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Universi^ Microfilms International aOON.Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Ml 48106
1325090
LADAN, MUSA
ZIONIST PERCEPTION OF THE ARAB PALESTINIANS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY M.A. 1984
University Microfilms
I nternstionel300 N. ZeebRoad, Ann Arbor. .MI 48106
ZIONIST PERCEPTION OF THE ARAB PALESTINIANS
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT
by
Musa Ladan
submitted to the
Faculty of the College of Public and International Affairs
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
Master of Arts
in
International Affairs
Signatures of Committee;
Chairman :
ï^an of the College
Date 1984 The American University Washington, D.C.
«the AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY ZIONIST PERCEPTION OF THE ARAB PALESTINIANS
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT
by . . MUSA LADAN
ABSTRACT
This paper addresses one key aspect of the Middle East conflict: the attitude of most of the leaders of the Zionist movement toward the Arabs of Palestine in whose land that movement sought the ingathering of diasporan Jews and the founding of a Jewish national state. Negative and persis tent, this perceptive phenomenon has been significant, as the study discovers, both as a causal factor and as a principal catalysis to the region's crisis.
The method of research consisted of examining and analyzing the theories, actions, treatments and statements of the influential Zionist leaders directed to the Arabs as contained in carefully selected books, newspapers, magazines and broadcasts.
The study arrives at two conclusions. First, if the
Zionist attitude were healthy and its approach prudent and tactful, the whole conflict might have been averted or reduced to a much lesser proportion. Second, a peaceful settlement in the Middle East at present depends on a peace- oriented revision of the attitudes and policies of the
Zionist leaders in Israel.
ii TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ...... ü
PREFACE ......
INTRODUCTION...... 1
Chapter
I. BACKGROUND TO THE P R O B L E M ...... 5
Sources of Controversy and Bases of Claims to Palestine Brief Analysis of Claims to Palestine
II. THE TWO INCOMPATIBLE NATIONALISMS ...... 15
Political Zionism Zionist Theories, Thoughts and Plans About the Palestinians Arab Nationalism and European Imperialism The Zionists, the Europeans, the Arabs and their roles in the Middle East Conflict
III. JEWS IN P A L E S T I N E ...... 40
The Concept of a Jewish- dominated Palestine Zionists Push for Control of Palestine Zionists' Disregard of Arabs' Feelings and Interests The Zionist State Zionist Attitudes Towards Palestinians' Words and Deeds Emptying Palestine of Palestinians
IV. ISRAELI OCCUPATION AND THE PALESTINIANS ...... 56
"Yiretz Yisrael"; A Terror Dream Zionist Actions and Policies Toward the Palestinians
iii Zionist Attitudes and Intransigence The World Opinion and Objections
V. THE ZIONISTS AND THE PALESTINE ARABS NATIONALIST GUERILLA MOVEMENT: CAMPAIGNS OF TERROR ...... 71
The PLO Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Zionist Perception and Rejection of PLO Consequences of Extra-Legal Methods
VI. ISRAELI DILEMMAS: CONCESSIONS, THE PALESTINIAN STATE, THE STATUS QUO AND ITS B U R D E N S ...... 86
Israeli Dilemmas Recognition As Part of Concession A Palestinian State: The Way Out Zionist Attitudes and the Price Exacted on Israel Israeli Security, Economic and Social Problems
CONCLUSIONS...... 118
Zionist Attitudes and Peace Efforts Handling the Zionist Attitude: The U.S. Role The Road to Peace Final Observations
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
iv PREFACE
History records the rise, fall, preeminence and obso lescence of peoples, nations and cultures and of the various ways such vicissitudes have determined the interrelations of one people with another throughout the human experience.
The following is part of the story of one people, the Jews, who rose, fell and rose again and the manner they looked upon and treated another people, the Arabs, who once rose in power but were now in decline. This does not necessarily portray the nature of one race or people but that entire human nature by which the stronger has always tended to oppress and extort the weaker.
The author owes much thanks to Dr. Alan R. Taylor, from whose books invaluable sources have been drawn for this study, and Dr. Abdulaziz Said who both rendered immense assistance, giving valuable advice and the benefit of constructive criti cism throughout the course of this work. Also greatly appreciated by the writer was the technical assistance given by Janice Flug, the American University Librarian. INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
MAJOR PROBLEMS, SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
That the Palestinian question is at the core of the
Middle East problem is now not only an accepted theme but one that is becoming a cliche in the discussion of that region's situation. But some issues have tended to distract attention away from it, while a single event, the Camp David agreement, seen as a "giant step" toward peace, has now become the euphoric and rhetoric "landmark" of reference and the only springboard in some quarters for further and future policies and actions, even as it has produced little or nothing in terms of real peace value for the entire region.
This attitude is regrettably most evident among some of the most crucial parties to the effort to finding a realistic solution to the Middle East crisis, namely, the United States,
Israel and Egypt. Thus the "mother question", as President
Assad called the conflict between the Palestinian Arabs and the Zionist Jews in Israel, has been rather submerged and is yet to receive the distinct attention and effort with the singleness of heart which it deserves. Yet unresolved, this very issue will permanently keep that region’s tension alive, and in all likelihood, be the one to set its latent conflict aflame, at any time and at all times.
1 One of the most unfortunate ingredients of the Middle
East conflict which not only helped produce and compound the
Palestinian question but also render the region's overall problem more and more intractable, has been the manner the
Zionist Jews, with very few exceptions, have all along perceived and treated the Arabs in Palestine as less human and downplayed the problem of these Arabs whose land they were to take and establish a Jewish homeland. Not only can this attitude be traced to as far back as the era of the earliest Zionist thinkers and leaders, but also, and of signi ficance to the ongoing Middle East imbroglio, it has become an entrenched legacy of the influential Zionist leadership whose expression has been both vigorous and unequivocal to the present day.
Of the factors that could have given rise to this unhealthy attitude of the Zionists toward their fellow Semitic people, the following may be among the important ones: Zionists' zeal and preoccupation with the return to Zion (after rejecting any other alternative to Palestine) and the anticipation of opposi tion to the process by others having their own claim to Pales tine; their propensity to a rather belligerent chauvinism; their disdain and scorn of the Palestinians and their level of enlightenment, and their ignorance about the degree or even existence of these Arabs' nationalist feelings and consciousness.
These and possibly other factors caused the Zionists to see the reality only in its simplified or distorted version. Most Zionists not only belittled the human factor in their return mission, but also absolutely gave no thought to the moral and ethical imperatives and to the practical question as to what kind of future the projected Jewish homeland or state would have to face if, as they had schemed, its estab lishment was to be heralded by bloodshed. They saw no need to seek the cooperation and good relations of the indigineous
Palestinian Arabs but instead concentrated virtually all their efforts in seeking the consent and/or collaboration of the successive powers in control of the territory while planning to conquer and expell the indigenes. This circumvention, which
Goldman referred to as "the original sin," has turned out to be the most grievious mistake the Zionists had made. This is so because Arab cooperation or even acquiescence, was not impossible as Goldman and some analysts have observed, if only some energy had been spared for it, but its neglect resulted in a tremendous waste and misdirection of Zionists' efforts and ultimately produced a Middle East saga of unrest and extreme sufferings no one today is happy about.
It is this attitudinal dimension of the Jewish-Palestinian interrelations and how it has come to bear on the Middle East situation that this study purposes to investigate. It is to trace and analyze as many instances (words and deeds) as possible of the Zionists' attitude as expressed and directed toward the Palestinians, as they pursued and realized their aspirations in Palestine. It will be shown that Zionists' seeing the Palestinians in negative images, their mistreating
and dehumanizing them with no good reason, largely account
for the parties' legacy of mutual hate, deep resentment and
unremitting hostilities, their resort to violence and extra-
legal methods of combating each other, their failure to ever
talk and negotiate a modus vivendi leading to peaceful co
existence, and ultimately, for the situation in which the
prospects for real peace in the Middle East have remained so
slim for so long. The final aim is to suggest and urge that
the Middle East dispute did not warrant wars, massacres and
untold sufferings of thousands of human lives, had it been
that mutual empathy rather than insensitivity and apathy formed
part of an initial bargaining between the Zionists and the
Palestinians, and that, should there be a change of heart mainly
from the Zionists even today, peace would be a possibility.
Any conscientious study adding anything to the effort
to finding a realistic framework to a just solution to the
Middle East problem is a useful contribution especially if
its focus is on unexplored areas. The present study attempts
to do that by concentrating on the attitudinal component of
the emotion-ridden Middle East question whose treatment in most other works seen, even if adequate, is usually spotted
and non-exclusive. CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM
SOURCES OF CONTROVERSY AND BASES OF CLAIMS TO PALESTINE
Over a period of many centuries the Arabs and the Jews developed deep historical and emotional attachments to
Palestine. What gave rise to the "Palestine question" were the two incompatible nationalisms, Arab nationalism and
Political Zionism of the nineteenth century, both of which were founded on historical roots to Palestine and each laying claim to the Holy Land. Both the Jews and the Arabs were in Palestine but a wicked twist of fate and history caused the two Semitic peoples to disagree on whose claim was valid or even to compromise and share the land.
It was around 1800 B.C. that the Jews had their first contact with Palestine when Abraham led his followers to the area. Later, Abraham's descendants migrated to Egypt where they lived and multiplied for several centuries until Moses led them out again. They again returned to Palestine around the twelfth century B.C. and established a kingdom under
Saul. David, Saul's successor, extended the kingdom's borders and his son and successor, Solomon, built the first temple in the city of Jerusalem during the tenth century B.C. This kingdom remained united for nearly two hundred years and then disintegrated into the kingdoms of Judah and Israel. It was
5 that united kingdom, before its dissolution, which provided the Jews their religious and emotional root, and the Zionists their basis of claim to Palestine.
In 721 B.C. the Assyrians invaded the northern kingdom of Israel destroying part of it. The small southern kingdom of Judah continued to exist until the Babylonians attacked
Jerusalem in 586 B.C. destroyed its temple and scattered the people. Some fifty years later the Persians captured Babylonia and allowed some of the Jews to return to Palestine, and a second temple was built.
Several ancient powers in turns ruled all parts of Pale stine in later years. It was the Roman conquest of 63 B.C. that sealed the fate of the Jews. In A.D. 70 and 135 the
Jews staged two major revolts against their Roman overlords.
These ill-fated insurrections were what led to the destruction of Jerusalem, the leveling of the second temple and the expul sion of the Jews from Palestine forever. Only few of them remained there thereafter.
As a birth place of Christianity Palestine became poli tically significant with the conversion to the faith of Emperor
Constantine who moved his capital from Rome to Constantnople.
Thus when the Roman Empire divided into two in 395 A.D.
Palestine became part of the Eastern or Byzantine Empire.
It was during the time of Omar, the second Caliph of
Islam that Palestine was lost to the Muslims around 634 A.D. The Christian inhabitants, mostly descendants of the original
Canaanites, as well as the small Jewish communities in
Palestine became Arabized. Most of these Christians also became Muslims. Once the Dome of Rock or Omar's Mosque was built near the spot where the prophet Muhammad ascended to heaven, Jerusalem became the third city sacred to Muslims after Mecca and Medina.^
BRIEF ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS TO PALESTINE
It would seem as though both the Jews and the Arabs have had valid claims to Palestine and a reasonable solution to their controversy would have been to share the territory and live peacefully. But as Alfred Lilienthal noted, "sharing land is not in accord with the nationalist dream of the modern political movement known as Zionism, whose ambition and ideo logy have triggered the chain of events leading to the present 2 crisis." And this notwithstanding the fact that the Arabs neither opposed the Jews as a religious entity nor objected to their immigration into Palestine as long as they did not come with political motives. It can, however, be remarked here that the Arabs did oppose the partition plan of 1947 which would have divided Palestine into two states, one Arab
^Fred J. Khouri, The Arab Israeli Dilemma (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968), pp. 1-2. 2 Alfred M. Lilienthal, The Zionist Connection (New York: Middle East Perspectives, Inc., 1979), p. 11. and the other Jewish, and perhaps lead to a peaceful sharing of the land. But it should be remembered also that at that time the Zionists' intentions were no longer secret. Thus the dispute seemed inevitable.
The Zionists have referred to the promise made to
Abraham by God that the land of Canaan would be given to his "seed", and on that and other arguments, asserted their claim to Palestine. But according to Lilienthal,
Palestine became an Arab country by the seventh century A.D., having long ceased to be Jewish in religion or rule, for the Jewish state had fallen in the first century A.D. . . . (But) Hebrew, Israelite, Judean and Jewish people (and Judaism) have been used by the raythmafcers to suggest an historic continuity. In fact they were different people at different times. . . And the earliest of the pre-Christian-era fore bears of the present day Jews intermarried with the Amorites, Canaanites, Midians, Phoenicians and other Semitic ancestors of the present day Arabs they found there and with whom they shared their lands. As to the rightful ownership of Palestine nothing can be proven in any absolute sense. Both sides can quote Scripture from any one of a number of holy books. Palestine Arabs of today have at the very least as valid a claim to what is Israel now as do the Israeli Jews. 3
Other authorities including Bible scholars who have weighed the various claims of the Jews and the Arabs against the Scripture, have often arrived at similar conclusions.
Alfred Gullaume, professor of Old Testament Studies at the University of London is one of these. He argued that
^Ibid., pp. 10-11 the words, "thy seed" occur.ing in the Scriptural verse which promised the land of Canaan to the "seed" of Abraham,
. . . inevitably includes the Arabs both Muslim and Christian who can claim descent from Abraham through his son Ishraael . . . Moreover, when the covenant of circumcision was made with Abraham . . . . and the land of Canaan was promised as 'an everlasting possession', it was Ishmael who was circumcised, Isaac had not been born. (And) these prophesies were fulfilled. The Jews did return to Judea from Babylon . . .4
Another Old Testament professor, William Stinespring, of Duke University stated, in introducing the book, Palestine and the Bible, that all the contributors to the book, though from different lands and denominations, do "agree that there is no basis in either Old Testament or New, to support the claim of the Zionists that a modern Jewish state in Palestine is justified or demanded by the Bible or by Biblical prophecy."'
One of these contributors, Elmer Berger, Executive Director of the Jewish Alternatives to Zionism, also debunked Zionism as an instrument of fulfilling a sacred philosophy:
. . . it is incontestable fact that no Orthodox Jew believes the present state of Israel has come into being in a process which fulfilled the injunctions of Old Testament. . . the Netore Karta . . . regard the present state of Israel as a subversive Phenomenon to their faith and . . . themselves indulge in frequent acts of defiance of the governmental authority of the state of Israel.6
^Ibid., pp. 15-19.
^Ibid., p. 10.
®Ibid., p. 23. 10
A well-argued summary of the Arab case was made by
Khouri. For him,
. . . a continuous occupation of Palestine (by the Arabs) from the seventh to the twentieth century provided a stronger historic right than one (by the Jews) based only on a much shorter occupation that ended some two thousand years ago. The world would be thrown into chaos, legally and politically, if every group were to be permitted to lay claim to an area that its ancestors had possessed at one time in history. If claim based on religion had any real validity, the Christians and the Muslims could also assert their rights to Palestine. It was contended that even on religious grounds, the land of Palestine was not promised to the Jews exclusively . . . And, in any case the return was to come by divine guidance and intervention, not by human, political action. Furthermore, one group could not be legally or morally bound by the religious beliefs of or by the promise made to another group.6
It is to be noted at this point that the Zionists used practically everything, not just religion, to further their cause. David Ben Gurion, for instance, argued at one time
that the Zionists had a stronger claim to Palestine because
they had shown more interest in developing and worked harder 7 on the land. The fervour for the return to Palestine among
the Zionists seemed so overwhelming that they would use every reason and means available to attain their aspirations- religion, propaganda, appeals, cunning, collaboration, force.
It was largely, though not exclusively, on emotional grounds that the Western Christian countries in particular gave their immediate support to Zionism. Soon after the
7 Khouri, op. cit., p. 11.
^Alan Taylor, The Zionist Mind (Beirut, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1974), pT 117. 11
Balfour Declaration, some of these Western powers, notably
the U.S., France and Italy, joined Britain in the effort leading to the founding of a Jewish homeland in Palestine by announcing their support for the Declaration. In a remark he made about this support, George Lenczowski observed that,
Christian charity toward a persecuted race, the Old Testament heritage, so important in shaping the his torical consciousness of some Protestant groups, and democratic liberalism added the glow of virtue to purely practical calculations, or appealed to those for whom Realpolitik was not a sufficient inducement. In the United States where the Jewish population was fairly large, considerations of internal politics „ constituted an additional incentive to support Zionism.
Some observers have pointed to another version of this support. They argue that the Christian world gave this support to the Zionists in part to compensate for the bad treatment the Jews had received in the European countries.
In doing so, however, they helped initiate the process by which the suffering of the Arabs in Palestine would be brought about. Khouri charged that "the Christian world was (merely) attempting to right the unhappy situation created by Christian intolerance at Arab expense alone.Even more poignant is this unsparing indictment by George Antonius:
The treatment meted out to Jews in Germany and other European countries is a disgrace to its authors and to modern civilization; but posterity will not exo-
g George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (London: Cornell University Press, 1980), p. 83.
^^Khouri, op. cit., p. 11. 12
nerate any country that falls to bear its proper share of the sacrifices needed to alleviate Jewish suffering and distress. To place the brunt of the burden upon Arab Palestine is a miserable evasion of the duty that lies upon the whole of the civilized world. It is also morally outrageous. No code of morals can justify the persecution of one people in an attempt to relieve the persecution of another. The cure for the eviction of Jews from Germany is not to be sought in the eviction of the Arabs from their homeland. . . The logic of facts is inexorable. It shows that no room can be made in Palestine for a second nation except by dislodging and exterminating the nation in possession.
Taylor also made the point that some Churchmen have held the view that "Christians should support Zionism as a means of making reparation for the suffering which anti-Semitism has inflicted upon he Jews."12 Beyond that, however, support for Zionism and the establishment of the State of Israel has been predicated by others on the admiration of the ability of the Jews to rise again or on its religious significance.
Thus in sharp contrast to those who reject Zionism as a means of achieving a divine purpose, are those who saw it as a phenomenon fulfilling that role. Some fundamentalist Chris tians and Barthians have taken this position. Taylor gave the example of Billy Graham, one of the most prominent among the fundamentalists, who "maintains that the founding of the
State of Israel represents the literal fulfillment of prophesy
11 Quoted in Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 410. 12 Taylor, op. cit., p. 178. 13
13 in modern history." Dr. H. Berkhof of the Netherlands
Reformed Church also saw the establishment of the State of
Israel as a reflection of God's promise even though he argued that the Christians could not be bound to subscribe to all 14 that Israel did. In the preface to his The Republic of
Israel, Dr. Joseph Dunner exuded his admiration and sympathy for the State and the people of Israel:
There is no doubt that the emergence of the first Jewish Commonwealth in nineteen hundred years has changed the course of Jewish world history. That a people bitterly abused, oppressed and pogromized, could rise again, must give courage and hope to all those who believe in the forward march of the human race. It is a proof of what the human spirit and dedication to a noble purpose can do inspite of heavily weighted odds.15
The Zionist issue has remained, however, a matter of controversy among both the Jews and the Christians while
Zionist claim to and the establishment of the State of Israel in Palestine vis-a-vis the rights and claims of the Arab
Palestinians, constitute one of the major challenges facing the world today.
This remains true as it inevitably should because the process of founding the Jewish state was not, even at the very beginning of its being theorized, designed to be a peaceful but rather a militarist one in which the Zionists would not work with but throw the Arabs out of Palestine by force, seize
T^Ibid., p. 178.
T^ibid., p. 179. 15 Quoted in Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 410. 14
their land and create on it their own state. It was largely
this attitude which brought the Zionists and the Arabs face
to face, each group with its mode of fervent nationalism while
some other nations of the world got into the dispute in diffe rent ways and for different reasons as the two opposing nationalisms came into collision. CHAPTER II
THE TWO INCOMPATIBLE NATIONALISMS
POLITICAL ZIONISM
The desire to return to Zion and re-establish their race in Palestine■had never died among the Jews in diaspora.
Interest in Palestine was manifested by the continual pilgrimage to the Holy Land by some of the Jews. There developed again among the Jews some thinkers whose writings spurred this idea of return and ultimately led to it. One of the most noteworthy among these was Moses Hess, a German
Jew, who in 1862 wrote a book, Rome and Jerusalem, in which he discussed the idea of Jewish return to Palestine with the help of France. But it was as early as 1837 that the idea of colonizing Palestine by the Jews was brought out by Sir Moses
Montefiore after one of his visits to the Holy Land. This later gained the support of such Jewish nationalist writers as Hirsch Kalischer who developed immense enthusiasm for the scheme. Montefiore's campaign and appeal to the French led to the founding in 1860 of the Alliance Israelite Universeile
Society. Another book, Auto-Emancipation, written by Leo
Pinsker of Odessa, appeared in 1882 which discussed and suggested the migration of Jews to Palestine.
^®M. Thomas Mancy, "Palestine in the United Nations" (Dissertation presented for the Doctor of Philosophy degree
15 16
These were among the pioneers whose writings spurred political
Zionism albeit gaining less than wide support at first among
the Jews of Europe and America.
There had been Jewish settlements even before Montefiore's
first visit to Palestine, but these were said to be non-nationa
list in motivation, while the 9,000 settlers he found there in
1837 did not number more than 50,000 at the close of the century. These Jews did not therefore pose any threat to
the Arab community at that time. Soon, however, Jewish students
in Russia started to form clubs while Theodor Herzl was busy forming nationalist organizations like the society BILU with
the motto, "House of Jacob, come let us go", and the Hovovei
Zion (lovers of Zion). These became the forerunners of the world Zionist movement Herzl launched in 1897.^® Thereafter, nationalist ideas centered around Zionism began to flourish and support for the movement began to become more wide-spread.
The first to develop a comprehensive Zionist philosophy was the Polish Jew, Aaron David Gordon (1856-1922) from whose writings came the notion of the ingathering of Jews as a culture and as people attached to the soil in Palestine. His contemporary, Ahad Ha-Am is also noteworthy here for his being among the first to be concerned about the ethical aspect of to the Graduate School, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. , 1949), pp. 17-19. See also Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 11. 17 Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 11. 17
the anticipated displacement of the indigeneous Palestine
Arabs. Several other Jewish thinkers perceived the coloniza
tion of Palestine by the Jews as a precursor of the divine
act and expression, thus suggesting a religious Zionism.
The world Zionist movement which took shape in the late
nineteenth century, however, went along secular lines prac
tically having nothing about it sacred and transcendental.
Herzl, the founding father of the movement, was also its
practical leader foremost among those who gave it its political
and secular content. Described as a double character, Herzl became the of manipulation, keeping his secret plans in his diaries and delineating the more pragmatical ones in his novel,
Atneuland (The New-Old-Land), in order to muster the support
and cooperation of the Jewish masses, transport them to their new found land and then expose them to the real scheme. As a secularist who was even said to have some mixed feelings
about Palestine, Herzl did not exclude alternative sites for
the Jewish Commonwealth (Cyprus, Argentina, Sinai, Kenya).
But while Herzl toyed with such ideas, other leaders in the
Zionist movement could not conceive of a Jewish homeland any- 1 R where else other than the Biblical Zion.
Zionist reprentations were made to various imperial powers seeking support and consent for a Jewish homeland
18 Taylor, op. cit., pp. 51-61. See also Lilienthal, op. cit., pp. 11-12. 18
in Palestine. The Czar of Russia and the German Kaiser both responded with "an emphatic no." The Turkish Sultan, Abdul
Hamid, though willing to accept the Jews in any of his pro vinces as his subjects and on the condition that they would accept military service, made an exception of Palestine.
When Herzl turned to Britain, Joseph Chamberlain, the British
Colonial Secretary, offered to him an East African British protectorate, the present-day Kenya, but not Palestine. This offer Herzl was to accept, but for the fact that he was over ruled by the other leaders in his movement. The sixth Zionist
Congress was also said to have accepted but later rejected the offer.^^
These instances of rejecting Zionist request were instruc tive in pointing to the tremendous task ahead of the Zionists before they got to the Holy Land, where again, the problem of the Arab occupants of the country was there for them to grapple with. Did the Zionists give a thought to this later phenomenon? Somehow they did, but certain impediments marred their basic approach and operation.
One of these impediments was the ignorance about Palestine and about Palestinians which many of the influential Zionist figures were said to be steeped in. Dr. Nahum Goldmann reported in an essay he wrote in 1974 that most of the Zionists
^^Lilienthal, op. cit., pp. 11-12. See also Kayhan International, September 16, 1984, p. 5. 19
were not aware of the Arabs In Palestine while the few who were, attached no importance to that reality. Max Nordau,
Herzl’s closest associate, came to him one day crying, "But 20 there are Arabs in Palestine, I did not know that." Amos
Elon remarked that, ". . . without ignorance most of the
Zionist leaders would not have ventured on their task in the first place.
Herzl himself was said to have "only the most meagre knowledge of what Palestine was actually like, its geography 22 and most especially its demographic composition." But whatever the depth of his ignorance about Palestine and the people there at any given time, Herzl was, or came to be aware of the Arab populace. He was, as Taylor pointed out, indeed
. . . conscious of the problem posed by the indige neous (Arab) population even before the Basle Congress . . . He began to record his reflections on this sub ject in 1895 and concluded that the resistence of the local inhabitants in the territory of the projected state would have to be countered by military force.23
Zionists' awareness of Arabs' nationalist consciousness in Palestine may also be described as hazy, at best. David was only concerned with the desire of the people of Lebanon and Syria to be free from the foreign European domination.
Facing eviction by the Turkish authorities for Zionist agita-
20ibid., p. 147. 21 Amos Elon, The Israelis: Founders and Sons (New York; Bantam Books, 1972), p"! 272. 22 Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 12. 20
tion in 1915, Ben Gurion met an Arab fellow law-school alumnus who told him, "As your friend, I am deeply sorry. But as an
Arab I am pleased." It was only then that the future Israeli prime minister himself started to become aware of Arab nationalist and anti-Zionist feelings among the Palestinian 24 Arabs. There were indeed some who not only pointed out that Arab nationalism was a reality but also advised that it was essential for the Zionists to come to terms with it.
That was one theme emphasized in an article written in 1921 by Chaim Arlosoroff in which he warned his colleagues that.
An Arab movement really exists— and no matter what sort it is— it will be calamitous if we negate its importance or rely on bayonets, British or Jewish. . . Only one course is open to us; the peaceful one— and only one policy: a policy of mutual understanding.25
Zionist leaders heard many such admonitions, but most of them responded to none of them positively. Thus when Goldmann once said that if the Arabs were to issue a Balfour Declara tion, it would be ten times more important than that of the
British, and that without an agreement with the Arabs Zionist ideas could hardly be realized, his colleagues laughed at him asking, how could he compare the Bedouins with the British
Empire. On their part, the Palestinian Arabs failed to
23 Taylor, op. cit., p. 67. 24 Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 148. 25 Quoted in Taylor, op. cit., p. 105. 21
realize that the European Jewish emigres were a threat to
them before it was too late. This happened largely because
"they looked upon the Jews in past historic terms as nothing
more than a small, docile minority thriving in the region
under the special protection of Muslim-Arab rulers, tradi
tionally provided to non-believers by the Koranic right 26 of El Dimha with the payment of tax." Therein lies part
of the impediments which helped compound the deficiencies
of the Arabs themselves.
It is doubtful again if the Arabs at first had an idea
what the Zionist scheme contained and to what extent prepara
tions had been made to meet the resistance that was bound
to be put up against its implementation in Palestine. Thus,
long after the Zionists had concluded plans to use force and
eject the Arabs from Palestine, some Arab leaders and spokes men were expressing their desire for understanding and good
relations with the Jews at least until the intentions of the
Zionists became evident. In 1914 Kalvarisky, one of the
Zionist moderate figures, travelled with some of the Zionist
leaders to Beirut and Damascus. During these visits it was
seen that many of the Arab leaders desired cordial relations
26 Lilienthal, op. cit., pp. 148-149. 22
27 with the Jews. In 1919, Feisal, as spokesman for the Arabs, said that the Arabs and Jews were cousins and there was 28 enough room for both of them in 'Syria.' The influential
Zionist leadership did not reciprocate these or any other
Arab overtures in a single gesture that was really genuine and reassuring.
This attitude is not surprising since the ultimate aim of most Zionist leaders was not sharing Palestine but possessing it in exclusion of the Arabs, for which reason military pre paredness became one of the earliest Zionist preoccupations.
Thus poised to pursue their plan, they had no need to seek
Arab friendship and cooperation except for the occasional putting on of appearance as a stratagem to buy time.
Very significant in regard to Zionist militarism and the shaping of the basic Zionist attitude toward the Arabs in
Palestine was Vladimir Jabotinsky (1880-1940), the leader of the more extreme Zionist elements, the Revionists, who broke from the mainstream and formed the New Zionist Organi zation (NZO). Seeing Arab resistance as inevitable, he strongly advocated a strong Zionist military force, saying ". . . the establishment of a Jewish majority in Palestine will have to
27 Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World (New York: Funk and Wagnels, 1970), pp. 108-109, 28 Khouri, op. cit., p. 12. 23
be achieved against the wish of the country's present majo- 29 rity." He became foremost among those who devoted much of their life time creating and organizing the envisioned
Zionist military force. And, his efforts came to fruition when it culminated in the founding of the Haganah, the para military which later formed the nucleus of the Israeli army.
Like Herzl, Jabotinsky saw the need to use any means available to cause the Arabs in Palestine to migrate and leave the territory in the exclusive ownership of the Jews. He typically represented and influenced the classic Zionist exclusivist and militarist attitude, putting together and helping to incorporate into a more forward and unequivocal
Zionist policy, all the militancy the movement was implicitly expressing. Ready to "ally with. . . the devil," he saw neither need for engaging in moral or ethical considerations nor need to hide the militarist intentions or the nature of the procedure according to the purposes of the movement.
Jabotinsky called the Arab Palestinians "a yelling rabble dressed up in gaudy savage rags," thus illustrating the Zionist psychology in regard to these Arabs, and whipping up and pro moting the attitude in which "distaste and rejection" of these people among the Zionists became basic. Seen in this image, the Palestinians became hardly anything to be reckoned with by most of the Zionist leaders. To illustrate how rooted
29 Taylor, op. cit., p. 96. 24
and wide-spread this attitude was among the Zionists, Taylor cited the eleventh Zionist Congress in which "there was barely any mention that an Arab population in Palestine existed or or) that this fact constituted an ethical problem to be resolved."
Herzl was no less influencial in shaping Zionist attitudes this way. He differed from Jabotinsky mainly in style, keeping his plans secret in the diaries while Jabotinsky did diametri cally the opposite. His main approach to the problem the Arabs posed was the use of cunning. His trained activists would work to 'spirit the penniless population (the Arabs) across the border. . .' denying them employment, buying their immovable property, selling nothing back to them and transferring every thing thus expropriated to the Jews alone. But to counter
Arab resistence which he anticipated, he would train the 'boys' to be ready to face them so as to ensure the success of the 31 systematic occupation of their land.
It would seem as if there is no inhumane treatment meted out to the Palestinians any time which Herzl did not prescribe.
He would use the indigeneous people for any task in which there was any form of danger: "If we move into a region," he said, "where there are wild animals— big snakes, etc.,—
I shall use the natives, prior to giving them employment in
30 Taylor, op. cit., p. 96.
S^Ibid., p. 92. 25
the transit countries, for the extermination of these animals." He would use them also in such tasks as draining 32 the swamps since they "were accustomed to the fever."
This clearly reveals that the earliest Zionists, them selves, who did not mention the Arabs in the first Zionist 33 Congress, hardly gave a thought to the moralism and realism which would be essential in an undertaking of this nature.
Unfortunately, despite well-meaning advice and warnings from both friends and sympathizers, this attitude persisted as it was bequeathed more or less intact to the succeeding
Zionist leaders, with few exceptions. Some of the statements made by these leaders as regards the Palestinians, reflected the exclusivist and rejectionist views of Herzl and Jabotinsky,
Typical of these was a statement made by Joseph Weitz, one time head of the Jewish Agency Colonization Department, in which he insisted:
Between ourselves, it must be clear that there is no room in this country for both peoples. The only solution is Eretz Israel, . . without Arabs, and there is no other way but to transfer the Arabs from here to the neighboring countries— transfer all of them— not one village, not one tribe should be left.34
32 Quoted in Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 151. S^lbid.
Quoted in Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 151. 26
There were some Israelis who later went to the extent
of justifying Zionist exclusivism on moral grounds. One
can perhaps make a good example of the intellectual, Eliezer
Schweid, the Hebrew University professor, who in a 1970
official publication argued that,
. . . the general policy of Zionism based itself upon the certainty and primacy of the right of the Jewish people to its homeland. From this point of view, the opposition of the Arabs was a stumbling block that must be overcome. . . We must emphasize again that one should not see in this approach disregard for truth and righteousness. This approach had a factual and moral basis.35
The prevailing view among the Israeli leaders again
has been to regard the Palestinians as Arabs who, when
displaced from their homes should be assimilated by the
surrounding Arab countries. And since also their separate
identity and the rejection of the Palestinians as a corporate
entity was underscored by certain Israeli official state ments. In 1969 Israeli Galili, then Minister of Information,
asserted: "We do not regard the Palestinian Arabs as an
ethnic category, as a distinct national community in this 36 country. Later in the same year Premier Golda Meir said
in an interview:
There was no such thing as Palestinians. . . It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country
Ibid., pp. 151-152. 36 Quoted by Taylor, op. cit., p. 143. 27
37 away from them. They did not exist.
In 1973 a British conservative MP, Mr. R. J. Maxwell Huslop, in the House of Commons, quoted David Hochohen, Israeli Chair man of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Knesset as having declared: . . but they (Palestinians) are not human beings, OQ they are not people, they are all Arabs."
This attitude is part of the legacy bequeathed by the early Zionist leaders who called the area "a land without people for a people without land." But "the territory the
Jews had left nearly 2000 years earlier was not vacant when their descendants returned. For centuries it had been inhabited 39 by Arabs." It is therefore inescapable for the Zionists to assume such an attitude and not to face armed resistance from the Arabs. It is this resistance and the Israeli counter measures to contain it which constitute the on-going crisis between the Palestinians and the Zionists in Israel.
Not all the early and present-day Zionists shared the same attitude though, but there has not been a time when the Zionist policy-making body was not dominated or made up of leaders of that frame of mind. Among the prominent Zionist
37 Quoted in Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 453. See also Taylor, p. 143. 38 Cited in Kayhan International, September 16, 1984, p. 5. 39 Congressional Quarterly, Inc. The Middle East (Washington, D.C.: Fifth Edition), p. 33. 28
leaders who showed some concern with the moral aspect of the
Arab problem was David Aaron Gordon, who viewed the return to the soil in terms of Jewish "moral and spiritual renaissance."
He counseled that neither the Jews nor the Arabs should deprive the other of their rights to the ancestral land.
But as Taylor argued, his method of taking the land from the
Arabs through its purchase even at above value prices, and without in any way "infringing upon the human rights of the
Arabs, nor dispossessing those who are actually working on 40 the land," was in fact aimed at dispossessing the Arabs.
Thus Gordon finally believed in the necessity of displacing, and ipso facto, dispossessing the Arabs in order to control the territory, since the Jews according to him, had a stronger claim to Palestine. He asserted.
If the mastery of the land implies political mastery, then the Arabs long ago have forfeited their title. Turks ruled the country for centuries and now the British are its rulers. . . The Arabs, like ourselves, have no other than a historic claim to the land, except that our claim beyond question is the stronger. . .41
Gordon's view, however, having recognized in theory at least, some of the rights of the Palestinians, provided an example of the minimum moderation which if possessed by the other influential Zionist leaders, would have allowed for devising
40 Taylor, op. cit., pp. 92-95.
^^Quoted in Taylor, Ibid., p. 93. 29
a modus vivendi between the parties.
The Zionists had in fact never lacked such people both among themselves and sympathizers, who sounded words of expert advice to help them see reason and revise their attitudes for the better. But as Khouri pointed out, "most Zionist leaders ignored the admonitions of various specialists on the Middle East, including those who were Zionists and pro- 42 Zionists. He cited the director of Palestine Office of the Zionist Organization who as early as 1913 warned;
We have before us the task, which in no wise can be evaded, of creating peaceful, friendly relations between the Jews and the Arabs. In this respect we have to catch up a great deal that we have neglected and to rectify errors that we have commit ted. It is of course quite useless to content our selves with merely assuring the Arabs we are coming into the country as friends. We must prove this by our deeds.43
Khouri went on to point out that other friends, like
Mark Sykes and Colonel R. Meinertzhagen, did urge the
Zionists to understand that the success of their mission depended upon an "understanding with the Arabs whose national aspirations must. . . be reconciled and linked with their own," and that they should show moderation and patience in dealing with the Arabs so that "Arab opposition may possibly be averted if the Jews, through a policy of peaceful pene-
42 Khouri, op. cit., p. 14. 43 Quoted in Khouri, Ibid. 30
tration, without blaring their trumpets and without special privileges such as Dr. Weizmann and other officials desire, attain by their own merits a position of supremacy 44 in the land." That is to say, as noted earlier in the introduction, that Arab cooperation could have been attained if the Zionists employed some tact and understanding in dealing with the Arabs. And they could have even assumed the position of supremacy which they desired without the bloodshed so far experienced and without having to continue to pay in various ways the price of creating a Jewish state, if only they heeded those warnings.
These pieces of well-meaning advice had little or no effect, despite the fact, as Khouri pointed out, that there were among the Zionists,
well educated and politically mature Western Jews, (who) continued (all the same) to display serious lack of understanding of the existence and intensity of Arab national pride. Rather than seeking to foster the Arab friendship and cooperation so essential to the peaceful achievement of Zionist goals from the very beginning, short-sighted Zionist tactics of lack of consideration for Arab feelings and inte rests whipped up Arab fears and opposition.45
Within Israel itself some voices were raised to stir the conscience of the Zionists. One of those cited by
Lilienthal was that of Moshe Smilansky, one of the first
44%bid. 45 Quoted in Khouri, Ibid., pp. 14-15. 31
settlers who cried out,
Where are you Jews? Why do we not at least pay compensation with a generous hand to these mise rable Arabs? . . . Did a single Jewish farmer raise his hands in the Parliament in opposition to a law that deprived Arab peasants of their land? How solitary does sit the Jewish conscience in the city of Jerusalem.46
And, in contrast to Eliezer Schweid of the Hebrew
University, Judah Magnes, the first President of the same
institution commented:
We seem to have thought of everything except the Arabs, but the time has come for the Jews to take into account the Arab factor as the most important factor facing us. . . If we wish to live in this space we must live with the A r a b s . 47
Taking a radical exception to what Zionist attitudes and actions came to be, Ahad Ha-Am, in one of his letters wrote :
Is this the dream of a return to Zion which our people have dreamt for centuries: that we now come to Zion to stain its soil with innocent blood? . . . Now God has afflicted me to have to live and see with my own eyes that I apparently erred, . . If this be the 'Messiah,' then I do not wish to see his coming.48
It is well to cite these many warnings, advice and objections, many of them from some of the Zionists them-
46 Quoted in Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 150. See also Taylor, op. cit., p. 109.
^^Ibid. See also Taylor, p. 109. 48 Quoted in Taylor, Ibid., p. 103. 32
selves, in order, for one thing, to emphasize that there is no attempt here to give the impression that all the
Zionists lacked good conscience and foresight, but on the other hand again, to make the point that those of them to whom so many admonitions were addressed remained insensitive to them. This helped in no small measure to produce the ongoing Middle East crisis the solution of which largely depends upon a modification of the Zionist attitude, if there is any desire for peace. Without this, chances are from slim to nil that normalcy will ever be witnessed in that region. ^
This is hardly debatable. Arab nationalism is real in Palestine. More than that, the Palestinians have been extremely frustrated and radicalized by the negative attitude and the kind of treatment they have suffered in the hands of the Zionists, resulting in their resort to arms and to extra- legal methods of combat. The world, with the exception of the United States and few other nations, has sympathized with the Palestinian Arabs and recognized not only their right to self-determination but also their fighting nationalist liberation movement (the PLO) as the sole representative of the people, thus enhancing and strengthening their nationalist feelings. Moreover, much that Israel has done so far, neither the fervor of this nationalism nor the effectivenss of its vehicle has been stifled or crushed at any time. 33
This has lately been evidenced by the ability of the PLO to stand its ground for three months against the superior
Israeli forces in the 1982 war in Lebanon, which ended only with the holding "hostage" and killing by Israel, with the forbidden U.S. cluster bombs, thousands of civilians in
West Beirut, and with the PLO fighting men believing in a sloganizing their victory as they evacuated the area which
Israel had demanded before halting the massacre.
What gave rise to Arab nationalism, what turn it took and how it affected and was affected by Zionist nationalism and other forces, and of what significance it has been in the Middle East situation, especially as it has encompassed and given form to the Palestinian movement, will be next.
ARAB NATIONALISM
The Arab world which during World War I was under the
Turkish yoke and desired autonomy, soon realized that it had a choice: either to join the Turks who had allied with the Central Powers, or cast their lot with the Allied Powers.
The despotic Turkish rule had, however, driven them to an anti-Turkish sentiment while their hopes for autonomy were dashed at the wake of the 1908 Young Turks' revolt when they realized that the Young Turks were as opposed to their aspirations as was Sultan Abdul Hamid the Young Turks had overthrown. These together with the overtures and pro mises of independence made by Britain to the Arabs made 34
the latter decide to go with the Allied Powers. This came through a deal largely through correspondence between the
British and Arab representatives, in the persons of Sir
Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt and
Sherif Hussein of the Hejaz.
Britain agreed, once the war was over and soon, to recognize Arab independence as proposed by Hussein which excluded only Eden and which, to the Arab understanding, included Palestine. On the strength of British assurances
Arab revolt against their Turkish overlords started in June
1916. But it was in the same month and year that the British and French governments signed the Sykes Picot Agreement which divided many Arab territories into French-and-British- ministered areas and zones of influence and provided for the internationalization of Palestine. Yet Hussein's con fidence in the British survived even the publication of the
Balfour Declaration. And, after a British Commander, George
Hogarth, was sent to explain to Hussein that "Jewish settle ment in Palestine would only be allowed insofar as would be consistent with the political and economic freedom of the
Arab population," Hussein not only accepted this but also revealed that the Arabs had no religious prejudice and would be willing to welcome the Jews in Palestine or any other 49 territory as long as these areas remained under Arab control.
49 Khouri, op. cit., pp. 6-9. 35
The Arabs were taken in. On March 23, 1918, an article was published in the Meccan Al-Qibla calling on the Arabs of Palestine to welcome the Jews as brethren and cooperate with them. Moreover, in the same month of that year Dr. Chaim
Weizmann toured Cairo and Palestine to allay the fears of the
Arabs by denying that the Jews sought political power, a statement which, though misrepresenting the truth went a long way to lessen the Arab concern. In November again, an official communique given to the press and posted on bulletin boards stated, among other things, that Britain and France would help in the setting up of "indigeneous governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia." This also helped a lot to quiet the Arabs since they considered Pale stine to be an integral part of Syria. These together with
(U.S.) President Wilson's "Fourteen Points" principle empha sizing right to national self-determination, strengthened
Arab's hopes.
Thus the impression given to the Arabs even as the
British Royal Commission of 1930 admitted, "was that the
British were going to set up an independent Arab state which would include Palestine." But when Arab claims to the assu rances given them were to be most useful, certain acts of ommission had rendered them less effective. British failure,
(for obvious reasons) to publish the 1916 correspondence with
Arabs before 1939 and Arabs' omitting to publish them at all in English and other major languages largely helped to 36
50 suppress the strongest support for these claims.
At the Paris Peace Conference convened after the war
Britain wanted the Sykes-Picot agreement revised to satisfy its own interests and the promises made to the Arabs. France opposed this, insisting on the Sykes-Picot provisions for her own interests in Syria. As the chief spokesman of the Arabs,
Emir Faisal, (Hussein's son) stood adamant on the principle of Arab independence. But he was induced to sign an agreement with Dr. Weizmann in which he welcomed Jewish immigration to
Palestine but in the postscript he made this dependent upon the fulfillment of the wartime indépendance promises to the
Arabs.^ 1 51
Among the major Zionist demands at the Conference were the inclusion of the Balfour Declaration in the Peace Treaty, deferring the principle of self-determination in Palestine
(at least until the Jews became the majority), setting up of a British mandate over Palestine instead of its interna tionalization, and providing for an unlimited Jewish immigra tion into Palestine. Inasmuch as the Zionist demands favored
British control of Palestine, the upshot was the explicit recognition of the Zionist aspirations and when the Palestine mandate was established later the Zionist Jews attained a
^°Ibid., pp. 9-10. 51 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 89. 37
much stronger position and progress in their mission.
The Arab delegation at the Paris Peace Conference was
said to be seriously disadvantaged by its lack of men with
experience in Western diplomacy even though T. E. Laurence,
the leader of the Arab revolt, did much to save the Arab
case. Feisal was said again to be more waryabout the French
than the Zionists and out of touch with the Arab nationalist
feelings, especially in Palestine, and led to the signing of
the agreement with Weizmann in the hope thatZionist support might be used against the French. In March, 1919 he wrote a letter to Felix Frankfurter saying that the Arabs and the
Jews were cousins and there was room for both of them in Syria, but at the same time he made it clear that it was not a Jewish state but a province within a larger Arab state that was acceptable to the Arabs. Feisal also accepted the "effective superposition of a great trustee" so long as a provision was made for a "representative local administration." The Arabs viewed this mandate system as a step toward the fulfillment of the Allied promises and the attainment of the Wilsonian 52 principles of Arab self-determination.
But the agreements reached by the European imperialists
and the Balfour Declaration stood in the way of fulfilling
52 Khouri, op. cit., p. 12. 38
these promises. Besides, as Lord Balfour himself admitted, his document was never intended to be translated into prac
tice and its hidden intention was in fact to help create a Jewish state. Thus, when Britain failed to fulfill its promises the Arabs contended that the Peisal-Weizmann agree ment had no further validity. It was in fact since 1918 that the Arab doubts about British intentions grew so much 53 that unrest on their part began to escalate.
The King-Crane Commission which Wilson sent to the Middle
East with the approval of the Allied Supreme Council found that an overwhelming majority of the Arabs in Palestine desired
Palestine to remain part of Syria with Feisal as head of state; and that if a mandate was established it be with Palestine as well as Syria under the British or the United States. The
Commission warned in its report against the danger of "the extreme Zionist program for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews looking finally to making Palestine a Jewish state."
It also advised that the Zionist proposals as a whole would be unfair to the Arab majority and would require the use of military force to be implemented. But the Paris Peace Con ference not only ignored this document but also failed to publish it until 1922. This failure to consider and publish the report before the Palestine Mandate was set up by the
S^Ibid, 39
League of Nations had the practical effect of aiding the
Zionist cause while the right action would have strengthened the Arab case and perhaps change the course of events for the better.
Each of the parties as seen, had some blame to shoulder for the worsening of the situation, making it more complicated and helping to sow the seeds of discord which sprung later to engulf the entire Middle East area. Specifically how, through acts of commission or omission, the Zionists, the imperialists and the Arabs did this was stated in the following by Khouri:
In short, the conflicting pledges and indecision of the British, the impatience of the Zionists to achieve their goals in complete disregard for the feelings and interests of the Palestine Arabs, and the political immaturity of the Arabs themselves at this critical stage in the history of Palestine helped to launch the chain of events which produced the Arab-Israeli dilemma confronting the world today.54
54 Khouri, op. cit., p. 15, CHAPTER III
JEWS IN PALESTINE
THE CONCEPT OF A JEWISH DOMINATED PALESTINE
At the early post World War period the rift between the
Arabs and the Zionists over Palestine was still in its embryonic stage and a concerted effort could have built a bridge between the two communities. But the Zionists and the Arabs failed to make any concessions, while the incon sistent and shaky policies of Britain served to widen the gulf between the disputing parties. The British, for instance, seeming to grant the requests of each side, encouraged the
Arabs and the Zionists to make new demands until she found it difficult to deal effectively with the resulting problems.
The Arabs in Palestine frequently refused to cooperate with the Palestine administration over resentments caused by the
Balfour Declaration and other British policies and at times resorted to violence. The Zionists in turn applied direct pressure on British officials through some of the influential
Jews and others in Britain.
Once large scale Jewish immigration failed to materialize in the late 1920's as a result of these problems, Zionist leaders who had been pushing for a Jewish-dominated Palestine tactfully changed this demand to one which provided for
40 41
parity between the Jews and the Arabs regardless of either group's numerical strength. But starting in 1933 when anti-
Semitism increased in central Europe following Hitler's rise to power, the Jews began to flee in increasing numbers.
The Zionists developed an underground network in Europe to persuade young Jews to come to Palestine rather than elsewhere. This and the restrictive immigration policies of the U.S. and other Western countries made most of the Jew ish refugees go to Palestine. Support again for a more massive
Jewish immigration came from many quarters and consequently the Zionists were able to revert back to the Jewish-dominated
Palestine demand.
Alarmed at the large-scale Jewish immigration and the land purchases, the Palestine Arabs began to close ranks to oppose this new development. Besides, the increasing nationa list consciousness in the Arab world brought about a sharp upsurge of interest in and activities on behalf of the Pale stine Arabs including that of armed volunteers from the neighbouring Arab countries who came to Palestine to stand with their brethren.
After the 1936 large-scale Arab rebellion, a commission set up by Britain reported that the main cause of Arab unrest was the desire of the Arabs for a national independence and their fear and rejection of a Jewish national home in Pale stine. The Commission recommended, among other things. 42
the partition of Palestine for the Jews and the Arabs, an idea the Arabs rejected outright while the Jews split, some accepting, others objecting to it.
The Arabs increased their acts of violence against this, and the increased Jewish immigration and land purchases.
The mandatory administration reacted swiftly. The Arab
Higher Committee (earlier known as Supreme Committee formed in 1936 by Muslim and Christian Arab groups to provide a united front) was outlawed, many Arab leaders were arrested, deported, or forced, like the Mufti, to flee Palestine while the death penalty was imposed on others. This scattered the
Arabs and stripped them of their leadership and strength.
At the same time the British actually assisted in arming and 55 training the Jewish defense forces.
This is not surprising if it is realized that the British actually meant to create a Jewish state in Palestine and deny
Arabs self-determination. There was, in the British-Zionist understanding, more than meets the eye, and in fact this was nothing short of full-scale collaboration. About this, Taylor had this observation to make.
A recent compendium of official documents on Palestine indicates that Britain's understanding with the Zionists was more extensive than hitherto realized, and that Whitehall did not consider itself bound by the restric tive clauses of the Balfour Declaration protecting the civil and religious rights of the Arab majority in Palestine. Weizmann made it clear to the Cabinet
Khouri, op. cit., pp. 21-25, 43
that the aim of Zionism was to establish a Jewish state with a population of four to five million Jews. This was fully understood by Lloyd George and Balfour, who informed the Zionist leader that in using the phrase "national home" in the Balfour Declaration, "we meant a Jewish state." (And) privately Balfour admitted that "in Palestine we do not propose to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country." This later came to mean that the British government had no intention of allowing self-determination for the Arabs of Palestine and that in any event, accor ding to Balfour, "the powers had made no declaration which, at least in the letter, they have not always intended to violate."56
Thus, the Arabs were fighting against two forces. Their position became more and more difficult, desperate and untenable, while the Zionists, thus favored and strengthened, gained further advantages over them. And, with the propaganda facilities at their disposal in many European countries, the
Jews promoted their cause even further and became progressively removed from the desire to make concessions with or show any regard for the rights and feeling of the Arabs. The Arabs on the other hand, weakened by some of the British policies, had little left to offer in terms of resistance, and, in contrast to the Jews who were gaining support in Europe, their support was limited only to the few independent Arab countries at the time, while their propaganda machinery, started bela- 57 tedly in 1936, was much less effective.
5G Taylor, op. cit., pp. 82-83. 57 Khouri, op. cit., p. 26. 44
The Arabs in Palestine could be said to be thus tyrannized by the British imperialists and started to be brutalized by the Zionists even at this time, which set in motion the process of their being radicalized and turned into militant, armed nationalists or even terrorists in some cases.
It was in 1937 that the Zionist Congress agreed to accept the principle of partition of Palestine, but only on the condition that the Jews receive a large area. But another commission set up to draw up the details of the partition
(following the acceptance of the recommendation of an earlier commission to divide the territory) found that it would be impossible to divide Palestine in such a way as to satisfy both the Arabs and Jewish communities. The British, influ enced by this view, decided in 1938 to invite not only the
Palestinian and Zionist representatives but also Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Transjordan, Yemen and Iraq to a conference in London.
This was significant as it showed for the first time that the outside world was becoming aware of the pan-Arab feelings and recognizing the deep concern of the Arab world for the fate of Palestine and the right of the Arabs to be consulted 58 on the Palestine question.
SGlbid., p. 27. 45
After the conference, which failed, and the issuance by the British of a White Paper which now seemed to favor the Arabs, the embittered Zionists stated point-blank that they would never accept Palestine as an Arab state with Jews 59 as a permanent minority. Zionist intentions were becoming obvious. Even though the Arabs were the overwhelming majority this newcomer minority started to demonstrate that it was the one fit to dominate and have a state in Palestine or a better part of it. Such attitude it was that gave birth to and sustained the problems in the Middle East.
The Zionists organized mass demonstrations against the
British; extremist Palestine Jewish groups began launching terrorist attacks on the Palestine government, and the Jewish
Agency not only refused to help round up the terrorists but it stepped up its support for illegal Jewish immigration into
Palestine. In May 1942 the American Emergency Committee for
Zionist Affairs called a conference at the Baltimore Hotel in New York, following which a program, called the Baltimore
Program, was adopted by the six hundred delegates in atten dance. Among others, it called for the opening of the gates of Palestine to the Jews and the assigning to the Jewish Agency the control of Jewish immigration and "with the necessary authority for upbuilding the country including the development
^®Ibid., p. 27. 46
of its unoccupied and uncultivated land, and that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth. . ."
This program was opposed by many Jewish religious fundamentalist individuals and organizations like Aguda
Israel, the rabbis of the reformed synagogues, the Board of Deputies of British Jews, and the Anglo-Jewish Association and others, all of whom, in opposing Zionism, maintained that
"the return to Zion must be brought about by divine inter vention and not by temporal agencies." The American Council of Judaism which also rejected the Baltimore principles called for a fair solution to the Palestine problem in which all would be treated equally.
The program itself revealed Zionist disregard for legality for the rights of the Arabs and for peace. Taylor remarked that the Baltimore Program,
. . . reinterpreted the Balfour Declaration in terms of Zionist aspirations alone, disregarding the very instruments through which Zionism had achieved status and enjoyed the benevolence of various good offices. In this sense, the Baltimore Program marks the depar ture from the rule of law as an international concept and its alienation from principles of adjudication which must underlie any system of peaceful co existence . 61
As the rifts between the Jews and the Arabs and violence persisted and all conferences failed, Britain, in April 1947
^^Ibid., pp. 29-30. See also Lenczowski, op. cit.. p. 389. 61 Taylor, op. cit., pp. 115-116. 47
took the Palestine issue to the United Nations General
Assembly. There the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest
Bevin, placed more blame on the attitudes of the Zionists
for the failure of the Jews and Arabs to reach any compro mise. The Zionists, he said, were more "unreasonable" than
the Arabs and the Arabs had stronger arguments in their favor.
This raised Arabs' hopes and alienated the Zionists who
thereupon felt convinced that more violence was needed and
American official support must be actively sought if they 62 were to reach their goals.
THE ZIONIST STATE AND THE PALESTINIAN ARABS
The idea of employing extra-legal methods as a promising
tactic for weakening the grip of a dominant power probably dawned on both the Arabs and the Jews when they saw how the
British earlier wavered in the face of their hostilities,
showed such pliability and weakness in dealing with them
and vacillated, trying to satisfy the two communities at the same time. This may also explain at least in part, why the
Palestinian nationalists have employed the same tactic against
Israel and continued to apply it.
It was in fact since 1942 that the two Zionist underground military forces, Irgun Zvai Leumi led by Menachem Begin, and
62 Khouri, op. cit., p. 38. 48
the Stern Gang led by Abraham Stern, embarked upon terrorist activities to compel Britain to accede to the Baltimore Pro- 63 gram. Examples of these acts include the blowing up of the King David Hotel (which houses the British Mandate
Administration) and the killing of ninety-five persons,
British and Arabs, and the mob-hanging of two British 64 sergeants at Nathanya. These acts were endorsed not only by many Jews including those outside Palestine, but also by the Jewish Agency itself. Hollywood's Ben Hecht relished these acts saying, "Every time you let go with your guns at the British betrayers of your homeland, the Jews 65 of America make a little holiday in their hearts."
Taylor cited an official British report, which showed the involvement of the Jewish Agency. The report,
revealed the clear intention of the Jewish Agency in 1945 to employ the services of Irgun and Stern Gang for the purposes of harrassing the authorities. The report was issued shortly after the Jewish Agency Headquarters had been occupied. . . "owing to evidence of the part it played in organizing, directing and cooperating with forces which had carried out violence against the Government." . . . The Haganah which was controlled by the Jewish Agency had agreed to the action (on the King David Hotel) thus establishing the Agency's agreement to the use of terror as a means of operation.66
63 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 400.
^^Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 58 and 153.
G^lbid. 66 Taylor, op. cit., pp. 117-118. 49
In 1944 two members of the Stern Gang assassinated
Lord Moyne, British Minister of State for the Middle East in Cairo. The High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Harold
MacMichael, was attacked in the same year too, but was lucky to escape with his life. Later on the Zionists would employ terror against anyone who for any reason was at vari ance with their views. In September 1948, Count Folke
Barnadotte, President of the Swedish Red Cross appointed by the UN as mediator for Palestine, was assassinated by the
Zionist terrorists just a day after he recommended a change in the UN partition proposal which would have assigned Negeb 67 to the Arab state. This followed the war between the Arabs and the newly created state of Israel that year.
Once the Zionists established their state and won the
1948 war against the Arabs who tried to crush the new state, they embarked on a policy of organized state terror and other policies to dispossess the Arabs of Palestine, eject them from their land and make room for the Jews. During the war itself, in April 1948, the Zionists massacred all the civi lian population in the village of Deir Yasin. This act as
Lilienthal maintained was not provoked in any way by the villagers. He argued, citing sources including the New York
Times, April 12, 1948, that the village,
had done nothing to provoke this attack and had lived
^^Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 440 and 408. 50
peaceably in a sort of agreement with the Jewish sub urbs surrounding it. The village had on occasion actually collaborated with the Jewish Agency and was said by a Jewish newspaper to have actually driven out some Arab militants. It was a Muslim sabbath when the atttacfc was launched on the village by the combined forces of the Irgun and the Stern Gang.68
Quoting Collin's and Lappirre's O Jerusalem!, Lilienthal gave a short account of one woman survivor, Safiyeh Attiyah, who said she saw one man open his pants and leap on her.
"I screamed, but around the other women were being raped,
too. Some of the men were so anxious to get our earings 69 they ripped our ears to pull them off faster." At the
time of the attack most men of the village were absent because they worked in Jerusalem. When the terrorists got
there only women, children and old people were present. Later
on a Haganah member commander said, "all of the killed, with very few exceptions, were old men, women or children (and) were unjust victims, and none of them had died with a weapon 70 in their hands."
Many sources confirm that the killings in Deir Yasin were carried out as an exemplary measure to instigate the
flight of the Arabs from their homes. Jon Kimche, the
Zionist writer, called the incident "the darkest stain on
fifl Lilienthal, op. cit., pp. 153-154.
G^Ibid., p. 154.
^°Ibid. 51
the Jewish record. and added, "the terrorist justified the massacre of Deir Yasin because it led to the panic flight of the remaining Arabs in the Jewish state area."
Jewish writer, Don Peretz, described the result of Deir Yasin as a "mass fear psychosis which grasped the whole Arab community." Arthur Koestler said that, "this bloodbath . .
. .was the psychologically decisive factor in the spectacular exodus of Arab refugees." Count Folke Barnadotte, the UN conciliator, in his own report, stated that "the exodus of
Palestinian Arabs resulted from panic . . . or alleged acts 71 of terrorism, or expulsion."
Israeli leaders themselves marveled at the effect of the Deir Yasin incident. Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the first
Israeli President, referred to it as "a miraculous simpli fication." Begin wrote in The Revolt: The Story of Irgun, that the military victory at Deir Yasin," greatly simplified the task of transforming Israel into an exclusively Jewish state," and admitted that the "subsequent tales of Irgun butchering" had resulted in,
maddened, uncontrollable stampede. Of the 800,000 Arabs who lived on the present territory of the state of Israel, only 165,000 are still there. . . The Arabs began fleeing in panic, shouting "Deir Yassin!" The political and economic significance of this development can hardly be overestimated.
^^Ibid,, pp. 156-157.
^^Ibid., p. 157. 52
Moshe Dayan in July 1948 attacked the village of Lydda, now the location of Tel Aviv Airport. "Dayan", according to pro-Zionists Jon and David Kimche, "drove at full speed into Lydda shooting up the town and creating confusion and a degree of terror among the population. . . Its Arab popu lation of 30,000 either fled or were herded on the road to
Ramallah. The next day Ramleh also surrendered and its Arab populace suffered the same fate." As Minister of Defense,
Dayan later told students at Haifa in March 1969, "there is not a single Jewish village in this country that has not been built on the site of an Arab village. The village of Nahalal took the place of the Arab village of Mahlone. Gifat took 73 the place of Jifta." Don Peretz, in his Israel and the
Palestine Arabs, stated that, the property left behind by
Arab refugees "was one of the greatest contributions toward making Israel a viable state. (And) of the 370 new Jewish settlements established between 1948 and the beginning of 1953,
350 were absentee property and nearly a third of the new immigrants (250,000) settled in urban areas abandoned by 74 the Arabs."
There were many other such acts of government terrorism on the part of Israel designed to eject the Arabs, take
73 Ibid., pp. 158-159. 74 Quoted in Congressional Quarterly, op. cit., p. 33. 53
their property and give it to the Jews somewhat in the same way Herzl or Jabotinsky would have it. This series of acts, as Taylor remarked referring to the killing of 49 Arabs in the village of Qasim who were unaware of a curfew imposed
in their area, "stands as— example of Israeli psychology with 75 regard to its own Arab citizens."
It does not mean that the Arabs did not commit acts of terrorism themselves but as Lilienthal observed, ". . . it is vital to understand the manner in which the land was emptied of Palestinians who had lived for centuries in their home- 76 land. Besides, Israeli atrocities were said by many observers to go out and out beyond proportion of those per petrated by the Arabs.
Israeli authorities again never intended to permit the displaced Arabs to return to their homes. Lenczowski remarked that "the establishment of Israel resulted in the displacement of nearly 70 percent of the Arab population which the Israeli 77 government refused to readmit." In this sense Zionist rejection of the Arabs was total.
Laws like the Emergency Articles for the Exploitation
^^Taylor, op. cit., p. 129.
7 6 Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 158. 77 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 410. 54
of Uncultivated Lands, the Law for the Requisition of Lands, the emergency laws and the Law of Prescription, all legislated as early as the first decade of Israeli existence, were all designed to confiscate Arab property, absent or even present, to ensure that those who left had no homes to return to, discourage their return and in each case to deprive them and spirit them outside the borders. Commenting on and after giving the above account, Taylor stated,
. . . the treatment of Palestinian Arabs in this respect reflects a disregard for basic rights under a system which purported to be democratic in principle but used its preponderant power to dispossess citizens. . . In brief, the Government of Israel has seen fit to adopt any course within its own boundaries to mini- „ mize the human and property rights of its Arab minority.
Dr. Israel Shahak, the concentration camp survivor who later organized the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights, told in his report, Arab Villages Destroyed in Israel, that
"the truth about Arab settlements in the area of the State of Israel before 1948 is one of the most guarded secrets of
Israeli life. . . This was done on purpose so that the accepted official myth of an 'empty country' can be taught in schools and told to visitors." In the same report which he smuggled out of Israel and published in London in 1975, Shahak revealed that, of the 475 Arab villages in 1948, three fourths of this original number had, by 1973, been completely destroyed by
YR Taylor, op. cit., pp. 127-129. 55
Israeli authorities leaving only 90 of the original villages,
In certain districts like Ramleh every Arab settlement was demolished. In the district of Jaffa, only Jaffa city 79 remained.
All these were perpetrated to flush out the Arabs from
Palestine, but neither did all the Arabs (many preferring to die standing by their homes) leave Palestine, nor were the Zionists able by all and every means, to remove all of the Arabs from Palestine. But they were able to forcibly subject the Arabs to the kind of occupation or colonization which clearly reflects the mentality of the Zionists in regard to these Arabs.
79 Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 159. CHAPTER IV
ISRAELI OCCUPATION AND THE PALESTINIANS
"YIRETZ YI8RAEL": A TERROR DREAM
The Zionist leaders in Israel had sought to empty Pale stine of the Arabs in order to establish a preponderant Jewish majority or a purely Jewish state. Many of the Arabs, however much that they were terrorized, physically brutalized and stripped of their properties, remained attached to the land where they were born. Some of them found themselves within the areas now referred to as the occupied territories: the
West Bank and Gaza Strip which Israel conquered in 1967 from
Jordan and Egypt respectively. By the end of 1976 there were about 400,000 Arabs within Israel, an estimated 750,000 in 80 the West Bank and slightly over 400,000 in the Gaza Strip.
Since these Arabs came under Israeli control, they have been looked upon and treated like inferior citizens or subjects, alienated, subjected to a repressive legal and military control and denied the right to self-determination. The Arabs in
Israel who between 1948 and 1967 made up ten percent of the
Israeli population were brought under legal controls, which, as Taylor put it, "insured (their) subordination to the
80 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 458.
56 57
Jewish character of the State. ." The basic instruments through which the system was operated were the various state laws enacted between 1948 and 1958, like the Emergency Laws,
(1949), the Acquisition of Absentees' Property (1950), The
Emergency Articles for the Exploitation of Uncultivated Lands
(1948), and the Law of Prescription (1958), all of which were designed "to dispossess citizens who were in a minority status and could not resist actions taken against them." The 1967 discriminatory Agricultural Settlement Law excluded the Arabs O O from any share in the Jewish-owned land. This policy in fact reflected Article 3 of the Constitution of the Jewish
National Fund which declared that "Land is to be held as inalienable property of the Jewish people," and that only 84 "Jewish labor shall be employed."
As late as 1976 a report, called the Koenig Report, presented to the Israeli Government, recommended a concerted action to change the predominantly Arab character of certain districts through the acquisition of their landed property and settling Jews. Even though this was not adopted as an express government policy, it showed the persistent attitude and treatment by the Israelis of the Arabs in the area.
81 Taylor, op. cit., p. 126.
G^lbid., p. 128.
®^Ibid., p. 129. 84 Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 117, 58
Furthermore, many acts similar to the one recommended were actually carried out against the Arabs. In the annexed eastern part of Jerusalem over 800 acres of Arab-owned land and properties were requisitioned by the state and the inhabi tants removed to areas outside the city.®^
A poll conducted by the Institute of Research and Develop ment of Arab Education, financed by the Ford Foundation, in fact revealed that the majority of the Arabs were dissatisfied with their status in Israel, Seventy-five percent of those questioned supported the establishment of a Palestinian state, sixty percent did not recognize Israel's right to exist, and Q0 sixty-four percent believed that Zionism was a racist movement.
This, then, dispelled the Israeli "benign" and "enlightened" occupation myth.
Yet the Israeli Arabs were said to be much better off than their brethren in the occupied territories where the worst abuses have been occuring. As citizens, the Israeli
Arabs have participated fully in the national and municipal elections. But there has not been any effective or proper unified Arab representation in the Knesset or any other aspect of the higher political levels of the country. The govern ment has paid salaries of teachers in the Arab public schools, otherwise Arab representation in the civil service has also
^^Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 459. 86 Congressional Quarterly, op. cit., p. 38 59
been minimal. "This general situation," as Lenczowski sums up, "was in conformity with the essentially Jewish character O of the state."
It was in the conquered territories of the West Bank,
Gaza, the Golan Heights and to a lesser extent, the Sinai region, that Israel formulated the most repressive military occupation policies. Here again, the government tolerated, encouraged and financed Jewish settlements. The Arabs have been subjected to harsh and arbitrary measures of military government: "undesirable" individuals have been deported; groups have been expelled, and punishments by way of arrests and jailings and destruction or cementing in of private homes have been carried out to prevent their further use. In April
1975 Amnesty International of London accused Israel of human 89 rights violation in its treatment of the Arab population.
The UN General Assembly found it necessary every year, beginning December 1968, to pass a resolution every year censuring Israel for violation of human rights in the occupied territories. In December of 1969, 1970, 1971, 1973 and
November 1979 the such resolutions were passed. So also did the UN Commission for Human Rights beginning March 1969, followed by annual resolutions of a similar type.®^
87 Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 458-459. Q Q Ibid., p. 460.
®^Ibid. 60
Despite all these, Israeli policies went on with an even increased audacity and, — notwithstanding censures from the
UN and criticism from many quarters including the U.S. for building settlements and acts of human rights abuse in the occupied territories, Begin's government was, as of late
1981, studying a plan that would soon populate the West
Bank with 1.5 million Jews. In this connection the Mayor of Bethlehem, Elias Freij, said the Arabs of West Bank would, in the process, be restricted into enclaves, "put into reser vations the way the Americans did the indians." And this, to the Zionists was "no pipe dream" as a settlement planning official, Zeev Ben-Yosef put it while revealing that 17,000 people had already been placed in sixty-three settlements and that there was enough infrastructure in place to increase the number of Jews in the West Bank to 120,000 in three years 91 to come. All such policies have been deplored by world nations and international organizations.
As a matter of fact, as much as the U.S. has given Israel unqualified support, it has hardly entertained any equivo cation in its criticism of Israeli occupation policies, and it is noteworthy that several U.S. administrations, notably
Carter’s, before Camp David, stood for a Palestinian home land. Adhering to the UN resolution 242 again, the U.S., starting from the Johnson Administration, objected to and
91 Newsweek, November 30, 1981, p. 58. 61
even voted at the UN against such Israeli acts as the annexation of Arab East Jerusalem, appropriation of Arab land, expulsion of Palestinian population, the proliferation of Jewish settlements on the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan
Heights and the declaring as Israeli capital of the old city of Jerusalem. The Reagan Administration has deplored many of these policies too, and gave support to some aspects of the Fahd peace proposal and came out with another that was called the Reagan Plan or Initiative which provided for some form of autonomy for the Palestinians. On September 1, 1982,
President Reagan delivered an appeal for a freeze on new 92 settlements as part of a "fresh start" in the Middle East.
The Zionist leaders, have, however, left no one in doubt that their policies would continue with an even greater relentlessness. Sharon’s response to the eight-point Fahd
Plan was "eight more Israeli settlements," in the occupied
Arab lands. Shamir vowed to exclude from the Sinai proposed peace-keeping force (which the U.K., France and Italy had intended to contribute to) "any European country that under- 93 mined the Camp David" i.e., which supported the Saudi pro posals. In an address to a convention of Aguda, the hardline foreign minister who himself had opposed the Camp David peace
92 Newsweek, December 20, 1982, p. 55. 93 Newsweek, January 18, 1982, p. 43. 62
efforts, declared, "We want peace but only on the conditions which will enable us to continue existence, and this means
Golan Heights, Judea and Samaria (West Bank) within the 94 boundaries of the land of Israel." In another address to
the Youth wing of his Herut Party, Shamir said, "Israel will make no compromises. At Camp David we reached the final and 95 absolute limit.
It was since mid-1981 after Begin's re-election that it
in fact appeared as if Israel was going to tighten its grip on the West Bank. In that year Palestinian mayors were barred from issuing any pro-PLO statements; West Bank muni cipalities were forbidden from receiving any funds from the
Jordan-PLO Joint Committee; the government expanded its list of banned books to several hundreds of titles; a freeze on
Arab construction around Jerusalem was declared. At the same time the appropriation of Arab land continued unabated.
And, despite the Camp David "spirit", the Israeli government had already in fact allowed the construction of more settle- 96 ments on the West Bank to begin as early as June 1979.
Between 1980 and mid 1981 Begin approved the setting up of twenty-one more settlements, bringing the number of Jewish
®^Ibid. ®®Xbid.
^^Congressional Quarterly, op. cit., p. 39. 63
settlers on the occupied territories to 110,000. At the time Jews controlled more than one third of the land and 97 ninety percent of the water in the area.
As of late 1982 the Israeli government had already controlled sixty percent of the land it refers to as Judea and
Samaria. The Housing Ministry was building 6,900 homes and had issued permits for the construction of 7,050 more. The
Cabinet had also approved thirty-five more West Bank settle ments, the daily Haaretz reported, for 70,000 migrants at a total cost of $830 million. Israel’s settlements are now said to dot the West Bank "like leopard spots, often surrounding and hemming in existing Arab towns and villages." And, except for some teachers who have found employment, sixty percent of Palestinian graduates and others migrate in large numbers, the exodus reducing the Arab population growth to only 1.4 percent a year, or half the growth rate of Israeli Jews, despite the high birth rate. Bethlehem's Mayor, Freij, said in 1982 that Israel was now on the hold and had time to go on building settlements. Israel Harel, Chairman of the
Settler's Council, revealed that, Israel now had "created enough facts (of settlements and colonization) to make them
97 Ibid., p. 40, 64
QQ irreversible."
Several actions also indicated that Begin was bent on making the West Bank an inseparable part of "Eretz Yisrael."
In 1981, for example, he referred to the pre-1967 Israel 99 as only "Western Eretz Yisrael," (i.e., part of "Eretz Yis- rael," the vauge Biblical term for the Promised Lane).
Professor Walid Khalidi of the American University in
Beirut remarked that ". . . Israeli colonization policies in the occupied territories have been changing the situation on the ground so rapidly that before long the physical basis of a Palestinian settlement will have been removed for all time."TOO
In early 1983 Begin's government after rejecting the
Reagan settlement freeze proposal, announced plans to expand settlements and increase the Jewish population in the occupied territories. A Western diplomat in Israel remarked that
"there is little doubt that this government considers West
Bank settlement its most lasting achievement. They just aren't going to stop unless some body forces them."^^^
Accompanying all these policies were other inhumane ones like those of deportations, closures of schools, clinics and business establishments and seizure of water resources, farms and gardens while proper compensations have never been paid to any category of the Palestinian victims.
98 Newsweek, December 20, 1982, p. 55, 99 Ibid., pp. 39-40. 65
Naturally and Inescapably these colonization policies and acts of reckless disregard for the social, economic and basic rights of the Arabs within both Israel and the occupied territories have added immensely to the bitterness and unhappiness of these people and fueled their nationalistic and hostile sentiments towards Israel. Israel thus came under sharp criticism from many individuals, organizations and the media. These include media within Israel itself.
In an article in the Israeli newspaper, Davar, on June 8,
1979, Dani Rebenstein warned that,
The trap into which the Israeli government policy in the territories is falling has no exit. The closure of schools and colleges is not making the Palestinian youth less faithful, nor is it breaking their spirit. . . the Israeli government and its means of punishment are only strengthening Palestinian national solidarity and increasing hostility toward Israel; then the Israeli government has to resort to more stringent measures and the vicious circle tightens. . . We appear to be strong, forcefully imposing ourselves on the hostile population to restrain it. . .
In a November 1982 conference on International Law and the Question of Palestine, Felicia Langer, an Israeli lawyer and human rights activist gave eyewitness accounts of "fifteen
^^^Quoted in Congressional Quarterly, Ibid., p. 40.
^Newsweek, April 25, 1983, p. 25. 102 Congressional Quarterly, op. cit., p. 66
years of oppression against the Palestinians in the occupied areas." She called Israeli repression "a blatant violation" of the Hague and Geneva Conventions which set forth the requirements of an occupying power in dealing with the land and its people. Using numerous accounts from her own clients she told of the Israeli illegal deportation of any politically active Arab, priest or trade-unionist. She spoke of confis cation of privately owned real estate and the deliberate official destruction and altering of land title records. "Some time ago," she said, "over 20,000 useful homes of the Pales tinians have been demolished by the occupation forces under the guise of justified punishment."
Physical tortures, Langer revealed, were still being used extensively in interrogation. The concept of collective pun ishment was also still widespread among the occupying forces.
"Often," she said, "friends, families, neighbors, and even fortuitous bystanders may have their homes demolished, businesses permanently sealed, be arrested or be deported for someone else's supposed violation of an Israeli military occupation order." She concluded by warning Israel that
"selective morality or double morality. . . is immorality
(itself)."103
In the same conference, Alan Dershowitz, a human rights attorney and a Harvard Law Professor, said that he was Jewish and an ardent supporter of the existence of Israel, yet he
103, Third World News, Vol. II No. 23, November 15-29, 1982, p. 7. 67
had written about and travelled much to speak against Israeli violations of Palestinian human rights. He agreed with
Langer in all that she had stated, but charged that the conferees themselves were practicing double morality for he had heard no one decry international law violations in Iran, the USSR and the Arab countries. In a world where there were no "A*s", he said, but many "D's" and "F's", many of these in Arab countries, he would give Israel grade "B" on the human rights issue. He argued that progress was being made in observing human rights and that his own efforts contributed
"to a partial" abolition of the practice of administrative detention, arrests and indefinite imprisonments without charges. He said, however, that this meant that administrative detention was outlawed against the Jews but was still practiced 104 against the Arabs.
In his own speech, Abdeen Jabarra, a Detroit attorney and lecturer on the Middle East, gave a legal explanation of the Israeli "military occupation order" and how it was applied.
The system, according to him, devolved from the Military
Occupation Order Number 2, which vested every power on the chief military officer alone. He discussed some specific orders pertaining to trial which, he said, denied the right
^°^Ibid. 68
to appeal to convicted Arabs. He too talked of property destruction and confiscation. He cited the "proof of title" device employed by the occupation forces to confiscate Arab properties. With it, he said, many Palestinian Arabs have lost their properties since it was impossible, by the require ments of the system, for them to prove that they in fact owned the properties.
In another conference held in Chicago September 17-18,
1983, on "Crimes Against Humanity," Professor Edward Said of Columbia University, New York, himself a member of the
Palestine National Council, talked about "ethnocide." In a descriptive comparison of genocide and ethnocide, or the systematic mistreatment or extermination of national, ethnic or religious groups, usually by a nation, he said the Pales tinian Arabs were facing ethnocide in the hands of Israel.
He charged again that the world has had no reason to watch in silence:
Perhaps for the first time in the history of nations the rest of the world is able, quite literally to watch the process in all its horrible detail. Igno rance is no longer an excuse. . . With the United States, and many other nations, Israel is determined to reduce the Palestinians, to a people without history, without national identity and without an effective cultural and political presence.106
TOSibid.
^^^World News Examiner, October 21, 1983, p. 3. Insert in American Muslim Mission Journal, October 21, 1983. 69
Earlier in June, Richard Arens, (brother of Moshe Arens,
Israeli Defense Minister) a Law Professor at the Bridgeport
University, Connecticut, and human rights activist, came to
Washington, D.C. to publicize his case against Israel. He
told the Washington Post that he had been so "disillusioned"
by Israel that he had even renounced his religion. "I am
shocked," he said, "the Israelis have displayed some— though not all of the characteristics of Nazis. . . They proceed with ruthless disregard of the lives of the occupied areas. I'm
talking about the West Bank and Lebanon." His feeling, accor ding to him, after coming back from a visit to Israel in 1973, was that the Israeli attitude toward the Arabs in Israel was racist.
While all these inhumane treatments were being meted out to the Palestinians as Zionist practical expression of their rejection and distaste of the Arabs, verbal expressions were at the same time directed to these same Arabs to add insult to their pain. Examples of racist, rejectionist and expansionist statements of the Zionists, capable of appealing strongly to the emotions of the Arabs were so many. The following are only a few of them.
I believe that it is true that the Arabs of East Jerusalem do not want it annexed, but we are not there because they want it.
— Moshe Dayan, Minister of Defense, quoted in Davar, August 10, 1967.
107 Washington Post, June 9, 1983, pp. Cl and C12. 70
Increased (Jewish) immigration will add to the strength of our gains in the war, it is not enough to occupy territories, we must settle them too.
— Abba Eban, Foreign Minister, quoted in Davar, September 11, 1967.
There was no such thing as Palestinians. . . They did not exist.
— Golda Meir, Prime Minister, quoted in Sunday Times, June 15, 1969.
We must ask ourselves. What sort of Israel do we want? Say; a Jewish State— Without the daily fear whether the minority now constitutes 50 percent.
— Golda Meir, quoted in Davar, June 6, 1969.
. . . but they (Palestinians) are not human beings, they are not people, they are all Arabs.
— David Hacohen, Chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs Committee, quoted by a British MP, M. Huslop, in the House of Commons, October 18, 1973.
There is no Zionist settlement, and there is no Jewish state without displacing Arabs and without confiscating lands and fencing them off.
— Yeshaayahu Ben-Porat, quoted by Yediot Aharon July 14, 1972.
It is inconceivable to us to allow a Palestinian state.
— Menachem Begin, quoted in Time, May 30, 1977. CHAPTER V
THE ZIONISTS AND THE PALESTINE
NATIONALIST GUERILLAS; CAMPAIGNS OF TERROR
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the
Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) came into being in January
1964 under the auspices of the Arab states at their summit conference in Cairo that year. Side by side with these official organizations, of which the main body was Fatah
(acronym for Harakat Tahrir Falastin), were many other
Palestinian nationalist, militant groups. Two of these, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led by George Habash, and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) led by Nayif Hawatmeh, were Marxist-oriented revolutionary movements, seeking to establish Arab sovereignty in Palestine and even change some of the regimes in the Middle East. Both Habash and Hawatmeh were Christians.
In 1968, the Palestine National Council (PNC) met and adopted a manifesto which committed the PLO to armed struggle against Israel; in 1969 Yassir Arafat (alias Abu Aramur) was elected the Chairman of the Executive Committee. Under the
PLO umbrella again were other factions like the Arab Liberation
Front (ALF), and Saiga (formed under the aegis of Syria and
Iraq respectively), and many other independent groups. 71 72
These guerilla organizations (or fadayeen) in fact embraced, during their formative years, nothing less than twenty groups, some of them splitting into sub-groups and others merging together.
By the late 1960's the guerilla organizations with
Fatah as the main component, grew into a major military force.
But up to 1970 the PFLP, PDFLP and the PFLP-General Command, another separate group under Captain Ahmed Jebreel, were the most militant expression of Palestinian nationalism con fronting Israel. These groups it was which engaged in terrorist activities like hijacking of passenger airplanes, and attacking of Israeli citizens, institutions, airports, and other estab lishments. Assuming group and individual operations, these acts were also not confined to the Israeli or occupied terri tories but extended world-wide to include attacks on some foreigners, among them diplomats, and even some Arab leaders 108 considered unfriendly. These acts, as Taylor observed, were an expression of frustration and lack of "a clearly 109 defined political direction or methodology."
Dr. Isam A. Sartawi, a member of the PNC and advisor to Arafat, agreed: ". . . the PLO underwent significant evolution. In the early days of the renascent Palestinian
108 Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 490-494; also Taylor, Alan R. The Arab Balance of Power (New York: Syracuse UniversityPress, 1982), pp. 46-47. 109 Taylor, Ibid., p. 56. 73
struggle, the need for clear political directives was not felt. . . This explains why the Charter of the PLO addresses itself merely to general principles rather than to operational issues. ” ^ It is also important to note that the resent ment and frustration felt by the Palestinian refugees over the treatment they had received from Israel, contributed to the formation of some terrorist groups and ultimately to the founding of the PLO. Al-Fatah, which is the least ideologically oriented, had in fact been formed since the 1950*s by Pale stinian students at Stuggart University in West Germany.
Arafat, who, himself, was forced to leave Jerusalem during the 1948 war and settle with his family in Gaza, was one of these students.
None of these reasons, however, justified the ramification of the PLO's acts of terror that had as its victims people who had little or nothing to do with Israeli policies, and which extended beyond the borders of Israel and the occupied territories. Besides, terrorism, as Taylor commented, "did 112 very little to help their cause." It is definitely one of the reasons why in the U.S. the organization has been so deeply anathematized and why it has failed to gain the modicum of sympathy it has so badly needed, which might have made some
Isam A. Sartawi, "The Palestinian Dimension," in The Middle East Conflict (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise institute (AEI), 1981), p. 26.
^ ^ ^Congressional Quarterly, op. cit., p. 36. 112 Taylor, Arab Balance of Power, op. cit., p. 56. 74
difference in its favor. More world sympathy and attention would have also been attained for the Palestinians but for these terrorist acts of the radical elements of the PLO, the movement widely regarded as the nationalist expression and representation of the Palestinians.
Such acts as the bombing of theaters and supermarkets, hijacking of planes including those of international airlines
(for example the KLM and TWA planes hijacked to Jordan in 1970), shooting and killing of Israeli passengers at such airports as Rome and Athens, attacking schools and holding children hostage, killing of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic 113 Games, assassination of individuals and the recent hijacking of an Israeli passenger bus, could not but be condemned by the most callous mind. Such acts, though understandably a function of frustration, were all the same tactless, in some cases senseless, and can be said to have helped drive the
Israeli leaders to their extremely hardline position regarding the Palestinian question, and to their resolute, negative perception and rejection of the PLO. Many of the PLO acts also prompted Israeli reprisal attacks in which the corpses, more often than not, were those of innocent Palestinian,
Lebanese and other neighboring civilians.
The Israeli leaders have thus perceived and labeled the
113 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 462, 75
PLO nationalists as "terrorists", "killers", "murders",
and for that reason ruled out any peace negotiations with the
leaders of that organizations. Shortly before his Alexandria meeting with Sadat, Begin eliminated the one crucial party
to the peace efforts. "If at any time", he said, "anybody brings that murderous neo-Nazi organization (the PLO) then
they will negotiate with that organization, but the chair 114 reserved for Israel will be empty."
Such an attitude, however, in terras of peace efforts,
is equally tactless and counter-productive. This is not only because the Zionists, like Begin himself, were terrorists, but also because the PLO, much that Israel has done to crush it, still exists and has emerged, as Dr. Sartawi observed,
"as the only Arab fighting force refusing to concede defeat 115 and determined to continue the struggle." No one can therefore afford to ignore this reality or the fact that the
Palestinian question is the nerve of the Middle East conflict, if there is any desire for peace. Dr. Sartawi again reminded:
Late in 1967, Moshe Dayan, the victorious Israeli Minister of Defense, boasted that he could eliminate Palestinian "terrorists" in twenty four hours. Seven years later, Yassir Arafat, the leader of the "terrorists" received a standing ovation in the UN General Assembly, while Dayan, disgraced by the 1973 war and out of office, was leading a demonstration outside the UN Plaza.
114 Quoted in Congressional Quarterly, op. cit., p. 32, 115 Isam A. Sartawi, "The Palestinian Dimension," in The Middle East Conflict (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), p. 25. 76
Fifteen years of Israeli efforts to eliminate the Palestinian resistance have failed.116
This is the reality. The encounters between the joint
Palestinian and Jordanian forces and those of Israel at 117 Karameh refugee camp in 1968 and between the PLO and
Israeli forces in Lebanon in 1982 are glaring examples.
In addition to this, the PLO, as Adnan Abu Odeh, Jordanian
Minister of Information stated in 1981, "is the (only) legi timate interlocutor for the Palestinians. . . (and) has no 118 national competitor that can replace it." Furthermore, since 1974, the whole world, except Israel, the U.S., Bolivia and the Dominican Republic, has, through the United Nations, recognized the organization as the sole, legitimate repre sentative of the Palestinian people. By 1976, the PLO had become the 21st full member of the Arab League, and by 1977 119 more than 100 nations had accorded it some form of recognition.
Therefore, to spurn the PLO and fail to deal with it in a productive manner because it is a terrorist organization is to lose sight of these realities. And for the Zionists in Israel, doing this would look like a sinner's climbing the mountain of his own sins to behold and decry that of another sinner.
^^®Ibid., p. 26. 117 Taylor, The Arab Balance of Power, op. cit., p. 56.
^^®American Enterprise Institute, Ibid., p. 13. 119 Congressional Quarterly, op. cit., p. 37. 77
If the PLO had any explanation for employing extra-
legal methods (revenge, frustration), the Zionists who,
since 1948, have been killing hundreds of defenseless,
innocent Palestinian men, women, and children and razing
their homes, have had none. One of the Arab gunmen who hijacked the Israeli passenger bus in April, 1984, for example, told a pregnant woman passenger before releasing her, "You want peace? We too do, but tonight everybody on 120 this bus will die. Your soldiers are killing our children."
(Emphasis added).
There are countless examples of Zionist terrorist acts from Deir Yasin to Sabra and Shatila. Both Irgun and Stern
Gang, led by Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir respectively, were parties to the Deir Yasin operation, described earlier.
Ariel Sharon led the attack in 1953 to the Palestinian village of Qibya (Kibya) with 200 to 300 "well-trained Israeli sol- 121 diers," as Major-General Vagn Bennike reported. Fifty-
three villagers were killed regardless of age or sex and their houses destroyed. Patterned after Deir Yasin, "it was an indiscriminate killing of civilians with the obvious purpose of sowing terror among the borderland Arab population
. . . If the murder (of eleven Israeli bus passengers near
120 Newsweek, April 23, 1984, p. 45. 121 Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 424-425. 78
Beersheba in 1954 by "an unknown assailant") was an act of
Arab revenge for Kibya, the subsequent Israeli retaliation 122 again surpassed in scope the Arab action."
Other examples of early Zionist terrorism include the incidents of Nahhalin in which nine civilians were killed, nineteen wounded, and the village mosque sacked; Kafr Qasim in 1956 (cited earlier) and the village of Samu in 1966 in which 125 houses, a school, and clinic were destroyed along with fifteen houses in a nearby village. Eighteen Palestinians 123 were killed and fifty-four wounded. All of these and many other similar acts were carried out just to drive the Pales tinians away from their country. Neither the means nor the end was justifiable.
While the PLO acts were those of radical groups and individuals, Israeli acts, were government operations execu ting a national policy. Late Dr. Isam Sartawi gave a list of acts of "ruthless campaign of terrorism," carried out by
Israel, "while accusing the PLO of terrorist activities."
The tasks, according to him, were assigned to the regular
Israeli army "and to special clandestine units of the Mossad."
Among the Israeli acts of terror cited by Dr. Sartawi are: the shooting down of a Libyan Boeing 727 and the killing of
T^^Ibid. 123 Kayham International, September 23, 1984, p.5 See also Lenczowski, pp. 424-425. 79
106 Innocent passengers, the demolition of houses, large-
scale arrests, systematic torture of detainees in the occupied
territories, plots to assassinate Palestinian mayors and plots
to destroy Aqsa Mosque.
Other examples include the assassination of numerous
Palestinians by the Mossad. Among those murdered were: Wail
Zuaiter, the PLO representative in Rome, 1972; M. Hamchari,
PLO representative in Paris, 1972; Mr. and Mrs. Hajjar, Kamal
Udwan and Kamal Nasser, in Beirut, 1973; Gassan-Kanafani and
Bodiah, in Paris, 1973; Abu Hassan and four companions, in
Beirut, 1979; and Tuqan and Safwat, in Cyprus, 1980. Attempted murders include the plot on Mayors Shakaa and Khalaf, 1980, 124 and the attempt on the life of Hindi in Cyprus, 1981.
Reporting on the recent incident in which Arafat was forced to leave Lebanon by the hot-headed factions of the PLO, for his moderate position, the Time Magazine in January 1984 stated ;
High-ranking sources in Jerusalem told Time that the Israeli government had actually authorized special military and intelligence units to infiltrate Tripoli under the cover of the naval gunfire and assassinate the PLO Chairman. When it realized what Israelis had in mind, according to these sources, the Reagan Admini stration intervened by insisting that the U.S. wanted the Palestinians removed from Tripoli without mishap. Only then did the Israelis stand down and allow the evacuation to proceed.125
124 AEI, The Middle East Conflict, op. cit., pp. 30-31, 126 Time, January 2, 1984, p. 66. 80
Sartawi, however, gave much credit to the "honorable position of the Israeli Peace Camp which opposed these practices with all the means at its disposal," but also warned;
The PLO is in a state of war with Israel and is entitled to exercise the rights of a belligérant under the Geneva Convention, the UN Charter and the UN anti colonial resolutions. As long as Palestinian rights continue to be denied, the PLO will continue to exer cise its privileges as a belligerent. Once an honor able peace is established, it can be taken for granted that acts of belligerence will come to an end.126
It is, however, very difficult, given the Zionists' attitude toward, and insensitivity and callousness to the pains and misery they inflict on the Palestinians, to visua lize how "an honorable" peace can be established, without a major change of heart on the part of the Israeli leaders.
Nothing in recent times can illustrate better these attitudes than the 1982 bombings of West Beirut and the massacres in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila near
Beirut.
On the declared bid to destroy the PLO, Israeli forces on June 4, 1982 launched air and artilery attacks on West
Beirut where about 500,000 Palestinian and Lebanese Arabs lived. A television documentary titled. Report from Beirut,
Summer of 1982, carried on WETA in Washington in the Summer of 1983, stated that the PLO was not destroyed but "18,000 civilians were killed, 30,000 wounded and hundreds of thou sands rendered homeless." Laying seige on the Western sector
126 AEI, The Middle East Conflict, op. cit., p. 31. 81
of the city, Israeli forces, according to narrator, James G.
Abourezk, "cut off medical supply, food, electricity and water.
A bomb crater became the community well. . . Red Cross officials provided Israeli forces with detailed maps locating all of the West Beirut hospitals. Yet most of these hospitals were forced to close because of repeated Israeli bombings and shellings."
A volunteer Norwegian doctor. Dr. Mads Gilbert, said
"We have proofs that the Israeli cluster bombs. . . were disastrous to human beings and it would seem as if the Pales tinians were being used as the guinea pigs of American
(weapon industries) to see what their capacities are."
An American woman doctor. Dr. Amal Shamma of Berbir hospital in Beirut said in answer to a question:
Do you have any doubt that this is a campaign of terror? I mean, you want to tell me that these children— are a threat to Israel? Or does Israel now feel safe that these babies are hurt?
As an American citizen, she said, she felt responsible and distressed for the killings and maimings in a war that didn’t have to be, that could be stopped by one man, the U.S. 127 President.
On September 15, 1982, according to the same television
127 Report from Beirut, Summer of 1982, ex. prod, James G. Abourezk, PBS, Summer, 1983. 82
report, "Israeli defense forces who had entered Beirut (fol lowing the September 13 assassination of Bashir Gemayel), dispatched rightwing Lebanese militia men into the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. Once there they murdered hun- 128 dreds of men, women and children," of the Palestinian refugees there.
Israeli complicity in the Sabra Shatila episode has indeed been widely reported. Newseek maintained that, "the
Israelis sealed off the camps, trapping as many as 80,000
Palestinians inside, turned the area over to the Christian militiamen and even fired flares that, perhaps inadvertently, allowed the killings to go on at night. . . To some American officials the killings appeared deliberate— Secretary of State,
George Shultz and Ronald Reagan denounced Israel in unusually 129 harsh terms."
Newsweek's December report revealed not only more on
Israeli involvement in the massacres but also about the typical attitude and lack of compassion Israeli leaders have been showing toward the Palestinians. When asked (by the Commission set up by Israel to investigate the circumstances of the inci dent) whether he tried to find out about what was actually happening during the massacres, Shamir, then Foreign Minister, said, "I did not ask. I also don’t recall that it bothered 130 me." Newsweek's report, in fact, featured this general
^^®Ibid.
Newsweek, September 27, 1982, p. 23 83
insensitivity :
In his appearance before the commission, Shamir defended his seemingly callous response to the buchery in the camps. The Communications Minister had testified that he called Shamir on September 17 (and) informed him that militiamen were slaughtering in the camps. . , Lt. General Rafael Eitan, the Israeli Chief of Staff. . , according to Brigader General Amos Yaron, congratulated the Phalan- gists on their performance and allowed them to continue their 'mopping up' until Saturday morning. . ; Sharon appears to have shrugged off at least some reports of the slaughter in the camps. Israeli television reporter, Ron Ben-Yishai warned Sharon on Friday night, that the militiamen were "murdering, killing civilians." The next morning Sharon testified, (he agreed that) he and Eitan had discussed by phone "a number of topics" about the situation in Beirut. . . In his testimony. Begin defended the decision to send the Christian militiamen into Sabra and Shatila— "They entered to the camps to fight terrorists," Begin insisted.131
No one has to-date proven that anyone in the refugee camps had anything to do with the assassination of the
Lebanese President-Elect, Bashir Gemayel, something for which some other persons or organizations had in fact already claimed responsibility. Any one else would be moved by such massive destruction of lives of innocent civilians as occured in West Beirut and Sabra and Shatila. That the Zionist leaders in Israel not only brushed off the gruesome incident of the refugee camps, but also appeared involved in its execution, suggests that most of the Zionists have not con templated coexisting with these Arabs and would have them
130 Newsweek, December 6, 1982, p. 58.
TSTibid., pp. 58-60. 84
removed from Palestine, if not from the face of this earth.
A number of people condemned or even confronted the
Israeli leaders on such attitudes. Jacobo Timerman, the journalist who Israeli leaders "moved heaven and earth" to get out of prison in Argentina, was invited to Israel to lead a new political party. He was given Israeli citi zenship the moment he arrived there. But in a book he wrote, The Longest War - Israel in Lebanon, Timerman deplored what he saw as Zionists' "total lack of compassion for the
Palestinians who were the victims of Israeli onslaught."
In a rather sweeping and unrestrained invective, he charged,
"I have discovered in Jews a capacity for cruelty that I never believed possible . . . If we have such a powerful army, why couldn't we do what we wanted without destroying cities and massacring thousands of civilians?" He called Begin "unbalanced"
— "a terrorist," and "a disgrace to the people." He accused
Sharon of helping to make Israel "the Prussia of the Middle East."T32
U.S. representative Paul McCloskey in 1982 picked up cluster bomb fragments from a hospital courtyard in Lebanon and presented them to the Israeli Defense Minister, Ariel
Sharon. He said the bombs were U.S. made and their use against civilians was prohibited by the U.S.-Israel agree ment. Sharon retorted, "In times of war we read that contract
1 32 Newsweek, December 20, 1982, p. 56. 85
with different eyes." McClosky told this story to the
Conference on "International Law and the Question of Pale stine". He said he felt that it illustrated the official
Israeli attitude that Israel need not be restrained by 133 international law "in its pursuit of land and security."
The Palestinian Arabs have generally been persecuted by the Zionists through both words and deeds. This it was that gave rise to the deep-rooted resentment of the Pale stinians and whipped up among many of them an intense, militant nationalist consciousness. It also ultimately led to the formation of the guerilla movement that has taken arms against
Israel and often employed savage retributive "justice" against the Zionist state. Israel has always responded swiftly and with even greater onslaughts of a similar nature. Consequently, a vicious spiral set in. These acts of terrorism and counter terrorism not only constitute one of the most serious impedi ments to peace, but also are among the ingredients that have helped complicate the situation in the Middle East and com pound the dilemmas Israel faces today. CHAPTER VI
ISRAELI DILEMMAS: CONCESSIONS,
THE PALESTINIAN STATE, THE STATUS QUO AND ITS BURDENS
RECOGNITION:
In his book. The Middle East in the World Affairs,
George Lenczowski identified some of the choices Israel has to make, now that it holds the trump card.
After the impressive victory of his coalition in the May election. Begin had a stronger base from which to negotiate, and if need be to make concessions than his immediate predecessors. His country also enjoyed strong support in the United States Congress which, as an ultimate arbiter of American economic and mili tary assistance policy, had the power to overrule the president's decisions. In the long run much depended on Israelis' own vision of the nature of their state. Israel faced three alternatives: it can aim at the retention of the conquered territories while giving their Arab inhabitants full equality and thus trans forming itself into a binational state; it can retain the terrorities and keep the Arab population in a posi tion of inferiority — legally and politically and be exposed to mounting criticisms of racialism and discrimi nation; or it could aim at preserving its Jewish character by returning the occupied areas in exchange for a genuine peace. . . It was certain, however, that the choice could not be avoided.134
One of the ingredients of concessions was reciprocal recognition by the Arabs and the Israelis — for the former to recognize the right of Israel to exist and for the latter to return Arab territories and recognize the rights of the
Palestinian Arabs to self-determinination and a state of their
134 Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 468-469.
86 87
own, to be established on the better part of these Arab
"reclaimed" territories.
The Israelis have, however, completely ruled out such a settlement. The Arabs within Israel are citizens, though actually treated as second-class; the Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza areas are more of a colonized people; Israel would never allow a Palestinian state. So the choice is yet to be made and if made, it is still awaiting explicit, official expressions. Thus, the dilemma, from all indications, seems to continue to loom on Israel.
On their part, except for King Hussein's 1969 press statements to the effect that Israel should choose either peace or Arab territories, construed as acknowledging the 135 right of Israel to exist, the Egyptian position as from
1977, the Fahd plan and its adoption in 1982 by most of the
Arab leaders and the oblique, isolated statements made by some of these leaders implying such a recognition, the Arabs have not come out in the open to recognize Israel. For the Arab rejectionists, among them the PLO, recognizing Israel is, at least officially, something yet to be conceived. And Israel has exploited this situation a great deal to maintain the status quo at least until it deems it fit to make one of the aforementioned choices, if ever it will.
135 R. H. Magnus, ed. Documents on the Middle East (Washington, D.C., 1969), pp. 211-212. 88
Before one, however, takes up issue with the Arabs on this, one needs first to understand their circumstances and their politics as they relate to Palestine and the Palestinians vis-a-vis their relations with Israel. These by their nature have made it very difficult for the Arabs to openly recog nize Israel. Realizing this, the Israelis went on after
1967 to spread the idea that if only the Palestinians and
Arabs would recognize Israel, then withdrawal from the conquered territories could take place and peace would be established.
This "ploy", as Sartawi called it, "was further strengthened through its incorporation in the Kissinger commitment of 1975, whereby the U.S. government, in a secret protocol of the Sinai
"forces separation agreement, was committed not to recognize the PLO or conduct talks with it until it recognized the 136 right of Israel to exist."
As Sartawi argued, however, "recognition, like marriage, cannot be unilaterally carried out; it calls for a recipro cating partner. In the face of Israel's denial of the existence of the Palestinian people, it is illogical of 137 Israel to stipulate Palestianian recognition of itself."
Another difficulty again was the Zionist call for a purely
1 AEI, The Middle East Conflict, op. cit., p. 29.
13?ibid., p. 29. 89
Jewish state in all of "Eretz Yisrael," to which, however,
1.25 million Palestinians have been added while their presence
has been denied. Thus the acquisition of the West Bank and
Gaza was consistent with this Zionist doctrine but the
addition of the Palestinian population was not.
This conundrum was the creation of Zionism, whose approach was faulty right from the beginning. It failed to take proper account of the people occupying the "Promised Land" while the typical Zionist attitude toward these people had
remained consistently malignant. There was therefore no
Zionist program of dealing with the Arabs in Palestine except
that of throwing all of them out of the territory, a scheme which failed and which now seems impossible.
It is only through a change of heart which is peace-
oriented that an answer can be found. This, for the Zionists,
is very difficult, given their psychology, their position of strength now and the experiences of the past. But there is hardly any alternative to it if peace is ever to be realized.
This is so because it does not seem quite likely that Israel
can be forced to make concessions by either the Arabs or the
U.S. For the Arabs and the PLO, however, this kind of evo
lution or change has been taking place.
Despite its national charter, some of whose provisions have been seen as seeking to destroy Israel, the PLO can
safely be said to be ready for compromise today. The charter
itself has been amended several times, for example in 1968, 90
1971 and 1977, In a parliamentary debate in 1981, Uri Avnery, a member of the Knesset, cited one of the 1977 decisions of the Palestine National Council, quoting Arafat as having said,
Our decision is that of the Palestine National Council, taken in 1977. It calls for initiating a dialogue with the democratic and progressive forces inside Israel. We shall continue to do this. Whoever is willing to participate in this dialogue is welcome to join too.
This, Avnery emphasized, was a direct message to the
Arabs, as it was published in the widely read Arab weekly,
Al-Hawadeth. And "it means that for the first time the
Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization tells the
Palestine masses. . . not the citizens of the United States nor the journalists of Western Europe. . . that a dialogue is taking place, with Zionist forces in the State of Israel."
He also cited another interview with Dr. Isam Sartawi published in the official organ of the PLO, Falastin Al-Thawra, in which
Sartawi mentioned the Israeli peace camp as willing to accept a Palestinian state. That is, there was, among the political blocs in Israel, one that wanted peace.
It was "this self same Isam Sartawi," Avnery said, (who)
"as an official representative and close advisor to Yassir
Arafat, sent a telegram of greetings to the Israeli-Palestine
Peace which maintains contact with the PLO. . , (which ended with the words) peace shall and must reign between the Pale-
138 stine and Israeli states and their peoples."
^^®Ibid., pp. 27-28. 91
The PLO mainstream, though hampered by the extremism of its minority elements, is in fact moderate. This radical component in the organization explains in the main, why the
PLO has been shifting from peace-oriented to rejectionist positions. Dr. Sartawi, himself a member of the Palestine
National Council, was murdered in April, 1983 for his moderate activities, reportedly by the Syrian-backed Abu Nidal left- wing faction of the PLO. He was the originator of the Pale- stine-Israel dialogue before his death. Described as "one of the PLO’s most moderate voices," he had for years served
"as roving ambassador and foreign—policy counselor to PLO chief, Yassir Arafat. . . who had argued that the PLO should give up vengeful dreams of wiping out Israel and push for an independent state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. . . The
Abu Nidal faction branded the victim a "criminal traitor" 139 and agent of imperialism.
The PLO, however, has not settled for anything less than an independent Palestinian state. In 1980, Arafat said in
a radio broadcast again: "The victorious march (of the PLO) will continue until the flag of Palestine is raised above
Jerusalem and above the whole area of Palestine from the
river (Jordan) to the sea (the Mediterranean) and from Ras
139 Newsweek, April 18, 1983. It is interesting to note that the person chosen to replace Sartawi was an Israeli, Ilan Halevi, — who had been serving as PLO spokesman in Paris. 92
al Naqqura (on the Lebanese border) to Eilat.This
clearly meant obliterating the State of Israel. Israel
could always refer to this to legitimize Its hard-line
policies.
Yet this and other similar statements made by Arafat
have always changed with circumstances or new developments.
For example, Arafat in 1981 described as "constructive" the
Fahd plan which not only provided for the establishment of
a Palestinian state but also, though tacitly, called for the 141 recognition of Israel's right to exist. And when at Fez,
during the following year, the Arab League endorsed the Saudi
plan, Arafat was there and was a party to the adoption of
that policy.
In an article he titled "PLO Gives Up Idea of an Indepen
dent Palestine," Zafrul-Islam Khan showed how the PLO chief
in February 1983 at the sixteenth session of the PNC at
Algiers, tried to persuade the Palestine National Council members to accept the Fez Summit plan (the Fahd Plan).
The session which was attended by about 300 PNC members from
all PLO factions (except members from the occupied territories who were prevented by the occupation authorities) approved
the Fez Plan as "the basis of the political movement." The
conference also "approved the idea of a Palestinian state
confederated with Jordan (as provided in the Reagan Plan)."
140 Quoted in Congressional Quarterly, op. cit., p. 38. 141 Newsweek, November 16, 1981, p. 115. 93
It again authorized the PLO leadership to hold ’dialogues' with democratic and progressive Jews within and without
Israel." At the same time the PNC chairman, Khaled al-
Fahoom, said "we do not want to annihilate any state in the region, not to push anyone into the sea." Arafat’s second-in-command, Abu lyad (Salah Khalaf) also showed that even after Sabra and Shatila the PLO was ready to accept 142 the U.S.'s promises.
In the same month and year as the Palestinian news agency, Wafa, reported, a meeting took place between Arafat,
Isam Sartawi, Imad Mashkow and Mahmoud Abbas of the PLO, and Michiahu Mild, Chairman of the Israeli Peace-Now Move ment, and former member of the Knesset, together with Yuri
Avneri and Uacuk Amonon, two other members of Peace Movement,
The meeting focused on the overall Middle East situation and on the means to promote joint action for a lasting peace in the area. Arafat expressed his appreciation for the role played by the Israeli peace forces in the efforts for peace.
Thus, compromise on the part of the PLO is already in place.
On the other hand, Israel, not willing to return Arab terri tories or allow a Palestinian state, rejected outright both the Fahd and the Reagan plans. It has also refused even to be recognized by the PLO. Sartawi cites Begin's 1977
142 Cresent March 16-31, 1983, p. 3. 94
inaugural address to the Knesset in which Begin, abandoning
the recognition argument, "affirmed that Israel refuses to
be recognized by the PLO." He also pointed out to Articles
17 and 18 of the Israeli Labor Party political program
which rejected the idea of Israel's being recognized by the
PLO and announced the intention of a Labor-led Israeli
government to liquidate the PLO "physically, ideologically
and politically."
Yet Israeli authorities, Sartawi remarked, would invoke
the Kissinger recognition commitment whenever it served their
interests, despite its unilateral disavowal by Begin. This happened, for example, when the Israeli embassy in Washington distributed photocopies of the Kissinger commitment as part of Israel's campaign against the joint U.S.-Soviet statement 141 on the Middle East of October 1, 1977.
Israel discarded the recognition argument in the wake of the peace-oriented evolution of the Arabs and the PLO.
Once such peace gestures started to be made by the Arabs, Israel closed the door lest it would be required or looked upon to reciprocate these moves by way of returning Arab lands and allowing a satisfactory Palestinian autonomy or an independent
Palestinian state.
A PALESTINIAN STATE: THE WAY OUT
It is not likely that Israel will, in a foreseeable future,
^^^AEI, The Middle East Conflict, op. cit., p. 29. 95
allow an independent Palestinian state on the areas where numerous Jewish settlements and settlers are already pro ducing fait accompli. It would take a major change of heart on the part of the Zionists, and lengthy and arduous nego tiations for any such thing to occur. Yet almost everyone else, except the Zionists and their backers, believes that it is the best solution to the Palestinian-Israeli problem, and a way out of the Israeli dilemmas. But to the Likud block, as Begin has repeatedly stated, a Palestinian state is "incon ceivable." Labor rejects completely any idea of such a state next door to Israel.
The Israelis argue that radical, irredentist Palestinians would assume control of such a Palestinian government and pose a threat to Israel. For the American policy-makers the fear is that an independent Palestine might turn to the Soviet
Union for military and political support, become another
Soviet ally and destabilize the area, especially Jordan and
Israel. Israel again worries that Israeli Arabs would iden tify with a Palestinian state, as indeed a poll has suggested.
There are some other problems, one of which was pointed out in 1974 by Tunisian Foreign Minister, Habib Chatti;
The only workable solution to the Palestinian problem — and one which we are sure their leaders would accept— is the creation of a new Palestinian state. . . (But) 96
the Palestinians would need more than these over crowded bits of terroritories (West Bank and Gaza) and additional land would have to come from Israel and Hussein's Jordan.144
Jonathan Kolatch, a New York writer and orientalist who last visited the Middle East in February 1983, shed some more light on these problems in an article he titled, "History
Will Show the Israelis Have Settled Everything", carried in the Washington Post. He noted:
Politicians everywhere like to lump the West Bank and Gaza. But are they a "lump?" What they have in common is a Palestinian population. But, take a look at the map. In the most perfect of the world's a poor case can be made for an independent state in Judea and Samaria (West Bank)— from Hebron in the South to Jenin in the North, from Tulkarem and Kalkilya in the West to the Jordan River in the East. It would be anywhere from 25 to 40 miles wide and 90 miles long. And it would be very landlocked.
The Gaza strip, on the other hand is on the Mediterranean. It has port potential. But it is only five miles wide and 25 miles long. Does that look like a country? So the utopian cry is to federate the two areas. But there is a major problem here. Gaza is 50 miles from the West Bank. Is Israel expected to provide land for and secure a 50-mile wide corridor so that Gaza can link up with an at-best marginally viable and certainly hostile Palestine on the West Bank?145
The problem of land is certainly a very difficult one.
An overwhelming majority of the Palestinian refugees and the millions of other Palestinians living in Arab and other countries would like to go back to join those in the West
144 Quoted in Congressional Quarterly, op. cit., p. 45. 1 45 Washington Post, May 8, 1983, pp. B1-B2. 97
Bank and Gaza under their new state. Then the overcrowding problem would loom large. But this would be more of their problem and that of the Arab world to solve than anyone else's.
A concerted effort on their part would minimize the diffi culty and they would be too happy to grapple with it.
Pakistan remained for decades as West and East Pakistan, separated by a thousand miles of the Indian territory.
Some territories like the Bahamas, which is made up of some
700 islands, have remained single political entities. There is no reason why the separation of Gaza and West Bank by a
50-mile distance should preclude a Palestinian state made up of the two strips of land.
Neither Israel nor Jordan would give up any land, and this would be part of the agreement, in addition to the understanding that the Arab-sponsoring states would handle the overcrowding problem. And, as Ambassador Eilts pointed out, a weak Palestinian state "demilitarized", and whose arms would be limited and "monitored" by agreement, would by no means pose any threat to its neighbors. If after five wars the whole Arab world could do nothing with Israel, then it is inconveivable how a young and weak Palestianlan state could do what the mighty Arab countries had failed to do. It would thus amount to a quibling, false reasoning to dwell on the security argument and other points made against the Palestinian state proposal, which, by any judgment, is 98
not utopian. In each case, the proposal embodies the best
promise for peace and cannot be jettisoned because, as with
any other alternative proposal, it is attended with some problems. And if there be democracy, a referendum involving
the Palestinians should be conducted.
In fact, Herman F. Eilts, former U.S. Ambassador to
Saudi Arabia, has shown that both Israeli and U.S. fears concerning a Palestinian state, though not unfounded, were exaggerated. According to him,
The Israeli concern is understandable but overstated. Bordered by Israel, with its enormous, qualitative military superiority, on the one side, and by Jordan, with its own interests and a larger population, on the other, a tiny Palestine state would not pose an unmanageable threat to its neighbors especially if it were demilitarized or if arms it did possess were contractually limited and monitored. Since the West Bank and Gaza are not economically viable, a Palestinian state would also be weakened by its dependence on outside economic support. Donors, including friendly Arab states that are anti-Soviet, should be able to influence the policies of the fledl- ging state.146
The fact of the matter is that Israel has had no inten
tion, to withdraw from the Arab territories while the U.S., now lacking the will beyond verbal protests, to block effectively any Israeli policies however detrimental to peace efforts, would yield to them finally. The numerous
and costly settlements erected by Israel on the occupied
areas were no demographic fiddle. Their purpose was to
146 Quoted in Congressional Quarterly, op. cit., p. 45, 99
create an unalterable set of facts, and this pointed to
annexation. What Israel will choose to do eventually, however,
is not quite clear. What is certain is that Israel has the
final word. Israeli leaders might have a change of heart as did Ian Smith of former Rhodesia (a rather far-fetched analogy, considering the differences of the circumstances), free the
Palestinians and grant them their own sovereignty; Israel might accord them citizenship (and end their present unclear status) and thereby lose its Jewish character. If the former choice were made then the question would arise as to either dismantle the Jewish settlements or turn them over to the authority of the Palestinian state.
The dilemma is further complicated by the fact that most Zionist leaders including the present-day Israeli leaders, have characteristically never thought well of or treated these Palestinians democratically. This may mean that future Israeli policies regarding the destiny of the
Palestinians may, as the Israeli autonomy plan clearly indi cates, not be what they (the Palestinians) would hope for.
Without a change in the traditional Zionist thinking, these
Palestinians will remain colonized for a long time to come.
And if anything would bring about such a change of attitude it would probably be a combination of certain factors, among them, a change in U.S. policy as regards the unqualified support and massive economic and military aid poured on Israel, 100
the realization that peace would promise Israel a better future, even as the Arabs would now seem impotent, and the harsh realities of the price Israel has continued to pay for those policies considered harmful to itself and objec tionable to most other nations of the world.
ZIONIST ATTITUDES AND THE PRICE EXACTED ON ISRAEL
Because of its policies which essentially are the product of Zionist ideology, Israel has failed to develop into the haven of true democracy it has been widely believed to be.
It has not known peace and has therefore not been able to continue to pull the enormous human and material resources it produced or acquired to build an economically and indus trially strong nation, form the model for other young nations and command international respect and admiration.
Israel, despite its founders' European background, has instead become a nation in a constant and severe sense of insecurity, bordering on paranoia, and with an economy over burdened with the task of meeting security needs at the expense of providing for prosperity and greater development. The results of these and other trends have been considerable dependence on foreign assistance, internal social, religious and political tensions and dissentions, and ideological con fusions, dilemmas and aberrations. In addition, Israel's intransigence has caused it to lose the modicum of inter national esteem and friendship it could gain. 101
One of the above points was made by Lenczowski as he noted :
The primacy of security concerns had its inevitable impact on Israel's economy. While until 1967 Israel was noted for its impressive economic development, the two subsequent wars compelled the state to allocate major resources to defense. As a result, the economic pace slowed and numerous measures of austerity were introduced. This general trend was also reflected in several successive devaluations of the Israeli currency of which 20 percent devalu ation decreed in November 9, 1974 was perhaps the most drastic. To maintain its economic viability, Israel had to rely increasingly on foreign aid provided mainly by the United States.147
Writing in the Spring 1981 issue of Foreign Policy,
Israeli correspondent Ben Yishai, discussed the price
Israel's failure to reach a settlement had exacted on its citizens:
Each additional day that Israel bears the massive burden of defense costs necessitated by the current situation, only adds to inflation— now more than 130 percent— and to the negative psychological effects of that inflation on Israeli society. . . Israel's occupation, a cross we bear, is contribu ting more than any other factor, to the eventual birth of a proud and independent Palestinian entity.
Israel's economy has, in fact, remained an ailing one.
The gross national product (GNP) grew only by 1 percent in 1977 and in 1980 by only 0.9 percent. In 1977 again,
30 percent of Israel's total earnings ($13.2 billion) was devoted to defense. In 1980 it amounted to $5,4 billion,
147 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 462. 148 Quoted in Congressional Quarterly, op. cit., p. 43. 102
i.e., more than 30 percent of the budget. The Israeli pound
(renamed Shekel in 1980) fell from 10.5 pounds to one U.S. dollar in 1977, and to 24 pounds to the dollar in 1979.
In 1980, the trade deficit stood at $3.7 billion.All these came along with rising inflation.
Inflation kept rising, from 100 percent in 1979, 133 150 percent in 1980 to 400 percent or more in 1984, as widely reported. When Prime Minister Shimon Peres visited Washington in the Summer of 1984 seeking more U.S. assistance, he referred to his country's market situation in a radio broad cast, as "this impossible inflation."
Added to all these is the fact that the Israelis are said to be "among the most highly taxed people in the world, paying nearly half of their income in taxes in the average brackets.
The wisdom, and the returns of certain policies and the burden of responsibility Israel has been carrying in governing a hostile population and building costly settle ments for security, defense, economic and demographic reasons, have all been widely challenged. The latter action has, in the first place, been shown to violate the Geneva Convention.
149 'ibid., p. 128. 1 5f) Time, July 9, 1984, p. 31. 151 Congressional Quarterly, op. cit., p. 128. 103
The Israeli Supreme Court, which in April 1979 ruled that
the settlements did not violate the Geneva Convention because they had been built for security purposes, reversed its ruling in October the same year, declared them illegal and 152 ordered them dismantled.
In reply to a question on the settlement policy, Moshe
Arens, even as member of Begin’s cabinet, said in 1979 that
"the settlements have no security value. It has political 153 value only. . . it does not have any defensive value."
And, according to an account in the 1979 Strategic Survey, a publication of the International Institute for Strategic
Studies,". . . a civilian settlement in a remote area amidst a hostile Arab population. . . could be more of a security threat than an ssset. . ." for instead of stopping an invading army it would force the Israeli army to rush to its protection, thus fragmenting the Israeli forces and hampering their movements, "as had indeed happened in the
1 5 4 Golan Heights in the 1973 war." A New York Times April,
1979 editorial comment also said: "New civilian settlements in the West Bank will serve no conceivable security require ments; the Israeli army has long since carved out the strategic ,. . ,155 high ground.
T^^Ibid., p. 40. T53ibid.
^^^Ibid. ISSlbid. 104
These and other policies, notably the Israeli Autonomy
Plan of May, 1979 for the occupied territories, led some of
Begin's ministers to resign from his cabinet. Dayan,
Weizman and Simha Ehrlich resigned as Foreign, Defense and
Finance Ministers respectively between October 1979 and May
1980.
In addition to the economic consequences of Israeli policies were also losses suffered by that nation in the sphere of international politics and diplomacy. An account has been given of how the United Nations, international organization and individuals kept censuring and denouncing
Israel for one or another of its policies and practices like human rights violations. Recently, this isolation has again included attempts, in addition to breaking or refusing to establish diplomatic relations by some nations or blocs, to bar or expell Israel from some international organizations and economic regimes.
In 1973 the entire continent of Africa through the
Organization of African Unity (GAU) severed diplomatic relations with Israel for its policies, among them continued occupation of Arab territories. Israel hence forth became an object of condemnation at various African conferences.
The aggravating factor here was not just Arab membership
TSGibid., p. 41. 105
in the OAU but Israel's friendly relations with South Africa as exemplified by the visit to Israel in 1976 of Prime
Minister John Voster, the ardent exponent of apartheid.
In 1975, African nations sponsored a motion in the UN
General Assembly which resulted in the adoption of a UN resolution which defined Zionism as "a form of racism and 157 racial discrimination."
Since 1973 only two African states, Zaire and Liberia, have restored diplomatic relations with Israel. In the
Summer of 1982 some members of the Nigerian National Assembly moved a motion in the House of Representatives calling for
Nigeria's re-establishing diplomatic ties with Israel.
Public response came immediately in the newspapers opposing the move, while Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of
International Affairs, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, wrote "an open letter" (published in the newspapers) to the National
Assembly advising the lawmakers on the dangers the measure they were advocating was fraught with. The motion was with drawn .
When it was rumored in 1983 that Togo and Senegal were considering restoring diplomatic relations with Israel, the two West African nations were quick in denying. A Nigerian daily. The New Nigerian, reported:
157 Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 463. 106
Togo on Wednesday denied that it intended to reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel, the Abidjan corres pondent of the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) reports. A foreign ministery statement broadcast on Lome Radio, said that togo had no plans to deviate from the path all OAU member states took 10 years ago when they severed diplomatic relations with Israel following that country's occupation of Arab territories during the Yom Kippur War. A similar denial was issued by the Sene galese government last week when it refuted a report in a Paris-based journal. . . Israel still looked forward to a raprochment with "one or two" black African states before the end of the year (1 9 8 3 ).158
These actions illustrate not only the extent of African nations' opposition to Israeli policies but also their deter mination to continue along the same line until at least
Israel makes some changes.
Some Third World countries, notably Iran and India, have sought to get Israel isolated, barred or expelled from the UN, some of its organs and other international organizations.
India dramatized this attitude in September 1983 when it barred Israel together with South Africa from attending the
New Delhi international energy conference, for their violations of human rights.
Relations between Israel and the big powers have again been severely strained often on account of Zionist attitudes and Israeli policies. Commenting on this and the relations between Israel and the country which did most at the beginning to help the Zionists reach their goal, Lenczowski noted:
^^^New Nigerian, September 10, 1983, p. 8. 107
Nothing could better illustrate the strange human emotions than the transformation of the Jewish- British friendship of World War I into outright hatred of Britain at the end and after the World War II.
Britain endorsed the Bernadette plan. . . And to stress her lack of enthusiasm for Israel, Great Britain abstained from voting on both occasions when Israel's application for membership in the United Nations was being decided.159
These relations between Britain and Israel have remained either cool or not as warm as they could be.
After the United States rebuffed Israel's request for arms sales in 1956, telling Israel to rely on the "collective security" of the United Nations, Israel turned to Britain.
But Prime Minister Anthony Eden told Israel to make concessions with the Arabs first. Israel then turned to France which became its major supplier of arms as from that time. But in the mid-1960's France re-examined its Middle East policies and terminated its supply of arms to Israel whereupon mounting pressures led the U.S. to take on that role to date.^^^
All these world powers including the Soviet Union, whose relations with Israel have been described at best as
"full of ambiguities," have voted together in the UN Security
Council to denounce some of Israel's actions. Examples were
Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967 and declaring the old city its capital in 1980, proliferation of Jewish
159 Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 416-417.
^^^Congressional Quarterly, op. cit., pp. 48-49, 108
settlements in the occupied territories and other expansionist policies and the bombing of Iraqi nuclear reactors near
Baghdad. The U.S. joined the other members of the Security
Council in almost all its objections to Israeli policies.
It also has remained most vocal at least in telling Israel
that some of its policies were obstacles to peace.
Japan and the European nations were said to grow "increa singly impatient with Israel's occupation of Arab terri
tories."^®^ In June 1977 the European Economic Community
(EEC) announced its support for the creation of a Palestinian state and repeated its demand that Israel withdraw from Arab lands.
In 1974 only the U.S., Dominican Republic and Boliva, of all the world nations, voted along with Israel trying unsuccessfully to prevent Yassir Arafat from being the first non-governmental representative to address the UN General 163 Assembly. This was one of the most unambiguous signals of isolation the world community sent to Israel in the hope of getting that country to make some positive changes in its policies. And, to date only two countries, Costa Rica and
El Salvador have moved their embassies from Tel Aviv to
Jerusalem. El Salvador did this in April 1984 because.
TG^Ibld., p. 128.
^®^Ibid.
T®®Ibid. 109
according to a Time magazine report, it had "looked for military assistance from Israel.
There have been cultural, social, religious and political tensions in Israel, added to the aforementioned economic and isolationist problems. Some of these, like the "government- decreed racism", as Lilienthal called it, were self-imposed, while others occured naturally as they would in any society where people, as in Israel, came from different parts of the world and with different cultures to forge such a hetero geneous social milieu.
Among the divisive phenomena that have plagued Israel were racism and discrimination, things one hears very little about. But that these have indeed formed part of Israeli social disorders was captured well by Lilienthal:
Israel’s Black Panthers are those Oriental Jews who have banded together under the name to dramatize their protest against the second-class citizenship imposed on the darker-skinned Jews from Arab countries . . . A most serious race riot broke out in the Summer of 1959 in the slum district of the port city of Haifa. The battle between "black Jews" from Arab countries and "white Jews" from Europe lasted four days, resulting in eleven Israeli policemen wounded, thirty-two rioters arrested and considerable property damage.165
Time magazine reported in 1971 that when Prime Minister Golda
1 fi4 '*^Time, May 7, 1984, p. 75. 1 Lilienthal, op. cit., pp. 132-133. 110
Meir met the leaders of the Oriental Jews she took an instant dislike to them.Lilienthal again quoted F. Stone, editor of the "famed newsletter" bearing his name, as one of the few who knew and could speak out about the situation in Israel.
Stone wrote in 1975:
Israel is creating a kind of moral schizophrenia in world Jewry. . . In Israel Jewry finds itself defen ding a society in which mixed marriages cannot be legalized, in which non-Jews have a lesser status than Jews and in which the ideal is racial and exclusionist. Jews must fight everywhere for their very existence against principles and practices they find themselves defending in Israel.167
One of the groups that has ironically been most at odds with the state is the Orthodox element, according to Lili enthal. "When Golda Meir addressed an Israel Bond meeting in New York in December 1971," he observed, "Neturei Karta members were joined in picketing the American Hotel by a larger contingent of men and women from the National Committee of Orthodox Jewish Communities. . . American Zionists were shaken (to see on TV) Jews with beards and peyes (long 168 sideburns). , . in militant opposition to Israel's policies."
This group it was, Lilienthal noted, who on occasion reacted by overturning cars entering their area 158 in Jeru salem on the Sabbath. Their view as quoted by Lilienthal, was expressed by their leader. Rabbi Amram Blau, who lamented:
1G®Ibid. 1 fi7 Ibid., p. 136. 168 Ill
We in the Holy Land find ourselves in an unfortunate position both materially and spiritually. Materially we are against our will included in an idependent, nationalistic state, labeled Jewish, whose entire foundation and ways are opposed to our faith. . . We decry bitterly the bloodshed of these wars, diametrically opposed to our will and our faith. . . Spiritually, we find ourselves under the rule of Jews, devoid of faith who aspire to live in permis siveness and abandon.169
According to Lilienthal, "the quest for power is the name of the game," among Israeli politicians:
Israeli politicians, as elsewhere, indulge in their share of infighting, splinter parties, and power ploys, and have been caught with more than their own portion of corruption.
Some of the examples given include the suicide of the
Housing Minister, Avraham Ofer under suspicion of land fraud, the arrest of a Rabinnical Court judge for unlawful currency deals, the arrest and release of millionaire Shmuel Flatlo-
Sharon and his running to win parliamentary election, the
Israeli case of fraud, "Israel's Watergate", involving the business conglomerate of Tibor Rosenbaum, and the discovery of illegal foreign accounts kept in Washington by Prime
1 7 0 Minister and Mrs. Yitzhak Rabin,
"Israeli internal politicking, at the very least,"
Lilienthal concluded,
. . . adds to U.S. financial liabilities and often threatens the world. In trying to consolidate their
169 Ibid., p. 139. 170 Ibid., p. 141. 1 12
own political positions, Israeli leaders continue to vie with one another in exploiting the troubles with the Arabs, so that even a verbal threat uttered against Israel could
1 T 1 invite "retaliatory" strikes from the Israeli armed forces, so politicians could take the credit.
A twelve-page Time magazine report titled "What Next for Israel?" made a comprehensive coverage of some of the aspects of the present-day Israeli situation. Full of pictures and responses to interviews, the report, carried in the July
9, 1984 issue, touched on almost every facet of Israeli life.
It stated that if one asked the question, "How are things going?", one unmistakable response one would get, even if tacit, would be a "nagging sense that somehow the country has lost its way, that its biblical promise to be 'a light 172 to the nations has dimmed."
After being physically more secure, the Israelis had no psychological security, the report said. And thirty six years after its birth "Israel faces problems never imagined by Yaacov Zvieli and other founders." Major General Israel
Tal’s response to a question was: "We now disagree among ourselves on everything, it is not the environment that has 173 changed. . . it is we who have changed." (emphasis added)
T^^Ibid.
T^^Time, July 9, 1984, p. 30.
^^^Quoted in Time, Ibid. 113
Knesset Speaker, Menachem Savidor, also said: "It appears
as if we have returned to the tribal period, to the days of
Joshua and Judges, when each tribe stressed the dividing line."T74
Other dilemmas of the Jews were further revisited:
"For many Israelis," Time understood,
. . . the government's policies present Israel with its most serious moral dilemma. Counting the Gaza Strip's 450,000 Arabs, Israel now rules more than 1.4 million people who do not enjoy full rights and have no loyaly to the state. If Israel con tinues to deny those rights to what amount to 25% of the people under its control it will erode its democratic principles. But if Israel accepts them as citizens the country will become a Jewish-Pale- stinian state erasing its heritage as the Jewish homeland.175
Commenting on this issue, former Foreign Minister, Abba
Eban said, "When you think of this situation in the light
of Jewish history and the struggle of Jews for equality of 176 right of status, the paradox becomes agonizing."
The Israelis, according to Time, have wondered how the
economy of an independent country can be dependent and sus
tained by foreign aid. Other questions Time asked were,
"Can a nation expand its borders in pursuit of greater security?
How long can a state that rules 1.4 million disenfranchised
Arabs remain what it set out to be: a Jewish homeland as
T^^ibid.
1 7 5 Ibid., p. 34.
^^®Ibid. 114
177 well as democracy.
On the economy the report said:
Israel's persistent economic woes became more severe after the 1973 war when the country was forced to replace as much as $20 billion in military equipment. (Now) economic optimists note that although Israel may have the world's highest per capita foreign debt ($5,350), . . , only $5.6 billion of the $22.5 billion total has been borrowed from commercial banks. The remainder is owed to more forgiving lenders: the U.S. and Jewish benefactors around the world.
Since 1948, Washington, has given more than $28 billion to Israel, just over half in grants. . . But Israelis are getting increasinly concerned that such financial dependence could compromise their sovereignty. . .178
Social upheavals have also escalated now to take another turn, according to the report. Twenty-six Israelis, inclu ding two army officers were on trial on charges of terrorist activities during mid-1984. This revealed, according to the report, that an underground Jewish terrorist movement existed, involving religious groups called Gush Emunim, a rabbi and reserve paratroopers and tank commanders in the 179 armed forces.
The tragedy is not just that these economic, political and social troubles have occured in Israel but that most of them occured unnecessarily. It can be said that the root cause of most of Israel's unwieldy problems was the very
Zionist approach to the whole question of settling and
177 Ibid., p. 30.
1 7fl Ibid., pp. 31-32. 179 Ibid., p. 32. 115
dealing with other people in Palestine. Despite all the well- meaning protests, counselings and admonitions of experts, friends, sympathizers and far-sighted Zionists among them, the Zionist leadership continued to ignore both the realities and the moral imperatives that ought to have dictated, at least in part, the methods, the tactics and the whole manner in which the Zionist enterprise should have been carried through. No one can understand how any undertaking can be carried out successfully which is based on the premise that a natural obstacle to it does not exist.
One of the biggest fallacies of Zionism was, therefore, its insistence that human beings were not people or that the land they inhabited was empty. A second mistake was that when they came face to face with the truth of the existence of these human beings, the Zionists, instead of taking part and letting these people have part of their land, chose to rid the land of its people and take an entire possession of it. Hence the campaigns of terror of 1948 and the 1950's.
If they sought the cooperation of the Arabs and went on through a peaceful and tactful penetration, the Zionists could have still achieved their goals without the continuing human suffering which has remained the saga of Israel and its neighbors to date.
President of the World Jewish Congress, Dr. Nahum Goldmann admitted this fact in 1974: 1 16
. , . If we had invested in the Arab problem a tenth of the energy, the passion, the ingenuity, the resource- fullness which we developed in order to gain the support of Britain, France, the U.S. and Weimar Germany, our destiny in the development of Israel may have been quite different, (emphasis added) . . . We were not ready for compromises; we did not regard it as a major problem. . . We did not make sufficient efforts to get, if not the full agreement of the Arabs, at least their acquiescence to a Jewish state, which I think would have been possible. That was the original sin.180
That was the "original sin" for which Israel has been undergoing those retributions and tribulations. Yet these could be reversed should Israeli leaders desire peace in place of military feats. This would make unnecessary the state of belligerency in the Middle East and reduce substan tially Israel's security burdens like the need to spend $1.2 million a day to continue occupying Southern Lebanon in order 181 to contain the PLO. The economy could rise again; tensions would ease and Israel and other nations of the Middle East, including the Palestinians, could then turn their attention and resources to their development priorities.
It is only through establishing peace that these could be achieved. But real peace has so much eluded the Middle
East for so long, that almost all the various proposals made for it by expertjr have seemed to crash down so that few today are willing to attempt any suggestions for fear that
180 Quoted in Lilienthal, op. cit., p. 7.
^®^Time, July 9, 1984, p. 34. 117
they might sound unrealistic, puerile or utopian. It is with this understanding that the following concluding remarks on the chances for peace are attempted. CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
FINAL OBSERVATIONS ON
PROSPECTS FOR PEACE
ZIONIST ATTITUDES AND PEACE EFFORTS
Two recurring themes in this study have been: that it was the initial Zionist attitude toward and approach to the
problem of the Palestinians that gave rise to and catalyzed
the chain of events now referred to as the Middle East con
flict, and that, it is only through revising the Zionist
attitude that peace can be brought about in the area.
The most important factor in inducing such a change as
suggested here again is Israel's leaders' admitting that
the unwieldy mounting problems their country has faced are
the by-product of a situation of precarious peace or none
at all. A corollary to this is the realization on the part of these Zionist leaders that the solution to even Israel's
internal problems largely depends on reaching a just settle ment of the Palestinian question. A change in U.S. policies
forced by reassessment or public opinion is seen again as
one crucial factor in modifying the Zionist attitudes.
The insistence on a change of heart on the part of
Israeli policy makers is founded on the fact that, "in the
118 119
Middle East, Israel has been strengthened substantially— absolutely, relatively, qualitatively and quantitatively— 182 in relation to its neighbors. . ," as Harald Saunders put it. Israel, with the full backing of the U.S., with the best arms and efficient armed forces, holds the trump card and has the final say. In this sense, Israeli leaders may choose— have a change of heart— but not be forced at present, without a change in U.S. policies, to make concessions so as to give peace a chance. It is well to note here that not even its stronger benefactor, the U.S., can influence
Israel beyond a certain limit.
thus, if Israeli authorities who have defied the world with impunity since 1948, were to change their position and, with a genuine desire for peace, just agree to start nego tiating directly with the leaders of the PLO, chances for peace would be very good. this is not to ignore the capability of the Arabs as exemplified by Syria's ability to bring down a sophisticated U.S. reconnaisance plane recently, the PLO's tenacity in combat as cited earlier, Iraqi's efforts in nuclear arms development, the overall proliferation of arms in the Arab world and the fact that no one can say for sure what the outcome of another Arab-Israeli war would be. But the situation as aforestated holds true at present.
182 Harald H. Saunders, The Middle East Problem in the 1980's (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), p. 71. 120
Peace is needed in the Middle East before anything triggers another major war which could affect world peace.
The last war, whose end, in terms of who lost or won was inconclusive, drew the super powers closer to confrontation than did the earlier ones, and there is no guarantee that a next war would not threaten world peace even in a more menacing manner. A lot of efforts have been made, notably by the U.S. and the United Nations to ensure peace both in the Middle East and the world at large. But what fruition these efforts came to was not a lasting but a precarious peace in the area.
In addition to Israeli intransignece which is one of the major factors in producing this situation, were some omissions to resolve certain key issues affecting peace in the Middle East. The UN resolution 242 of November 1967, for example, provided for the right of every state in the
Middle East to enjoy full sovereign existence. But this document failed to even mention a home for the Palestinians who had been displaced from their rightful homeland. Their existence was referred to as refugees and their physical settlement as that of refugees. The unnecessary ambiguity in terms of requiring Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories which the document created by its omitting the article "the" before "territories" again gave rise to a lot of confusion and left the interpretation of the phrase in 121
question at the mercy of various interests. Thus, even
though Israel reluctantly accepted the UN Resolution 242
in July 1970, it did so with certain reservations. One of
these was that withdrawal from the conquered territories
"should by no means signify (Israel's) evacuation of all the occupied territories." Because of these reservations Israel could not be regarded as really having accepted Resolution 183 242, as Lenczowski observed.
But this latter argument remains a moot point. It is hard to see how by this very statement of reservation alone
Israel rejected UN Resolution 242 or even the U.S. statement which advocated that Israeli withdrawal from Arab lands should be substantial. None of these statements stipulated with drawal from all the occupied territories. It is noted, however, that Egypt, Jordan and Syria all accepted the UN
Resolution while Israel remained suspicious of it. Again, when in 1969 U.S. Secretary of State, Rogers, presented his plan embodying the UN Resolution 242 to the Egyptian
and Israeli governments the Israeli government under Golda
Meir "rather angrily rejected it." And when in February 1971
Ambassador Gunner Jarring, as UN representative, asked Presi dent Sadat of Egypt whether he was ready to abide by the UN
Resolution 242, accept Israel's existence and abandon the state
of belligerency, Sadat's response was positive, but when
183 Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 450-451. 122
Golda Meir was asked with the same memoranda whether she
was prepared to abide by the same UN Resolution her reply 184 was negative.
If the Israeli government’s response to this UN effort were positive and implemented, the 1973 war might have been
averted and some normalcy could have been restored in the
area. Israel’s refusal to make the above concession, its rejection of earlier and subsequent proposals like those of
Fahd and Reagan, and its re-interpreting or violating certain peace agreements like the autonomy plan, while other parties agreed and adhered to them (except of course the PLO which was never consulted), illustrate Israeli intransigence and
the attitude that was true to the tradition of the Israeli
Zionist leadership.
HANDLING THE ZIONIST ATTITUDES; THE ROLE OF THE U.S.
When the UN efforts failed, the onus of negotiations and finding a settlement in the Middle East passed over to the
United States. But since 1967 the U.S. had become the main supplier of large amounts of sophisticated arms and very generous economic assistance to Israel. And in contrast to
the policies of the 1950’s by which the U.S. could withhold or cut aid to Israel to induce it to be more pliable to peace efforts, the U.S. policy now as it was purported, was
TG^ibid., p. 452. 123
to provide even greater amounts of military and economic aid
so this could "generate in Israel a greater feeling of secu rity and induce it to be more receptive to the implementation of UN Resolution 242."^®^ George Lenczowski stressed that
"this was definitely the line pursued by William Rogers and
. . . Henry Kissinger. . . while the Congress authorized deliveries of very sophisticated American weapons systems
to Israel and, with the passage of time, the combined American grants, loans and military assistance exceeded $2 billion a 186 year on the average."
A case can be made for any policy that in truth becomes such a positive inducement as the U.S. policy in regard to
Israel claimed to have done, so eventually the Israelis might make concessions. But in this particular case, that has not turned out to be the case, however benign and well-meaning the intentions of the U.S. policy-makers. Lenczowski dis cussed this aspect of U.S. policy together with the expansio nist policies of Israel and its attitude toward the Palesti nians :
If the American arms policy toward Israel was calculated to produce a greater pliability on the part of the Israeli government it appeared to have failed in its objective in the later 1960's and 1970’s. The Israelis were clearly in no hurry to withdraw from the occupied territories and the military school of thought, which insists on strategic-territorial safeguards rather than the uncertainties of Arab peace promises (from the
1 q R 'ibid., p. 452. ISGlbid. 124
Israeli point of view), clearly dominated Israeli's political thought and behavior.
The undeniable fact was that by expanding its control over large Arab territories Israel found under its sovereign power about 1.5 million (Pale stinian) Arabs. . . (And) the Israeli attitude toward the Palestinians could broadly be described as nega tive. First, Israeli leaders tended to reject the notion of a distinct Palestinian nationality. . . The tendency was to regard them as somewhat nondescript Arabs who when displaced from their homes, could and should be assimilated by the surrounding Arab countries. Second, because a separate identity of the Palestinians was denied, the next logical step- their claim to self-determination— was also rejected by the Israelis.
. . . These attitudes of denial went hand-in-hand with Israel's territorial aspirations. . . Menachem Begin, (for example) . . . true to the tradition of the Revisionist party, advocated the inclusion not only of the West Bank but of the territory of Trans jordan into the State of Israel. His views were shared to a large extent by the National religious party. . . 187
To date, neither Israeli nor U.S. policies have changed.
Israel has continued to reject or refuse to implement every peace proposal or agreement including those put forward by the U.S. But experience would have shown that the U.S. could influence Israeli policies with certain doses of resolve.
In 1953 when Israel attempted to divert Jordan water along the Huleh canal, defying the UN order to cease work on the proposed hydroelectric plant, it was only the U.S. that forced Israel to stop the project. Once Secretary of State,
John Foster Dulles, suspended some aid to Israel on October
TG^ibid., pp. 452-453. 125
20, just eight days later Israel declared it would stop Huleh 188 operations.
Several efforts were made by successive U.S. adminis
trations to influence Israel's actions and policies with some determination but the nature of the U.S. politics and
Jewish influence in the U.S. neutralized these efforts while this determination kept slackening. President Eisenhower did endeavor to introduce the policy of "impartial friendship 189 in the Middle East." In 1956 he "condemned Israel's agres sions, and in a televised statement insisted on unconditional 190 evacuation by Israel of occupied territories." Talk of even- handedness in the U.S. Middle East policies started during the Nixon Administration when William Scranton publicly called 191 for it. In 1975, when the U.S. encountered Israeli opposition to making concessions on the Suez Canal crisis,
President Ford announced that the administration was soon going to reassess the U.S. policy of unconditional support and massive aid for Israel. And despite the congressional bi partisan letter strongly opposing him. Ford went ahead with 192 his reassessment policy. President Carter, before the
Camp David Agreements, publicly stood for Israeli withdrawal
TGBibid., PP . 424t-425.
TG^Ibid., P. 427.
^®°Ibid., p. 433.
TS^Ibid., p.
TG^ibid., p. 805. 126
from Arab territories, a home for the Palestinians and the need to take the PLO into account in the peace-making 193 process.
The efforts of all these presidents in trying to elicit compromises from Israel were thwarted largely by the Congress.
Lenczowski observed that, "in the struggle between the consecutive American presidents and Israeli premiers— Golda
Meir, Itzhak Rabin, Menachem Begin— the United States Congress acted as an arbiter and. . . Israeli premiers as a rule 194 emerged victorious."
If the U.S. and Israeli executives struggled over policies in the late 1960's and 1970's, lately the premiers and presi dents have had no need for struggles. The U.S. executive branch has not been able to go beyond the ritual, verbal condemnations of Israeli acts of aggression and intransi gence. The suspension of the sales of F16 fighters to Israel by the Reagan Administration, following Israel's invasion of Lebanon can be cited to counter this argument. But as reported by the Washington Post, even though ". . .on March
31, (1983) Reagan (had) disclosed publicly that the sale would not proceed until Israel agreed to withdraw its troops from Lebanon," just a little over one month later the threat became empty or even a farce when in May, the admini-
193 Ibid., p. 809. 194 Ibid., p. 811. 127
stration announced that the F16's would be released to 195 Israel "as a gesture of cooperation."
When Reagan praised the 1981 Fahd plan as it called for
Arab recognition of Israel, Israeli outcry against Reagan's interest in the Saudi proposal sent the White House officials
"backtracking," according to a Newsweek report. "Haig and
Reagan were trying to say that the U.S. is pleased, Saudi
Arabia is interested enough in bringing peace to the region. . but Reagan got carried away," one aide was reported as saying.
"The administration," the report concluded, has hesitated, fearful of angering Israel. .
Discussing a related issue. Time magazine, in October
1982 said, "Although the U.S. denounced the Israeli invasion of West Beirut, the President undercut the force of the pro test. Campaigning in New Jersey, Reagan offhandedly commented,
"I am sure what led them (Israeli forces) to move (into West 197 Beirut) was an attack by some leftist militia forces."
The report further commented that.
In the eyes of Reagan's diplomatic planners (certain) . . . considerations rule out the use of the most obvious U.S. lever on Begin's government: a reduction or suspension of U.S. military and economic aid to Israel. The counter argument, of course, is that continued generous U.S. aid to Israel underwrites the very Begin policies that a Washington so furiously
195 Washington Post, May 20, 1983, p. A22. 196 Newsweek, November 16, 1981, p.
1 9 7 Time, October 4, 1982, p. 26. 128
198 opposes.
When in October, 1984 Israeli Prime Minister, Shimon
Peres went to Washington asking "for American help to ensure
his country's economic survival. . . the Reagan Administra
tion "committed itself to $2.6 billion in economic and mili
tary aid for Israel in 1985," a Newsweek report said. "U.S.
officials also assured Peres that they would do whatever was necessary, including dipping into the Treasury Department's
Economic Stabilization Fund, to keep Israel from defaulting
on its $24 billion foreign debt." The only condition, accor
ding to the report, was that "the Israelis would have to
accept some stern fiscal discipline— and possibly a little
American supervision— in exchange for Washington's assis
tance.
In sharp contrast to U.S. authorities' "trembling" before
the Israeli leaders, the latter could be said, at best, to
have little respect for the former. After annexing the
Golan Heights in 1980 Begin remarked; "We know that our
American friends would tell us 'no' and. . . we could not
take this into account." The U.S. and Egypt, Begin said,
would go along with the action for they could not afford
to give Israel the pretext by which it would refuse to
complete the Sinai withdrawal. In 1982 Begin referred
^®®Ibid., p. 27. 1 99 Newsweek, October 22, 1984, p. 46.
^^^Newsweek, January 18, 1982, p. 44. 129
to a report that originated in the Middle East Policy Survey.
In it he quoted Senator Charles Percy of Illinois as having
recommended tougher U.S. action so Israel would stop bombing
West Beirut, and, even though Senator Percy had denied
making such a remark, Begin went on cynically to tell the
Americans: "You must have forgotten that Jews do not kneel
but to God," adding, "Nobody is going to preach to us 201 humanitarianism."
In January 1981, Sharon taunted the U.S. leaders, saying
they were showing "hopelessness" in dealing with the Polish
crisis and that they did not understand what was going on 202 in the Middle East and Africa. And even at this time Peres
was in Washington in October 1984 requesting more aid to
Israel, one of the remarks credited to him by a Time report
titled "Bracing a Partner in Need," based on the very remark, 203 was that Israelis "are not ready to listen to any advice."
If there was any reaction to any of these statements
from the Americans, it must have been very mild or even
apologetic. But when King Hussein of Jordan recently made
a statement criticizing U.S. policies in the Middle East
there was an immediate uproar followed by the cancellation
of the sale of some arms that Jordan had requested.
201 Time, August 16, 1982, pp. 11-12. 202 Newsweek, January 18, 1982, p. 44. 903 Time, October 22, 1984, p. 46. 130
The Israelis might have been doing all these as a
tactic, in the belief that the tougher they proved to be
the more the Americans would lean toward them. The Americans on their part, for various reasons including emotional ones, would appear to have been cowed into turning their backs to be ridden by the Israelis, for being pro-Israel has turned out, for one thing, to be an added, in some cases, essential credential for electoral campaigns, and indeed for winning elections.
In their struggle for the Democratic Presidential nomina tion, for example. Senator Gary Hart and former Vice President
Mondale, each promised during a debate in New York (where there was a high Jewish population) that upon winning the presidential nomination and election, he would move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. While it is doubtful if any of them was more pro-Israeli than Reagan, and while the campaign for the embassy transfer had started or been revived in the Congress toward the close of Reagan's first term, his administration was consistently opposed to the move. This illustrates how much an asset being pro-Israeli could be in the U.S. electoral politics. Even though it might not be advisable for any of them (Hart or Mondale) to pursue the policy on reaching the White House (since no administration had attempted it), they still invoked their "pro-Israelism" this way in their desperation to win. Only Jesse Jackson, 131
who was the obvious and inevitable underdog, took an exception to that position.
This observation is important in trying to understand the political realities in the United States as relates to
U.S. policies in the Middle East. It would seem as if the
U.S. policy-makers have been caught up in a Middle East dip lomatic quagmire. The Arabs have looked upon the U.S. alone for settlement with Israel. Many of them have been moderate and pro-American; many have been supplying oil to America and her Western allies and many had definitely made the required concessions which Israel was supposed to have reciprocated.
On the other hand, while the U.S. has been regarded as the only power capable of making Israel come out with her own concessions, and has had a moral duty to do so, the leadership in the U.S. has been so hampered by the Jewish influence and the electoral and other aspects of U.S. politics, it has not been able to employ the right measures to fulfill that obligation.
It is true that all the U.S. administrations including the present one have denounced or condemned many of Israel's acts of aggression, expansionism, defiance of world opinion or anything that threatened peace, including voting against
Israel in the United Nations. But it is also true that rhetorics and verbal recitation of condemnations have not worked and "American policy toward Israel," as Lenczowski 132
remarked, appeared generally "to have failed," So if there
is to be peace in the Middle East, the Zionists in Israel must revise their attitudes while the U.S. may have to
revise its policies toward Israel to induce such a change
among the Israeli leaders. Only then will the region be put on the road to peace.
THE ROAD TO PEACE
There is a good case for the argument that only when
Israel is led by its internal situational realities or by, or in conjunction with some external influence, can chances for peace be enhanced. Such external force is most con ceivably the reduction or suspension of aid to Israel by the U.S., if this were possible, until Israel started to work for peace. Perhaps more realistic but surely less promising was the solution advanced by Ian S. Lustick, pro fessor of government at Dartmouth who suggested that,
. . . the United States would continue current very high levels of military and economic aid to Israel but would publicly, concretely and regularly express its opposition to settlements, deportations, seizure of water resources. . . or any other aspects of occu pation. . .204
The problem here, however, is that the U.S. has done nearly all of these, and it was action that worked as seen in the 1950's, while talking per se, however strongly worded, once not followed by action, as has been the case, has produced
204 Quoted in Congressional Quarterly, op. cit., p. 32. 133
nothing. If the "positive" approach had worked the problem would not have persisted till 1980 when Lustick wrote his proposal in the Winter 1980-81 issue of Foreign Policy.
Certainly, as Lenczowski stated about the same time, this very approach "had failed" by the early 1980's. This would there fore give more credence to the earlier suggestion that wit- holding aid was "the most obvious U.S. lever," as Time magazine (October 4, 1982) noted, for influencing Israel's actions.
After the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, U.S. Secretary of State,
Henry Kissinger embarked upon what was known as step-by-step approach instead of attempting an overall settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. He eventually achieved two disengagement agreements in the Sinai between Israel and
Egypt and separation of forces agreement between Syria and
Israel. He was, however, severely criticized for not using the opportunity to try a comprehensive settlement, including 205 a solution to the Palestinian problem.
A case was, however, made for this approach. Saunders observed that the approach from 1973 was based on the belief that.
Solution of one set of problems would make it possible to resolve more difficult issues later as confidence in the negotiating process grew. With this approach there was emphasis on the process itself, in the belief
205 Congressional Quarterly, op. cit., p. 128. 134
that the objective was to build a new set of relations in and out of the negotiation.206
Perhaps this approach was not quite suited to the situa tion in the Middle East. Another argument Saunders cited, pointed out that, "... time has run out on partial settle ments and only agreement on large issues can produce further progress toward peace. . . I f there is agreement on large 207 principles, the smaller ones will fall into place."
The large issue in the Middle East is the nagging Pales tinian problem. It should not at any time be sacrificed for anything else. And to deal with the Palestinian question realistically is to deal with the PLO— which is universally recognized as the representative of the Palestinian people.
As a matter of fact much that the U.S. has pledged not to talk with or recognize the PLO, it has maintained secret contacts with it. The New York Times, among others, revealed this since early 1984 when it stated:
For a period of nine months, the Reagan Administration conducted secret discussions through an intermediary with Yassir Arafat, the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, according to American participants in the effort.208
This proved right former ambassador Eilt's assertion in the Winter 1980-81 issue of Foreign Policy that, "Whether one likes it or not in the . . . (Reagan) administration a
^^^Saunders, op. cit., p. 72.
20?Ibid. 208 New York Times, February 19, 1984, p. 1. 135
U.S. dialogue with the PLO is very likely to be a key catalyzing further progress toward a broader Middle East ,,209 peace."
The legitimate and relatively more moderate PLO leader ship has, as shown earlier, expressed its readiness to recognize Israel, one of Washington's requirements. It is also known that its terrorist tactics have been carried out by either individuals, or the more radical elements of the minority PLO groups, while the main body has already declared that the organization was no longer seeking to destroy Israel,
But the PLO could not throw its last card by publicly and unequivocally recognizing Israel. Such a diplomatic gamble would obviously be self-defeating in the face of Israel's refusal even to be recognized by th PLO let alone making parallel her own recognition of the PLO.
So perhaps the U.S., aware of these facts, but perhaps again "fearful" of Israel, went on to talk with the PLO in secret.
If Israel were ready to grant the rights of the Palesti nians, the PLO has proven that it was ready to acknowledge
Israel's existence. But Israel is not, and there can be no peace, unless all the Palestinians including the PLO were to be annihilated. The alternative to this is peace.
And the U.S. alone is looked upon to bring it about. The
^^^Quoted in Congressional Quarterly, op. cit., p. 32. 136
U.S. can only do this at present through its aid leverage over Israel.
If there is to be peace, the U.S. must move forward, considering the various, relevant principles as written down both in the United Nations resolutions and the Camp David frameworks to work for peace:
o All nations in the Middle East have the right to exist in secure borders free from threats.
o There should be no acquisition of territory by force.
Resolution 242 by which the U.S. stands, called for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories.
o Disputes, according to Article 33 of the UN Charter, shall be settled peacefully.
o And, as Saunders pointed out, "Against the background of the United Nation's decision, tacitly reflected in Resolution
242, that the Palestine Mandate should be divided between
Jews and Arabs, most members of the United Nations, including our European allies, recognize the right of the Palestinian
Arabs to self-determination in the territories from which 210 Israel would withdraw in a peace settlement,"
Saunders further reminded that.
Officials of the United States— whose president (Wilson) gave the concept of self-determination to the world in 1919 have been in the unusual position of being attacked sharply for using the word in relation to the Palestinian Arabs.
210 Saunders, op. cit., p. 67. 137
Saunders further noted that the problems now were, that
the Arabs wanted the Israelis to withdraw, "but withdrawal
is not the policy of the Likud government. . . and that most
Israelis were still not ready for psychological or perceived
security reasons— to accept the Palestinians with equal
rights in the former mandate of Palestine."
But not only were the Israelis not ready to accept a
Palestinian state but also to accept a Palestinian self-
government in association with Jordan, as President Reagan
proposed in 1982. Time magazine, September 13, 1982, quoted
Begin as calling the U.S. proposal an "affront to Israel," while the Israeli Cabinet unanimously agreed to reject it 211 and refused to enter any negotiations on its basis.
It is hard then to understand what the Zionist leaders
of Israel want to do with the Palestinians. Most experts,
however, understand the right things to do to reconcile
Israel's security needs and Palestinian rights. Saunders
thought that the first thing was to ensure that those who
would govern in the land from which Israel would withdraw
"if (it). . . will agree to withdraw," would assure the
security of Israel. The second thing was to see whether
an independent Palestinian state would be acceptable. He
then noted that "self-determination," a principle originated
by the U.S., in this particular case had become synonymous
^^ ^Time, September 13, 1982, p. 8. 138
with an "independent Palestinian state" which Israel has
opposed. Implying that it would be the duty of the U.S. to
see to the success of this scenario. Saunders finally
remarked: "the United States is seen as able to move toward
a just solution of conflict only when its vital interests 212 are threatened," (emphasis added). If that be the case
then it is well known that the U.S. has had vital interests
in the Middle East, even if long terra, whose protection is
synonymous with establishing peace and stability in the region,
It would only be hoped tht the U.S. would use the right measures in trying to pursue those interests while at the same time working for a just peace. As Yvegeny Primakov,
Director of the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies said, 213 "It will be necessary to evolve a whole range of measures,"
to reach a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Such measures virtually only the U.S. possesses and can apply at
the present.
There is no attempt here to suggest a certain scenario or steps to be taken, or draw a comprehensive peace formula
to be adopted for a peace-making process. Such formulas have
in fact been exhausted. There is only one formula. Since war has not been, and does not seem to be a next probable deciding factor in the final settlement (as seen in the Arabs’
212 Saunders, op. cit., pp. 71-72. 213 Yvegeny M. Primakov, "Is Peace Feasible in the Middle East?" in The Middle East Conflict, op. cit., p. 25. 139
foregoing several casus bellis), and since war is to be
avoided anyway, then the only peace formula is to employ
such measures that will cause the Zionist leaders in Israel
to revise their attitudes and make concessions as the other parties have made so a peaceful settlement can be reached.
And since all "positive" measures of strengthening Israel militarily and economically by the U.S. have not just failed but in fact produced the opposite of the desired results,
the next logical thing to do is to reverse the policy until such a time that Israel starts making concessions and the region is securely on the road to peace. Failure to do this on the part of the U.S., after having tried almost everything else, in vain, would amount to exercising veto over peace.
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