Maximum Containment Facilities – Sense and Nonsense, Risks and Benefits

Jens H. Kuhn, MD, ScD, MS Biosafety

space suits

virus hunters

hot zones Biosafety

In the life sciences, biosafety is “…the containment principles, technologies and practices that are implemented to prevent the unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins, or their accidental release”

This means: biosafety is primarily concerned with the laboratory researcher and not with the public Biosafety

In most countries, infectious agents are classified by risk group

Agent risk group classification is established to emphasize the potential risk and consequences of exposure and infection for the laboratory worker or the release into the environment with subsequent infection of the general population

Risk group classification reflects the overall knowledge of a given pathogen, in particular its infectivity, mode and ease of transmission, pathogenicity and virulence (including induced morbidity and case-fatality rate), sensitivity to physical or chemical agents, and availability or absence of countermeasures, including vaccines, therapeutic remedies, and cures

This means: risk group classification is different in different countries And: there is no such thing as a BSL4-agent Biosafety

Depending on the risk group classification, research on infectious agents has to be performed in facilities offering varying levels of containment

Containment facilities differ drastically from country to country

This means: containment requirements are different in different countries Maximum Biosafety and Containment Classification Biosafety designation Designation for containment facilities

Australia Physical Containment (PC)-4 pathogen, Risk Group 4 agent Biosecurity Level 4, Physical Containment (P)4

Canada Risk Group 4 Containment Level (CL) 4

France Pathogène de Classe (P)4 [Class (P)4 pathogen] Niveau de Sécurité Biologique (NSB) 4 [Biological safety level 4]

Gabon Pathogène de Classe (P)4 [Class (P)4 pathogen] Niveau de Sécurité Biologique (NSB) 4 [Biological safety level 4]

Germany Risikogruppe [risk group] 4 Sicherheitsstufe [Safety level] (S)4

Japan 1類感染症 [class 1 infectious disease] Maximum Biosafety Level (MBL)

Russia Групп I [group I] pathogen /

South Africa Class 4 pathogen Physical Containment (P)4

UK Category A pathogen in the 1980s; now Protection Level (P)- Physical Containment (P)4 4 pathogen

US Class 4 pathogen Biosafety Level (BSL-)4

WHO Risk Group IV pathogen, WHO Risk Group 4 Biosafety Level 4 Maximum Biosafety and Containment Classification Biosafety designation Designation for containment facilities

Australia Physical Containment (PC)-4 pathogen, Risk Group 4 agent Biosecurity Level 4, Physical Containment (P)4

Canada Risk Group 4 Containment Level (CL) 4

France Pathogène de Classe (P)4 [Class (P)4 pathogen] Niveau de Sécurité Biologique (NSB) 4 [Biological safety level 4]

Gabon Pathogène de Classe (P)4 [Class (P)4 pathogen] Niveau de Sécurité Biologique (NSB) 4 [Biological safety level 4]

Germany Risikogruppe [risk group] 4 Sicherheitsstufe [Safety level] (S)4

Japan 1類感染症 [class 1 infectious disease] Maximum Biosafety Level (MBL)

Russia Групп I [group I] pathogen /

South Africa Class 4 pathogen Physical Containment (P)4

UK Category A pathogen in the 1980s; now Protection Level (P)- Physical Containment (P)4 4 pathogen

US Class 4 pathogen Biosafety Level (BSL-)4

WHO Risk Group IV pathogen, WHO Risk Group 4 Biosafety Level 4 Maximum Biosafety and Containment Classification Biosafety designation Designation for containment facilities

Australia Physical Containment (PC)-4 pathogen, Risk Group 4 agent Biosecurity Level 4, Physical Containment (P)4

Canada Risk Group 4 Containment Level (CL) 4

France Pathogène de Classe (P)4 [Class (P)4 pathogen] Niveau de Sécurité Biologique (NSB) 4 [Biological safety level 4]

Gabon Pathogène de Classe (P)4 [Class (P)4 pathogen] Niveau de Sécurité Biologique (NSB) 4 [Biological safety level 4]

Germany Risikogruppe [risk group] 4 Sicherheitsstufe [Safety level] (S)4

Japan 1類感染症 [class 1 infectious disease] Maximum Biosafety Level (MBL)

Russia Групп I [group I] pathogen /

South Africa Class 4 pathogen Physical Containment (P)4

UK Category A pathogen in the 1980s; now Protection Level (P)- Physical Containment (P)4 4 pathogen

US Class 4 pathogen Biosafety Level (BSL-)4

WHO Risk Group IV pathogen, WHO Risk Group 4 Biosafety Level 4 U.S. Biosafety Level Classification

[Biosafety level 1 (BSL1)]

[Suitable for working with microbes that pose no risk, or a very limited risk, to personnel or the environment. Work is often conducted on open lab bench tops. No special containment equipment is needed and foot traffic through the lab is not restricted. However, there are limited safety measures. For instance, contaminated work surfaces must be decontaminated; and eating and drinking is not permitted.] U.S. Biosafety Level Classification

Biosafety level 2 (BSL2)

Built for work with microbes of moderate risk. Access is limited, laboratory coats must be worn, and biosafety signage is required at entrances. In addition, special cabinets that contain and filter the air are used for working with microbes that can move through the air (aerosols).

BSL2+: Biosafety level 2 facility + biosafety level 3 working techniques U.S. Biosafety Level Classification

Biosafety level 3 (BSL3)

Used for work with microbes that can cause serious injury or, in cases of an extreme exposure, death. In addition to the safety measures of level 2 labs, there are several other safeguards. People younger than 16 are not allowed in these labs; doors must be kept closed; windows are sealed. Surgical gloves and masks, or respirators, are used. The rooms are kept at a lower air pressure level than surrounding rooms, and the outdoor environment to contain aerosols. Air in the room also is continuously filtered through HEPA filters that are able to catch minute particles. These filters are regularly disinfected and changed.

BSL3+: Biosafety level 3 facility + biosafety level 4 working techniques

BSL3Ag: Biosafety level 3 facility + special measure to prevent release of agricultural high-consequence pathogens U.S. Biosafety Level Classification

Biosafety level 4 (BSL4)

Highest level of safety measures to protect those working inside them and in adjacent areas. Used for work with highly infectious or dangerous microbes. Contain the safety measures of BSL3 facilities. In addition, access is very restricted. Entry logs are kept for the labs. Lab workers must wear protective suits and undergo a disinfectant shower upon leaving. The labs have double-door airlocks. Special nonbreakable containers are used for working with the microbes. Materials in the lab are destroyed or decontaminated before leaving.

Not: highly contagious! U.S. Biosafety Level Classification

Examples:

US Other country

Alkhurma virus BSL4 BSL3 (India), P3 rather than P4 (France)

Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus BSL4 Group 2 rather than Group 1 (Russia)

Kyasanur Forest disease virus, Alkurma virus BSL4 BSL3 (India), P3 rather than P4 (France)

Omsk hemorrhagic fever virus BSL4 Group 2 rather than Group 1 (Russia)

Tick-borne encephalitis virus (CEEV and RSSEV) BSL4 S2 and S3 rather than S4 (Austria, Germany), Group 2 rather than Group 1 (Russia) Yersinia pestis BSL3 Group 1 rather than Group 2 (Russia) U.S. Class 4 Agents

Family Human disease (according to ICD-10) Natural reservoir Geographic Genus distribution Species Virus(es)

Arenaviridae Arenavirus [‘Chapare virus’] [‘Chapare virus’] Unnamed Rodent? Bolivia Guanarito virus Guanarito virus (GTOV) Unnamed (“Venezuelan haemorrhagic fever”) (A96.8) Rodent: Zygodontomys brevicauda Venezuela Junín virus Junín virus (JUNV) Junín (Argentinian) haemorrhagic fever (A96.0) Rodent: Calomys musculinus Argentine pampas Lassa virus Lassa virus (LASV) Lassa fever (A96.2) Rodent: Mastomys ssp. West Africa Machupo virus Machupo virus (MACV) Machupo (Bolivian) haemorrhagic fever (A96.1) Rodent: Calomys callosus Bolivia Sabiá virus Sabiá virus (SABV) Unnamed (“Brazilian haemorrhagic fever”) (A96.8) Rodent? Brazil [Whitewater Arroyo virus] [Whitewater Arroyo virus Unnamed (WWAV)] U.S. Class 4 Agents

Family Human disease (according to ICD-10) Natural reservoir Geographic distribution Genus Species Virus(es)

Bunyaviridae Orthobunyavirus Garissa virus Unnamed Mosquitoes? Kenya Hantavirus All hantaviruses Haemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome Rodents Essentially world-wide (A98.5) ,“Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome” Nairovirus Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (A98.0) Ticks: Dermacentor ssp. Balkan Countries, Russia, (CCHFV) Hyalomma ssp., NIS, Middle East, Sub- Rhipicephalus ssp. Saharan Africa U.S. Class 4 Agents

Family Human disease (according to ICD-10) Natural reservoir Geographic distribution Genus Species Virus(es)

Herpesviridae Simplexvirus Cercopithecine herpesvirus 1 Cercopithecine herpesvirus 1 (CeHV-1) Herpesviral encephalitis (B00.4) Macaques Worldwide U.S. Class 4 Agents

Family Human disease (according to ICD-10) Natural reservoir Geographic distribution Genus Species Virus(es)

Filoviridae Ebolavirus Côte d’Ivoire ebolavirus Côte d’Ivoire ebolavirus (CIEBOV) Ebola virus disease (A98.4) ? Africa Reston ebolavirus Reston ebolavirus (REBOV) / ? Philippines? Sudan ebolavirus Sudan ebolavirus (SEBOV) Ebola virus disease (A98.4) ? Africa Zaire ebolavirus Zaire ebolavirus (ZEBOV) Ebola virus disease (A98.4) ? Africa Marburgvirus Lake Victoria marburgvirus Lake Victoria marburgvirus (MARV) Marburg virus disease (A98.3) ? Africa U.S. Class 4 Agents

Family Human disease (according to ICD-10) Natural reservoir Geographic distribution Genus Species Virus(es)

Flaviviridae Flavivirus Kyasanur Forest disease virus Alkhurma virus Unnamed Ixodid ticks Saudi Arabia Kyasanur Forest disease virus (KFDV) Kyasanur Forest disease (A98.2) Ixodid ticks India Omsk hemorrhagic fever virus Omsk hemorrhagic fever virus (OHFV) Omsk haemorrhagic fever (A98.1) Ixodid ticks Western Siberia Tick-borne encephalitis virus Tick-borne encephalitis virus, Far Eastern Subtype (TBEV-FE) Far Eastern tick-borne encephalitis (A84.0) Ixodid ticks Asia, Eastern Europe U.S. Class 4 Agents

Family Human disease (according to ICD-10) Natural reservoir Geographic distribution Genus Species Virus(es)

Paramyxoviridae Henipavirus Hendra virus Hendra virus (HeV) Unnamed (B34.8?) Frugivorous flying foxes Australia Nipah virus Nipah virus (NiV) Unnamed (B34.8?) Frugivorous flying foxes Bangladesh, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand U.S. Class 4 Agents

Family Human disease (according to ICD-10) Natural reservoir Geographic distribution Genus Species Virus(es)

Poxviridae Orthopoxvirus Variola virus Variola virus (VARV) Smallpox (B03) Humans Eradicated U.S. Class 4 Agents

With the exception of Variola virus, which can only be used at SRCVB Vector in Koltsovo, Russia, and CDC, Atlanta, USA, all Class 4 agents are highly infectious but not highly contagious viruses (R0<1.5). Biosecurity

Originally, biosecurity referred to measures aimed at protecting indigenous or farm animals and crops from the accidental introduction of nonendemic pathogens. This is the basis for the U.S. Select Agent classification

More recently, biosecurity has been used to describe the means by which a country or region attempts to prevent the deliberate introduction of pathogens into susceptible humans, animals, and plants. This is the basis for the NIAID Priority Pathogens List and the forthcoming DHS Priority Pathogens List. Neither list differentiates sufficiently biocriminal, bioterrorist, or biowarfare intents.

Usage of the term biosecurity differs from agency to agency, from expert to expert, and from country to country. Some argue that biosecurity only encompasses physical measures such as the prevention of agent theft from research institutes, whereas others include all measures to prevent the use of biological weapons including national policies, international treaties, and law. Recently, Lawrence Livermore Laboratories suggested a biosecurity level classification for containment facilities (biosecurity levels 1-4) Biosecurity

The terms “Select Agent,” “Priority Pathogen,” and “risk group agent” cannot be used interchangably

“Biosafety” and “Biosecurity” refer to completely different problems

Some high-level risk agents might require only low- level security and vice versa U.S. Select Agens

HHS Non-Overlap Select Agents and Toxins -Abrin - cercopithecine herpesvirus 1 - Coccidioides posadasii - conotoxins - Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus - diacetoxyscirpenol, - ebolaviruses - Flexal virus - Guanarito virus - 1918 H1N1 influenza A virus and viruses containing parts thereof - Junín virus - Kyasanur Forest disease virus - Lassa virus - Lake Victoria marburgvirus - monkeypox virus - Machupo virus - Omsk hemorrhagic fever virus - ricin - Rickettsia prowazekii - Rickettsia rickettsii - Sabiá virus - saxitoxin - shiga-like toxins -tetrodotoxin - tick-borne encephalitis virus - variola virus - Yersinia pestis U.S. Select Agens

High Consequence Livestock Pathogens and Toxins/Select Agents (Overlap Agents) - Bacillus anthracis - Brucella melitensis (serovars abortus, melitensis, and suis) - botulinum toxin - Burkholderia mallei - Burkholderia pseudomallei - Clostridium botulinum (neurotoxin-producing strains only) - Coccidioides immitis - Coxiella burnetii - eastern equine encephalitis virus - henipaviruses - Francisella tularensis - Rift Valley fever virus -shigatoxin - staphylococcal enterotoxins - T-2 toxin - Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus U.S. Select Agens

USDA High Consequence Livestock Pathogens and Toxins (Non-Overlap Agents and Toxins)

- African horse sickness virus - African swine fever virus - Akabane virus - alcelaphine herpesvirus 1 and 2 (exotic strains only) - bluetongue viruses (exotic strains only) - bovine spongiform encephalopathy prion - camelpox virus - classical swine fever virus - Ehrlichia ruminantium - foot-and-mouth disease virus - goatpox virus - human coxsackievirus B5 - influenza A virus (avian highly pathogenic strains only) - Japanese encephalitis virus - lumpy skin disease virus - Menangle virus - Mycoplasma capricolum - Mycoplasma mycoides capri - Mycoplasma mycoides mycoides - Newcastle disease virus (velogenic strains only) - peste-des-petits-ruminants virus - rinderpest virus - sheeppox virus - vesiculoviruses (exotic strains only) U.S. Select Agens

Listed Plant Pathogens

- “Candidatus Liberobacter africanus” - “Candidatus Liberobacter asiaticus” - Peronosclerospora philippinensis - Ralstonia solanacearum (race 3, biovar 2) - Sclerophthora rayssiae (var. zeae) - Synchytrium endobioticum - Xanthomonas oryzae (pathovar oryzicola) - Xylella fastidiosa (citrus variegated chlorosis strain) NIAID Priority Pathogens Category A Category B Category C - Bacillus anthracis -Brucellae - Clostridium botulinum - Burkholderia mallei - Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus - Dengue viruses - Burkholderia pseudomallei - Henipaviruses - Filoviruses - Caliciviruses - Influenzaviruses - Francisella tularensis - California encephalitis virus - Mycobacterium tuberculosis (MDR) - Guanarito virus - Campylobacter jejuni - Rabies virus - Hantaviruses - Clostridium perfringens epsilon toxin - Rickettsiae not categories A and B - Junín virus - Coxiella burnetii - SARS coronavirus - Lassa virus - Cryptosporidium parvum - Tick-borne encephalitis virus - Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus - Cyclospora catayanensis - Yellow fever virus - Machupo virus - Eastern equine encephalitis virus - Rift Valley fever virus - Entamoeba histolytica - Poxviruses - Escherichia coli (diarrheagenic strains only) - Variola virus and other poxviruses - Giardia lamblia - Yersinia pestis - Hepatitis A virus - Japanese encephalitis virus - Kyasanur Forest disease virus - LaCrosse virus - Listeria monocytogenes - Microsporidia - Ricin - Salmonellae - Shigellae - Staphylococcus enterotoxin B - Rickettsia prowazekii - Ricin - Toxoplasma gondii -Vibriospp. (pathogenic strains) - West Nile virus - Western equine encephalitis virus - Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus - Yersinia enterocolitica Biosurety

A novel term coined by the U.S. Army, referring to the integration of personnel security measures, biosafety and biosecurity Maximum Containment Facilities

Three types: 1. Research is performed with the researcher wearing a hermetically sealed, one- piece impermeable positive-pressure “space” suit. The researcher is separated from the infected or contaminated material Maximum Containment Facilities

Three types: 2. Infected or contaminated material are manipulated inside a fully contained and double high-efficiency particulate-absorbing (HEPA) filter-exhausted Class III biological safety cabinet (BSC; “glove box,” “crocodile.” The researcher conducts work through gloves that are sealed to the cabinet. The researcher is separated from the virus, and the virus is also separated from the laboratory environment Maximum Containment Facilities

Three types: 3. Research is performed in a “space” suit employing a Class III BSC. Maximum containment and protection Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

Australia: • Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL), Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO), Geelong, VIC

• National High Security Quarantine Laboratory (NHSQL), Victorian Infectious Disease Reference Laboratory (VIDRL), Melbourne, QLD

• Virology Laboratory of the Queensland Department of Health, Coopers Plains, VIC Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

Belarus:

• Отдел Биотехнологии и Особо Опасных Инфекций [Department for Biotechnology and Especially Dangerous Infections], Научно- Исследовательский Институт Эпидемиологии и Микробиологии (НИИЭМ) [Scientific-Research Institute for Epidemiology and Microbiology (SRIEM)], Minsk Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

Brazil:

• Campus de Botucatu [Botucatu campus], Universidade Estadual Paulista "Júlio de Mesquita Filho" (UNESP) [Estadual Paulista "Júlio de Mesquita Filho" university], São Paulo

• Fundação Oswaldo Cruz, Rio de Janeiro Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

Canada:

• Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health, Winnipeg, Manitoba (Health Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency)

• [Central Public Health Laboratory, Etobicoke, Ontario] Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

France:

• Laboratoire P4 Jean Mérieux [P4 Laboratory “Jean Mérieux“], Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale (INSERM) [French National Institute for Health and Medical Research], Lyon Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

Gabon:

• L’Unité des Maladies Virales Emergentes [Emerging Viral Diseases Unit], Département de Virologie [Departement of Virology], Centre International du Recherche Médicales de Franceville (CIRMF) [International Center for Medical Research], Franceville Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

Germany:

• Bernhard-Nocht-Institut für Tropenmedizin [Bernhard Nocht Institute for Tropical Medicine] (BNI), Hamburg

• Institut für Virologie [Institute for Virology], Marburg an der Lahn, Hesse Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

Hungary:

• Országos Epidemiológiai Központ [National Center for Epidemiology], Budapest Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

India:

• High-Security Animal Disease Laboratory (HSADL), Bhopal Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

Italy:

• Istituto Nazionale per le Malattie Infettive Lazzaro Spallanzani (INMI) [National Institute for Infectious Diseases Lazzaro Spallanzani], Rome Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

Japan:

•[国立感染症研究所 [National Institutes of Infectious Diseases], 武蔵村山市 [Musashimurayama], Tokyo]

• 理化学研究所 [Institute of Physical and Chemical Research (RIKEN)], Tsukuba Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

Russia:

• Центр Специальной Лабораторной Диагностики и Лнчения Особо Опасных и Экзотических Инфекционных Заболеваний (ЦСДЛ) [Center of Special Laboratory Diagnostics and Treatment of Especially Dangerous and Exotic Infectious Diseases (TsSDL)], Sergiyev Posad-6, Moscow Region

• Центр Вирусологии при Научно-Исследователбский Институт Микробиологии Министерства Обороны Российской Федерации [Virological Center of the Scientific-Research Institute of Microbiology of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation], Sergiyev Posad-6, Moscow Region

• Государственный Институт Стандартизации и Контроля Медицинских Биологических Препаратов имени Л. А. Тарасевича [L. A. Tarasevich Institute for the Standardization and Control of Medicinal Biological Preparations], Moscow Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

Russia:

• Иркутский Научно-Исследовательский Противочумный Институт Сибири и Дальнего Востока [Irkutsk Scientific-Research Anti-Plague Institute of Siberia and the Far East], Irkutsk, Irkutsk Region Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

Russia:

• Государственный Научный Центр Вирусологии и Биотехнологии «Вектор»(ГНЦВБ «Вектор») [State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology “Vector” (SRCVB “Vector”)] (Ministry of Public Health and Social Development of the Russian Federation), Koltsovo, Novosibirsk Region Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

Singapore:

• National Laboratories of the Defence Science Organization Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

Spain:

• Centro de Investigación en Sanidad Animal [Center for Investigations of Animal Health] (CISA), Instituto Nacional de Investigación y Tecnología Agraria y Alimentaria (INIA) [National Institute for Agricultural and Food Scientific Research and Technology], Madrid Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

South Africa:

• Special Pathogens Unit, National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD), Sandringham Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

Sweden:

• Säkerhetslaboratorium och Forskning [Containment and research laboratory], Kunskapscentrum för Mikrobiologisk Beredskap [Center for Biological Preparedness] (KCB), Smittskyddsinstitutet (SMI) [Institute for Infection Control], Solna Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

Switzerland:

• Institut für Viruskrankheiten und Immunprophylaxe (IVI) [Institute of Virology and Immunoprophylaxis], Mittelhäusern Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

Taiwan:

•預防醫學研究所 [Institute of Preventive Medicine] (Ministry of National Defense), Taipei

• 昆陽實驗室 [Kwen Yang Laboratory], 疾病管制局 [Centers of Disease Control], Executive Yuan (Department of Health), Taipei Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

UK:

• Centre for Applied Microbiological Research (CAMR), Porton Down, Salisbury (Department of Health)

• Central Public Health Laboratory (CPHL), London (Health Protection Agency)

• Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment (CBDE), Porton Down, Salisbury (Ministry of Defence)

• National Institute for Biological Standards and Control (NIBSC), Potters Bar

• National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR), London Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

USA: • Special Pathogens Branch (SPB), Division of Viral Rickettsial Diseases (DVRD), National Center for Infectious Diseases (NCID), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, Georgia (Department of Health and Human Services) Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

USA: • Special Pathogens Branch (SPB), Division of Viral Rickettsial Diseases (DVRD), National Center for Infectious Diseases (NCID), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, Georgia (Department of Health and Human Services) Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

USA:

•Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research (SFBR), San Antonio, Texas Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

USA:

• Center for Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases, The Robert E. Shope, MD, Laboratory in the John Sealy Pavilion for Infectious Diseases Research, University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB), Galveston, Texas Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

USA:

• United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Frederick, MD Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

USA:

• Virginia BioTechnology Research Park, Division of Consolidated Laboratory Services (DCLS) “BioTech Six”, Richmond, VA (Department of General Services of the Commonwealth of Virginia) (“surge BSL4”) Existing Maximum Containment Facilities

USA:

• Center for Biotechnology and Drug Design, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA

• NIH‘s Maximum Containment Laboratory (MCL), Building 41A, Bethesda, MD

• NIH‘s Maximum Containment Laboratory (MCL), Twinbrook III Building, Rockville, MD

• United States Naval Medical Research Unit No. 3, Cairo, Egypt Suspected Facilities

•Lybia

• North Korea

• Russia Destroyed Facilities

• Iraq: al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Facility (al-Manal), al- Dawrah

• Kazakhstan: Степногорская Научная Опытно-Промышленная База (СНОПБ) [Stepnogorsk Scientific Experimental-Industrial Base (SNOPB)], Stepnogorsk Maximum Containment Facilities Under Construction

China:

• 中国科学院武汉病毒研究所 [Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Wŭhàn Institute of Virology], Wuhan

Germany:

• Island of Riems, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania

• Robert-Koch Institut, Berlin

India:

• Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biology (CCMB), Hyderabad

Switzerland:

• Department of Defense’s Spiez Laboratory Maximum Containment Facilities Under Construction

USA:

• National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory, Boston, MA Maximum Containment Facilities Under Construction

USA:

• DHS‘s National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), Fort Detrick, MD Maximum Containment Facilities Under Construction

USA:

• Galveston National Laboratory, Galveston, TX Maximum Containment Facilities Under Construction

USA:

• NIAID‘s Integrated Research Facility (IRF), Fort Detrick, MD

• NIAID‘s Integrated Research Facility (IRF), Rocky Mountain Laboratories, Hamilton, MT

• DHS‘s National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) Maximum Containment Facilities

Are they necessary? Did we have enough, do we have enough, or do we need more? What are the benefits and risk of these facilities? Where should they be located? Who should and who shouldn’t work in them? Who should and who shouldn’t know about them and know about what is been done in them? What are they for? Laboratory-acquired infections...

Agents involved

Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus Ebolaviruses Junín virus Kyasanur Forest disease virus Lake Victoria marburgvirus Lassa virus Machupo virus Omsk hemorrhagic fever virus Sabiá virus Tick-borne encephalitis virus Security breaches...

Rumors, Rumors, Rumors ...