Sir Robert Vansittart, the Global Balance of Power and Nazi Germany, 1934- 1937

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Sir Robert Vansittart, the Global Balance of Power and Nazi Germany, 1934- 1937 SIR ROBERT VANSITTART, THE GLOBAL BALANCE OF POWER AND NAZI GERMANY, 1934- 1937 Michael Lawrence Roi A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of History University of Toronto @Copyright by Michael Lawrence Roi 1996 Bibliotheque nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographic Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. rue Wellington Ottawa ON KIA ON4 Ottawa ON KIA ON4 Canada Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accorde me licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive pennettant a la National Library of Canada to Bibliotheque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sell reproduke, preier, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette these sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/filrn, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format electronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriete du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protege cette these. thesis nor substantial extracts kom it Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otheMrise de celle-ci ne doivent Stre imprimes reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. Michael Lawrence Roi Ph,D, November 1996 Department of History University of Torontc Sir Robert Vansittart, the Global Balance cf Power and Nazi Germany, 1934-1937 ABSTRACT Sir Robert Vansittart, the permanent under-secretary of state at the Foreign Office from January 1930 to December 1937, has attracted considerable scholarly attention. The interest in his views on international affairs is not surprising given the influence he exerted in the deliberations on British foreign and defence policy in the 1930s. And yet, the nature of those views has been largely misunderstood. Not only has Vansittart been accused of having an inflexible mind but he has also been called a Germanophobe. His opposition to Nazi Germany has been attributed to his abiding, if not irrational, hatred of Germany. This interpretation does not stand up under analysis. By illuminating the complexity of his approach to international affairs, including the global scope of his perspective, this study offers an alternative interpretation of his tenure as the civil service head of the Foreign Office. The focus here is on the years between 1934 and 1937, a period during which the British Empire was confronted with the emergence of the triple threat of Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan and (after 1936) Fascist Italy. What made these threats especially troublesome was their interconnection, as events in one region affected the situation in others. To meet this global crisis, Vansittart advocated a global strategy based on alliance diplomacy. In short, Britain had to work with other Great Powers to maintain the balance of power in those areas judged vital to British interests. Other policy-makers regarded alliance diplomacy as an outmoded practice that made war more rather than less likely, a view shared by Neville Chamberlain, the chancellor of the Exchequer and, after May 1937, prime minister. This study highlights the differences between Vansittart's strategy and the one favoured by an ascendent Chamberlain. Consequently, it suggests that the strategy pursued by Chamberlain after 1937 was not the only option open to Britain. CONTENTS ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION RETHINKING VANSITTART THE BEGUNNING Vansittart's Strategic Vision And The DRC "DEEPENING SHADOWS " Death of Disarmament And The Stresa Solution January 1934 -- June 1935 "THE WORST OF ALL WORLDS" The Abyssinian Crisis And The End Of The Stresa Front June 1935 -- February 1936 VANSITTART AND EDEN Facing The Dictators, Though Not Together 1936 A YEAR OF GRACE 1937 CONCLUSION "MINE IS A STORY OF FAILURE" BIBLIOGRAPHY INTRODUCTION Sir Robert Vansittart, the permanent under-secretary of state at the Foreign Office from 7 January 1930 to 3 1 December 1937, remains a much misunderstood and maligned historical figure. "Van", as he was known to friend and foe alike, has been accused of Gerrnanophobia, criticised for being indifferent to events outside of his Eurocentric perspective and castigated for possessing an inflexible mind. This study challenges these images of Vansittart. It also illustrates the inadequacies of the conventional interpretations of Vansittart as an anti-appeaser towards Germany and as an appeaser of Italy, neither of which convey accurately the essence of his views. The first chapter discusses his alleged Gemanophobia and demonstrates why this does not adequately explain his attitudes and actions in the 1930s. Indeed, it is one of the principal contentions of the following pages that the evidence does not support a picture of Vansittart as Gerrnanophobic and that historians must, therefore, look elsewhere to explain his reactions to Nazi Germany and its policies. By highlighting Vansittart's global outlook, chapter one also questions his Eurocentric image. A preoccupation with Europe and Germany has led historians to focus their research too narrowly into the Foreign Office archives concentrating solely on the Central Department, which dealt with German affairs. This study utilises to a far greater degree than any previous analysis of Vansittart's career the files of the various departments of the Foreign Office, whose work and activities Vansittart commented upon in great detail. In particular, extensive use has been made of materials in the Northern and Far Eastern Departments. What emerges, as a result, is an altogether different picture of Vansittart in the 1930s, one which emphasises inter aiia the permanent under-secretary's global approach in assessing and then dealing with Britain's foreign policy dilemmas. While this study concentrates on Vansittart, it is not, however, concerned with the details of his personal life. Rather, it represents a specific look at the role played and the influence exerted by him in the formulation of British foreign policy. Through a detailed analysis of his evolving strategy for meeting the international difficulties Britain confronted in the 1930s, the following chapters offer an alternative view of his tenure as permanent under-secretary. These chapters make clear that the image of Vansittart as an inflexible thinker animated by a Germamphobic idCe fixe could not be hrther fiorn the tmth. On the contrary, he possessed a supple mind, which adapted to the ever-changing circumstances of the 1930s. As the international environment altered, often to Britain's disadvantage, he tailored his policy recommendations to meet the new situation. This flexibility rested upon Vansittart's conviction that Britain simply could not safeguard its world-wide interests without the assistance of other powers. The global situation, therefore, largely determined Vansittart's perception of those powers which were most likely to assist Britain in maintaining the status quo and, as the situation in the world changed throughout the 1930s, he was forced to modify his views of Britain's potential friends and probable enemies. What made the problems confronting Britain in the 1930s especially vexing was, in fact, their global scope. Events in one region of the globe inevitably affected the situation in others. Thus, the realities of Britain's global position meant confronting difficulties truly global in scope. Rarely could a situation be dealt 3 with solely on a bilateral basis. When formulating policy, Vansittart took into consideration that Britain had to balance its interests in the various regions of the globe, always pondering the world-wide implications of a particular course of action. He looked at Britain's strategic dilemmas in global terms and as a series of interlocking questions. In other words, Vansittart believed in a global balance of power. Vansittart's views on the difficulties facing Britain in the 1930s and the solutions he advocated for dealing with these dilemmas deserve to be reconsidered. As the civil service head of the Foreign Office, and backed by powerful allies including two prime ministers, James Rarnsay MacDonald and Stanley Baldwin, Vansittart exercised enormous influence on British foreign policy. It is important to understand the position he held in Whitehall as this sheds light on the scope and, inversely, the limitations of his authority. While there were limits to his influence, it is clear nevertheless that his advice carried immense weight in the debates on foreign and defence policy in the 1930s. When chided by Ramsay MacDonald in August 1933 for a memorandum Vansittart had written on Austria that seemed "to bear the meaning that [he was] dictating the policy of the [Foreign] Office", the permanent under-secretary replied, "I know my place very well " . In spite of the prime minister's admonition, both Vansittart and MacDonald often crossed the lines separating politician and civil servant.' A remarkable letter survives in the 'MacDonald letter to Vansittart, 25 Aug. 1933; and Vansittart letter to MacDonald, 26 Aug. 1933, Ramsay MacDonald Papers, P[ublic] Rfecord] O[ffice, Kew] 30/69/679. =D.C. Watt has observed that "Sir Robert Vansittart was one of that extraordinary generation of civil servants between the wars to whom time, their abilities and the rapid change of Cabinets and ministers had combined to give a length of experience in office and a weight of influence which stand in remarkabIe contrast to the usual constitutional relationship between minister and permanent official. " D .C . Watt, "On Opposition from within the EIite. The Case of Appeasement 1933-1939," Government And ODDOS~~~O~ 1(1966), p. 429. MacDonald Papers in which Vansittart discussed with the prime minister the removal of Sir John Simon, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, from the Foreign Office: . I fully realise all your difficulties in the matter. The maintenance of the National Government here is one of the most important conditions of the maintenance of peace in Europe, for a return to party politics will certainly be misjudged by the Germans, and by others as a weakening.
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