LASA Forum Summer 2015 Volume XLVI Issue 3

DEBATES

What is the direction of Brazilian politics? 2014 election and the current landscape of The process leading to this outcome was What is the legacy of the Workers’ Party executive-legislative relations in recent both unexpected and unprecedented in (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) and how years to speculate about scenarios for Brazilian history. The levels of vote will it affect Dilma Rousseff’s second term 2015–2016. intention volatility were higher than in in office? These are the questions that prior races, due mainly to the tragic death oriented a symposium held at the Latin of PSB (Brazilian Socialist Party) candidate American Institute at Freie Universität An Unpredictable Campaign with an Eduardo Campos in a plane crash Berlin on January 30, 2015, as part of the Expected Outcome immediately prior to the beginning of the Brazilian studies initiative funded by the free electoral airtime on radio and TV German Academic Exchange Service The 2014 presidential election was the (Horário Gratuito de Propaganda (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, closest in Brazil’s modern history. Only Eleitoral). This shocking turn of events led or DAAD). The purpose of the conference 3.28 percent of the vote separated the to a spectacular rise in the vote intentions was to debate expectations regarding winning reelection bid of the PT’s Dilma for Marina Silva, the vice presidential Dilma Rousseff’s second term in office in Rousseff from Aécio Neves, the PSDB candidate on Campos’s slate and successor light of recent events and the 12 previous (Brazilian Social Democratic Party) as PSB presidential candidate. Initially years of PT-led coalition governance in runner-up in the second round. Given the almost immune to criticism due to the Brazil. Analysts reviewed the trajectory of level of economic and political harrowing circumstances of her entry into the PT in power since 2003 and surveyed dissatisfaction in the country in the two the race, for a moment Marina topped the the broad challenges facing the Brazilian years prior to the election (clearly polls and seemed poised to defeat the PT in democratic regime exactly 30 years after illustrated by a wave of popular protests an expected runoff. Yet the remainder of the military withdrew from power in 1985. beginning in June 2013), followed by very the campaign saw a massive and intensive low levels of growth, high interest rates, media blitzkrieg against Marina, Scholars from five countries and six and resurgent inflation in 2014, the ability encouraged and abetted by the PT. The different institutions—Freie Universität of the opposition to challenge the PT’s levels of negative campaigning in the weeks Berlin, Universidade de Brasília, IPEA hegemony was enhanced. Similarly to that followed, with successful accusations (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Lula’s reelection in 2006 and to her own of inconsistencies in Marina’s government Aplicada), Oxford University, Universidad first election in 2010, Dilma benefited from proposals, led to a steady decline in de Salamanca, and CEDLA (Center for the votes of the poorer, less developed popular support for her. This culminated in Latin American Research and regions of the country. The 2014 Brazilian an also unprecedented recovery of Aécio in Documentation, Amsterdam)—met to Electoral Panel Study (BEPS)1 shows that the final days of the election. Certainly, the discuss policy scenarios for Dilma’s second lower income groups voted predominantly constant attacks by the PT against Marina term. The papers resulting from the for Dilma, regardless of their level of social and a very solid performance by Aécio in symposium cover political, social, mobility. High levels of employment, high televised debates (especially in the final, economic, and environmental dimensions minimum wage, and several social widely viewed clash on Rede Globo) and draw on diverse sources of data. In programs including Bolsa Família, Minha proved decisive to reverse his earlier slide general, the tone is one of concern and mild Casa Minha Vida, and Tarifa Social, among and propel him into the second round pessimism. Despite the considerable others, are responsible for the PT’s electoral against Dilma. In this way, the 2014 contest advances of the Lula-Dilma years, success, as initial multivariate analysis at became the sixth consecutive presidential challenges exist on numerous fronts. There the individual and aggregate level show. election in which the top two finishers is little doubt that the road ahead is Aécio, on the other hand, gained the vote came from the PT and the PSDB, with the strenuous and uncertain. Difficulties in the of the richer and more developed regions of last four of these contests decided by relationship with other parties in the the country, and, in particular, of a specific runoffs. coalition, especially the Party of the sector: the traditional middle class with Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), upward mobility, also as shown by the The much shorter second round (October 5 with civil society, and with economic 2014 Brazilian Electoral Panel Study. to 26) again saw successive PT attacks sectors prove to be daunting. We begin this against Aécio, portraying him as a bon dossier by focusing on the aftermath of the vivant and as a scion of the political elite,

15 lasaforum summer 2015 : volume xlvi : issue 3

traditionally indifferent to the plight of the not able to win approval of a single bill constitutional amendment, this one ending poor. Thus, even in a highly unfavorable initiated by the executive branch in 2014.2 the possibility of immediate reelection for economic environment, the government This was a notable first in the democratic holders of executive office. In his first five was able to win reelection, depending regime that began in 1985. months as Chamber president, Cunha heavily on an aggressive campaign against presided over 121 roll-call votes, the busiest its key challengers. Yet the price of that But the worst was yet to come. Political legislative session in over 20 years, leading strategy—treating political adversaries as analysts often refer to the three first months some analysts to conclude that the mortal enemies—seems rather high, given of a new administration as the honeymoon PMDB-led Congress was beginning to the national divisions that have emerged in period. Yet for Dilma Rousseff, early 2015 wrest control of the national agenda from the wake of the election. The opposition’s was a honeymoon in hell. First, the PT lost the PT-led government. newfound determination combined with the race for the presidency of the Chamber the dissatisfaction among certain members of Deputies. The PMDB candidate Eduardo of the PT coalition, especially sectors of the Cunha, who—while nominally a member Petrobras, Popularity, and Impeachment? opportunistic, catchall PMDB, peaked in of the governing coalition—has always the aftermath of the election. Differently been extremely critical of the Dilma Finally, adding to the unfolding scenario of from the reelection of her predecessor Lula administration, was elected in the first chaos, independent investigations of a in 2006—which was an almost seamless round with almost double the vote tally of bribery scheme in Petrobras generated transition from a first term to a second, in a the PT candidate, Arlindo Chinaglia. The compelling evidence that over R$200 context of economic boom and high jockeying for power in the Chamber of million were stolen from the state-owned presidential popularity—the political Deputies was extremely harsh: again oil giant and diverted to cover the circumstances seemed much more turbulent marked by processes of intimidation and campaign expenditures of the PT, PMDB, as Dilma’s second inauguration cutthroat campaigning from within the and PP (Progressive Party), the key parties approached. PT-led alliance itself. The result was a in the governing coalition. There are deeply divided governing coalition, with accusations that Dilma’s reelection both houses of Congress controlled by the campaign was funded in part with these Honeymoon in Hell PMDB and with a flamboyant tormentor of illicit resources. Beginning in February of the government, Cunha, heading one of this year, press coverage of President Dilma Despite the gathering clouds in 2014, few them. The one consolation for the PT was became relentlessly negative, with new predicted that the situation would be so to have a more friendly figure from within accusations in the Petrobras affair emerging unfavorable to the Dilma government in the PMDB, Renan Calheiros, elected as almost daily. Key allies fell victim to the 2015. Immediately after the election, Dilma president of the Senate. investigations, including Dilma’s close perceived emerging tensions in her personal friend Maria das Graças Foster, relationship with Congress. The tone of the One immediate consequence of Cunha’s the CEO of Petrobras (forced to resign), PSDB-led opposition was more aggressive victory was the final approval of a and João Vaccari Neto, the PT party than at any previous point in the Lula- constitutional amendment that requires the treasurer (arrested by the Federal Police on Dilma years. The reshuffled cabinet was mandatory implementation of all budgetary suspicion of receiving bribes). By April, significantly criticized, especially for some amendments approved by Congress. The Dilma’s electoral triumph had changed to a members with political trajectories that PT opposed this constitutional reform, new record: the worst presidential approval would place them in direct opposition to which significantly weakens the rating in Brazilian history. Polls in mid- what the PT defended in the past, the most discretionary authority of the executive April showed only 13 percent public obvious being the conservative senator branch and deprives Dilma of one of the support, with 62 percent disapproving and Kátia Abreu—the “chainsaw queen” of main ways to discipline her unruly 63 percent believing she should face agribusiness—as minister of Agriculture. coalition. Cunha also fast-tracked a impeachment hearings. Relations with Congress deteriorated political reform package in which he rapidly with important losses in some himself took a leading role. By the end of As we write these lines, Brazil is in flux, crucial votes. In fact, legislative data May 2015, this process was moving toward with the highest levels of political collected by CEBRAP show that Dilma was the implementation of yet another uncertainty since the government of

16 Fernando Collor de Mello in the early with reference to more conventional Notes 1990s. The opposition is organizing explanations of the vote—such as simple 1 The 2014 BEPS was composed of seven waves massive popular demonstrations against voter evaluation of the incumbent Dilma in of interviews over the course of the campaign, the government, some demanding Dilma’s 2014. Sérgio Costa, Barbara Fritz, and starting in May/June and ending in November, impeachment, with some fringe elements Martina Sproll then examine the apparent after the second round. The data will be going even further to demand military exhaustion of the recent Brazilian economic publicly available by the end of 2015. The intervention. The PT, for its part, has boom, with particular attention to the analysis that underpins the findings discussed declared that it will also mobilize its impact of the economic slowdown on the above is available upon request from Lucio Rennó ([email protected]). supporters to prevent “undemocratic” ongoing processes of economic attempts to replace the government. The redistribution. The text by Fábio de Castro 2 Data from the Banco de Dados Legislativos, implications of such a divisive scenario are and Renata Motta examines the www.cebrap.org.br. not simply a headache for Dilma’s inner disappointing performance of the PT circle and spin doctors; they represent an government on environmental issues: a unprecedented “stress test” for Brazilian technocratic reliance on the democracy and its much-heralded model of neodevelopmental model has widened the coalitional presidentialism. gap between the state and civil society organizations in environmental politics, leading to ecosystem degradation and A Look at the Dossier on Brazil social injustices. Roberto Pires then examines one of the ostensible successes of Although the PT has won four consecutive the PT in power, the creation of presidential elections using the number participatory institutions of direct 13—the party’s official designation on the democracy. Pires argues that these ballot—the superstitious might somehow institutions have now stalled and are facing believe that the PT’s 13th year in power a “midlife crisis”: in certain policy areas, (2015) is an unlucky omen. A more participatory spaces frequently reproduce rational interpretation would hold that any the socioeconomic inequalities of the larger party winning four consecutive national society, failing to include those frequently elections will sooner or later fall victim to excluded from “formal politics.” The fatigue, scandal, or both. Even prior to her challenge for Dilma’s second term will be recent tailspin, Dilma Rousseff was to revive those spaces, perhaps via a working overtime to maintain both the political reform that would reconnect direct Cardoso legacy of economic stabilization and indirect forms of democracy. Finally, and the Lula legacy of social inclusion, Rodrigo Rodrigues-Silveira reviews some while at the same trying to jump-start of the key issues that face the ongoing economic growth after the end of the political reform debate in 2015–2016, commodities boom and prepare Brazil for particularly the issue of intergovernmental the sporting mega-events of 2014 and coordination. 2016. This is a tall order by any standard.

To review the challenges facing Dilma in her second term, this dossier begins with an article by Lucio Rennó on the “electoral hangover” facing Brazil in 2015. Rennó finds that the image of a Brazil fractured by class struggle is somewhat misleading and that the 2014 election can be understood