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America's Choice Between Security Interests and Democratic Values This document is downloaded from DR‑NTU (https://dr.ntu.edu.sg) Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Allies in crisis : America's choice between security interests and democratic values DK Nur Asyura Pg Hj Mohd Salleh 2019 DK Nur Asyura Pg Hj Mohd Salleh. (2019). Allies in crisis : America's choice between security interests and democratic values. Doctoral thesis, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/105774 https://doi.org/10.32657/10220/48830 Downloaded on 29 Sep 2021 14:10:46 SGT ALLIES IN CRISIS: AMERICA’S CHOICE BETWEEN SECURITY INTERESTS AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES DK NUR ASYURA PG HJ MOHD SALLEH S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Singapore Thesis submitted to the Nanyang Technological University in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2019 Scanned with CamScanner Authorship Attribution Statement (A) This thesis does not contain any materials from papers published in peer-reviewed journals or from papers accepted at conferences in which I am listed as an author. 20 JUNE 2019 . Date DK NUR ASYURA PG HJ MOHD SALLEH ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to my supervisors Dr. Evan Resnick and Dr. Ralf Emmers for their close support and consistent feedback that were crucial in guiding me from the beginning of my research to the final stages of drafting. I am also extremely grateful to Dr. Farish Noor and Dr. Ian Storey for their consistent motivation and strong moral support. My sincere thanks also goes out to many people in RSIS, including Roxane and Yee Ming, whose helpful advice aided me as I navigated my way around the procedures and library resources. I would like to thank my friends and the PhD cohort for their research help and encouragement that sustained the momentum I needed to complete this thesis. I am also highly indebted to my parents, sisters, and husband Naveed Khan, who cheered and supported me all the way. Their undying belief and love fuelled the light I needed in times of struggle. TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Chapter 1: Introduction………………………………...……….............. 1 2. Chapter 2: The Inductive Approach………………….…………...…… 7 2.1. Introduction……………………………...………...........................7 2.2. Literature Review……………………………...………................. 9 2.2.1. Defining Democracy……………………………...…..…. 10 2.2.2. Debates in the Democracy Promotion Literature.…..... 13 2.3. Research Methodology…………..……...………......................... 25 2.4. Conclusion……………………………...………............................. 32 3. Chapter 3: Democracy Subversion in Chile, 1970-1973………………. 35 3.1. Introduction……………………………...………........................... 35 3.2. History……………………………...………................................... 36 3.2.1. An American Ally…………………………….....……...... 37 3.2.2. Chile’s Political Crisis……………………...……............. 41 3.2.3. America's Policy Response………………………..…….. 45 3.3. Presidential Intent……………………………...…….................... 53 3.4. Influence of Senior Policymakers….………...………................. 62 3.4.1. Resistance from the Policy Doves………………………..62 3.4.2. The Nixon-Kissinger Partnership………………………..68 3.4.3. The Bureaucratic Divide…………………………………..72 3.5. Congressional Pressure…………………………………....…….. 75 3.6. Capitalist Influence………………………………...………...........78 3.7. Public Opinion and the US Media ….………...……….............. 84 3.8. Conclusion……………………………………………...….…........ 87 4. Chapter 4: Passive Democracy Promotion in South Korea, 1979 - 1980.................................................................................................... 90 4.1. Introduction……………………………...………........................... 90 4.2. History……………………………...………................................... 91 4.2.1. An American Ally……………………………...…..…...... 92 4.2.2. South Korea’s Political Crisis……………………………. 96 4.2.3. America's Policy Response…………………………..…... 102 4.3. Presidential Intent…………………………...……….................... 109 4.4. Influence of Senior Policymakers…….……...………..................114 4.4.1. Avoiding “another Iran”………………………………….115 4.4.2. Deterring North Korea……………………………………115 4.4.3. Clashing Foreign Policy Opinions……………………….116 4.4.4. Influential Individuals…………………………………….119 4.5. Congressional Pressure…..……………………………....…….....122 4.6. Capitalist Influence……………………………...……….............. 126 4.7. Public Opinion and the US Media…………………........…........ 129 4.8. Conclusion……………………………...………............................. 131 5. Chapter 5: Active Democracy Promotion in the Philippines, 1983-1986………………………………………………………………… ..136 5.1. Introduction……………………………...………......................... ..136 5.2. History……………………………...………....................................138 5.2.1. An American Ally……………………………...…….........138 5.2.2. The Philippines’ Political Crisis..………...………............141 5.2.3. America's Policy Response……………………………... ..146 5.3. Presidential Intent…………………………...……….................. ..152 5.4. Influence of Senior Policymakers….………...………..................160 5.4.1. Competing Ideologies…………………………….……….161 5.4.2. The Trigger Event……………………………………….…168 5.5. Congressional Pressure…………………………………...…….....171 5.6. Capitalist Influence…………………………………...………........175 5.7. Public Opinion and the US Media...…………...……....................181 5.8. Conclusion……………………………...………........................... ...185 6. Chapter 6: Conclusion - Analysing US Policy towards Allies in Crisis……………………………………………………………………......190 6.1. Introduction.……………………………...……….......................... 190 6.2. Domestic Actors…………………………………………………....193 6.3. Role of Ideas………………………………..…………………........197 6.4. Economic Interests………………………………………………....201 6.5. Centralising Decision-Making……….………....………...............204 6.6. Direct Access to the President……………………….…………….207 6.7. Trigger Events in the Allied State…………..……………………..210 6.8. Media-Public Opinion Nexus……………………………………..212 6.9. The Passive Democracy Promotion Policy……………………….214 6.10. Future Research Avenues………………………………………….218 6.11. Conclusion……………………………………………….……...….221 Appendix I: Acronyms……………………………...………............................. 224 Appendix II: Glossary of Persons……………………………...……….............225 LIST OF TABLES 1. Strategies that Characterise America’s Policy Responses towards States with Democratic Crises…………………………………………………..…17 2. Main Macroeconomic Variables in Chile from 1970 to 1973 (%)…….…44 3. Foreign Aid to Chile from US Government Agencies and International Institutions from 1970 to 1974 - Total of loans and grants (in millions of US dollars)…………………………………………………………………...50 4. Factors surrounding US Democracy Subversion Policy towards Chile, 1970 – 1973…………………………………………………………………...87 5. Factors surrounding US Passive Democracy Promotion Policy towards South Korea, 1979 – 1980……………………………………………...…..133 6. Factors surrounding US Active Democracy Promotion Policy towards the Philippines, 1983-1986………………………………………...……....186 7. Comparison of Factors Influencing US Policy Responses towards Allies in Crisis…………………………………………………………………..…193 LIST OF FIGURES 1. Spectrum of US Policy Responses towards Allies experiencing Democratic Crises………………………………………………………...…16 2. US Investment in Chile’s Manufacturing Industry, 1965-1970………….40 3. Imported Crude Oil Nominal Price (US$/barrel), 1978 – 1980………...110 4. US Unemployment Rate and Inflation Rate (%), 1978 – 1980………......111 ABSTRACT This study aims to highlight factors that are critical in shaping America’s different policy responses towards allies experiencing a democratic crisis. In this crisis, the population of an allied state demonstrates a severe lack of trust in the ally’s political leadership. By branching beyond international relations theory and adopting a heavily inductive approach which pursues a structured and focused comparison research method, this study investigates how various factors and domestic actors can influence different foreign policy outcomes in three case studies. These cases are America’s democracy subversion, passive democracy promotion, and active democracy promotion policy responses towards Chile, South Korea, and the Philippines respectively. This study contributes to a very important but-understudied area on US foreign policy towards democratic progress in other countries. The research also aims to contribute to policy- relevant knowledge by helping academics and policy specialists better understand America’s role in today’s shifting liberal democratic order. CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION On 25 January 2011, nationwide protests broke out across Egypt as protestors urged the authoritarian Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to step down. Back in Washington, American policymakers were swept into a dilemma. The removal of Mubarak could impede America’s long-standing informal alliance with Egypt, which America relied on to maintain United States (US) influence and stability in the Middle East. The then US President Barack Obama needed to urgently respond to the political crisis in Egypt. Should US policymakers support the pro-democracy protestors or back the Mubarak regime? When an ally state struggles with a democratic crisis, this thesis shows that US policymakers would choose to respond in three different ways. A democratic crisis can take place when the population of a state demonstrates a severe lack of trust in the state’s political institutions and governing policymakers.1 As the state’s legitimacy and institutional strength are weakened by the public’s persistent call for a more democratic government, this can endanger the state’s capability to fulfil its commitment
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