A Peace That Never Had a Chance: American and Allied Diplomacy Towards the Russian Provisional Government, March-November 1917
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A Peace that Never Had A Chance: American and Allied Diplomacy towards the Russian Provisional Government, March-November 1917 by Ceilidhe Wynn A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario ©2011 Ceilidhe Wynn Library and Archives Bibliotheque et 1*1 Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington OttawaONK1A0N4 OttawaONK1A0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-83102-1 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-83102-1 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library and permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le loan, distribute and sell theses monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur worldwide, for commercial or non support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou commercial purposes, in microform, autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in this et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. Ni thesis. Neither the thesis nor la these ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci substantial extracts from it may be ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement printed or otherwise reproduced reproduits sans son autorisation. without the author's permission. In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne sur la Privacy Act some supporting forms protection de la vie privee, quelques may have been removed from this formulaires secondaires ont ete enleves de thesis. cette these. While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans in the document page count, their la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu removal does not represent any loss manquant. of content from the thesis. 1*1 Canada Abstract In March 1917, the Russian Revolution caused the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II. A Provisional Government, composed of moderate Duma members, replaced the imperial government. Nine months later, the Bolshevik party seized power, overthrew the Provisional Government, and removed Russia from the war. This "second revolution" of 1917 has been the concern of many past and present historians while the interim period of the Provisional Government has received considerably less attention. This study deals with a critical aspect of the interim period. The Provisional Government created a peace program, which came to be based on the principles of no annexations, no indemnities, and the right to self-determination, with the hopes its partners in the war, especially the United States, would accept this program and bring an end to the war. This monograph analyzes the extent to which American and Allied decision makers constituted an obstacle to the Russian Provisional Government's peace program. u Acknowledgements First and foremost, I would like to thank Irene Sanna, Regina Aulinskas, and Joan White for ensuring everyday that the History Department not only runs but runs efficiently. Your attention to detail has helped me on many occasions and Joan, your candy has always gotten me through some longs days. Dr. Dominique Marshall's care and guidance has helped not just me but all of those in my cohort. Dr. Marshall's love for learning and history is inspiring and when times got rough it was this inspiration that kept me going. Secondly, my thesis supervisor Dr. E. Peter Fitzgerald is the person who should receive the most thanks for this thesis. I would like to thank Professor Fitzgerald for his attention to detail, for his unwillingness to accept anything less than the very best, for his patience, and for his guidance. My sanity, and therefore the completion of this thesis would not have been possible without my office mates in Office 437. Promise to continue the Wall of Fame and to always uphold the very high standards of discussion in Office 437. My parents have been my most wonderful supporters and I would like to say thank you to them for always listening and for telling me to never give up. I hope I have made you proud and I hope that you know how lucky I am to have you for parents. Thank you Mom and Stevie. Finally, I would like to say thank you to Michael. I lack the words to describe my gratitude to you for being my number one supporter, advocate, fan, and friend. Thank you for always believing in me even when I didn't believe in myself. I am so excited to start this next chapter of our lives together and to be your wife. iii Table of Contents Abstract ii Acknowledgements iii Table of Contents iv List of Abbreviations vi List of Appendices vii Introduction 1 The March Revolution 1 Major Research Questions 3 Historiography 6 Primary Source Material 22 Chapter 1: Russia in Allied and American Diplomacy before 1917 26 Russia within Allied Strategy and Diplomacy before 1917 26 Allied Perceptions of Russia before 1917 34 American Diplomacy towards Russia before American Intervention 39 Chapter 2: The Stockholm Conference Proposal and the Allied Response 51 Previous Attempts to Convene an International Socialist Conference 51 The Zimmerwald Movement 56 Stockholm: A Conference with Many Origins 60 Allied Reaction to the Call for an International Socialist Conference and the Allied Missions to Russia 64 Chapter 3: The United States and the Stockholm Conference 72 American Reaction to the Call for an International Socialist Conference 72 Why Did Wilson Reject the Idea of the Stockholm Conference So Quickly? 79 Chapter 4: The Miliukov Affair and the War Aims Question 90 The Miliukov Affair 90 British and French Reaction to the Provisional Government's Proposal to Revise War Aims 102 American Reaction to the Provisional Government's Proposal to Revise War Aims 106 Chapter 5: The American Mission to Russia and the Shift in American Views on Russia 110 The Root Mission 112 The Shift in American Views on Russia 125 Domestic Pressure Groups 134 Chapter 6: The United States and War Aims Revision 142 Allied Reaction to War Aims Revision 144 President Wilson's Inaction on the Question of War Aims Revision and Possible Explanations 153 iv Conclusion 161 Bibliography 167 Appendix 1 173 v List of Abbreviations AFL - American Federation of Labour AUAM - American Union Against Militarism CPI - Committee for Public Information FRB - Federal Reserve Board FRS - Federal Reserve System FRUS - Foreign Relations of the United States ISB - International Socialist Bureau ISC - International Socialist Committee MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology NEC - National Executive Committee (of the British Labour Party) NS - New Style OS - Old Style SFIO — Section francaise de I'internationale SPD - Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands UDC - Union of Democratic Control YMCA - Young Men's Christian Association VI List of Appendices Appendix 1: Trade Statistics for the United States and Imperial Russia Introduction The March Revolution The two belligerent camps of the First World War were defined by their military alliances and in part by their internal political systems. Generally speaking, the Central Powers were autocratic governments with a weak parliamentary component, while the Allied Powers were democratic governments with strong parliamentary institutions. The exception on the Allied side was Russia, an autocracy ruled by a tsar holding autocratic power, at least up to the constitutional experiment that followed the revolution of 1905 - an experiment the Imperial Government never sincerely accepted. Since the outbreak of war in 1914, Russia had been a thorn in the side of Allied propaganda, which aimed to represent the Entente as a group of democratic nations fighting to protect Europe from the autocratic rule of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires. In March 1917 all of this changed, when revolution in Russia brought about the downfall of the 300 year-old Romanov dynasty.1 A Provisional Government, composed of moderate Duma members, replaced Tsar Nicholas II and his ministers. These men took up the task of guiding the "New Russia" to both a transition to democracy and a successful conclusion of the war.2 The Allies first perceived the March Revolution as a very welcome change. The Provisional Government was seen as a new democratic ally on the Eastern front and Paris and London believed the Provisional Government would revive Russia's war effort. The 1 Until the November Revolution, Russia still used the Julian or Old Style calendar, effectively putting the country 13 days behind the rest of the world which used the Gregorian or New Style calendar For the purposes of this work I will be using only New Style dates, unless I am discussing an event or document in or from Russia, in which case I will use both New and Old Style (NS/OS), or if I directly quote a source that uses Old Style dates; in such an instance, I will note the use of the Old Style with (OS) 2 The State Duma, created by the Fundamental Laws of 1906, was roughly equivalent to a lower house of parliament 1 transition in Russia from autocracy to democracy injected a new spirit into the Allied propaganda effort as well. The Allies were now able to argue with greater plausibility that they represented a crusade of democracy against the absolutism and autocracy of Germany and the Central Powers. The New Russia soon welcomed a new associate in the Allied coalition: the United States.