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TRANSNATIONAL TRAFFICKING and the RULE of LAW in WEST AFRICA: a Threat Assessment

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TRANSNATIONAL TRAFFICKING and the RULE of LAW in WEST AFRICA: a Threat Assessment TRANSNATIONAL TRAFFICKING AND THE RULE OF LAW IN WEST AFRICA: A Threat Assessment July 2009 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME Vienna Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment Copyright © 2009, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) This publication may be reproduced in whole or in part and in any form for educational or non-profit purposes without special permission from the copyright holder, provided acknowledgement of the source is made. UNODC would appreciate receiving a copy of any publication that uses this publication as a source. No use of this publication may be made for resale or any other commercial purpose without prior permission in writing from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Applications for such permission, with a statement of purpose and intent of the reproduction, should be addressed to: Policy Analysis and Research Branch United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime PO Box 500 1400 Vienna Austria DISCLAIMERS This report has not been formally edited. The opinions, figures and estimates set forth in this paper are the responsibility of the authors, and should not necessarily be considered as reflecting the views or carrying the endorsement of UNODC or the Secretariat of the United Nations. The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNODC or the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Cover pictures © Shunya (www.shunya.net) and Wlablack | Dreamstime.com Website: www.unodc.org Nouakchott The boundaries and names shown and the designations MAURITANIA used on this map do not imply official endorsement or Rosso Seneg Tombouctou acceptance by the United Nations. al 'Ayoûn Néma Kaéd i el 'Atroûs Gao Sai n t - Lo u i s NIGER Thiès Tahoua CHAD Diourbel Dakar Kaol ack SENEGAL Kayes MALI Zinder Diffa Gambia Tambacounda Niamey GAMBIA Maradi Lake r ige Dosso Banj ul N Ch ad Ziguinchor Bamako BURKINA FASO Niger Ouagadougou Bi rni n Keb b i Kano Maiduguri Bissau GUINEA- Pot i sku m BISSAU Dabola Sikasso Boke Bobo-Dioulasso GU INEA Kad una BENIN Gom b e Ki nd i a Kankan ue Djougou NIGERIA en A Conakry B Volta Abuja T Korhogo Tamale So k o d e Parakou L SIERRA Freetown LEON E O Ogbomosho A Bo CÔTE D'IVOIRE Lake Sav al o u Ngaoundéré N Bouaké Volta G Oshogbo Lac d e O T Bonthe Kossou GHANA T Ibadan Kumasi En u g u I Lagos Benin City LIBERIA Yamoussoukro B a C n Monrovia d Kof ori d ua Porto-Novo a Agboville m Lomé Buchanan Gagnoa a CAMEROON Accra Bight of Benin Port Cal ab ar O Harcout Abidjan C Sassandra C Takoradi a Douala Yaoundé E pe Cap e Pal m as Th A ree Points Malabo N E Q Gulf of Guin e a U Bight of A 0 100200300 400 500 km T O Cam p o Biafra R IA 0 100 200 300 mi SAO TOME L GU CONGO AND PRINCIPE INEA GABON For the purposes of this report, “West Africa” refers to Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Contents Preface 1 Executive summary 2 Transnational trafficking and the rule of law 9 The flows 11 Cocaine from South America to Europe 13 Oil from Nigeria to the world 19 Cigarettes from the world to Africa 27 Counterfeit medicines from Asia to West Africa 33 Victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation from West Africa to Europe 41 Small arms and ammunition from the world to West Africa 49 Toxic waste from industrialized countries to Nigeria and Ghana 55 Workers from West Africa to Europe 61 The threat to the rule of law 67 Comparing the flows 75 Valuation 75 Human rights 76 Assessing trends and interventions 77 Towards prioritization 77 Conclusion 81 Legislative annex: Parties to United Nations drugs and crime conventions 83 References 85 Acknowledgements 94 Preface West Africa suffers from a combination of factors that make bility by curbing their appetite for the drugs, cheap labour it vulnerable to organized crime. It is one of the poorest and exotic goods that are being smuggled via the region, and regions on earth. In many countries governance is weak. The by stopping the use of West Africa as a dumping ground for region is located along illicit trafficking routes. And criminal weapons, waste, and fake medicines. Private companies that groups can recruit foot soldiers from a large pool of desperate are complicit in this illegal business should be named, shamed, youth. and banned, and codes of conduct more rigorously enforced. Criminals are exploiting these conditions to traffic a range of Second, illicit transnational flows may change over time, products through the region: drugs (mostly cocaine from including in response to successful policy interventions. Signs South America to Europe); cigarettes; weapons and ammuni- of a recent decline in cocaine trafficking through West Africa tion; people (destined for illegal migration or the sex trade); provide a welcome example. However, unless the underlying counterfeit medicines; toxic waste (including e-waste); oil; issues are addressed, the problem will be displaced somewhere and natural resources (like hardwood and diamonds). In some else, or simply replaced by another illicit activity. Therefore, cases, the value of trafficking flows dwarfs local economies. governments must strengthen the rule of law in their coun- This trade is putting a fragile region at greater risk – under- tries to develop social antibodies against organized crime and mining the rule of law; deepening corruption; polluting the to eventually break the cycle of crime and underdevelopment. environment; violating human rights; stealing natural Because of the transnational nature of the threats, national resources; depleting human resources; and jeopardizing health. governments should draw on the support of donors, regional This makes West Africa more prone to political instability and arrangements, and international instruments like the UN less able to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Conventions against Corruption and Transnational Organ- While this Report takes a regional approach, its assessment ized Crime. should be put into a global context. Most illicit activity occur- West Africa is under attack, from within and especially from ring in West Africa is caused by external market forces. abroad. It is time for the world – and the governments con- That being said, there are many beneficiaries in the region. cerned – to respond to the threat before more of the common Collusion between corrupt elites and opportunistic criminals wealth is stolen, more lives are lost, and before criminality enriches the few, impoverishes the many, and undermines deepens its penetration of state institutions and society at public institutions. States are being hollowed out from the large. inside. Democracy and development falter, while crime and corruption flourish. A two-pronged approach is needed. First, based on the evidence in this Report, the international community should be better prepared and equipped to iden- Antonio Maria Costa tify threats, and take the remedial action needed to tackle Executive Director them. Rich countries should take their share of the responsi- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 1 Executive summary West Africa* is arguably the poorest and least stable area on traffickers were using West Africa as a way station, and were earth. It is also afflicted by a number of transnational traf- paying for the privilege in cocaine. These payments were ficking flows, attracted by and aggravating the special vul- then trafficked north to a large network of West African nerability of this region. This report examines these flows (particularly Nigerian) retailers already active in Europe. in a similar way, looking at the potential impact on the rule The potential impact of this flow, valued at the time at of law, with an eye to facilitating comparison and prioritiza- almost two billion US dollars per annum (wholesale), was tion. The flows examined are: clear: the traffickers had more resources at their command s Cocaine from South America to Europe than many of the law enforcement agencies in the region, s Oil from Nigeria to the world and the leverage corrupt officials at the highest levels of government. To some extent, this threat was realized. For s Cigarettes from Europe and Asia example, after his father’s death in December 2008, the son to West and North Africa of the president of Guinea confessed his involvement in s Counterfeit medicines from Asia to West Africa drug trafficking, having made use of his role as head of the s Victims of trafficking for sexual exploita- presidential guard and having been facilitated by his access tion from West Africa to Europe to diplomatic passports and pouches. s Small arms to West Africa Since 2008, this flow appears to have been in decline, a reduction attributable at least in part to the increased inter- s Toxic waste from Europe to Nigeria and Ghana national attention to the area. Despite progress, it appears s Workers from West Africa to Europe that at least one billion dollars’ worth of cocaine continues Cocaine to be trafficked through the region, and the West African distribution network in Europe remains intact. Should The large-scale use of West Africa as a transit route to international attention waver, this region retains all of the Europe is a relatively new phenomenon, precipitated by the attractions that drew traffickers here in the first place. shift in trafficking flows away from a declining North American market and toward a growing European market.
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