Signature Redacted D Epartment of Political Science Signature Redacted 11 May 1993 Certified by George W
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
i~ ) RECONSTRUCTING ROCKETS: The Politics of Developing Military Technology in Brazil, India, and Israel by Steven M. Flank B.A. Physics Cornell University, 1987 S.M. Nuclear Engineering MIT, 1991 Submitted to the Department of Political Science in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology June 1993 a Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1993 All rights reserved Signature of Author Signature redacted D epartment of Political Science Signature redacted 11 May 1993 Certified by George W. Rathjens Professor of Political Science Thesis Supervisor Accepted by_ Signature redaci Donald L.M. Blackmer Chairman, Graduate Program Committee ARCHIVES MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF T;:r'JMOI( O(ry 'JUL 2 0 1993 uBRARIES 77 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02139 MITLibraries http://libraries.mit.edu/ask DISCLAIMER NOTICE Due to the condition of the original material, there are unavoidable flaws in this reproduction. We have made every effort possible to provide you with the best copy available. Thank you. The images contained in this document are of the best quality available. RECONSTRUCTING ROCKETS: THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPING MILITARY TECHNOLOGY IN BRAZIL, INDIA, AND ISRAEL by Steven M. Flank Submitted to the Department of Political Science on 11 May 1993 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science ABSTRACT This thesis is a study of why and how some countries develop the technologies to produce ballistic missiles, I tell that story for three countries--Brazil, India, and Israel. In each case, I follow whatever strands seem impor- tant to the story, from fiberglass motor cases and solid propellant binders to organizational rivalries and the broadest philosophical debates of a society. They: With the end of the Cold War, missile proliferation has achieved greater prominence as a worldwide security problem. Current understandings of proliferation and the development of military technologies in general emphasize security-based or external motivations, giving insufficient attention to the political nature of these technologies. My three case studies raise questions about whether externa factors can be a plausible explana- tion for even the basic existence of missile programs, much less their actual shape. The thesis instead develops and applies a strong methodology for probing the internal motivations for the evolution of indigenous missile technology, based on the history and sociology of technology. This established body of theory and practice, also known as the social construction of technology, elevates tech- nology to the same status as bureaucracies, nationalism, or security threats as a subject worthy of detailed scru- tiny. The theory recognizes that the diverse communities and interests needed to make missiles a reality will never monolithically decide to construct ballistic missiles, with the technical processes then obediently following in the wake of the political decision. Instead, starting small and building on existing resources, a "large tech- nological system" is painstakingly constructed, and if successful, recruits both "social" and "technical" allies along the way. The traces of this process can be revealed by examining technical artifacts as "congealed culture," as embodying the social and political context of their original construction. Cases: Brazil: The Brazil chapter argues that a traditional security analysis, looking at threats, rivals, security dilemmas, and military capability, is insufficient to explain this case. As one of the main figures in the research effort, an Air Force colonel, said, "After all, whom will we attack?" A realist perspective has difficulty account- ing for even the existence of Brazil's Sonda rockets or VLS satellite launch vehicle, much less their specific his- tory or characteristics. My analysis instead examines how the detailed construction of Brazilian missiles reflects the empire-building tactics of important engineers, the competition between the leading missile and space research organizations, the prevailing ideas about military technology's role in development, and the place of the military in the Brazilian polity. I conclude that the Brazilian space and missile programs are a result of a temporary con- vergence of a diverse set of personal, organizational, and ideological interests, a convergence that ia now mostly in the past. India: While there may be little technical difference between the Indian missile and space programs, they are politically quite distinct. The space program is supported by a stable, national consensus based on broad themes that are found throughout Indian politics, such as nation-building, self-reliance or technological autonomy, and international position. The missile program is a less stable and historically contingent alliance of particular interests, such as concerns about brain drain, a small cadre of missile engineers, India's nuclear -20 "option strategy", and Army-Air Force rivalry. The analysis again examines the detailed construction of the artifacts of the missile programs, especially the intermediate range Agni and short range Privhvi missiles. The Agni missile, although it did travel a thousand kilometers in its first test, is not a ballistic missile in the usual sense. So far, it has been just two specimens of a hybrid, RV technology test bed, a weak political alliance that is only as strong as the interstage holding together rockets from the space and Prithvi programs. The Prithvi missile, which is far more likely to become a deployed, mass-produced system, has had its political essence defined by its relationships to the Army, to long-range artillery, and by necessity, to conventional, non- nuclear warheads. Each of these conclusions demonstrates that the Indian space and missile programs are far less problematic (from the perspective of risks of war or of U.S. policy) than commonly assumed. Many tradi- tional political analyses, because they ignore so much of the politics of developing military technologies, are not able to reach these same conclusions. Israel: From the late 1950s through the mid-1970s, four forces in the Israeli political system promote the devel- opment of new weapons systems and new military technology: self-reliance, inter-industry rivalry, faith in tech- nology, and secrecy. The primary inhibiting forces are economic limitations, the availability of alternatives to indigenous development, and again secrecy. These forces are structural, in the sense that their power spans more than the single issue of security, and in the sense that they are not likely to change quickly as a result of events only in the security arena. The characteristics of Israeli missiles are determined largely by a synthesis of these conflicting forces, rather than any specific military requirements. The resulting patterns include virtual autonomy, export dependence, and bottom-up technological development. Each is functionally adapted to meeting simultaneously the demands of both the promoting and constraining forces. Even strategic systems such as Jericho missiles or the Shavit satelite launch vehicle fit consistently into these broader patterns of indigenous technology development in Israel. A security-centered analysis, on the other hand, would not be able to explain much beyond the basic fact that Israel will have missiles--not how many, what kind, or whether or not they will be indigenous. Since the mid-1970s, some of the structural factors enforcing the dialectical pattern in Israel have changed. For example, each test, each use of indigenous technology in combat, increases the acceptance, desirability, and ease of recruiting for new indigenous technologies. The process feeds on itself. Since the mid-1970s, it has become progressively harder to challenge the idea that Israel can and should develop its own weapons systems. None- theless, even now the internal contradictions highlighted by this analysis continue to plague Israeli military industry. Conclusions: Beyond the specific conclusions of these three case narratives, this thesis evaluates the utility of the history and sociology of technology in understanding the development of military technologies. I conclude that the meth- odology is capable of generating conclusions different from those of other, more traditional, methodologies; that those conclusions are "interesting," in an academic or aesthetic sense; and that they are useful, in a policy sense. In a mort tentative way, this thesis also points to patterns in the seamless web of large military technological systems, including ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. These patterns may inform important aspects of intern.tional relations theory, such as the relatively minor role of traditional security motivations in all three of thK case studies. Others can offer lessons for development theory, such as the significant role of the Westernized norms of indigenous engineering and scientific communities. Finally, these analyses could improve policy formulation, for example by highlighting the role of scientific and engineering communities or the close relationships between security and development policies in these countries. Thesis Supervisor: George W. Rathjens Professor of Political Science -3- TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract...............................................................................................................................2 Tables of Contents...........................................................................4