The Annexation of Crimea and the Secessionist War in Eastern Ukraine: a View from the Republic of Moldova
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Südosteuropa 62 (2014), no. 3, 363-372 DOSSIER: PERSPECTIVES ON THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS, II vIRGILIu BÎRLĂDEaNu The Annexation of Crimea and the Secessionist War in Eastern Ukraine: A View from the Republic of Moldova Abstract. The paper examines the official reactions in the Republic of Moldova to the annexa- tion of Crimea by Russia and the secessionist war in Eastern Ukraine . It also analyzes the impact these events had on the interaction between the authorities in Chișinău and Tiraspol during the period between February and june 2014. The strong pro-Russian tilt of Transnistria and the pro-European reforms that were initiated by Moldova led to opposing interpretations of the Ukrainian crisis as well as to a sharper separation of opinions in the negotiations on the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict itself. The high expectations provoked by triumphalist slogans after Crimea’s annexation and the suggestions made by Russia about rehabilitation of territorial identities from the time of the Russian Empire (such as Novorossiya) allowed the Transnistrian authorities to revive the previous political agendas, in which the East-West divisions are at center stage . Virgiliu Bîrlădeanu is an Associate Professor of History at the Moldova State University in Chișinău. Introduction The annexation of Crimea at the beginning of 2014 and the secessionist war that followed in Eastern Ukraine generated a wave of political discussions and initiatives in Chișinău and in the separatist region of Transnistria. 1 Shortly after the controversial Moscow-backed referendum was carried out on 16 March 2014 in Crimea, through which the region from Moscow’s point of view expressed its desire to become part of the Russian Federation, the separatist authorities in Tiraspol also sought integration with Russia . The parliamentary speaker of Transnistria, Mikhail Burla, was sent to Moscow to present to the Russian authorities the region’s request to join the Federation. To back the request, the 1 The paper was prepared with the support of the research project “Possibilities and limits, challenges and obstacles of transferring CEE EU pre-accession best practices and experience to Moldova’s and Georgia’s pre-accession process” (Eu-PREaCC, 2013–2017). 364 virgiliu Bîrlădeanu Supreme Council adopted an official declaration addressed to the vice president of the Russian State Duma, Ivan Melnikov. The document, adopted on 16 april 2014, asked the Russian authorities “to recognize the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic as a sovereign independent state” .2 At the time, the mass media reported that during the meeting between Burla and the Russians, a legislative proposal was made that would facilitate the an- nexation of new territories by the Russian Federation without the agreement of the countries of which these territories are part . Burla argued that according to the results of a previous referendum in Transnistria in 2006, 97 .2 percent of voters favored the region’s independence and unification with the Russian Federation . He further stated that for the 200,000 residents of Transnistria, liv- ing conditions might decline as a result of Moldova’s signing of the associa - tion Agreement with the European Union and the introduction of restrictive economic measures by the Moldovan authorities . On the basis of the results of the 2006 referendum, Burla argued that the next step should be the accession of the region to the Russian Federation. In his speech to the Russian officials, Burla recommended that “[t]hese steps should be implemented consistently, following not only the logic but also the legal mechanisms . First, the recognition of the republic should take place; only then can we approach the Russian government to request accession”.3 on 22 april 2014, in support of this initiative, the nongovernmental organiza- tion “Soiuz russkikh obshchin” (union of Russian Communities) in Transnistria began a campaign to collect signatures for a petition addressed to Vladimir Putin. The Russian president was asked “to initiate the procedure for the official recognition of Transnistria” .4 The petition argued that “the developments in neighboring ukraine and the rise of the political and economic crisis had led to violations of the rights of our citizens and increased the pressure on Transnistria. In the context of security threats to Transnistria, the question of our state’s status and Russia’s position is of particular importance to us.”5 2 Obrashcheniia Verkhovnogo Soveta PMR k Prezidentu, Gosdume, Sovetu Federatsii RF, OON, OBSE, Prezidentu PMR [Appeals of the Supreme Council of the TMR to the President, State Duma, RF Federation Council, UN, OSCE, President of the TMR], Sait Verkhovnogo Soveta Pridnestrovskoi Moldavskoi Respubliki, 16 april 2014, available at <http://www.vspmr. org/News/?ID=8843>. all websites were accessed on 15 july 2014. 3 Narod zhdet priznaniia, Novosti Verkhovnogo Soveta [The People Waits for Recognition, Supreme Council News], Sait Verkhovnogo Soveta Pridnestrovskoi Moldavskoi Respubliki , 21 april 2014, available at <http://vspmr.org/News/?ID=8861>. 4 vsled za verkhovnym Sovetom obrashchenie k Putinu dlia priznaniia Prednestrov’ia gotovit Soiuz russkikh obshchin [Following the Supreme Council, the Council of Russian Communities Prepares an Appeal to Putin to Recognize Transnistria], Infotag News Agency, 23 april 2014, available at <http://www.infotag.md/rebellion/187559/>. 5 Soiuz russkikh obshchin nachinaet sbor podpisei v podderzhku priznaniia Pridnestrov’ia [Council of Russian Communities Begins Collecting Signatures to Support the Recognition The Annexation of Crimea: A View from Moldova 365 Viorica Kohtarjova, the president of the organization, claimed that, during the two weeks of campaigning, more than 185,000 signatures were collected in support of the petition . The pro-government media in Russia interpreted this petition as a unanimous demand by Transnistria’s population to join the Rus- sian Federation . Transnistria was referred to as a region of Novorossiya . The lists with the signatures were submitted to the deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation, Dmitrij Rogozin, during his visit to Tiraspol for the Victory Day celebrations on 9 May . on 10 May, on the way back from Tiraspol to Moscow, Rogozin’s aircraft was grounded at the airport in Chișinău, and the lists were confiscated by the Moldovan authorities after a search on board the aircraft . Further, the Romanian and ukrainian authorities denied Rogozin’s plane access to their airspace. upon his return to Moscow, Rogozin declared that the Moldovan special services, which detained and raided the plane in Chișinău, had confiscated only a small part of the lists: “[…] we took care of the majority of them. The Russian delegation also brought home the Transnistrians’ appeal to the Russian leadership. It might have a sym- bolic rather than a legal meaning, but for us this is of importance now . Anyway, Chișinău’s provocation will have serious consequences for our bilateral relations”.6 He further declared that “Romania closed its airspace to my plane at the request of the united States. ukraine also did not allow it [access]. Next time I will fly in a Tu-160 [Russia’s largest strategic bomber] .”7 This episode could be regarded as a random event, if one disregards the atti- tudes dominating Russian society at the time. However, Rogozin’s declaration triggered a firm reaction from the Romanian Foreign Ministry, which requested an official explanation. In his reaction, the prime minister of the Republic of Moldova, Iurie Leancă, declared: “It is time for Mr. Rogozin to understand that the Republic of Moldova should be treated with respect, as are other countries that are subject to international law, based on these principles, based on our sincere and strong desire to have the best possible relationship with the Russian Federation .”8 of Transnistria], Informatsionnoe Agentstvo Novosti Pridnestrov’ia, 22 april 2014, available at <http://novostipmr.com/ru/news/14-04-22/soyuz-russkih-obshchin-nachinaet-sbor-podpisey- v-podderzhku> . 6 Rogozin: Podpisi pridnestrovtsev o priznanii respubliki nakhodiatsia v Moskve [Rogozin: Transnistrians’ Signatures regarding Recognition of the Republic are in Moscow], Vgliad. Delovaia Gazeta, 11 May 2014, available at <http://vz.ru/news/2014/5/11/686132.html>. 7 MID Rumynii schitaet ugrozoi obeshchanie Rogozina priletet’ na Tu–160 [Romania’s MFa Considers Rogozin’s Promise to Return in a Tu-160 a Threat], Ria Novosti, 10 May 2014, available at <http://ria.ru/world/20140510/1007291400.html>. 8 Leancă îi răspunde lui Rogozin: Republica Moldova trebuie tratată cu respect [Leanca Responds to Rogozin: The Republic of Moldova Should Be Treated with Respect], TV7 366 virgiliu Bîrlădeanu Leancă said that the relevant institutions would investigate the issue and would decide on the character of these signatures and on Moscow’s attempt to remove them from the Republic of Moldova: “I do not see how they [the lists with collected signatures] fit with the official posi- tion of the Russian Federation, which has always supported the principle of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova .”9 More broadly, in Chișinău, this episode led to resumption of the discussion about whether Russian Federation respects its role as a mediator and guarantor in the Transnistrian conflict or whether it is in fact a guarantor of this seces - sionist region’s existence. In Chișinău, the most widely accepted interpretation of the events in ukraine was that,