.

18. Meno (C), DDRI..E for SAF, 2I Oct 611, subi: Approval of USAF W 1965 RDT&X Advanced Manned Slrategic Aircraft (A]'[SA) Program; lt"g (S)t CS.AF to Condr AFSC, 88826, l-O Nov 5{, subj: AI|ISA Progran F\:nding Status; Memo (S), lcting SAF for SECDEF, 10 Dec 611, subj: Format B on AMSA; l"{erro (S), SECDEF for CJCS, L7 Dec 6l+., subj: The Strategic Aircraft Program, in Acft ft., Strat Div, Dir/Op R4nts and Dev Plans; SECDEF Format B (S) si-gned 25 Nov 64, h OSAF 56-64, vol }.f .

19. Ftist (S-Rn), n:.r/Op Rqnts and Dev Plans, Mar-Jr:n 65, pp 124-125; Merno (S), OnnACI ior SAF, tj feU 6!, subj: Approval- of USAF FY L965 Advanced l,fanned Strategic Aircraft (AUSA) Program; Meno (U), DDMaE for Asst SAF (R&D)r 9 Apr 5!, subj: Approval of Avionics Subsystern for Strategic Bonibers; Me.no (C), nnRA,f for SAF, 11 Jun 61, subj:,Approva1 of USAF W 1965 Al,lsA Program; 6-uestion and Answer Sheet (s), usar-21 oct 5J, irr Acft Br, Strat Div, Dir/@ Rqnts and Dev Plans; l4emo (S), Asst SAF (neo; ror bnneo, f4 Jin 65', suui: Approval of Al'xsA Propulsion and Avionics Work Stents; Meno (C), witfr atchs, Asst SAF (RS,D) for DDR&E, 15 l,Iay 6J, subj: Request for Approval of Advanced Avionics Developrnent hogram; iterno (U), Asst DDRS& for Asst SAF (R&D), n.d., sgbi: Approval of Avionics Subsyitern for Strategic Bornbers, in 0SAF 224-65. 20. Hist (S), nir/op Rgts and Dev Plans, l4ar-Jr:n 65, pp |a;5-J/'5; Dir/Op Rgnts, Jan-Feb 65, pp 2L-22.

Ut{CLASSIFIElI UI{CTASSIFIED pages 5t, llotes to 27 - JO

2L. Stmt (U) by SECDEF in Senate Hearings before Subcmte on Appropriationst A9,iU ione, Ist Session, DOD Appropriations, Lg66t Pt 1r PP 5Or 58-19.

22. t{se (S), CSAF for Condrs AFSC and- SAc, 85383, 29 Ju. 65'-.sufj: Ad'vanced Manned. strategic Aircraft (ltusa) Priority, in Acft Br, strat Div, Dir/Op Rqmts and Dev Plans.

23, Stmts (U) UV CSAF in Eouse Hearings before Subcmte on Appropriations, ggin Cing, Ist Sesslon, DoD Appropriations, Lg66' pt 3t .pp 877-878; by [CS, RAn, in House Hearings...ry Appropriations, L%6, Pt 5t pp III+, 186.

24. Stmts (U) UV CSAF in House Hearings before Subcmte on Appropriatlons, ggtn p! 875-877; in cooi, ist session, DoD Approprlatlons, +966' !r -pp Senate Hearings before SilUcrcffiilEproprf ations . . .ry Appropriations, W, pt lr p 981+. Aj. Dra^ft (OUO) Stmt of SECIEF in House Hearlngs before tbe Subcnte on Appropriations, L%7, g.d.; pp 6t-6Zi Supplenent (S) to Sta.ff Dlgest no 2'1, t-l+ uay 55, in Atr'cHo. 26. nist (s-RD), Dir/op Rqmts and Dev Plans, Jul-Dec 65, pp r35-r37; Memo (S), asst SAf (ngO) for DDR&E, 2J Sep 5!, subJ: Request for Approval of the Ad.vanced. Strategic Arrionlcs Develolmeni Prograo,; Memo -(C), OOnfm for Asst sAr (R&D), 4fuc 65, subj: Approval of uso3' w,L965 RDTS;E Advanced Manned Strategie aircrafl (AI'{SA) Program; Meno (S), Dep Asst SAF (R&D) for DDR&g, 18 Oec 65, subj: Request for Approval of the p"LS""^t DDR&JE for SAtr', 17 Jan Advanced Strategic Avlonics Memo-(C), -66, subj: Approval of LSAF FV 66 RDT&,E Advanced. Manned Strategic Alrcra'ft (el'rse) e.1i,ai"el la"e (u) ionoar AFSC to csA3, AF IN 39329 (r3 ;.an 65); il; (cl, oorifu f;; sAr, 28 Jart 66, subj: Appro'ar of us61l FY Lfi6 RyT8tr Advanceci Manned. Strategic Aircraft Program, in Acft Br, Strat Div, Dir/Op Rqmts and Dev Plans; Meno (C) Dep Asst SAF (R&D) for DDRSsE' 2 Nbv-6!r- sub;: Request for Approval of Advanced A:rionics Derrelopnent Program, in OSAF 221+-55. l4p,y 6J; 27. AF,PCc1> (S), 6>-61, Adva.nced Manned Strategie Aircraft, 2) Rationale Sneit (S) for Action on PCP, Ad.vanced. Manned Strateglc Air- craf,t, t5 .lut 6i in Acft Br, Strat Dlv, Dir/Op Rqmts and. Dev Pla'ns; DoD Press Release (u) t z, rpr 66, 1n AFCHO. 28. Uemo (S). SAF for SECIEF, IO Oct 65, subJ: Air Force Budget for FY t%7; f,ist (C)'of Subject/tssu! Consi.ilerations On Wblch SECDEF Eas Made Tenta- tive Decisionsr"Fy 67 Budget, n.d., in Acft Br, Strat Div, Dir/Op Rqmts and Dev P1ans. subJ: 29. Merno for Record (U), Cnief Op Analys, -Ofc of VCS, 2l Nov 6!, Dr. Brorn Visit to etrUOAr 1n OSAF 4Z'6r, vol 2. 30. trlemo (C), SS for CSAtr', 25 oct 65, no subJ, in oSAtr' 257'65'

uilcLAssrFttlI Notes to pages 3A - 36 ulrcLAsslflE0 ,5

3r. Ibid. 32. Aviation lgilJl (U), 28 l,tar 66.

33. Memo (S), SECDEF for SA, SECNAV, and SAF, subj: YY 1966 Supplemental and FY 1967 Defense Budget Reconunendations, in Acft 89, Strat Div, Dir/Op Rqrts and Dev Plans. 34. Aviatiog Dailv (U), zS llar 66.

35. Strnt (U) by SECDEF in Senate Hearings before Subcmte on Appropriations, 89th Cong, lst Session, DOD $pproprigtions, 1966, pt 1, pp 57-58. 36. Aviation lFek and Space Technolosr (U), vol 84, no J:8, 2 !4ay 65, pp 22-25.

37. &rt (U) of Subcmte No. 2, House Onte on Armed Services, The DOD Decisi-on to Reduce the lfiurber and lYpes of Manned Bombers in SAC' pz_-8.

38. Staff Digest (C), no 87, 5ltay 66, in AFCHO. 39. Ner+ IorF Tjmes (U), 13 W 66.

40. Washington Evening !ta! 13 May 66, and Sr-rndav Star. 15 l,Iay 66 (U).

ChaPter III

1. C,eorge F. Lemmer, Strengthening USAF General hrnoose Forces. l96l-l]961+ (rs), (RrcHo, r966)-w 8E;+.

2. Ibid., USAF Aircraft Characteristics Sr-nmnary ttBlack Bookrft (S) F-111A, Afl.;!.aliorrW Wee[ and Space Technologr (U), vol 81, no 161 19 Oct 64, pp 3. Stmt (U) by DDR8E jn House Hearings before Subcnte on Appropriations, 88th Cong, lst Session, DOD Appropriations, L96l+, Pt 6, pp 84-85, l+. Hist (s-nD), oir/op Rqnts, Jul-Dec 63, pp.26-27i &rt (s) No. 1, MASSG, 15 oct 63, b OSAF 337-63. 5. General D;mamics, F-UVSAC Configuration (S), 3 Nov 53; lteno (S)' with atchs, SAF for SECDEFT 13 Feb 64, subj: F-111 Consideration as a Strategic Aircraft, in OSAF 626-64.

ut{cLAssrHED E,A UT{CLASSIFIElI Notes to pages 36 - l+l

6. Memo (S), Asst SAF (ruo) for Llnder SAF, 20 Jall. 64, no subJ; Meno (S), rith atchs, SAF for SECDEFT 13 Feb 6{, subj: F-Itl Consideration as a Strategic Aircraft, in OSAF 626-6t+.

7. Stnt (U), by CSAF in OSAF Policy Ltr for Condro, vol 18, ne 9r I ltlay 64,

8. Stmt (U) by DDRSE j.n House Hearings before Subonte on Appropriations, 88th Cong, 2d Session, DOD Appropriations, 1965, gt 5t p 52. 9. tlist (TS-RD-N0F0RN), sAc, Jul-Dec 64, vo1 2, p 299i Porer, Desien for Survival, pp I75-L76. 10. Hist (TS-RD-N0FCIRN), sAc, Jul-Dec 6l+, vol- 2, pp 299'3W. 11. ttr (U), Roger Lewis to SAF, 8 Dec 64, no subj, in OSAF 62641+. L2. Hist (S), Dir/Op Rqnts, Jan-Feb 65, pp 15-i..6. 13. Ibid.; ttist (S), nir/Op Rryrts, Jul-Dec 6ln, p l+I.

14, l,tr (S), Comdr AFSC to CINCSAC, 10 l{ar 6J, subj^: Fo11ow-on Manned Strategic Aircraft, in Acft nr, Strat Div, Dir/Op Rqnts and Dev P.Lans. L5. Ltr (s), Dir/Plans, SAc, to Dir/op Rqnts, Dec 54, subi: Qualities Desired to l,Iake the F-111 a SAC Weapon Systen, in Acft Br, Strat Div' Dir/Op Rqnts and Dev Pl-ans.

16. Usg (U), AFSC to CSAF, AF IN 1Q333 (fe Uar 65), in Acft Br, Strat Div' Dir/Op Rqrts and Dev Plans. !7. Hist (S), Dir/Op Rqnts, Jan-Feb 55, pp ::5-I6i Memo for the Record (C), Dep Dir/@ Rqnts, 29 Mar 6!, subj: F-lJt Briefing, in Acft Br, strat Div, Dir/Op Rqnts and Dev Plans. 18. Hist (TS-RD-N0FORN), SAC, Jan-Jun 65, vol- t, p 62i Lt'r (S), CTNCSAC to CSAF, 13 Apr 6J, no subj, in Acft Br, Strat Divr.Dir/Op lqtotu and Dev Plans; Minutes (s), ost'lc l,{eetingsr 65-41 25 Feb 65, ar:,d 65-151 28 May 65, i OSAF 25?-65i f,xec Session (TS) fbuse Couunittee on Ar:ned Senricest SuLconmittee No 2, 25 Jan 66, p 69, in OSAF 3-66. l-9. Stpts (U) Uy CSAF and CINCSAC jn House Hearings before Subcmte No 2, hte on Armed Services, 89th Cong, 2d Session, DOD.Decisjro4 to Reduce llre Nqrler and tmes of l4a{rned Bombers 4 q4C, pp 61131 6201. 20. Stunt (U) by CSAF...DoD Decision to Reduce tJre Nranber and TYpes gf I,lanned Bombers ln SAc, pp 6to5, 6LI3,

2L. Memo (S), SAF for SECDEF, 2 Jr:n 6!, subj: Strategic Verlign of the F-It]; itt tslr'csar to sAF, n.d., subj: i'-pris for SAC' in gsALlp-65; Memo (S)r'wiitr atch, Asst SAI (ilc,D) ior CSAF, I Jul- 51, subj: SAC F-r}l?s, in Acft Br, Strat Div, Dir/@ Rqnts and Dev Plans.

U,llCLilSSlt,li10 I

Notes to pages l+J - L6 UNCLASSIFIED 57

22. Ltr (S), CSAF to SAF, n.d.e subj: F-Illts for SAC; Memo (S), Slf for SECDEFT 2 Jun 61, subj: Strategic Versj.on of the F-11I, in OSAF 1r2-63i Air Staff Sununary Sheet (S), wittr atchs, Oir/Op Rqnts, 2l+ May 6J, subj: F-ILfrs for SAC, in Acft Br, Strat Dj.v, Dir/@ Rrgnts and Dev Pl-ans.

23. Msg (S), CSAF to SAC and AFLC, 87L66r 1 Jul- 6!, subj: Air Force B-52 C-F Replacement Proposal, in Acft Br, Strat Djv, Dir/Op Rqnts and Dev Plans; Ilist (S-RD-N0FOlllt), Dir/Aerospace Programs, Jul-Dec 65, p !. 2l$. I{ist (s-RD-NorCIRN), Dir/Aerospace Prograns, Jul-Dec 6J, pp r-2.

25. Stlnt (U), by CSAF in ... DOU Decision to Reduqe lhe Nuinbe,q and I)mes of l4anned Bomberg in sAc, p 6ts1 Dm FeFEerease G);25 AprZr-in AFCHO.

26. fuogram Change, SECDEF Decision (S), Strategic Bomber Forces, 11 Dec 6J, in Acft Br, Strat Div, Dir/Op Rqnts and Dev Plans.

27. Memo (S), Asst SAF (R&D) for DDR&E, 28 Sep 6J, subj: Request for Approval to Cornrnence FB-lIlA Development Program; Air Staff Sr:mnary Sheet (C), Asst for R&D Programming, DCS, R,&Dr 20 Oct 65, subj: Recorunended Sources of Funds; Memo (C), Rsst SAf (R&D), 26 Oct 6!, same subj, in OSAF 1rZ-65i Memos (c) Dnna,e for SAF, 9 Nov 5!, subj: Approval of USA!" rY 1966 nDTsE; FB-11-14 Program, 13 Nov 5J, subj: FB-IJ.IA Development Program, in Acft Br, Strat Div, Dir/Op Rqmts and Dev Plans.

28. Reclang (g) to Tentative DDR8& Position, FB-III/SRAM1 r.d.; Ltr (S), H.B. /sAE/ for SECDEF, 9 Nov 65, no subj; Meuro (S), SAF for SECDEF, 10 Nov 55, suuj: B-111A Program, in Acft Br, Strat Div, Dir/@ Rryrts and Dev Plans; Draft (OUO), Stunt by SECDEF in House Hearings before Appropriations subcmte, L967, p 63, in AFCHO; Telecon (u) r.ritir tt Col Robert E. Whiting, Acft Br, Strat Div, Djrr/op Rqnts and Dev Plans. 29. Final Rprt (S), F-111A Mark II Avionics Subsystem Design, 5 JvJ 65, ix OSAF 142-65.

30. Ltr (S) Dir/Op Rqmts and Dev Plans to DCS, R8E, 12 Nov 5!, subj: B-ILLA Program Change Schedule; ttteno (S), Acting SAF for SECDEF, L9 Nov 55, subj: Strategic Bomber Frograms; Incl (S) to Memo, SECDEF for SA, SECNAV, sAF, 24 Nov 61, subj: FY 1966 Srpplernental and ft ].96? Defense Budget Recommendation, in Acft Br, Strat Div, Dir/Op Rgts and Dev P1ans.

3r. ttr (S) CINCSAC to VCS, 15 Jan 66, subj: FB-ILI Development and Produc- tion, in Acft Br, Strat Div, Dir/Op Rqnts and Dev Plans.

32. Meno (S), Dep SECDEF for SAF, 20 Dec 6J, subj: Mark II Avj.onics for the F-ILIA and FB-lnA/snaU; Daily Staff Digest (C), 23 l{ar 66.

33. Air Staff Surunary Sheet (U), nir/Production, I Mar .66, subj: FB-111 Aircraft Configuration, in Acft Br, Strat Div, Dir/Op R4nts and Dev P1ans.

u1{ctAsstFtED b

u1{ctAsslFlED (A Notes to Pages l+7 - t$

Draft (Orc), Sturt of SECDEF in House Hearings before Appropriations 3L.'. Subcmte , L967, pp 60-6f in AFCHO. 35. Stut (U) by CSAF in Senate Heari-ngs before Subcmte on Appropriations, 89th Cong, lst Session, DoD Appropriations, Wh-, Pt 1, p 975; Strnt (U), uy obs, nan, in U6use HeanirUs uefore Subsnte on Appropriationst 89tir Cong, ist Session, DOD 4Irpropriaiions r. W, pL 5t.p f87; Stut (u), uy lap :n osar roiicy l,tr ror comors (U)' 15 Feb 66r i:t gsAF Research and Analysis Di-v.

36. Stunt (U), SECDEF in House Hearings before Subcmte on Appropriations, DOD Appropriations, 196?, 89th Cong, 2d Sess, Pt 1, p L5. 37. fbid. t pp l+5-l+6. 38. Stnt (U) by CSAF in... @ Decision to Redlce the Nunnber and llrpes of Manned Bombers jx SAC, p 61O1.

UNCTASSIFIEIl 59 U1{CTASSIFIEll

GI.OSSARY

Acft Aircraft AFCHO Air Force Histori.cal Division Liaison Office AFT,C Air Force Iogisties Cotmand AFSC Air Force Systems Cqnnand A},ISA Advanced l,tanned Strategic Aircraft Analys Ana\ysis ARDC Air Research and Development Comand ASD AeronauticaL Systerns Division Asst Assistant Atch Attachent

Br Eranch

CINCSAC Corsnander in Chief, Strategic Air Cmnnd CJCS Chairrnan, Joint Chiefs of Staff Condr Cwunander Conpt Comptroller Cong Congress CSAF Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force csAIn4 Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, meurorandum

DCS Deputy Chief of Staff DDR&E Director of Defense Research and &rgineeriag Dep Deputy Dev Developrnent Dir Director Div Division DOD Depart'ment of Defense DSI,C Designated Systems Management Group

Exec Executive

FY Fiscal Year

Gen Generaf Hist History Incl- Incl"osure IOC Ini.tial Operational CaPabilitY rJ U') Joint Chiefs of Staff

UNCTASSITIED 50 UlICLASSIFIED

GIOSSARY (Contta) Ltr Letter

MAC Military Airlift Cmnand I'[,ASSG l{anned Aircraft Studies Steerlng Group Merno Memorandun Mgt Management Msg Message

!1.d. No Date No l,lunber 0fc Office Op Operation, OPerational OSAF Office of Secretary of the Air Force 0sD Office of Secretary of Defense

PCP Program Change ProPosal Fb Part

R&n Research and DeveloPment RDT&3 Research, Development, Test, and Evaluatf'on Rprt Report Rgts Bequirements

SA Secretary of the ArmY sAc Strategic Air Connand SAF Secretary of the Air Force SECDEF Secretary of Defense SECNAV Secretary of the Nar4Y Secy Secretary SRAM Short Range Attack Missile Strat Strategic Subj Subject

TAC Tactical Air Corcuand Telecon Telephone conversation

vcs Vice Chief of Staff Vo1 Volwre

uilcLASSltlto ' 51 UlICLASSIFIED

DISTRTBIITION

!a USAF I,IAJOR COMI,IANDS

1. SAF-oS 27. AFoCC 5l+-55. ADC 2. SAF-IJS 28. AFCICCC 56-57. AFCS 3. SAF-GC 29. AFoCCo 58-59. AFLC l+. SAF-AA 30. AtoccP 6043. AFSC 5. SAF-LL 3T. AFOCE 64. ATC 6. SAF-oI 32. AFnDC 65. MC 7. SAF-FI{ 33. AFRDC-D. 66. coNl\c 8. SAF-RD 3l+. AFFDD 67. MAC 9. SAF-IL 35. AFRDDD 68. OAR 10. AFCVC 36. AFNDQ 69. PACAF 11. ATCCSSA 37. AFNDQPC 70-7L. SAC w. AFCVS 38. AFNDQNF 72-73. TAC ]3. AFBSA 39. AFRST 7l+. USAFA 14. AFESS 40, AFSDC 75. USATE 15. AFtrOA /+1. AFSTP 76. USAFSS 16. AFIIS IQ. AFSPDE L7. AFJAG 1,J. AFXDC 18. AFNIN l+l+. ATXOP 19. AFAAC 45. ATXOPX 20. AI'ABF l$. AFX0P)6 2T. AFADA l+7. AH(PD 22. AFADS lL9. AFXPE 23. AFAI'{A l+9. Afl(PDP OTHER 24. AFoDC 50. AFXPDS 25. AFOAP 5T. AF)FDX 77-78. RAND 26. AFOAPF 52. AFXSA ?94L. ASr (HA) 53. ATXSASS3 82-100. AFCHO (stoct<)

ul{ctAssfFtED UilCLilSSIFIED 6z AFCHO PUBLICATIONS

Below is a selected list of AFCHO historical monographs which nay be obtained on loan or for permanent retention. Copies may be obtained by calling Oxford 6-6565 or by forsarding a rrritten reo.uest.

The Ttrreshglg of Space. L945-1o<4. (S) An Air Force Histonr of Space Activities. I9l+5-Wg. (c) The Air Force in-Space. 19(q-fq60. (S) Ttre Aj.r F-orge in Space. Fiscal, Year 1961. (s-m)

T?re Air Force iS Space. Fiscal Year 1952. (S)

USAF Cowrterifrsursency Doctrines and Capabilities. 1a5l-1952. (S-Noforn)

USAF Snecial Air Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities , 1967. (S-lloforn)

USAF Plans and Policies in South Vietnam. Lg6I-1961' (Ts-Noforn)

USAF Plans and Policies in South Vietnam and laos. 1954. (Ts-Noforn)

Strenethenjxe uSAf Ggnera] BrmosgForces. 1951--1964' (Ts-Noforn) St-renethgrjxe USSF Airfift Forces. i951-1954. (S-Noforn)

USAF Ba]-listic Missiles. 1oq8-1959. (S-m) istic Miss . (s-ttoforn) usAF Ballistic t-tissil-e Proerams. l-952-1964. (tS-m-Noforn)

(S) USAF C-om$and lund Control Pr-o.blenF.,J"958-,to61. tlsAF strateeic cormand and control svstems' 195s-r963' (s-Noforn)

Corunand and Control for North Anrericarr lir Oefense. f9q9+ . (S-Noforn)

u1{cLASSIFIED