7
Theodore Roosevelt and the Philippine Insurrection John Davenport
In our history, perhaps no single armed conflict has touched the collective soul of the American people as deeply as the war in Vietnam. In what became a multimedia event, the war in Indochina presented American soldiers in a new light. For the first time, it was thought, our troops were fighting a war of aggression, a war for empire. This empire however, was not a product of the 1960s, nor was it the denouement of the post-World War II realignment. Long before young soldiers found themselves fighting for their lives in places such as Khe Sanh and Da Nang, other young Americans had fought this nation’s first imperial war in Asia -- the Philippine Insurrection. From 1899-1902, the United States fought to extinguish the flame of independence which had flared in the Philippines following the defeat of Spain in the Spanish-American War. An aggressive newcomer on the imperial stage, America was a nation which had cut its teeth on a patrimony of “manifest destiny.” For many people in the United States, freedom and liberty emanated from our shores. Counted among this number was the energetic young governor from New York, Theodore Roosevelt. From his earliest appearance in the public limelight, Roosevelt expressed an abiding belief in the superiority of western culture and the rectitude of Western expansion, particularly the American variant. This belief shaped his personal and life profoundly and affected his conduct as President of the United States. Nowhere is this evinced more clearly than in his conduct of the American war in the Philippines between his assumption of power in 1901, and his declaration of the islands’ pacification in July 1902. The month of March, 1899, saw American troops continuing an advance outwards from Manila which had begun a month earlier. Different readings of an agreement between the Filipinos and Americans, concerning guarantees of the former’s independence, had caused tensions which escalated to the point where a minor incident triggered a war. An American sentry fired on a Filipino patrol, and within days the Americans were driving the ill-equipped and poorly trained Filipinos away from their capital city into the surrounding countryside. By March 19, Manila was held securely by the Americans; by March 31, it was reported that “greater damage and heavy losses” had been suffered by the Filipinos. It could be boasted, without exaggeration, that “nowhere was the enemy able to retard the advance.”1 As the war progressed in the Philippines, controversy over the American presence in the archipelago grew. People such as Andrew Carnegie, former President Grover Cleveland,
LesterBrune,ChronologicalHistory ofUnitedStatesForeignRelations(NewYork:Garland Publishing,Inc., 1985),423-426.Adjutant-General’sOfficialCorrespondence,vol.II.(Washington:GovernmentPrintingOffice, 1902),873-876.HereafterreferredtoasAGC.MoorefleldStorey,ed.,SecretaryRoot’sRecord(Boston:GeorgeEllis Co.,1902),7. Text-fiche.KarlIrving Faust,Campaigningin thePhilippines(SanFrancisco:TheHicks-Judd Company,1899; reprint,NewYork:ArnoPress, 1970),118-240.
8
of
of
as
to
in
the
244.
was
was
time
most
were
War,
as
..will
Lodge,
a
on
speech
give
all
“should October
fighting
Roosevelt
the
at
a
notion
1937),
Filipinos
who
American
Roosevelt
America,”
republic.”
felt
of
soon
Civil
3.
Cabot
on
in
a
the
they
the
handmaid
were
York:
could
shortcoming.”
“as
the Roosevelt
antagonistic
if
to
wrong
every
later
he
Henry
perhaps
of
fence,”
attack
Philippines.
the
“is
then
(New
boys
at
go
Company,
Jordan,
threatens
presence
that
Theodore
and
is
that
the
was
underlies
islands
and
it
his
American
of
months
Starr that
Company,1899),
attraction
the
insurgents,
should
political
which
personal
all
what
propose,”
which
Cyclopedia
Democrats
and
continued,
American
proved
chagrined
make the
Roosevelt
the
every
Winston
Some
hide
David
demanded
from
we
he
at
to
of
most
gave
8
that
Page
savagery
he
conquest
J.C.
above
soon
over
American
“really
war.
side
and
the expansion:
doctrine
Roosevelt
L.C.
fact
Philippines
did
away
Theodore
which
“the
but,
islands,
of
the
any
of
sarcasm,
copperhead
but
the
the
the
withdraw
nor
were
other
president
beginning 389.
that
the
of
to
of
to
the
that
(Boston:
Roosevelt
issue
in
Theodore
control
sharpest the
(Philadelphia:
satisfaction
fit
who
to
was
battering
against
expansionist.”
a
1925),
the
hold
on
future
Union,”
the
eds.,
greatness,
an
their
in
warned
on
“regret
who
were
savagery
the
still
patriotism,
needed
Sons,
Considering
of
people
am
Correspondence
for
Hart,
Governor
Peace
Government
be
Philippines
friends
government
concealed
“I
forcefully
the
the
views
who
Bryan
possibly
the
the
armed
plan
troops
Yorker
express
the
out
his
for
of
of
from
Scribner’s
Cleveland,
p.4.
would Bushnell
the
he
the
Colonial
poorly
attacks,
anti-imperialists
of
those
unabashed
Yet,
Cincinnati,
question.”
New
handmaid
of
urged
to
not
at
spoke
“barbarous
the
1899,
Jennings
his
very
from
Albert
such
is
announcing Charles
which
the
American
245-246.
Conquest
his
Garrison
contempt
Selections
hid
“It
young
by
and
As
given
statement
Principle
and
type
August
Bryan,
York:
his
ed.,
only
Philippine archipelago,
1941),
Ex-President showed
William
26
Lloyd
different
the never
stung
University,
publicly,
2
scene.
the
Comparing
the
not
toothy,
(New
Farleger
Fisher,
of
embarrassing
criticized
speech History
they
government.”
I.
Lodge,
in
on
is
a
and
complete
Times,
the
he
Jennings
got.
of
can.”
170.
expressed vol.
expansion. in
‘
William
Ronald
nile,”
Association,
prove
for
Newton
while
and
Cabot
lives
March,
he
Stanford
243.
political
York
we
Roosevelt
something Although
at
as
this.”
1899,
theory
William their
Ibid.,
New
slaughtered.”
Henry
Ferleger,
Alden
Herbert
Horace
Privately,
1884-1918,
8
Memorial 7
6
“Expansion
Text-fiche.
3
succinct 2
21,
American
“half-hearted confidently,
like
6
for
good
Roosevelt triumph,
“Military represents.”
national remarked
our
“prefer reserved
be certainly
given
and dignity 9 peace.. .every expansion of a civilized power is a conquest for peace.. .It means not only the extension of American influence and power, it means the extension of liberty and order, the bringing nearer by gigantic strides of the day when peace shall come to the whole earth.” Words such as these, spoken without equivocation, characterized the public orations of Theodore Roosevelt in 1899 and through out the war years. Time and again he made crystal clear his belief that “civilization” was synonymous with white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant culture. For Roosevelt, the expansion Euro-American culture was a positive good, an ennobling experience for the expanding power, as well as an edifying experience for the recipient of the former’s attention. Within this scheme, America held a unique position. America had not only a right, but a duty, to expand and share with the less “fortunate” of the world the civilization, peace, and liberty which were all by-products of its history. Without a doubt, Roosevelt declared, his countrymen could not “if they wish to retain their self-respect, refrain from doing their duty as a great nation.” 10 Nor did Roosevelt see this duty as something which could be accepted or rejected at will. The land of liberty had not asked for the responsibility of bestowing civilization upon its Asian charges, but like it or not, the former Spanish possessions were now ours. The force of American arms had won the Spanish war, now the United States was responsible for the future happiness and prosperity of the Philippines. Thus, “under no conceivable circumstances,” said Roosevelt, could we “turn [the FilipinosJ over to rapine and bloodshed” or “allow them to sink into a welter of blood and confusion.” Roosevelt’s resolve to hold the Philippines was hardened by the pressure of the insurgency. The major obstacle to the betterment of the islands, as Roosevelt saw it, was the “half-caste and native Christians, warlike Moslems, and wild pagans” of the archipelago who made up the forces of guerilla fighter Emillo Aguinaldo. 12 There probably would have been little argument from the future president over the characterization of the insurgents made by Elihu Root. In a Youngstown, Ohio speech given less than a month before the presidential election of 1900, the Secretary of War inveighed against the “haif-guerilla, half-bandit” Filipino insurgents who hindered the bestowal of “happiness, peace, and prosperity” which submission to American authority would ensure. 13 In fact,Roosevelt had welcomed the appointment of Root by William McKinley as a good first step toward putting down the insurrection. From his home in Oyster Bay, Roosevelt wrote Henry Cabot Lodge that “Root realizes that the first thing to do is smash the Philippine insurrection.” 14 Privately, Roosevelt admitted that while he hoped that, “the trend of events will speedily as may be justify us in leaving them,” he had, “never varied in my feeling that
Ibid. 10 EltinMorrison,ed.,TheLettersofTheodoreRoosevelt,vol.II.(Cambridge,Massachusetts:HarvardUniversity Press,1951), 1400. 11 Ibid., 1415. SeealsoFerleger,426-428. 12 Ferleger, 427. 13 Storey, 8-9. 14 Lodge,416.
1
10
a
to
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to
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as
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sole
flag!
to
arose
dated
in
along
newly
was
arrived
270.
for
Press,
Howard
the
It
bullet
people hand
other
authority,
sentiment the
islands, MacArthur
had
confidence
Printing
starry
intended
President
of
maneuvered
insurrection:
1912),
not
done the
remainder
one
turn.
dispatch
was Disputes
nor
Philippines
explained
Filipinos
he
the
The
Philippines,
the
be on
problems.
the
same
a
William
the
everything
the
pleasant
men
of
his Arthur
was
Press,
the He
of Pennsylvania
the
assassin’s
the
in
Chaffee
do
“a
On
can
in
of
to
The
heel.
in
an
Government
two
stage.
While
cases;
States
sight
be
became
to
view
limelight
task
by
to
successfully
17
1901.
the
General
would
came
intractable
better
guiding
lost
Underneath
throughout
the
the in
Thus,
however,
of
principle.
to
he
1901,
United
had
University
lines.”
authority
Knickerbocker
to
criminal
of
felled
Army’s
most
Washington
never
shared jurisdiction.
15,
the
(Washington:
home.”
Filipinos
to
appear
the
his
one
Manila
Philippines
of
York:
was
over
“Nothing He
63.
Sharing
equal
Ladrone/
period.
moment
the
nonetheless
up in
successor
did
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case
the
vol.
conmiitted
the
presidents
he
(New
American
the
commander
criminal
islands,
(Philadelphia:
the
simple
post of
prove
beloved
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found
legal
September
on
President
the
bring
khakiac
experience
States,
rifle
McKinley
other
summed
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From
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our
on
along
the
jurisdiction
equally
in
obstacles was
to
before
Taft
would
self-government.
insurrection.
as
to
archipelago.
but
his
on Philippines
Imperialist
future
The
Papers.
United
Yet
was
would
development.”
who,
Pleading
to
centered
for
the year the
--
us
as
the
forces.
exploitation,”
American
soldiers
matter
a
affairs
the
they,
one,
of
to
President
in
of out
man
of
of
the
insisted
goals.
Confident
“developed
Roosevelt
ready
which
that
Pock-marked
was
return
scene
would.
the
Chaffee
after
kind Commission,
President
President
determination matters.
that
industrial
referred
15
and
of
and
first
American
the
he
views
Philippines
American
which
quite
the
to
Occupation
Relations
any
his
And
stamping
standard-issue
authority
new
Adna
it
on
the
the
claimed
the
Roosevelt:
Filipino!
not
the
after argued
months
Congress
of
of
straits,
and
of
Hereafter
The
to
criminal
where
open
among
Philippine
been
who
thoughts concomitant,
foreign
Krag/
the
fight
against is
different
American
16
one
all
were
a
General
the
reiterated
Three
the
had
Philippines.”
Theodore
government
song American
looked
to
and Chaffee The
“them
Army
places,
very
“Kmg”
damn
Second
they
of
governor
the
command
be
islands
with
a
dangerous
were
Major
mutually
all
civil
the
handle
105-106.
if
contentious
xxxii-xxxiu.
to
claimed.
Blout,
Burton,
war,
the 1901,
two
States.
“civilization”
the
already
of
take
civil
to
A
hold
throw
popular Relating
him a
the H.
H.
he
4,
of
and
Roosevelt damn,
two,
to
those
by
to
immediately,
A
to
would
These
even
to
1902),
78.
Taft
and
right
reference
war.
Morrison,
Papers
David
James
Army,
United
path
fight
had
those
17 18
1968),
15 16
superiors, The
October Office,
the
almost Chaffee
Taft
guided
arrived
meet”
member
“Damn,
Taft.
to
Civilize accompanied
promoted
representative
the
through
“guarantee
the the
in
stated, islands,”
the
Buffalo, power we 11
Principle involved is that when court is informed that prisoner held by military authority of United States Army for crime, court shall not discharge prisoner, nor shall he be taken into court, nor is thai by authority of military law reviewable on habeas corpus by court.19
The stage was set for the next act which would include as players an indignant President, a scheming general, and revelations concerning American war crimes. “I am deeply chagrined,” Roosevelt wrote Chaffee, “to use the mildest terms, over the trouble between yourself and Taft.” 20 friend to both men, the President was presented with a paradox which was eerily analogous to his own thinking. While he advocated expansion, it was to be mainly for the benefit of “savages;” while he believed that “we can ultimately help our brethren of the Philippine Islands,” 21 they must be taught “that we are the masters.” 22 Roosevelt’s confidence in Western expansion was predicated upon competing views of the objects of that expansion. It was easy enough to enunciate the value of expanding Christian virtue, white “civilization”, and American liberty, but what if your “barbarous neighbor” refuses the offer? The dispute between Chaffee and Taft forced Roosevelt to confront his own conflicting views concerning expansion. 23 While the President wrestled with the question of authority in the Philippines, other developments began to overtake him. Soon after Roosevelt assumed office, a flurry of dispatches went out to “all Station Commanders” in the islands. One in particular urged its readers to “wage war in the sharpest and most decisive manner possible.” 24 Another, lamented the fact that it was “an inevitable consequence of war” that the civilian population must suffer, but warned that it would “be impossible to wage war efficiently” while considering the welfare of noncombatants. With directives such as these floating around, it was only a matter of time before what had heretofore only been hinted at, became common knowledge. Although reports of alleged atrocities committed by American troops were nothing new, in fact many reports went back to the opening of hostilities, the allegations made in the closing months of 1901 were more than distasteful rumors. In the Philippines, Governor Taft had been alerted to the situation in a report from Major Cornelius Gardener of the Thirteenth U.S. Infantry. In Washington, the news reached the President through the efforts of Army chief Nelson Miles. On february 17, 1902 Miles submitted to Roosevelt “an unsigned draft...containing a number of sentences which in effect recited alleged cruelties and barbarities.” 26 Striking a note of irony, the
19 AGC,1296. 20 Thid.,1297. 21 Morrison,1343-1344.
22 Ferleger,427. 23 Thid.,246. 24 Storey,appendixA,Circular#6,December24, 1901. 25 Ibid.,Circular#3,December9, 1901. 26 Morrison,297.
12
in
of
“a
as
the
the
the
for
the
and
and
was
war
was
time
state
had
as
white
of
Elihu
press.
whom
brutal.
of
proved
natives
well “would
that
became
the
plan to
who
American
foolish,”
station
the
the
their
future
it
Roosevelt
as
United
the
days
was
those
in
villages the
answer
news
possibly
of
on
simply
clear
man
to
27
the
harassing
the behavior
dictatorship.”
fear
by
more
combination
in
a
first
grab,
Americans,
the
the
The
proposal
for
a
quite
with
singularly
and
regarding
and
among
as
civilian
much
remarking
combat
on
the
the 32
Wars.
and
the
himself
soldiers
104-108.
of
him
surfacing of
under
people
painfully
lynched
soldiers’
which
from
power
Referring
noted
organizational
hate
been
found
why?
to
love
famous
The
to
heavily
be
opinion our
hatred
his
Indian
power,
adopt
during
were
1900),
and
but
had
new
to
rigors
not
of
also
Spending
in
control
to
a
his
conduct.” the
--
America
come
blatant became
began.
atrocities
do
the
resulting
was
identifying Head, an
were
which
mischievous
him
shift
of
fact,
forces
gave as
this
their
pent-up
village,
war
government
request
he
drinking
islanders
crop.
soon
activities. than
opinion
during
In
from
should
to
it
which
but
the
by
and
the
Bloody
writer
natives
more
submitted
31
their
given
image
a
reports
area
Miles’
justify
your
came
more
for
The
bay African-Americans
conduct
after
Miles
Post
proposed
military
enemy
The
the to
Plains,
hatreds
transgressions
American
by
at
have
once
men
American
addition --
381
or
unfortunate
same
the
the
accepted.
me
general
recent
Miles,
“form
York:
at venting
In
the
refused
to the
mcial
reason
on
“Sir
the
to
in
one
for
restore
These 1902,
the
the
General
Evening
driven
28
would
of
the
noticing
were
(New
in
treacherous,”
American
In
to
of
war,
not
combat
and
boredom
it
good
American
degenerated
that
record
time
that
was
General
home.
if
York
the
strongly
29
islands:
“very
which
President cream
1899
crimes,
at
no
with
Martys
any
record
kept
effect
defend
proposition
of point
source
islands.”
with
bloody
impossible
indeed
do
the
the
New
a the
in
observer
war was
apparently
plan.
this
is
the
behavior
to
the in
brutality
later
reacted
be the
days
at
Filipino
on
interesting
dismal
wasted
Between
.it
was
troops
rather prevalent
the
to
who
to
a
was
their
countryside.
The
meeting
of
British
exactly
the
was Philippines
up
consequences
imagine
those
noting
a
officer,
here..
exaggerated
would
it
report
nothing
There
harm
Geronimo.
here racism.
lathers
“would
the
relations
not
the wrote
to
the
opening
us
enemy
president
American
that
built
dire
which
his
30
had
consideration,
that
cafes,
the
of had
that
an
Sheridan,
design” overt
Americans
chief,
the
after
plan
that
only
The
were
of
Philippine
lasting
with
into
with
the
and
President
American
not
Manila”
different
Miles
244-245.
244-245.
fact
long
admonished
the
“difficult
and
Since
necessitates
Apache
1899
reason.”
in
this
no
Brinsley
predicted
64.
zenith
the
Miles’
Manila’s
remarked
of
it
that “political
One
affairs. representing
stress Miles
the
in
Along
Roosevelt
The
all
committed
Not
the
rapidity
in
considering
were
that
to
good
see
Storey,
Morrison,297.
Morrison,
Morrison,
administration Ibid.
fairness
Richard
the
“niggers,”
serious
Filipino-American
32
31 33
30
28 troops
captured reached
hamlets 27 29
as
by
you
locals.
idling conveying,
Manila
Although crimes
combat
gentleman with
invaders.
of
Roosevelt clear obvious
Finding do Taking
the Root
military
claimed
crimes power. President 13
fighting, the Americans set fire to each hut and then shot the inhabitants as they fled. One report of the event described how the soldiers made the “women denude themselves,” and how when one woman “resisted being denuded...She was shot on the spot.” L.f. Adams, a soldier from Missouri, wrote home that
In the path of the Washington Regiment and Battery D of the Sixth Artillery there were 1,008 dead niggers, and a great many wounded. We burned all their houses. I don’t know how many men, women, and children the Tennessee boys did kill. They would not take any prisoners.35
Another soldier, Sergeant Howard Mcfarland of Co. D, 43 Infantry, reported that his solution to the Philippine question would be to “blow every nigger into nigger heaven. ..When we find one that is not dead, we have bayonets.” 36 As reports such as these filtered back home, Congress set itself to investigating not only the overall conduct of the war, but also the allegations of atrocities. On January 13, 1902, Senator George Hoar of Massachusetts, introduced a resolution which would create a Senate committee to “examine and report into the conduct of the war in the Philippine Islands.” The testimony given to this committee by former American servicemen was disturbing. It told a story of cruelty and inhumanity which shocked many who heard it. 38 In Washington, Roosevelt initiated his own investigation in the hopes of possibly insulating the army. When this became impossible, he attempted to justify the unjustifiable. He promised a crowd gathered in Arlington, Virginia, that he would make every effort “to find out every instance of barbarity on the pan of our troops.” Furthermore, he intended “to punish those guilty of [crimes] and take, if possible even stronger measures.. .to prevent the occurrence of all such instances in the future.” Privately, he stressed that while there had “been some blots on the record” of the army, his troops had been “exceedingly merciful.” He claimed that the soldiers fought under conditions which “were most exasperating.” Elucidating this point, Roosevelt stressed that the “enemy were very treacherous.” 40 He added,
it was well-nigh impossible to find out who among the pretended friends really had committed outrages; and in order to find out, not a few of the officers, especially those of the native scouts, and not a few of the enlisted men, began to use the old Filipino method of mild torture, the water cure. Nobody was seriously damaged, whereas the Filipinos had inflicted
States. Sheridan,172-173. Storey, 10. 36 Ibid. united StatesCongress.Senate.CongressionalRecord(13 January 1902),649. 38 Fortranscriptsof thetestimonyseeHenryGraff,ed.,AmericanImperialism and the Philippine Insurrection (Boston:Little,BrownandCompany,1969),64-79. Storey,4. 40 ForexampleseeNewYorkTimes,26September1901,p.6. 14
incredible tortures upon our own people.4’
The “water cure” of which Roosevelt spoke of as “mild,” was a process in which water was forced into the stomach of a captive until the pain of distension extracted the desired information. Throughout this period, Roosevelt defended the actions of the army, choosing to see only those aspects of the war effort which fit his preconceived notions concerning white, Christian Americans. Fortunately, for the President, the revelations of atrocities coincided with the rapid collapse of the insurgent forces. One by one, gueriulaleaders were either captured or turned themselves in. In increasing numbers, insurgent bands, once so potent a force, laid down their arms. By July, 1902, so few guerilla units remained active that Roosevelt felt secure in proclaiming an end to the war. He confidently declared that “the insurrection against the authority and sovereignty of the United States is at an end and peace has been established.” 42 In his opinion, the Philippines were now ready to be molded in the American image. With the political questions regarding the American involvement still open, Roosevelt thanked the soldiers whose conduct had tarnished the once glittering facade of American expansionism. In a message to “the Army of the United States,” Secretary of War Root, conveyed the President’s gratitude:
The President thanks the officers and enlisted men of the Army in the Philippines, both regulars and volunteers, for the courage and fortitude, the indomitable spirit and loyal devotion with which they have put down and ended the great insurrection which has raged throughout the archipelago against the lawful sovereignty of the United States... [the ArmyJ has added honor to the flag which it defended, and has justified increased confidence in the future of the American people, whose soldiers do not shrink from labor or death, yet love liberty and peace.43
Theodore Roosevelt’s beliefs shaped profoundly his conduct of the war from September 1901 to July 1902. He brought to the Office of President and the position of Commander-in-Chief a deep and abiding confidence in the virtue of the American people and the superiority of white, Western culture. The war for Roosevelt, had been a crusade to save the Filipinos from themselves, from the catastrophe of a non-American future. The war was over; the examination of what is meant and how America fought it, of which this essay is but one small part, had just begun.
41 Morrison,297. 42 NewYorkTimes,4 July 1902,p.1. 43 AGC,1352. AlthoughRooseveltdeclaredthePhilippinewartobeat anendinJuly1902,combatin thearchipelagowould continueuntil 1905as theUnitedStatesArmyfoughttheMoros.