www.ssoar.info

A revival of the ? Vanhoonacker, Sophie

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Vanhoonacker, S. (2003). A revival of the Benelux? Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 32(1), 7-18. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-60116

Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC Lizenz (Namensnennung- This document is made available under a CC BY-NC Licence Nicht-kommerziell) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu (Attribution-NonCommercial). For more Information see: den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/deed.de Sophie Vanhoonacker (Maastricht) A Revival of the Benelux?

Seit Mitte der 1990er Jahre scheint die Benelux neuen Auftrieb erhalten zu haben, nicht als internationale Organisation, aber in Form einer engeren Zusammenarbeit ihrer Mitglieder im Rahmen der EU. Durch eine Reihe von Memoranda betreffend die zukünftige Entwicklung der EU und spezifische Themen, wie Justiz- und Innenpolitik, waren sie bemüht, den Prozess der europäischen Integration in Richtung einer Vertiefung voranzutreiben. Durch ihren Zusammenschluss versuchen sie, größeren Einfluss auszuüben und die Interessen kleinerer Staaten besser zu vertreten. Gute persönliche Beziehungen auf höchster politischer Ebene haben bei der Herstellung der Verbindungen eine große Rolle gespielt. Die engeren Beziehungen bedeuten allerdings nicht den Beginn einer ‘ménage à trois’. Die Kooperation findet in erster Linie auf höchster Ebene (zwischen den MinisterpräsidentInnen) statt und ist in sehr flexibler und pragmatischer Weise organisiert. Die Kooperation ist keineswegs allumfassend, und es bestehen weiterhin wichtige ökonomische, kulturelle und politische Unterschiede zwischen den drei Ländern. Sie ist auch keineswegs exklusiv, sondern Teil einer breiteren Strategie der Netzwerkbildung innerhalb der EU.

1. Introduction This article examines the cooperation between these three countries in the framework of the The Benelux is by many still associated with in recent years. What are their the customs union set up in 1944 amongst Bel- motivations to try to speak with one voice on gium, and the . As its certain EU issues? Why does the co-ordination objectives have since long been realised in the of positions occur at this moment in time? What much broader framework of the EU, the organi- could the possible impact of such cooperation sation has today a somewhat anachronistic and be? What are the advantages or possible disad- even moribund connotation. Since the mid- vantages for the countries in question? Is it just 1990s, however, the Benelux seems to have re- an ad hoc initiative or is it the beginning of a ceived new impulses, not as an international more structured relationship? Before address- organisation but as a form of closer coopera- ing these questions, the cooperation will be tion amongst the three countries in the frame- placed in the broader context of a general trend work of the EU.1 During the Intergovernmen- in the EU to form cores and coalitions, and the tal Conferences (IGCs) leading to the Amster- relations between the Benelux countries will be dam and the Nice Treaty and in the Convention situated in a historic context. on the future of the EU, the Benelux countries have put forward joint memoranda outlining their views with regard to some of the major 2. On Cores and Coalitions4 issues on the agenda.2 In addition they have also issued two memoranda on cooperation in the The attempt of a smaller group of EU mem- field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).3 It is ber states of the same geographical area to closer interesting to note that the Benelux organisa- co-operate or to form a privileged partnership tion itself plays no role in this cooperation. is not an isolated event in the EU. Also the Nor-

ÖZP, 32 (2003) 1 7 dic countries co-ordinate positions in the frame- a Security Council as in the United Nations work of the EU and with the Visegrad group, whereby some of the big member states would we have an example of cooperation amongst be permanent members whereas membership for prospective member states. Regional partner- the others would be on the basis of rotation. A ships are, however, just one of the expressions differentiation on the basis of size is an ex- of a general trend to closer cooperate amongst a tremely sensitive matter and proposals in this limited group of member states. The debate on direction have only made the smaller countries regional partnerships cannot be seen independ- more determined in their fight to defend the prin- ently of the broader discussions on: ciple of equality amongst the member states. – flexibility or ‘closer cooperation’ (Title VII The debate on cores and coalitions also lin- of the ); gers on in the current discussion on the future – the formation of an avant-garde or pioneer of Europe. The German of Foreign group; Affairs Joschka Fischer, in his much debated – the formation of a directorate amongst the speech at the Humboldt University (Fischer three biggest member states in the framework 2000), talks about a centre of gravity, composed of Common Foreign and Security Policy of a group of states who would conclude ‘a new (CFSP). European framework Treaty’; Jacques Chirac Since the launching of the so-called Schäuble- pleads for the development of a pioneer group Lamers paper (September 1994)5 , when two (Chirac 2000) and the former President of the prominent members of the German Christian Jacques Delors advo- Democratic party first openly pleaded for the cates the formation of an avant garde (Delors formation of a hard core of a small group of 2001). Although they don‘t necessarily agree member states, the debate on closer coopera- on the role and the institutional basis for such tion in the EU has taken full swing. In the IGC core, the fact that they all mention the issue in leading to the , agreement their blueprints on the future Europe shows that was reached on a new Title (Title VII) laying the last word about closer cooperation amongst down the conditions under which a majority of a smaller group of countries has not been said member states6 can ‘establish closer coopera- yet. The imminent enlargement to a Union of tion between themselves’, making use of ‘the 27 makes the discussion all the more topical. institutions, procedures and mechanisms’ laid This paper focuses on the Benelux, an exam- down by the Treaties. The negotiations were ple of closer cooperation amongst a group of difficult as cooperation amongst a smaller group countries in the same geographical area. Gen- inevitably implies the exclusion of some of the erally, regional partnerships are, however, based players.7 Especially the Euro-sceptic countries on more than just having common borders. were afraid to be reduced to second-class mem- Other elements such as size, relative power, a bers. To safeguard the position of the non-par- common history or a similar level of economic ticipating countries, the conditions for enhanced development may also play a role. Before look- cooperation were defined very narrowly, to the ing at the recent attempts of the Benelux coun- extent even that the articles in question have tries to co-operate, the relationship of the three until now not been applied. It remains to be seen countries in the framework of the EC/EU will whether this will change after the entering into be placed in a historical perspective. force of the , which relaxed the conditions (Galloway 2001, 133, 142). In the area of Common Foreign and Security 3. The Benelux and the Early Years of Policy (CFSP), the debate has been dominated European integration9 by the discussions on the formation of a direc- torate amongst the three biggest member states For most observers the Benelux is inextrica- , and the United Kingdom.8 bly linked with the process of European inte- One of the proposals suggests the formation of gration itself.10 As a customs union between

8 , the Netherlands and Luxembourg, it wards, was initially opposed to Beyen’s proposal is often seen as a precursor of the European for an economic community. He feared that its Communities, promoting trade between neigh- organisation on a supranational basis would be bouring countries by abolishing tariff barriers detrimental for a small country like Luxem- and disposing of its own institutional framework bourg, but he was ultimately convinced to join including a Court of Justice. Furthermore, it was forces (Brouwer/Pijpers 1999, 105; Trausch the presented at a meet- 1996, 122f.). ing of the Foreign Affairs Ministers in Messina Also in the case of the Fouchet proposals there in June 1955 that re-launched the debate on was initially no question of a joint position . A committee under the amongst the Benelux countries. Although they chairmanship of the Belgian Minister of For- shared the Dutch concern about the intergov- eign Affairs Paul-Henri Spaak prepared the re- ernmental character of de Gaulle’s Political port that ultimately led to the establishment of Union, first proposed at a press conference on 5 the European Economic Community (EEC) and September 1960, Belgium and Luxembourg Euratom. Another well-known European event were much more positive towards the French on which the Benelux countries had a major proposals than were the Netherlands. From the impact were the Fouchet negotiations on Politi- first meeting onwards the Dutch Minister of cal Union. Belgium and the Netherlands vetoed Foreign Affairs made it clear that de Gaulle’s proposals to organise political co- would radically oppose a Political operation on a purely intergovernmental basis. Union of which the United Kingdom would be Both episodes in these early years of Euro- excluded. The British participation had to ad- pean integration deserve some closer attention dress a double concern: it had to prevent the because they give us some concrete indications domination of the Political Union by France and with regard to the cooperation between the three Germany; secondly it had to guarantee a close small founding member states. As a matter of link with the Atlantic Alliance.11 Belgium ini- fact, the denomination ‘Benelux memorandum’ tially took a much more conciliatory stance, but (1955) is quite misleading. The text was not hardened its position when in January 1962 the drafted in the framework of the Benelux organi- French presented the so-called Fouchet II pro- sation nor was it the result of a joint effort of posal, which totally ignored their concerns with the three countries elaborating a common ini- regard to the relationship of the Political Union tiative (Duchêne 1994, 262ff.). Following the with the and the Atlan- crisis provoked by the rejection by the French tic Alliance. When in April 1962 the British national assembly of the draft treaty for a Euro- themselves asked to be associated with the talks pean Defence Community (EDC), the Belgian on Political Union, Belgium joined the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Paul-Henri Spaak in their request for British EC membership as a and his Dutch counterpart , each precondition for the establishment of a Political separately had started to draft proposals for a Union, ultimately leading to a suspension of the relaunch. Spaak, in close consultation with negotiations on 17 April 1962 (Vanhoonacker Monnet, had elaborated proposals around the 1989). concept of sectoral integration; Beyen on the The two abovementioned episodes in the early other hand favoured the idea of ‘general eco- history of European integration provide us with nomic integration’ and the creation of a com- some first interesting insights. Contrary to the mon market. Following his famous letter of 4 questions that were related to the subject matter April 1955 to Spaak in which Beyen explained of the Benelux treaty (trade, borders, regional his ideas, the two combined their respective cooperation), more political questions on the approaches in a joint proposal for a common further development of the EC were not dealt market and a new Community for civil nuclear with in the framework of the Benelux institu- power. The Luxembourg Minister of Foreign tions but on a rather loose and ad hoc basis, with Affairs , who was informed after- the Ministers of Foreign Affairs playing a key

9 role in the co-ordination of positions. This co- the dynamism of the earlier years faded away. ordination task proved sometimes rather diffi- Although the Benelux countries are often men- cult. In the case of the Fouchet proposals for tioned as if they were one block, there are im- example, it is not until the negotiations have portant differences amongst them. In the politi- been going on for several months that the three cal field for example, the Netherlands took an finally agree on a memorandum that is to be the Atlanticist line, while Belgium and Luxembourg basis for their joint position. Even then they tended to be more supportive of a Europeanist hardly succeed to hide their divergences (Van- view. In the economic area, The Hague was gen- hoonacker 1989, 518). erally much more liberal than Belgium and Lux- In both cases the motivation for their coop- embourg. The question arises whether the Lux- eration differs. For the Benelux memorandum embourg compromise and the accession of the of 1955, it was in the first place the desire to United Kingdom are also explanatory factors for give a new impetus to the European integration the reduced cooperation? One could argue that process which spurred a joint initiative. In the the smaller countries felt less threatened because case of the Fouchet negotiations, it was prima- provided the long awaited counterbal- rily the fear for domination by the Franco- ance vis-à-vis France and Germany and because German axis that made Belgium and the Nether- the Luxembourg compromise guaranteed that lands join forces. They hoped to prevent such they could always invoke a veto when vital in- predominance by guaranteeing British member- terests were at stake. Or perhaps there were sim- ship of the Political Union and by equipping the ply few joint initiatives because the three coun- Union with a supranational and independent tries felt rather comfortable in the European body such as the European Commission. The Communities and they didn’t see a real need to latter was seen as indispensable for the defence join forces. of the interests of the smaller member states. Although the absence of joint approaches ‘à The reticence of the small member states with trois’ is partly compensated by the numerous regard to intergovernmental bodies would per- bilateral contacts, it is not until the major sist. When in the early 1970s France proposed changes brought about by the fall of the Berlin regular meetings of the Heads of State and Wall that the cooperation between the Benelux Government in the framework of the European countries gets a new impetus.12 Council, it was the Netherlands who insisted that its creation be counterbalanced by the introduc- tion of direct elections for the European Parlia- 4. Common concerns and views ment. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Benelux coun- Since the mid-1990s the Benelux countries tries remain active participants in the European have again tried to cooperate on a number of integration process through initiatives such as questions. The most visible expression of this the Werner report on Economic and Monetary renewed attempt to coordinate positions are the Union (Luxembourg), the Tindemans report joint memoranda that have been represented at (Belgium), and the on Euro- the Intergovernmental Conferences leading to pean Political Cooperation (Belgium). Although the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice and the texts the Benelux countries contributed in a signifi- on the future of the EU.13 That these three found- cant way to initiatives such as the Single Euro- ing countries again feel the need to present a pean Act and the , most of common front has everything to do with the the projects on which they had a major impact breath-taking developments on the European were unilateral rather than joint initiatives. Sev- continent in 1989 and with their changing posi- eral factors may have played a role. With the tion in the EU as a result of these events. Also realisation of the customs union in 1968, one of domestic factors have played a role. the central objectives of the Benelux had been Although history rarely knows real breaks, it attained within the framework of the Six and cannot be denied that the fall of the Berlin Wall

10 constituted a major shock for the European in the area of CFSP. The formation of a Contact Communities and that at this moment its mem- Group for the former Yugoslavia, in which only ber states are still digesting the consequences. the four larger EU member states were repre- While the Twelve were initially primarily think- sented,14 was a slap in the face of the smaller ing in terms of concluding association agree- ones. It is feared that this will be the beginning ments with the former communist countries of of a new trend whereby the big member states Central Europe, it soon became clear that the will increasingly act outside the EU framework latter aspired nothing less than EU membership. in major international crises. The mini-summits Conscious of its positive impact on the stability amongst the big three during the Afghan crisis of the European continent, Belgium, Luxem- only reinforced these fears. bourg and the Netherlands strongly support the Besides concerns about their future power expansion of the European Union. At the same position, growing intergovernmentalism and the time however, they realise that it will strongly further direction of European integration, there change the nature of the EU and affect their own are also domestic factors that have positively position. Having always been strong advocates influenced the re-launching of the Benelux co- of European integration, they fear that increas- operation. Following the formation in 1994 of ing diversity and divergence of interests will a coalition of liberals, socialists and the Demo- water down the process, reducing the EU to crats 66 (D66) in the Netherlands,15 fears were nothing more than a glorified free trade area. arising that pressure from the eurosceptic liber- Secondly, they are concerned that as small als would loosen the Dutch commitment to the countries it will become increasingly difficult European integration process. The socialists and to be heard and to have an impact on the direc- D66 saw closer cooperation with their Belgian tion of the EU. In a Union of 27 they will only and Luxembourg partners as a possible way to represent 8.4% of the votes compared to 13.7% counter such development (see also Bossaert/ in the EU15 (and to 29.5% in the Europe of Six) Vanhoonacker 2000, 174). (Hösli 1995). Also in the European Commis- Last but not least, one has to take into account sion, they will not always be represented since that the smooth functioning of the rather ad hoc participation in a Union of 27 or more will take and informal cooperation between the three place on the basis of the principle of rotation. countries depends to a large extent on a good Even the future of the Presidency, one of the mutual understanding of the key political ac- key symbols of equality amongst the member tors. The recent strengthening of Benelux could states is under pressure and might in the future not have been realised without the excellent re- be abandoned for a different type of set-up. lations between the Prime Ministers Kok, Thirdly, the three share a concern about the Dehaene (and later Verhofstadt) and Juncker. future position of the European Commission. Kok’s successor, Jan Peter Balkenende, seems The development of two new intergovernmen- to want to continue the cooperation. tal pillars (CFSP and JHA) in Maastricht and the lack of leadership since the departure of Jacques Delors has considerably weakened the 5. Concrete cases of cooperation position of this institution, traditionally seen as the defender of the small countries’ interests. The most visible and concrete expressions of Also the trend whereby an intergovernmental the renewed attempts of the Benelux to coordi- body as the European Council plays an increas- nate positions are the various joint memoranda ingly central role in steering the EU is consid- that have been published since 1996. Six of them ered to be primarily in the advantage of the big represent joint positions with regard to Inter- members. governmental Conferences and the further de- The increasing concern about being domi- velopment of the Union;16 two are dedicated to nated by the bigger countries has also been the area of Justice and Home Affairs.17 The spurred by the discussions about a directorate question that dominates the first group of memo-

11 randa is how to come to a more efficient, demo- a central role for the European Commission and cratic and transparent Union. Themes receiv- be organised within the Treaty framework. An ing a central place are: the further deepening of à la carte Europe whereby countries just pick European integration, the possible need for dif- and chose from the menu on an ad hoc basis is ferentiation and the absolute necessity for a solid rejected. Closer cooperation is also an impor- institutional underpinning of the EU. tant theme in the memorandum presented just The texts welcome the Union’s enlargement before the European Council of Helsinki (10– but underline the need to counterbalance it with 11 December 1999). The three are of the opin- a further deepening. Priority areas are the com- ion that the conditions for enhanced coopera- pletion of the internal market, external policy, tion as defined in Amsterdam were too strict and justice and home affairs as well as employ- they advocated their relaxation in the IGC 2000. ment.18 A recurrent topic is the need to become They also favoured their extension to the sec- more prominent on the international scene. The ond pillar. As we will see below, the Benelux Benelux countries plead for more consistency played a key role in the debate on the relaxation between the pillars, a strengthened role for the of the flexibility conditions. Commission in CFSP and decision-making by In the discussions on the institutional reform qualified majority. During the IGC leading to of the EU, the Benelux countries manifest Amsterdam they advocated a gradual merger of themselves as strong defenders of the Commu- the WEU into the EU and they supported the nity method according to which the European incorporation of the Petersberg tasks into the Commission has the exclusive right of initia- Treaty. tive. The Commission is seen as the body that The three have also at several occasions ex- is best placed to serve the general EU interest pressed frustration with regard to the slow and its position should therefore be further progress in the third pillar. In Amsterdam they strengthened. In the memorandum to the Con- defended the incorporation of asylum and mi- vention (December 2002), it is proposed that gration into the Community pillar, and pleaded in the future the President of the Commission for the incorporation of Schengen into the Treaty is elected by the European Parliament and con- framework. The Benelux countries have also firmed by the European Council deciding by dedicated two separate memoranda to the area qualified majority.21 The Benelux countries of Justice and Home Affairs. Prior to the Euro- also express their preference for a reduced-size pean Council of Tampere, they presented a joint Commission where seats rotate on the basis of contribution outlining the priority areas for ac- equality. tion with regard to the realisation of a space of The strengthened position of the European freedom, security and justice.19 In March 2001, Parliament and its role as co-legislator in an in- they made a list of proposals on the table and creasing number of areas is very much wel- indicated a deadline by which political agree- comed and seen as a way to come to a more ment or adoption should be achieved. It is also democratic Union. But also the national parlia- stated that the Benelux will try to better coordi- ments should become more active and follow nate its positions in these fields, although in Commission proposals more closely. The three practice this has proven to be difficult.20 don’t want to create any new institutions involv- A second recurring theme is that of differen- ing national parliamentarians and they reject tiation or what the Treaty of Amsterdam has Giscard’s idea for a Congress of peoples, com- called ‘closer cooperation’. In the memorandum posed of representatives of the EP and the na- presented briefly after the start of the 1996–97 tional parliaments. IGC, the Benelux countries argue that in an en- Briefly before the European Council of Se- larged Union, differentiation will be ‘unavoid- ville, the three countries have also presented able’. Cooperation amongst a core of countries their views on the reform of the Council. They in a certain policy area should, however, not plead for a better preparation of the European undermine the acquis communautaire, provide Council, oppose the creation of a new Council

12 formation of Deputy Prime Ministers and they elux countries by joining forces have been able advocate a careful analysis of the pros and cons to seriously influence the EU debate. The Neth- of the current Presidency system before giving erlands who held the Presidency during the fi- it up for an alternative system.22 The future of nal six months of the 1996–97 IGC played a the Presidency was one of the central themes of key role in integrating Schengen into the Treaty. discussion during the preparations of the memo- It very skilfully relied on the support of the other randum of December 2002. While the Nether- two countries to steer the negotiations in the lands strongly argued in favour of maintaining preferred direction and ultimately managed to a system based on rotation, the Belgian Prime reach agreement on a protocol incorporating Minister Verhofstadt did not want to exclude an Schengen into the Treaty framework (see opening to the proposal of France, the UK and Schout/Vanhoonacker, forthcoming). Spain to have an elected chair of the European A second and probably the most visible ex- Council. After some fierce discussions, this led ample of an impact of the Benelux countries on to a compromise whereby the three advocated the European debate has been that of the ex- to maintain the principle of rotation, adding that pansion of the agenda of the IGC 2000 beyond a longer term Presidency of the Council is only the three leftovers of Amsterdam (composition acceptable if elected amongst the members of of the European Commission, extension of that body. qualified majority voting and re-weighting of The co-ordination of positions and the at- the votes). At the European Council of Helsinki tempts to present a common front through the Benelux countries pleaded for an ‘extended’ memoranda does not imply that the three speak agenda including the relaxation of the condi- with one voice on every single aspect of the fur- tions for ‘closer cooperation’. Initially they only ther development of the EU. Each also presented had the support of and the European Com- national contributions to the various IGCs and mission, but gradually they managed to con- to the Convention. By joining forces, the Ben- vince others, including France, Germany and elux hopes to give more weight to issues they the Portuguese Presidency (first half of 2000). consider important and to contribute to the steer- By the end of the Portuguese Presidency the ing of the EU in their preferred direction. The Fifteen agreed to put ‘closer cooperation’ on the abovementioned discussion on the future of the IGC agenda. Presidency illustrates that it is not always easy It would be a misrepresentation of reality and to come up with common positions. Also, when grossly exaggerated to accredit the above-men- it comes to highly sensitive questions such as tioned achievements entirely to the efforts of the re-weighing of the votes, the national reflex the Benelux. Decisions in the EU are a process is predominant and both in Amsterdam23 as well of give and take whereby it is key to have the as in Nice,24 this led to a direct confrontation support of as many member states as possible, between Belgium and the Netherlands. While especially that of the bigger ones. Nevertheless the latter (16 million inhabitants) advocated a by joining forces and presenting strong argu- differentiation in votes between the two coun- ments the Benelux could convince other coun- tries, Belgium (10 million inhabitants) wanted tries to join them in their position and as a re- to maintain parity. The incident illustrates that sult they had more impact on the debate than if despite the willingness to support each other, they would have been alone in defending a po- national interests will always prevail. sition. The abovementioned discussions around the re-weighting of votes have caused some strain in the relations between the Netherlands and 6. No ‘ménage a trois’ Belgium, but these internal squirms have not prevented the cooperation to continue and their The multiple joint memoranda that have been joint efforts have not been without success. published over recent years seem to suggest that There are at least two examples where the Ben- the cooperation amongst Belgium, Luxembourg

13 and the Netherlands is more than an isolated whether the dialogue between the two groups event. The question arises what the prospects will be long-lived.25 It remains, however, that for longer-term cooperation are. So far the at- candidate countries such as the Baltic states and tempts to speak with one voice have not been the Visegrad group see the Benelux as an in- underpinned by an institutional framework and spiring example as how to co-operate more meetings take primarily place at the higher lev- closely in the EU framework. els. Twice a year there is a summit meeting at The cooperation between Benelux countries the level of the Prime Ministers, accompanied is far from all encompassing and there continue by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Min- to exist important economic, political and cul- isters of European Affairs of the three countries. tural divergences amongst these three founding In addition there is also an exchange of views member states. The Netherlands is the most lib- on the margins of European Councils. The ad- eral of the three and in dossiers of liberalisa- vantage of the cooperation is that it is organised tion, its position is often more aligned with that in a very flexible way and that there is little red of countries such as the United Kingdom. Bel- tape. Undoubtedly this very pragmatic approach gium’s blueprint of the EU is that of a Euro- is one of the keys to the success of the coopera- pean federation and when cooperating in the tion. On the other hand it raises the question Benelux forum it has to milder its ambitions.26 what will happen when the current Prime Min- The French speaking Belgians are not so eager isters will be replaced by other players who have to cooperate in the Benelux because they see it less affinity with each other. Experiences with as a Dutch speaking club. the Franco-German axis have shown that espe- Also the different size of the countries is some- cially in times of crisis, the presence of more times an obstacle for cooperation. The Nether- permanent structures can be very important to lands whose population and economy rank sixth sustain cooperation. in the EU has a different position than that of Nevertheless, even without a firm institutional Luxembourg, which is the smallest EU mem- underpinning, the circumstances for a continu- ber state. The Hague wears the double hat of ing close relationship are rather favourable. The being the biggest of the smallest and the small- prospect of a Union of 27 or more member states est of the biggest member states. As smallest of will definitely change the position of these three the biggest it likes to manifest itself as the de- founding member states and if they still want to fender of the interests of the small. In the dis- have some weight, they will be forced to look cussions on the future composition of the Euro- for allies and form coalitions. Their geographi- pean Commission and the re-weighting of the cal proximity and their common concern to pre- votes during the IGC 2000, it defended a posi- vent a watering down of the European integra- tion that was in line with that of other small tion process make them obvious partners. Suc- member states.27 In other cases, however, – and cesses such as their positive influence on ex- foreign policy is a case in point – the Nether- tending the IGC 2000 agenda are encouraging lands likes to see itself as the smallest of the to continue on the current road. The coopera- big. When Prime Minister Kok was not invited tion amongst Benelux countries is also open to to the mini-summit organised by Tony Blair in other member states. During the Belgian Presi- London in early November 2001 to discuss the dency (second half 2001), the three have also results of his trip to the Middle East, he decided tried to develop a dialogue with the Visegrad to invite himself.28 He was the only of the group, another regional partnership. In Decem- smaller countries not accepting the proposal of ber 2001 the Prime Ministers and Ministers of Prime Minister Verhofstadt that the Belgian Foreign Affairs of the two groups held an in- Presidency would represent them at the meet- formal meeting in Luxembourg during which ing. When it comes to military cooperation at they discussed the future of Europe. Consider- the European level, the Netherlands has a pref- ing the rather loose cooperation amongst the erence to cooperate with countries such as the Visegrad group, it remains rather doubtful United Kingdom and Germany.

14 The Benelux coalition is far from being ex- multiple instruments used to make sure that na- clusive. The cooperation has to be seen in the tional interests are being heard and possibly framework of a broader strategy of the three taken into account. This also explains why no countries to intensify their bilateral and multi- serious attempts have been made to further in- lateral relations with the objective of better de- stitutionalise the cooperation. The actors in- fending their national positions and exert influ- volved consider the flexible organisation and the ence on the future direction of the EU. In the pragmatic approach as a strength and not as a Netherlands for example, the closer cooperation weakness. Furthermore, the Benelux countries with Belgium and Luxembourg is part of a so- don’t want to be reduced to one block. The ‘com- called ‘buurlandenbeleid’, aimed at developing mittee of wise men’, a Benelux reflection group, closer links not only with the small but also with acknowledged the risks for the three countries the big neighbours (‘buurlanden’) like France, of acting too openly as a single bloc during the Germany and the United Kingdom. In a speech 1996–97 IGC, warning that the common posi- at the Dutch Society for International Affairs tion could be translated into one Benelux mem- the former Dutch State Secretary for European ber in the Commission, or one Benelux Presi- Affairs Dick Benschop has been pleading for a dency of the Council. In this regard, too close networking approach.29 In an increasingly di- cooperation could even be counterproductive vergent and heterogeneous Europe where deals (Pijpers/Vanhoonacker 1997, 137). In any case, are more and more reached outside the formal even if the three countries would wish to give meetings of Ministers or Heads of State and more priority to attuning their positions, it would Government, The Hague wants to avoid becom- be highly unlikely that this could be realised. ing marginalised. As a middle-sized country, it The interests of the three do not necessarily al- aims to become an important partner in a broad ways coincide and as we have seen in the dos- European network comprising not only the EU sier of the re-weighting of the votes, the first member states but also the candidate countries.30 priority continues to be the defence of one’s own In the area of the environment for example, the position and interests. Thirdly it would certainly Netherlands is cooperating with the Scandi- be an illusion to assume that close cooperation navian member states (see Bossaert/Van- would add up to the same influence as that of hoonacker 2000, 182). The same trend of in- France or Germany. The power base of the Ben- tensifying contacts with other EU member elux in terms of population, military force, is states, and not only with the traditional partners not strong enough to acquire big power status. France and Germany, is also apparent in Lux- Their ability to exert influence will therefore to embourg. With the goal of fostering the influ- a large extent continue to depend on their abil- ence of the smallest Benelux member in the EU, ity to rally other countries behind their position. the Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker stressed By joining forces their chances to be heard will in the declaration of the new government in June however be much bigger than when acting uni- 1999 that it is highly important for the Grand- laterally. Duchy to invest more in bilateral relations with its EU partners.31 Concluding, one could repeat the question put forward by Professor A.E. Kersten in a Ben- NOTES elux study (1982) and ask whether by closely 1 The Benelux organisation is not involved and plays cooperating the three equate the influence of one no role in the cooperation between the three coun- big member state? In our view the answer to tries in the EU framework. that question is negative (Bossaert/Vanhoon- 2 Benelux Memorandum on the Intergovernmental acker 2000, 183). Firstly there is no political Conference, 5 May 1996. support in the respective countries to give the Benelux Memorandum on the Intergovernmental Conference, 8 December 1999. cooperation such a central place. Benelux co- Benelux Memorandum on the IGC and on the Fu- operation is not an aim in itself but one of the ture of the European Union, 29 September 2000.

15 Benelux Memorandum on the Future of Europe, 22 23 The Belgian Prime Minister Dehaene was furious in June 2001. Amsterdam (June 1997) when at the very last mo- Preparation of the European Council of Sevilla: Ben- ment the Dutch Presidency proposed a modification elux Memorandum on the reform of the Council, 4 of the current weighting system in the Council fa- June 2002. vouring the big Member States, without consulting Memorandum of the Benelux. A balanced institu- Belgium. This proposal would have meant an end to tional framework for an enlarged, more effective and the parity between Belgium and the Netherlands, more transparent Union, Brussels, 4 December 2002. which at that moment each had 5 votes. According 3 Mémorandum des pays Benelux pour le Conseil to the Dutch proposal in Amsterdam, the four big européen de Tampere, 6 October 1999. Member States would have 25 votes, Spain 20, the Mémorandum Benelux en matière de Justice et Netherlands 12, Belgium 10 and Luxembourg three. Affaires Intérieures en vue du Sommet de Laeken, 24 The position of Belgium in the IGC 2000 was that it March 2001. would only accept a differentiation in votes between 4 Based on the title of a study by Pijpers (2000). the Netherlands and Belgium if a distinction would 5 The Schäuble-Lamers paper was not an official docu- also be made between France and Germany (which ment of the German government but it is hard to was unacceptable for France!). The Netherlands and imagine that it had not first been seen and ‘approved’ Prime Minister Kok fiercely fought for an extra vote by Chancellor Kohl. and in Nice The Hague finally received one more 6 In the Nice Treaty the minimum number has been vote than Belgium. Relations between the two coun- reduced to 8 (currently still a majority of the mem- tries came under serious strain. ber states but after enlargement this will be less than 25 Summit Meeting between Benelux and the Visegrad half). Group, Luxembourg, December 2001 (Press State- 7 For an overview of the negotiations on flexibility both ment). in Amsterdam and Nice, see Stubb (2002). 26 Even then the liberal members of the second cham- 8 On the discussions of a directorate, see Keukeleire ber in The Hague found the Benelux memorandum (2000). on the Future of Europe too ambitious. In: Kritiek 9 This part of the article has been taken from Bossaert/ VVD op Benelux-Memorandum, in: @Europa 7, 1- Vanhoonacker (2000, 170ff.). 2. 10 On the Benelux and the early years of European in- 27 The small member states defended the position that tegration, see Bloemen (1992). also in an enlarged Union each member state should 11 On the Dutch position towards de Gaulle’s propos- have one Commissioner. Later on, some of them, als for a Political Union, see Nijenhuis (1987). including the Netherlands, supported a rotating mem- 12 See the chapters ‘België’ by Schreurs (1999) and bership at the condition that it would be based on the ‘Luxemburg’ by Brouwer/Pijpers (1999). principle of equality. 13 See note 2. 28 Initially only the French President Jacques Chirac 14 Besides Russia and the US, only France, Germany, and the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder had Italy, the United Kingdom were members of the Con- been invited; the Spanish and Italian Prime Minis- tact Group. ters had only been called at the last moment. 15 This coalition is also known as the ‘purple’ coali- 29 For the text of his contribution, see Benschop (2000). tion. 30 On the Netherlands and the increasing importance 16 See note 2. of bilateralism in its foreign policy, see Pijpers (1999). 17 Mémorandum des pays Benelux pour le Conseil 31 Declaration of government of 12 August 1999, by européen de Tampere, 6 October 1999. Mémorandum Jean-Claude Juncker, 3. See also Bossaert and Benelux en matière de Justice et Affaires Intérieures Vanhoonacker (2000, 182f.). en vue du Sommet de Laeken, March 2001. 18 Even though it is still primarily a national responsi- bility, it is argued that national employment policies REFERENCES should be better coordinated and that the provisions in the Treaty on the complementary role of the EU Benelux memorandum on the Intergovernmental Con- should be made more explicit. ference, 5 May 1996. 19 Mémorandum des pays Benelux pour le Conseil Benelux memorandum on the Intergovernmental Con- européen de Tampere, 6 October 1999. ference, 8 December1999. 20 Mémorandum Benelux en matière de Justice et Benelux memorandum on the IGC and on the Future of Affaires Intérieures en vue du Sommet de Laeken, the European Union, 29 September 2000. March 2001. Benelux Memorandum on the Future of Europe, 22 June 21 Memorandum of the Benelux. A balanced institu- 2001. tional framework for an enlarged, more effective and Benschop, Dick (2000). De dynamiek van Netwerk more transparent Union, Brussels, 4 December 2002. Europa, in: Internationale Spectator, 54 (4), 186–190. 22 Preparation of the European Council of Sevilla: Ben- Bloemen, E.S.A. (1992). Het Benelux-effect. België, elux Memorandum on the reform of the Council, 4 Nederland en Luxemburg en de Europese integratie, June 2002. 1945–1957, Amsterdam.

16 Bossaert, Danielle/Sophie Vanhoonacker (2000). Re- (1960–1962): Nee tegen de Gaulle, in: Internationale launch of the Benelux, in: Alfred Pijpers (Ed.): On Spectator, 41 (1), 41–49. Cores and Coalitions in the European Union. The Pijpers, Alfred (Ed.) (1999). Nederland zoekt het Position of Some Smaller Member States, The Hague, tweegesprek. Neobilaterale accenten in de Europese 169–183. politiek, Den Haag. Brouwer, Jan Willem/Alfred Pijpers (1999). Luxemburg, Pijpers, Alfred (Ed.) (2000). On Cores and Coalitions in: Alfred Pijpers (Ed.): Nederland zoekt het in the European Union. The Position of Some Smaller tweegesprek. Neobilaterale accenten in de Europese Member States, The Hague. politiek, Den Haag, 97–113. Pijpers Alfred/Sophie Vanhoonacker (1997). The posi- Chirac, Jacques (2000). Notre Europe, Discours pro- tion of the Benelux-countries, in: Geoffrey Edwards/ noncé par le Président de la République Française Alfred Pijpers (Eds.): The Politics of European Treaty devant le Bundestag allemand, Berlin, mardi 27 juin Reform, London, 119–141. 2000 (www.europa-digital.de/aktuell/dossier/reden/ Preparation of the European Council of Sevilla: Ben- textchirac.shtml). elux Memorandum on the reform of the Council, 4 Delors, Jacques (2001). An ‘Avant-Garde’ driving the June 2002. European unification process forward, Speech at the Schout, Adriaan/Sophie Vanhoonacker (forthcoming). A International Bertelsmann Forum 2001 «Europe leadership function for the Presidency? The Case of without Borders». Berlin, 19–20 January 2001 the incorporation of Schengen. (www.notre-europe.asso.fr/pages/index-en.htm). Schreurs, Rob (1999). België, in: Alfred Pijpers (Ed.): Duchêne, François (1994). . The First Nederland zoekt het tweegesprek. Neobilaterale Statesman of Interdependence, New York-London. accenten in de Europese politiek, Den Haag, 85–96. Fischer, Joschka (2000). From Confederacy to Federa- Stubb, Alexander (2002). Negotiating Flexibility in the tion. Thoughts on the Finality of European Integra- EU. Amsterdam, Nice and Beyond, London. tion, Speech at the Humboldt University’, Berlin, 12 Summit Meeting between Benelux and the Visegrad May 2000 (www.auswaertiges-amt.de). Group, Luxembourg, December 2001 (Press State- Galloway, David (2001). The Treaty of Nice and Be- ment). yond. Realities and Illusions of Power in the EU, Trausch, Gilbret (1996). Le Luxembourg face à la con- Sheffield. struction européenne, Luxembourg. Hösli, Madeleine O. (1995). The balance between small Vanhoonacker, Sophie (1989). La Belgique. Responsable and large: Effects of a double-majority system on ou bouc émissaire de l’échec des négociations voting power in the European Union, in: International Fouchet?, in: Res Publica, 31 (4), 513–526. Studies Quarterly, 39, 351–370. Kersten, Albert E. (1982). Maken drie kleinen een grote? De politieke invloed van de Benelux, 1945–55, Bussum. Keukeleire, Stephan (2000). The Case for a ‘Directo- AUTORIN rate’ in the CESDP, in: Alfred Pijpers (Ed.): On Cores and Coalitions in the European Union. The Position Sophie VANHOONACKER is Assistant Professor at of Some Smaller Member States, The Hague, 35– the Faculty of Arts and Culture, University of Maastricht 62. and Director of a master programme European Public Kritiek VVD op Benelux-Memorandum, in: @Europa Affairs (EPA). She has a background in political sci- 7, 1–2. ence and history. Her main fields of research are EU Mémorandum des pays Benelux pour le Conseil institutions and decision-making (with a particular in- européen de Tampere, 6 October 1999. terest in the Presidency of the Council); CFSP; transat- Mémorandum Benelux en matière de Justice et Affaires lantic relations. Intérieures en vue du Sommet de Laeken, March 2001. Contact address: Faculty of Arts and Culture, P.O. Nijenhuis, Hans (1987). De Nederlandse taktiek in de Box 616, NL–6200 MD Maastricht; email: onderhandelingen over een Europese politieke unie [email protected].

17