Indian China Policy in the Prelude to War
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Indian China Policy in the Prelude to War — Historical Perspectives on the Forward Policy Decision Johan Skog Jensen Master's Thesis in History University of Oslo Spring 2011 Contents Acknowledgements ii List of Abbreviations iii List of Maps iv Introduction 1 Historiographical Perspectives 7 I: In the Shadow of Empires: The Historical Landscape 17 (i) Nehruvian China policy – visions of greatness 17 (ii) Tabula rasa? The Great Game revisited 33 (iii) Asian light, Himalayan shadows 51 II: The Rise of the Border Dispute 53 (i) External pressure 53 (ii) Internal pressure 60 (iii) The diplomatic response 65 (iv) Indian perceptions and positions harden 72 III: The Forward Policy Decision 78 (i) Policy precedents 79 (ii) Contextual factors 86 (iii) The Prime Minister's decision 99 (iv) A game of chess and a battle of wits 109 Conclusion 114 Bibliography 121 i Acknowledgements Asia is "rising" in Norway, too. Thanks to a growing academic infrastructure, it has been an enjoyable experience to study Indian diplomatic history in Oslo. The Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS) not only granted a generous two year scholarship, but also provided a stimulating setting for the work. I would especially like to thank Geir Heierstad, Tor Jørgen Melien and Saira Basit for their support. I am also grateful to the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS) which was kind enough to host me for some time with a SUPRA-scholarship. The University of Oslo and the Department of History (IAKH) offered the necessary funding for research work in India. According to Umberto Eco it is a sign of dubious style to acknowledge one's formal supervisor.1 I cannot, however, resist the temptation to express my gratitude to professor "pandit" Helge Pharo for his thorough guidance. While in India, my friend and fellow student from the University of Hyderabad, Alok Kumar Mishra Satapathy, helped me with virtually everything. He also invited me to stay with his family. I would like to thank them for a lovely time together. I would furthermore like to express my appreciation to Caroline Therese Schønheyder and my father for reading and assessing drafts. As usual, I am particularly indebted to Margrethe for her numerous reviews, sharp wit and unfaltering Dunkirk spirit. The thesis was written in fond memory of my grandfather, Johan Andreas Jensen (1922– 2010) – army officer, passionate reader of history, and wonderful narrator. Oslo, 24 April 2011 Johan Skog Jensen 1 Eco, Umberto (1977/2002) Kunsten å skrive en akademisk oppgave, Idem, Oslo: 252 ii Abbreviations CIA – Central Intelligence Agency GoI – Government of India IB – Intelligence Bureau MEA – Ministry of External Affairs NAI – National Archives of India NEFA – North East Frontier Agency NMML – Nehru Memorial Museum and Library PLA – People’s Liberation Army PM – Prime Minister PRC – People’s Republic of China UN – United Nations UNSC – United Nations Security Council US – United States USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics iii Maps Map 1. The three sectors of the frontier – 42 Map 2. The eastern sector and the McMahon line – 42 Map 3. Boundaries in the western sector – 43 iv Introduction One early spring day in 1962, Chinese authorities presented a diplomatic note to the embassy of India in Beijing. The note was one of the first reactions to an emerging pattern of Indian policy in the disputed border areas between the two countries.2 According to the Chinese, the new structure of developments was threatening and provocative: "In the past year and more (...) Indian troops have steadily pushed forward, continually set up new check-posts and extended their scope of patrol in China's territory" and "as a result, the situation along the Sino-Indian border, far from easing, has become increasingly tense since the talks between the Prime Ministers of the two countries in April, 1960." The Government of India's view could not have been more to the contrary. Indeed, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru thought it "absurd" to speak merely in terms of a border conflict when China in fact claimed large sections of Indian territory as its own.3 In addition to China's stated claim on more than 50,000 square miles of land which New Delhi considered to be Indian by law, custom and tradition, China was, the Indians insisted, unlawfully occupying an area of 12,000 square miles in the Himalayan Ladakh region, "which has always been a part of India".4 As a consequence of this, all Indian activity in the disputed areas was in fact argued to be perfectly legal manifestations of sovereignty on the Indian side of "the international border" – i.e. the Indian claim line. It was deemed to be the right and duty of the government "to take all necessary measures to safeguard the territorial integrity of India".5 What eventually came to be known as the "Forward Policy" was part and parcel of what appeared to be such necessary measures.6 The final objective of the new policy was to establish Indian authority over the disputed areas. This had been the primary objective of all Indian China policy since the 2 Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 1 March 1962, in: India. Ministry of External Affairs (1962) Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Governments of India and China November 1961-July 1962. White Paper VI, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi – hereafter designated as White Paper VI 3 Jawaharlal Nehru at press conference 13 June 1962 in New Delhi, in: Nehru, Jawaharlal (1964) Press Conferences 1962, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi 4 Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 30 April, 1962, in: White Paper VI 5 Note given by MEA, New Delhi, to the Embassy of China in India, 13 March, 1962, in: White Paper VI 6 This analysis refers to the name "Forward Policy" for the official policy adopted by the Government of India on 2 November 1961. By "forward policy", it refers to the policy precursors in a broad sense, rather than to the official policy adopted on 2 November 1961 in a narrow sense. Importantly, however, the term "Forward Policy" is in itself contested. According to the official Indian view, the term is fundamentally mistaken as it may also refer to British imperial geopolitics in the Himalayas. Furthermore, the policy was officially seen as a defensive move to stem Chinese aggression; as such there was nothing "forward" about it. Nevertheless, the term "Forward Policy" was and still is employed in official Indian documents and everyday speech; "nomenclature, appearing convenient, stuck". The term is not employed as an a priori judgement of the policy. See Prasad, S. N. (ed.) (1992) History of the Conflict with China, 1962, History Division, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi: 86 1 territorial dispute erupted in the late 1950s. What was novel, however, was the means by which the goal was pursued. The Forward Policy represented a marked deviation from earlier Indian China policy. This thesis intends to examine the nature of the change in policy towards China. By drawing in part on newly declassified sources and archival research, the analysis will discuss the origins and causes of India's Forward Policy decision within a broad historical framework. What factors can help explain why the Government of India opted for the Forward Policy in late 1961? And how can the decision be understood in its historical context? The Forward Policy has later generally been considered to be the triggering cause of the 1962 war – a short but intense border war between India and the People's Republic of China in the global shadows of the Cuban crisis.7 Briefly put, India failed severely in its pre- war efforts to solve the border dispute and was rapidly defeated during the war. In the history of South Asian geopolitics 1962 represents an epochal landmark: "For the first time in the nation's life India faced a critical threat to its physical integrity, which it could not meet, of a sort vastly more dangerous and humiliating than the sputtering conflict with Pakistan over the status of Kashmir."8 Half a century later, there is still talk of a "1962 trauma" in India.9 The most obvious significance of the Forward Policy decision thus emanates from its pivotal role in the prelude to war. But the aim here will not be to give a comprehensive account of the causes of the Sino-Indian war. The analysis will rather focus on the origins and causes underlying one of the crucial Indian decisions that contributed to escalate the border dispute. The historical significance of the Forward Policy is not exclusively a product of the Chinese response it is often assumed to have provoked. The pre-crisis conceptualisation of the policy was in itself interesting as a momentous case of Indian foreign policy making. In particular, the process was a revealing example of changing Indian perceptions of China in the period. It also illustrated the often underestimated impact of public opinion, press and parliament in the early foreign policy making of Nehruvian India. 7 See Misra, Maria (2007) Vishnu's Crowded Temple. India since the Great Rebellion, Penguin Books, London: 309; Guruswamy, Mohan & Singh, Zorawar Daulet (2009) India China Relations. The Border Issue and Beyond, Viva Books, New Delhi: 72–73. Most scholars agree that the Forward Policy was a pivotal component in the prelude to war. But to what extent it was responsible for triggering the war is a matter of some discussion. Neville Maxwell puts much emphasis on the Forward Policy as the central and immediate cause of the Chinese attack in his influential book (1970/1997) India's China War, Natraj Publishers, Dehradun.