Südosteuropa 62 (2014), no. 3, 363-372
DoSSieR: PeRSPectiveS on the ukRainian cRiSiS, ii
vIRGILIu BÎRLĂDEaNu
The Annexation of Crimea and the Secessionist War in Eastern Ukraine: A View from the Republic of Moldova
Abstract. The paper examines the official reactions in the Republic of Moldova to the annexa- tion of Crimea by Russia and the secessionist war in Eastern Ukraine . It also analyzes the impact these events had on the interaction between the authorities in Chișinău and Tiraspol during the period between February and june 2014. The strong pro-Russian tilt of Transnistria and the pro-European reforms that were initiated by Moldova led to opposing interpretations of the Ukrainian crisis as well as to a sharper separation of opinions in the negotiations on the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict itself. The high expectations provoked by triumphalist slogans after Crimea’s annexation and the suggestions made by Russia about rehabilitation of territorial identities from the time of the Russian Empire (such as Novorossiya) allowed the Transnistrian authorities to revive the previous political agendas, in which the East-West divisions are at center stage .
Virgiliu Bîrlădeanu is an Associate Professor of History at the Moldova State University in Chișinău.
Introduction
The annexation of Crimea at the beginning of 2014 and the secessionist war that followed in Eastern Ukraine generated a wave of political discussions and initiatives in Chișinău and in the separatist region of Transnistria. 1 Shortly after the controversial Moscow-backed referendum was carried out on 16 March 2014 in Crimea, through which the region from Moscow’s point of view expressed its desire to become part of the Russian Federation, the separatist authorities in Tiraspol also sought integration with Russia . The parliamentary speaker of Transnistria, Mikhail Burla, was sent to Moscow to present to the Russian authorities the region’s request to join the Federation. To back the request, the
1 The paper was prepared with the support of the research project “Possibilities and limits, challenges and obstacles of transferring CEE EU pre-accession best practices and experience to Moldova’s and Georgia’s pre-accession process” (Eu-PREaCC, 2013–2017). 364 virgiliu Bîrlădeanu
Supreme Council adopted an official declaration addressed to the vice president of the Russian State Duma, Ivan Melnikov. The document, adopted on 16 april 2014, asked the Russian authorities “to recognize the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic as a sovereign independent state” 2. At the time, the mass media reported that during the meeting between Burla and the Russians, a legislative proposal was made that would facilitate the an- nexation of new territories by the Russian Federation without the agreement of the countries of which these territories are part . Burla argued that according to the results of a previous referendum in Transnistria in 2006, 97 .2 percent of voters favored the region’s independence and unification with the Russian Federation . He further stated that for the 200,000 residents of Transnistria, liv- ing conditions might decline as a result of Moldova’s signing of the associa - tion Agreement with the European Union and the introduction of restrictive economic measures by the Moldovan authorities . On the basis of the results of the 2006 referendum, Burla argued that the next step should be the accession of the region to the Russian Federation. In his speech to the Russian officials, Burla recommended that “[t]hese steps should be implemented consistently, following not only the logic but also the legal mechanisms . First, the recognition of the republic should take place; only then can we approach the Russian government to request accession”.3 on 22 april 2014, in support of this initiative, the nongovernmental organiza- tion “Soiuz russkikh obshchin” (union of Russian Communities) in Transnistria began a campaign to collect signatures for a petition addressed to Vladimir Putin. The Russian president was asked “to initiate the procedure for the official recognition of Transnistria” 4. The petition argued that “the developments in neighboring ukraine and the rise of the political and economic crisis had led to violations of the rights of our citizens and increased the pressure on Transnistria. In the context of security threats to Transnistria, the question of our state’s status and Russia’s position is of particular importance to us.”5
2 Obrashcheniia Verkhovnogo Soveta PMR k Prezidentu, Gosdume, Sovetu Federatsii RF, OON, OBSE, Prezidentu PMR [Appeals of the Supreme Council of the TMR to the President, State Duma, RF Federation Council, UN, OSCE, President of the TMR], Sait Verkhovnogo Soveta Pridnestrovskoi Moldavskoi Respubliki, 16 april 2014, available at
Viorica Kohtarjova, the president of the organization, claimed that, during the two weeks of campaigning, more than 185,000 signatures were collected in support of the petition . The pro-government media in Russia interpreted this petition as a unanimous demand by Transnistria’s population to join the Rus- sian Federation . Transnistria was referred to as a region of Novorossiya . The lists with the signatures were submitted to the deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation, Dmitrij Rogozin, during his visit to Tiraspol for the Victory Day celebrations on 9 May . on 10 May, on the way back from Tiraspol to Moscow, Rogozin’s aircraft was grounded at the airport in Chișinău, and the lists were confiscated by the Moldovan authorities after a search on board the aircraft . Further, the Romanian and ukrainian authorities denied Rogozin’s plane access to their airspace. upon his return to Moscow, Rogozin declared that the Moldovan special services, which detained and raided the plane in Chișinău, had confiscated only a small part of the lists: “[…] we took care of the majority of them. The Russian delegation also brought home the Transnistrians’ appeal to the Russian leadership. It might have a sym- bolic rather than a legal meaning, but for us this is of importance now . Anyway, Chișinău’s provocation will have serious consequences for our bilateral relations”.6 He further declared that “Romania closed its airspace to my plane at the request of the united States. ukraine also did not allow it [access]. Next time I will fly in a Tu-160 [Russia’s largest strategic bomber] .”7 This episode could be regarded as a random event, if one disregards the atti- tudes dominating Russian society at the time. However, Rogozin’s declaration triggered a firm reaction from the Romanian Foreign Ministry, which requested an official explanation. In his reaction, the prime minister of the Republic of Moldova, Iurie Leancă, declared: “It is time for Mr. Rogozin to understand that the Republic of Moldova should be treated with respect, as are other countries that are subject to international law, based on these principles, based on our sincere and strong desire to have the best possible relationship with the Russian Federation .”8 of Transnistria], Informatsionnoe Agentstvo Novosti Pridnestrov’ia, 22 april 2014, available at
Leancă said that the relevant institutions would investigate the issue and would decide on the character of these signatures and on Moscow’s attempt to remove them from the Republic of Moldova: “I do not see how they [the lists with collected signatures] fit with the official posi- tion of the Russian Federation, which has always supported the principle of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova .”9 More broadly, in Chișinău, this episode led to resumption of the discussion about whether Russian Federation respects its role as a mediator and guarantor in the Transnistrian conflict or whether it is in fact a guarantor of this seces - sionist region’s existence. In Chișinău, the most widely accepted interpretation of the events in ukraine was that, for the Russian Federation, ukraine is “the last redoubt” in the struggle against NATO enlargement . The recent signing of the Association agreement with the European union and the European vector of ukraine’s new administration would lead to ukraine’s integration into Euro-atlantic organizations . To counteract these projects, Russia triggered actions aimed at the territorial dismemberment and political destabilization of Ukraine . The same pressures – intended primarily to stop the signing and ratification of the association agreement with the European union – could affect the Republic of Moldova. For the officials in Chișinău, these pressures began with the organiza- tion of a “consultative referendum” in the region uTa Gagauzia on 2 February 2014. The referendum was aimed at determining “Gagauzia’s right to declare its independence” 10. The authorities in Chișinău referred to this referendum as being inspired and financed by Moscow to challenge Moldova’s territorial integrity and to “stimulate separatist processes” in contravention of the Consti- tution, the Election Code, and other legislative acts of the Republic of Moldova . With a participation rate of 70 percent, the results of the consultative referen- dum were similar to those of Crimea’s referendum: 98.9 percent of the partici - pants supported independence for Gagauzia if the Republic of Moldova lost its sovereignty, and 98.47 percent of voters supported Moldova’s accession to the Eurasian Customs Union . Although the referendum was declared illegal and unconstitutional by a ruling of the district court in Comrat, the matter cannot be considered entirely closed. The press in both Chișinău and București drew worrying parallels between the referendums that took place in Transnistria and in South ossetia in 2006. The latter, even if contested by Tbilisi, was used
Companie de televiziune, 11 May 2014, available at
Recycling the Concept of Novorossiya
Recently, the Russian president used the term “Novorossiya” in his annual Tv special, “Direct Line with vladimir Putin,” on 17 april 2014. He explained that ukraine should protect “the legitimate rights and interests of Russian and Russian-speaking citizens of the Southeast”, which “was called Novorossiya back in the tsarist days”. “Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Nikolayev, odessa were not part of ukraine back then”, he continued. “These territories were given to ukraine in the 1920s by the Soviet government.”11 The reference to southeastern ukraine as “Novorossiya” by Russian officials and the mass media needs to be explained, as it points to parallels and continuities in Rus- sian imperial policies . The origins of this concept can be traced to another project for restoration of previously Russian-ruled territories, which was initiated by Tsarina Catherine II during a period when “profound transformations occurred in the way that the Russian state and the Rus- sian elite understood and acted on territory in the eighteenth century .”12 Many have noted that the consolidation of the state in the second half of the eighteenth century, presided over by an elite whose visions and ambitions in shaping territory were distinctly different from those that had prevailed a cen- tury earlier, sheds light on the models for territorialization used by modern Russia. The tsarist authorities acquired an essentially spatial view of government and gradually developed a diverse range of tools and practices that allowed it
11 Putin: Khar’kov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Nikolaev, odessa ne vkhodili v sostav Ukrainy [Putin: Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Nikolayev, Odessa Were Not Part of Ukraine Back Then], segodnya.ua, 17 april 2014, available at
13 Ibid ., 53f . 14 Andrei Sorin, Kormia dvuglavogo orla … Literatura i gosudarstvennaia ideologiia v Rossii v poslednei treti XvII – pervoi treti XIX veka [Feeding the Double-Headed Eagle … Literature and State Ideology in Russia in the Last Third of the 17th – First Third of the 19th Century]. Мoscow 2001, 38f. 15 See О. I. Еliseeva, Geopoliticheskie proekty G. a. Potemkina [Geopolitical Projects of G . A . Potemkin] . Moscow 2000; В. Н. vinogradov (ed .), Vek Ekateriny: dela balkanskie [The age of Catherine: Balkan affairs]. Мoscow 2000. 16 G. v. vernadskii, Zapiski o neobkhodimosti prisoedineniia Kryma k Rossii (Iz Tavel’skogo arkhiva v. S. Popova) [Notes on the Necessity of the accession of Crimea to Russia (from the The Annexation of Crimea: A View from Moldova 369
Potemkin made several proposals concerning the toponymy of the area . Crimea was to return to a previous name, Hersonia; the city of Caffa/Kaffa was to be renamed Feodosia; “and, in memory of the fact that here the Grand Duke Vladimir received the holy Christian faith, [would] be built a great temple of God” 17. after Crimea’s annexation, more name changes were made, such as Taurida, Sevastopol, Simferopol, Eupatoria, Panticapaeum, and Fanagoria . Immediately after the Treaty of jassy (9 january 1792) and the annexation of the territory between the Dniester and the Bug, the tsarist authorities founded new settlements, such as odessa (1794), Grigoriopol (1792), ovidiopol (1795), and Tiraspol (1792). In the authorities’ view, these measures would support the symbolic environment of the translatio imperii project . Therefore, the southeastern border of the Russian Empire reached the Dniester River in 1792. at the same time, the area between the Bug and the Dniester was referred to in some texts as Bessarabia,18 before this name was given to another region, annexed by the Russian Empire in 1812 after the Peace Treaty of Bucharest. The expansion of the Russian Empire in Southeastern Europe and its colonization practices, together with new military and administrative structures, reflect a symbolic reconfigu - ration of the new territorial identities in order to “build” the legitimacy of the imperial presence in these regions . until 1873, Crimea, as well as the other regions mentioned above, was part of several administrative units under the name Novorossiya (Novorossiysk Gov- ernorate during the years 1764–1783 and 1796–1802; Novorossiysk-Bessarabian Governate-General from 1822 to 1874). The structure and the administrative centers of these new units differed from one period to another, as did their boundaries . The current revival of the name of an administrative structure defunct for more than a hundred years, on the eastern edge of this area and in the immediate vicinity of the Russian Federation, suggests a renascence of old practices and imperial projects of territorial expansion .
The Transnistrization of Ukraine
The authorities in Chișinău reacted with concern to the recent annexation of Crimea by Russia, repeating that it sets a precedent that violates the principles of collective security; that it has the potential to trigger new conflicts and to en - danger the neighboring countries; and that it “dynamites” the political situation
Tavel’ archive of v. S. Popov)], Izvestiia Tavricheskoi uchenoi arkhivnoi Komissii 56, no. 32. Sim feropol 1919, 111–126. 17 Ibid., 167f. 18 See Pavel Sumarokov, Puteshestvie po vsemu Krymu i Bessarabii v 1799 godu. S istoricheskim i topograficheskim opisaniem vsekh tekh mest [journey Throughout Crimea and Bessarabia in 1799. With Historical and Topographical Descriptions of all the Places]. Мoscow 1800. 370 virgiliu Bîrlădeanu in Ukraine and Moldova on the eve of their signing the Association Agreement with the European Union . For the Moldovan political class, the annexation was an argument in favor of maintaining the pro-European vector . Following the logic of the previous conflicts in Transnistria, abkhazia, and South ossetia, it was expected that the next stage of the conflict in Eastern ukraine would involve a request from the Russian Federation to obtain the status of moderator, thus triggering what is referred to as the Transnistriza- tion of ukraine. The notion of “Transnistrization” appeared earlier and was often mentioned in the context of postulates and possible consequences of the “Kozak Plan”.19 according to this notion, Russia’s objective in the Republic of Moldova is not to recognize Transnistria as an independent state or to aim for its annexation . In reality, Russia is interested in maintaining the geopolitical status quo in the region, and conflict is a mechanism for retaining its control over Tiraspol and Chișinău and stopping or limiting the expansion of the West. In its statement condemning Russian military aggression in Ukraine, the Chișinău-based Foreign Policy association noted: “The recent events show that we are witnessing the phenomenon of the ‘Trans- nistrization of Crimea’. The Russian Federation is applying the same method of dividing the society, encouraging and institutionalizing separatism, and creating illegal structures of state power in an independent and sovereign country that was experienced for the first time 22 years ago in Transnistria.” 20 In the same vein, Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration of the Republic of Moldova Eugen Carpov, when answering the question “are there any simi- larities between the Transnistrization of Ukraine and the way the problem of Transnistria emerged in Moldova?” noted: “The situation was different. In 1992 the Soviet union disappeared, and it was attempting the reorganization of territories that remained after the empire’s disap- pearance. Now we see a different geopolitical situation, but surely many elements can be seen in parallel: internal movements and the use of military troops, disobedi- ence to the central authorities, and many other items that would be very good for our European partners to avoid; at least, by learning the lessons that we learned .”21
19 The Russian Federation’s memorandum on setting up a federal state in the Republic of Moldova, also known as the “Kozak Plan”, envisaged an “asymmetrical federation” between Moldova and Transnistria and triggered another political crisis in the Republic of Moldova . See Igor Boțan, “Kozak Plan” Implications, Association for Participatory Democracy “ADEPT”, 30 November 2003, available at
The newly elected president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, recounted his own childhood and adolescent years spent in Transnistria . While delivering a speech on the problems Ukraine was currently facing and the possible ways of recon- ciliation, Poroshenko mentioned that “my classmates died in this local military conflict”. The self-proclaimed and unrecognized republic “has been a barely flickering flame for more than 20 years now”, he said, “[and] I will not let the Donbas be turned into something similar to Transnistria” 22.
The Russian Spring and Transnistria
The official positions taken by the authorities in Chișinău and Tiraspol re- garding Ukraine further divided the two in the ongoing negotiations on the resolution of the conflict in Transnistria itself. The withdrawal of the Trans- nistrian authorities from the “five-plus-two” negotiations format in april 2014 effectively meant that Transnistria’s administration would not participate in the process of European integration of the Republic of Moldova . It thus maintained its affiliation with the geopolitical projects directed by Moscow. an argument for the Tiraspol authorities in favor of this position was the rehabilitation of Novorossiya, a region under Russian control, with borders closer to Transnistria . On the eve of the signing of the Association Agreement by Moldova, Yevgeny Shevchuk, the Transnistrian president, once more put forward the idea that a “civilized divorce” would be “the best solution” between Transnistria and the Republic of Moldova . However, it should be noted that the Transnistrian leaders, although vocal, were cautious in their statements. although Transnistria’s foreign ministry expressed its support for the referendum in Crimea and “the decision to enter into the composition of the Russian Federation”, Yevgeny Shevchuk did not officially express his opinion concerning the annexation of Crimea. Further, various requests by the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Lugansk to the Transnistrian authorities to recognize their “sovereign state” and to initiate diplomatic relations remained unanswered . The administration in Tiraspol has been concerned that the new Ukrainian government agreed to cooperate with the Moldovan government to resolve the conflict in Transnistria. The ukrainian Rada adopted a decision on 17 june to close all customs offices under the Trans- nistrian authorities’ control, and the authorities in Chișinău initiated several criminal investigations of some of the officials in Tiraspol. of Pretexts and artificial obstacles], Radio Europa Liberă, 17 april 2014, available at
Combined with these external pressures are the views expressed by the internal opposition in Tiraspol. In an article published on 18 March 2014, the political analyst Andrei Safonov noted that, after a period of two decades, projects of USSR integration are being put forward: the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union .23 although a “union state” ( soiuznoe gosudarstvo, Russ .) still does not completely exist between the Russian Federation and Belarus, some regions of the former Soviet union are striving for unification (tianutsia k ob″edineniiu, Russ.). on 17 February 2014, the Russian Federation acted as decisively as it had in 2008 when it recognized the independence of abkhazia and South ossetia. In answering the question “What should Trans- nistria do under these conditions?” Safonov noted in February 2014 that, for Transnistria, Ukraine is a gateway to the East and, for Ukraine, Transnistria is a Western shield, “a buffer in the way of militant Romanism”. “During all these months of confrontation, neither the government nor our society has given any reason to the political forces in Ukraine to accuse the Transnistrians of insincerity, shadow games, or any hostile intentions toward the Ukrainian people .”24 according to Safonov, Transnistria’s strategies in relation to ukraine must be built in several directions: (1) economic interaction between adjacent regions at the border between Ukraine and Transnistria, particularly Odessa; (2) privileged trade status with Ukraine; (3) retention of the Ukrainian military observers in Transnistria; (4) drafting of projects to create free trade and business zones on the border between Transnistria and Ukraine; and (5) creation of incentives to attract ukrainian investments to Transnistria, without any sanctions from Chișinău.25 The difficulty with which the Transnistrians are formulating political solutions to the conflict suggests that in this dialogue, economic arguments are more effective. However, this approach is contrary to the interests of the Kremlin, which created separatist enclaves in the territory of former Soviet republics – the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, and ukraine – in order to maintain its influence in the region and delay the process of European integration . And the Kremlin still insists on the incorporation of the separatist entities into the economic and political structures created by the Russian Federation and its allies, but in fact, this will lead to the isolation of these regions from the rest of the world .
23 Andrei Safonov, Na karte mira proiskhodiat grandioznye sdvigi (otvety na voprosy riada SMI) [Gigantic Shifts are Taking Place on the World Map (answers to questions by a number of mass media)], Informatsionnyi portal Andreia Safonova, 18 March 2014, available at