Beyond Jihad and Traditionalism Afghanistan’S New Generation of Islamic Activists
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Borhan Osman Beyond Jihad and Traditionalism Afghanistan’s new generation of Islamic activists EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Not all Afghan youth who are politically active and communities, they also all strongly lean on who want to change the status quo fit into the educational institutions. Hizb ut-Tahrir has been a often simplified categories of being either predominantly campus-born group effective at progressive and educated, or uneducated and spreading its message among students (and subversive. There is an often-overlooked segment teachers and lecturers). Eslah organises large, of Afghanistan’s youth that is educated and dedicated programmes, such as free seasonal engages in modern political debates and activities, courses for school children and religious while at the same time aiming to replace the competitions with attractive awards for the current democratic order with a sharia-based winners. Eslah also runs its own high schools, government and to reverse many of the freedoms universities and teacher-training institutes. Hezbi that emerged after 2001. This paper explores their youth have their own university branches in major ideologies and activities. universities. Modern media, from TV stations to YouTube channels and from highly circulated The research has focused on four radical Islamist brochures to slick magazines, are utilised by all trends in Afghanistan that appear to have four groups to propagate their message, again in significant appeal and a growing following among different ways. Among the four groups, Eslah has educated youth. These are Hizb ut-Tahrir, which built the largest media network, with FM radio seeks a caliphate that encompasses the whole airing in several provinces and a TV channel in Muslim world and uses anti-nation state, Herat. Hizb ut-Tahrir publishes a glossy bi-weekly clandestine political activism; Jamiat-e Eslah, the magazine, sends out press releases on current Afghan affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood, which affairs, and has a vibrant social media presence. operates as a well-organised and grassroots- Salafis use existing media, including the state radio oriented organisation; the younger generation of and television channels of RTA and the private Tolo Hezb-e Islami, which seeks to revive the ideological TV, to promote their message, but it also took over cause of the party it inherited from the anti-Soviet a private TV channel (temporarily) and a private jihad era; and a re-energised Salafism, which FM radio in Nangarhar. Some have additionally seems to become increasingly accepted as part of introduced large-scale religious gatherings; Eslah religious orthodoxy. The four groups reveal a and the Salafis have organised mass public snapshot of what appears to be a broader Islamic gatherings where thousands of people come to trend among segments of Afghan youth. listen to religious lectures. While all four groups use religion as the primary Demonstrations have been the Islamic activists’ mobilisation tool, with a specific focus on mosques most attention-grabbing activity. All of the four as convenient platforms to reach out to local 2 Borhan Osman: Beyond Jihad and Traditionalism studied groups, except the Salafis, frequently hold segments of society and have, so far, not suffered protests. In one instance, hundreds of women the same violent targeting that has hit a large from Eslah held a demonstration in Kabul in 2013 number of pro-government ulama, tribal elders against the Law on the Elimination of Violence and officials. against Women condemning the freedoms Looking ahead, all four groups seem poised to envisaged in the law as a plot by the West to strip grow at a steady pace, both in numbers and Muslim women of their Islamic dignity. The most influence within public institutions, and to become remarkable protests, however, came from a more an influential part of the country’s political belligerent strand of students on campuses such as landscape. This is especially the case with the three Nangarhar and Khost, where rampant protest groups that have political ambitions and that are, activism subsided only after authorities shut down in different ways, seeking to increase their the dormitories in 2013. influence within the government: Eslah through Ideologically, all four groups state that their aim is recruiting sympathisers from within government to fully bring Islam back into every field of life, but institutions, Hizb ut-Tahrir through infiltration of they differ on the details of what such an Islamic institutions and Hezb-e Islami youth through the revival would look like and how it should be patronage of its older generation already in achieved. Hizb ut-Tahrir considers khilafa (a government. Because Islamic activism is a Muslim caliphate ruling over all Muslim lands) as movement in transition, predicting its future the only true Islamic polity and its members behaviour is difficult. The shape the different generally consider all current governments in strands take and whether they develop into violent Muslim lands as kufri (heretic). Eslah and Hezbi extremism, or not, will depend on various factors, youth, on the other hand, look at Muhammad including the prevalent political environment in Morsi’s short-lived presidency in Egypt and Recep Afghanistan and the fate of other Islamic groups Tayyep Erdogan’s rule in Turkey as possible internationally, from both jihadist and political inspiring models of modern Islamic government. spectrums, in their projects of establishing an None consider the Taleban’s previous Islamic Islamic order. But how to accommodate these Emirate regime as an example of a viable or Islamist groups with other growing, and possibly desirable Islamic state. Salafis and Hizb ut-Tahrir conflicting, trends such as the ‘secularists’ will consider democracy and multi-party politics as become a pressing question as Afghanistan seeks anti-Islamic. The Islamic activists’ views on to move to self-reliance. women’s education and work differ widely, even within each group (often depending on how conservative an individual’s home area is, rather 1. INTRODUCTION than on which group he or she belongs to). Youth in post-2001 Afghanistan are often The diversity in their Islamic trends, in terms of described in generalised terms and classified as message, level of organisation and political aims, either educated urbanites with progressive ideas means that there is a variety of ‘flavours’ on offer, on the one hand, or uneducated rural cohorts with allowing these groups to accommodate audiences anti-modern tendencies on the other. International with different types of religious dispositions. The actors and many press reports, keen to show the appeal of these groups is partly fed by a positive face of post-Taleban Afghanistan, often widespread frustration with a government seen as paint a picture of a new generation that readily corrupt, partisan and too dependent on the West, embraces democratic values, pointing to something that has led segments of the educated developments such as more children going to and entitled-feeling youth to turn to Islamic school and university, civic activism and the activism as an alternative to the current socio- vigorous discourse about human rights and political system. The groups’ appeal indicates that freedoms among the younger population. This the historically unsuccessful Islamic governments view sees, at the other end of the spectrum, the of the mujahedin and the Taleban have not violent extremists, the likes of the Taleban, who necessarily discredited the search for an ‘Islamic tend to be treated as the country’s default Islamist solution’ in Afghanistan. force and are looked at mainly through the lens of Politically, the Islamic groups have, so far, the security threats they pose. managed to walk a tightrope between, on the one This binary classification is simplistic and probably hand, the government, which they often criticise, rooted in the limited study of current trends in and on the other, the Taleban insurgency with society, particularly among youth. More diversity which they are often in undeclared competition. exists among Afghan youth than the dichotomy of They have also managed to preserve their religious disruptive militants versus progressive credibility among both pro- and anti-state AAN Thematic Report 01/2015 3 Borhan Osman: Beyond Jihad and Traditionalism modernisers. This diversity includes politically inquiries a step further by digging deeper into the active youth, both urban and rural, who advocate phenomenon and with added focus.1 against democracy, struggle non-violently to This paper, which offers a snapshot of the present establish a sharia-based government and talk of landscape of Islamic activism in Afghanistan, is reversing existing freedoms. These youths are based exclusively on fieldwork and focuses on four themselves diverse and follow various ideologies, groups. The first group is a newcomer to the but they generally have enjoyed a modern Afghan scene: Hizb ut-Tahrir, a primarily Europe- education (some have been educated in the West), based, pan-Islamic organisation with explicit global engage in what are recognisably modern political ambitions; it seeks a caliphate that encompasses debates and use modern methods of mobilisation the entire Muslim world through anti-nation state, and recruitment, such as demonstrations, rallies, political activism. The second group is the Afghan electronic media and well-defined and well- affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamiat-e followed membership procedures. They might also Eslah, which builds upon a ‘failure of the share the narrative of the traditional Taleban, mujahedin’ narrative and a legacy it claims from calling the government a “puppet of the West” and the first Afghan political Islamist movement from international troops “occupying forces.” However, the 1960s Nuhzat-e Islami. Inspired by two major many are professionals, a sizeable minority are non-violent Islamist groups in the region (Jamaat-e women and these youths are generally well Islami in the Indian subcontinent and the Muslim connected to their peers in the broader Muslim Brotherhood of the Arab world), Jamiat-e Eslah world.