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General Assembly Security Council Sixty-Ninth Session Seventieth Year Agenda Item 32 Prevention of Armed Conflict

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General Assembly Security Council Sixty-Ninth Session Seventieth Year Agenda Item 32 Prevention of Armed Conflict United Nations A/69/875–S/2015/259 General Assembly Distr.: General 21 April 2015 Security Council Original: English General Assembly Security Council Sixty-ninth session Seventieth year Agenda item 32 Prevention of armed conflict Letter dated 16 April 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General Upon the instructions of my Government, I convey the grave concern of Armenia with regard to the ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of Azerbaijan on the line of contact between Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan and across the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, recorded for the month of March 2015 (see annex). On 19 March, a military infiltration of the Azerbaijani armed forces along the line of contact in the Martakert region of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic resulted in four deaths and seven wounded soldiers of the Nagorno Karabakh Defence Army. Azerbaijan hides its military losses. Special arrangements put into effect by presidential decree in Azerbaijan have severely restricted the access by journalists and representatives of civil society to their borderline regions since September 2014. The deterioration of the situation as a result of the military provocations of Azerbaijan during the month of March resulted in the death of soldiers Arsen Karapetyan, Arshak Harutyunyan, Hakob Khachatryan, Eduard Hayrapetyan, Samvel Hakobyan and Hovsep Andreasyan, while soldiers Narek Mkrtchyan, Gurgen Mkrtchyan, Taron Khudabakhshyan, Artavazd Karapetyan, Sargis Gabrielyan, Gor Darmanyan, Jirayr Nalbandyan, Jora Grigoryan, Onik Miqayelyan, Edgar Martirosyan, Rafayel Nazarjan and Gevork Manvelyan were wounded. The use of heavy weaponry in violation of the ceasefire indicates the intention of Azerbaijan to further escalate the situation. For the first time since the establishment of the ceasefire, 120 mm artillery weapons were used. Such deliberate and consistent aggressive actions by Azerbaijan are aimed at undermining the ceasefire regime established by the trilateral ceasefire agreements in May 1994 and February 1995 by shifting the military balance in the region. Azerbaijan blatantly pursues a military solution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. On 23 March, the Minister of Defence of Azerbaijan, Zakir Hasanov, declared: “The time has now come. We will liberate our lands in a short time. … We will destroy 70 per cent of the enemy with the first strike. … We have so many weapons and [military] equipment that, after our strike, the Armenians will not 15-06232 (E) 150515 *1506232* A/69/875 S/2015/259 recover even after hundreds of years.” While the world marks the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Azerbaijani minister continues to send a message of hatred and xenophobia, such as: “Each of our soldiers must day and night use every opportunity to destroy the enemy”. Calls by Azerbaijan to return to a military phase of the conflict are further attempts to suppress by the use of force the right of people of Nagorno Karabakh to self-determination. Armenia resolutely condemns the aggressive policy, rhetoric and actions of the Azerbaijani leadership, which lead to the loss of human lives. Azerbaijan bears full responsibility for the military escalation of the conflict and its consequences. Armenia reiterates its firm position that consolidating the ceasefire by implementing confidence-building measures is crucial to advance the peaceful settlement of the conflict. Our proposal to investigate ceasefire violations in order to identify the party responsible for concrete incidents still stands alongside with other proposals on confidence and security-building measures. I kindly request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 32, and of the Security Council. (Signed) Zohrab Mnatsakanyan Ambassador Permanent Representative 2/22 15-06232 A/69/875 S/2015/259 Annex to the letter dated 16 April 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of Azerbaijan, 1-31 March 2015 1. On the line of contact between Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan (based on information exchange between the Ministries of Defence of Armenia and of Nagorno Karabakh): Total number of violations: ~ 1,523 Total number of shots: ~ 76,596 AK (AKM) ~ 41,134, PK ~ 27,439, SVD ~ 2,362, DSHK ~ 2,636, RPK ~ 669, Black arrow ~ 77, Istiglal ~ 1,380, Utyos (NSVP, NSVT) ~ 167, RPG-7 ~ 48, RPG-18 ~ 25, RPD-5 ~ 10, ZSU-23 ~ 50, AGS-17 ~ 188, SPG-9 ~ 6, M-57 ~ 7, Vintarez ~ 6, 60 mm/82 mm mortar ~ 375, 120 mm mortar ~ 16, GP-25 ~ 1 2. On the state border with Armenia (see also table below): Total number of violations: ~ 525 Total number of shots: ~ 9,593 AK (AKM) ~ 2,736, PK ~ 4,703, SVD ~ 368, DSHK ~ 1,148, RPK ~ 152, Black arrow ~ 448, Istiglal ~ 33, RPG-7 ~ 3, Utyos (NSVP/NSVT) ~ 2 No. Date Direction Time Type of weapon Ammunition Results of violations 1. 1 March Koti 0110 AK 3 At 1355, near the village Abdurakhmanli, on the line of 2. Vazashen 0120 AK 11 contact, soldier Narek Mkrtchyan 3. DShK 5 received a shrapnel wound from the Azerbaijani side. 4. Paravaqar 0130 PK 40 5. DShK 50 6. 0144 PK 30 7. 0154 Istiglal 6 8. AK 60 9. 2045 AK 57 Abbreviations: AK (AKM), Kalashnikov rifle (7.62 mm/5.45); PK, Kalashnikov machine gun (7.62 mm); PKT, Kalashnikov tank machine gun; SVD, 7.62 mm sniper rifle; DShK, 12.7 mm machine gun; RPK, 5.45 mm machine gun; Black arrow, 12.7 mm sniper weapon; Istiglal, 14.5 mm sniper weapon; Utyos (NSVP, NSVT), 12.7 mm machine gun; RPG-7, antitank grenade launcher; RPG-18, antitank grenade launcher; RPD-5, 7.62 mm machine gun; AGS-17, 30 mm automatic grenade launcher; GP-25, Kalashnikov rifle grenade launcher; ZSU-23, 23 mm anti- aircraft weapon; KPVT, 14.5 mm heavy machine gun; SPG-9, antitank grenade launcher; PM-37, 82 grenade launcher; and M-57, hand grenade. 15-06232 3/22 A/69/875 S/2015/259 No. Date Direction Time Type of weapon Ammunition Results of violations 10. PK 10 11. Istiglal 2 12. 2120 AK 20 13. Aygepar 0400 PK 2 14. 1445 SVD 1 15. Chinari 1710 Black arrow 3 16. Mehrab 2140 DShK 30 17. Dovegh 1905 Utyos 2 18. Koti 2020 PK 20 19. Barcruni 2145 AK 6 20. Khndzorut 2212 7 21. Sevakavan 1745 6 22. 2 March Chinari 1100 Black arrow 1 At 0250, near the village Yusifjanli on the line of contact, in the 23. 1120 SVD 1 combat position, soldier Arsen 24. Paravaqar 1310 AK 4 Karapetyan was fatally wounded from the Azerbaijani side. 25. 1415 DShK 3 26. AK 3 27. 1450 DShK 4 28. 1550 10 29. 1600 6 30. Movses 1700 AK 7 31. Mehrab 1700- Black arrow 20 1830 32. PK 30 33. DShK 55 34. SVD 20 35. 2030 PK 20 36. N. Karmiraghbyur 1720 PK 4 37. Vahan 2210 DShK 25 4/22 15-06232 A/69/875 S/2015/259 No. Date Direction Time Type of weapon Ammunition Results of violations 38. PK 45 39. Eraskh 2240 AK 30 40. 3 March Aygepar 0855 SVD 1 41. 1120 2 42. 1130 1 43. 1250 AKM 4 44. Eraskh 1920 AKM 6 45. Dovegh 2030 Black arrow 1 46. Aygedzor 2040 PK 60 47. Sarigyugh 2050 AKM 20 48. PK 20 49. Eraskh 2100 AK 3 50. Voskepar 2210 AKM 3 51. Movses 2220 4 52. Mehrab 2230 DShK 6 53. Vazashen 2250 AKM 5 54. Voskevan 2300 SVD 1 55. 4 March Vahan 0005 DShK 40 56. PK 100 57. 0010 DShK 20 58. PK 80 59. Paravaqar 0010 PK 20 60. Eraskh 0045 AKM 40 61. 0125 AK 5 62. 0220 5 63. Movses 0410 AKM 4 64. 1405 SVD 2 65. Vazashen 1100 AKM 9 66. Aygepar 1145 AK 1 15-06232 5/22 A/69/875 S/2015/259 No. Date Direction Time Type of weapon Ammunition Results of violations 67. Mehrab 1300 DShK 25 68. 2040 PK 30 69. 2045 10 70. Aygepar 2045 AK 25 71. 5 March Aygedzor 1000 AK 300 72. PK 300 73. Dovegh 1350 Black arrow 5 74. Aygepar 1420 SVD 1 75. 1705 Black arrow 1 76. 1740 SVD 1 77. Agarak 1700 PK 7 78. Movses 1705 NSVP 9 79. Mehrab 2220 SVD 20 80. 6 March Berdavan 1100 PK 45 81. SVD 15 82. Paravaqar 1140 DShK 5 83. PK 20 84. AKM 20 85. Vazashen 1615 PK 9 86. DShK 17 87. 1650 DShK 5 88. 1900 6 89. 1900 DShK 7 90. PK 6 91. Mehrab 1715 SVD 10 92. AKM 20 93. 1810 SVD 6 94. Black arrow 4 95. 1810 Black arrow 2 6/22 15-06232 A/69/875 S/2015/259 No. Date Direction Time Type of weapon Ammunition Results of violations 96. Kayanavan 2220 AKM 1 97. 7 March Aygepar 1225 AKM 2 98. 2200 AK 3 99. Dovegh 1320 AK 10 100. Black arrow 3 101. Aygedzor 1600 PK 80 102. Black arrow 12 103. Berqaber 1950 AK 5 104. 2120 6 105. Azatamut 1950 15 106. 8 March Chinari 1300 PK 5 107. Kayanavan 1455 SVD 4 108. Paravaqar 1545 PK 13 109. N. Karmiraghbyur 1829 AK 6 110. Eraskh 2045 3 111. Jil 2125- PK 50 2145 112. AK 30 113. 9 March N. Karmiraghbyur 0210 SVD 1 114. Paravaqar 0210 DShK 4 115. Chinari 1300 SVD 2 116. Aygedzor 1400 RPK 20 117. 1720 AK 80 118. 1728 PK 150 119. Berqaber 1710 AK 3 120. Kayanavan 1720 SVD 3 121. Movses 2205 AKM 4 122.
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