Lessons from Bosnia: the IFOR Experience

Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience Contributing Editor Larry Wentz A DoD CCRP/NDU Collaboration This collaborative effort is a continuation of the series of publica- tions produced by the Center for Advanced Concepts and Technol- ogy (ACT), which was created as a “skunk works” with funding provided by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I). The early success of ACT led to the creation of ACTIS when the president of the National Defense University (NDU) merged the experimental School of Information Warfare and Strategy with ACT and ASD (C3I) made the Director of ACTIS the executive agent for the DoD Command and Control Research Program (CCRP). ACTIS has demonstrated the importance of having a research program focused on the national security implications of the Information Age and in providing the theoretical foundations for providing DoD with information superiority, as well as the importance of an educational program designed to acquaint senior military personnel and civilians with these emerging issues. As a result, ACTIS’s educational programs are being merged with the Colleges of NDU and ACTIS’s research programs are being transitioned to OSD under the direc- tion of ASD (C3I). DoD Command and Control Research Program Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) Mr. Anthony Valletta (Acting) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) Acquisition Dr. Margaret Myers (Acting) Executive Agent for CCRP Dr. David S. Alberts Mr. Larry Wentz* (Acting) Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency. Cleared for public release; distribu- tion unlimited. Portions of this publication may be quoted or reprinted without further permission, with credit to the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C. Courtesy copies of reviews would be appreciated. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lessons from Bosnia / edited by Larry K. Wentz. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 1-57906-004-8 1. Yugoslav War, 1991- --Participation, American. 2. Yugoslav War, 1991- --Bosnia and Hercegovina. 3. IFOR (Organization)--History. 4. National security--Bosnia and Hercegovina. 5. United States--History, Military. 6. Bosnia and Hercegovina--History, Mili- tary. I. Wentz, Larry K. DR1313.7.F672U656 1997 949.703--dc21 97-38128 CIP *as of January 1998 The National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a major com- ponent of the National Defense University (NDU) that operates under the supervision of the President of NDU. It conducts strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and unified commanders in chief; supports national strategic components of NDU academic programs; and provides outreach to other governmental agencies and the broader national security community. The Publication Directorate of INSS publishes books, monographs, reports, and occasional papers on national security strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy through NDU Press that reflect the output of NDU research and academic programs. In addition, it produces the INSS Strategic Assessment and other work approved by the President of NDU as well as Joint Force Quar- terly, a professional military journal published for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Contents Foreword ............................................................................................... xi Acknowledgments ............................................................................... xv Preface ................................................................................................ xix I. Introduction........................................................................................ 1 II. Bosnia—Setting the Stage................................................................ 9 III. Command and Control Structure .................................................. 35 IV. Intelligence Operations ................................................................. 53 V. Civil-Military Cooperation ........................................................... 119 VI. The International Police Task Force........................................... 139 VII. Information Activities ............................................................... 167 VIII. Tactical PSYOP Support to Task Force Eagle ......................... 189 IX. Counterintelligence and HUMINT ............................................. 225 X. Information Operations in Bosnia: A Soldier’s Perspective ...... 255 XI. C4ISR Systems and Services ...................................................... 273 XII. NDU/CCRP Bosnia Study ......................................................... 379 XIII. Lessons Learned About Lessons Learned ................................ 397 XIV. Summary................................................................................... 409 End Notes .......................................................................................... 445 Appendix A: The Dayton Peace Agreement Summary ................... 467 Appendix B: Chronology of IFOR Events ....................................... 475 Appendix C: References................................................................... 481 Appendix D: Acronyms ................................................................... 489 About the Contributing Editor .......................................................... 501 About the Authors ............................................................................. 503 Foreword Knowledge is power, and today’s age of the “information revolution” calls for new ways of attaining and controlling knowledge. Joint Vision 2010 is built on the premise that modern and emerging technology—particularly information-specific advances— should make possible a new level of joint operations capability. Sun Tzu reminds us, “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.” His timeless vision is about information superiority—the capability to collect, process, and dis- seminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. This is the central precept of JV 2010. Information is a critical element of mission accomplish- ment for peace operations such as Joint Endeavor. First, a successful information campaign contributes to building and preserving public support for the operation. Second, the successful use of information can help the commander achieve operational goals by influencing parties, resolving crises, defusing misunderstandings, and correcting misperceptions. Such use of the information “weapon” will be more critical in peace operations where the tradi- tional military tools (weapons) have a less central role in military activities. For Joint Endeavor, achieving “information dominance” through the employment of advanced information technology became a powerful tool in shaping the operational environment and helping the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) successfully monitor the Former Warring Factions and enforce compliance with the Dayton Peace Accords. In a recent Foreign Affairs article, Major xi General William Nash, the first commander of Task Force Eagle and Multinational Division North, observed that in Bosnia, “We don’t have arguments. We hand them pictures, and they move their tanks.” The “CNN effect,” coupled with the information revolution, creates formidable challenges for the military. Peace operations, in particular, require a more sophisticated understanding on the part of the military and civilian officials of news media behav- iors and a more intricate melding of military, political, and public affairs objectives. In Bosnia, there was media presence throughout the country when IFOR arrived. The modern information networks serving the media, IFOR, and its coalition member nations (and as a matter of fact, the rest of the free world) provided an ability to share information at a speed and efficiency never before experi- enced. The problem soon became one of finding the useful details among the wealth of information available rather than a lack of information. The U.S. Department of Defense has been successfully exploiting rapidly developing advances in information technology for military gain and Bosnia provided a unique opportunity to collect experiences in and insights into the use of advanced information technology in a multifaceted, first-time-ever NATO-led coalition peace support operation. Lessons were learned as NATO, the United States, and its allies and the other coalition members of IFOR took on the challenge of transforming, in real time, a go-to-war designed military capability into one to support the needs of a complex peace operation. This transformation included the integration of dispar- ate military C4ISR systems and services and commercial services into the largest “federated” military information system ever built. E-mail, PowerPoint briefings, and video teleconferencing became the instruments of command and control. xii Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, PSYOP, Counterintelligence, Human Intelligence, and the IFOR Information Campaign emerged as key players and initiatives in Joint Endeavor. Dealing with non- governmental, private volunteer, and international organizations was new for NATO and many of its coalition partners and real-time adjustments were

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